The Abermule Disaster – January 26th 1921

The Cambrian Railways, which traversed Wales from Whitchurch in Shropshire to Aberystwyth and Barmouth, via Dovey Junction, contained a number of single line sections. The small station of Abermule was a crossing station between two such sections. To the east was Montgomery, to the west was Newtown.

The line was controlled using Tyer’s Electric Tablets, with a linked tablet instrument at each end of each single track section. To allow a train to proceed into the section, a call button would be pressed on one instrument, alerting the operator at the other end of the section. If the other operator was in a position to accept the train, he would then press a release button on his instrument, which allowed a tablet (a metal plate inscribed with the name of the section) to be withdrawn from the caller's instrument. The tablet would then be placed inside a pouch fitted with a metal loop (which allowed it to be easily picked up or handed over by a train crew while in motion) and given to the driver of the train as proof of his authority to occupy the section. Until the tablet was replaced in one of the instruments, another tablet could not be withdrawn from either of them. Tablets of adjacent sections had differently-shaped and -positioned holes and notches in them to prevent a tablet being inserted into wrong instrument.

Normally, the Tyer’s units were located in the signal box at each end of the section but, at Abermule, the electric tablet machines and the other block telegraph instruments were kept in the main station buildings, while the signals were worked from a separate signal box at the east end of the station, and some of the points from a ground frame at the other end of the station. Regulations specified that only the stationmaster or signalman were to work the tablet machines, but it was common for both to be occupied with duties away from the station buildings, and it became accepted practice for any member of the station staff to work them.

Shortly before midday on 26 January 1921, a west-bound stopping train from Whitchurch and an east-bound express from Aberystwyth were approaching Abermule from opposite directions and were due to cross there. The regular Abermule Stationmaster, Parry, was on leave, and Relief Stationmaster Lewis, who was deputising for him, had gone for his lunch. The other three station staff at Abermule were Signalman Jones, Porter Rogers, who was seventeen, and a trainee booking clerk named Thompson, who was only fifteen years old.

The staff at Montgomery station requested clearance for the stopping train to run to Abermule, and Signalman Jones pressed the release on the tablet instrument for the Montgomery-Abermule section, allowing the train to proceed. He then checked that the express was running to time, and was informed that it had just passed Moat Lane Junction on the far side of Newtown, as scheduled. Jones went to the signal box to open the level crossing gates and clear the signals for the stopping train. Meanwhile, Relief Stationmaster Lewis returned from his lunch. A permanent way sub-inspector attracted his attention with an urgent enquiry, and the stationmaster immediately went with the sub-inspector to the goods yard, without entering the instrument room or inquiring as to the position of any trains approaching Abermule.

Newtown station then requested permission for the express to proceed to Abermule. Porter Rogers pressed the release on the tablet machine for the Newtown-Abermule section which allowed it to do so. He then went to the ground frame at the west end of the station to set

the points for the express, but found the frame Lewis gave the "Right away" signal by hand. locked against him because Jones had already Jones, who was also on the down platform, "set the road" for the stopping train to arrive on assumed that the express had been delayed the down road. While Rogers was occupied at or held at Newtown for some reason. Rogers, the ground frame, Newtown signalled that the who was still at the ground frame, assumed the express was entering the Newtown-Abermule same, because of Lewis's actions and because section. However, there was no-one in the the frame was locked, and so he lowered the Abermule station buildings to note the signal. down advance starting signal. Lewis, Jones

Before Porter Rogers could call to Signalman and Rogers did not realise the truth until the Jones to release the ground frame lock, the stopping train had already departed. stopping train arrived. The youth, Thompson, "The driver of the down train was oiling collected the tablet for the Montgomery- his engine at the moment when the tablet Abermule section from the driver of the stopping holder was handed to his fireman by relieftrain, and was heading back to the station stationmaster Lewis. It is clear that neither he buildings to put it in the tablet instrument nor the fireman could have examined the tablet when he met Lewis returning from the goods before the train started from Abermule. It is also yard. clear that neither Lewis, Jones, nor Thompson

He gave the tablet to Lewis, saying that he could have looked at the tablet instrument for had to go and collect the tickets (although only the Abermule-Newtown section, otherwise they one passenger had alighted from the train). He would have seen the indicator showed that a did not mention that he had yet to exchange tablet had been withdrawn for an up train. the tablet for one for the Abermule-Newtown After the down train had started (about 12.3 section (which he could not have done, because p.m.), presumably when he returned to the the Abermule-Newtown tablet machine was still booking office to send the "entering section" locked). Thompson also mistakenly told Lewis bell signal for the down train to Newtown, and that the express was still "about Moat Lane", the "out of section" bell signal to Montgomery, presumably from having overheard some of the terrible mistake that had been made was Jones's earlier telephone conversation. discovered by Thompson, and Lewis realised

Lewis assumed that because the express that he had given the Montgomery - Abermule had apparently not reached Newtown, the two tablet to the down train. Lewis telephoned to trains would cross at Newtown rather than Newtown to ask if the express had left and was Abermule, and he did not look at the tablet informed by Brock that it had left at 11.59 when closely enough to see that it was the one for the he had sent the "entering section" bell signal. A Montgomery-Abermule section that had just vain attempt was made to attract the attention been handed over by the driver of the stopping of the enginemen of the down train, by lowering train. He crossed back to the down platform and raising the up distant signal, but probably and, because the driver was oiling around the by the time this was attempted, the train had engine, handed the tablet back to the stopping passed the signal post, about 660 yards from train's fireman, who did not notice the error the loop points. either. 82 GREAT WESTERN STAR MAGAZINE January/February 2021

When [fireman] Owen recovered, he found himself on the ground just behind the second vehicle (No. 310) of his train, which was lying across the railway on top of the first. He saw driver Jones on the opposite side just behind and underneath the third vehicle, which was leaning over towards the slope of the cutting. He got across the framing, and found Jones more seriously injured than himself, and anxiously enquiring whether they had the right tablet.

He assured him on the point, but a little later, as his driver was still anxious, he went to look for the tablet and crept under the frame of Coach No. 7730 for the purpose. After a little search he found both tablet holders lying on the ground to the left (north) of the track alongside the wreckage of the two engines. He picked them up and found that one of the tablets for the Montgomery-Abermule section had evidently been carried by the down train. He then returned and showed them to his driver to relieve his anxiety.

He subsequently handed the tablet holders to traffic controller Morgan, who travelled in the down train. Morgan eventually passed them for custody to chief traffic inspector George. The latter, immediately after the accident, returned on foot to Abermule, where he arrived at 12.18 p.m. and arranged by telephone for the dispatch of medical and nursing assistance from Newtown."

The express was travelling at about 50 mph, and the crew were about to begin slowing for the arrival at Abermule, when they saw the stopping train heading for them on the same track. Although they immediately braked, they could not stop in time. The crew of the stopping train did not appear to have seen them, because they continued to put on steam. The crew of the express were just able to jump clear in time, although they were both severely injured. Fifteen passengers, including a director of the railway, Lord Herbert Vane-Tempest, and the driver and fireman of the stopping train, were killed in the collision.

After the crash, Driver Pritchard Jones of the express train was desperately concerned that he had made an error, until his fireman, Owen, retrieved both their own correct tablet for the section, and the tablet for the MontgomeryAbermule section, from the wreckage. The tablets were handed to the Traffic Controller for the Cambrian Railways, who had been travelling on the stopping train, and the Chief Traffic Inspector, who had been a passenger on the express. The Inspector (George) took the Montgomery-Abermule tablet on foot to Abermule station and replaced it in the correct machine in the presence of witnesses, to allow a breakdown train from Oswestry to reach the scene of the crash and assist with freeing the injured.

The two engines involved were Cambrian Railway 4-4-0 passenger locomotives – Class 61 No 82 (believed to have been on the stopping train) and Large Belpaire Passenger Class No 95, again believed to have been on the express). Both were reduced to wreckage and written off. There was severe telescoping of the passenger carriages, especially in the express train, which caused most of the casualties. This was apparently the result of the collision occurring on a slight curve, causing the buffers to be slightly misaligned, and allowing the fourth carriage of the express to override the buffers of the third.

The obvious cause of the Abermule collision was the unauthorised working of the tablet machines by anyone who happened to be around, and the failure of the staff at Abermule to notify each other of their actions. The slack working practices had been allowed to develop over several years by Stationmaster Parry and Signalman Jones.

A contributory cause was the failure of anyone to examine the tablet they received by removing it from its pouch and checking that it was the correct one. Although inspection of the tablet was required in the working rules, it was clearly taken for granted that the tablet was correct, since the system had worked faultlessly for years. Indeed, for anyone to ostentatiously examine a tablet may have been a breach of etiquette, as it would imply that the person handing it over might not be competent or trustworthy. Driver Pritchard Jones and Fireman Owen of the express train were conscientious in inspecting every tablet they received; the crew of the stopping train were not.

Finally, the awkward layout of tablet instruments, signals and points levers at Abermule meant that it was possible for conflicting movements to be made. The inquiry recommended that tablet machines be placed in the signal box under the sole control of the signalman, and also that starting signals (which gave trains authority to leave the station) be interlocked with the tablet instruments, so that they could not be cleared until the correct tablet had been released. However, this would involve the rebuilding of the station buildings

and signal boxes at Abermule and several other small stations, and it was suggested that alternate single-line sections use the electric tablet system and the older electric staff system; there would be no possibility of mistaking a staff for a tablet. The signalling method continued in use on the line until 1988, when it was replaced by the radio-controlled electronic token block system.

The obvious, though costly, solution to the problems of working single lines would be to double the tracks. As finances allowed, the Cambrian Railways (and the GWR, which took over the Cambrian after the grouping of 1923) had been slowly carrying out the necessary work. Ironically, British Rail actually removed much of the doubled track and some of the crossing stations as part of the Beeching Axe.

A memorial plaque to remember the 17 people who died in the Abermule train collision, which happened 100 years ago has been unveiled.

To mark the centenary, wreaths have been laid in the village on behalf of Network Rail, Abermule with Llandyssil Community Council, Powys County Council and Machynlleth Town Council.

A commemorative plaque, sponsored by Network Rail, Transport for Wales & Abermule with Llandyssil Community Council, has also been donated to the community, remembering those who lost their lives.

The plaque, made by local stonemason M.E & A Hughes Monumental Masons, is the first permanent and physical reminder of the collision in the town.

A memorial gathering had been planned by the community council and events were due to be held at the local school, however, due to the coronavirus pandemic, this could not go ahead and will be rearranged for a later date.

Instead, representatives from Network Rail and Abermule Community Council attended the site, near to the old Abermule Station to lay the wreaths, in compliance with social distancing measures and government guidance.

Railway Mission’s Chaplain for Wales, Andy Hall, also recorded a ceremonial reading in memory of the victims. Bill Kelly, route director for Network Rail Wales and Borders, said: “It’s so important we pause and reflect on those events at Abermule a century ago - when 17 people lost their lives. Learning from past accidents is fundamental to the way we operate the railway today and it’s vital we remind ourselves of what happened in the past - how far we’ve come - and areas where we could still improve. This new, permanent memorial in the community of Abermule will serve as a reminder to future generations of those who tragically lost their lives.”

James Price, Transport for Wales CEO, said: “The events of 26 January 1921 are a reminder of the fragility of life and the vital importance of safety on the railway. Our thoughts remain with the people of Abermule and the relatives of those involved 100 years on from this tragic event.”

Councillor Gareth Pugh, on behalf of Powys County Council, said: “As part of the Abermule community, I would like to express both my personal condolences and the deepest condolences of the local authority, Powys County Council, to both the victims and families of the railway disaster. It is part of our history and entirely appropriate that 100 years on we mark that tragic event in which 17 people lost their lives.”

Jane Rees Chair of Abermule with Llandyssil Community Council, said:

“The Community Council welcomes the joint venture with Network Rail and Transport for Wales to create a lasting memorial to the 17 passengers and railway workers, who lost their lives in the train crash near Maeshafren on 26th January, 1921. Our thoughts are with their surviving relatives, many of whom were local to Montgomeryshire. It is a shame that we could not have a memorial event due to the coronavirus pandemic. The memorial plaque will be sited in the village at a later date, when we can arrange an event with the opportunity to view the project work by the local school children.”

Wales Chaplain Special Reading

Wrapped up in that fateful moment

Lives ended, lives changed;

In the blink of an eye.

Through grief, loss and mourning:

Scarred memories transcend

The how, where, and why.

Etched for all time,

On landscape and mind,

The tragic event Unfolds and unwinds,

As we seek to remember a long century on the 36 injured

And 17 gone.

Note: The plaque, donated by Network Rail, TfW and the community council, will be stored in a safe place in the village before it is installed in a permanent location (TBA).