Paris 21 march 2016 de felice tobeposted

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities in partnership with the Banque de France Paris – March 21, 2016

Eurozone outlook, ECB and Italian Banks Gregorio De Felice Chief Economist – Intesa Sanpaolo

Eurozone: tailwinds remain strong…

• Oil price: 2015: ‐47%; 2016: ‐25%. Impact +1.5% in 2015‐17

GDP growth drivers in 2015‐17 2.0 1.5

1.7

1.5

1.5 0.35 1.0 0.60 0.5

0.35 0.40

0.55

0.30

0.0

• Exchange rate: 2015: ‐ 9%. Impact +0.6% in 2015‐16 • Monetary policy: 2015 (Jan): APP target announced +1,100 bn 2015 (Dec): additional 680 bn

‐0.5 2015 GDP growth forecast Monetary policy effect** Exch rate effect

2016

2017 Global demand

2016 (Mar): further 240 bn + TLTRO II

Oil effect

Impact **: at least 1.1% extra GDP growth in 2015‐17

Note: ** Effect of the QE (Draghi, ECB press conference, December 2015): +1% GDP growth in 2015‐17 Source : Thomson Reuters‐Datastream and Intesa Sanpaolo estimates with Oxford Economic Forecasting

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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… but growth unlikely to be faster than in 2015 • Business surveys point to a deceleration in GDP growth versus 2015H2, but might have been influenced by financial markets turbulence. Industrial output data paint a rosier picture and suggest some acceleration in Q1 2016.

• Modest global growth and high uncertainty still weigh on Eurozone economic prospects.

PMI and the ECI

Industrial output: strong entry in 2016 5.0 3.5

IP q/q%

2.0 0.5 ‐1.0 ‐2.5

Germ Q3 2015

Eurozone

Q4 2015

Italy

France

Carry over growth for Q1 2016

Germ capital goods

Source: Thomson Reuters‐Datastream and Intesa Sanpaolo calculations

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Growth relies on domestic demand Consumption will grow faster than in 2015 2.5 Contrib. core

• Our outlook foresees oil prices in 2016‐17 at 10% ‐ 15% lower than in December 2015.

Contrib. perif.

1.5

• This would imply a positive contribution of around +0.6% to real disposable income, broadly in line with the effect occurred in 2015.

0.5

‐0.5

‐1.5 02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Source: Intesa Sanpaolo calculations

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Inflationary expectations too low for the ECB Both market expectations and survey results remain at historically low levels 60

3

55

2

50

1

45

‐1

40

‐2

35

‐3 04

05

06

07

08

PMI Output prices ‐3m

09

10

11

12

Expec. Prices ‐3m, dx

13

14

15

16

Note: expectations are derived from the EU Commission survey by sector.

Series are standard deviations from the long‐term average and are aggregated using the weights of the manufacturing, services and trade sectors in the value added.

Source: Markit (PMI), EU Commission and Intesa Sanpaolo calculations

HICP core, yy% dx

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Fiscal “flexibility”: only a pause in fiscal tightening EU Commission estimates a fiscal easing of 0.2% of GDP in 2016 2.5 2.0 1.5

Changes in structural balances % of GDP 2010‐13 2015

• Fiscal policy to make use of maximum flexibility (reform efforts) in 2016‐17 and possibly more (but only ex‐post).

2014 2016

1.0 0.5 0.0

• Fiscal policies will only contribute +0.1% to GDP growth in 2016.

‐0.5 ‐1.0 BEL

GER

IRL

ITA

PRT

ESP

EUR

Source: European Commission, AMECO

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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The only game in town is still monetary policy: ECB fired back The ECB announced a set of “Easing Measures” to counter downside risks for growth and inflation.

• Cut in official rates: marginal lending down to ‐0.25%, refi to 0.0% and deposit rate to ‐0.4%.

• Increase in the APP target to 80bn a month (effective from April).

• Extension of the purchases to IG euro‐denominated corporate bonds, from June 2016 (bank bonds excluded). The ECB has not yet specified how much of a single issuance will be purchased: presumably, the limit will be set at no more than 30% (as is the case for government bonds). We doubt the ECB will buy more than 5 billion a month.

• Forward guidance reinforced: rates will remain « … at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases».

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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ECB March package a help mainly for banks’ funding costs The aim: « … offer attractive long‐term funding conditions to the banking system to stimulate credit and provide funding certainty until 2021 …».

• Four new 4 year TLTRO II, the first in June 2016, the last in March 2017.

• The maximum amount banks can take is 1,480bn: i.e., 30% of the loans’ stock as of January 31 2016, excluding lending to the public sector and mortgages (EUR 5,642bn), net of the liquidity taken up with the TLTROs conducted in 2014 (EUR 218 bn).

• Banks will be charged an interest rate that could be “as low as” the deposit rate (‐0.40%), depending on the amount of new lending they will be able to provide between January 2016 and January 2018. Conditions are easy to meet, so banks will be reimbursed easily.

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Italian banks’ wholesale funding costs can be cheaper Rates on outstanding bank funding (%) 3.5 3.0

• TLTRO II provides a less costly alternative to wholesale funding. In theory, the maximum take‐ up could be huge (EUR 320bn for Italian banks).

• Wholesale funding costs will be impacted positively: participating banks will enjoy tangible savings compared to the issue of bonds of correspondent maturity.

2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Jan12 Jul12 Jan13 Jul13 Jan14 Jul14 Jan15 Jul15 Jan16 Total customer funding Source: Bank of Italy

Deposits

Debt securities

• More fragile banks and / or banks located in peripheral countries will benefit the most, because of their current levels of interest rates.

The yield‐to‐maturity of senior Italian bank bonds 2020 is around 0.9% for sounder issuers, but several percentage points higher for the less solid.

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Capital gains on Govies to partly offset the costs of negative rates Eurozone banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign as a % of total assets (1H 2015) 11% 9% 6% 4%

4%

3%

3%

3% 2%

IT

SP

PT

EU

AU

CY

GR

GE

FR

2%

2%

NL

IR

• Capital gains on bond holdings temporarily offset the unfavorable impact of negative rates on interest rate margins.

Source: ECB

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Yield curve to steepen, but only with stronger GDP growth • The cost of non‐conventional measures for banks would be lower if they produced a steepening of the yield curve. This is not the case.

• In the US the curve only steepened in response to strong evidence of economic recovery and with the beginning of the Fed’s exit strategy.

The APP has not steepened the yield curve.

This should come as no surprise

In the US, the yield curve only steepened when the pace of economic activity picked up

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Excess reserves more costly for core banks Excess reserves: Netherlands and Germany have the lion’s share So far the cost is limited Excess reserves (ER) Dec 11 Dec 12 Dec 13 Nov 14 Oct 15 Dec 15

Recourse to Depo where availble

Fr

Ger

Aus

Fin

It

Neth *

BG*

SP*

AE

3.1 56.6 13.0 14.6 55.4 84.0

-0.1 163.9 51.1 29.0 104.8 174.4

0.2 18.6 7.5 5.3 7.7 13.3

0.0 23.9 11.4 10.4 27.5 32.2

0.1 20.8 8.9 2.2 4.6 5.5

176 158 51 107 115 115

15 23 8 33 25 25

51 72 18 17 19 19

4.5 403.5 116.9 82.8 352.1 443.8

77

53.58

10.4

5

220

Current cost of ER bln euros

-0.25

-0.52 -0.04 -0.10

-0.02

-0.35

-0.08

-0.06

-1.98

MFI tot assets bln euros

8135

7,664

3919

2496

1076

2828

25923

854

555

Note: * the excess reserves is approximated by CA holdings in lack of statistics available to public on minimum reserves Source: NCBs, ECB and Thomson Reuters‐Datastream

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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The impact on Italian bank lending is uncertain • •

The credit trend is currently affected (most of all) by demand factors, and by the constraints imposed by banking regulation.

A “crowding out” effect could arise as a result of the opening of the purchase programme on IG corporate bonds. According to our calculations, total eligible Italian bonds amount to approximately EUR 69bn.

Factors influencing business credit demand (net %) (*)

fixed investment

inventories and working capital

M&A and corporate restructuring

debt restructuring

4Q15

4Q14

4Q13

4Q12

4Q11

4Q10

4Q09

4Q15

4Q14

4Q13

4Q12

4Q11

4Q10

4Q09

4Q15

4Q14

4Q13

4Q12

4Q11

4Q10

4Q09

4Q15

4Q14

4Q13

4Q12

4Q11

4Q10

4Q09

4Q15

4Q14

4Q13

4Q12

4Q11

4Q10

4Q09

100 75 50 25 0 ‐25 ‐50 ‐75 ‐100

debt securities issuance

(*) a positive sign represents an increase in demand, a negative sign a decrease. Source: ECB, Euro Area Bank Lending Survey (BLS)

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Italian bank rates to decline further Rates on new loans to non‐financial corporations (%, loans other than overdrafts and revolving loans) 2.5

5.0 Italy ‐ Euro area (rhs) Italy Euro area

4.0

2.0

3.0

1.5

2.0

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

‐1.0 Dec10

Dec11

Dec12

Dec13

Source: Bank of Italy, ECB, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations

Dec14

‐0.5 Dec15

• For new loans over 1M to non‐financial companies the spread with the Euro area has been negative since May 2015 (reaching ‐30bps in December 2015).

• For loans of smaller amounts, the gap with the Euro area has narrowed to below 10bps.

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Negligible effects on profitability Return On Equity of Italian banks and domestic GDP growth 16%

ROE*

12% 8%

Figure of Top 5 banks

GDP growth

4%

Strong correlation between Italian bank performance and domestic economic growth

0% ‐4% ‐8% 1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

• Interest margin likely to be further compressed.

• Economic recovery is a key factor in the profitability of Italian banks, as a result of the business model.

*2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014 ROE net of goodwill amortization

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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New measures to accelerate the disposals of NPLs Changes in Insolvency & Foreclosure Regulation • Persistence of NPLs due to a clogged judicial system.

• A reform1 of insolvency and foreclosure procedures (2015) aimed at:

Changes to the Fiscal Changes to the Fiscal Framework Framework

State Guarantee on NPL securitization (GACS)

• New fiscal treatment of loan‐loss charges adopted in 20151 to encourage write‐offs and disposals of NPLs:

• The buyers/sellers pricing gap is a key factor restraining NPLs’ disposals.

- increasing speed and efficiency of insolvency procedures and property foreclosures;

- loan‐loss charges immediately tax deductible in full (instead of pro‐quota in a 5Y period);

- promoting higher recovery rates.

- remove DTAs related to loan‐ loss charges in 10 years.

• Broader reform of civil justice to raise its efficiency.

• Scheme to enable Italian banks to securitize and offload bad debt with a State guarantee in a way that would not be considered State aid (27 Jan 2016).

• Banks’ participation will be voluntary.

Notes: 1) DL83/Jun‐2015/L132/Aug‐2015. Sources: Intesa Sanpaolo Research Department, Bank of Italy

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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Structural reforms pave the way to consolidation Reform of co‐operative banks (Banche popolari)

Reform of mutual banks (Banche di credito cooperativo)

• Approved in January 2015, to be enacted by year‐end 2016.

• Approved in February 2016, to be enacted by year‐ end 2017.

• The reform will apply to 10 larger co‐operative banks (out of 37 at YE14) with more than EUR 8bn in assets (c.15% of total asset of the system).

• The reform will apply to all mutual banks (> 370), but a few larger ones (equity > EUR 200M) that could opt to remain independent.

• The reform mainly envisages:

• The reform mainly envisages:

- the transformation into joint‐stock companies and removal of the‐one‐shareholder one‐vote governance rule;

- mutual banks will be required to participate in the capital of a holding company (equity > EUR 1bn), in turn controlling them;

- for a two‐year transitional period banks can introduce a 5% shareholding limit.

- mutual banks will benefit from a cross‐guarantee scheme (legally obliged to support each other).

Central Banking Series: Inflation Expectations, Implications & Policy Response in a New Paradigm for Commodities ‐ Paris – March 21, 2016

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