Marc Sageman May 11 06

Global Salafi Terrorist Networks Marc Sageman sageman@post.harvard.edu

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Evidence Based Terrorism Research • • • •

Specific threat to the U.S. Application of scientific method to terrorism research Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information – Trial transcripts • US, France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Canada

– Press accounts (FBIS) • English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Dutch

– Academic publications – Internet (corroborated)

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Global Salafi Jihad • Violent Islamist born-again social movement • Fight for justice & fairness: – Build a better world; utopia modeled on the community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf)

• Four phases: – – – –

Peaceful capture of the state (al-Banna – Muslim Brothers) Against the near enemy (Faraj – “the forgotten duty”) Global expansion of defensive jihad (Azzam) Global offense against the far enemy (Zawahiri & bin Laden) • Expel the West from the Middle East

• Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or population to establish an Islamist state 3

Evolution of al Qaeda • Three processes of self-selection of the most militants: – 1988-9: the most militants, who had come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home, stayed behind and formed al Qaeda – 1991-2: the most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan – Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy” – 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan

• 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda: – – – –

Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism Control of training camps & establishment of shelter Staff for planning & coordination Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda

• Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy” 4

Poverty?: Family of origin (SES) 250 200 150 100 50 0

Upper

Middle

Lower

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Islam?: Devotion as youth 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Religious

Secular

Christian

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Madrassa?: Educational background 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Madrassa

Secular

Christian

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Na誰ve teenagers?: Age at joining 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

>34

Average Age: 25.69

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Ignorance?: Levels of education 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

<HS

College

MA

9

Religious?: Type of education 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

HS/Voc Humanities Soc Sci

Tech/Nat Sci

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Lack of opportunity?: Occupation 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Unskilled

Semiprofessional

Professional

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No sex?: Marital status 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Single

Married

12

No responsibility?: Family status 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

No Children

Children

13

Just bad?: Criminal background 250 200 150 100 50 0

No Prison

Crime

Political Activism

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Criminal Background • Vast Majority: no crime • Some major crime – Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI)

• Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells – Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud – Drug traffic (more common now)

• Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.

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Simply mad?: Mental health • Very little evidence of mental illness • Very little evidence of personality disorder – No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause) – No pathological hatred – Very little trauma in family studied: usually overprotected youths

• Overall, “good kids,” except second generation Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime 16

Place where they joined jihad 250 200 150 100 50 0

Native

Expatriate

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Diaspora • Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon – Expatriate + Second/Third Generation

• 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe) • Link between terrorism & Diaspora predated “globalization” & not specific to religion or Islam – Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA 18

Joining the Jihad • Friendship (pre-existing): 68% – “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join – Joining childhood friends

• Kinship: 20% – Fathers, brothers, first cousins – Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship bonds

• Discipleship: 10% – Students of Sungkar & Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah

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Trajectory of Muslim expatriates • Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”) • Mostly from religious, caring & middle class families • Global citizens, conversant in 3 or 4 languages, skilled in computer technology • Separated from traditional bonds & culture • Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society • Seek friends • Drifted to mosques for companionship, not religion • Moved in together (halal food), formed cliques

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Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants • Two main paths – Second generation in the West – Young economic immigrants to the West

• Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background • Excluded from society – Dropped out of school • Petty crime (false documents & drug dealing) • Drug addiction

• Discriminated by society – Resentful & activation of collective identity – Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology

• Groups of friends, who grew up together & collectively drifted to religion to escape their situation • Radicalized collectively

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Mobilization • Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted friends, from the bottom up • No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program – No campaign, shura or budget dedicated to recruitment – Selection: 15-25% of volunteers accepted

• Gaps in the distribution (U.S., Palestine, Iran) • No evidence of “brainwashing”: they simply acquired the beliefs of their friends • No evidence of “recruiter”: total proselytizing environment  they all mutually recruited each other • Social bonds came before ideological commitment • Group processes: no Robinson Crusoe narrative 22

Motivation • Insidious process: • Low risk participation with an increasingly closer set of friends • Medium risk proselytism for an ideal way of life • Importance of specific script for the global Salafi jihad: 12 Islamist institutions generated 50% of sample • Salafi ideology: new values (Islam & ummah) – Faith & commitment grounded in intense small group dynamics – Gradual development of a collective identity – Greater jihad: “born again”, imitate Salaf through personal example

• Complete transformation of values 23

In-group love • Dynamics of dense social networks promotes ingroup love • Self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause – – – – – – –

Secular  religious Material  spiritual Short-term opportunity  long-term vision Individual concern  communitarian sacrifice Apathy  active engagement Traditional morality  takfir group morality Worldly gains  otherworldly rewards 24

Out-group hate • Grounded in everyday experience of discrimination & exclusion from highest levels of society – Endemic in Middle East & Western Europe

• Grounded in group dynamics: – “Bunch of guys” escalation of mutual complaints about the unfairness & injustice in society – Endorse conspiracy theories

• Endorse takfir doctrine  sanctions commission of crimes v. society 25

Group Dynamics • Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than individual mental pathology • Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends & family • This natural & intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists • High risk terrorist operations – In-group love + out-group hate (under specific violent script, often religious)  mass murder + suicide 26

The Network Clumps Central Staff Core Arab Southeast Asian Maghreb Arab

Node Size Leader Lieutenant Other people

Fate

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Dead Captured

Pre-existing social bonds

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Operational Links Bali, 2002 Jakarta, 2003 Singapore Plot, 2001

9/11/01 Strasbourg, 1999 LAX,. 1999

France, 1995 Casablanca, 2003 Emb, 1998

Morocco, 1994 Istanbul, 2003

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Personal v Operational Links

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Continued Evolution • Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign – Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders – Neutralization of al Qaeda proper

• Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks – Expansion of home-grown initiative due to lack of leadership & restraints – Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training – Informal communications, difficult to monitor – Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers – New local, more aggressive & reckless leadership

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Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad • Decentralized, loosely connected network – Mobilized and motivated autonomously – No more 9/11, but lots of 3/11 or 7/7, especially in Europe – Threat to the West comes from the West • Military role (no hard targets) – sanctuary denial in potential failed or friendly states • Importance of the Internet – Virtual “Invisible hand” organizing terrorist operations: C2 – Social transformation of the jihad – Enemy Center of Gravity: • Vision of Salafi utopia unites the leaderless jihad • Ideological battleground (War of Ideas)

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