The IMF's Legal and Policy Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring

The IMF’s Legal and Policy Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Fifth Annual Sovereign Debt Restructuring Conference, February 25, 2022

Yan Liu Deputy General Counsel International Monetary Fund The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

1

Outline

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

1

Five Challenges to Sovereign Debt Restructurings and IMF’s Role

2

IMF’s Legal and Policy Framework for Sovereign Debt

3

Reflections on International Architecture

2

Challenge 1 - Procrastination

Challenge - economic, financial and political fallout of a sovereign debt restructuring; impact on regaining market access IMF can help - condition IMF lending on taking credible steps to restore debt sustainability, incentivizing the debtor to start the restructuring process sooner rather than later

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

3

Challenge 2 – Lack of Financing Challenge - when a member is renegotiating its debt, it typically lacks access to market and needs financing to prevent disruptive cuts in government expenditure The IMF can help - provide financing as a “lender of last resort” to help members solve BOP problems and restore medium term viability, catalyzing lending from other creditors The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

4

Challenge 3 – Asymmetry of Information Challenge - debtors know more (or are suspected to know more) about how much they owe and can repay, creating distrust with creditors The IMF can help - use DSA to estimate the minimum debt relief needed to restore debt sustainability, serving as a benchmark for negations; and promote debt transparency

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

5

Challenge 4 – Lack of Commitment

Challenge – lack of commitment to economic reforms to address the policies that led to buildup of unsustainable debt, including after getting relief The IMF can help – use the IMF-supported program as a commitment device to hold the debtor to its promises The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

6

Challenge 5 – Coordination Failure

Challenge – creditors may pursue different strategies in debt talks, and refuse a deal while others want to accept The IMF can help – incentivize debtor and creditors engagement and coordination by applying its policies (e.g., on financing assurances, arrears) and promoting the use of enhanced CACs The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

7

Outline

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

1

Five Challenges to Sovereign Debt Restructurings and IMF’s Role

2

IMF’s Legal and Policy Framework for Sovereign Debt

3

Reflections on International Architecture

8

Debt Sustainability Policy Debt sustainability is a key requirement for all IMF lending

When debt is unsustainable in a pre-default context, IMF is precluded from lending unless credible process is in train to restructure private sector debt (PSI) and credible/specific assurances are received from official bilateral creditors (OSI)

MAC-SRDSF for market access countries and LIC-DSF for low-income countries are used to determine whether the sustainability requirements are fulfilled INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management

9

Exceptional Access Policy The IMF may lend beyond the normal access limits if four substantive criteria (and procedural requirements) are satisfied:

Exceptional balance of payments need in the current or capital account High probability that the member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term Prospects of gaining or regaining access to private capital markets The policy program of the member provides a reasonably strong prospect of success INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management

10

Financing Assurances Policy Requires IMF-supported programs to be fully financed

“Fully financed” means that the financing is adequate to fill financing gaps during the program period, and the member is in a position to repay the Fund during the post program period

In programs involving restructuring, the policy does not prescribe the burden sharing across creditors The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

11

Arrears Policy Apply when the member is in arrears to its external creditors Define conditions when the Fund can lend despite arrears to encourage timely resolution of arrears and restore debt viability Differ depending on whether creditor is private, official bilateral or multilateral Under review to better support orderly and transparent resolution of sovereign debt difficulties in light of creditor landscape evolution INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management

12

The IMF’s Role in Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Don’ts and Dos Member decides whether to restructure and the perimeter of the restructuring

The IMF does not micro-manage the debt restructuring IMF-supported program identifies the resource envelop available for debt service, and conditionality can be used to support progress in debt restructuring The IMF can play other supportive roles (explaining the member’s macro framework to creditors or encouraging participation) INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management

13

Outline

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

1

Five Challenges to Sovereign Debt Restructurings and IMF’s Role

2

IMF’s Legal and Policy Framework for Sovereign Debt

3

Reflections on International Architecture

14

Reflections on the International Architecture for Sovereign Debt Restructuring The experience suggests that the contractual approach for restructuring private sector claims remains appropriate.

The current framework faces challenges, including  Increase in nonbonded and collateralized debt  Lack of debt transparency and clarity on the perimeter/treatment of claims  Increasing stock of bilateral official debt to non-Paris Club creditors  Common Framework yet to deliver on its promises Possible reform options to address these key issues  Inclusion of enhanced CACs in domestic law and SOE bonds  Developing majority voting provisions for syndicated loans  Improve Common Framework to make it faster and more effective  Enhance debt transparency  Possible responses to a systemic crisis The views expressed herein are those of the presenter and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

15

THANK YOU! yliu@imf.org

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY IMF

16