issue#1548

Issue no: 1548

• APRIL 17 - 23, 2026 • PUBLISHED WEEKLY

PRICE: GEL 2.50

In this week’s issue...

Abastumani Airspace to Be Closed to Flights from April 16 NEWS PAGE 2

Ukraine Latest: Russia Presses the Front as Strikes Deepen and Diplomacy Fails to Hold NEWS PAGE 3

Dalibor Rohac on How Orbán’s 16-Year Grip Finally Broke POLITICS PAGE 5

FOCUS

ON SPRING FASHION 2026: What’s trending, and where to shop in Tbilisi

PAGE 8

EU Grants Strategic Status to Black Sea Submarine Cable Linking Georgia and Romania BUSINESS PAGE 7

How War Is Impacting Childhood in Occupied Ukraine

OP-ED: Hungary Returning to the of Habit: Abe’s West, Walking a Razor-Thin Tightrope Grains Dunes Rewired for an SOCIETY PAGE 9

OP-ED BY GEORGE KATCHARAVA

Algorithmic Stage CULTURE PAGE 10

T

he political earthquake that rattled the Hungarian steppe on April 12 did more than just end Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year tenure; it shattered the glass of the world’s premier laboratory for "soft autocracy." For over a decade, Budapest served as a global beacon for the illiberal right, a place where state institutions were methodically captured while maintaining the polished veneer of democratic legitimacy.

But as Péter Magyar and his Tisza party swept into power with a crushing constitutional supermajority, the message to the world’s populist movements was clear: ideological crusades eventually wither when they fail to insulate the citizenry from the rot of economic stagnation and systemic corruption.

In Washington, the shockwaves are being felt acutely within the far right of the MAGA movement, which had long anointed Orbán as the “spiritual father” of modern conservatism in Europe.

Continued on page 4

Soft Archives, Sharp Edges: Catalogue of Sensory Data at The Why Not Gallery CULTURE PAGE 11 Prepared for Georgia Today Business by

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2

NEWS

GEORGIA TODAY

APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

Abastumani Airspace to Be Closed to Flights from April 16

A CGI of a planned building renovation. Source: City Hall

Traffic Restrictions Planned in Tbilisi’s Sololaki District from April 18

BY TEAM GT

T

raffic in central Tbilisi’s Sololaki districts will be restricted starting April 18 due to a major project to rehabilitate historic buildings, Mayor Kakha Kaladze announced.

Preparatory work begins April 17, with the project carried out in two phases by the Tbilisi Development Fund. The first phase will focus on repairing damaged underground and above-ground infrastructure. The second phase will include the full restoration of 21 historic buildings, eight on Sulkhan-Saba Street and 13 on Ingorokva Street, with an estimated cost of up to GEL 120 million. Planned works include structural reinforcement, roof replacement, restoration of wooden features, and improvement of courtyards and entrances. The project covers about

45,000 square meters and is expected to benefit up to 450 families. A historic tower will also be restored using specialized methods.

Traffic restrictions will be introduced in two stages. During the first 10 days, movement will be limited on Giorgi Leonidze Street at its intersection with Sulkhan-Saba Street. Alternative routes will include Ivane Machabeli, G. Lortkipanidze, and G. Kikodze streets, with access to Ingorokva Street maintained via Leonidze.

In the second phase, lasting 30 days, traffic will be restricted on Sulkhan-Saba Street, with Pavle Ingorokva Street serving as the main alternative route.

Public transport will also be affected.

Buses on several routes will be rerouted via Ivane Machabeli, Mikheil Lermontov, and Giga Lortkipanidze streets before returning to their usual paths.

Authorities advise drivers to plan ahead and follow temporary traffic signs.

CoE Human Rights Commissioner Meets Georgian Dream Officials During Visit to Georgia

BY TEAM GT

T

he Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, continues his official visit to Georgia, holding highlevel meetings with senior government officials alongside engagements with civil society and field visits near the occupation line.

During his visit, O’Flaherty met with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze to discuss cooperation between Georgia and the Council of Europe, with particular focus on the implementation of the 2024–2026 Human Rights Action Plan.

The Government Administration announced that Kobakhidze reaffirmed the government’s commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Officials emphasized that media pluralism, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression are guaranteed under Georgia’s Constitution and legislation. The meeting also addressed humanitarian challenges in the occupied territories and ongoing peace initiatives aimed at confidence-building.

O’Flaherty also held talks with Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili, focusing on recent developments and measures taken to protect human rights. During the meeting, Bochorishvili briefed the Commissioner on what she described as the severe security, humanitarian, and

human rights situation in the Russianoccupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

The Minister stressed the importance of keeping the Russia–Georgia conflict high on the international agenda, including within the Council of Europe framework, and highlighted the role of the Secretary General’s consolidated reports in maintaining international attention on developments in the occupied regions.

As part of his visit, the Commissioner traveled to the village of Odzisi, located near the occupation line, and to an internally displaced persons (IDP) settlement in Tserovani. The visits, attended by Bochorishvili and Head of Government Administration Levan Zhorzholiani, were aimed at providing the Commissioner with a direct overview of the humanitarian situation on the ground, including the living conditions of displaced populations and communities affected by the conflict.

O’Flaherty, who announced ahead of the visit that he intended to engage with government, authorities, and civil society on key human rights concerns, is expected to conclude his trip with broader assessments of the situation in Georgia.

His visit comes amid ongoing international attention to human rights, democratic standards, and the broader political environment in the country.

Observers note that the Commissioner’s findings and potential recommendations may play a significant role in shaping future dialogue between Georgia and Europe and institutions.

Abastumani Astrophysical Observatory. Source: Government of Georgia.

BY LANA KOKAIA

F

rom April 16, airspace over the resort town of Abastumani will be closed to aircraft, according to a journalistic investigation by Radio Liberty.

The report says the restriction will apply within a 52 km diameter zone, affecting both passenger and cargo flights.

The area is part of adjusted air routes over Georgia.

State agencies have said the decision is linked to the protection of the Abastumani Astrophysical Observatory, which requires clear sky conditions for obser-

vations. The observatory’s director confirmed that the institution has long requested adjustments to air traffic routes.

However, aviation industry sources cited in the investigation say the change may be connected to private interests in the area, a claim not independently verified.

The investigation also states that the restricted zone covers roughly 2,000 sq. km, extending from near the TurkishGeorgian border into southern Georgia.

It adds that the restriction is expected to shift flight routes northward and may increase flight times and operational costs for airlines.

The report states that documentation from aviation authorities allows limited exceptions for flights taking off or land-

ing in the area.

It further notes that several properties and infrastructure in Abastumani are linked to businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, including a helipad, though these claims are based on publicly cited investigative sources.

Radio Liberty says sources within state agencies expect the rerouting of air traffic to increase costs for airlines, which could eventually affect ticket prices or transit routes through Georgia.

The observatory director, meanwhile, said the restriction aligns with the institution’s long-standing request to reduce air traffic over the site, but added that he was not informed in advance about the timing of the final decision.

Hessink’s to Hold Inaugural Georgian Art Auction in Tbilisi

BY LANA KOKAIA

H

essink’s Tbilisi Auction House will hold its first international auction in Tbilisi on April 27, 2026, presenting Georgian modern and contemporary art to both local and global audiences.

The auction, titled Contemporary Georgian Art, will feature 90 works spanning the late Soviet period to the present.

The collection includes pieces by artists such as Alexander Bandzeladze, Vera Pagava, Luka Tsetskhladze, Lia Bagrationi, Iliko Zautashvili, Kako Topouria, and Mamuka Tsetskhaldze, alongside works by emerging artists.

The event will take place at the Museum of Modern Art. A pre-auction exhibition will be open to the public from April 20 to 26 (10:00–18:00).

Inaugural auction in Tbilisi. Source: The "Hessink’s Tbilisi Auction House".

On the day of the auction, the program includes a reception at 18:00, the auction at 19:00, and a formal dinner at 21:00.

The sale will be accessible to international buyers through digital platforms, including Hessink’s website, as well as

major auction platforms such as Drouot and Invaluable.

Organizers say the initiative aims to connect Georgian art with the global market and position Tbilisi as a regional hub for art transactions.

Armenian Symphonic Music Concert to be Held in Tbilisi

BY LANA KOKAIA

T

he Kakhidze Tbilisi Music and Cultural Center, in cooperation with the Embassy of Armenia in Georgia, will host an Armenian symphonic music concert in Tbilisi on April 22.

The concert will feature the Tbilisi Symphony Orchestra conducted by Vakhtang Kakhidze, alongside internationally acclaimed violinist Sergey Khachatryan.

The program includes works by prominent Armenian composers, including Aram Khachaturian’s Adagio from the ballet Spartacus, his Violin Concerto,

Armenian symphonic music concert: Source: Ministry of Culture of Georgia

and Avet Terterian’s Symphony No. 3.

Khachatryan is a winner of the Jean Sibelius International Violin Competi-

tion and the Queen Elisabeth Competition and is considered one of the leading violinists of his generation.

NEWS

GEORGIA TODAY APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

3

Ukraine Latest: Russia Presses the Front as Strikes Deepen and Diplomacy Fails to Hold COMPILED BY ANA DUMBADZE

T

he past week in Russia’s war against Ukraine brought a familiar and increasingly dangerous pattern: Moscow kept up heavy pressure along key sectors of the front, both sides continued long-range strikes far behind the line of contact, a brief Easter ceasefire collapsed almost as soon as it began, and Ukraine’s partners moved again to shore up Kyiv’s military position with fresh drone, missile and industrial support. By April 16, the week had culminated in one of the heaviest recent Russian aerial assaults on Ukrainian cities, underlining once more that neither the battlefield nor the diplomatic track is moving toward de-escalation.

On the battlefield, the broad picture remained one of sustained Russian offensive activity, but without the kind of operational breakthrough Moscow has been looking for. Ukraine’s top commander, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said Russian forces had intensified attacks along much of the roughly 1,200-kilometer front, with the fiercest pressure concentrated around Pokrovsk and in sectors tied to Oleksandrivka, Kostiantynivka and Lyman. Reuters also reported that Russia continued to make incremental gains, including the capture of Vovchanski Khutory in Kharkiv region, even as Ukrainian counterattacks in the southeast aimed to disrupt Russian momentum. In other words, the week confirmed that the war remains one of attrition and localized movement rather than sweeping advances.

Yet Ukraine’s military also tried to shape the narrative away from pure defense.

Kyiv announced a new combat model that integrates drone warfare more closely with infantry operations through unified drone-assault formations. Syrskyi said this approach had already helped Ukrainian troops regain nearly 50 square kilometers in March alone. He added that since late January, Ukraine has retaken around 480 square kilometers in the southeast and east. Those figures do not erase the reality of ongoing Russian pressure, particularly around the Donetsk axis, but they do suggest that Ukraine is finding ways to blunt and occasionally reverse Russian advances by relying ever more heavily on drones, robotics and deep strikes rather than classic maneuver warfare alone.

In the long-range strike war, Ukraine has expanded attacks on Russian militaryindustrial and energy-linked targets, and Reuters reported that Kyiv struck 76 such sites in March, including 15 in the oilrefining sector. This week, Rosneft had to divert crude supplies after a Ukrainian drone strike badly damaged the Sheskharis terminal at Novorossiysk, one of Russia’s most important Black Sea export nodes. Novorossiysk handles about 14% of Russian crude exports. The disruption forced rerouting toward the Tuapse refinery and other alternatives.

The practical significance is obvious: even when such strikes do not decisively cripple Russian output, they complicate logistics, increase costs, and force Moscow to defend infrastructure that finances the war.

Russia, for its part, continued using missiles and drones not only against

Ukraine’s military rear but against infrastructure essential to the economy and civilian life. Reuters reported on April 10 that Ukraine was still repairing the Druzhba oil pipeline after damage caused by a Russian drone strike earlier in the year, a disruption that had cut supplies to Hungary and Slovakia. Later in the week, Russian attacks also hit port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and a range of urban targets. The pattern fits Russia’s wider strategy of trying to exhaust Ukraine’s economy, transport and energy systems while sustaining pressure on civilian morale.

The diplomatic centerpiece of the week was to be a 32-hour Orthodox Easter ceasefire. Putin announced it on April 9, saying Russian forces would halt military activity from the afternoon of April 11 through April 12, and expected Ukraine to do the same. The truce came after Zelensky floated the idea and linked it to the idea of stopping attacks on energy infrastructure. But almost immediately the ceasefire proved too brittle: Reuters reported that both sides accused each other of violating it within hours, and by the end of the truce, Ukraine was claiming 7,696 Russian violations, including artillery, assaults and thousands of drone attacks, while Russia said Ukrainian strikes had caused deaths and injuries in the border regions. Whatever diplomatic symbolism the ceasefire carried, it did not produce even a temporary lowering of violence.

Even so, one concrete humanitarian result did emerge: Russia and Ukraine exchanged 175 prisoners of war each, with the United Arab Emirates acting as mediator. Zelensky said seven civilians

Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to destroy Russians on land, in the air, and at sea.

Source: National Guard of Ukraine

also returned to Ukraine, many of them having been held since 2022. In a week otherwise marked by failed military restraint, the exchange was a reminder that limited transactional arrangements remain possible even while broader peace efforts stay stalled.

Reuters reported that Kirill Dmitriev, a Putin envoy, traveled to the United States for meetings with Trump administration officials, but the Kremlin quickly played down the significance of that contact and said it did not mean substantive Ukraine negotiations had resumed.

The failure of the ceasefire was reflected in the civilian toll. Reuters reported that one person was killed in Donetsk region during the truce period itself. On April 14, a Russian missile strike on Dnipro killed at least five civilians and injured more than two dozen. On April 15, Russia attacked Ukraine in waves with hundreds of drones and missiles over roughly a 24-hour period, killing two people and wounding at least seven while striking port and city targets. On April 16, the week reached its bloodiest point: Reuters reported that Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro and other cities had killed 13 people, including a 12-year-old child, while dozens more were wounded. Ukraine’s air force said Russia launched 703 aerial targets over 24 hours, highlighting the sheer scale of the assault even though most were reportedly intercepted or neutralized.

Ukraine also continued striking inside Russia, and those attacks carried their own civilian consequences. Reuters reported that a Ukrainian drone attack

on the Tuapse port area on Russia’s Black Sea coast killed two children, while damaging homes and hitting enterprises.

Earlier in the week, Russian officials also said Ukrainian drone attacks in Kursk and Belgorod injured five people during the Easter truce period. Kyiv’s strategy of taking the war to Russian energy, military and logistics targets has clear military logic, but this week again showed how the expanding strike war is exacting civilian costs on both sides of the border.

Against that backdrop, Western support focused overwhelmingly on drones, air defense and defense-industrial cooperation. In Berlin, Germany and Ukraine signed new defense cooperation accords, including a major drone-production deal that Zelensky said could become one of the largest in Europe. Reuters reported that Germany has provided around €55 billion in aid since 2022 and allocated another €11.5 billion in its current budget, including support for Patriot missiles and IRIS-T systems, as well as investment in Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities. Norway agreed to produce Ukrainian drones on Norwegian soil and highlighted a broader aid commitment of about $28 billion between 2023 and 2030. The Netherlands announced €248 million for drone production for Ukraine, while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the alliance remained on track to fund assistance through its Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List mechanism.

Britain, meanwhile, announced its biggest drone package yet, pledging at least 120,000 drones for Ukraine this year.

4

POLITICS

GEORGIA TODAY

APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

In the Foaming Wake of the 9th of April

Rally in front of the Government Palace, on Rustaveli Avenue. Tbilisi, April 7-8, 1989. Photo by Mikheil Kikvadze

OP-ED BY NUGZAR B. RUHADZE

T

he fire that caught on the nation 37 years ago is still burning, and the fuel feeding that passion is an undying source, keeping the free and independent Sakartvelo up and going. At least this is the feeling that most people around me are nursing in their hearts and minds.

The 9th of April memorial is bringing back the huge national pain suffered in 1989, when the ‘Ancien Régime’ murdered peaceful demonstrators holding a nonviolent sit-in and striving for national independence from the Soviets. The protest took place in front of the Parliament House on Rustaveli Avenue. On that bloody, tragic day, 21 people, mostly young females, died, and hundreds were injured and poisoned due to brutal force and an unknown chemical gas.

The day is one of the most significant

dates, rendered as a turning point in modern Georgian history, marked with an absolutely unbridled, all-national readiness to fight for freedom. Naturally, a memorial was installed in front of the parliament building, which the citizens of Georgia visit and adorn with flowers to pay homage to the innocent victims of Soviet troops. So, it would be not an iota of exaggeration to call the 9th of April the Day of National Unity, but notwithstanding this glorious designation, this year the supposedly peaceable and reverential commemoration turned into unpredictably explosive political tension between modern-day protesters and government officials at the wellknown and heartily frequented memorial on Rustaveli Avenue.

This year, the day started with a noiseless vigil while it drizzled and the sky was somber. Thoughtful Georgians kept a nocturnal vigil at the memorial, small groups substituting each other, spending the whole night at the site. But trouble was in the air, and the situation

became unpleasantly strained when the ruling party frontrunners arrived, among them the current head of the government.

All of a sudden, protesters grew around like mushrooms, shouting as the officials laid flowers. The accusations were trivially old: “Russia lovers.” A confrontation was imminent, and quickly turned into abusive, even physical altercations; no longer a peaceful service. Some of the protesters who knocked down the wreaths placed by the administration representatives were arrested on the spot. Vituperative and scurrilous language was exchanged between the crowd and the officialdom. The strong police presence became indispensable, and all this was witnessed by members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Georgia.

Meanwhile, the 9th of April Big Day is asking for deep and meaningful analysis for the generations to come. It certainly was tragic, but at the same time a pivotal point in the history of modern Sakartvelo. That day, almost two scores of years

ago, the Georgian people were out in the streets with the intention of ridding the country of the Soviet regime and with a demand for Georgia’s independence, the inner sense of national freedom having been the prerequisite for those two politically overcharged claims.

Carnage, gas poisoning, and repression followed; the dead, injured, shocked, and traumatized individuals filled the place. If interpreted purely politically, the Soviet Union was becoming weaker on a daily basis, and national movements all around the big Soviet country spread ubiquitously. The downfall of the nuclear power covering one-sixth of the globe was clearly looming.

In Georgia, the national forces clashed with the imperial authority, which made catastrophic mistakes, used excessive force, and made false analyses of the overall situation in the country: the sturdier the governmental repressions, the stronger the popular protest, and, as a result, Soviet legitimacy lost meaning and supremacy in the eyes of the

Georgian people.

The public reaction to this was unification, consolidation, unanimity, a sharpened sense of independence, and finally, a declaration of independence after two years of earnest fight. All this was followed by international reaction to the metamorphosis ‘A la Géorgienne’.

The world saw Soviet-type cruelty with its own eyes. The victory worked as a political catalyst for further events in the country and as a historical test of the endurance and viability of the Georgian people.

Now, it is time for relevant conclusions: force cannot always defeat the truth; a united nation is a decisive power, a split society is a loser; emotion is not decisive but helps; freedom asks for sacrifice; history has to be evaluated thoroughly; not interminable mourning but rational reasoning over the future is necessary; and finally, ask not what happened but what was learned from the lesson. Time to know well what we want to make of ourselves!

Hungary’s PM-elect Pledges Continued Ties with Georgia, Stresses Non-interference

BY TEAM GT

H

ungary’s Prime Ministerelect, Péter Magyar, has stated that Budapest will maintain strong relations with Georgia while emphasizing a policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs.

Speaking in response to a question from a journalist with Rustavi 2 TV, the leader of the Tisza party reaffirmed Hungary’s commitment to cooperation with Georgia, describing bilateral ties as important and mutually beneficial.

“Yes, obviously, we will continue the good relations with Georgia,” Magyar said.

He noted that Hungary’s foreign policy

under his leadership would prioritize constructive partnerships, regardless of previous political alignments.

“The fact that Viktor Orbán’s government had strong ties with a country doesn’t mean Hungary will have worse relations with that country. On the contrary, where relations have been weaker, we will seek to improve them,” Magyar stated.

He added that cooperation is in the shared interest of both countries and expressed readiness to deepen engagement, including a potential visit to Tbilisi.

At the same time, the incoming prime minister underlined that Hungary would not interfere in the domestic affairs of partner states.

“We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

We have no intention of interfering in

the elections of your country, North Macedonia, or anywhere else. That is not our style, and it is not the job of any European government,” he said.

Magyar’s remarks come following his recent electoral victory, which signals a shift in Hungary’s political landscape after more than a decade of rule by Orbán.

Analysts expect Budapest’s foreign policy to remain pragmatic, while potentially recalibrating its positioning within the European Union and its relations with regional partners.

Georgia and Hungary maintain a strategic partnership, with cooperation spanning political dialogue, economic ties and mutual support in international formats. The future direction of this relationship is likely to be shaped by the new Hungarian government’s broader European and regional agenda.

Péter Magyar. Source: AP

OP-ED: Hungary Returning to the West, Walking a Razor-Thin Tightrope Continued from page 1 The fall of his model in its own birthplace suggests that nationalist rhetoric is no longer a sufficient shield against domestic dissatisfaction. For the Kremlin, the implications are nothing short of catastrophic. For years, Orbán acted as Vladimir Putin’s primary spoiler within the European Union, a reliable wrench in the gears of Western unity, who used his veto to paralyze aid to Kyiv and dilute sanctions. With his departure, the "Russian backdoor" into European intelligence and diplomatic circles is being slammed shut, isolating Putin from his most effective lever of obstructionism in the West.

Yet, Magyar’s victory is not a simple "clean break." The new Prime Minister inherits a nation physically and financially tethered to Moscow through a labyrinth of energy dependencies. Hungary remains lashed to the Soviet-erabuilt Druzhba oil pipeline, and bound by a fifteen-year Gazprom contract that defies easy exit. Most daunting is the Paks II nuclear project; with the first concrete already poured for the Rosatombuilt reactors, Magyar faces the ultimate paradox of modern sovereignty: trying to pivot toward Brussels while the nation’s power grid remains an anchor of Russian technology and debt.

Domestically, the task is equally Her-

culean. Despite his two-thirds majority, Magyar must "de-capture" a state where the chief prosecutor and the heads of the media and constitutional authorities sit on long-term mandates specifically designed to survive a change in regime.

His strategy, a rapid pivot toward the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the creation of a National Asset Recovery office, is a desperate bid for the transparency required to unlock billions in frozen EU funds. These funds are the only lifeline for a budget currently bleeding from high deficits and the inflationary hangover of the Orbán era.

Beyond the Danube, the "Magyar Method" has already become a tactical

manual for the "frontline" democracies, where political opponents are studying Magyar’s rise, paying attention not for his technology, but for his narrative, echoing realities on the ground, dismantling systems in power with insider’s knowledge. Although, most importantly, this was a good lesson to those that attribute themselves to a political knowit-all, the Hungarian experience is clearly proving an example that even the most entrenched systems can be overturned through sheer voter mobilization.

As the frost between Budapest and Kyiv begins to thaw, the new administration is signaling a pragmatic reset. The era of state-sponsored vilification of

Volodymyr Zelensky has ended, replaced by a commitment to humanitarian support and financial stability. While Magyar remains wary of direct military aid, balancing a public sensitive to the proximity of war, his realignment solidifies a unified European front. Hungary is finally returning to the Western fold, but it is doing so by walking a razor-thin tightrope: satisfying the democratic demands of Brussels while managing a Kremlin that still holds the keys to its energy future.

Author’s bio: George Katcharava is the founder of eurasiaanalyst.com, a geopolitical risk and advisory firm.

POLITICS

GEORGIA TODAY APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

5

Dalibor Rohac on How Orbán’s 16-Year Grip Finally Broke CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WILL BE STARTED AGAINST ORBÁN AND HIS PEOPLE? ONE OF THE MORE COLORFUL FIGURES IN HIS ENTOURAGE, FOREIGN MINISTER SZIJJÁRTÓ, GIVEN THE RECENT LEAKS ABOUT RUSSIAN TIES, MIGHT BE FEELING THE HEAT.

Dalibor Rohac. Source: El Mundo

INTERVIEW BY VAZHA TAVBERIDZE

A

fter 16 years in power, Viktor Orbán is out, and Hungary is stepping into unfamiliar territory. His defeat is more than just a change in leadership; it reflects a deeper sense of frustration among voters who no longer saw progress in a system that had come to feel stagnant, insular, and increasingly out of sync with the rest of Europe.

As political economist Dalibor Rohac puts it, this was “mostly a vote against the status quo in Hungary,” driven by years of economic disappointment, corruption concerns, and a growing sense that the country was falling behind its neighbors.

In his conversation with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service, Rohac explains that the breakthrough came when that frustration finally found a political outlet in Péter Magyar, giving Hungarians a credible alternative for the first time in years. Still, the path ahead is anything but simple. Hungary now faces the difficult task of untangling deeply embedded political and economic networks, while trying to reset its place in Europe. The question now is not just what comes after Orbán, but whether Hungary can truly move beyond the system he built.

LET’S LOOK AT VIKTOR ORBÁN - 16 YEARS AT THE HELM. WHAT ARE THE MAIN FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DOWNFALL? Viktor Orbán lost this election for essentially two reasons. One is his track record in office; the fact that 16 years of Orbán's rule did not bring about prosperity for Hungary, nor did it strengthen the country. Hungary, in fact, started lagging behind its neighbors, became one of the least well-governed countries in Europe, the most corrupt country according to Transparency International, and one of the poorest places in the European Union.

So, this was mostly a vote against the status quo in Hungary.

And the second reason was that, for the first time in those 16 years, that anger and disappointment had a real outlet in the form of the Tisza party. Previously, the opposition was divided, fragmented; found it difficult to cooperate, and didn't have an obvious leader. That had helped Viktor Orbán get through some of the recent elections. Not anymore. It was the emergence of Tisza, and Magyar in particular, as a political force that helped to coalesce the opposition.

WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM MAGYAR? JUST HOW DIFFERENT WILL HIS POLICIES BE COMPARED TO HIS PREDECESSOR? Péter Magyar started out in the environment of the Fidesz party. He was the husband of the now disgraced former justice minister, and he broke with Fidesz over some of these scandals, specifically an incident involving a presidential par-

don for people who were covering up sex abuse scandals in a children's orphanages in Hungary. He's coming from that center-right environment. His messaging has actually been very distinctly centerright and focused on traditional Hungarian values, patriotism, etc.

So, in some ways, he doesn’t represent a radical, revolutionary shift from the status quo. But for those who care about the rule of law, corruption, and Hungary's place in the EU, it is a cause for celebration. Viktor Orbán was somebody who very consciously and deliberately pursued an ideological project that sought to peel Hungary away from the EU, bring it closer to Russia and China, and pursue a different model of political economy and development. And I think that's the end of that story: it ends with this defeat.

We will now be seeing Hungary’s return to far more conventional, far more normal politics.

HOW LARGE WILL ORBÁN’S SHADOW BE - OR RATHER THAT OF THE SYSTEM HE BUILT - LOOMING OVER MAGYAR? I would venture to suggest that most of Magyar’s time will be spent firefighting.

Hungary is not in great economic shape.

It’s facing an energy crisis, like other parts of Europe. Obviously, there will also be the tail end of this Iran war influencing the energy situation.

There are structural dependencies on Russia and China that not only went unaddressed by the previous government, but, if anything, were deepened.

So, I think there will be a lot of firefighting and cleaning up to do.

ORBÁN SPENT 16 YEARS BUILDING THIS SYSTEM. JUST HOW PERVASIVE IS IT, AND HOW DIFFICULT WILL IT BE TO UNDO THE DAMAGE? It’s going to be complicated. The fact that he has a constitutional majority helps in that endeavor. But just to offer one concrete example, Péter Magyar already, on the night of the election, called for the resignation of the sitting president of Hungary. The president is elected by parliament. There is a complicated procedure that allows for his impeachment, which requires a twothirds majority in parliament, and it also requires the assent of the constitutional court.

I'm pretty sure Mr Magyar would prefer the president to step aside quietly, but if he does not, he will have to go through the formal impeachment procedure, with an uncertain outcome. That is just one constitutional office among many. There are judges appointed by Fidesz, people in the public administration, central bankers, and the whole nexus of economic and media power controlled by individuals close to Fidesz.

I think it’s going to be an uphill battle.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the peaceful handover of power by Viktor Orbán is the expectation that Magyar will eventually fail in this task, and that Orbán could return to office in the future.

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT

I’m agnostic about that, and also about their future career prospects. But one thing that I think is reasonably clear is that Hungary ran this experiment for 16 years, trying to build an alternative to liberal democracy in the heart of Europe, and that experiment has proven to be a failure, both politically and substantively.

Therefore, I suspect that the demand for Viktor Orbán's ideas and political thought will decline, and that the current infatuation, especially in Republican circles in the United States, will weaken and fade in the months to come.

WHAT DOES THIS CHANGE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? I think Magyar will try to repair Hungary's relationship with the EU and restore its standing. He will need to unlock close to 20 billion euros in EU structural funds that have been frozen.

Because he harbors no anti-European or anti-Ukrainian animosity, he will no longer be an obstacle to European-level consensus.

And I think for some of Orbán's former allies, such as Robert Fico, this will mean increased pressure to fall in line as well.

So, I think EU politics will become less contentious and less fractious, and perhaps the EU will be able to arrive at common decisions more quickly and effectively.

SINCE YOU ALREADY MENTIONED UKRAINE - WHAT DOES IT CHANGE FOR KYIV? I think this will be a qualitative change for the better from the Ukrainian perspective. You don’t need the Hungarian prime minister to be an explicit cheerleader for Ukraine: you need the Hungarian prime minister not to stand in the way of common European solutions, whether it comes to EU membership for Ukraine, helping Ukraine defend itself, or providing financial support.

I do think we will see changes in that direction, and they will be quite noticeable.

ANOTHER CHANGE THAT WILL INEVITABLY OCCUR, BUT FOR THE WORSE, WILL BE FOR RUSSIA. WHAT DOES THE LOSS OF ORBÁN MEAN FOR RUSSIA? The Orbán government has acted as a sort of handmaiden to Russian interests in Europe. It has provided intelligence to the Russians about what was happening at EU summits. It was providing all kinds of support. There are reports of FSB operatives in Hungary, even during the election campaign, but more sig-

nificantly, Hungary served as a conduit for various Russian individuals who were able to enter the Schengen area through it.

I think all of that will go away. Again, this is part of the task that stands before Mr Magyar: to try to clean Hungary up.

And going after Russian intelligence agencies and other forms of Russian influence will be part of that task.

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT HUNGARY WILL BE MORE ROBUST ON RUSSIAN SANCTIONS? AND WHAT KIND OF GAME DO YOU EXPECT MAGYAR TO PLAY WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN? One of the slogans that gained traction in the final days of the election campaign was “Russians go home.”

I don't think there are any friendly or fuzzy sentiments towards Russia in Hungary. In fact, far less so than in some neighboring countries, such as Bulgaria or Slovakia. The only importance of Hungary in this process has been as a weak link within the EU. We don't need Hungary to be the leader of sanctions efforts against Russia. We just need Hungary to play its part: not to be an obstacle and not to provide avenues for circumventing sanctions.

And I do expect that Hungary will be able to play that role.

HOW MUCH WILL MAGYAR HAVE TO PLAY ALONG, GIVEN RUSSIA’S ENERGY LEVERAGE? IT’S PROBABLY A QUESTION OF WHEN, NOT IF, MOSCOW USES IT. Yes, you could easily imagine Russia trying to use that leverage against Hungary. And if you are in the midst of an energy crisis in Europe, if you are in the midst of an economic downturn, then I think the room for maneuver will be somewhat limited.

But I also think the momentum against Russia after these 16 years is too strong.

This train has left the station, amid chants of “Ruszkik haza!” (Russians go home), and there won't be much for Putin to do.

This is a challenge for Magyar, but it is something that can be addressed over time. Just look at how the EU has made significant strides in moving away from Russian energy in the short term.

LET’S LOOK AT THE MORE DISTANT HORIZON: THE UNITED STATES. PRESIDENT TRUMP WAS VERY VOCAL IN HIS SUPPORT FOR ORBÁN, AND THE VICE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY TRAVELED TO BUDAPEST TO BACK HIM. I think the vice president's visit demonstrated that US soft power, so to speak, does not quite work the way people might have expected. I don't think it did much to change the outcome of the election: if anything, it may even have worked

Peter Magyar, Prime Minister-elect of Hungary. Source:Balint Szentgallay/Getty Images

to Fidesz’s detriment.

For Donald Trump, I think this is going to be a setback, and an important one, because until now Hungary has played an outsized role in the imagination of some MAGA intellectuals and Trumpaligned conservatives, as a living example of a country governed under an illiberal democracy, offering an alternative model on key policy questions.

Hungarian voters have said a very resounding “no” to this form of governance, and so you look at Donald Trump and he looks increasingly isolated, increasingly aligned with people who, I think it's fair to qualify as losers, right?

I don't think anybody is trying to emulate Mr Fico in Slovakia, for example, or Mr Vucic in Serbia. So, if that's the company Donald Trump keeps, it becomes far less impressive and perhaps even far less potent as a political force.

ANOTHER ALLY OF ORBÁN IS THE GEORGIAN DREAM GOVERNMENT IN GEORGIA. WHAT DOES THIS CHANGE FOR THEM? For Georgia’s current government, this is another setback. It is already fairly isolated in the West.

Orbán's Hungary was one of its few cheerleaders and advocates within the European Union, perhaps alongside Slovakia. I don't think it was a particularly effective advocate for Georgia, but it was still an entry point into the EU, and now Georgian Dream has lost that.

So, hopefully, that will put some additional pressure on the government and perhaps might lead to democratic change in Georgia itself in due course.

But I would also argue that Georgian Dream has already crossed lines that Orbán never did, in terms of the use of political violence, the suppression of dissent, and a willingness to override traditional checks and balances.

I do think that Georgian Dream and Georgia are in a different place, partly because Georgia is not part of the EU, but also because the system has become more autocratic, more willing to jail opponents, and more willing to just use brute force. And so it will be harder, I think, for Georgia to get to a healthier place.

ARE THERE LESSONS FROM PÉTER MAGYAR THAT THE GEORGIAN OPPOSITION AND THE BROADER PROTEST MOVEMENT COULD LEARN? I think the main lesson is that leadership matters, and that an opposition getting its act together matters. We have seen an incredible mobilization of civil society and of the Georgian public, but that mobilization has not translated into effective opposition politics.

And I understand that the situation is different, because Georgian Dream does not operate under the constraints imposed by the EU. It is more violent, more ruthless, and more autocratic than Orbán was, and has demonstrated that it does not believe in peaceful transfers of power or in the procedural norms of democracy.

Ultimately, Orbán still proved to be a kind of normal democratic political actor. So I think the main lesson is the need for the opposition to get its act together.

Georgian Dream has already crossed lines that Orbán never did

6

POLITICS

GEORGIA TODAY

APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

“Magyar will be willing to ‘play ball,’ unlike Orbán’s veto-smashing” - Pavel Havlícek on Hungary after Orbán INTERVIEW BY VAZHA TAVBERIDZE

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avel Havlícek, a Czech political analyst with the Association for International Affairs, speaks to RFE/RL’s Georgian Service about what Viktor Orbán’s fall and Péter Magyar’s rise mean for Hungary at home and abroad.

After 16 years of entrenched rule, Budapest now faces not just a change of government, but the dismantling of a deeply embedded political system. Havlícek argues that the shift will be most visible domestically, in the courts, media, and state institutions shaped under Orbán, but will also extend outward, with a likely reset in relations with the European Union and traditional allies such as Poland.

He also outlines what this change could mean for Ukraine, and for Orbán’s inner circle, some of whom may now face investigation or exile. At the same time, he cautions that the process ahead will be difficult, with entrenched networks of political, economic and media power unlikely to disappear overnight.

WHAT DOES IT ACTUALLY CHANGE? MAGYAR COMES FROM THE CENTER-RIGHT AND IS A FORMER FIDESZ MEMBER. HOW DIFFERENT WILL HIS POLICIES BE FROM ORBÁN’S?

There are a number of areas where we will see not just change, but a completely different attitude. This will be most visible in the domestic sphere, where 16 years of Orbán’s rule became deeply embedded in society and public life. It is therefore no surprise that the first names mentioned for replacement were the heads of courts and government media boards.

Beyond that, and of particular interest internationally, we are likely to see a process of normalization with the EU and with Hungary’s traditional allies, most notably Poland. It is logical that Magyar’s first international visit will be to Warsaw. Poland, and particularly Prime Minister Donald Tusk, will be key for rebuilding bilateral ties, and this marks a significant shift.

Even more importantly, Magyar intends to play a moderately positive and constructive role within the EU and its institutions, including, in the longer run, engagement with the eurozone. This could mean an end to many of the conflicts we have seen in recent years and potentially unlock the frozen EU funds.

That trade-off would also have very concrete implications for Ukraine, particularly regarding the €90 billion loan that Orbán has so far blocked.

WHAT DOES THIS CHANGE FOR UKRAINE, AND TO WHAT EXTENT? Magyar is cautious on Ukraine. He has

Pavel Havlícek. Photo by Katerina Cibulka, Czech Radio

said he is against fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU integration, for example by 2027. But what matters is that he will be willing to “play ball,” unlike Orbán, who repeatedly used vetoes to block anything resembling support for Ukraine.

Even something as simple as constructive silence could prove to be a gamechanger, particularly when it comes to EU sanctions packages against Russia.

Orbán was very active in blocking these.

Magyar, by contrast, is unlikely to hesitate in allowing them to pass.

We can also expect him to cooperate on approving the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, although he will almost cer-

tainly have his own counter-demands.

But it’s not a coincidence the Kremlin refused to congratulate him and that a conflict is imminent.

WHAT NOW FOR ORBÁN AND FOREIGN MINISTER SZIJJÁRTÓ? HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT THEY COULD END UP IN MOSCOW ALONGSIDE FIGURES LIKE YANUKOVYCH OR ASSAD? AND HOW LIKELY ARE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, GIVEN THE RECENT LEAKS ABOUT RUSSIAN TIES? This is perhaps the most intriguing part

of the story. Already on election night, Magyar spoke about “traitors,” and about those who manipulated society and turned Hungarians against one another, making clear that this would not be tolerated going forward.

He later claimed that Szijjártó had barricaded himself inside the foreign ministry, reportedly destroying documents related to sanctions on Russia. If that is even partially true, then we are likely to see investigations, and potentially prosecutions. Some individuals could well end up facing jail time, while others, Szijjártó included, might choose to leave the country. He might still be Budapestbased but my expectation is that this is not for too long and he will need to fly, either to Moscow, Minsk, or one of the Gulf states, even if this is hot ground right now too.

There will need to be a strong elite rotation, with an element of repression/ punishing people for all the corruption and nepotism put in place. Most likely, this will also touch people in the highlevel offices (say the director of MOL, media foundation Keszma, MCC and other government think-tanks and propaganda mouth pieces, and the like).

However, it will be important to hold justice right and not to overdo it (leading to repression), even if this might be very much demanded by the citizens.

In general, though, there is no appetite to protect the "traitors," and everybody knows who they are.

GYLA Files Court Case Over Georgia’s FM Defends EU Policy as Opposition Voting Restrictions for Emigrants Sharpens Criticism in Heated Parliamentary Session

BY TEAM GT

G Voting using electronic election technologies. Source: CEC of Georgia

BY LANA KOKAIA

T

he Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) has filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of Georgian emigrants living in France, challenging a recent amendment to the Election Code that bans the opening of polling stations in Georgian embassies and consulates abroad.

GYLA argues that the restriction contradicts the universal right to vote guaranteed under Article 24 of the Constitution of Georgia.

The organization says the regulation does not serve a legitimate constitutional purpose and creates “artificial financial and social barriers,” including travel costs and work-related constraints, which could prevent hundreds of thousands of emigrants from voting.

It adds that income earned by emigrants

abroad is often essential for both them and their families.

The NGO also refers to Constitutional Court practice, which allows restrictions on voting rights for citizens abroad only when the state lacks the capacity to open polling stations in every city. GYLA notes that polling stations have historically been opened at Georgian embassies and consulates, where the state has both financial and administrative capacity to organize elections.

“These buildings are under Georgian jurisdiction, meaning the election administration can ensure free voting without interference from host countries,” the association says.

GYLA also says the ruling Georgian Dream party justifies the change as a measure to prevent foreign interference in elections.

The organization says it plans to continue strategic litigation on behalf of other groups of emigrants in the near future.

eorgia’s Foreign Minister M a k a B o c h o r i s hv i l i defended the government’s foreign policy during a heated interpellation session in Parliament, rejecting claims that the country is becoming internationally isolated, while opposition lawmakers accused the ruling party of derailing Georgia’s EU integration process.

Addressing members of the opposition For Georgia faction, which initiated the questioning, Bochorishvili dismissed criticism of Georgia’s international standing. “Your dreams about isolation are just your dreams,” she said, arguing that the country continues to engage actively through international platforms and bilateral relations.

MP Giorgi Sharashidze sharply challenged the minister’s position, accusing both Bochorishvili and the government of responsibility for what he described as a stalled EU path. “Let us call things by their name: you are responsible for bringing Georgia’s European integration to a dead end,” he said, adding that authorities must explain “why the country moved beyond its constitutional framework.”

“Ms. Maka, explain to the citizens of Georgia why you are betraying the country’s historic choice of freedom from Russian influence and a European, democratic future, and whether you still have even the minimal resources, political will, or competence for Georgia to return to the path of EU membership during your tenure,” he added.

Bochorishvili responded by emphasizing that her priority is safeguarding national interests and ensuring stability.

“We will not allow any step that poses even the slightest threat to the stability and security of the country,” she stated.

FM Maka Bochorishvili Source: Georgian MFA

Reaffirming that EU integration remains Georgia’s strategic objective, the minister nevertheless criticized what she described as an “unfair” approach from Brussels. “There is no basis or justification for the approach with which the European Union is conducting relations with Georgia today,” she said, adding that current policies risk harming both Georgia and broader European interests.

Sharashidze rejected this argument, accusing the government of shifting responsibility onto the EU. He pointed to alleged violations of constitutional obligations, particularly Article 78, which mandates efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration, and warned that Georgia is now “further from EU membership than in 2023,” referencing earlier remarks by EU Ambassador Pawel Herczynski.

The Foreign Minister denied that the government had suspended the EU integration process, instead claiming that political dialogue was halted by Brussels in 2024. “The decision to open negotiations lies with the EU Council, not with Georgia,” Bochorishvili said, adding that Tbilisi remains ready to proceed once such a decision is made.

The exchange also touched on broader geopolitical and security issues.

Bochorishvili reiterated that Russia’s continued occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia rules out any discussion of restoring diplomatic relations or adopting neutrality. She also criticized international sanctions targeting Georgian officials, describing them as unfair and, in some cases, lacking transparency.

Sharashidze, however, argued that the government’s policies have contributed to democratic backsliding and growing distance from European standards. He accused the ruling party of fueling antiEuropean rhetoric and political polarization.

The interpellation session demonstrated ongoing, deep divisions over Georgia’s foreign policy direction, with the government insisting it is protecting national interests, while the opposition warns the country is drifting away from its declared European path.

In a follow-up statement, MP Giorgi Sharashidze said that the Foreign Minister had effectively confirmed a shift in Georgia’s European course during her parliamentary address. “Yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maka Bochorishvili, confirmed from the parliamentary tribune a change in the country’s European course and, through falsehoods and disinformation, attempted to shift responsibility for the suspension of the EU integration process onto the European Union,” he stated.

Sharashidze further argued that responsibility for the current situation lies with the ruling party, and he recalled a key political decision made in 2024. “Everyone in Georgia knows that on November 28, 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced the ruling party’s decision to unilaterally suspend Georgia’s EU integration, thereby causing irreparable damage to the country’s prospects of becoming a full-fledged member of the European family, founded on peace and prosperity,” he said.

He added that government officials would ultimately be held accountable for their actions. “Maka Bochorishvili and every member of Georgian Dream knows very well that they cannot escape the personal responsibility that history and the Georgian people will assign to them for undermining the country’s European future,” Sharashidze said.

BUSINESS

GEORGIA TODAY APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

7

EU Grants Strategic Status to Black Sea Submarine Cable Linking Georgia and Romania

EU flags. Source: FB

BY TEAM GT

T

he European Parliament and the Council of Europe have approved the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project, granting it the status

of a Project of Mutual Interest (PMI), a designation that unlocks access to EU funding and streamlined regulatory procedures.

Based on the decision published in the EU’s official journal, the PMI status allows the project to benefit from accelerated permitting processes and financial support mechanisms aimed at strength-

ening cross-border energy connectivity across Europe.

The initiative is considered a key component of efforts to enhance energy security and diversify supply routes between Europe and the South Caucasus.

It is expected to facilitate the export of renewable electricity generated in the region, particularly from Georgia, to European markets via the Black Sea. The PMI designation was granted as part of a broader package approved by the European Commission, which included 235 cross-border energy projects aimed at improving interconnectivity, reducing dependency on single suppliers and accelerating the transition to cleaner energy sources.

The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project envisions constructing a digital and highvoltage underwater transmission link between Anaklia, Georgia and Constanta, Romania. The plan includes a 1,155-kilometer line (1,115 km underwater and 40 km onshore) with a capacity of 1,300 MW. The Black Sea cable has been highlighted in recent years as a strategic project linking the South Caucasus more closely with the European Union’s energy system, while also supporting the bloc’s long-term climate and energy goals.

Tbilisi Expands Support for Small Businesses

BY MARIAM RAZMADZE

T

bilisi City Hall is expanding its ‘Micro and Small Business Support’ initiative, transforming the pilot project into a full-fledged program with significantly increased financial backing for local entrepreneurs, Mayor Kakha Kaladze said during a municipal government meeting.

A central change under the updated program is the increase in the maximum co-financing limit, which rises from 20,000 GEL to 50,000 GEL. The expansion follows positive results from the pilot phase, during which approximately 50 businesses received support to acquire equipment and grow their operations.

The program introduces a tiered cofinancing model based on project size:

Image source: Freepik

• Up to 90% funding for projects under 5,000 GEL • 85% for projects between 5,000 and 20,000 GEL • 80% for projects between 20,000 and 30,000 GEL

• 70% for projects between 30,000 and 50,000 GEL Priority will be given to applicants with operational businesses and clearly defined development plans, say City Hall officials.

Georgian Parliament. Source: gov.ge

Georgia Clarifies Grant Law: Red Cross and Financial Institutions Exempt from Key Requirements

BY TEAM GT

G

eorgia’s Parliament is set to adopt amendments to the Law on Grants that will exempt certain entities from compliance requirements, including the need for government approval in specific cases.

Under the revised draft, the provisions of the Law on Grants will no longer apply to grants issued by the Georgian Red Cross Society. In addition, grants issued by financial and credit institutions will not require a formal agreement with the Government of Georgia.

The amendments, which are being reviewed in expedited second and third readings, were refined during discussions in the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Issues. Committee Chairman Archil Gorduladze presented the updated version, emphasizing the need for clearer legal interpretation rather than a substantive policy shift.

Gorduladze claimed that the exemption for the Georgian Red Cross Society reflects an already implicit understanding in existing legislation. “For greater clarity, it should be explicitly stated that the Law on Grants does not apply to this organization,” he noted, referring to the Society’s status as part of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The draft law also introduces a similar clarification for financial and credit insti-

tutions. In practice, this applies to grants issued alongside loan agreements by international financial organizations such as the World Bank. Gorduladze explained that such grants are already subject to separate government procedures and are not linked to political activities, minimizing any potential risks to state sovereignty.

The Law on Grants already exempts several international educational and research programs from its requirements, including the European Union’s Horizon Europe and Erasmus+ initiatives, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the EU’s Creative Europe program. These programs support general education, higher education, and scientific research.

With the proposed changes, the Georgian Red Cross Society and financial and credit institutions will be added to this list of exempt entities.

The amendments also redefine what qualifies as a grant. Funds provided by diplomatic missions, consular offices, and representatives of international organizations accredited in Georgia will no longer be classified as grants if they are used—or could be used—for activities tied to the political or public interests of a foreign government or political party.

The legislative package is expected to pass swiftly, marking another step in the government’s ongoing effort to refine the regulatory framework governing foreign funding and grant distribution in Georgia.

Georgia Tightens Gambling Regulations, Increases Fines for Licensing Violations

Armenia PM: Georgia Rail Route Remains Key Until Azerbaijan Link Reopens

BY LANA KOKAIA

A

rmenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan says railway exports through Georgia will remain important until Armenia restores rail connections with Azerbaijan under the “Trump Route” (TRIPP) project.

Speaking at a meeting with major employers, Pashinyan said Armenia is entering “a completely new stage of economic development,” linked to the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan.

He added that key developments are expected soon, including the launch of the TRIPP project, which he says aims to fully lift Armenia’s transport blockade.

“Railway exports through Georgia are possible until we reopen the railway with Azerbaijan, and this is very important,” Pashinyan said.

He said Armenia has already partially overcome its blockade, noting that railway cargo transit through Azerbaijan

has resumed. At the same time, he described the Georgian route as a reliable alternative for both imports and exports.

“The political agreement is that this railway will never be closed,” he said, referring to the future Armenia–Azer-

baijan link.

Pashinyan added that railway exports are still limited, as logistics chains built over the past 30 years will take time to adjust. He said rebuilding trust and shifting from road to rail transport remain key challenges.

Iveria Casino. Source: FB

BY TEAM GT

L

Nikol Pashinyan. Source: FB

egal liability in Georgia’s gambling sector is set to be tightened, with significantly higher fines introduced for violations of licensing conditions.

The amendments are being proposed to the law “On Arranging Lotteries, Gambling and Prize Games,” with the government submitting the legislative initiative to Parliament.

Under the draft law, penalties for various license holders will increase substantially. The fine for casino operators will rise from 7,000 GEL to 20,000 GEL, while slot machine salon operators will face an increase from 1,000 GEL to 10,000 GEL. Fines for gambling club license holders

and operators of gambling and prize games will increase from 2,000 GEL to 10,000 GEL. Meanwhile, operators providing casino, slot machine and totalizator games in electronic or system-based formats will see fines rise from 7,000 GEL to 20,000 GEL. The government says the existing penalties have proven insufficient as a deterrent and fail to ensure proper compliance with licensing requirements.

“In many cases, it is economically more beneficial for a license holder to violate the licensing conditions and then pay the fine, rather than fully comply with the established requirements,” the government said in its explanatory note.

The draft amendments were prepared by the Ministry of Finance and are expected to be reviewed by Parliament in the coming weeks.

8

SOCIETY

GEORGIA TODAY

APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

Spring 2026: What’s Trending, and Where to Shop in Tbilisi Benetton remains a destination for colorrich pieces that instantly brighten a wardrobe.

SNEAKERS ARE GETTING LIGHTER For several seasons, “dad sneakers” dominated the sportswear conversation.

This spring, the mood is changing. The new silhouette is slimmer, lighter and more refined.

On the runway and in street style alike, retro-inspired trainers with thin soles are replacing chunkier designs. They carry a subtle 70s and 80s running-shoe spirit, but feel fresh enough for everyday wear now. Color is still very much part of the story too, with vibrant sneakers continuing to make a strong statement.

At Tbilisi Outlet Village, this trend is easy to explore through Nike, Adidas and Puma, where you can discover both neutral retro runners and brighter styles with more personality.

DENIM, REIMAGINED Denim is one of those rare pieces that never really leaves the fashion conversation, but each season gives it a new direction. For Spring 2026, one of the standout ideas is head-to-toe denim: the full look, built around denim jackets, jeans and coordinated separates.

There is also a visible shift in the denim palette. Dark washes are stepping aside in favor of lighter, faded finishes. In terms of silhouette, capri-style cuts are making a return too, bringing a more playful,

directional feel to spring dressing.

For denim lovers, Levi’s, Lee & Wrangler and Calvin Klein are all strong choices at Tbilisi Outlet Village. That makes it easy to build an entire look in one place, whether you want something classic, relaxed or more trendled.

SPORT STYLE MOVES BEYOND THE GYM This season, sporty dressing is no longer limited to workout spaces. Pieces that once belonged strictly to activewear are now part of everyday wardrobes.

One of the clearest examples is the quarter-zip jacket: simple, comfortable and suddenly everywhere. Technical outerwear is also stepping into the spotlight, especially lightweight waterproof jackets with a retro attitude. Styled the right way, they work just as well on city streets or in casual office settings as they do on the weekend.

This is the beauty of Spring 2026 style: practicality is no longer separate from fashion. The two now move together.

ACCESSORIES ARE DOING MORE

COMPILED BY ANA DUMBADZE

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or the past two years, fashion has been shaped by one dominant mood: quiet luxury. Neutral tones, minimal details and almost invisible branding defined the look. But Spring 2026 brings a new energy. This season feels more expressive, more playful and far more personal.

The shift is easy to spot. Colors are bolder, silhouettes feel lighter, and styling is less about rules and more about character. It is a season built around contrast: calm and bold, polished and relaxed, classic and unexpected. And that is exactly what makes it exciting.

So what is changing this spring, and which of these trends can you discover at Tbilisi Outlet Village?

Accessories feel especially important this season because even one detail can completely shift a look.

Among sunglasses, the standout shape is the bug-eye frame: oversized, rounded and slightly nostalgic. In bags, pouch silhouettes remain relevant, while brooches are making a quiet but stylish comeback. Worn on a shirt, attached to a bag handle or added to the hair, they bring a distinctive finishing touch.

At Tbilisi Outlet Village, Furla and Guess are strong stops for bags, Sani Optics stands out for sunglasses, and Samsonite offers a wide selection of functional accessories with a polished edge.

FROM NEUTRALS TO STATEMENT COLOR The first change begins with color. In 2024 and 2025, beige, black and white led the conversation. This spring, the palette opens up: cobalt blue, fiery red, lemon yellow and emerald green are stepping into focus.

But the real trend is not just one standout shade. It is the way colors are combined. Spring 2026 is embracing color clashing: unexpected pairings that somehow feel completely right. Think bold tones worn together with confidence, or a neutral base lifted by one vivid accent.

That also means neutrals are not disappearing. Khaki, black and deep navy still have their place, but now they feel sharper when styled with a brighter detail.

At Tbilisi Outlet Village, Tommy Hilfiger is a natural choice for this season’s bold red, white and blue energy, while

A SPRING WARDROBE WORTH DISCOVERING Spring 2026 is not about dressing louder for the sake of it. It is about dressing with more freedom. More color. More contrast. More individuality.

At Tbilisi Outlet Village, these trends come together in one place: from statement colors and retro sneakers to denim essentials and standout accessories. It is an easy destination to reach by car from the city center, and an inspiring one to explore when your spring wardrobe needs something fresh.

This season, style feels more open, more vibrant and more fun. And sometimes, the best way to discover it is to step just outside the city and into a new kind of shopping experience.

Russia Advances Bill Allowing Overseas Georgia Confirms Timeline for Plastic Ban Military Deployment to ‘Protect Citizens’

BY TEAM GT

R

ussia’s lower house of parliament has approved in its first reading a draft law that would grant President Vladimir Putin the authority to deploy Russian armed forces abroad in cases where Russian citizens are detained or prosecuted by foreign courts.

Russia’s state news agency Interfax reported that the legislation would expand the legal grounds for overseas military operations, linking them directly to the protection of Russian nationals facing legal action outside the country.

An explanatory note attached to the bill states that the measure is intended to “protect the rights of Russian citizens” in international or foreign judicial

proceedings, including those conducted by courts or institutions that Moscow does not recognize.

The proposal comes amid increasingly strained relations between Russia and Western countries, as well as a growing number of cases involving Russian nationals detained abroad. While Russian authorities frame the initiative as a legal safeguard for citizens, critics are likely to view it as a significant escalation that could broaden the scope for military intervention beyond Russia’s borders.

If adopted in subsequent readings and signed into law, the bill would further consolidate presidential powers over the use of military force internationally, raising concerns about potential implications for international law and state sovereignty.

No immediate reaction from foreign governments has been reported.

BY MARIAM RAZMADZE

T

he Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of Georgia has clarified that the ban on serving beverages in plastic bottles by food service establishments will take effect as scheduled on July 1, 2026, despite broader adjustments to long-term plastic regulations.

As of April 1, 2026, a wide range of single-use plastic products were banned from production (except for export), import and placement on the market.

These include: • Plastic cutlery (forks, knives, spoons, chopsticks) • Plates, straws and drink stirrers • Food containers, cups and lids made from expanded polystyrene (EPS).

The regulation also prohibits public

institutions from procuring plastic cups, containers and beverages in plastic bottles under three liters.

Starting July 1, 2026, additional restrictions will directly affect restaurants, cafés and other food service operators.

Businesses will be prohibited from: • Serving ready-made food in single-use plastic containers or cups • Providing beverages to customers in plastic bottles.

These measures reduce plastic waste generated by the hospitality sector.

Looking ahead, a broader ban on plas-

tic beverage bottles will come into force on February 1, 2031. From that date, the production (except for export), import and sale of beverages in plastic bottles will be prohibited.

Exceptions will apply to: • Water containers of three liters or more • Other beverages in containers of 20 liters or more The ministry states that the phased approach is designed to gradually reduce plastic consumption while allowing businesses time to adapt.

SOCIETY

GEORGIA TODAY APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

9

Far from Home

Photo by the author

BLOG BY TONY HANMER

I

t was time to return to my roots, the real ones, the UK, after an absence of more than 12 years. My uncle’s funeral in Dorset, south England, had been the last reason.

I went alone. This time, too, I had to leave my wife in Tbilisi. But not by choice: she was denied a UK visa. This, despite our hostess’s address being identical to that of our last visit together in 2010; showing a bank statement for my wife, and our translated/notarized marriage certificate; AND having been married to me, a Brit, since 2009! I couldn’t even get an audience with the current ambassador. So off I went, fuming, alone. Things clearly have changed in Albion. I based myself in Dorset and also visited Cambridge for the first time, as well as Shrop-

shire (via Birmingham and Bristol).

Spring was in full glory of greens and flowers.

Along with catching up with many British friends, most of whom are older than me and thus close to or even well past retirement age, I saw a Georgian fellow I’ve been friends with for about 20 years. He has lived and worked in the UK for longer than a decade, but his English remains rudimentary. He has moved nearly once per year on average.

At least his current flat is on an Underground line which connects directly with Heathrow Airport, so, most convenient for my flight back to Georgia.

He has sublet his apartment to several other Georgians, one per room, and I met them all, along with others of his countrymen. He even showed me an outpost of the Georgian Orthodox Church, built Catholic in the 19th century and then bought by Georgians for their own

use in 2010. They were about to celebrate Orthodox Easter, and congratulated me (and Lali, whom they know from our Facebook videos). Later, at a small supra, I remembered that this is the first Easter any living Georgians will have had without a Patriarch, as the new one has still to be chosen. I toasted the successor, whoever he will be, which will soon be made known.

The thing all the Georgians I met had in common was that, while grateful for the work opportunities the UK provides them, they are indeed Not Home. For them, quite conservative to a man, Britain is a scarily liberal place, with its sexual and religious freedoms quite wide-spectrum compared to Georgia.

Now, some of you might think that Sakartvelo could use quite a lot more of the same. I reserve my opinion. But to these Georgians, the UK has gone too far. I suppose one of their biggest concerns is Islam: maybe not too surprising, considering how many times this religion has swept over Georgia and put it to the sword over plenty of centuries.

But there is also the separation from family that most of these diaspora Georgians feel. One of them couldn’t (or chose not to) return to Tbilisi for his own wife’s funeral, knowing that doing so would prevent him ever from going back to the UK. Another has school-age children in Tbilisi, growing up without him. They are working to provide for their families, but separated from them by a gulf which will turn out to be one-way if they ever traverse it.

For a couple of days, my main Georgian friend showed me around London, in which I have never lived, and hardly know. Tower Bridge, Greenwich, Trafalgar Square, the Shard and Cucumber, St James’s Park, Buckingham Palace, St Paul’s Cathedral and more. The irony of

Photo by the author

this tour-guiding process was not lost on us: I also promised to show him the Svaneti he has never seen when he finally does return! We must have done nearly 10 miles each day on foot.

Then I said goodbye, and made my way to Heathrow to fly out, suitcase stuffed with elderflower cordial, Marmite, a few books, a map of Flint county in North Wales from 1610 with my village of Hanmer on it (!), gifts for Lali, and more. A bittersweet trip, for

me and those I left behind.

Tony Hanmer has lived in Georgia since 1999, in Svaneti since 2007, and been a weekly writer and photographer for GT since early 2011. He runs the “Svaneti Renaissance” Facebook group, now with over 2000 members, at www.facebook.com/groups/ SvanetiRenaissance/ He and his wife also run their own guest house in Etseri: www.facebook.com/hanmer.house.svaneti

How War Is Impacting Childhood in Occupied Ukraine

BY KATIE RUTH DAVIES

F

or thousands of Ukrainian children, the war is not only something happening around them; it is changing who they are, how they learn, and, in some cases, where they feel they belong.

In areas of Ukraine now under Russian control, daily life for children has been impacted in ways that extend far beyond the battlefield. Reports from international organizations, researchers, and Ukrainian officials describe changes to schooling, the movement of children away from their homes, and the spread of programs that now mix education with military and political messaging.

These findings come from groups including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, and the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab. Russian authorities dispute many of the conclusions, saying their actions are intended to protect civilians from the dangers of war.

Let’s take a closer look at the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine’s children.

CLASSROOMS UNDER OCCUPATION For many children in the occupied territories, changes quickly appeared in school.

Ukrainian textbooks disappeared.

Familiar lessons were taken off the schedule. In their place came Russian books and classes following the Russian curriculum, taught in Russian, with a different version of history and identity.

The OHCHR reports that Ukrainian language instruction has been reduced or removed in many schools in regions occupied by Russia. New programs, described as “military-patriotic,” introduce students to civic ideas aligned with

the Russian state. In some classrooms, education now includes elements that connect learning with loyalty and national identity.

Some parents have tried to fight these changes, but according to documented accounts, families have reported being pushed to enroll their children in the new system, and in some cases face administrative consequences if they refuse.

GROWING UP IN A MILITARIZED ENVIRONMENT In the occupied areas of Ukraine, military themes have become part of everyday life for children.

Programs linked to groups like “Yunarmiya” introduce uniforms, drills, and ideas about service and loyalty at a young age, with schools increasingly reflecting these priorities.

Beyond schooling, some children have been sent to camps and youth programs, researchers at the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) note. These programs often combine education with physical activity and messaging that promotes loyalty to the Russian state. Some include militarystyle training or structured discipline.

A new report from Yale HRL, released on March 25, says it has found strong evidence linking subsidiaries of Gazprom and Rosneft to a network of at least six re-education camps in Russia and Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, where at least 2,158 Ukrainian children have been held.

Researchers say that, starting in 2022, Gazprom-linked entities issued more than 1,000 subsidized travel vouchers that enabled children to attend programs described as combining political indoctrination with elements of military training.

The lab also notes that many of the people and organizations allegedly involved have not been sanctioned. It says the findings are especially signifi-

Putin’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Marija Lwowa-Belowa, and Ukrainian children kidnapped and taken to Russia. Source: kas.de

cant given a recent 30-day waiver by the US administration, in effect from 12 March to 11 April, that allowed crude oil sales from both companies to continue.

According to the report, Gazprom and Rosneft may be among the first Russian companies accused of involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children to still be generating revenue tied to US consumer activity during that period.

FORCED TRANSFERS AND FAMILIES SEPARATED Investigators from the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine say that numerous Ukrainian children have been moved from occupied areas into Russian-controlled territory and, in some cases, deep into Russia itself. Some have been placed in institutions or foster care; others were separated from their families for extended periods.

The findings of the Commission’s February-April 2026 report concluded that certain transfers amount to war crimes, and in some cases may be labeled as crimes against humanity.

There are accounts of children being given Russian citizenship, and of families struggling to find out where their children have been taken. In some cases, that information was not provided at all.

Most of the children taken from Ukraine are still in Russia or Russian-occupied areas. Some have been forcibly adopted, given new names, and lost official traces of their identity. Many are children from bombed cities whose parents were killed, or were separated during Russian military control. Others were taken from orphanages or sent to camps under the pretext of evacuation.

Accounts collected in Stolen Lives: The Kidnapped Children of Ukraine by Wladimir Klitschko, the brother of Kyiv Major Vitali Klitschko, and Tatjana Kiel, describe a similar pattern, particularly among teenagers from the Kherson region. Children were taken in groups from schools and moved by bus, train, or ship, often to Crimea. Many were then sent through a series of camps that began with a holiday-like setting and gradually became more restrictive.

Reports describe forced “re-education,” where only Russian is allowed, children are made to sing the Russian anthem, and must attend state history lessons.

Some say they were told their families had abandoned them or that life in Russia was better. Those who resisted faced punishment, isolation, threats, and in some cases violence.

Contact with families is rare, and only

a small number have managed to be located and returned.

Russia denies that these actions are unlawful, insisting that the children were evacuated for their own safety, and that legal procedures were followed.

Ukrainian authorities have stated that more than 19,000 children have been officially identified as unlawfully deported or transferred, while some Ukrainian officials have cited much larger figures, sometimes in the hundreds of thousands, when referring to children living under occupation or affected by displacement.

It is difficult to get exact numbers due to limited access to the occupied regions.

While the UN Commission has not published a single total figure of the number of children it considers to have been removed from Ukraine by Russia, it has confirmed documented cases across multiple regions.

“The Russian authorities have systematically failed to disclose the whereabouts of the children to parents or legal guardians and have kept them in a coercive environment obstructing their return.

Instead of establishing a system facilitating the return of the children, the authorities have sought their long-term placement with families or in institutions in the Russian Federation,” the Commission’s latest report reads. “Throughout 2022, Russian authorities declared that adoption was their preferred option for the placement of these children. The Commission has therefore also concluded that Russian authorities have committed the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance of the children deported or transferred from Ukraine, and the war crime of unjustifiable delay in their repatriation.

“From the cases investigated by the Commission, 80 per cent of the children have not yet returned. Those who managed to organize returns encountered obstacles, delays, and security risks.

Continued on page 10

10

SOCIETY

GEORGIA TODAY

APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

How War Is Impacting Childhood in Occupied Ukraine

A Ukrainian child reunited with his family. Source: UCAP

Continued from page 9 Many parents and legal guardians remain unaware of the fate and whereabouts of the children and are still searching for them. Children suffered from trauma and anxiety. A child who managed to return to Ukraine, stated: ‘I was sad, I was scared. I worried that I would have to live in the Russian Federation’.”

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE The US Department of State in March announced the allocation of $25 million to help locate, track, and support the rehabilitation of Ukrainian children removed from their families or communities. The funding will support both tracing efforts and psychological rehabilitation services for returned children, in coordination with Ukrainian authorities and local partners.

Meanwhile, Canada, Norway, and Ukraine have announced plans to cohost a ministerial conference in Toronto in September 2026 focused on the return of prisoners of war, civilians detained in Russia, and deported Ukrainian children.

On March 25, the Tom Lantos Human

Rights Commission, a bipartisan panel in the US House of Representatives cochaired by Democrat James McGovern and Republican Christopher Smith, held a hearing focused on Russia’s forcible transfer of Ukrainian children.

Katya Pavlevych, policy adviser with Razom for Ukraine and the American Coalition for Ukraine, told lawmakers the scale of the crisis is the largest involving missing children since World War II. She said at least 400,000 Ukrainian children are now enrolled in Russian paramilitary organizations.

Pavlevych urged Congress to pass two proposed bills: the DROP Act and the Shadow Fleet Act, which aim to target Russian oil revenues. She also called for a reassessment of US engagement with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, saying there is documented evidence linking it to cooperation with Russian authorities in the deportation and militarization of Ukrainian children.

MORE THAN NUMBERS For the families searching, time is of the essence. Efforts to locate and return children have grown into an international effort, with Ukraine working alongside

dozens of countries and organizations.

Each case is different, and often complicated, involving legal barriers, missing records, and the challenge of tracing a child’s path across borders.

Ukrainian officials say just over 2000 children had been brought back by early 2025. Each return is a success, but also a reminder of how many cases remain unresolved.

We must remember that behind every report, every estimate, and every investigation are individual lives: children

who have been separated from their families, moved across borders, or raised in a different system; children who may carry those experiences for years. Organizations like UNICEF and Save the Children warn of long-term effects on mental health, identity, and development.

For those who return, going home is only the beginning. Rebuilding a sense of safety, trust, and belonging can take much longer.

What is happening to children in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine is

still being pieced together. Investigations are ongoing, access is limited, and accounts often conflict. Much remains unclear to us.

Even so, reports, testimonies, and early research keep going back to the same basic reality: the war is not only changing territory, it is changing what childhood looks like for many of the children caught up in it.

The full consequences will take time to understand, and they are likely to continue long after the fighting stops.

STORIES OF UKRAINIAN CHILDREN AND TEENAGERS RETURNED FROM DEPORTATION AND THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN MARCH 2026

forced to march under the supervision of armed guards. Even at an early age, her daily environment was shaped by militarization and control. Instead of a safe childhood, she was exposed to propaganda and strict discipline, while her mother sought a way to protect her from this reality.

Kseniia, 18 — Kseniia spent months unable to communicate openly, hiding her pro-Ukrainian views to avoid attention. She had to feign loyalty to the occupation authorities to stay safe. Living under constant self-censorship and fear, she was deprived of a normal social life. Today, she is safe and dreams of becoming a police officer or serving in the military to defend Ukraine.

Oleksii, 16 — Oleksii witnessed the abduction of his father by occupying forces at a checkpoint. His father was held in a basement for three months, while the family faced interrogations and threats. The experience left them under constant pressure. To avoid forced military registration in Russia, Oleksii left before turning 17.

Andrii, 18 — Andrii was interrogated

by Russian police for using the Ukrainian language in private messages. Even personal communication became grounds for punishment. Today, he is back in Ukraine and can freely speak his native language without fear.

Yaroslav, 19 — Yaroslav was detained

and held in a basement, where he was interrogated overnight by FSB officers.

He was pressured to sign a contract with the Russian army. The threat of coercion into military service was immediate, and refusal carried serious consequences, leaving him with no sense of control over his future.

Iryna, 18 — Iryna was trapped inside her home for days due to relentless shelling, without water or food, while Russian soldiers aggressively harassed civilians, including young women, on the streets of her city. Upon turning 18, she was finally able to leave the occupied territory.

Nazar, 9 — Nazar spent four years living under constant shelling, as his family had no way to escape their occupied village. Russian forces set up positions just a few hundred meters from their home; shells regularly flew past, and mines landed in their yard on multiple occasions. Today, his entire family is safe.

Diana, 14 — Diana lived with her mother under occupation for years, facing searches, threats, and pressure. Their documents and car were seized, and Ukrainian passports were destroyed, forcing people to hide proof of identity.

Fear became constant, leaving no sense of stability. Unable to endure it any longer, they decided to leave and eventually returned to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

All returns have taken place as part of the President of Ukraine’s initiative, Bring Kids Back UA, thanks to the support and efforts of its partners, including the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ukrainian Child Rights Network, Save Ukraine, Helping to Leave, Humanity, and others.

All names have been changed for safety reasons.

Viktor, 19 — Viktor lived for years in a frontline area under constant shelling and without communication. Daily life unfolded to the sound of explosions.

The turning point came when a shell hit a neighboring yard and shattered the windows in his room. The proximity of danger made it clear that staying meant constant risk to life, leaving him with no sense of safety or stability.

Dmytro, 18 — Despite serious health problems, Dmytro was pressured by Russian authorities to join the army. One officer openly told him to stop studying and go fight. His condition was ignored, and his right to choose his future was dismissed. The pressure to serve in the occupying forces became direct and unavoidable.

Nika, 6 — At kindergarten, Nika was

CULTURE

Grains of Habit: Abe’s Dunes Rewired for an Algorithmic Stage

Photo by the author

REVIEW BY IVAN NECHAEV

T

here is a peculiar discipline to the stage at the Movement Theater; a discipline that resists theatrical excess and instead builds meaning through duration, pressure, and the gradual reconfiguration of the body. Ana Gogishvili’s The Woman in the Dunes, adapted from Kobo Abe, settles into this space with a kind of austere confidence, allowing the material to unfold as a condition one inhabits.

From the outset, the stage refuses illusion in any conventional sense. The environment, constructed through a spare combination of physical texture, light (by Kato Japaridze), and a persistent field of digital imagery, functions as a closed system rather than a setting.

The AI-generated visuals behave like an atmosphere that continuously recalibrates perception. At times they resemble granular movement, at others a kind of abstract flow, as if sand itself had been translated into a digital substrate. This visual layer, developed in tandem with Gogishvili’s direction, operates with enough autonomy to feel like a second

logic running parallel to the performers.

At the center are Anano Iashvili and Giorgi Tsertsvadze, whose performances avoid psychological exposition in favor of incremental physical adjustment.

Iashvili’s presence is particularly controlled: her movements are economical, almost pre-programmed. She establishes a rhythm early on, a pattern of labor, pause, and recalibration, that gradually becomes the temporal structure of the entire piece. Tsertsvadze, by contrast, begins with a more legible sense of resistance: his gestures are larger, his timing less settled, his body still oriented toward an outside that the stage steadily erases. What is striking is how this difference dissolves. Over the course of the performance, his physical vocabulary narrows, aligns, and eventually syncs with the system Iashvili has already internalized.

Kakha Bakuradze’s choreography is built on repetition, though not the kind that accumulates into spectacle. Instead, each cycle appears slightly adjusted; shortened, redirected, stripped of excess, until movement begins to resemble function. Digging, carrying, stabilizing: these actions are never mimed in a literal sense, yet their logic is unmistakable. The body becomes a site of adaptation, where intention is gradually replaced by necessity.

The production’s most conspicuous intervention is technological. AI-generated visuals and animation are active participants, occupying a status comparable to that of the actors. This decision

places the work within a recognizable contemporary lineage, in which digital systems are granted a kind of performative agency. The question, as always, is whether these systems structure the experience or merely decorate it. When they function as environments, conditions that shape perception and action, they may approximate something of Abe’s closed, self-regulating world.

What emerges is a performance less concerned with entrapment as a dramatic situation than with adaptation as a temporal process. Resistance does not disappear; it becomes procedural, absorbed into the very actions that sustain the environment. By the final sequences, it

Photo by the author

is difficult to locate any clear boundary between agency and compliance. The performers continue to move, to adjust, to maintain; but the question of whether these actions constitute struggle or acceptance is left deliberately unresolved.

Gogishvili’s staging avoids overt philosophical statements, and this restraint proves decisive. The work does not attempt to explain its own condition.

Instead, it sustains it, patiently, sometimes uncomfortably, until the audience begins to register its logic on a sensory level. Time stretches, variation diminishes, and attention shifts from what is happening to how it continues to happen.

CULTURE

GEORGIA TODAY APRIL 17 - 23, 2026

11

Soft Archives, Sharp Edges: Catalogue of Sensory Data at The Why Not Gallery

Photo by the author

REVIEW BY IVAN NECHAEV

T

here is a particular kind of exhibition text that promises “dialogue” and “synchronicity” and “immersive environments,” the familiar soft rhetoric of contemporary curating.

Catalogue of Sensory Data, the collaborative exhibition by Nata Varazi and Gvantsa Jishkariani at The Why Not Gallery, begins there, and then, somewhat unexpectedly, delivers on it. The surprise lies in the material fact of the

work: Felt. Wool. Fiber. A medium historically coded as domestic, minor, peripheral, here expands into a total environment that feels like an atmosphere one moves through, inhales, brushes against.

The first encounter is spatial rather than conceptual. Suspended forms, spiked, star-like, vaguely vegetal or perhaps microbial, hover in midair, their saturated reds, ochres, and bruised violets absorbing and diffusing light. They read as both decorative and faintly threatening, soft sculptures that retain the memory of touch even when untouched.

Their tactility is not incidental; it is the

Photo by the author

textile composition, dominated by a white deer-like figure, elongated and almost spectral, evokes a symbolic lexicon that feels at once folkloric and estranged. If Varazi’s contribution leans toward the surreal and the oneiric, Jishka-

Photo by the author

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primary language. The surfaces are visibly worked, compressed, agitated into density. This is insistence: matter shaped through repetition, pressure, time.

Behind and around them, the wall-based works unfold a parallel narrative. A large

riani’s presence is felt in the friction between image and context. Her longstanding engagement with post-Soviet visual culture, its propaganda aesthetics, its ornamental excess, its uneasy humor, surfaces here in a softened, almost disarmed form. The usual irony is muted, or perhaps metabolized into material.

Felt absorbs critique; it slows it down, renders it tactile, almost tender.

What binds the exhibition is not simply thematic overlap, identity, memory, inner experience, but a shared commitment to what might be called affective indexing. The “catalogue” of the title is not taxonomic in any strict sense. There is no system here, no clear classification.

Instead, the works function as entries in a loose, unstable archive of sensation: longing, vulnerability, a kind of ambient melancholy that resists narrative closure.

This is where the exhibition’s strength becomes most apparent. Rather than staging trauma or identity as spectacle, a tendency visible in much contemporary practice emerging from post-Soviet contexts, Catalogue of Sensory Data turns inward, privileging states that are difficult to articulate and therefore often dismissed. The softness of the material becomes a conceptual strategy. It refuses the hardness of declaration, the clarity of political messaging, without retreating into apolitical abstraction.

The Why Not Gallery’s collaboration with Fabrika Project Space frames this exhibition as a beginning. It feels appropriately provisional. Catalogue of Sensory Data does not resolve into a statement; it accumulates. It lingers as a sensation carried out of the space, something half-formed and persistent, like the afterimage of color when the eyes close. In this sense, the exhibition succeeds most where it is least declarative.

It does not tell us what to feel. It constructs the conditions under which feeling, ambiguous, layered, unresolved, becomes newly legible.

Editor-In-Chief: Katie Ruth Davies

Journalists: Ana Dumbadze Vazha Tavberidze Tony Hanmer Nugzar B. Ruhadze Ivan Nechaev Mariam Razmadze Lana Kokaia Layout: Misha Mchedlishvili Photographer: Aleksei Serov

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