POLITICS

China’s New Emerging Role in the Middle East

Leaders from China and Egypt conduct discussions during a meeting in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China in 2019. Photo by Greg Baker-Pool/Getty Images

BY EMIL AVDALIANI

There is much debate both within and without China over whether or not its economic interests in the region will force it to play a more active security/military role in the Middle East. In fact, recent political and economic trends in the region indicate that a shift in China’s approach to the Middle East along these lines has already started.

So far, most Chinese cooperation with Middle Eastern countries has focused on energy and economic relations. But things are changing. Recent developments indicate that Beijing is now strengthening its ties to Middle Eastern countries in areas such as defense, culture, and the toning down of mutual criticism.

China has concluded partnership agreements with some dozen Middle Eastern countries so far, but several warrant special attention, particularly Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is now China’s largest trading partner in West Asia, and Beijing is Riyadh’s largest trading partner in the world.

This is not an isolated case. China is also the UAE’s largest trading partner. More than 200,000 Chinese nationals reside in the UAE, and the Dubai Port is a vital global shipping and logistics hub for Chinese goods.

In the last decade, as Chinese fears have grown over the safe operation of sea lanes, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait have come under increased Chinese attention. The gaining of infl uence in and around geographical choke points for global trade and oil and gas shipment has become pivotal to Beijing’s foreign policy in western Eurasia.

No wonder Egypt features so strongly in China’s investment agenda. Billions of dollars have been invested by Beijing in Egypt. China is helping Egypt build a new administrative capital in the desert outside Cairo, as well as a Red Sea port and industrial zone in Ain Sukhna. Several high level trips were made by Egyptian offi cials to Beijing since 2014, compared to just two to the country’s traditional security partner, the US.

The growing connections between Middle Eastern states and China are sensitive for the West. The US’ evolving international position has led it to discard some of its responsibilities in Eurasia, which has had the effect of causing small countries to revisit their relationships with the US and consider the rising China.

Another interesting Middle Eastern partner for China is Iran. Tehran wishes to establish relationships with global powers to balance US pressure. Its growing partnership with Moscow fi ts this paradigm, as does its increasing closeness with Beijing.

Iran could prove much more important to China than other Middle East states. Its growing isolation from the West is likely to continue in the coming years, which will push it to work ever more closely with China. Iran’s strategic location and human resources, as well as its intention to serve as a civilizational center of gravity for neighboring states, could divert American military and economic capabilities away from the South China Sea, which would work in Beijing’s favor.

Iranian troops or their allies are operating in many countries around the Middle East, and the Iranian navy is active in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. All of this dilutes US power across the Eurasian continent. Moreover, Iran’s location can enable China’s Belt and Road Initiative to pervade the region, whether on land or sea (the Caspian and the Persian Gulf).

China publicly rejects any notion of its seeking military or security dominance in the Middle East. Beijing understands that it still lacks the knowledge, networks of contacts, and necessary authority (on a par with Western authority) to proclaim its geopolitical aims in the troublesome region. Despite this, westerners often take it for granted that China is in fact seeking domination in Eurasia. After all, why would the country want to spend billions and station hundreds of soldiers either in the Middle East or elsewhere in Eurasia?

There is a grand debate within China itself on whether Beijing’s economic interests in the Middle East could force it to become a more active security/ military player in the region. Though there are hopes that this can be avoided, there are already signs pointing in this direction.

Beijing recently announced its intention to take part in anti-piracy initiatives in the Persian Gulf following incidents with oil tankers. With the US diminishing its presence in Eurasia overall, China will have to address the geopolitical vacuum. Spending billions will not solve every problem, but economic development of the region could forestall tensions for some time.

It is likely that China will have to increase its presence in Western Eurasia. Concrete steps have already been taken: Beijing opened a base in Djibouti and set up military installations on the border with Afghanistan and in Tajikistan.

As China grows its position in the region, it will need partners to manage inter-state confl icts. Russia is a likely choice, but the latter, like Turkey and Iran, will not be particularly interested in sharing military/security positions in the Middle East that were gained by waging war in Syria and working in concert to constrain the American position.

Overall, it can be argued that Beijing will continue to be extremely careful not to become too involved in the region. As far as China is concerned, Russia and the US can keep responsibility for security in the region. What is crucial for Beijing is multipolarity, and it will pursue that principle assiduously.

But as time goes on, China will fi nd it increasingly diffi cult to stay above the fray in the Middle East. It will have to become more responsive to rising challenges to its businesses and sea and land trade routes.

This will inevitably lead to greater insecurity between the US and China. Top US offi cials have been warning about China’s efforts to gain infl uence in the Middle East, which could undermine defense cooperation between the US and its traditional regional allies in the region. The Middle East is thus transforming into yet another arena of competition between the US and China.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian thinktank, Geocase.

The Maro Makashvili Chamber Opens at the Georgian Parliament

Maro Makashvili is a renowned freedom fi ghter who gave her life for Georgia’s independence during the 1921 war. The Parliament of Georgia honored this national icon by dedicating a chamber after her. The Maro Makashvili Chamber will host an exposition featuring women members of the Georgian Parliament throughout history.

It was renovated and equipped through the Parliament’s Gender Equality Council, with assistance from the Government of Sweden, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UN Women.

Born into a noble family of well-known writers, Makashvili was a 19-year-old student at Tbilisi State University when the Red Army invaded Georgia in February 1921. She volunteered as a nurse and was sent to Kojori along with the Georgian Regiment, where she met her untimely death. From the 1920s to the present, artists, poets and composers and the Georgian public have memorialized and cherished her heroism, elevating her to a symbol of Georgia’s struggle for independence. In 2015, she became the fi rst woman to be awarded the Georgian Order of National Hero.

The 7 December opening of the Chamber brought together a range of supporters from the Government, civil society and international organizations. This included Parliament Chairperson Kakhaber Kuchava, Chairperson of the Parliament’s Gender Equality Council MP Nino Tsilosani, Ambassador of Sweden Ulrik Tideström, UNDP Head Nick Beresford and UN Women Country Representative Kaori Ishikawa.

Unit Manager for Human Rights, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Lela Akiashvili and representatives of the Public Defender’s Offi ce and civil society organizations delivered a seminar for youth about women’s political empowerment and their role in building democracy.

“Maro Makashvili is the fi rst woman to be awarded the Georgian Order of National Hero. It is symbolic that Parliament now has a chamber named in her honor, which which will remain for generations. Maro Makashvili, who fought for Georgia’s independence, is a symbol of how to build a strong country,” said Kakhaber Kuchava.

“The names of courageous and talented Georgian women are written in history. Their struggle for equality, human rights, independence and freedom is inseparable from the development of Georgia. As we pay tribute to women heroes of the past, we also salute women leaders of the present who pave the way to achieving gender equality, protecting human rights and increasing women’s participation in Georgia’s political and economic life,” said Ambassador of Sweden Ulrik Tideström.

“Georgia’s history remembers many extraordinary women who shone like stars in public life. Yet women still have to struggle with gender stereotypes that lead to discrimination, gender-based violence and political and economic under-representation. As we acknowledge women’s roles in Georgia’s democratic development, we need to consolidate efforts and take concrete steps to create an equal environment for all citizens — women and men alike,” said UNDP Head Nick Beresford.

The Maro Makashvili Chamber was established under the auspices of the ongoing 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence campaign. The event is also part of this year’s Human Rights Week that brings together UNDP’s local and international partners and wide circles of Georgia’s society. This includes the Government Administration, Parliament, the Public Defender’s Offi ce, the European Union, UN agencies, the Government of Sweden, civil society organizations and international agencies.

Cargo Train Services Launch between Georgia and China

BY ANA DUMBADZE

The fi rst regular cargo train left for Georgia from Gansu’s Wuwei City, marking the inauguration of the Wuwei-Tbilisi cargo train services, Georgia’s Foreign Ministry reported this week. The fi nal destination of the cargo train is Tbilisi, and it is set to arrive in 10-12 days.

The ministry says that cargo transportation from China via railway will become regular, both in the direction of Georgia and via Georgia, heading to other European countries.

At the inauguration ceremony, Georgian Ambassador to China, Archil Kalandia emphasized the strategic importance of the project in supporting the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (ITR), and Georgia’s positioning as a regional trade, transport, and logistics hub.

For his part, the Vice-Governor of Gansu Province noted the growing role of Georgia in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, facilitating the implementation of similar projects.

Zhvania School and USAID Supporting Good Governance and Improving Competencies in Minority Communities

BY ANA DUMBADZE AND KATIE RUTH DAVIES

The role of USAID in the social-economic processes in the country is very important. The project “Raising Awareness of Public Administration Reform and Capacity Building in Local Self-Government Units Densely Populated by National Minorities” is yet another example of their commitment and important work, as part of the USAID Good Governance Initiative (GGI) in Georgia.

The Zurab Zhvania School of Public Administration is a subcontractor of the project, implementing the project “Raising Awareness on Public Administration Reform and Capacity Building in Local Self-Government Units Densely Populated by National Minorities.” Apart from the fact that the results obtained from this project are very important for the minorities living in the regions of Georgia, they are also very important for the school, because the status of “subcontractor” signifi es trust in the educational institution itself, both in fi nancial and operational terms.

“For us, it’s a kind of quality indicator that means that the school is on the right path of development,” Ketevan Jakeli, Director of the Zhvania School, tells GEORGIA TODAY.

The project aims at supporting good governance on local self-government levels by strengthening the capacity of offi cials. Within the framework of the project, up to 40 representatives of national minorities from Akhalkalaki, Lagodekhi, Gardabani, Ninotsminda, Marneuli, Akhaltsikhe, Tsalka and Bolnisi self-governments are being trained in issues of public and open governance, disinformation and integration into EuroAtlantic institutions.

In the process of validation of the training modules, the design, feasibility, content of the modules and compliance of the adaptation standard of the materials for the target groups were determined. The NATO and EU information center, the Civil Service Bureau, the Government Administration and industry experts were involved in this process.

Expected results include introducing the benefi ciaries to the principles of good governance, improving the opportunities for benefi ciaries to use public administration terminology in Georgian, and improving benefi ciaries' competencies in public governance, decentralization, sustainable development goals, open governance, disinformation, EU integration and NATO aspects.

Zhvania School has developed several thematic modules for the program on topics such as misinformation, cyber security, integration into the EU and NATO, good governance matters, public reforms, and the decentralization reform ongoing in the country.

“In Georgia, we have municipalities where the majority of the population is made up of ethnic minorities, and the language barrier still exists despite various programs carried out by the state. It is important that public offi cials who represent ethnic minorities not be left behind the countrywide reforms being implemented. The collaboration between Zhvania School and the USAID Good Governance program serves exactly this goal,” Jakeli says. “The modules that have been carried out in Georgian-language municipalities have been developed and adapted considering the needs of ethnic minorities. 40 public offi cials from various municipalities are currently taking the relevant training courses. As such, we can say the training on public governance has been very successful.”

The thematic trainings are preceded by a two-week intense “intro course”- a course where benefi ciaries study terminology-focused language in order to make passing the following thematic modules easier. The intro course is followed by modules on EU and NATO integration.

“We, both Zhvania School and USAID, are closely following the processes, because it is important to assess the results, and it is very important for us to see how this initiative actually helps those studying with us to integrate into the processes underway in the country. They are part of these processes, and this is a problem that can only be solved through joint forces,” Jakeli notes adding that attracting highly qualifi ed fi eld experts is also important.

“I’m glad to see that these trainings and working on the integration of minorities was something that inspired and excited them, and it’s nice to see how motivated they are. As a result, 40 public offi cials will gain knowledge about the reforms and processes ongoing in the country, which itself contributes to their involvement and more active efforts for the better future of our country.”

“Participation in these trainings is very important for ethnic minorities living in Georgia,” says Orkhan Alyev, the Mayor’s Representative in Bolnisi Municipality. “Based on my experience, I think that all the state offi cials representing ethnic minorities should be maximally involved in such initiatives, as it raises our awareness regarding the political, social and economic processes and reforms going on in the country, and helps us to better involve ourselves in them.

“I’m very grateful to USAID and the Zhvania School for such an opportunity. Importantly, we, the project benefi ciaries, are also taking a language course as part of the project, which is crucial for us to fi nally overcome the existing language barrier and improve our knowledge of the Georgian language,” Alyev notes. “This is of utmost importance for our daily activities. Again, this is a very good project and I want to thank its initiators!”

“I'm very satisfi ed with my participation in this project,” says Maia Beridu, Assistant to the Tsalka Municipality Mayor. “I think all the public servants, not only those representing ethnic minorities, should get involved in such projects. It is very helpful that it is available in a convenient online format, as I've never had such an opportunity before due to my busy schedule.

“Public governance is a complex topic, and this course gives us an opportunity to further strengthen and deepen our knowledge in this direction. I'm very grateful to our professional trainers for their dedication and enthusiasm. It's a great comfort to have this relationship with them,” she adds.

“We’re undergoing very diverse trainings as part of the project,” notes Giorgi Sackov, Head of the Bolnisi Municipality City Hall Committee on Education and Youth Affairs. “I personally am maximally involved in it. When a person is employed in the public sector, it is always important for their career to grow and develop, for them to be able to use their knowledge in practice, and the efforts of USAID and Zhvania School help us to achieve this goal. This project helps its benefi ciaries to feel more self-confi dent and raises our awareness of many important topics. I’ll be involved in it until the end with pleasure, as it helps me believe in my strengths and overcome any barriers.”

To fi nd out more about the USAID GGI, and the Zhvania School’s involvement in implementing it, GEORGIA TODAY spoke to Lina Panteleeva, who has worked in USAID/Georgia’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Offi ce since 2012. She has been managing USAID’s Good Governance Initiative since 2015.

“USAID views transparent, accountable, and effective governance as critical to building a citizen-centered democracy that responds to the needs of the Georgian people,” she tells us. “This is a fundamental building block for Georgia’s continued democratic development and for the country meeting its commitments under the Association Agreement with the European Union.

“The USAID Good Governance Initiative has been our fl agship activity in this space since it launched in 2015. We designed the program to promote transparency, accountability and effectiveness in governance by improving the performance of the legislative and executive branches at the local and national levels.

“This work covers a lot of different technical areas - from things like human resources, participatory legislative processes, budgeting, and the management of public fi nances, to legislative oversight of the executive government. We work with a range of partners across the Government of Georgia, including the Parliament and the State Audit Offi ce. We also partner with government counterparts on important reforms, including civil service reform and decentralization.

“At the day-to-day level, we build linkages between different branches and levels of government, which in turn increases the effectiveness of public services and ensures that elected offi cials conduct oversight of executive bodies, like mayoral offi ces and national agencies. We also create mechanisms to help Georgian citizens participate in local decision-making processes. For example, we helped several Georgian cities to introduce participatory budgeting activities. These processes allow citizens to submit their own ideas for projects to receive funding. The winning projects are selected by popular vote.

“This stuff can get pretty technical, but it all comes back to the same simple set of goals: increasing the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of governance so the Georgian people can receive the high-quality public services they need and deserve.

“After seven years of USAID support through this program, we can point to some tangible progress. Georgia now has a merit-based civil service and much stronger and more capable local government institutions, and citizens can more easily access information about the work of the country’s legislative and executive government bodies. I want to point out that there is still much room for improvement, especially in implementing some of the reforms that Georgia has already introduced. USAID is committed to supporting further progress toward good governance, and we look to our partners in the Government of Georgia for their commitment.

WHAT WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ZURAB ZHVANIA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES, AND WHY WAS THIS SCHOOL CHOSEN?

USAID has always put a major emphasis on ensuring that governance is not only effective but inclusive, so that all citizens benefi t from improved public services and better-functioning institutions of government. In the case of public administration reform, it’s important that civil servants, including those living in ethnic minority communities or other underrepresented areas, are knowledgeable about the reforms and how they impact their day-to-day work. It is also important to ensure that ethnic minority civil servants are able to participate in the implementation of public administration reforms, including through capacity building and awareness raising on key aspects of those reforms.

This is the main purpose of our partnership with the the Zhvania School. The school was established in 2005 with US Government support to tackle the issue of low representation of ethnic minority representatives in public service. It is currently one of the few government-certifi ed training providers in Georgia, and the only organization providing training and adult learning programs for civil servants for whom Georgian is not their fi rst language. We are really hopeful that this project, implemented in cooperation with the Zhvania School, will contribute to improving governance at the local level and raise their awareness of key aspects of public administration reform, open governance principles, decentralization, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and disinformation. Partnering with the school will also ensure the sustainability of project results, as the training modules developed through the program will continue to be available in the future.

LOOKING AHEAD, IS GEORGIA NOW ABLE TO "GO ITS OWN WAY" WITHOUT USAID’S GOOD GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, OR DOES IT NEED FURTHER SUPPORT? (IF SO, IN WHICH AREAS)?

We have supported the Government of Georgia to introduce good governance principles for many years. It’s part of our strategy to advance citizen-centered democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration. Georgia has already implemented important reforms and realized tangible progress in many areas. However, there are still gaps in implementation and challenges to be overcome before Georgia reaches a state where citizens feel a positive change in their everyday lives. This is a process of continual improvement that takes time and requires enormous effort, alongside continued support from Georgia’s international partners.

The Covid-19 pandemic underlined the importance of well-functioning institutions of government. It also revealed the gaps that remain in Georgia’s system. In particular, it showed that transparency, freedom of information, decentralized governance, inclusive and evidence-based decision making, and greater accessibility of public services are critical to address the needs of citizens and to earn their trust. Moving forward, the Government of Georgia needs to continue focusing on these areas and fully leverage the support of its development partners, including USAID.

Russia and Its Lies About “Responsibility to Protect”

OP-ED BY MICHAEL GODWIN

In 2005, the United Nations established the principle of Responsibility to Protect at the World Summit, commonly shortened to R2P. This principle was established with the expressed goal of preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in the world. Ratifi ed unanimously by all 170 UN member states, this has largely been framed as a great step forward for stability and peace.

Like any globalized piece of legislation, there will be those that seek to bastardize and twist its original meaning. Putin would never allow such an opportunity to slip away, and as such has been the target of multiple accusations. These accusations allege that he has used a portion of the R2P framework to illegally expand his empire in Europe and the Middle East.

The R2P principle is founded in the generally accepted belief that for a state to be truly sovereign, a government must provide for the protection of its people, fi rst and foremost. This protection includes the four aforementioned forms of abuse, including the targeting of any one group within the nation’s territory. While much of this is already codifi ed in international law, R2P acts not only as a bolster to that effect but also as a protective effort for certain sectors of the population. These sectors are not just vulnerable, but are commonly or routinely targeted. To address this further, the UN established these three components referred to as the Three Pillars: “...the responsibility of each State to protect its populations (pillar I); the responsibility of the international community to assist States in protecting their populations (pillar II); and the responsibility of the international community to protect when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations (pillar III).”

The fi rst and second pillars are largely seen as the core of the R2P scope. These outline the duties of the state to its people, as well as methods the international community may assist fi nancially, materially, or in a consultative capacity. It is the third pillar that has come under some debate in recent years.

This concept has its roots in the widely held belief that the world should never again turn its back on mass violence against a people. However, it is the misuse of this third pillar that has caused more consternation than any other.

Russia used this pillar as a part of its justifi cation for invading Georgia in 2008. The Kremlin argued that it invoked the third pillar in an effort to protect its people and other ethnic Russians against what was perceived as genocide. The UN denied this as any grounds for justifi cation of a military invasion. While the Georgian government forces had been sparring with separatists and illegally armed groups for some time by August 2008, the international community widely recognized that diplomacy was far more effective than any military response.

Despite this, Russia has continued to use their false interpretation of the third pillar as a basis from which to launch multiple other campaigns in violation of international law and norms. Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic have since, and continue to, suffer under the weight of the Kremlin's advances. In addition to sovereign Georgia, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have been in the crosshairs for some time.

Russia routinely plants deep-cover teams against and puppet entities inside these nations in order to create a proPutin minority. Through false information campaigns and the manipulation or subversive hijacking of media outlets, they are able to drive the split between the local nationals and their new “Russifi ed” base.

The near future and the next attempt to seize back their lost Soviet lands will almost assuredly contain these efforts, and more. Russia has already begun to potentially incorporate one of these new tactics: land grabbing masked as peacekeeping. The sight of the infamous “MC” markings are now ubiquitous in the recently contested Nagorno-Karabakh region.

But what would the next Russian incursion look like? Be it Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or any other European or Asian country that falls into the Kremlin’s crosshairs, it is worth postulating what that operation could look like. As an attempt to explore and clarify some of the concepts noted, here is a notional example

NOTE: For the purposes of anonymity and ambiguity in interpretation, the author has used fake names and places in this example.

Russian “peacekeepers” display their MC markings, a cyrillic abbreviation of the Russian words миротворческие силы, or peacekeeping forces. By Alexander Ryumin/TASS

SCENARIO: RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN “LITHONIA”

The nation of “Lithonia” lies on the northwestern borders of the Russian Federation. A heavily wooded nation, most of the country’s over 1,100,000 people live near the coastal capital of Lart’a. With a 71% majority of its population being ethnically Lithonian, another 29% is Slavic, almost all coming from Russian families relocated during Soviet occupation. Many consider the cultural differences to be of minor concern, with only fi shing territory rights, an ongoing miners’ strike, and a recent tax reform policy being the most prominent issues for citizens.

However, the new tax code guidance memorandum has only been published in the native language, Lithonii. While this is no major concern given its use of the Cyrillic alphabet, there is a rise in social media advertisement posts and unsourced stories being shared about how this is to ostracize the “uncultured” Slavic portion in the nation. To complement this, images and “memes” are circulating that show the Slavic portion of the country as uneducated, poor, and a burden on the state welfare programs.

The Lithonian Christian Church uses its considerable social power in an effort to unify people, but many in the Eastern Orthodox parts of the country see this as an attempt to make them irrelevant. Behind the scenes, Russian intelligence and subversion agents are creating and promulgating this division through media and social centers. More content is pushed in front of people to further ostracize the two groups from one another.

Using these social media platforms, the Russian agents support and help organize protests and rallies near government offi ces in various districts of the country. Targeting an up-and-coming pro-Slavic youth movement, they use them to spark agitation between them and the local police, causing a physical confrontation on the steps of a regional municipal building. The next morning, photos of the national police seemingly beating an unarmed teenager have gone viral on local and international social media. Lart'a releases statements outlining the facts behind the confrontation, but by this time the social media reactions have already begun.

As a result, more protests become marred by sporadic violence promulgated by members of this same youth group. With Russian-backed media keeping these images on every 24-hour news cycle, many begin to take note of the situation in Lithonia. The Russian government convenes with its security council, then holds a press conference declaring the need to protect Russian culture, traditions, and its Russo-ethnic people at home and abroad. Finally, a statement is released from the Kremlin that the Russian Federation is ready to help with the establishment of peace and security with their brother nations, particularly Lithonia, within its duty to protect oppressed people.

The Lithonian military only numbers around 20,000 active and reserve members and many of them are not trained for this type of problem, with only 8% having deployed in the recent NATO operation in Afghanistan. Additionally, the majority of the Slavic members of the armed forces have not been seen reporting back to their units after the recent weekend. The Kremlin offers its assistance to help under a Russian Peace Authority (RPA) operation, continuing to say it is operating under the UN R2P and in the interests of peace and stability.

Before Lart'a can respond with any offi cial statement, armored personnel carriers and helicopters with large hastily painted RPA and MC on their sides arrive in the eastern part of Lithonia bordering Russia. With no overt Russian standard military markings, sporting light blue and white RPA fl ags, and soldiers wearing light blue helmets and berets, it is diffi cult to distinguish them from other commonly seen peacekeeping forces. Curiously, paramilitary and “Civil Protection” units have begun replacing the national police in the affected towns. These new “authorities” begin encouraging national police offi cers to either join them or to move back to Lart'a, all the while keeping armed guard on them.

The Russian agents, still operating undercover, begin utilizing their hidden weapons: electronic jamming equipment. Soon, the entire country has gone dark, preventing any solid intelligence picture from being formed for the remainder of Europe and the United States. Russian telecommunication infrastructure is moved in to replace the local providers and a complete transfer of information dominance is completed.

As the fog begins to clear on the situation in Lithonia, Russian military units operating under the RPA have built a new border around the eastern half of Lithonia. Main battle tanks with RPA blue and white fl ags guard every road crossing, and permanent military installations begin being constructed. The Lithonian military is warned that any unit approaching the Peace Authority Line will be met with hostility in defense of the oppressed people. Since the Lithonian military’s warfi ghting capability is dwarfed by the RPA deployment force, it is forced to comply and pulls back around Lart'a in the west.

International leaders express outrage in various press events and demand an explanation from the Russian government, only to be met with silence. NATO military commanders meet in multiple joint sessions, wrestling with options. The potential for a fallout and total war with Russia due to the alleged attack on the blue-helmeted and identifi ed Russian Peace Authority is weighed with appeasement. All the while, Russia maintains the leverage of its gas exports should there be any aggression towards its RPA troops.

While this is only a simple example, this is not far from the tactics Russia has used in the real world. Its symptoms can be recognized, but only if they are cut short from growing into a real problem should they become ineffective. On a larger scale, fi rm and long term restrictions on the Russian government in the international community need to come to term.

Recent events only supply more evidence to this. Russia, and its puppet Belarus, are using humanitarian issues at the Polish frontier as a means to force NATO to the table. In addition, Ukrainian and other allied intelligence offi ces have reported on the movements of large Russian military formations close to the Ukrainian border, including the occupied Donbas region. These formations are reported to number up to 100,000, a number that would be reasonably able to seize the eastern half of the nation.

Rescinding the right for Russia to operate in a peacekeeping capability and fulfi ll any third pillar R2P obligation, removing their vote from the UN Security Council, and a hard line in the proverbial sand stating that Russian forces are barred from operating outside of the Russian mainland must be implemented. While many in Moscow will cry outrage, it is only with this level of forced restraint that Europe, as well as many others, can begin to achieve some semblance of peace.

In reality, it is hard to envision this being implemented due to a large group of Western world leadership having the idea that appeasement tactics and befriending the Kremlin is possible. Flatly, this is not a reality with Putin or any of his cohorts in control. While the future may change this fact, it is the here and now that will shape much of the future, sovereignty, and perhaps the even existence of the European Union.

Insignia and fl ag used by Russian military units near the Ukrainian border showing their false use of peacekeeping identifi cation markings and UN insignia. Source: InformNapalm.org

SOCIETY Partnership for Gender Equality – Joint Initiative of FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, and Liberty Bank

Anew series of meetings have launched at the joint initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Liberty Bank in the regions of Georgia. The purpose of the meetings is to raise the awareness of gender equality, reproductive health and rights, community participation, women's economic empowerment, as well as of banking services among rural women, that will benefi t women involved in agriculture. In December 2021, meetings will be held in Shida Kartli and Racha-Lechkhumi regions.

The fi rst meeting of the series was held at the Georgia Gold Hotel in Gori, on December 4, 2021. The meeting was attended by women from Gori and Khashuri municipalities, who are involved in the FAO Agriculture and Rural Development Project (sponsored by the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC)). The participants were informed about issues such as family planning, prevention of uterine and breast cancer, domestic violence, harmful practices (child marriage, gender selection), the role of gender equality in the development of business and agriculture, fi nancial planning and banking services offered to women involved in agriculture by Liberty Bank.

At the same time, a training session “Men Talking to Men” was also held as part of the cooperation between the UNFPA and FAO. “Men Talking to Men” is an initiative conducted by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) since 2016 to help increase the engagement of men in the process of achieving gender equality. Integrating “Men Talking to Men” initiative in the joint initiative is a good opportunity for men, who are in business and agriculture, to understand the importance of gender equality in the fi eld they are involved, that it has a positive impact on productivity, teamwork and output, and reduces the risk of men stirring up gender stereotypes.

The events were opened by representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Liberty Bank.