Les Cahiers de l'IFAS #3

Food Security in Southern Africa Causes and responses from the region Being the partial proceedings of a conference co-organized by the South-African Regional Poverty Network, Care-International and Ifas.

Held at Human Sciences Research Council (Pretoria), on the 18 March 2003

Scott Drimie, guest editor for HSRC-SARPN Michel Lafon, editor for Ifas

Cahiers de l'Ifas is an occasional working paper published by Ifas, dedicated to disseminating research on social issues in Southern Africa.

Under the guidance of appointed editors, each issue covers a specific theme; papers originate from researchers, experts or students, local or not, with an interest in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

Any query regarding this publication should be directed to the chief editor.

Institut Français d'Afrique du Sud, Johannesburg 2003 (Les Cahiers de l'Ifas n°3) ISSN : 1608-7194 Chief editor : Philippe Guillaume, director of Ifas-Research Cover picture : Keyprint cc The text herein presented as well as back issues of Cahiers de l'Ifas are available on IFAS website.

IFAS PO Box 542 - Newton 2113 Johannesburg - South Africa Tel 27-11-836 0561 Fax 27-11-836 5850

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CONTENTS

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Foreword

LAFON M

About the authors

GENERAL 7

Workshop report

SCOTT DRIMIE

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Food security, vulnerability and social sustainability

DUBOIS, JL

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Lessons from the current food crisis in

WIGGINS, S

Southern Africa 35

The Southern-African food security crisis - causes and

MBAYA, S

responses 59

Vulnerability assessments in Southern Africa

MARSLAND, N

COUNTRY PAPERS 67

Food sec challenges in post-conflict Angola

STEINBERG, D & BOWEN, N

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Overview of the current food security

SAMATEBELE, H

crisis in Zambia 109

Moving beyond food aid incorporating

SAWDON, G

livelihoods analysis into vulnerability assessments in Swaziland 115

A short discussion paper on the Lesotho food crisis

ABBOTT, J

FOREWORD IFAS is particularly pleased with this new issue of Cahiers de l'IFAS, and this feeling goes beyond the common attitude of an editor eyeing a new offspring.

First, the period elapsed since the release of the previous issue has been unduly long, it was time we resume with this venture. We remain convinced at IFAS that there is space and need for this kind of communication, beside the internet on the one hand, and more elaborated publications on the other.

Second, this issue signals for IFAS a foray into unfamiliar territory.

A French government funded Research Institution dedicated to Human Sciences, IFAS was so far mostly concerned with sponsoring academic research on the region and disseminating its results; our programs usually involve local, regional and French contributors, and remain within our specific area.

This third volume of Cahiers de l'Ifas clearly departs from such, in topic, methodology and approach. We feel that the centrality and urgency of the issue here tackled amply warrant this new perspective.

The present food crisis in Southern Africa, with its many correlated aspects among which the impact of HIV-aids appears particularly compelling, is proving to be, as it unfolds, one of the most serious challenges, if not the most fundamental one the sub-region has been confronted with over a long period of time; it can be argued that the present situation, as far as the population's well being is concerned, belittles the political turmoil around the Independences or political liberations, at least in countries which were not devastated by wars: in all countries except South-Africa, it questions the very survival of a significant number of the population as both rural and urban communities are affected; these communities will never be the same afterwards, even if they manage to overcome the onslaught of the crisis.

By opening this volume to development practitioners - most contributors belong to development NGOs operating in the sub-region / we ensured that the approach would remain practical and nurtured by experience.

If this publication contributes to make policy makers, donors and other stakeholders in the region development and aid programs more fully aware of the magnitude of the crisis and the urgency to provide adequate responses,

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and, further, convince them of the necessity to implement lasting solutions, at a time when international attention is drawn away from Africa, our move will have been amply vindicated.

Thirdly, this volume is the materialization of a collaboration between IFAS and SARPN, incepted about 2 years ago at a time when SARPN was still gathering strength; from a fledgling actor, it has become one of the major players in the regional development field; its rich and well informed website is testimony to this, as are the numerous activities it is involved in. IFAS is extremely grateful to have been awarded an opportunity to be a part, however small, of that process.

As Scott Drimie clarifies in the introduction, the papers that follow were presented at a conference held on the 18 of March, at SARPN premises in Pretoria, of which IFAS was a partner. True to our mission, we took advantage of this opportunity to foster contacts between local and European experts sharing similar concerns: the participation of IRD expert J-L Dubois has already resulted in the establishment of links between SARPN and the European “Capabilities” network and the French based one dedicated to “Support to poverty alleviation and inequalities reduction policies”. We trust they will prove fruitful.

Not all papers presented at the conference are included herein. Due to space constraints, a selection had to be made. The choice was mitigated though by the fact that all papers are posted on SARPN website.

The papers fall into two categories: regional and country papers.

Jean-Luc Dubois, in a paper nurtured by the information gathered, gives an overview of the situation in the region as a whole; it is completed by Wiggins, which draws on the papers presented to suggest broad trends in economy and development and social responses affecting the region. Sue Mbaya's piece shows with clarity the full impact of the crisis on the region, as well as its several causes. Niel Marsland reminds us, through slides, that figures are a human construct and hence liable to interpretations; more accurately, he reveals the premises of the vulnerability assessment figures, a key element in the appreciation of the situation as a whole.

The country papers are to some extent an illustration of the regional overviews.

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Steinberg and Bowen's description of the situation in Angola and the challenges of reconstruction may well become a ground paper on the country at that stage of its history. Samatabele's piece on Zambia reminds us that the food crisis did not start with the recent poor harvests: there has been a steady decline in agricultural production and well being of the population since Independence ... Also included, papers on the smaller kingdoms of Swaziland and Lesotho, more often than not discarded or neglected. Even if their lesser populations as well as support and/or resources drawn from the regional powerhouse that surrounds them, may contribute to somewhat cushion the crisis, the food security situation needs to be addressed, and the two papers suggest strategies to that end.

It is appropriate to thank all authors and organizations for giving us permission to publish the presentations and post them on both Ifas and SARPN websites freely.

Michel Lafon IFAS Research officer Johannesburg May 2003

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About the contributors: positions and contact details Abbott, Joanne: Care program coordinator, Lesotho and South-Africa; joabbott@caresa.co.za Bowen Nina: Care deputy director, Southern and West Africa Regional Office; bowen@caresa.co.za Dubois Jean-Luc: Director of Research, French Institute for Research on Development (IRD);Versailles University Center of Economics and Ethics for Environment and Development (C3ED); jlucdubois@aol.com Lafon Michel: research officer from French CNRS posted at Ifas; michel@ifas.co.za Marsland Niel: senior adviser with Save the Children-UK; based at the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Comity, in Harare; nmarsland@fanrsadc.co.zw Mbaya Sue: director of Compassion Ministries, Harare, Zimbabwe; mbayas@ecoweb.co.zw Samatabele Helen: deputy director, Program Against Malnutrition, Lusaka, Zambia; pam@zamnet.zm Sawdon Gary: adviser with Save the Children-UK, based in Mbabane, Swaziland; gsawdon@scf-uk.org.uk Scott-Drimie: senior research specialist based at the Human Sciences Research Council in Pretoria; sedrimie@hsrc.ac.za Steinberg Douglas: adviser with Care Angola, based in Luanda, Angola; steinberg@care.ebonet.net Wiggins Steve: Research Fellow, rural non-farm economy and urban-rural relations, Overseas Development Institute, London; s.wiggins@odi.org.uk

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1. Regional papers

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FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: CAUSES AND RESPONSES FROM ACROSS THE REGION Workshop Report

A Meeting hosted by the Southern African Regional Poverty Network in collaboration with CARE International and the French Institute of South Africa 18 March 2003, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria Scott Drimie HSRC 1. Background The severe food shortages and hunger that have recently struck countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, particularly in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique, have been described by the World Food Programme as the 'worst food crisis in a decade'. The region has suffered from a lethal mix of food shortages, lack of access to basic social services and an alarmingly high prevalence of HIV/AIDS all contributing to the growing numbers of vulnerable people in rural and urban Southern Africa. According to several reports from missions undertaken in the SADC region in 2002 by the World Food Programme and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, fourteen million people were living on the brink of starvation and faced serious shortages until the region's main harvest in April 2003.

The Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) recognized the current food crisis facing the region as a vital area for intervention within their mandate to stimulate debate on key issues and promote effective 1 communications . SARPN together with its partners in this endeavour, CARE International and the French Institute of South Africa (IFAS), co-hosted a workshop entitled “Food Security in Southern Africa: Causes and Responses from across the Region� and co-ordinated the attendance of a wide range of practitioners involved in food security issues from across SADC. The participants were drawn from government departments, research organisations, international and national non-governmental organisations, and donors. A regional overview and a series of country papers, including several undertaken by CARE in an analytical exercise to better understand the underlying causes of the crisis, were commissioned to be presented at the meeting on the 18th of March 2003.

1 In keeping with the goals of SARPN, the workshop was designed to facilitate the sharing of perspectives on food security issues in several Southern African countries and to generate debate about appropriate responses to the crisis in the region.

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2. Purpose of Meeting The purpose of the meeting was to examine the underlying causes of the current food crisis in a number of Southern African countries and to outline initial policy responses aimed at addressing food insecurity in the region.

The workshop therefore attempted to: ! Identify long-term livelihood trends and coping strategies, using examples from the region. ! Identify shocks and stresses, including HIV/AIDS that have impacted on livelihood strategies and assessed their contribution to food insecurity and poverty in the Southern Africa region. ! Identify lessons learnt and initial responses for government, civil society, donors and regional institutions that move beyond the current food crisis.

The core objective of the meeting was to stimulate debate and to guide future analytical work as part of a regional action-research agenda. The ultimate objective was to contribute to the development of livelihood recovery strategies in the Southern African region, and to inform and influence key government and donor agendas that integrate long and short term responses to the food crisis. This report attempts to distil the major arguments and recommendations presented at the workshop, particularly in the closing plenary. The papers presented at the workshop and a contact list of the participants, along with a wide range of other documentation pertaining to the regional food crisis can be accessed on the SARPN website at www.sarpn.org.za 3. Workshop papers and presentations The workshop saw a total of ten papers and four presentations, listed in table 1 below, as well as additional commentaries, covering food security issues in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as for the region as a whole.

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Table 1: Workshop papers and presentations Author Dubois, Philippe Frankenburger, Timothy, Kristina Luther, Karyn Fox and John Mazzeo Hugon, Philippe

Marsland, Neil Mbaya, Sue McEwan, Margaret Modiselle, Salome & Mike Aliber Mphale, M M Roberts, Ben Samatebele, Helen Sawdon, Gary Steinberg, Douglas & Nina Bowen Watkinson, Eric Also tabled: SADC, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Vulnerability Assessment Committee

Paper (or presentation, in italics) Commentary on the regional crisis Livelihood erosion through time: macro and micro factors that influenced livelihood trends in Malawi over the last thirty years Food insecurity and famine in southern Africa.

An economic debate: lack of availabilities, market failures, inequities of rights, effects of shocks or systemic risks?

Vulnerability assessments in southern Africa: concepts, findings, strengths, challenges and future developments The Southern African food security crisis.

Causes and responses. A regional overview Literature review. Macro and micro factors influencing livelihood trends in Zambia over the last thirty years Pilot study on methods to monitor householdlevel food security HIV/AIDS and food insecurity in Lesotho Perspectives and Alternatives: HIV/AIDS and the Food Crisis Overview on the current food security crisis in Zambia Moving beyond food aid. Incorporating livelihoods analysis into vulnerability assessments in Swaziland Food security challenges in post-conflict Angola Overview on the current food security crisis in South Africa Regional emergency Food Security Assessment Report, December 2002

4. Recommendations The workshop provided a “series of conversations� on the food crisis in the region with a diverse range of perspectives presented and debated. The recommendations emanating from the workshop touched on a number of issues although a particular need to understand and influence policy 9

processes was raised by a number of participants. Thus the need for different kinds of strategies to inform and influence key government and donor agendas that integrated long and short-term responses to the food crisis were major concerns of the workshop. It was particularly important to note that a range of civil society organizations indicated a desire to engage with policy making at both the national and regional level but lacked a clear framework or set of guidelines as to how this might be done.

Issues raised in the final plenary included: 4.1 The challenge of engaging and influencing policy > The lack of capacity in policy analysis across the region in all sectors but particularly in the public sphere; > The lack of access to policy documentation, strategies and discussions; > Poor institutional capacity within civil society to participate in policymaking processes; > The lack of inter-sector dialogue to feed into food security policies and programmes at national and regional levels; > The lack of intra-sector dialogue to feed into food security policies and programmes at national and regional levels. This reflected a failure to communicate between different directorates or sectors within national government departments; > The challenge for civil society to become more influential in order to engage with their own governments in order to better influence policy; > The challenge of finding creative ways to feed into and effectively engage with policy-making processes. This raises questions around who to target, how best to communicate, and how to identify those who undertake the strategic thinking; > Suggestions around how to influence policy included: + The development of policy briefs + Small roundtable meetings with key personal within the policy-making processes to ensure dialogue for example, for workshop participants to take forward the main issues into small meetings at national level + The development of short presentations to be made to relevant policy makers it was noted that these presentations had to be readily “digestible� for policy makers > It was suggested that food security debates needed to feed into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers to influence national poverty reducing frameworks.

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1 Proposed Follow-Up: – In terms of policy dialogue breakdown, SARPN undertook to link with the SADC Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN), considering particularly their emphasis on building networks related to food security and to develop local capacity to engage in policy-making processes (see www.fanrpan.org).

– SARPN would develop some key policy briefs, which covered issues discussed at the workshop.

– SARPN would explore the viability for a workshop focused on “Influencing Policy-Making” to be held as a matter of priority.

4.2 A need to have a comprehensive understanding the current food security crisis from a policy perspective > The “new” debate on HIV/AIDS and food security has not been clearly understood by a number of regional organizations engaged with food security; > More attention was required on long-term solutions for food security, particularly on achieving and securing the capabilities and assets of affected people; > More research was required into the issue of food security and funding found to support such research.

1 Proposed Follow-Up: – SARPN would compile a poverty brief around some of the main issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS and food security drawing on the two Lesotho papers presented at the workshop. In addition it would further disseminate its poverty brief on HIV/AIDS and land (see www.sarpn.org.za).

– SARPN would continue to collect and disseminate information on its website around food security (with particular emphasis on HIV/AIDS) and ensure that these penetrated the region through strategic partnerships.

– SARPN would continue to update delegates on the workshop on “Mitigating the Impact of HIV/AIDS through Agriculture and Rural Development” organized by FAO/GTZ and OXFAM-GB (27th to 29th of May 2002, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria).

– Participants were encouraged to link with the analytical process driven by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in their review of regional food security (see “way forward”).

– Participants were encouraged to link with the analytical exercise driven by CARE, which formed a central component of the papers presented at the workshop (see “way forward”).

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In addition, SARPN would create a web-page on the existing SARPN website (www.sarpn.org.za) to post the papers and proceedings of the workshop, which would complement the existing focus on the site on “Hunger and Food in Southern Africa”. A range of related papers would also be posted on this page. The SARPN secretariat also undertook to create an electronic mailing list of all the workshop participants so that ongoing dialogue, debate and discussion could be facilitated.

CARE intended to finalise the analytical process that it had undertaken in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia and to disseminate these to a wider regional audience when complete. Both CARE and SARPN would continue to dialogue with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in their endeavour to establish a “Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa”.

ODI intended to support strategic thinking on food security issues in Southern Africa by facilitating a forum of specialists and key policy stakeholders from the international and regional research community, donors, NGO, civil society and private sector with identified specialist knowledge of the issues and the region. The project intended to produce Policy Papers and to host a combination of moderated electronic discussions and workshops on the key policy options. The purpose of the Forum was to support initiatives by governments and donors to improve food security in the region. The work would focus in five countries, namely Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which were representative of a range of food security contexts across the region.

ODI had agreed to outline the objectives of the “Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa” at the Gaborone conference on “Agricultural Recovery and Trade Policies and Strategies for Southern Africa”. In addition, ODI intended to use the space allocated to them at the conference to report some of the findings that emerged from the SARPN/CARE/IFAS workshop.

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FOOD SECURITY, VULNERABILITY AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY Jean-Luc Dubois, UMR C3ED IRD-UVSQ Introduction Several countries in Southern Africa are presently facing acute food security issues. Nearly 13 million people in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are involved in a food crisis which requires about 3 millions tons of cereals to ensure food security for everyone.

Food security is considered differently when the focus is on the macro or the micro level. On the macroeconomic level, food security means that enough food has to be available to cover the population's whole nutritional requirements. On the micro level, i.e. for the households and the individuals, three conditions need to be respected: sufficient food at the macro level, stability in the supply, and a regular access to the corresponding availabilities for all households and their members.

At the beginning of year 2003, the current level of food availability was insufficient to cover the needs of Southern Africa. Therefore food aid was required. The situation has worsened since and the overall coverage of food requirements is not yet totally covered, even with the support of external food aid. This situation increases the risk of famine.

Various reasons can explain this situation; they differ from one country to the other. However, a common origin is drought and, to a certain extent, the difficulty of adaptation to new changes in weather conditions. Secondary causes could also be quoted such as the cyclones (Mozambique), a depressed economic environment (Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland), uncontrolled price variations (Malawi et Mozambique) and public policies that tend to reduce the agriculture productivity (Zambia, Zimbabwe).

Within this context, the main concern is to avoid people falling into chronic poverty insecurity, i.e. into a situation where they will suffer from hunger, with all the negative consequences on health, social relationships and economic productivity. Such a challenge is still part of the fight against poverty since the lack of food for survival remains a key feature of absolute poverty. But the first objective is to prevent people from reaching this turning point beyond which they would begin to suffer from hunger. This implies putting a particular focus on those categories of people that have the greatest chances of reaching such a point, i.e. the most vulnerable. Therefore, taking 15

into account the dimension of vulnerability is, in fact, the clue for the design of food security policies.

This is even more true nowadays, since this vulnerability dimension is presently exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, which jeopardizes people's capacity to conduct their own lives correctly and raises the issue of social sustainability in the long term.

Therefore, reducing vulnerability and ensuring social sustainability are two fundamental issues directly related to the problem of food security. These have to be considered when designing public policies aimed at avoiding food insecurity.

1. Vulnerability as a Key Issue The lack of food is one of the most acute forms of absolute poverty, when poverty is defined in terms of lack and non-accessibility to basic goods. To avoid such a situation various measures are usually included in the design of food security policies. Some of them are preventive, i.e. they are implemented ex-ante through policy decisions which include, for instance, the regular follow-up of crop production, the setting-up of early warning systems, the constitution of food stocks and buffers, the reinforcement of regional exchanges, etc. Others measures are set up ex-post, i.e. in a curative way, to overcome the crisis when it starts. They include actions such as food distribution through meals in schools, food-for-work operations, etc. - and the call for external humanitarian aid. All these measures are aimed at avoiding the surge of famine.

In such a situation, it is important to know what groups of people have the greatest chance of falling into chronic food insecurity, i.e. are the most vulnerable. Vulnerability can be defined as the probability of an individual (or of a household) of seeing its overall standard of living worsen when confronted with a dramatic event. This worsening can be, for instance, the falling into poverty traps after the loss of a job or suffering from hunger when an increase in market prices prevent the purchase of adequate food. With this definition, the most vulnerable an individual (or a household) is, the greater its probability of falling into a crisis situation, when a risk becomes a dramatic event.

This focus on vulnerability, which is complementary to the poverty one, implies first, identifying the threats and, more generally, the risks that people may encounter and, second, assessing their capacity to cope with the consequences of the related dramatic events. Since both the distribution of risks and the capacities to deal with these risks varies deeply from one group to the other, some people are more vulnerable than others. More generally, the 16

level of vulnerability, as well as the level of poverty, is unequally distributed among the whole population.

Some groups can be naturally considered as the most vulnerable. This is the case, for instance, with disabled people, children, pregnant women, etc. For the others, the level of vulnerability varies according to gender, age, activities, location, etc., i.e. according to the risk they may be confronted with and the capacity they have in hand to overcome it. A capacity which is related to their level of education and health, their social networks, assets, level of income, etc. Statistical surveys and analytical refinements are generally required to estimate what their level of vulnerability is and to classify people between more or less vulnerable groups.

The capacity of resilience expresses the capacity of overcoming any crisis and consequences of dramatic events. Therefore, reducing the vulnerability of individuals and households implies increasing their capacity of resilience.

This can be done by improving their access to appropriate goods and services, by increasing their resources and assets, by developing their capabilities, etc..

As a result, when confronted with crisis, they have in hand the opportunity to sell some of their assets in order to get the needed resources, to use information in order to find appropriate solutions, to refer to social networks for help, and so on.

2. HIV/AIDS Prevalence Increases Vulnerability This issue of food insecurity is presently exacerbated by the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the corresponding countries. For instance, Malawi has a prevalence rate of 15%, Lesotho 31%, Swaziland and Zimbabwe 33%.

HIV/AIDS increases the household's vulnerability since it slowly destroys the basic individual's capabilities, i.e. their capacity to do things, by increasing the difficulty of going to work, cultivating fields, meeting their peers and, more generally, living correctly. In fact, it attacks insidiously the core of the person's capacity of resilience. The consequences in terms of production deficit and decrease in earnings are severe. The U.N. estimates that 9.6% of Zimbabwe's agricultural labour force was lost in the year 2000, and 5.8% in Malawi where 70% of the households suffer a decrease in their labour force due to the disease. In Zimbabwe, the production of cattle by smallholders decreased by 29%, by 49% for vegetables and by 61% for maize, in households where somebody died from AIDS. An adult death usually results in a 45% decline in the household's marketed maize but, when the cause of death is identified as AIDS, the loss is 61%. If the wealthiest households can hire extra workers to manage and cultivate their holdings, the 17

poorest smallholders cannot earn a living and have to take their children out of school to look for a job and bring money home.

In the meantime, social relationships tend to be reduced and even the emerging of associations to help those in difficulty does not compensate this loss. Social capital, i.e. the networks of social linkages, as well as human capital, i.e. the health of parents and the education of children, whether they are considered as private or public goods, are totally jeopardized by the situation.

But, the most serious consequences long term come from the breaking up of entire families. This was observed in several districts in Zimbabwe, in the year 2000, where two thirds of the households who lost an adult woman essential for family life disintegrated and their members were dispersed. Consequently, the number of orphans increased with grandmothers becoming the heads of families with only children and, even more, with children-headed households that now have to be considered for social and preventive actions.

In this context, the fundamental role of the family, which lies in the transmission of life experiences, global knowledge, life skills and know-how, becomes impossible to maintain. The early death of the parents prevents the transfer of knowledge and skills to their children. Those, growing up as orphans, have less opportunity and more difficulty to learn how to manage a holding, cultivate a field, and prepare adequate nutritive food. More generally, the transmission of capability, i.e. the capacity to achieve objectives, is not correctly ensured anymore. Such situations raise new issues vital for the future of societies: the issues of sustainability and, more precisely, of social sustainability.

3. Linking with Social Sustainability Sustainability implies by definition that development policies aim to answer the needs of the present generation without compromising the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own future needs.

Within this framework, three interacting spheres are usually considered when examining conditions for sustainable development: the economic, social and ecological spheres. For each sphere, there are peculiar sustainability rules. For instance, economic sustainability requires a regular self-maintained growth, based on a series of balance principles and investment rules in order to optimize growth and avoid putting into debt future generations. With the same spirit, ecological sustainability, through the analysis of ecosystems, requires protection of non-renewable resources, reduction of pollution, repletion of destroyed resources; thus transmitting an equivalent level of resources to 18

future generations and guaranteeing them a quality of life, at least, equal to ours.

Social sustainability relates to the social dimension of sustainable development. It implies that “the various economic, social and ecological policies being implemented in the context of development should not generate negative consequences or social dysfunctionnings that destroy the social cohesion, jeopardise human and social capital and reduce people's capability of improving their well-being presently or in the future�.

For the three spheres, a common condition needs to be respected to ensure sustainability: the transfer of a correct level of potentialities, resources and capacities from one generation to the next. This means that the present generation has to transmit to the next generation a level of potentiality (in terms of resources of capital, assets or benefits of any kind) at least equivalent to the one they benefited from, in order to reach and equivalent standard of living. It implies protecting people's capacities of accumulating resources and generating potentialities.

Because of wide spread of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, nothing ensures that these conditions will be respected in the near future. HIV/AIDS breaks the chain of knowledge and capabilities transferred from one generation to the other, as well as the labour sharing between generations. As a result, the family survivors, who are usually orphans and elderly people, may be not able to manage the farm correctly due to their lack of knowledge and experience.

This situation does not ensure the acquisition and transmission of knowledge; it reduces the traditional and social linkages, generates losses in human and social capital, and makes the social sustainability of development totally uncertain.

Conclusion Food insecurity raises the issue of vulnerability. People who are most vulnerable are those who do not have enough capabilities meaning a combination of assets, potentialities and capacities to overcome the probability of falling into chronic food insecurity. In this context, increasing their resilience, i.e. their capacity to overcome the crisis, through the reinforcement of their own capabilities remains a feasible solution.

Unfortunately, HIV/AIDS introduces a constraint in this context because the epidemic destroys, little by little, people's capacity in such a way that even the social sustainability of development is under threat. This raises the level of anxiety concerning the future of the society.

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Within this context, one may think that the current food crisis in Southern Africa could be related, at least partly, to the decrease in people's capability. It becomes difficult for them to earn an income through agriculture or a salaried work, to get a regular education, to ensure correct health, to reinforce or maintain social and family relationships. For these reasons, some authors (A. de Walle et J. Tumushabe) now refer to the surge of a new variant of famine.

This means that, besides the classical famine due to insufficient availability of food (i.e. the Malthusian approach) and the famines due to the lack of accessibility by default of rights (i.e. the Sen's approach) or by market failure (i.e. the Ravallion's approach), a new form of famine is appearing as a result of the destruction of people's capacity to acquire knowledge and maintain social linkages.

This assumption is still debatable, but becomes so realistic that it has already inspired the action of UNICEF and the World Food Program in relation to local NGOs who are involved in the fight towards chronic food insecurity.

References Institut de France, 2000, Sécurité alimentaire et développement durable, Actes de Colloque 2 décembre 1999, Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris, 240 p.

Azoulay G. and J-C. Dillon, 1993, La sécurité alimentaire en Afrique. Manuel d'analyse et d'élaboration de strategies, ACCT-Karthala, Paris, 296 p.

Dubois J-L. and F-R. Mahieu, 2002, “La dimension sociale du développement durable : réduction de la pauvreté ou durabilité sociale ?”, in Développement durable ? Doctrines, pratiques, évaluations, J-Y. Martin (ed.), IRD, Paris, pp.73 94.

Dubois J-L., F-R. Mahieu and A. Poussard, 2002, “Social Sustainability as a Component of Human Development”, Workshop Poverty, Social Capital and Development., Von Hugel Institute, St. Edmunds'College, Cambridge University, mimeo 17 p.

Dubois J-L. et S. Rousseau, 2001, “Reinforcing Household's Capabilities as a Way to Reduce Vulnerability an Prevent Poverty in Equitable Terms”, Symposium Justice and Poverty : Examining Sen's Capability Approach, Cambridge University June 5-7 2001, mimeo 15 p.

Mbaya S., 2003, The Southern African Food Security Crisis, Causes and Responses : A Regional Overview, Meeting on “Food Security In Southern Africa: Causes and Responses from across the Region” March 18th, SARPN Care International FISA, Pretoria, mimeo, 23 p.

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Hugon Ph., 2003, Food Insecurity in Southern Africa. An Economic Debate : Lack of Availabilities. Market Failures, Inequalities of Rights, Impact of Shocks or Systemic Risks ?, Paris, mimeo 15 p.

De Waal A. and J. Tumushabe, 2003, HIV/AIDS and Food Security in Africa, A report for DFID, 22 p.

Rousseau S., 2002, “Capability, Risk and Vulnerability�, Workshop Poverty, Social Capital and Development, Von Hugel Institute, St. Edmunds' College, Cambridge University, mimeo 14 p.

SADC FANR Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 2003, Towards identifying impacts of HIV/AIDS on food security in Southern Africa and implications for reponse Findings from Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe.

WCED [World Commission on Environment and Development], 1987, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

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LESSONS FROM THE CURRENT FOOD CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Report on SARPN/CARE/IFAS meeting Steve Wiggins Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute Learning lessons The food crisis in Southern Africa that stems from the crop failures of the 20012002 crop season has, not surprisingly, prompted much reflection on the causes of the problem and policy responses. Several official donors and NGOs have set in motion reviews, including, for example the EU and CARE International. Academics have started formal research, including a review of relief efforts by Georgetown University. In the region, overall reviews have been initiated by networks such as Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) and Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN).

In the UK, groups at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, Imperial College at Wye, University of East Anglia, the Natural Resources Institute, Greenwich and at the Overseas Development Institute have conducted reviews.

On reflection of the papers and presentations at the workshop there is considerable similarity in the appreciation of the nature of the current foodrelated crisis in Southern Africa, the analysis of the causes, and in identification of key policy issues. The exceptions to what might be seen as a regional pattern appear in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, both country cases marked by ruinous wars, and in South Africa, distinctive for its urbanisation and relative wealth.

What follows is an attempt to synthesise the findings and arguments presented at the meeting, organising the material by the crisis and its causes, the responses of those affected directly and of government and donors, and the policy issues arising.

The current food security crisis and its causes The current crisis can be seen starkly in the figures produced by the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee in December 2002. For the six countries covered by the formal emergency, 15.2 million people are considered to be in need, or 26% of the population of those countries, requiring food aid amounting to 735kt (000 tons) for the period December 2002 to March 2003.

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Most assessments of the crisis see it as much as crisis of livelihoods, or of development in general, as a simple food shock. Typically authors distinguish between the longer run, or structural factors, that create vulnerability for particular social groups, on the one hand; and the immediate causes, or triggers, for the problems of the crop season for 20012002 and the following consumption year 20022003, that constitute shocks that hit vulnerable households.

Long run problems Over the last twenty years or more, the countries of Southern Africa have struggled to develop their economies, create jobs and incomes and allow their citizens to construct livelihoods that would lift them out of poverty and reduce their vulnerability to shocks. Development models and strategies have disappointed and failed across the main production sectors of Southern African economies mining, industry, and agriculture.

Mining, that has provided wealth for Angola, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (as well as Botswana and Namibia, two countries that are not part of the current crisis and are not considered in this review) has faltered. The problems of Zambia began in 1974 when the copper price fell sharply, dramatically reducing foreign exchange earnings and government revenue.

The mines of South Africa, and to a lesser extent those of Zambia and Zimbabwe, for decades during the twentieth century drew on labour from their own rural areas as well as those of most of the surrounding countries. But during the 1990s jobs were shed in the mines, with foreign migrant workers losing their posts. For countries such as Malawi, (southern) Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland the impacts were strong. Remittances that underwrote consumption back in the home areas as well as providing funds to buy farm inputs, hire farm labour and tractors, and to invest in cattle, dried up.

Through the labour market this affected not just the households that contained migrants, but also their neighbours who were often hired to work on the fields of migrant households.

The urban and industrial economies have been plagued by too little investment and business expansion to provide jobs for those entering the labour market. The cities that once enjoyed moderate prosperity and provided formal jobs have seen widespread formal unemployment, with a proliferation 1 of low-return informal jobs typically petty trading in streets and markets.

As formal jobs have been lost in the cities, wages have fallen in real terms.

Consequently remittances from the urban employed back to family in their villages of origin have been cut back. So much so, that in some cases such as 1 Note that street trading is not necessarily the lowest paid occupation: casual wage labourers may earn less. Indeed, capital is needed even for petty trading, so not all can enter this work. (Steinberg & Bowen 2003 on the case of Luanda)

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Zimbabwe, it is reported that flows may be in the other direction, as the rural households send supplies to support their urban cousins.

The disappointments of the mining and industrial economies has meant that most countries in Southern Africa have become more dependent on agriculture to provide jobs, incomes and foreign exchange. Agricultural development, however, has not been sustained. In the 1970s and 1980s many countries adopted farm policies in which the state, through parastatals, played a major role in organising production. Government agencies typically bought produce and marketed it; supplied fertiliser, seed, chemicals, and machinery services; offered extension advice and veterinary services; while public banks offered seasonal credit at often subsidised interest rates. Prices of inputs, credit, and outputs were often controlled, and usually set uniformly for the whole country and throughout the year. Under these policies, there were some impressive increases in production. During the 1980s in Zimbabwe, for example, maize production from smallholder farms was doubled in less than a decade. Distant provinces of Zambia, such as Eastern and Northern, also saw remarkable increases in the amount of maize marketed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Malawi in the 1980s saw a 'green revolution' in smallholder maize production, as farmers adopted packages of hybrid varieties of maize and manufactured fertiliser.

But the model was seen as flawed, owing to the high operating costs of the parastatals and the public subsidies involved, to the inflexibilities of the controls on prices and marketing, and to the monopoly status of the state agencies that allowed some to operate ineffectively and inefficiently.

Moreover, the models stressed commercial farming. In some cases, such as Malawi, there was a clear bias in agricultural policy towards the interests of the large-scale estates and their burley tobacco production. Similarly in Angola and Mozambique large state farms were favoured over smallholdings. But even when the strategy recognised the potential of smallholder farming, there was a concentration of resources on smallholders in the more favoured agro-ecological zones, and on those farmers with the resources and means to expand production 'master farmers', 'emergent farmers', 'small-scale commercial farmers' and the like. When small farms did increase marketed output, the bulk tended to come from a small fraction of the 2 smallholders. The majority of small farmers marketed little if any produce, and indeed, many were net buyers of food, depending on farm labouring and non-farm activities to provide cash to buy food. Their poverty, and their position as net food buyers, was barely appreciated by those making agricultural policy.

2 Scoones et al. 1996 report that in the drylands of Zimbabwe as many as 40% of households may sell no crops, whilst 10% of farmers generate half the crop sales.

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The state-led approach was dismantled throughout the region in the 1980s and 1990s, under regimes of structural adjustment and market liberalisation.

It was hoped that closing down, or privatising, the parastatals would not only cut the costs to government and the country as a whole, but lead to more efficient markets as private agents would replace the state agencies in their functions and competition between them would provide a spur to efficiency.

But the results to date have been meagre. Private traders have been reluctant to collect crops from small farmers in distant villages, and unwilling to supply fertiliser and seed in small packets to remote farms. Banks have more or less ceased to provide credit to smallholders who have consequently faced a liquidity problem at planting time. And very few small farmers have the funds or inclination to pay for extension advice, or even for veterinary services.

Although the liberalisation of the 1990s has seen some successes for example, export horticulture from Zimbabwe, large-scale cotton farming in Mozambique, and smallholder burley tobacco production in Malawi these have been restricted once again to the better-resourced farmers in accessible farming areas with good soils and rains. Elsewhere farmers have not had the means to take advantage of any market opportunities. Indeed, in the more distant zones, such as the outlying provinces of Zambia, many farmers have turned inwards, focusing on crops such as sorghum, millet, sweet potato and cassava for their own subsistence and to supply the immediate local markets.

Hence most countries have seen the bulk of their rural populations left dependent on farming, and rain-fed farming at that, barely managing to subsist at poverty levels in years without shocks. They have been left highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather, as well as to those arising in the economy and from government policy. In addition, in some areas, an increasing rural population has put increasing pressure on arable land and on the grazing and woodland resources. In such areas, southern Malawi being one of the most acute cases, many households today find themselves with the use of plots of less than one hectare, making just meeting household subsistence needs difficult, let alone imagine producing surpluses for the market.

Economic disappointments have left governments without the revenues to invest, to provide services, or to subsidise their economies. Foreign exchange has been at a premium, leading either to shortages or to depreciating currencies that have raised the cost of imports and tended to stoke the fires of inflation.

3 In this case, however, the cereals were apparently not lost to Malawi. Most of them, allegedly, stayed inside the country and later were bought back by the food reserve agency at a higher cost than their sale price. The circumstances and details of this trading are under official investigation.

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Last, but not least, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has placed a major burden on households and their livelihoods, and made them all the more vulnerable. It has also deprived government and private enterprise of large numbers of trained and experienced staff.

Vulnerability and social differentiation The medium and long run processes outlined have left large fractions of Southern Africa's population not just poor, but also vulnerable to shocks that threaten to drive them into outright destitution.

Some policy-making has tended to see fairly homogenous groups of potential victims, above all a rural population that normally feeds itself from its own farm production. The papers repeatedly presented a different picture, one of considerable and important differences amongst the poor.

In rural areas, the poor and vulnerable may be seen in two groups.

One groups are those who are economically disadvantaged, those lacking land, tools, and oxen to farm, those lacking formal education and skills that offer the chance of the better-rewarded non-farm jobs. These households regularly buy in food, paid for by working on the farms of others and in nonfarm jobs. A particular example is the 400,000 or more households that used to work on the large-scale commercial farms of Zimbabwe. For net buyers of food, the key point in food security is the price of staple foods.

The other group consists of those whose disadvantage lies in social and health conditions. Since they were also often economically disadvantaged as well, they were especially vulnerable, They include: Women and girls expected to carry out domestic work as well as to farm and earn incomes, often restricted in mobility by social norms, often with less education and formal skills than men, usually with insecure rights to land and other resources, with much less chance of getting credit, more susceptible to HIV/AIDS inflection, sickness and death; Children given their acute needs for regular meals, their vulnerability if their parents were sick or to die, and liable to be pulled out of school and to lose their education. The fate of HIV/AIDS orphans was highlighted.

They often had to fend for themselves and care for their sick parents.

There were sad reports of 'lost childhoods'; and, Those unable to work or to move, including the elderly, the disabled, the sick, and those caring for those sick (especially the carers in households with members suffering from HIV/AIDS).

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A telling statistic came from Zimbabwe: that one third of households surveyed claimed that they could not afford to buy grain even at the (low) official price.

If most of the focus was on the fate of the rural poor, there was growing awareness that the urban poor were hard hit as well. Much less was known about the degree of hardship and the coping strategies of those living in urban and peri-urban areas compared to the rural areas, in almost all the countries of the region.

The immediate causes of the crisis These include drought throughout much of the region during the 20012002 crop season, but also include flooding (Mozambique, Malawi), as well as frosts and hailstorms (Lesotho). All told, the weather during that season was, in many parts of Southern Africa, the worst for farming since the severe drought of 19911992. Consequently farm output fell. Food prices have risen, often well ahead of the levels of inflation. In Lesotho, for example, maize prices rose by 45% in 2002, against an overall inflation of just 14%. Crop failures have also meant less work on farms, depriving the near-landless of incomes.

Zambia was also hit by loss of cattle to disease, so that crop farmers have lacked animal traction.

In some cases the problems have been exacerbated by government policy. In Zimbabwe, the fast-track resettlement of the large-scale commercial farms has led to large areas remaining unplanted (as much as 38% in the current season 200203), partly since the resettled farmers have not had access to inputs. In Malawi the decision to sell off most of the grain reserve in 2001, leaving only some 4kt in store (compared to a usual minimum of 60kt), deprived the government of cereals supplies.3 And in Angola a government that enjoys buoyant revenues from oil spends a pitifully small amount on poverty alleviation and social services.

Dramatic as some of these triggers are, the papers presented insist that it is not so much the triggers but the underlying vulnerability that has allowed these shocks to create the degree of distress seen.

Responses to crisis: coping strategies Much of the response to the crisis has been at local level, by the households and communities affected. Indeed, a problem in vulnerability assessment is that it is easy to state that so many millions have run out of food before half the consumption year has passed, but much harder to say just how many are in 28

that position in a normal year. It is likely that the poor and the poorest are only too familiar with food insecurity in any year, let alone one of widespread crop failures.4 Perhaps the most common way to cope reported is cutting down on food consumption, by reducing portion sizes, and skipping meals. In some cases the foods eaten have changed, as people have looked for cheaper but less preferred foods, including collecting wild foods from the bush.

Otherwise, households try to cut non-food costs. Spending on drugs and medical care has been reduced. Children have been taken out of school, both to save on school fees, but also so that the children can help to find work or take care of household members while the adults go out for work. There are widespread reports of enrolment falling.

Some families have coped by selling off assets, above all their livestock. This compromises their future security as well as depriving them of animal traction. But as so often when food is short, or costly, the livestock prices have fallen relative to cereals. In Zimbabwe, for example, a cow could be had for less than 300kg of cereals by December 2002, compared to the best part of a ton in normal times.

Households have looked for additional work to earn income, often taking up very lowly rewarded tasks such as collecting wood and water. Some of these activities involve migration, that increases the risks of contracting HIV. For women and girls, prostitution may be a desperate resort to earn cash, again making infection all the more likely.

In come countries, such as Lesotho and Malawi, an increase in livestock theft has been reported, as well as theft of food crops from fields.

Coping is all the more difficult for the households suffering from social and health disadvantages. For these groups many of the coping strategies simply were infeasible, so that any small shock was likely to plunge them into destitution, hardship and hunger. For them food-for-work schemes could not help, since they had not the time to participate. Starter packs of farm inputs were only valuable in as much as they could be sold to neighbours for cash or exchanged for food.

4 Aliber & Modiselle's study of the impact of rising maize prices on the poor in South Africa revealed a bimodal distribution of experience amongst the households interviewed. About one third of households never worried about feeding themselves; but another one third or so were almost continually worrying about food, reducing portions, switching to the lowest cost foods possible, skipping meals and desperately finding ways to feed themselves at low cost..

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The most dramatic examples come from households with members sick with HIV/AIDS. Not only do they lose the labour of the sick, but that of those caring for the sick as well. On top of that they have to try and buy drugs, while at the same time those infected need extra food to boost their immunity. When food is scarce their sickness and decline intensifies.

Indeed, for households with HIV/AIDS there is vicious spiral that sees the household deprived of labour and income, liquidating assets to pay medical bills, reducing the area cultivated and the intensity of cultivation, and so spiraling down into destitution. Alex de Waal (2002) has dubbed the combination of a food crisis with HIV/AIDS as 'New Variant Famine', a crisis so acute that it demands a much greater public effort to relieve it.

There is, however, debate as to how much of the current crisis can be attributed to HIV/AIDS. For the case of Zambia, in particular, there are questions about the numbers of households affected and the additional burdens imposed. There are also questions as to whether the downward spiral continues to destitution and death, or whether households can cope and the non-infected can recover from the effects of the disease.

Responses: government and donors In several cases, governments were slow to declare an emergency and mount relief programmes. For example, in Zimbabwe, NGOs warned of the scale of the mounting problem in November 2001, but the government declared an emergency only in April 2002.

Some countries have not had strategies for food security, but only those for food production. In some cases it has been more or less assumed that a liberalised, and efficient, farm economy would produce sufficient food to meet domestic needs at low cost. This may not be justified. South Africa removed controls on food prices and subsidies to farming and the food chain in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but subsequently saw food prices in the 1990s rise faster than the general rate of inflation.

The main responses to the current crisis have been to import food, both commercially, as well as through the donor pipelines coordinated by the World Food Programme and by the Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (CSAFE). The commercial imports far exceed those through donor channels: by January 2003 commercial cereal imports to the six countries of the Emergency Programme amounted to 1,359kt, with another 689kt planned for the 200203 marketing year, while the donor imports were 395kt with another 367kt in the pipeline.

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The imported cereals have been distributed sometimes as donations, at other times in food-for-work programmes. Targeting the food to the needy raises difficulties. Some governments, most notably Zimbabwe, have been accused of favouring their political supporters and ignoring those seen as opponents.

But there is simply not enough monitoring of food distribution to know if reports of specific instances reflect general trends or isolated abuses. NGOs have been widely used to distribute the grains brought in by WFP and CSAFE. They have used community targeting, calling on locals to set the criteria for access to relief food.

In some cases, special feeding programmes have been set up to direct food to children and to those living with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.

Less commonly reported are measures to affect food prices directly. Lesotho has subsidised unsifted maize meal to the tune of 30%. Zimbabwe has adopted administrative controls on the prices of key basic goods, including maize and maize meal. This has had mixed results, with food becoming unavailable at the official price, and only obtainable on the parallel market at 5 prices, in the case of maize, at 18 or more times the official price.

Some countries have distributed packs of seeds and fertiliser to farmers affected by drought, most notably in the case of Malawi, where the targeted inputs programme reaches as many as one million farmers. Zimbabwe has also just (early 2003) set up a scheme to fund inputs to farmers in the fasttrack resettlement areas.

The accent on food in response and vulnerability assessments The overall pattern of response, both by governments and donors, has been a focus on food imports and food production despite the Emergency Programme including in its appeal the need for medicines, despite WFP's assertion that the Programme is as much about saving livelihoods as saving lives.

The Vulnerability Assessments carried out regionally and for each country, under the auspices of SADC (specifically the Food, Agriculture and Natural

5 Inflation is running at very high levels in Zimbabwe. The government has set official prices for many basic goods, including maize and petrol. The foreign exchange rate, unusually for the region, is fixed at Z$55 to US$1. A parallel rate exists for currency, of around Z$1,500 to US$1 (January 2003). Establishing the price of maize, set officially at Z$11/kg but with parallel prices of Z$200/kg (January 2003), then, in internationally comparable terms generates four possible figures from US$0.01 to US$3.64/kg, or US$7 to US$3,636/ton. The figures for the official selling price at the official exchange rate gives maize at US$200 a ton; while the parallel price at the parallel rate gives a figure of US$133 a ton. Both these figures are well below the reported delivery cost of imported maize at Harare, of around US$240 a ton. It seems, then, that in both official and parallel markets, maize was being sold at below the import parity level, implicitly subsidised.

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Resources secretariat), reflect a tension between an appreciation of the wider nature of the crisis as one of livelihoods in peril, and the narrower agenda of forecasting how much food to import through donor channels. The Assessments use two methods to estimate needs for assistance. One, most commonly used, looks at food balances at household level: opening stocks, harvests, plus food obtained through sales of assets, through working for cash, and through gifts, borrowing, labour exchange, etc. and compares this to consumption needs. The gap between the two then becomes a basis for estimating food aid imports. The other approach, applied fully so far only to the cases of Swaziland, Mozambique, and Lesotho, looks at how vulnerable people obtain their food in a normal or baseline year, assesses how the shock or trigger of the current crisis will have affected those means of obtaining food, and uses the insights to plan assistance.

Since the Emergency was declared in 2002, the vulnerability assessments have progressively tried to add more information on nutrition and health, and in particular on the impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Full incorporation of this data and its analysis has not yet been achieved, but is expected to appear in the next round of assessments for May 2003.

Despite the increasing sophistication of the assessments, the headline figures that come from them are the numbers in need of the assistance and the volumes of cereal gaps. But these lay the assessments open to a telling question: the assessments arrive at very large cereal gaps that for the six countries at January 2003 was given as 544.5kt and yet anthropometric surveys of children show few signs of malnutrition running at levels above those that apply in normal years. It may be that the assessments are inaccurate and exaggerate food needs.6 But it may also be that people have done more to cope than expected, above all by cutting back on cereals consumption by both eating less and switching to alternative foods.7 Policy issues arising In looking at the longer run causes of the current crisis, it was apparent that fundamental elements of a development strategy had proved elusive. In general, all of the countries reviewed had struggled, above all in the 1990s, to achieve economic growth sufficiently strong to raise incomes and alleviate poverty, or to generate growth with a wide distribution of the benefits.

6 One source of error is informal movements of grains across borders. The shipments from northern Mozambique to southern Malawi are well known, but there are also reports of considerable amounts moving across the borders of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi's borders with Zambia and Tanzania.

7 This question depends on seeing the crisis in terms of physical availability of food, with the risk that for sheer lack of food, people will starve and die. But if the crisis is seen as one of livelihoods at risk, of potential destitution and

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Given that agriculture was the major employer in most of the countries reviewed, the disappointments of agricultural development were acutely felt.

Although different voices advocate, variously, the merits of low-input sustainable agriculture, large-scale commercial production of export crops, smallholder green revolutions, etc., there are few models of demonstrable success that has been achieved without (apparently) unsustainable government support. Those exceptions usually concern farms located in the best agro-ecological zones, with good access to markets, and well-endowed with infrastructure for example, parts of Mashonaland, Zimbabwe, the line of rail in Zambia, the irrigated valleys of southern Mozambique, etc. But outside of these areas, in less accessible area often of lower natural potential where the majority of the rural population live, it is far less easy to recommend agricultural development strategy with confidence.

It was also apparent that policy-makers and implementing agencies were grappling with the technical details of food policy. For example, policy for strategic reserves of cereals provokes as many questions as answers. Should reserves consist of financial assets, to buy in extra imports when needed, or physical stocks kept in country? In either case, how large should the provision be? And what should be the policies for buying in and selling off the stocks?

Much work has been done on early warning systems for harvests and food stocks, and vulnerability assessments in general. But the methods are still being perfected, and questions remain over how best to link their findings to policy-making. Although in practice ways have been found to distribute food aid, questions arise over the degree to which assistance is targeted and if so how this can be done.

A major point in debate is the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Will this, as de Waal has claimed, have such severe impacts that it forces us to rethink food security policy and to reconsider the extent to which households and communities can cope? Or is the challenge one that might be met by adding to and modifying current approaches, for example by adding supplementary feeding programmes and health care to affected households? Good work has been done to outline qualitatively the likely impact of the pandemic on rural economies and societies, but the quantitative magnitude of the impacts remains to be defined. Until more precise information and understanding is achieved, it will not be clear whether indeed the current crisis is a 'new variant famine' or not.

hardship (but without substantially increased death rates), the role of food aid can be seen in a different light. It is needed not to save lives so much as to alleviate hardship and to put downward pressure on grain prices, so that households need not bankrupt themselves to obtain food, or put themselves at risk to obtain food (e.g. women being practically forced into prostitution). What may, then, be needed is a better model of grain and food markets on the one hand, and of the ability of the very vulnerable households to command food on such markets.

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In discussion at the meeting, the question of how to convey research findings to policy-makers arose, and how civil society could participate in debates on food policy. In the papers, especially that on Angola, it was reported that those suffering the effects of the crisis had little or no voice in policy-making circles.8 Some agencies, such as CARE International, would like to see food security taken on board as a right, something that governments and societies are legally obliged to ensure on behalf of all citizens. But it is clear at currently such ideas are a long way removed from the practice of policy making in most countries of the region. If access to food is to become a right that is respected, several papers argued, then local civil society will have to organise and advocate, to put pressure on the political system.

Additional references de Waal, Alex, 2002, 'New Variant Famine' in Southern Africa, Presentation for SADC VAC Meeting, Victoria Falls, 17-18 October 2002 Scoones, Ian with Chinaniso Chibudu, Sam Chikura, Peter Jeranyama, Daniel Machaka, William Machanja, Blasio Mavedzenge, Bright Mombeshora, Maxwell Mudhara, Claxon Mudziwo, Felix Murimbarimba & Bersazary Zirereza, 1996, Hazards and opportunities. Farming livelihoods in dryland Africa: lessons from Zimbabwe, Zed Books, London & New Jersey

8 In South Africa, poor consumers when interviewed or consulted in focus groups, sometimes said that they were happy to have the chance to get a message to government about their plight.

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THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN FOOD SECURITY CRISIS CAUSES AND RESPONSES: A Regional overview Sue Mbaya Compassion Ministries Harare 1. Introduction Over the last few decades, Southern African governments have identified the eradication or alleviation of poverty as a key objective of developmental programmes. In spite of these repeated articulations and ongoing efforts poverty levels have not fallen. In fact, poverty has gradually worsened culminating in the present region-wide food crisis. The crisis will affect over 15 million people through impacts ranging from lack of access to food, food insecurity, malnutrition, and possibly famine. The ongoing food crisis has had a significant toll and brought great suffering to many in the region.

However, within the spectre of starvation and collapse lie opportunities for key players in the region, both governmental and non-governmental, to identify and address the factors underlying the vulnerability that has allowed the prevailing crisis to develop. This treatise aims to give an overview of the factors underlying this crisis, some of the key responses to it, the lessons that have been learnt from it to date and the opportunities for intervention.

2. Baseline Livelihood Patterns The economies of Southern African countries are a function of their rural and urban subsets. In many of these countries the rural and urban economies are interlinked and closely related. The majority of the people of Southern Africa are rural with agriculture as their main source of livelihood. In addition to most people in the region relying on agriculture, most of the countries in the region also have agriculture as one of the main contributors to their economies. At the same time, three quarters of the poor live and work in rural 1 areas. This gives agrarian economies special significance in the region and particularly in the discussion around poverty and food security. For this reason, agrarian factors may appear to dominate this overview.

While agriculture is the main source of livelihood most agrarian households, both commercial and non-commercial, diversify their sources of income within the overall framework of an agricultural existence. Hence, households frequently combine cropping for subsistence purposes with cash cropping. In addition, they may raise livestock. Here, land is the main resource for household livelihood and food security. Land is also a main vehicle to invest, accumulate wealth, and to transfer it between generations.

1

IFAD, 2001

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In those parts of the region where water bodies are prominent, such as certain parts of Malawi, fishing may be the main source of livelihood which is then supplemented by agricultural activity such as the cultivation of cassava. A key difference between the commercial and smallholder sub sectors is the fact that in the case of the smallholder sector, households generally derive a greater proportion of their livelihood from non-cash activities while the situation tends to be the reverse within the commercial agrarian sub sector.

An important livelihood source for many rural people in the region is that of ''off-farm'' income. This is income that is derived from a location that it separate from the farmer's holding. Sources of off-farm income include seasonal or contract labour and small-scale income generating activities, such as the retailing of various commodities, gold panning etc. While most communities do employ a mixed set of activities as their livelihood strategy, the choice of the main livelihood activity frequently varies by age group and by gender. For instance, younger men and women are often more likely to choose off-farm activities, in the case of young women - particularly nonagricultural ones - as their key livelihood activities. On the other hand, older people are often more likely to rely on on-farm income sources.

Away from rural areas, in the peri-urban zones, income from non-agricultural sources becomes an increasingly more significant component of the livelihood strategy. Agricultural activity often becomes gradually less significant a contributor to livelihood as one approaches the urban areas where urban agriculture tends to be a secondary source of income for those engaging in it, with non-agricultural in come sources predominating.

A mixed livelihood strategy is generally acknowledged as being more resilient than a livelihood strategy that is based on a single activity. The basis of this premise is that the disruption of one livelihood activity does not then automatically signify the absence of a livelihood source. The implication of this is that even though most communities or groups within communities recognise a particular activity as their main source of livelihood, there will be occasions where, as part of their recovery strategy during times of stress, such communities or groups rely on a secondary activity as their primary source of livelihood.

3. The Extent of the Crisis The current food crisis has affected all countries of the Southern Africa region. However, countries in the region have been affected differentially.

While the majority of the countries have been so badly affected so as to require external food aid, a few have been able to contain the situation and to

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mobilise internal resources in response to the hardship experienced by their people. This overview will examine some of the factors underlying these differences.

Two of the indicators that have been used to assess the extent of the food crisis in each country are; the number of people requiring emergency food aid and the levels of malnutrition in children under the age of five. The performance of the countries in the region in relation to these indicators is compared in Table 1. From these and other indicators, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi have been recognised to be the worst affected.

Table 1. The Extent of the Food Crisis in Southern African Countries Country

People Needing Food Aid2 Malnutrition in Children Under Five (%) of Population

Wasting

Stunting

Lesotho

34%

7.5%

34.7%

Malawi

31%

6%

49%

3%

5.5%

43.8%

Swaziland

28%

2.2%

40%

Zambia

28%

4.4%

39.9%

Zimbabwe

52%

7.3%

49.3%

Mozambique

Sources: SADC, 2002a; SADC 2002b

Factors underlying the ongoing poverty and the current food crisis are varied but generally include transitory shocks to production systems, weak economic growth performance resulting from unsuccessful macro-economic policies, poor balance of payments situations and highly skewed patterns of income and wealth distribution resulting from past colonial policies.

2

September 2002 through March 2003

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4. The Food Crisis: Emerging Trends 4.1 Vulnerable groups (a) Women and girls Reference is often made to the feminisation of poverty. This usually incorporates the following dynamics: · traditional and societal gender roles that keep women at the lower rungs of the social ladder in manner that compromises women's access to resources, entitlements and assets · traditional and societal gender roles that restrict women to tasks that are valued lowly or unpaid · that most women are in the informal sector where there is greater risk of their labour being poorly remunerated · that women constitute the majority of those living in poor rural areas · that women tend to major on subsistent, food production efforts as opposed to cash generating endeavours which tend to be the domain of men The social and economic factors listed above have the effect of compromising the food security situation of households that are headed by women. It is therefore no surprise that female-headed households have been found to be more adversely affected by the current food crisis than male headed households. Female-headed households have also been found to be more significantly represented in the poor and very poor wealth categories than 3 male-headed households. (b) Children The Southern African humanitarian crisis has enormous implications for 4 children, since 60 per cent of the region's population are aged under 18. It is therefore logical to estimate that over half of the 15 million people to be affected by the crisis will be children. The effects of the ongoing crisis on children have been summarised as follows:

3 4

SADC 2002a SCF, 2002b

38

BOX 1 Key Issues for Children > Acute levels of malnutrition are threatening the lives of children across the region. > Children and their families are at risk of being displaced from their homes as they are forced to leave in search of food. > Children are being removed from school to work and to help their families find or pay for food. > Children are vulnerable to high-risk behaviour including prostitution, in order to procure food. High rates of HIV/AIDS have left many child-headed households increasingly vulnerable to food shortages.

Source: SCF, 2002b

Young children, whose bodies are in their formative years and whose resistance and stamina are much lower than those of grown ups have been severely impacted by the current food shortages. Under such conditions children tend to be more susceptible to illnesses than adults. Another effect of the food crisis relating to children has been absenteeism from school.

Children sometimes miss school in order to assist the family to secure food.

Alternatively children who have to walk long distances to get to school stop going to school because they are too hungry to walk the distances involved.

For instance according to the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 18 per cent of households in the country have removed one or more children from school as a coping mechanism in response to the lack of food. The immediate and long-term consequences of such disruption to children's education can be considerable.

The SADC Vulnerability Assessment Committee assessments carried out at the end of 2002 revealed that although chronic malnutrition is prevalent, severe malnutrition exists in pockets, and not as the norm. Malnutrition levels among children (measured by weight-for-height) were found to be below the 10-15% thresholds that qualify a crisis to be termed a famine.5

5

SADC 2002a

39

(c) Farm workers Farm workers represent an appreciable proportion of the rural populations in several countries in the region, such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

In Zimbabwe the farm worker community represents 12 to 15% of the total population. Farm workers tend to be among the most impoverished and vulnerable groups. They tend to have limited food security, education and access to health services. They also have inadequate shelter, water and sanitation facilities. Their earnings are generally inadequate to meet basic family needs and therefore must be supplemented by subsistent food production.6 Clearly, these statistics would make farm worker communities among the most vulnerable to food insecurity, and they have been.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the displacement of large numbers of farm workers as an outcome of the land reform process has added a significant dimension of vulnerability to lives of farm worker communities. Not only has household food security been severely undermined as a consequence of the loss of employment, but social safety mechanisms that were in place to cater for the weaker members of these communities were disrupted leaving many orphans, the elderly and the disabled destitute. (d) Those affected by HIV/AIDS Over the last few years, HIV/AIDS has emerged as a key developmental factor on the continent. During this period an important relationship has 7 evolved between HIV/AIDS and food insecurity. Those who are affected spend more time on patient care or seeking medical attention than on productive activities. They also spent more resources on medical bills than on income-generating activities. Similarly, they have less energy and motivation for food production and other income generating activities. These factors have the tendency of reducing the vibrancy of this group of people and increasing their vulnerability to food insecurity.

4.2 Coping Strategies One of the most common coping strategies in times of food insecurity is that of reducing food consumption. In badly affected parts of Zimbabwe households have sought to cope with the situation by initially eating smaller portions. As scarcity of food supplies becomes worse families intensify their efforts at coping by skipping a meal during the day. This gradually graduates

6 7

Moyo et. al., 2000 see the section on HIV/AIDS as a determinant of food insecurity

40

to skipping several meals per day. In extreme cases, families then resort to skipping whole days without eating a proper meal. This extreme response has negative consequences on daily routine. Hence, school children who have to walk long distances to school begin to miss school in response to the need to conserve energy. Similarly, household chores and work requiring significant manual strength suffer. This trend has been observed in other parts of the region. About 80% of households surveyed in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland Zambia and Zimbabwe indicated that they had already changed their consumption patters in response to the ongoing food insecurity.8 The change of food consumption patterns is frequently accompanied by strategies to increase the household's financial resource base in order to increase the household's access to scarce (and therefore more dear) commodities. Strategies to increase the resource base may include income generating activities or money saving strategies. Frequently both types of are employed simultaneously.

Coping strategies with negative long-term consequences have also been observed. Perhaps the most commonly recognised are prostitution by women and girls, theft and other criminal/illegal activities such as gold panning, the selling of valuable household assets and the eating of wild grasses, fruits and leaves whose potential side-effects may be unknown.

Community based coping mechanisms have also been instituted in response to the prevailing crisis. One such response in Zimbabwe has involved reverting to the traditional practice of community food reserves. In the past, some cultural groups in the country had a practice of keeping what might be referred to as a community food bank. This involved community members (in addition to their own food production), participating in cultivating and producing a communal food reserve at the premises of traditional leader (or alternatively contributing to the food bank from their own harvest). This reserve would be kept under the supervision of the traditional leader and the food distributed to vulnerable community members in times of hardship when their own resources fell into short supply.

8

SADC, 2002b

41

4.3 The Urban Gap While it is true that the majority of the poor and vulnerable live in rural areas, it is also true that a significant number of poor people live in urban and periurban areas. This is especially the case in countries that have a significant informal settlement problem in urban areas, such as Zambia. In spite of this, very little has been unearthed concerning the food insecurity situation in urban and peri-urban areas. For instance the recent SADC Vulnerability 9 Assessment Committee assessment report , only included urban data for Zimbabwe and Zambia. There exists an important gap.

5. Recent Determinants of Food Security The causes underlying the current and ongoing food crisis in the region are varied and in some respects, complex. In many fora the prevailing crisis is attributed to climatic events over the last three seasons. Firstly, in 1999 floods associated with Cyclone Eline, disrupted the agricultural season resulting in poor harvests particularly in parts of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. This disruption was followed by two years that were characterised by drought. In this way, irregular rainfall seasons have had a significant contributory role to the current crisis. However drought conditions are not solely responsible for the current situation. Other, significant factors can be recognised including fundamental issues such as poor planning and forecasting capacity, pricing and distribution dynamics; emerging, adverse trends including HIV/AIDS; economic and agricultural policies, whose relative impact depend on countries.

In addition to the factors tabled above, another factor has begun to emerge as a significant contributing force to regional food security. It is that of regional and international trade agreements that compromise the capacity of countries in the region to develop their production systems and markets in favour of northern production systems.

5.1 Economic Considerations Many of the countries in Southern Africa are characterised by poor macroeconomic structures. Countries in the region generally exhibit low rates of economic growth. The challenge for the region is to increase and 10 sustain rates of growth in order to prevent the incidence of poverty.

Unfortunately, most of the countries in the region exhibit lower economic growth rates than those required in order to prevent the incidence of poverty.

For instance, Zimbabwe experienced improved food access in the

9 10

covered six countries; Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Malawi SAPES, UNDP, SADC, 2000

42

smallholder sector between 1990 and the year 2000. This was due to previously subsistent farmers progressively undertaking other income generating activities. The income earned would be used to supplement crop production and to ensure access to food when the harvested food items were depleted. In this way food security was gradually enhanced. However, since the year 2000, the deteriorating economic climate has reversed those gains. In addition to negative growth rates, the escalating inflation rate (currently well into the three digit range) has worsened the position of the poor as their incomes have failed to keep up with escalating commodity prices, gradually eroding their buying power. In this way, the food access of both the rural and urban poor has been decreased.

Another economic factor has been working to further compromise the food security situation in Zimbabwe. Following several seasons of reduced food accessibility, Zimbabwe has been forced to consider the importation of many foodstuffs. The implementation of this response has been limited by shortage 11 of foreign funds. In the face of inadequate local production and insufficient imports, food shortages have gradually intensified causing further escalations in prices and ultimately worsening food insecurity.

The failing economy in Zimbabwe has affected rural households from another angle. Households have been impacted by the reduction in the level of remittances that they receive from city-based family members. The reason for this is that urban dwellers have been gradually realising declining real incomes as a result of the inflationary economy and high unemployment levels (over 65%). The ability of household, both rural and urban, to save in preparation of lean times has also been significantly impacted, worsening their vulnerability.

The deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe has had many ramifications. Since the year 2000 the resulting mounting food insecurity has seen some Zimbabweans turning increasingly towards illegal incomegenerating initiatives, some of them with cross-border implications. Informal or illegal exports of commodities such as sugar into neighbouring countries became prevalent. Initially these trading activities had the effect of depressing the local markets of the recipient countries. As time has progressed, the informal cross-border trade has contributed to the shortage of commodities in the exporting country, while ameliorating the situation in the recipient country. This can be illustrated by the example of informal exports from Mozambique and Tanzania to Malawi and Zambia. The estimated levels have been high enough to have helped to reduce the cereal gap in Malawi and Zambia.

11 caused in part, by poor agricultural production as a result of the disruptions to the commercial farming sector and in part by the dwindling manufacturing industry

43

The issue of decreased remittances has also been a significant factor in Lesotho. The economy of Lesotho has traditionally been dependent on South Africa primarily due to the significant levels of expatriate remittances received from South Africa. In recent years there has been a significant downward trend in employment opportunities in South Africa and an increase in retrenchments. The resulting reduction in remittance income has had a negative impact on household income and ultimately household food security.12 The SADC Regional Human Development Report of 2000 indicated that many of the economies of the region had a structural deficiency, exhibiting an unhealthy dependence on agriculture. The stabilising influence of the manufacturing industry was said to be on the decline. This structural deficiency meant that the countries of the region were compromised with respect to their capacity to ameliorate against the impact of shocks to their agricultural production systems. This has subsequently been demonstrated by the fact that the recent disturbances to agricultural production in the different countries (whatever the source of these disturbances), subsequently contributed significantly to the present food crisis. In contrast, the two countries in the region that have a less pronounced reliance on agriculture, South Africa and Botswana, have been observed to have suffered much less from the consequences of the shocks to their agricultural production systems.

In the case of Botswana dry conditions and production shortfalls have affected the household food security of poor households. The situation has been managed internally with the affected households receiving assistance from government. No requests have been made to the international community for humanitarian assistance.13 5.2 A Structural Issue?

Maize is the staple food for the majority of countries in Southern Africa. In the remaining countries maize is still a significant food source. In Zimbabwe for instance, the official consumption requirement for maize is 1.8 million 14 tonnes per annum. Zimbabwe has the capacity to produce enough maize for domestic consumption however, over the past 6 years, Zimbabwe has tended to produce harvest below self sufficiency levels.15 This trend is fairly common across Southern Africa. Evidence from Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia confirms the fact that millions of people in the region do not produce 16 sufficient maize from which they can subsist.

12

SADC 2002a; Abbot, 2002 SADC, 2002b The Farmer, April 3, 2001 15 The Farmer, October 17, 2000 16 Abbot, 2003 13

14

44

Clearly then, there is a serious issue with respect to national food availability within the region. This has the effect of increasing the demand for the product, giving rise to the need to import. Invariably, it is more expensive for countries in the region to import a tonne of maize than to produce it domestically. The difference between these two costs, the import parity, is subsequently reflected in the maize prices which become elevated. In the case of Malawi this scenario resulted in 2002 maize prices that were beyond the reach of most rural households. This gave rise to a food access problem in addition to the food availability one. The Malawi situation is particularly worrying. A recent analysis noted that even though already considered high, consumer maize prices are likely to now increase after being abnormally low over the last couple years as a result of the export parity. This has led to the analysis proposing that the Malawi maize crisis is a continuing, structural 17 problem.

The issue of recurring commodity deficiencies raises the question of planning and forecasting. Proper planning and forecasting in this regard would take into consideration anticipated production levels in relation to projected demand. This way, seasonal shortfalls would be identified in advance and the appropriate steps taken to avert impending disaster. The case of Zimbabwe can be used to illustrate this point. At national level Zimbabwe is one of the countries in the Southern Africa region with the capacity to produce enough maize for domestic consumption. For instance, during the 1999/2000 season Zimbabwe's maize production was in surplus of domestic requirements.

When a joint FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) forecasted a shortfall for the 2001/2002 maize harvest and the need to import, government failed to act on this information timeously, contributing to the resulting crisis.

This and other instances of failing to forecast accurately or failing to react to forecasts received, point to the need for greater capacity in the areas of planning and early warning systems. In the case of Zimbabwe there was an additional factor to be considered, that of political intervention. Food shortages forecasted and published by the technical division of the agricultural ministry were both contested and ignored by the political levels within the ministry; an example of political imperatives taking precedence.

The issue of recurring maize shortages also raises the question of the appropriateness of maize as a staple food in the region. Being non-indigenous to the region, maize crops often fail in many of the areas that experience moisture stress. In the case of Zimbabwe, this constitutes approximately two thirds of the country. And yet, maize is planted widely throughout the region in preference to crops that are more resilient to moisture stress, e.g. sorghum

17

Rubey, 2002

45

and millet. The relative susceptibility of maize to failure as a result of moisture stress has had the effect of increasing the vulnerability of many rural households to food insecurity.

5.3 The Contribution of Some Recent Policies The land reform programme in Zimbabwe and associated policies have been the subject of considerable scrutiny and commentary. The “fast-track” manner in which the second phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme was implemented set up a situation which the state could not support and develop in a sustainable manner. Also fairly widely reported and discussed has been the significant decrease in cereal production as a result of the disruption to commercial farming operations. Downstream effects of this disruption now include reduced availability of: · cereal products · oil seed products (mainly soya beans) and hence valuable nutritional oil products · stock feeds and therefore · dairy products While the politically motivated assertion that the commercial farming sector 18 did not feed Zimbabwe can be said to have been accurate as far as maize was concerned, events have subsequently proved the assertion to be inaccurate.

The shortage of the above-mentioned commercial farming sector outputs has contributed appreciably to the levels of food insecurity in the country. These shortages and their effects have been exacerbated by yet another series of government policies, that of price controls.

Faced with its inability to provide agricultural inputs (seed and fertiliser) to resettled farmers as it had promised, the Zimbabwe government began instituting price controls in the year 2001. While the price of key agricultural inputs was fixed to make them more affordable to government, the gazetted prices were unsustainable in terms of production. Shortages of these inputs subsequently became a major problem during the 2002/2003 agricultural season, limiting severely the total hectarage brought under crop. The situation has been further complicated by the emergence of parallel, informal markets for the controlled items. In essence controlled commodities have become inaccessible at the official prices, but more available at the elevated informal market prices. This has worsened the situation by creating “artificial” shortages since many are unable to afford the inputs at these elevated prices.

18 and therefore that the redistribution of land from white commercial farmers to indigenous small and medial scale farmers would in no way jeopardize the country's maize supplies

46

5.4 Chronic Vulnerability It is an accepted fact that the majority of the poor live in rural areas. Rural areas are more at risk from large, transitory shocks induced by climate (droughts, floods, etc.) and from illness and high mortality (due to the relatively poor health care services). The poor are especially vulnerable to such risks.19 Invariably, communities have developed coping mechanisms to mitigate against such shocks and to ameliorate against their vulnerability to them. However, in most countries in the region, pockets of chronic vulnerability can be found. For instance, in Zimbabwe, the drier regions of the country tend to experience the most acute food insecurity and hence the need for food aid. Here, food insecurity has become chronic.

Chronic vulnerability has been identified as one of the main contributing factors to the current food crisis in Lesotho. The causes responsible for this 20 chronic vulnerability have been said to include: · Loss of household income due to retrenchment and reduced employment (most notably South African employment); ·

Reduced purchasing power due to much higher costs of food and inputs

·

Increasing household expenditure on items associated with long term illness and death (highly linked with HIV/AIDs);

·

Reduced land planted due to heavy rainfall, reduced use of inputs and chronic illness;

·

Government policies on subsidizing inputs which encourage farming households to delay their planting to wait for inputs (which often arrive late); and

·

Poor agricultural practices that result in low productivity.

The significance of chronic vulnerability is that it greatly impacts the community's capacity to bounce back form the shocks that may be experienced. In many cases, the coping mechanisms are severely compromised to the extent that they are no longer viable.

A possible source of future chronic vulnerability can be observed in Mozambique. While the 2001/2002 season saw reasonable yields being produced in the northern parts of the country, the southern parts were less productive. The food insecurity situation subsequently experienced in the southern and central parts of the country was in part, as a result of the poor infrastructural linkages that limited the efficient distribution of available food stocks. In this way the underdeveloped communication systems may give rise to the chronic vulnerability of communities in remote areas.

19 20

IFAD, 2001 Abbot, 2002

47

5.5 HIV/AIDS: A causal/effect factor The impact of HIV/AIDS on food security has aptly been summarised as follows: BOX 2 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Food Security and Development The devastating implications of HIV/AIDS for development and poverty reduction may be attributed to the fact that the pandemic: > deprives families, communities and entire nations of their young and most productive people > is deepening poverty on a massive scale > is reversing human development achievements in a huge part of the developing world > is worsening gender inequalities, > is eroding the ability of governments to maintain essential services > is reducing labour productivity and supply and > is putting a brake on economic growth.

Source: Loewenson and Whiteside, 2001 In other words, HIV/AIDS has and continues to compromise the development initiatives which have been designed to eradicate or alleviate poverty in Southern Africa and beyond. To the contrary, HIV/AIDS has had the effect of exacerbating poverty on the African continent. On a personal level HIV/AIDS weakens the individual from undertaking livelihood securing activities (be it work of searching for food), thereby increasing the likelihood of food insecurity. At the same time, food insecurity and the hunger and malnutrition that accompanies it has the effect of accelerating the progress of disease in the HIV-positive individual as well as rendering that individual susceptible to other infections. The fact that the health situation in the region is either poor or deteriorating (as in the case of Zimbabwe) exacerbates the situation. The vicious cycle emerging and the impact of food security potential can be illustrated as follows:

48

Poverty & Inequality

Food Access & Equality

Faster Progression from HIV to AIDS New HIV Infections

Slower progression of illness Retardation of HIV rates

Food Security Food Insecurity

Well-being Security Malnutrition Risky Survival Activities

Figure 1: The Interplay Between HIV/AIDS and Poverty (Adapted from Save the Children and Oxfam, 2002) One of the more easily recognizable impacts of HIV/AIDS is loss of income due to absenteeism resulting from illness or from care of the ill.21 This means that cash income and labour are diverted towards coping with the illness, reducing the affected household's efforts towards income generating activity, be it agricultural or otherwise. Either way studies have observed that there is ultimately an impact on the food security of the affected household.22 An additional link between HIV/AIDS and reduced household food security is financial debilitation as a result of the liquidation of assets. The liquidation of assets is now recognised as a coping strategy to generate income in response to the financial demands of the illness that accompanies HIV/AIDS.23 Families badly affected by HIV/AIDS dispose of their savings, income, household assets and finally immovable property in response to the demands of illness and death associated with HIV/AIDS. 21 22 23

FAO, 1994 Mbaya and Ngaru, 2002 Microsave-Africa, undated; Mbaya and Ngaru, 2002; Drimie, 2002

49

In many households HIV/AIDS does not just attack one person, but often more than one. In this way HIV/AIDS causes progressive and worsening deterioration in the livelihood status of households experiencing multiple illnesses and deaths. Households that are better resourced prior to the onset of illness tend to cope better with the effects of HIV/AIDS.24 This means that as food insecurity has increased over the last few years, there has been a corresponding decrease in the capacity of affected households to cope with the effects of HIV/AIDS, particularly once the chronic stage of illness is reached.

A recent study raised concern about the emerging urban rural migration trend associated with HIV/AIDS.25 The study noted that there was a strong tendency for city-based people to return to their rural homes once they were in the chronic phase of HIV/AIDS related illness. The study raised concern over the sustainability of the burden that was being placed on rural resources in this manner. There are also likely to be implications for the already shrinking household livelihood resources.

Perhaps one of the most insidious impacts of HIV/AIDS is the manner in which it has attacked the fibre of society and all its institutions; the family; local leadership; central and local government; service and community support infrastructure and so on. Hence, the following consequences of HIV/AIDS have become increasingly more common: ¡ growing numbers of child -headed households ¡ increased incidence of grandparents and other extended family members taking care of numerous orphans ¡ the prevalence of unfilled civil service posts following the death of officers In this way HIV/AIDS has negatively impacted the capacity of communities to secure and enhance their livelihoods. In addition, the pandemic has and continues to negatively impact the security of these communities in the generation(s) to come.

In an earlier section the impact of economic factors on household food security was discussed. There are now indications that HIV/AIDS has the potential to significantly impact national economies. According to the World Bank as HIV prevalence rates rise, the national income or gross domestic product can fall significantly. The example is given that in South Africa, the

24 25

Mbaya and Ngaru, 2002 Mbaya and Ngaru, 2002

50

pandemic is projected to reduce the economic growth rate by 0.3% to 0.4% annually, resulting by the year 2010 in a GDP 17% lower than it would have been without HIV/AIDS. In essence, the pandemic would wipe out US$22 26 billion off the country's economy. This example gives a measure of the incredible destabilising potential of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

As already indicated, the present food crisis has tended to make poor people more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS as an increasingly compounded situation unfolds. Those who are food insecure undertake coping strategies that place them at risk of contracting HIV infection in order to survive. At the same time HIV/AIDS accelerates people's food insecurity by reducing their capacity to work and to secure food. The combined effect of HIV/AIDS and food insecurity has the potential to produce a humanitarian disaster of unprecedented levels.

5.6 Unfair International Trade Systems One of the contributory factors to the failure of poverty reduction initiatives in the region has been the failure of agricultural reform programmes that were instituted under the umbrella of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

Countries embarking on SAPs were compelled to adopt stringent economic reforms in order to receive loans from international monetary organisations, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SAPs have subsequently been widely criticized for their secretive, undemocratic processes of decision-making, the heavy-handed role of the World Bank and IMF and the hardship ultimately suffered by poor people, women, small producers and the environment as their governments are left grappling with crippling debt repayments. Frequently sighted outcomes of SAPS included:27 路 the elimination of protective tariffs led to the collapse of domestic manufacturing industries; 路 privatization led to state bankruptcy by allowing international capital to buy state enterprises at very low costs; 路 deregulation of banking systems led to very high interest rates; 路 cuts in public sector employment, cost recovery programmes in the health sector and liberalization of the market all reduced the safety nets previously enjoyed by the poorer people and thus exposed them to the harsh climate of a liberalized economy.

Hence, unfair policies associated with SAPs and other related programmes have contributed to the economic ills of the region, the marginalisation of the poor from markets and, ultimately, to growing insecurity for the poor.

26 27

World Bank, 1999 Catholic Relief Services, 2000

51

6. Lessons Learnt and Options for the Future Following an initial lethargic reaction by a number of the governments in the region, the regional community has subsequently began to recognise the seriousness of the ongoing food crisis. Table 3 gives an indication of the progress made by the different countries in meeting the production shortfalls.

The key response has been that of mobilising food reserves from areas of plenty to the affected areas. While the main sources have been outside the region, there has been a degree of meeting these regional needs from within.

South Africa whose food stocks have remained stable overall, has steadily supplied other countries in the region with food.

Table 3: Filling the 2002/2003 Domestic Cereal Gap (September 2002) Country

Domestic Cereal Gap (MT)

Remaining Cereal Gap

Lesotho

255,500

77%

Malawi

277,000

76%

Mozambique

380,000

22%

Swaziland

121,000

73%

Zambia

684,000

87%

Zimbabwe

1,654,000

75%

Adapted from FEWS, 2002 It is likely that the delay in filling the cereal gap will significantly jeopardise the capacity of actors concerned to supply existing needs this year. Another illustration of this lethargy is the slow pace with which the Zimbabwe government has acted in response to the disaster in the Matebeleland south region of the country. Perhaps one of the worst affected areas in the country, food reserves have been total depleted and livestock herds decimated by the drought. Only in March of this year was a state of emergency declared in the area by the authorities. A valuable lesson that has been learnt has been the importance of governments and relevant civil society organisations reacting and responding quickly to early warning messages.

In the same way members of the international donor community can be said to have been initially slow in responding to the crisis and to requests for 28 assistance. While the international community has subsequently responded positively, saving many from starvation, the initial slow response is partly ted 28

see for instance, SCF, 2002b

52

responsible for the fact that the World Food Programme is yet to secure all the resources required to fund the identified regional needs for the period ending March 2003.29 Current indications are that the remaining shortfall, estimated at over 1 million MT will be difficult to achieve.30 A lesson well illustrated by the case of Zimbabwe has been that of the ruthlessness with which political imperatives can be given priority over the security of the vulnerable. While governments might be expected to make decisions that are in the interest of their nationals at all times, it is ultimately the responsibility of civil society elements to call their governments to accountability and to show political commitment to the food security of their nations rather than to self-serving political agendas. Although in most countries it remains the role of government to create the environment (policy and otherwise) for wide scale responses to threats of disaster, there is much that can be achieved by local and international civil society structures with respect to influencing the decisions of policy-makers in this regard.

The operating environment for NGOs wishing to participate in food distribution efforts has posed significant challenges to their food distribution efforts. Political dynamics have been widely reported to have interfered with the food distribution efforts of NGOs in politically unsettled parts of Zimbabwe. In addition, untimely changes in the NGO registration regulations were also used to streamline NGO participation in food distribution activities. Over and above state-instituted challenges, NGOs have also encountered challenges caused by the poor economic climate. For instance, with the country experiencing its worst fuel crisis in two decades,31 oftentimes distribution missions had to be cancelled or postponed as a result of the non-availability of fuel.

The food distribution efforts launched by the partnership between governments, local and international non-governmental organisation and international donors have been fashioned as emergency relief operations with the objective of saving lives. These efforts have been hugely successful in saving lives and averting a famine. Noteworthy is the role played by smaller NGOs, church organisations etc. in reaching albeit small numbers of people who fell outside the distribution programmes of the larger agencies. While the operations of these organisations have been at a small scale they have nonetheless been an integral part of averting starvations.

29 30 31

WFP, 2003 SADC, 2002a WFP, 2003

53

There have also been some efforts to couple the food handouts with a development component. For instance, some organisations have been involved in a donor-supported initiative to distribute household drip irrigation kits as a way of encouraging communities to embark on household and community gardens. The produce from these gardens is intended to supplement the food aid items distributed to the communities. Unfortunately such efforts have been limited. For the most part observed efforts have not gone beyond the sphere of relief. Of course there is a limited amount that humanitarian efforts can do given the underlying factors. It is really the responsibility of local development agencies and their governments to begin to address the issues relating to innovative agricultural strategies; cropping regimes that allow farmers to maximise on their efforts in the face of shifting climatic conditions and soils; and labour-saving technologies that increase resilience to erratic rainfall, the sustainable rebuilding of a civil society sector that has been ravaged by HIV/AIDS and energy saving, mechanisms and processes for households that are affected by HIV/AIDS. In the absence of these responses, the gains achieved through the ongoing relief efforts may not be sustained, particularly in the face of forecasts of another sub-normal harvest. Given this, the prognosis has to be that the crisis for the region is not over.

The challenge that faces policy analysts and policy makers is how to address the structural defects and the chronic vulnerability that contributed so significantly to the current crisis. Failure to do so leaves the affected countries in a “sitting duck� position with the inevitability of a repeat scenario an all too likely occurrence. While the required effort will vary from country to country, it is apparent that the process will call for a committed, transparent and multi-sectoral analysis involving a wide cross section of players in order for appropriate, sustainable interventions to be identified.

Another challenge that confronts civil society and governments alike is that of continuing to search for coping strategies in response to the prevailing situation and possible similar occurrences in the future. However there is the need for such strategies to be relevant to prevailing tastes and trends. The importance of this can be illustrated by the example of the community food reserves that were encouraged in Zimbabwe. The success of this initiative has 32 been somewhat limited as it has been in other parts of the region. It would appear that in a progressively individualised world, the concept of community labour is no longer well received. Community responses to this traditional practice would seem to indicate the need for the practice to be modified in keeping with new paradigms.

32

see for example the dying out of similar community practices in Malawi (Mbaya and Ngaru, 2002)

54

An area that requires serious and urgent attention is that of ensuring that responses to the current crisis take into consideration the HIV/AIDS dimension. Many organisations with a tradition of embarking on relief work in response to humanitarian crises have automatically churned out their usually responses without factoring in this new and all-important dimension.

What does an HIV/AIDS sensitive food relief programme look like? This is the question that organisations must now ask themselves on a project-byproject, community-by-community basis. The interventions will vary from consideration factors such as making particular arrangements for the ill or for those caring for the ill and who may therefore be unable to attend food distributions and associated meetings. There may also be preventive interventions, for instance those that reduce caregivers' risks of becoming ill themselves etc. Associated with the issue of consideration for caregivers is the apparent lack of focus on the gendered nature of exposure to HIV/AIDS and food insecurity dimension. This is an area that requires careful consideration.

There is an important discussion which presently occupies a very low profile.

That is the discussion concerning the recovery strategy for the region. The devastation of household and community viability that has been caused over the last few agricultural seasons has been considerable. Unfortunately current indications imply that while some countries such as Malawi currently have reasonable prospects for a good agricultural harvest, in other countries the present season's harvest may not bring significant improvement to the existing crisis (see Figure 2). Several reasons are identified. Many of these are the very factors that have contributed to the evolution of the crisis in the first place. Firstly, climatic factors; for instance, the current season's rainfall in Maputo (Mozambique) has been the lowest recorded in the last 50 years.33 At the same time, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia have experienced crop losses as a result of the effects of Tropical Cyclone Japhet. A second factor is that of the consequences of recent policies. For instance the non-availability of agricultural inputs together with the reorganisation of the commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe have resulted in less than 40% of maize farmland planted for the next season.

However, even if the current season were to yield a normal harvest, it will take more than just a successful agricultural season in order to restore badly affected households and communities to security and viability. For instance the communal farmer in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe34 who lost over 60 herd of cattle might need assistance with restocking. In view of the multiplicity of

33 34

FEWS, 2003 Matabeleland South, where drought has decimated livestock herds

55

crises confronting governments in the region, this matter is unlikely to be prioritized by governments. There is an opportunity for NGOs and community based organisations to take the lead in this discussion.

The experiences of the last two years have demonstrated the importance of inter and intra-sectoral coordination. The implementation of food distribution efforts in Zimbabwe demonstrated a concerted effort on the part of NGOs in the coordination of their efforts. However, on occasion overlapping has still occurred. This has demonstrated the need for closer cooperation between governments and civil society at national, regional and at the international levels. Better compilation and reporting of data would significantly improve the coordination process.

Finally, there has been appreciable participation of private sector institutions in the mobilisation of food stocks. The levels of commercial maize imports in countries such as Zimbabwe and Zambia has raised the profile of the capacity that exists in the private sector. In this way, the largely untapped potential of private sector entities to contribute to developmental issues has been demonstrated. It will be in the interests of governments in the region to maximise on the momentum generated to date.

7. Conclusion The Southern Africa region is confronted with a uniquely challenging situation. The combined effects of the prevailing food crisis and the escalating HIV/AIDS pandemic, set in a background of chronic instability and vulnerability, have the potential to yield catastrophic results. This situation demands integration of short-term relief efforts intended to save lives with longer-term development interventions, all appropriately sensitized to the gendered nuances and the special needs of those affected by HIV/AIDS. These responses need to be back-stopped by appropriate policy reforms aimed at addressing existing structural and economic anomalies.

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Bibliography Abbot, J.: see herein Catholic Relief Services, 2000. From Debt to Poverty Eradication: What Role for Poverty Reduction Strategies?

Fews, 2000. Summary of 1998/99 Zimbabwe Current Vulnerability Assessment, FEWS, http://www.fews.org.va/zi/ziva.html Fews, 2002. Southern Monthly Report: Assessments Point to Rising Needs.

SADC Food Security Network Ministerial Brief. Friday, 10/11/2002 Fews, 2003. Mozambique Monthly Report. Seasonal rainfall at 50 year low.

3/4/2003 IFAD, 2001. Rural Poverty Report 2001. The Challenge of Ending Rural Poverty. Oxford University Press. New York Loewenson, R and Whiteside, A. 2001. 'HIV/AIDS: implications for poverty reduction', paper prepared for the UNDP for the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, 25-27 June 2001.

Mbaya, S. and Ngaru M. 2002. HIV/AIDS And Its Impact On Land Issues In Malawi And Zambia. Report of the Malawi Study. A Study Conducted on Behalf of Oxfam GB. Harare, May, 2002 MicroSave-Africa, Undated. “HIV/AIDS - Responding to a Silent Economic Crisis Among Microfinance Clients.”

Rubey, L. 2002. Malawi's Food Crisis: Causes And Solutions. www.sarpn.org.za SADC-FANR, 2002a. Regional Emergency Food Security Assessment Report, December 2002. Vulnerability Assessment Committee SADC-FANR, 2002b. SADC Food Security Network Ministerial Brief.

Southern Monthly Report, 10/11/2002 World Bank, 1999. HIV/AIDS in Africa. Africa Region/The World Bank Vol. 1 November 1999 World Food Programme (WFP), 2003. Regional Consolidated Situation Report for Southern Africa Crisis. 3 Mar 2003 Save the Children and Oxfam International, 2002. HIV/AIDS and Food Insecurity in Southern Africa. 1 December 2002. http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000118/index.php Save the Children Fund (SCF) 2002a. International Save the Children Alliance Emergency Statement: Southern Africa Food Crisis. 27 Nov 2002. www.reliefweb.int

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Save the Children Fund (SCF) 2002b. Evolution of a Crisis - A Save the Children UK perspective. 30 Sept 2002b. www.reliefweb.int Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 2002. Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment Report. 16 September 2002.

58

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: Concepts, findings, strengths, challenges and future developments.

Niel Marsland: SC (UK)/SADC VAC VULNERABLE TO WHAT? ? Household food security: “access to adequate food at all times for an active and healthy life” ? Household livelihood security: “ A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation” (Chambers and Conway: 1992) MOST RECENT FIGURES….

VAC Aug VAC Dec assessment: assessment: Maximum Maximum rural people in rural people in need Dec 02- need Dec 02March 03 March 03 Zimbabwe* 6,700,000 7,180,000 Malawi 3,300,000 3,590,000 Zambia*+ 2,900,000 2,730,000 Lesotho 650,000 740,000 Swaziland 270,000 300,000 Mozambique 590,000 660,000 Region 14,400,000 15,200,000

Country

* ** *** +

VAC Dec. VAC Dec Assessment assessment MT Percent in cereal food need** aid*** Dec 02 Mar 03 52% 31% 28% 34% 28% 3% 26%

345,000 173,000 132,000 39,000 15,000 31,000 735,000

Figures for Zimbabwe and Zambia include some urban needs Rural population in need over total national population Excludes stock replenishment National population figures updated since VAC August assessment (decreased about 10%)

59

Assets livestoc

Sale

Income Generatin Activitie Piecewor Petty Employme Etc.

Cash on cash

+

Current stock + Purchase

+ Barter

Food Activitie Labour Gifts Food Winter Purchase

CEREAL

Cumulativ Househol Foo Acces

July/ August 2002

Total Current Food Available

+

Compare = ><?

April 2003 Harvest

Total Future Food Available

Expecte Cerea Availabilit

Cumulative Houshol Food Need

Require Availabilit

Fixed monthly consumption requirements x number of months

CASH

Filter out cash not spent on food

Filter out grain for sale/ exchange/ seed/ gifts

Method 2: Swazi., Moz., Les., (partly), Zim. (partly), Mal.(partly)

(external cause)

Defining the magnitude of a problem: Involves translating hazard information into economic consequences, comparing historical data sets to current values.

The drought will result in 50% of normal crop production

purchase (50.00%)

deficit (15.00%)

milk/meat (20.00%)

own crops (15.00%)

Food Security Outcome

Conducted on a seasonal basis (e.g.) pre- or postharvest) or in response to a predicted or observed hazard (such as flood, or a price rise)

The outcome analysis:

(outcome)

Risk of food shortage

HOW IT ALL FITS TOGETHER

The Analytical Framework & Associated Information Requirements

(internal cause)

Vulnerability to hazard & Hazard =

Baseline Analysis: Tackles the fundamental questions of how people survive, translating rural economies into useful analytical backups.

own crops (30.00%)

Normal Sources of Food

purchase (50.00%) milk/meat (20.00%)

Contingency and Response Planning

STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES Method 1: Strengths + + + +

Conceptually robust food access model Addresses key livelihoods issues (assets, activities, outcomes) Generates quantifiable food security outcomes (“cereal gap”) Good for looking at past and present components/measures of household food security

Method 1: Challenges + Difficulty in predicting the future important especially for livelihoods of the poor (heavy reliance on rainy season off-farm activities) + Seasonality elements are left out/under-represented in the analysis assumes a “linear” food access profile through time concept of “counting back” has implications for temporal targeting. + Food aid focus + Operational difficulties……

A M J

J A S O N F

J

F M

?

?

Emergency Assessment Period before assessment Period after assessment

?

?

?

?

?

Livelihood Baseline

Method 2: Strengths + Modelling on the basis of the past, not prediction less room for error (see last page) + Holistic measure of livelihood vulnerability + Quantified outcomes in terms of food aid and other interventions.

Method 2: Challenges + Not transparent + Relies heavily on skill of analyst 62

?

+ Various assumptions used in modelling (e.g. expandability of coping strategies). + No household level data + Difficult to tease out gender and age dynamics How accurate are the figures?

Country

Zimbabwe* Malawi Zambia*+ Lesotho Swaziland Mozambique Region

* ** *** +

VAC Aug VAC Dec assessment: assessment: Maximum Maximum rural people in rural people in need Dec 02- need Dec 02March 03 March 03 6,700,000 7,180,000 3,300,000 3,590,000 2,900,000 2,730,000 650,000 740,000 270,000 300,000 590,000 660,000 14,400,000 15,200,000

VAC Dec. VAC Dec Assessment assessment MT Percent in cereal food need** aid*** Dec 02 Mar 03 52% 31% 28% 34% 28% 3% 26%

345,000 173,000 132,000 39,000 15,000 31,000 735,000

Figures for Zimbabwe and Zambia include some urban needs Rural population in need over total national population Excludes stock replenishment National population figures updated since VAC August assessment (decreased about 10%)

1.

Macro picture……. + EMOP only 56% funded as of Jan 31st (now up to over 70%) + Domestic cereal gap at macro level: 1,600,500 MT (six countries) as at Jan 20th, of which Zim = 897,000 MT. 2. Large need for food aid estimated by the VACs: 735,000 MT Yet….

3. Available data indicates that acute malnutrition rates low in general (wasting in under-5s below 10%) What does this mean? + + +

Estimates of food aid need are inflated??

Micro level malnutrition figures are not representative of country wide situations??

Households are maintaining nutrition by depleting assets??

63

Other issues…… + + + + +

Is food aid the only answer?

What about “non-food sectors”?

What about HIV/AIDS? What about Angola?

What urban assessments?

64

2. Country papers

65

66

FOOD SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-CONFLICT ANGOLA Nina Bowen, CARE Southern and West Africa Regional Office Douglas Steinberg, CARE Angola 1. Introduction After four decades of conflict, the cease-fire signed in April 2002 offers Angola the best opportunity in generations to forge a more equitable growth path, and to reformulate a governing apparatus that serves the needs of the population. Given that the balance of power has definitively shifted to the government, the peace is likely to be durable. Unlike other countries in southern Africa however, Angola is not facing an unusual drought year. The Angolan emergency is essentially linked to war and governance. The war destroyed infrastructure throughout the country, forced millions to move, and razed communities through scorched-earth tactics. Human rights were violated, women raped, men abducted. Millions went hungry and died.

Entire generations have been pressed-ganged into warfare, killed, or simply disappeared.

Almost 50% of agricultural households in rural Angola are now female headed, with almost no remittance streams. HIV infection, at 5.5%, is comparatively lower than the regional average. With little being done, HIV/AIDS impact is likely to follow patterns now seen in other countries in the region. Urban population growth has been extremely high in Angola in the last 40 years, even by African standards. Urban areas accounted for 15% of the population in 1970, versus an estimated 50% in the 1990s. Luanda alone accounts for over 3 million, or almost 25% of the national population.

To a limited extent, clientelist redistribution has benefited a wider layer of the urban population through subsidies for fuel, water, and electricity. During periods of hyperinflation state resources financed imports of food and other commodities at a subsidized exchange rate. But these benefits have been outweighed by a decline in real purchasing power and the decay of social service delivery (Hodges 2001).

Despite these hardships, the people of Angola have shown impressive perseverance and remain hopeful for the future. In the second half of 2002, half of the nearly two million people who had taken refuge in IDP camps returned to their home areas, and seek to revive their livelihoods. But they return to areas that hardly fulfill the basic conditions for a decent life. Most areas have virtually no services, including water, health facilities, schools, or civilian administration.

Farmers possess few productive resources, including the minimum inputs such as seeds, hand tools and ploughs, or sufficient labor to recuperate land that has lain fallow for years. Due to the 67

pervasive prevalence of land mines, they undertake agriculture literally at the risk of life or limb. The immediate challenges of post war resettlement and rehabilitation center on humanitarian assistance in the short term to ensure adequate access to the most basic assets to reestablish food production, the rehabilitation of roads to facilitate the growth of markets and entry into trade, the construction and staffing of basic social infrastructure, and training of health and education workers.

The oil sector provided 80% of government revenue during the 1990s.

Backward and forward linkages to rest of economy are limited, except through the redistributive mechanisms of government revenue and 1 expenditure. However, the government has never had a long term economic and social development strategy which identified and implemented prioritized public expenditure targets, and which could therefore assist in redressing the distortions caused by the structure of oil revenues. In the longer term, reducing high inequality through more equitable and responsive public spending is crucial to avoiding instability in the future. The lack of transparency in public resource management, and the weakness of civil society and mechanisms to link citizens with the government, has made accountability even more difficult to achieve.

Comparatively little social science research has been carried out in the postindependence period, nor was it a priority during the colonial period. More recent scholarly work has focused on the political and military aspects of the war, and the oil and diamond economies (e.g. Aguilar 2001; Cilliers and Dietrich 2000; Hodges 2001; Le Billon 2001). The international community has largely focused on emergency aid, rapid interventions, and identifying gaps in basic needs. Consequently, understanding of social structures and livelihood trends is more cursory than in most countries. As a result of the war and under investment in basic statistical capacity, household data is also very limited and there is no national level poverty data.

With these constraints in mind, this paper first presents a situational analysis of the immediate challenges facing Angola. It then turns to a discussion of trends in the rural areas of the Central Plateau, historically seen as Angola's breadbasket, and follows this with a section on urban livelihoods, where approximately half the population now lives. The lack of both qualitative and quantitative data over time means that the paper does not seek to definitively identify and establish livelihood trends, but rather to raise questions and facilitate future analysis. The final section takes up the policy implications, and argues that reconstruction must be a dialogue that links the center with the grassroots, accompanied by greater governmental s is a major 1 The oil industry is highly capital intensive, with less than 10,000 employees, half of which are employed by the state oil company Sonangol.

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transparency. In this context, chronic weaknesses in local government structures is a major constraint to community led development.

Perhaps the biggest challenge is understanding and responding to the reality that post-conflict recovery is not, and cannot be, a simple reconstruction of the past. In the aftermath of conflict many elements may be reconfigured: livelihood strategies, gender relationships, the varying legitimacy accorded to political authorities, social networks and support structures, individual aspirations, and perceptions of valued work. The reconstruction program in Angola must do what they have often failed to do elsewhere. It must look for new solutions, address fundamental issues of what direction development should take, and incorporate institutional reformulation and strengthening as a central organizing principle.

2. A Devastated Country after Decades of Civil War Following four decades of conflict, Angola has one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world. Despite its vast mineral wealth and agricultural potential, the country ranked 160th out of 174 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP, 2000). Not counting international refugees, approximately 1.8 million people currently depend on food assistance.

Almost seven out of every ten Angolans lack access to clean water, 60 percent lack access to proper sanitation, and three out of every four Angolans have very limited access to health care.

Insufficient household food resources, poor care practices, and inadequate access to basic health care contribute to some of the worst rates of maternal and child mortality, malnutrition, and life expectancy in the world. Infant mortality is 150 per 1000 live births and the rates of under-five and maternal mortality are 292 per 1000 and 1,854 per 100,000, respectively. A calculated 53% of children under five are stunted (-2z scores ht/age) and 42% are underweight (-2z scores wt/age). Life expectancy at birth is 44 years (UNICEF 1999). Access to prenatal and post-partum care is poor. In many localities, up to 80% of mothers deliver at home without the presence of a skilled assistant. Although caution must be taken in identifying demographic trends due to the lack of reliable data, there is some suggestion that the war has mitigated long term fertility declines seen elsewhere in Africa by keeping childhood mortality high, restricting access to contraception and maternal and child health care, and potentially by causing social and marital disruptions could have led to an earlier start of childbearing (Agadjanian and Prata 2001).

During the course of the war, the nation suffered massive population displacement and economic disintegration. Angola has the highest 69

percentage of internally displaced persons (IDPs) of any nation.2 Following the resumption of the war in 1998, over four million of Angola's 13 million people fled their homes and resettled elsewhere in the country. Seventy percent of these IDPs are women and children. In addition, another 500,000 Angolan refugees, mainly from the border provinces, fled to neighboring countries. Most recently, following the end of hostilities in early April 2002, more than 80,000 destitute UNITA fighters and their families (a total of approximately 430,000 persons) made their way out of isolated rural areas to 34 "gathering" (formerly "quartering") areas (OCHA 2002). This recent wave of displaced persons included many that are acutely ill and malnourished. Finally, Rapid Assessments of Critical Needs (RACN) organized by the United Nations in newly accessible areas have identified large pockets of people who were caught between warring factions and are among the most affected.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that the highly vulnerable population of the newly accessible areas is around 1.2 million people.

The security situation in the countryside has vastly improved since the cease fire. Most municipalities in the interior of the country are now accessible by road, and rural trade and markets are slowly beginning to recover. As conditions improve, large-scale population movements have once again begun to take place. In September 2002, UN-OCHA reported that approximately 35,000 refugees had returned from Zambia and the DRC. UN-OCHA also estimated that at least 700,000 IDPs had returned to their areas of origin during the previous five months (OCHA 2002). By mid-September 2002, with the beginning of the main farming season looming, as many as 10,000 IDPs per day were on the move. When the UNITA gathering areas are eventually closed, the relocation of ex-combatants and their families will also accelerate.

In response to the rapid resettlement of IDPs and former UNITA soldiers, the government of Angola and UN agencies have given priority to the transition from a humanitarian crisis to longer term development interventions during 2003. Two-thirds of the $386 million called for in the United Nations' 2003 humanitarian appeal are earmarked for food assistance (not only for those remaining in IDP camps but also to assist people as they resettle and until they re-establish viable livelihoods). Other priorities include the restoration of health services (UNICEF, WHO), including rehabilitation of health posts and provision of essential drugs and equipment; provision of seeds and tools (FAO); emergency survival assistance for the hardest-hit pockets that remain inaccessible by road (WFP); and actions to promote safety through mine 2 For most Angolans, displacement is not a single event followed by "resettlement". It has been experienced as consecutive migrations and reverse migrations throughout the course of the war. See, for example, a study on four different displaced communities in Malanje and Benguela (Andrade 2001), as well as a more general account of migration patterns in Robson and Roque (2001).

70

awareness, child protection and civic education (OCHA, UNMA). As of mid-February 2003, pledges and contributions to the appeal totaled only 1.1% of the year's requirements, though the WFP food pipeline is sufficient to carry through until the end of May. The government of Angola has called for a donor conference to begin planning the longer-term development interventions and to generate support for these actions. Neither date nor a consensus on the agenda has been established. The international donor community is committed to the immediate humanitarian crisis, but remains equivocal about long-term commitments until the government of Angola itself demonstrates a real commitment to investing in social development.

Most of the bilateral aid is channeled through UN agencies, as well as the ICRC, but a considerable proportion of the funding goes to support the work of NGOs, with preference given to NGOs based in the donors' respective countries. The emphasis has been on emergency assistance but beginning with the current agricultural season more money has gone into supporting food production particularly through seeds and tools distribution.

Increasingly, donors are giving attention to issues surrounding human rights, democracy and governance, youth and child protection (including family reunification), education, and endemic diseases (including HIV/AIDS).

Much of the aid goes to the Planalto provinces, where most of the population (outside Luanda) lives. There are about 60 international NGOs and well over 200 national NGOs working in Angola. The international NGOs are mostly concentrated in Plantalto provinces as well, and they are least active in provinces that have been extremely inaccessible due to war (such as Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Kuando Kubango). National NGOs follow a similar pattern, though half of them are only working in Luanda. For many Angolans, both urban and rural, churches are the integral part of their social capital networks. In the absence of any alternative, churches provide a variety of social services, but often their means are limited. Indeed, there are remote areas much of the countryside where virtually no agency has any presence whatsoever. These areas remain under-served.

The fact that many thousands of war-affected people have begun to return home to rebuild their lives is promising. However, as populations leave camps where they had been provided with food and non-food assistance, they face a more precarious situation. Among returning IDPs, food insecurity is likely to become more widespread, and many returnees will have difficulty establishing viable livelihoods. The population currently on the move is abjectly poor. Almost without exception, returnees lack sufficient food stocks, seeds, tools, and livestock to return to anything that remotely resembles normal agricultural production. Without assistance, most returnees 71

will lack sufficient productive capacity to meet even their most basic household food needs. Furthermore, many IDPs will arrive too late to take full advantage of the current agricultural season. Those who do return in time are faced with irrigation systems in disrepair and land that has not been cultivated in years. Field preparation is especially laborious, often prohibitively so for vulnerable female-headed households and those with high dependency ratios.

IDPs are returning to areas where the economy is moribund. Due to war and government negligence, farm-to-market roads and other infrastructure are in a deplorable state. The threat of land mines obstructs access to markets, services or productive assets. Food availability in these areas is insufficient to meet the basic needs of the influx of returning families. Although it is expected that rural markets will gradually reach many isolated areas, it is unlikely that commercially traded, low unit value basic staples will reach those areas in the near future. Moreover, because most families are returning to isolated localities with severely depressed, war-affected economies, most returnees will have little opportunity to develop complementary or alternative sources of income to offset production deficits. Thus, even if food becomes available on local markets, most households will have insufficient buying power to acquire it. Food security will continue to be a serious concern through 2003.

With a large portion of the population on the move and with government services only now being re-established, it is impossible to establish with any certainty precise measures of conditions in much of the hinterland. Where limited data exist, malnutrition rates vary from just “under alarming” to “emergency levels” (as classified under the SPHERE protocol). At present, humanitarian assistance remains concentrated in IDP camps in and around larger towns in the municipalities. Thus far, the overwhelming majority of those who are leaving the population centers have done so with little or no humanitarian assistance.

The numbers are in fact difficult to ascertain with any precision, but this does not change the point that Angola has long been -- and will continue to be for the foreseeable future -- a country on the move. The population flux has made planning and assistance difficult as much as any other factor.

Looming on the horizon is the threat of HIV/AIDS. The rate of HIV seroprevalence at is 5.5% -- up from 3% in 1999.3 Other sexually transmitted diseases are common and survey research reveals that only 17% of women of reproductive age know how to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS (UNICEF 2001). Angola has all the structural vulnerabilities to facilitate a 72

rapid increase in the HIV/AIDS epidemic: a breakdown in health services and access to STI treatment and care, social and economic disruption, large numbers of uniformed and demobilized soldiers, and a highly mobile population. Although the epidemic is at an earlier stage than neighboring countries, prevention programs are timid, and mitigation and care interventions almost entirely absent. There are insufficient resources in place to prevent the epidemic from rapidly escalating to comparable regional levels.

Discussion about mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in emergency and development programming is at its most nascent stages. Fluidity in the immediate post conflict period adds another methodological challenge to the complexity of assessing how the AIDS pandemic is playing itself out. AIDS mortality elsewhere is manifesting itself in educational declines, health care stresses, and weakened government capacity and private sector skills. It will be the same in Angola, with the potential to cancel out gains made possible with the end of war. While at present the underlying causal factors that give rise to a "new variant famine" are not descriptive of Angola's current food security crisis, future analytical approaches must incorporate these questions in the years to come.

The legacy of war, poor governance, and the structure of revenue flows pose daunting obstacles to addressing these challenges. Among other factors, the initial causes of the war were grounded in the inequitable social and geographical distribution of resources, exacerbated by the use of identity politics by political factions to deploy and justify violence. Eventually the war seemed to become a pretext for something even more insidious. As time passed, it became driven more by personal ambition, mutual suspicion, and the enticing possibilities of winning or retaining control of the state and the resources it affords access to. Under the guise of war, resources derived from the vast petroleum and diamond industries have disappeared into an obscure network of patronage and corruption. Resources have been used to shore up political support, and little has been invested in the social or physical capital development of Angola. The needs of people have been largely ignored, and they have remained voiceless in decision-making processes. Foreign governments and multinational corporations have certainly been complicit, but the Government of Angola must bear its share of responsibility for the negligence of its own people.

3

However, recent data from antenatal surveillance sites in Luanda only show 8.6% sero-prevalence.

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There has been increasing pressure on the government to disclose revenue from oil production and to ensure more funds are devoted towards rehabilitation and social sectors. The oil diagnostic, along with an audit of diamond revenues and improvements in accounting procedures at the Ministry of Finance, are core demands of the International Monetary Fund.

International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Global Witness have also put pressure on the government, and Angolan civil society organizations have pursued a similar agenda. So far, the government has proven to be frustratingly unresponsive to pressure due to the ready availability of cash and credit lines directly secured by the government from the oil industry and its financial partners (see Global Witness 1999, 2002).

The oil diagnostic is also an important tool in its own right, revealing whether resources belonging to the people are being spent legally on their behalf. A rigorous analysis of public expenditure is challenged by the lack of adequate budget execution data and the fact that substantial extra budgetary 4 expenditures are not recorded, although some progress has been made. The allocation of expenditure on basic social services was only 3.2% between 1997-2001. Angola devotes less than half the SADC average to health and less than one-third the SADC average to education (UNDP et. al. 2002).

During 1997-2001, expenditure on overseas medical evacuation was equivalent to 13% of the total health expenditure, merely four percentage points less than the expenditure on primary health care. Overseas scholarships accounted for the largest component after primary education and administration, equivalent to 18% of total education expenditure (UNDP et. al. 2002). Public sector expenditure patterns is therefore a significant contributory cause to social indicators that are among the worst in the world.

Provinces with the lowest per capita expenditure on education and health were the several highly populated provinces of the interior, also the region most directly affected by the war. Higher allocations to basic social services, as well much greater attention to ensuring equitable geographical distribution, must take priority in the post-conflict period.

Ultimately, the most difficult obstacles to reform are political. The current system privileges a small number of groups, and the unwillingness of these groups to lose their advantageous position has blocked past reform attempts.

One estimate suggests levels of income inequality approaching that of Brazil and South Africa (Adauta de Sousa et. al. 2001). This reinforces the point that the reconstruction process cannot simply replicate pre-existing structures, as previous inequities have contributed to the conflict. High inequality and poverty are also related to the way liberalization of the economy has been carried out. Private economic activity expanded after the liberalization 4 In late 2002 a leaked IMF report alleged that US$ 900 million in annual revenues were not reflected in Treasury accounts over a five year period. This figure represents approximately one third of state income.

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measures of the 1990s, but large companies with close connections to government have been favored to the detriment of smaller enterprises (Aguilar 2001).

The immediate humanitarian needs must focus on resettlement and rehabilitation of livelihoods. Food assistance continues to be an urgent need, particularly in the more remote areas. Material and technical inputs are required to revive agricultural production. Mid-term investments in human capital and infrastructure will require development strategies that rehabilitate transport and market infrastructure, commercial agriculture, schools, health services and water facilities, while ensuring active involvement of communities and efforts to strengthen management capacities. The Government of Angola must assume a significant role in this process, and must be more open to cooperating with foreign entities and civil society. An activist international civil society, pushing an essentially international agenda for transparency, will probably have much less impact on the government than local voices. Yet these are still relatively unassertive. Investment in national civil society, such as efforts to build commitment, constituencies and capacity, may prove to be the best strategy for influencing the government policy agenda in the long run.

3. Livelihood Trends on the Planalto This section discusses the situation on the Central Plateau, or Planalto, region of Angola, with a focus on Bié Province. Bié is one of the most devastated regions of the country, especially since the two-year period of 1998-1999, when the war escalated to affect in some way an overwhelming majority of communities and households in the province. Most of the buildings in the municipal towns were either partially or fully destroyed. Kuito, the capital of Bié, is purportedly the most destroyed city in the country. The economy of Bié is extremely insular. The war disrupted trade, migrant labor, and petty commerce, stripping farms and communities of assets, and turning many villages and small towns into virtual ghost towns.

As a result, small-holder farming systems and marketing channels virtually stopped functioning. Farmers now barely eke out a subsistence farming small patches of exhausted lavras (rain-fed plots) without the benefit of inputs such as draft animals, tools, farm equipment, or adequate seeds.

Commodity production for export out of the province is no longer significant, although there are signs of rejuvenation in neighboring Huila and Huambo Provinces. Maize production, largely relying on the matuba variety, which requires better soil fertility and additional inputs lacking throughout Bié, has been particularly dismal. Most of the maize harvest in 2002 was consumed early as green maize. Food shortages forced many households to consume 75

seed instead of planting it. The FAO and WFP crop assessment projected that household maize stocks would be depleted in July and August in BiĂŠ, only two or three months after the harvest in May (FAO/WFP 2002).

The peace has brought the relaxing of three central constraints: the lack of free circulation of goods and people, the inability to exploit fertile areas due to physical insecurity, and the disruption caused by consecutive displacement and migration. Recent CARE surveys and participatory rural assessments have identified continued access to poor agricultural land and the lack of quality seeds and tools as the two most significant constraints to agricultural production. Farmers no longer attempt to cultivate the traditionally high value crops such as peanuts, once an integral part of the diet, or soya and Irish potatoes. Other underlying factors of livelihood insecurity include: loss of livestock assets for traction and income diversification; insufficient labor for land cultivation due to labor intensity of cultivation techniques associated with the loss of productive assets, especially in female headed households; little or no access to off-farm income; and poor to non-existent access to markets and transportation systems. Few children attend school due to lack of functioning schools and a reluctance of parents to send their children to schools that do exist because of the acute need for agricultural labor, and a lack of confidence in the educational system. The quality of teaching is poor due to the lack of teachers, training, and materials. Morbidity and mortality are high due to poor availability of health infrastructure, medicines, and trained personnel at health facilities. At the community level, there is inadequate access to safe water, and a lack of transport and communication 5 which prohibit emergency referrals.

Those who are particularly vulnerable, with comparatively less access to assets and health services, include female headed households, the elderly and war disabled without family support, non-registered IDPs, and the families of demobilized soldiers.

Female-headed households now account for approximately half of all rural households in BiĂŠ.

They are disproportionately vulnerable to chronic, and at times acute, food insecurity.

CARE surveys have shown female-headed households to be particularly bereft of productive assets, including access to fertile land, seeds, tools, and livestock, as well as sufficient labor from within the household to fully participate in the cultivation cycle. Non farming income generating strategies are limited. Around IDP camps, virtually the only activity is to market charcoal or basic food items, such as drinks. Lack of access to primary materials makes it impossible to produce and market other handicrafts.

Women are paid approximately half the wage rates paid to men for 5 Information is drawn from a participatory rural appraisal conducted by CARE in September 2002 to analyze the livelihood security obstacles in five rural municipalities of BiĂŠ Province (Andulo, Camacupa, Catabola, Chinguar, and Chitembo).

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piecework. Programming activities throughout BiĂŠ have not paid enough attention to the results of these discrepancies.

Projecting the future is fraught with uncertainty, but the form and flexibility of future livelihood security strategies will likely be structured by demographic and associated social changes, access to off-farm income, land tenure, soil quality, commercial networks, and the interplay of these issues with local power structures.

Throughout the most intense periods of war, men in disproportionate numbers sought refuge in urban areas, such as Luanda and Benguela, which were outside the war zone. Those who remained were often recruited into one army or the other. Many men simply disappeared. Male absence and the restriction of the movement of men, who were more likely to be at risk if encountered by troops, have contributed to shift in gender roles. This presents both challenges and opportunities. The absence of men places additional labor burdens on rural households, by necessity influencing the way in which farming systems re-establish themselves. Land preparation is of particular concern, as is women's access to animal traction, traditionally under male purview. On the other hand, women have increasingly taken up responsibility for long distance marketing products, not a role held in the past (Pacheco 2001, McCaston 1996). During the period of relative peace after the Lusaka Accords in 1994, women in BiĂŠ took on greater migratory agricultural labor activities by traveling to UNITA areas and earning goods that would then be traded in their communities and local markets (McCaston 1996).

Tens of thousands of people are on the move, and many will return to the communities they left, sometimes moving back and forth. But how many will decide to stay? In the Planalto, household livelihood systems have long relied on cash income to capitalize rural agriculture, often obtained through migrant and casual labor. Such employment is no longer available, suggesting livelihood diversification strategies will need to adjust in the post conflict period. Youth in particular may be drawn to the larger towns, as occurred immediately after independence and during the periodically more stable windows since then (Pacheco 2001; Robson and Roque 2001), potentially accentuating the gendered demographic trends noted above.

Access to land continues to follow indigenous systems of allocation, although we have little detailed knowledge of how land tenure systems have changed over time. Few have formal title to land, while absentee landlords who are well connected at the highest levels of government are appropriating the best land. The lack of secure tenure for small holders restricts investments to improve farm production in the longer term. The directions of change in local 77

land tenure systems will need to be better understood, although it is already clear that the potential concentration of land ownership poses a significant threat. The new draft land law does not protect customary tenure, and has been presented in the absence of a clear policy regarding land usage and development. It also recognizes the 1975 cadastre, thus preventing the resolution of disputes from the colonial period when land was systematically alienated. The consultation process has been cursory, at best. Although the government has backed off the three-month deadline for public review, no time frame has been set for the consultation process. A recent threat to shut down the consultative process (managed by NGOs), and simply move to approve the draft law in the National Assembly is further source for concern.

While there are localized land conflicts already manifesting themselves in the Planalto, the land question is not yet widely seen as a problem by farmers. In part this may be because the area under cultivation has significantly decreased, and pressures from the new land allocations have not yet been felt.

Most of the former state farms were divested and converted into private commercial operations under a program begun at the end of the 1980s, although in many cases the title holders have not yet enforced these rights due to political uncertainty and a lack of capital for investment. There is also no 6 clear picture of the number of land concessions awarded.

The Planalto has historically long been seen as Angola's breadbasket, despite the fact that many areas of the Planalto have only moderately productive soils and low per hectare productivity areas. This was evident by the late 1960s, although animal traction extended labor inputs over a greater land area to produce surpluses and exports, particularly of maize (Rask and Tinne 2000).

The widespread use of animal traction, along with other domestic livestock, provided additions to soil fertility and conservation. Extended fallow rotations and shifting cultivation also allowed for periodic soil recuperation.

In areas around secure cities and where IDPs are congregated there has been strong pressure on accessible land, resulting in loss of fertility and soil degradation. Because of IDP resettlement, cropping also occurs in some areas that are not naturally suited for intensive cultivation, and soil degradation in those areas is severe. A return to land which has not been under cultivation for several years will ease some of the current pressure, but soil degradation will continue to prove a long term challenge in some zones.

Seed multiplication and crop plant genetic resources also need to be addressed, especially with introduction of foreign seed material, a great many of which are hybrid varieties. There is still a substantial amount of locally adapted seed material available. Research and multiplication, although being done, will need to be expanded.

6 An analysis of three municipalities in Huambo suggests that if the allocations took effect, the concentration of land ownership would approximate the colonial period (Pacheco 2001).

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Central to reconstruction and more secure livelihoods is the assurance of viable outlets and distribution systems for surplus production, and of a reliable supply system for consumer goods and inputs. This will also take on forms different from what previously existed. Shifts in gender roles at more local levels have been suggested above. In addition, the colonial bush trader system is dismantled, and the post-independence period of controlled markets has been progressively liberalized. In Huila and Huambo Provinces, trade outside the province is largely the purview of young men, traveling to Benguela, Luanda, Lubango, and Namibia. The same trend is likely to emerge in BiĂŠ. Changing trade practices involve the disempowerment of particular trading groups. The most visible of these are the old licensed commercial elite, who in some cases are attempting to organize political conditions to revive their privileged position in relation to commerce, often following colonial templates. The recent relocation of the central market in Kuito, the capital of BiĂŠ Province, to five kilometers out of town was intended to reduce competition with the few local shops and is suggestive of such pressure. How this develops over time will depend on both the regulatory environment and the extent to which these players are able to influence provincial and municipal administrations.

Working in areas with large concentrations of displaced people, CARE, as well as other NGOs, have taken every advantage possible to combine interventions in order to achieve synergies and respond to multiple aspects of livelihood security. This has often involved cooperation with other agencies to provide food and agricultural inputs along with health services and basic material assistance, as well as mine awareness and mine clearance interventions, which ensure that the land attributed to IDPs was mine free.

The resettlement process, however, has raised the complexity of such coordinated interventions to another level. Aside from the logistical challenge, the dispersed population has also resulted in limited resources being spread thinly over a large area -- and involving a larger population that now includes people who remained in the previously inaccessible areas and demobilized soldiers.

Farmers return to communities where local power structures are in a state of flux, and often in conflict. Indigenous, colonial and post-independence party power structures overlay one another to create complex hierarchies of those who are connected and those who are marginalized. The combined influences of colonialism, competing political factions and the violence of the war has created a mosaic of power and authority structures that can vary from community to community. Access to the limited resources, such as humanitarian assistance, often depends on relations with the community elite. The ability of traditional authorities, or sobas, to retain allegiance of 79

community members was sometimes undermined, or reinforced, by their individual actions during times of turmoil. In other areas, church leaders and political party members are more influential. As aid agencies move into the rural communities, a much more subtle understanding of social organization and political dynamics is called for. This requires increasingly more attention to consequences of our work, particularly in terms of how it may benefit some and unwittingly harm others.

A recent review of CARE's seed and tool distributions, using standard relief distribution methodologies, highlighted the reality that the interests of traditional authorities, or sobas, do not always coincide with those of their communities, or with broad representation of its members (Archibald and Kauck 2002). Fluid population movements and logistical hurdles have meant that the quantity of inputs available is frequently insufficient for all community members in need. Relief distribution methodologies have relied too heavily on simplified assumptions of how distribution lists are drawn up, and the role of sobas and their auxiliaries in this process. To inform everyone, and then select only a percentage for registration, â&#x20AC;&#x153;brings much trouble.â&#x20AC;?

Anticipating this, the sobas choose first to meet their social responsibility.

Those who do not receive inputs perceive the process as based on favoritism and not, as the sobas perceive it, on "duty", resulting in feelings of exclusion and helplessness underpinned by a general discontent with the traditional authority and the humanitarian agency. These perceptions, created in part by the project approach, generate conflict and undermine social cohesion.

People in BiĂŠ face enormous problems: food and livelihood insecurity, material deprivation, lack of access to essential public services and uncertainty about the future. The challenges are daunting, perhaps nowhere more so than in the newly accessible areas, many of which have long been under the control of UNITA. Here, in areas long-isolated from humanitarian assistance, material deprivation and extreme vulnerability combine with fear and uncertainty about the future as the MPLA administration registers its presence in towns and villages.

People here live on the margins of the state; suspicious of its intentions and wary of its representatives. For example, the people in these areas report of government army (FAA) troops rounding-up male civilians on suspicion of being UNITA (or rather, ex-UNITA) soldiers and transporting them to gathering areas. Suspicion runs high, making establishment of strong working relationships with communities and their leaders more difficult, and more important. NGOs, with little experience of working in these areas, are not exempt from this suspicion. NGOs constitute an unknown entity, regarded at best with suspicion, or as associated with the government.

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In addition to the problems related to seed and tool distribution, described above, a key problem in registering people in former UNITA areas is that they simply do not want to give their names for registration, particularly to strangers collecting names for something they do not understand. Thus, the registration for seeds and tools distribution in this area presented similar problems of process, but very different issues relating to the context in which the registration was being done.

Currently, people in the former UNITA areas know little, if anything, about NGOs and, in the present climate, they are reluctant to offer their names for registration. It appears that, regardless of levels of need in such areas, NGOs should not expect to find people eagerly waiting to participate in projects.

Consequently, NGOs must commit to develop as much as possible relationships based on mutual understanding and trust. This, however, will take a great deal of effort and focus.

4. Urban Livelihoods Livelihood security in urban areas is structured by access to social networks, especially extended family, point of entry into the labor market, access to and cost of basic services, and security of housing. Urban-rural remittances and transfers have been highly restricted due to inaccessibility, although this has varied by city and the surrounding security situation. Urban agriculture is insignificant in Luanda, but more important in other provincial capitals. A household survey of Luanda and five provincial capitals in 1995 indicated that 70% of households are below the poverty line, with 12% in extreme poverty (INE 1996). Poverty rates increase consistently with household size.

The evidence also suggests that more female-headed households are below the poverty line than male headed households (Grave, Ribeiro and Ceita 1997 cited in SCF (UK) Angola 2000). Twenty three percent of urban households in 1995 were female headed (INE 1996). The situation is likely to have further deteriorated in subsequent years.

Contrary to common belief, on an aggregate level it appears displacement has been predominately on an individual or household, rather than community basis. The existence of extended family, based either on kinship or shared place of origin, is important for income and transfers, the pooling of housing, and especially access to the labor market (Robson and Roque 2001).

The type of work to which one has access is also a differentiating factor.

Informal trade, despite its unpredictability, is considered to be more reliable and profitable than casual wage labor, and yet the poorest find it difficult to secure the capital necessary to enter it. The informal sector grew rapidly in 1990s to account for the largest share of the urban workforce. The contraction of agriculture, massive internal migration, military 81

demobilization, and post-1990 liberalization also contributed. In Luanda, it has been estimated that 54% of all households are linked to the informal economy, and is of disproportionate importance for female headed 7 households (Adauta de Sousa 1998).

Women and girls are increasingly the primary income earners, and work longer hours compared to men (SCF UK Angola 2000). Increasingly high levels of female entry into trade should not be confused with high levels of opportunities. The majority depends on informal markets and petty trading, which translates into long hours of work for women, in turn contingent on extended social networks for child care. Women are comparatively more involved in home based businesses, petty trade in neighborhood markets, and door to door retail. Larger businesses in major city markets are more male dominated, and of higher value. Formal employment is mostly performed by men. Among the self employed, women's profits are only 39% of men's (Adauta de Sousa et. al. 2001), implying women are less able to take advantage of the most profitable opportunities.

A small number of large scale private enterprises have emerged from clientelist privatization, preferential business licenses, import contracts, and a history of privileged access to foreign exchange (Aguilar 2001). These enterprises dominate the wholesale market, dictate prices, and limit informal sector growth. The volatile macro-economic environment and an uncertain legal environment also restrict upward mobility.

Ameliorating such constraints will contribute towards ensuring the informal sector can serve as a more reliable income source, and potentially even a source of employment growth.

All areas of urban Angola have suffered from underinvestment in services in recent years, but the peri-urban areas have received little or none. As an example, regressive public expenditure patterns provide water virtually free of charge in the central urban area of Luanda, where the wealthiest strata lives. Household water expenditures in peri-urban areas, by contrast, are estimated at an average of US$ 21 per month (INE 2000 quoted in Robson and Roque 2001). Many parents send their children to informal schools that offer no qualifications but are less expensive and offer flexibility in fee payments and attendance. Similarly, the majority also rely on private informal health practitioners. Increasing public expenditure on basic service delivery, and expanding those services to peri-urban areas, must take center stage in the post-war period. Physical infrastructure is only one aspect of this, as the exceptionally poor quality of existing educational services suggests.

7 A survey of one Luanda community found that 80% of women work in the informal economy, versus 7% who were in formal employment. Men were more evenly employed between informal and formal sectors (45 and 42% respectively) (SCF UK Angola 2000).

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Schooling currently provides very low returns, implying investment in recurrent costs (materials, staffing, and training) are potentially even more important (see Adauta de Sousa et. al 2001).

The ability to integrate into existing settlements is one of the more significant factors influencing the ability to secure a way of life. Housing is by far the most decisive hurdle, and provides a sense of security as well a source of income diversification through renting out (SCF UK Angola 2000).

Securing access to land for residence may be obtained through a relative, purchase, or occupation. In Luanda particularly, obtaining land from the authorities for residence is expensive, complicated, and ultimately insecure.

Given the importance of secure housing, more attention must be paid to zoning issues, and ensuring that residential areas previously allocated to the â&#x20AC;&#x153;displacedâ&#x20AC;? and in-coming migrants are not now reallocated to commercial developers, as has happened in Luanda recently.

An effective pro-poor policy framework will need to re-examine the assumption that urban growth will be significantly reversed with the end of the war. Anecdotal evidence suggests that reverse migration is occurring as urban areas become more accessible. During previous periods of peace, enhanced freedom of movement led large numbers to migrate to urban areas, rather than facilitating a return to rural areas. For those populations that have been long established in the cities, and for those who have been born in the towns, a return to "areas of origin" may hold little attraction. High birth rates also mean that a large proportion of the urban population is made up of young people, who do not consider themselves displaced and have no plans to "return" to rural areas. In Angola, there is no evidence that urban conditions have pushed down fertility rates, in contrast to other countries (Agadjanian 8 and Prata 2001). The implication is that post conflict reconstruction cannot be modeled on an outdated perception of Angola as primarily a rural society.

There are few structures for ensuring dialogue between urban residents and the state, an ineffective budgeting process, and little transparency in the expenditure of public resources. Efforts to build transparency and accountability, as well as trust, must be accompanied by attention to improve the efficiency and capacity of state entities. Resources for local authorities at municipal and comuna levels are controlled by the provincial or central government and are irregular, so local authorities have limited capacity to plan for or deliver services. There has been some effort at reform however,

8 In a comparison of six African countries, Angola, along with Mozambique, has the highest levels of adolescent fertility. However, Angola was the only country where levels of adolescent fertility in urban areas are slightly higher than in rural areas. In other countries, the reverse is true and the gap is quite wide. In addition to Angola and Mozambique, the other countries in the study were Kenya, Benin, Ghana, and Zimbabwe.

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and plans for municipal elections may work towards strengthening these.

Urban areas may prove the most fertile ground for experimentation in new forms of governance.

Churches and religious organizations are the single most important form of collective social organization, although it has proven difficult to expand these networks into wider community collective action. Kinship and relations based on areas of origin appear to be more important for collective action than neighbors (Robson and Roque 2001), except in the case of long established neighborhoods. Building on forms of social organization that have developed in urban areas and linking these with government structures requires a redefinition of the state's role, and substantial mobilization work at the local level given the relative lack of community-based organizations.

5. Linking Communities and Central Government in a Common Development Process.

For the immediate future, the humanitarian work is very much focused at the community levels, with central government largely circumvented. Resource flows provided by the international donor agencies have been uncertain, but generous enough to mount meaningful humanitarian operations. The UN consolidated appeal for 2002 targeted the needs at $292 million dollars, and it raised about 54% of this need. Most of the resources ($124 million) were devoted to emergency feeding through the World Food Program, meeting over 80% of the food assistance called for. In addition, donors and NGOs mobilized resources outside the framework of the consolidated appeal.

While the response has been impressive, it is still barely adequate, and there is no reason for complaisance now.

Until now, most of the resources have been channeled through UN agencies or implementing partners such as NGOs, and both UN agencies and NGOs operate on the ground. Very little of the international assistance has supported the government. Efforts to negotiate agreements with the IMF and World Bank have been met with principled intransigence on the part of the Government of Angola. Principles aside, government capacity to implement at the field level is limited. For example, government management of the demobilization program has been characterized by fits and starts, and the results have been quite variable across gathering areas. Suspicions over the government's commitment to really fulfill its promises must be balanced by a more mundane assessment of the government's capacity to organize an operation of this scale. Efforts to serve the 400,000 former UNITA combatants and their families have encountered obstacles related to poor planning and capacity for implementation. It is a stretch to imagine the 84

government successfully serving the needs of a million IDPs, another million resettlers, and some half-million returning refugees -- spread over a million square kilometers.

At another level, donors and multilateral lending agencies resist supporting a government that will not adequately account for the uses of its own ample resources. But the corruption debate is only one aspect of a complex set of issues. Were the government to fully account for its resources and allocate them to meet Angola's humanitarian and development needs, the Angolan people would face a radically different future. Until the government assumes its responsibility, few are willing to fill the gap. In either case, external funding is likely to diminish over time, particularly as Angola transitions from an emergency to a development context. This will require UN agencies and the non-governmental sector to rethink they way they do business.

Throughout this transition, the needs and interests at local levels will need to be promoted, but there are few advocates.

It would be irresponsible and naĂŻve to ignore the burden corruption and mismanagement of public resources places on the Angolan people. Who gets what, public employment, public spending, and who pays for it are questions that raise fundamental issues about the distribution of society's resources.

Nonetheless, the emphasis on this aspect of governance does not do justice to the many government workers who are in fact quite committed to their work.

The focus on corruption diverts attention from other problems that limit the effectiveness of those in the government who are committed. The people throughout the various ministries are hampered in pursuit of their work by limited resources, particularly human resources. The government's best intentions to provide assistance at the grassroots level would be frustrated simply by a lack of personnel. In many comunas (provincial sub-districts) the only government agent is the lone comuna administrator. Particularly in exUNITA areas, this government agent may be regarded with suspicion, and he possesses limited resources to provide basic civil services, let alone undertake a consultative process for providing humanitarian and development assistance. Throughout Angola, it is the community of international agencies and NGOs that provide social services at the community level. In the absence of these organizations, the rural communities would soon find themselves obliged to fend for themselves.

Among the committed in government, many retain the ideology that drove the original movement for independence. The Marxist revolutionary movement was to a large extent a movement of urban intellectuals, with little connection with the poor, particularly the rural poor. A tendency to dictate from the center may be partly based on conviction, but the entire colonial and postindependence experience has not been rich in examples of democratic 85

governance. Certainly the Portuguese administration did not provide models for inclusive consultation in decision-making. While efforts towards transparency in the management of financial resources will be most welcome, they will not be sufficient if there is no structure for ensuring consultation on how the abundant resources are used. A telling example was the first draft of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The plan essentially focused on big infrastructure projects, with little attention to the needs of the rural poor. It was developed by technocrats, without consulting those who are impoverished. Even at this level, the absence of middle management personnel with high technical competencies in government ministries is also a serious constraint. Reliable information and analysis on poverty, if it were to exist, is useless without the capacity to make use of those inputs. Given the extent of change in Angola (with regard to the role of women in the household economy, the patterns of control and access of land, market networks and demographics), there is an urgent need for more research to inform policy.

Furthermore, a process of dialogue must accompany the opening of the central government to greater scrutiny. Progress towards the development of more democratic institutions has been made, but the National Assembly does not yet reflect an effective system of parliamentary accountability, and the democratization of local and provincial government has been consistently postponed. The reforms of 1991-92 lifted previous restrictions on NGOs as well as, with exceptions, the private media. The associations, NGOs, trade unions and media that emerged in the early 1990s are still extremely weak, particularly outside Luanda.

For a new spirit of dialogue to have any impact on the rural and urban poor, it must link with diverse groups in these communities. The development of community structures and forums for consultation will require personnel who are adequately trained in participatory planning, as well as the instruction of communities as to their role and civic obligations. Grassroots civil society, such as farmer associations, community based organizations, churches and secular NGOs play a crucial role in this process: as representatives for a local constituency, they are more likely than the international community to influence the political priorities of a fundamentally nationalistic government.

As the example of seed distribution demonstrated above, the risks of doing it wrong are significant -- the people we most aim to help may be left behind.

Government, local authorities, civil society and citizens need capacity building in many aspects of organizational development: governance, particularly mechanisms to ensure inclusion, conflict resolution, and management skills such as project design, implementation and accounting.

Unless the government is more forthcoming in allocating the resources, it is difficult to imagine sustained development assistance from outside. The combined resources of the nation's wealth, foreign assistance and foreign 86

direct investment could transform Angola into a stable regional power. But unless a process of dialogue that links the center with the grassroots accompanies a trend toward more transparency, the gains that Angola may make will not address the livelihood constraints of the poor.

References Adauta de Sousa, M. 1998. O Sector Informal em Luanda: Contribuรงao para um Melhor Conhecimento. Luanda: European Union and National Bank of Angola.

Adauta de Sousa, M., T. Addison, B. Ekman, & A. Stenman. 2001.

Discussion Paper No. 2001/22. From Humanitarian Assistance to Poverty Reduction in Angola. Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Agadjanian, V. & N. Prata. 2001. War and Reproduction: Angola's Fertility in Comparative Perspective. Journal of Southern African Studies 27:2.

Aguilar, R. 2001. Discussion Paper No. 2001/47. Angola's Incomplete Transition. Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Andrade, F. 2001. Displaced people in Malanje and Benguela. In Communities and Reconstruction in Angola (ed.) P. Robson. Guelph: Development Workshop.

Archibald, S. & D. Kauck. 2002. CARE Kuito's Farmer Project: Supporting the Transition from Conflict to Peace. Luanda: CARE International Angola.

Cilliers, J. & C. Dietrich (eds). 2000. Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP). 2002. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola. Rome: FAO/WFP. Global Witness. 1999. A Crude Awakening the role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets. London: Global Witness.

Global Witness. 2002. All the President's Men: The Devastating Story of Oil and Banking in Angola's Privatised War. London: Global Witness.

Grave, M., G. Ribeiro, & C. Ceita. 1997. A Pobreza Urbana e Peri Urbana.

Estudo sobre Comunidades e Instituiรงoes Comunitarias Angolanas na Perspectiva do Pos Guerra. Luanda.

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2001. Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. Oxford and Bloomington: The International African Institute and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in association with James Currey and the Indiana University Press.

Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE). 1996. Perfil da Pobreza em Angola.

Luanda: INE INE. 2000. Inquerito sobre a Disposiรงao e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Services Sociais Basicos. Luanda: INE. Le Billon, P. 2001. Angola's Political Economy of War: the Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000. African Affairs 100.

McCaston. K. 1996. Poverty and Livelihood Insecurity in War Torn Angola: A rapid food and livelihood security assessment of MPLA and UNITA areas in the provinces of Bie and Kuando Kubango. Luanda: CARE International Angola.

Pacheco, F. 2001. Rural Communities in Huambo. In Communities and Reconstruction in Angola (ed.) P. Robson. Guelph: Development Workshop.

Rask, N. and M. Tinne. 2000. Angola Agricultural Sector Assessment Final Report. Report Prepared for USAID Angola by Chemonics International Inc. Contract No. PCE-I-0099-00003-00. Luanda: USAID Angola.

Robson, P. (ed) 2001. Communities and Reconstruction in Angola. Guelph: Development Workshop.

Robson, P. and S. Roque. 2001. Here in the City There is Nothing Left Over for Lending a Hand. Guelph: Development Workshop.

Save the Children (UK) Angola. 2000. Luanda Urban Child Welfare Project (LUCWP). Analysis of Poverty in Peri-Urban Luanda: Baseline for Hojy-Ya-Henda. Luanda: Save the Children (UK) Angola.

UNICEF. 1999. Progress of Nation Report. Luanda: UNICEF. UNICEF. 2001. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Angola Report. Luanda: UNICEF. UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, & WHO, in partnership with Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health. 2002. Public Financing of Social Sectors in Angola. August 2002.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2002.

Update on Humanitarian Activities. September 2002.

Luanda: OCHA. Hodges, T.

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OVERVIEW ON THE CURRENT FOOD SECURITY CRISIS IN ZAMBIA Prepared by Helen M Samatebele, deputy director, PAM, Lusaka Acronyms ASIP CFSAM CSO DMMU EMOP FRA FSP GDP GMO GRZ HIPC MACO MT NEWU OVC PAM PRSP SHAPES VAC VAM

Agricultural Sector Investment Programme Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission The Central Statistical Office The Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit Emergency Operation Food Reserve Agency Food Security Pack Gross Domestic Product Genetically Modified Organisms Government of the Republic of Zambia Highly Indebted Poor Country Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Metric Tonnes National Early Warning Unit Orphans and Vulnerable Children Programme Against Malnutrition Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Small Holder Access to Processing, Extension and Seeds Vulnerability Assessment Committee Vulnerability Assessment Mapping

1.0

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Geography:

Zambia derives its name from the Zambezi River, which rises in the northwest corner of the country and forms its southern boundary. She lies between latitudes 100 and 180 South and longitudes 220 and 330 East. Zambia is landlocked, sharing boundaries with eight neighbours: the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north and northwest, Tanzania to the northwest, Malawi to the east. Mozambique to the southeast, Zimbabwe to the south, Botswana and Namibia to the southwest, and Angola to the west.

With a land area of 752,614 square kilometers and an estimated 75 million hecters of arable land. The overall land-person ratio is one of the smallest in Africa. Most of Zambia lies on a high plateau with an average height of 3,500 to 4,500 feet above sea level.

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Zambia's vegetation is of the savannah type and over half the country is covered by trees, varying from the more open conditions in the south to tall dense woodlands in the north and northwest. These woodlands contain only hardwoods. Apart from minerals and forests, the country is also richly endowed with fish and wildlife resources.

The country's climate makes possible the cultivation of a wider range of crops: maize, tobacco, cotton, rice, wheat and groundnuts. One can also grow a variety of vegetables and citrus fruit, bananas, pineapples, mangoes, avocados and grapes. Tea, coffee and sugarcane are also grown.

1.2

The People:

Zambia has a population of 9.3 million people with an annual growth rate of 2.3% (Central Statistical Office (CSO) 2000 Census of population). Zambia is a country of great diversity in terms of race, ethnicity, linguistic and religion. Such diversity provides an interesting blend of values, norms and cultural and spiritual traditions.

Zambia's cultural diversity derives from the fact that its people belong to over seventy tribes. The major tribes are: Lozi (Western Province), Bemba (Northern Province), Ngoni (Eastern Province), Tonga (Southern Province), Lunda (Luapula and Northwestern Provinces), and Luvale and Kaonde (Northwestern Provinces).

1.3

Economy:

Zambia was economically prosperous at independence (1964), due to the thriving copper industry. Zambia has the potential to expand agricultural production. However, it is estimated that only 14% of total agricultural land is currently being utilized. Agriculture generates about 22% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provides direct livelihood to more than 50% of the population. The agricultural sector employs 67% of the labor force and it is the main source of income and provides employment for women who make up 65% of the rural population. The sector is currently the main stay of the rural economy.

Zambia is one of the countries in the southern Africa sub-region faced with a food crisis attributed to a complex combination of unfavorable weather pattern, poor health standards and unfavorable socio-economic conditions and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The current crisis has been further compounded by reduced food production in the last two consecutive seasons (2000/2001 and 2001/2002) resulting in the country experiencing substantial deficits of the staple food.

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Whilst weather and other exogenous factors may have limited the sectors' ability to grow, by and large, agricultural policies of the past, imposed limitations on growth prospects. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has also had some effect on agricultural production and productivity. Today about 80 per cent of Zambians live in income poverty and suffer from other deprivation such as little access to social services and poor quality of the services.

Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas compared to the urban areas (83 percent and 56 percent respectively) but it has risen faster in urban areas lately due to failing industries and rising unemployment. Most of the rural poor are small-scale farmers followed by medium scale farmers. Their low productivity, which provides bare subsistence, largely explains their poverty.

2.0

THE POVERTY SITUATION:

2.1 Today, Zambia is among one of the poorest nations in the world despite decades of political stability and freedom from conflict, it is in the same category as most war torn neighbours. The World Bank classifies Zambia as a Least Developed Country. The UNDP Human Development Report 2001 ranks Zambia 143 out of 161 countries, having fallen consistently over the past years from 136 in 1996, to 142 in 1997, to 146 in 1998. Indeed, of 79 countries for which data is available between 1975 and 1997, Zambia is the only country where the value of the Human Development Index is lower than it was in 1975.

A look at the social indicators reveals a declining trend over time, clearly showing the worsening living conditions of most Zambians. Life expectancy is estimated at 37 years, compared to 42 years at the time of independence (1964) and 54 years at the end of the 1990s. Mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Infant Mortality Rate is 112/1000 live birth in 1999 and Maternal Mortality Rate is at 900/100,000 live birth. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is around 23% has contributed to the high death rates. The number of orphans has increased to over 600,000, while a significant proportion of school age (7-13 years) children are not in school (Kelly, 1999). Malnutrition rates for under fives are high with 53% stunting, 24% under weight and 5% wasting nationwide.

National household surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 1991, 1993, 1996 and 1998 use an income poverty line as a measure for poverty. According to the latest statistics, CSO estimates that 80% of the population have incomes below the minimum level determined by CSO. CSO further reveals that the percentage of people living in poverty increased from 70% of the population in 1991 to about 74% in 1993, decreased to 69%

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in 1996 and then rose again to 73% in 1998. This measure only shows the proportions of the population that are income poor, but poverty has many other dimensions.

2.2

The Causes of Poverty

Poverty has many root causes and is deep rooted in Zambia. The main reason for Zambia being poor is because of failed economic performance with average income being a third of the level at independence. Although income growth may not always remove poverty for everyone, Zambia cannot escape poverty under a stagnant economy with a growing population. Mining output (copper and cobalt) the driving force in Zambia's economy, declined for a long time, pulling down other sectors that depend on it. No major substitutes in agriculture, tourism and others came on stream. The Government with support from its cooperating partners has put into place various programmes to address the problems. However, these have been constrained by a) deepening poverty due to disappointing economic growth all be it that improvements have been experienced in the past two years, b) the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and c) political leadership that has lacked the financial resources to deal with crippling national debts and grapple successfully with the problems affecting ordinary citizens. The result is that almost all major social, economic and demographic indicators continued in the spiral of decline that began almost two decades ago.

The failing economy pushed Zambia into debt in the 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to sustain living standards, eventually creating a debt crisis that further entrenched poverty in the 1990s. It also led to reversals in gains attained earlier after independence in social development like education, health, water and infrastructure. The government of the day adamantly remained committed to free health and education but the reality caused by limited financing in a stagnant economy resulted in poor delivery.

Even with diminished resources, poverty would have been less in Zambia with better planning and, in particular, superior prioritisation of resources and good governance in general. This has not always been the case.

In the 1990s, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases has worsened the poverty situation a lot. At the time when resources were already low, HIV/AIDS has increased the disease burden beyond the individual level to adversely impact on the economics of the family, the health system, the working environment as well as human capital and many others HIV/AIDS is ravishing Zambia. Like other countries in the region, it has lost large numbers of its young, productive people. The loss of life has affected 92

every aspect of society. Businesses have lost skilled workers, Government has lost a substantial proportion of the workers who provide vital social services such as doctors, nurses and teachers. The extended family, the heart of traditional coping mechanisms in times of stress, has been tested to the breaking point. It is estimated that 13% of all Zambian children are orphaned as a result of HIV one of the highest proportions on the continent. Ironically, the families that open their doors to take in these children now find themselves placed at higher risk. With more and more dependent mouths to feed, household food stores that might once have carried the nuclear family through seasonal shortages are now woefully inadequate. Household assets are sold as increasingly desperate families try to buy commercially available foods. Increased prices undercut the value of their purchases they pay more and get less. To survive, some engage in high risk activities increasing their risk of exposure to HIV and fueling the epidemic.

3.0

CURRENT FOOD SECURITY SITUATION

3.1

Background

Zambia is dependent on one main staple food crop maize. Maize has a high yield potential when grown with the use of hybrid seed and fertilizer. For a long time (from independence in 1964) the government heavily subsidized the production of maize through input provision, credit, marketing and processing of maize. This led to some small-scale farmers who were growing other food crops like millet and sorghum to abandon them due to lack of incentives. Therefore, in Southern parts of the country in areas not suitable for maize production, the people are heavily dependent on maize for both household food security and cash. In the Western, Northern and Northwestern parts of the country more cassava and finger millet is grown which contribute to household food security.

Zambia on average produces what it can consume in terms of maize production in the region of 900,000 to 1,000,000mt per year. Unfortunately the food security situation in Zambia has deteriorated in the last 10 years and is closely liked to poverty situation. The agriculture sector in particular is facing serious challenges that have led to the country's inability of most households to procure food from own production and purchase. These underlying consequences include the following: ! The irrational supply of fertilizer and seed in the market. ! A pattern of insufficient, erratic and poorly distributed rainfall. ! Massive losses of cattle and draught power due to animal diseases like corridor.

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! High interest rates caused by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which makes it impossible for commercial small-scale farmers to borrow money for food production. ! Lack of credit facility for small-scale farmers. ! Failure by the government to release funds to the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to enable it to carry out its function of smoothing out shortages and storing for one season to the next. ! Prevalence of HIV/AIDS among farm populations. ! Poor extension services. ! Unsustainable farming practices that have degraded land and soils. ! Failure by government to invest in the agriculture and other social sectors due to external debt stock servicing of US$6,898 million.

3.2

Cereal Crop Production Trends

As stated above, Zambia depends on maize for its staple food whilst cassava, millet and sorghum contribute to the food basket in varying proportions. For the past ten years the cereal production figures have been declining due to the failed agricultural policies such as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Agricultural Support Investment Programme (ASIP), drought, etc. Zambia which used to be a net exporter of maize to countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1970s and 1980s is now a net importer of maize and other cereals to meet national food requirements.

The decline in maize production over the last five years has been a major concern caused by a number of factors like poor and late input distribution, lack of credit, unfavourable weather conditions and in some cases loss of animals for animal drought power. These factors contributed to less areas planted for maize production.

The country's Maize production for the 2001/2002 season reduced by 25% from 801,889 metric tones in 2000/2001 to 601,606 metric tones in 2001/2002. The 2001/2002 production was about 42 percent less than the 1999/2000's, which was a relatively normal year as far as weather conditions are concerned. See table 1 below.

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Table 1: MAIZE PRODUCTION OVER THE PAST THREE (3) SEASONS 2000

Province

Central 156,318 Copperbelt 136,437 Eastern 284,511 Luapula 15,422 Lusaka 63,957 Northern 41,311 North Western 21,149 Southern 285,263 Western 48,437 National 1,052,806 Total

2001

2002

162,272 68,080 196,317 14,998 58,127 43,496 19,196 211,281 28,120 801,889

130,655 64,300 202,385 15,714 48,355 38,022 19,558 63,093 19,525 601,606

%Change %Change 2002 from 2002 from 2001 2000 -19 -16 -6 -53 3 -29 4 2 -16 -24 -12 -7 2 -7 -70 -78 -30 -59 -25 -42

Source: Final Crop Forecast Report 2002, MACO/CSO Maize Production From 1998 - 2002

1200

Consumption Level

1000

800

600

400

200

0 1998

1999

2000

2001

Year

Production

95

Deficit

2002

3.3

Cereal Crop Production Levels 2001/2002

The 2001/2002 agricultural season was very poor resulting in drought situations affecting the Southern half of the country which is the grain basket of the country. This drought sharply reduced crop yields by almost 40% of the anticipated harvest. Some small-scale farmers recorded little or no harvest at all. See Figure 1 showing Rainfall Departure Map for the 2001/2002 season.

The final crop forecast estimated the seasonal cereal production for the 2001/2002 agricultural season to be 742,194 Metric tonnes (MT) (608,806MT of maize; 54,416MT of sorghum/millet; 11,645MT of rice; and 74,527MT of wheat). With the winter production of 7,200Mt of maize and 70,000Mt of irrigated wheat, the season cereal production is therefore 744,867 recording a very slight increase from the initial estimates done in July 2002. It was estimated that the deficit of 600,000MT of cereal would need to be imported into the country to meet food needs.

The official maize commercial imports as of end of December 2002 have been estimated at 60,512MT. So far, 59,670MT of non-genetically modified maize (GMO) has been brought into the country in form of food aid while another 90,173MT is still expected (Table 2).

Table 2: ZAMBIA Cereal Balance Sheet (May 2002 Marketing Year) August 20021 December 20022 Opening Stocks Domestic Production TOTAL AVAILABILITY Domestic Requirements Unplanned Exports Desired Closing Stocks TOTAL REQUIREMENTS DOMESTIC CEREAL GAP

April 2003 5 - Year Average3

23,000 738,000

23,000 744,867

1,095,000

761,000

765,194

1,190,000

1,445,000 10,000 17,000

1,413,000 10,000 1,423,000

1,467,000 14,000 20,000 1,501,000

-711,000

-657,806

-311,000

0

60,512

111,00

1,472,000

Commercial Imports Received**

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Food Aid Received TOTAL IMPORTS RECEIVED

46,000

120,182

182,000

46,000

120,182

182,000

150,000 132,000

40,000 90,173

0 0

282,000

130,173

0

328,000

250,355

-383,000

-407,451

Commercial Imports Expected Food Aid Expected TOTAL IMPORTS EXPECTED TOTAL IMPORTS UNFILLED CEREAL GAP

-129,000

**The 60,512 consists of 10,481MT brought in by Sable Transport and 31MT by Hubert & Associates.

Source: Maize Importation Task Force The Millers Association of Zambia has brought in 50,000MT through formal import. ! SADC Regional Early Warning Unit Estimate, based on government figures. ! National Early Warning Unit Estimate based on final Crop Forecast figures. ! SADC Regional Early Warning Unit.

3.4

Appeal to Respond to the Cereal Shortages

Zambia is one of the countries in Southern Africa faced with a food crisis.

The current crisis has been compounded by the fact that there has been reduced food production in the last two consecutive seasons (2000/2001 and 2001/2002) resulting in the country experiencing a substantial deficit of the staple food.

The Zambian Government declared a disaster in May 2001 and requested for external assistance from the donors. The United Nations Agencies (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Health Organisation (WHO) produced the United Nations Emergency Consolidated Appeal (CAP) to address the Food Insecurity Crisis in Zambia in July 2002. The CAP sought funding of US$71.39 million for emergency food assistance, and to boost the capacity of the UN to respond to pressing new needs in health, education, water and 97

sanitation, child protection and food production. In these sectors much of the assistance sought was for expansion or acceleration of ongoing programmes.

The assistance would target 1.71 million beneficiaries affected by the food crisis in the rural sector with the distribution of 224,000MT of relief food.

The Zambia Emergency Food Security Assessment conducted by a collaboration effort involving Government, UN Agencies, NGOs and SADC officials estimated that 2.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance for the period August 2002 to March 2003. The worst affected were the rural vulnerable groups located in the Southern, Eastern, Central, Lusaka and Western Provinces including the elderly, child and female headed households, households keeping the disabled, the sick and widows not supported by other households. Significant numbers of these households contain orphans and other vulnerable children affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

3.5

FOOD RELIEF PROGRAMME

From August 2002, the Office of the Vice President, Disaster Management and Mitigation (DMMU) in collaboration with the WFP and other UN systems began to implement the Emergency Operation Programme (EMOP) which included the distribution of relief food and non-food items to the 43 disaster affected districts. The various NGOs already implementing development programmes in the targeted districts were invited to participate in the relief food distribution programme. Apart from the relief food, nonfood various items e.g. agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer and tools) were sourced for distribution to the affected farm families.

3.6

Commercial Import Progress

There is a lot of uncertainty over the commercial maize importation in Zambia. Based on the August 2002 cereal deficit 742,192MT from the Ministry of Agriculture Food balance sheet, Government made plans to facilitate commercial maize importation. On June 2, 2002, the Government of Zambia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Millers Association of Zambia for maize importation to fill the deficit for the 20022003 consumption season. The millers were to import 300,000MT while Government was to bring in 155,000MT. As indicated in the balance sheet, the Millers have brought in 50,000MT as formal imports. However, there is strong evidence that the Millers have purchased substantial amounts of maize (above official imports) brought into the country through cross boarder trade with Tanzania and Mozambique, which had not been accounted for.

Therefore, although the cereal gap appeared so large in the food balance sheet 98

when only official imports are considered, in reality the gap is much smaller and that is why there is no commercial shortfall in urban areas. The Millers have confirmed that they still have stocks to last up to February and beyond.

In the last few months, Government has been giving conflicting figures on what they intend to import towards relief and strategic reserves. As a result of conflicting pronouncements from Government, wrong signals were sent to the private sector. The private sector (Millers) feels that if Government imports large quantities of maize, it will depress market prices. These pronouncements could have also contributed to the sharp increases in maize meal prices.

Despite all these arrangements and pronouncements to bring in large amounts of maize, the government has only about USD10,000,000.00 set aside for maize importation. Given this amount, only about 40,000MT of maize could be purchased through the government arrangements assuming a landed price of over USD245/MT. Unless the government finds some extra funds, indications are that not more than 40,000MT could be imported through the government arrangements up to March 2003. The Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that contracts to bring the 40,000MT have already been signed.

Information from Millers Association indicated that most millers are currently well stocked with maize. This was adequate to supply the urban market till the early harvest comes on the market in March 2003.

3.7

Food Aid Progress and Plans

Generally the food aid pipeline has been very weak. Between August and December 2002, government sourced 46,347MT genetically modified free maize and 4,000MT of mealie meal. This comprises grain from local purchases (17,677MT) as well as from import (28,670MT). The NGOs have brought a combined total of 2,000MT of maize. During the same period multilateral donors through World Food Programme (WFP) imported 31,000MT. Therefore, the total relief food that has so far been sourced amounts to 77,347MT of maize grain and 4,000MT of mealie meal out of the estimated 224,000MT cereal requirement for the period August 2002 to March 2003. As at end of December only 27.5% of the requirement for the period August to December had been met through combined effort of WFP and the government. The WFP cereal pipeline for the period December 2002 to March 2003 is 90,173MT.

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4.0

IMPACT OF THE CEREAL SHORTAGE

4.1

Increased Vulnerability

Agriculture employs over 70% of the rural population and therefore, any stocks to the sector will have direct impact on livelihoods of households. The various sources of primary income are crop sales, casual labour agricultural, livestock sales, and other non off farm activities (e.g. fishing, crafts, brewing etc). Because the season experienced drought, these income-generating activities were also affected thereby reducing household incomes greatly.

Some households reported they had no income at all and also find it difficult to borrow from their community to meet food needs, thus the two conservative years of drought have increased the vulnerability of the affected population. There is evidence of increased poverty due to loss of income, crops, livestock, etc.

4.2

Increase in Staple Food Prices and Markets

Because of the poor harvest, the market price of the little available maize and imported maize prices short up drastically during the months from August to December 2002. The rural areas prices of maize grain had sharply risen, relative to the urban areas during the months of November and midDecember. Similarly the price of mealie meal followed a similar trend but the input was evenly spread in urban and rural districts. The prices increases varied from 6% to over 50%. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) maize production in the last season declined by 32% compared to the 5-year average. The rural price increases were compounded by the fact that there were very few traders that were prepared to take maize grain and mealie meal to the affected rural areas because the roads are bad and that the rural community could not afford to pay for the high maize price to cover traders' costs. The bottom line is the rural markets have continued having critical shortage of grain.

4.3

Livestock Prices

Livestock contributes to wealth and is used to generate income for various requirements like food, education, medicals, etc. In most of the food insecure areas, the price of livestock went down as the season progressed. There was a desperate measure by households to sell off some livestock to raise income to buy grain. In Western Province for example the outbreak of Anthrax and Contragious Bovine Pluro Pneumonia (CBPP) further increased the prices compounded by the ban of livestock movement by government. This measure denied the affected areas from household income through the sale of livestock causing food insecurity at household level.

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4.4

Coping Strategies

When households are faced with shocks such as disasters they employ various coping strategies. For the affected areas the most common type of coping strategy is altering dietary intake. Over the past five months, period August to December 2002, 78% of the entire areas surveyed population reported reducing the daily number of meals. This is 13% higher than that reported in the August assessment conducted by Vulnerability Assessment Group (VAC). Other dietary-related coping strategies included reducing the amount eaten at meal times (72%) and skipping an entire day without a main meal (58%). Households are also relying more on wild foods than in normal years (38%).

The level of borrowing is also of concern, as this could lead to further perpetuation of livelihood strains beyond the immediate food crisis.

Households tend to first rely on borrowing from friends and relatives (30%), followed by borrowing from non-family members (27% and borrowing from money lenders (5%).

Table 3: Frequency of Selected Coping Strategies Type of Coping Strategy

% hhs engaged in each coping Strategy (August December)

Reduced number of meals Reduced amount at meal times Skipped entire day without food Reduced expenditure on alcohol and tobacco Increased consumption of wild foods Reduced expenditure on non-foods Beyond normal livestock sales Borrowed from friends and relatives Borrowed from non-family members Borrowed from money lenders

78% 72% 58% 57% 38% 34% 32% 30% 27% 5%

Source: Zambia Emergency Food Security Assessment Report, January 2003 4.5

Targeting Food Aid

In a country where 80% of the population is classified as living in poverty, the issue of targeting relief food to affected communities remains a big challenge.

Presently Zambia has limited information of the demography and problems of vulnerable households which therefore causes problems of proper targeting during relief programmes. To register the vulnerable groups so that 101

they get the required daily rations according to WFP stands at 350gm per person per day of grain was a problem. The NGOs and local village committees entrusted with the distribution of relief food used various methods to distribute the relief food because the numbers of people requiring food continued to increase as the programme progressed. Since the relief food was not enough to meet the target beneficiaries due to shortages, compounded by the fact that the government refused the GMO maize brought into the country by WFP, efforts were made to prioritise groups that were the most vulnerable in the community such as the chronically ill, women and elderly persons. Of the planned relief requirements, only 11% of the requirements were received by December 2002.

4.6

Education

The number of school dropouts stands at 16% mainly due to parents' mobility to afford school costs. This is worsened by the critical hunger situation that forces children into casual labour to earn food and cash, or fetch water, firewood, etc. In some cases children are too weak to cover long distances to school because of hunger. School feeding programmes are not in place to provide supplementary meals to school going children.

4.7

Health and Nutrition

The health and nutrition status of Zambia's people has been in decline for at least two decades. The government struggles to provide basic drugs and services. Increased hunger reduces people's ability to fight diseases. The HIV/AIDS, a new challenge, is affecting all population groups in the country.

For most, the drugs and health care they need to cope with HIV/AIDS, T.B, malaria and the opportunistic infections they suffer from are simply unavailable. The sick and dying seek shelter within the extended family and in so doing, undermine the capacity of those families to cope with the food deficit crisis.

Although the malnutrition rates among the children under 5 years have not significantly increased during the food deficient months, this could be attributed to some coping mechanisms that the households apply during disasters, e.g. depending on wild foods, mothers denying themselves food so that their children have something to eat.

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There is a relationship between HIV/AIDS and food security. According to Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) findings, the following relationships: ! Pressure to seek alternative incomes makes people vulnerable to infections. For example in some border towns with minimal options for income sources, some women can be forced into prostitution. ! The impact of HIV/AIDS on household labour availability affects production or income where household labour is in short supply it means that the food production is reduced, that's contributing to food insecurity.

4.8

Loss of Seeds

Rural small-scale farmers depend on informal seed supply systems for inputs like seeds. Normally the households reserve some of the seeds from own harvests to plant the following season. When drought strikes there is loss of seed reserves as the family consumes even seed stocks in an effort to prevent starvation. There are also instances where families who receive relief grain such as maize select and then reserve such grain for planting the following season. The result of this practice is a poor crop and seed for the next season leading to household food insecurity.

5.0

LESSONS LEARNT/POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1

Crop Diversification

In Zambia, rural livelihoods depend on crop production for both food security and income. The continued reliance on one main crop i.e. maize for household and national food security has caused food crisises when faced with shocks such as droughts.

It is therefore, imperative to promote crop diversification programmes in order to broaden the food base so as to mitigate loses in times of drought.

Crop diversification programmes being implemented by many NGOs such as Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) for example have been successful in improving household food security among its target beneficiaries. The PAM projects such as the Food Security Pack (FSP) and Small Holder Access to Processing, Extension and Seeds (SHAPES) target small-scale farmers by promoting the distribution and planting of a variety of crops such as sorghums, millets, legumes, planting materials cassava and sweet potatoes at household level. The projects have recorded good successes because even during the drought years households growing a variety of crops have been able to have good harvests despite the drought.

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It is recommended that crop diversification should be promoted in the country to help improve food security especially among small-scale farmers. Zambia should promote other main food crops like cassava which has the potential to give high yields even in poor rainfall areas.

5.2

Access to Opportunities

Rural households have low access to opportunities that will help them develop a more secure livelihood. They cultivate very small land less than 1 hector because of limited draught power, have no access to credit, not exposed to improved agricultural technologies to improve productivity, etc.

The result is that the household incomes in non-drought years are too low to meet basic needs adequately or build up savings, assets or necessities. Such households are equally unable to withstand any external shocks such as droughts.

The government, NGOs and the private sector must provide opportunities for rural communities to engage in other alternative livelihood ventures to create incomes so as to build up resources to sustain livelihoods in times of shocks.

5.3

HIV/AIDS

The household labour availability is a major concern, particularly for households affected by HIV/AIDS. The loss of heads of households or productive age adults prematurely, or where women are required to look after the chronically sick reduces the ability of the households to process enough food or bring income into the household. The result is increased household food insecurity and poverty.

Rural communities are being affected by HIV/AIDS and are responding to this in various ways. It is therefore, recommended that community support systems must be strengthened to help cope with the situations. There is need to get more information on the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural livelihoods.

This would help agriculture and rural development programmes to design interventions that would properly address this problem.

5.4

Coping Strategies

Rural households employ different types of coping strategies during stress periods. These are being employed during the current food crisis as the food relief being distributed is grossly deficient to meet the households' needs.

Although there are no official loss of lives due to food shortages so far, probably due to coping strategies, the effect on health and nutrition is being felt.

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The food relief programme currently in place is addressing the access of food, however, apart from food, households require money to buy other essential commodities like soap, salt, pay for medicals, etc. It would be worthwhile to employ different types of assistance such as cash for work and other public work schemes in such areas so that families can get access to income to subsidise their households' incomes and lessen the practice of selling off produce, assets such as animals, farm implements that are so essential for rural livelihoods' sustainability. There is need to have a better understanding of vulnerability in Zambia and coping strategies so that appropriate interventions are designed so that local coping strategies are not lost.

5.5

National Early Warning Systems

Timely crop forecasts are essential to plan for any impending disaster situation. In the Zambian case, the Crop Forecasts Assessments and Needs Assessments were done rather late due to funding problems. This delayed the quick response and mobilization of relief resources for targeted areas. Since Zambia a landlocked country, all relief resources have to pass through neighbouring countries competing with other commercial imports, it is very unlikely that some of the relief food still in the WFP pipe will reach the designated areas on time.

It is essential to strengthen the government's Monitoring Systems such as Crops, Nutrition, Health and Meteorological Surveillance. In addition the Disaster Preparedness should be given a priority by the government to prevent late response to disasters and avert hardships experienced by targeted beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. A National Disaster Management Policy should be developed to guide government and various stakeholders during disasters.

5.6

Strategic Food Reserves

National food reserve is essential to mitigate any impending food shortages be it from droughts or other calamities. Unfortunately in Zambia the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) has not lived up to its name. Because FRA has not been properly funded, the Agency has not been able to build up food reserves to mitigate the food shortages resulting in increase in the staple maize prices.

It is, therefore, essential that the FRA should have sufficient food stocks at all times to help mitigate and stabilizing food prices during disasters. It would also prevent damping of commodities like maize and other commodities and hence protect the country from unfair trade practices that would affect Zambian farmers.

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6.0

IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK

Zambia faces another extremely challenging year. After the difficulties experienced in the 2001/2002 season, the year end economic indicators point that inflation is at 26%, the Kwacha has lost by 14% and a budget deficit. The Department of Meteorology issued a detailed rainfall forecast for the current (2002/2003) growing season. The forecast is that the northern half of the country will receive normal to above normal rainfall whilst the southern half will receive normal to below normal rainfall. The moderate El Nino will affect Zambia especially the southern half. At the beginning of the 2002/2003 season, rains have been erratic especially in the southern half of the country resulting in delayed planting and withering of crops due to insufficient rainfall. There are also concerns of reduced crop areas planted due to insufficient seed availability. If a significant reduced harvest did eventuate, another humanitarian crisis in the current drought affected areas would follow. This situation needs close monitoring and contingency plans to avert another disaster. See Figure 2 showing Rainfall Departure Map, 2002/2003 season.

7.0

CONCLUSION/THE WAY FORWARD

The current food crisis being experienced in Zambia is not new and is becoming more frequent. It means that food security issues are not being properly addressed so as to prevent their frequent occurrence.

There is need to have food security policy that will guide government in developing and implementing strategies that would lead to the achievement of household and natural food security. The agriculture sector should be the driving force towards the achievement of food security and, therefore, the government must priotise funding the sector during the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Programme. It will take a lot of political will on the part of government to achieve food security. All stakeholders should collaborate in contributing towards Zambia's food self sufficiency.

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Fig.1: Rainfall Departure Map: Below, Normal and Above Normal Cumulative Rainfall (July 1, 2001 to April 20, 2002)

Fig.2: Rainfall Departure Map: Below, Normal and Above Normal Cumulative Rainfall (July 1, 2002 to February 10, 2003)

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REFERENCES 1999/200 Agricultural Statistics Bulleting, by Database Management and Early Warning Unit, Department of Planning and Cooperatives Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Civil Society and Poverty Reduction Process in Zambia, prepared for KEPA (Service Centre for Development Co-operation) April 2002 by Mwene Mwinga (Dr).

Crop Weather Bulletins by Meteorological Department.

Final Crop Forecasting Report 2002, MACO and CSO. Land and Agriculture, from UNCED, Rio de Janeiro 1992 to WSSD, Johannesburg, 2002.

Sustainable Agriculture/Rural Development and Vulnerability to AIDS Epidemic: FAO and UNAIDS Joint Publication, UNAID Best Practices/Collection, December 1999.

Successful Experiences that have contributed to Household Food Security in Zambia, by Mubanga Mushimba, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Taking the Campaign to the People, Debt Cancellation for Poverty Eradication, Reports from Provincial Visitations, Conducted by the Jubilee Zambia Secretariat Team, May June 2002.

Third Country Training Programme Poverty Reduction through Rural Development Activities (Regional Development Good Practices Cases), Country Paper, January 2002 by Helen Samatebele and Bwalya Chilufya.

Targeted Food Security Pack for Vulnerable but Viable Farmers in Zambia, 2001 2005. Agricultural Seasons Inception Report by Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries.

Zambia: Draft Proposal for Reducing Hunger by the year 2015, Lusaka, December 2000 by Patrick Nkandu.

Zambia Emergency Food Security Assessment: Zambia National Vulnerability Assessment Committee in collaboration with the SADC, FANR, Assessment Committee, January 2003, Lusaka.

Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002 2004, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, May 2002.

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MOVING BEYOND FOOD AID Incorporating Livelihoods Analysis into Vulnerability Assessments in Swaziland Sawdon Gary, Save The Children 1.

CONTEXT Swaziland is a small land locked country surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. It has a population of approximately one million. 60% -70% of this population are from rural areas and are predominantly involved in a subsistence agriculture economy.

Although the small kingdom is perceived to be middle income, previous livelihoods and poverty reports, reveal that at least 60 to 70% of the Swazi population live below the poverty line. It is now recognised that the current food security crisis is not simply the effects of a drought. Overall livelihoods have been deteriorating at a rapid pace. The national currency has devalued dramatically and the consumer price index has risen sharply in the past four years. Current vulnerability assessments have shown that poor and middleincome groups have faced a general decline in access to casual and wage labour. Inflation and prices rises have reduced savings and assets, resulting in their inability to withstand future livelihood shocks.

Swaziland ranks amongst the top five countries in the world most affected by HIV/AIDS. The excess morbidity and mortality due to the disease has and will soon have wide ranging socio-economic impacts on households, communities, and the national economy. According to the 2002 SeroSurveillance report, HIV prevalence among antenatal clinic clients was as high as 38%. (15 49 years) At the end of 2002, AIDS related deaths were estimated to be above 50,000. The number of AIDS orphans (30,000 in 2001) is now projected to rise at an average of 10,000 per year between 2002 and 2011. (Stanecki Projections).

For both the short and long term prognosis, communities, the Government of Swaziland and international agencies will need to be able to respond to the recurrent vulnerability of households throughout Swaziland. In both rural and urban areas, non-farm household incomes and livelihoods will continue to be vulnerable to a range of economic shocks and environmental stresses.

All indicators point to a continuous structural decline in the role of migrant remittances and growing poverty in the wake of poor economic growth.

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The National Disaster Task Force and the Swaziland Vulnerability Assessment Committee

In consideration of these alarming trends, the Swaziland VAC & SC (UK) along with many other stakeholders, including NGO's and Donors, recognise the need to strengthen the approaches and methodologies for gathering and analysing vital livelihood information for development and emergency purposes. The previous year's food security crisis in Swaziland has, once again, provided an impetus for the need to re-orient and strengthen existing state systems and approaches.

The current food crisis, affecting six countries in Southern Africa, has promulgated the establishment of National Vulnerability Assessment Committees (NVAC) within the region. The Swaziland NVAC, under the umbrella of the NDTF, was established as part of a collaborative initiative with the SADC-FANR RVAC. The overarching goal of the NVAC is to incorporate a livelihoods approach to vulnerability assessments in Swaziland. (e.g. one that embraces a multi-sectoral approach, which integrates the analysis of HIV/AIDS, health, water, etc with issues of food access and availability.)

Since July 2002, the Swazi NVAC has successfully conducted two emergency food need assessments in collaboration with SADC-RVAC. These assessments have largely increased the relevance and visibility of Swaziland VAC, as a key stakeholder in food security analysis in the country. After an initial focus on food aid requirements and after intensive debates, it is increasingly clear that responses to the current humanitarian crisis needs to go beyond short-term food aid needs to longer term livelihood programmes.

As a key source of information for decision makers, it is equally critical that the Swaziland VAC assessments be broad and reflect priorities beyond just food needs.

In order to address this need, the SADC-FANR VAC has proposed that the April/May round of humanitarian assessments are conducted using a livelihoods based methodology. At the recent NVAC stakeholders meetings held in Pretoria from March 7th to 11th, the NVAC's from the six most affected countries, endorsed the LBVA approach and each country has developed operational plans. Overall, this will enhance an understanding of the factors underlying current food access problems, as well as, presenting a range of intervention options going beyond food aid.

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The proposed methodology builds on existing work already done by the Swaziland VAC in the previous assessments. However, these proposed approaches require well-trained and highly motivated VAC members, as well as, a strengthened and institutionalised VAC. 1.2

Swaziland's Experience with Livelihood Approaches

People's livelihood systems are affected by both internal and external factors.

Livelihood approaches to vulnerability assessments can provide an understanding on how and to what extent the combination of external and internal vulnerability affects the livelihoods of people. Linking this information together with the likely impact of shocks can provide a proper analysis for decision-makers to predict and prepare for emergency responses, as well as developmental programme planning. Recognising the significance of understanding people's livelihoods fully is an imperative for Swaziland.

In order to achieve this vision and to strengthen the initiatives of the Swazi NVAC, institutional strengthening and capacity building are needed.

Introducing a livelihoods approach to vulnerability assessments dates back to 1997. At that time the approach was known as RiskMap. Using this approach, the first Household Food Economy assessment was carried out, with the first national livelihood baselines established in April 1998. EU (ECHO) supported this initiative. The main players involved were the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MOAC), Save the Children Swaziland and the Lutheran Development Service. Over the subsequent years, the livelihood database has been used to model and provide appropriate recommendations and responses to several natural disasters.

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CONSTRAINTS AND WEAKNESSES (SWAZILAND AND THE SADC REGION)

The nature and depth of the 2001-02 food security crisis in Swaziland, and the SADC region as a whole, has raised a number of structural and institutional concerns that need to be resolved. These include: ! On the whole, existing livelihood research and data is fragmented and not consolidated. As well, there is a strong need to extract this data out of the food aid debate and place it in the wider context of alternative and longer term livelihood interventions. ! Weak institutional arrangements and lack of capacity have been identified as major constraints to the longer term aims of the Swaziland VAC. 111

! An identified need to enhance and considerably strengthen the planning and policy levels with accurate and accessible information concerning household livelihood information; providing an invaluable input into policy and planning for both emergency and development planning. ! A more comprehensive, systematic and comparative understanding of the situations of the impacts of HIV/AIDS, rural and peri-urban environments, . ! To strengthen and build capacity in interpretation and analysis of livelihood information and dissemination of relevant information and analyses to relevant stakeholders.

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PROPOSALS ON THE NEXT STEPS

In consideration of the livelihoods research that has taken place (both in the recent NVAC and previously) and the recent updating of the livelihood baselines, Swaziland is now poised to use this information to gain a much a deeper analysis of livelihoods and to provide alternative options, beyond food aid, for policy and decision makers. However, as noted above and in recognition of a multitude of livelihood problems, there is, additionally, a strong need to extract this data out of the food-aid debate and place it into a wider context of alternative short term response tools and appropriate mid term strategies.

In order to take this process forward, there is a strong need for the Swaziland VAC to: ! Strengthen its institutional viability; ! Initiate a strategic review process and consolidate all relevant livelihood information ! To obtain much deeper understanding of the livelihood needs and provide appropriate recommendations on identified acute and problematic areas in Swaziland (e.g. impact of HIV/AIDS, livelihood failures low-veld areas, etc.)

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SPECIFIC AREAS MAY INCLUDE . . .

Explore an appropriate national institution, where livelihoods analysis can be imbedded and identify key areas of institutional strengthening and capacity building requirements.

Provide leadership on a process that reviews existing vulnerability data, and thereby considers alternatives to food-aid for short-term response, as well as appropriate mid-term strategies to reduce vulnerability.

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Build capacity (through training, workshops etc) in the reliefdevelopment community, and critically within the government, to carry this strategic process forward more autonomously Conduct further Livelihoods Based Vulnerability Assessments in the acute, problematic areas of Swaziland, primarily in the Low-veld Cattle & Cotton Food Economy Zone and portions of the middle-veld.

Incorporate issues relating to HIV/AIDS impact into the livelihood analysis.

Where possible, to influence and link with government policy, to support relief, mitigation and development strategies more appropriately.

Explore, within alternative strategies, the issue of targeting assistance more effectively against need and vulnerability.

To initiate a process of producing tools for analysing urban and periurban livelihoods.

Link with any comparable initiatives in other countries in the region (SADC-RVAC and other NVAC initiatives).

Begin laying foundations to establish appropriate livelihood based monitoring systems with trained nationals able to operate analytical tools Policy recommendations that will ensure appropriate emergency response building resilience amongst vulnerable communities.

Clear framework for institutional management of livelihoods and food security related issues.

Work with other stakeholders to come up with tangible strategies to address vulnerability posed by food insecurity and HIV/AIDS.

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A SHORT DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE LESOTHO FOOD CRISIS: balancing humanitarian and development responses to food shocks Abbott, Care program coordinator In the media, the term drought is being used almost interchangeably with famine in the context of the current southern African food crisis. Lesotho is cited as one of the countries affected by food insecurity and was the first to declare a national emergency. But what is the real picture in Lesotho, how much is the current food insecurity caused by drought compared with other longer term factors?.

Rainfall was higher than in previous years. Thus, there was no drought in Lesotho, rather the heavy rainfall prevented farmers from getting into their fields, reducing the area they planted due to waterlogged soils. This alone wasn't the only climatic variation, early frosts and erratic hailstorms both contributed to a weather pattern which affected not only the land area planted but also adversely affected harvests. But this isn't a new phenomenon: a long term review of livelihoods in Lesotho corroborates that people feel "livelihoods in Lesotho are increasingly threatened by drought or irregular rainfall; by other climatic hazards", regardless of whether climatic variation is actually increasing.

But even if there was no drought, has the erratic climate contributed to food insecurity in Lesotho? The Lesotho Emergency Food Security Assessment Report (Sept 02) reports that nearly half of surveyed households had run out of cereal stocks. But this is not unusual - a CARE study in 3 villages in 2 southern districts in 1998 found that only 29% of households claimed they could feed themselves from their farming all year round and this in a highly productive area. The average number of months per year over which these households could feed themselves was 6 and this is still higher than the national average. It has been a long time (some authors suggest half a century) since most Basotho can ensure household livelihood security through farming. This finding is common across the southern African region, with evidence from Malawi and Zambia, that millions of people do not produce adequate food in most years.

So if climatic variation is a feature, and possibly an increasing feature, of Basotho livelihoods, and household food deficits the norm, is this year any different? The Emergency Food Security Assessment suggests so: it estimates that up to 36% of the population will require assistance up to March 2003. A total of 36 000 MT of cereal is estimated for the period Sept 02March 03. But the food insecurity does not classify as a famine - as measured by wasting of children under five which is estimated at around 7.5% of 115

children (and not the 15-20% levels which are considered by WHO to be a nutritional emergency).

So if there has not been a drought, and probably will not be a famine, is 'business as usual' in Lesotho an adequate response to the food insecurity?

The answer to this question, from all parties regardless of their views on the food crisis, seems to be an unequivocal "no". At the humanitarian level, blanket food assistance is not required, but instead, careful targeting towards the most vulnerable households which vary "substantially by socio-economic group, food economy zone, and district". The most vulnerable groups are identified as: · Aged-headed households living alone or without a spouse; · Female headed households, particularly the large number of very poor; · Orphans living in households with a high dependency ration; · HIV/AIDs victims and affected households.

While the current food insecurity can be responded to as a crisis requiring an international food aid emergency response, this single or series of climatic shocks within one growing season, must be viewed within a significant longer term growth in the vulnerability of poor people in Lesotho, that has multiple causes. Perhaps of greater concern than the measured 7.5% wasting, is the figure of 47% of children showing stunting (cf 46% in 2000), evidence of long term poverty and chronic vulnerability.

But what are the factors that are contributing to this long term vulnerability?

In response to a request from DFID, CARE put together a multi-disciplinary team to review the underlying causes of vulnerability in Lesotho and to develop a programme to assist in livelihood recovery in the worst affected areas. This team spent time differentiating between the most immediate and short-term needs of the current food crisis, and the longer term requirements of improving the capacity of resource poor households and communities to improve their food and livelihood security. The list of identified underlying causes included the following: · Loss of household income due to retrenchment and reduced employment (most notably South African employment); · Reduced purchasing power due to much higher costs of food and inputs; · Increasing household expenditure on items associated with long term illness and death (highly linked with HIV/AIDs); · Reduced land planted due to heavy rainfall, reduced use of inputs and chronic illness; · Government policies on subsidizing inputs which encourage farming households to delay their planting to wait for inputs (which often arrive late); · Poor agricultural practices that result in low productivity.

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This checklist indicates a range of underlying causes, many of which (e.g. climate, supra-national policies and processes), are beyond the direct control or influence of the Kingdom of Lesotho. Macro-economic and social ties between Lesotho and South Africa are central to the underlying causes. The devaluation of the Rand has severely inflated food and transport prices, meaning food is available in the markets and shops but it's price is beyond the reach of many households. Jandrells supermarket chain reports that many of their shoppers make a 50kg bag of maize meal now last 5-6 weeks rather than a month. This indicates a household eking out a bag of maize over a 25-50% longer period, with obvious impacts on the nutritional status of family members.

As also identified in the emergency food security assessment, HIV/AIDS is beginning to heavily impact on Basotho livelihoods with reduced labour for planting and farming but crucially increased expenditure on medical and funeral bills, diverting household expenditure from productive activities.

Interviews held as part of CARE's review of underlying causes of vulnerability indicate the high number of orphan headed households: a recent UNICEF study estimated that 15% of school children are orphans. The Nutrition Unit within the Ministry of Agriculture reported finding 56 "double orphan" families with little or no means of support in a mountain village of only 200 families. And because many orphans fail to inherit land due to the death of their parents before they reach adulthood, they are effectively condemned to life-long vulnerability through a reduced asset base and no or reduced rights to land claims.

Informants from both the Ministry of Agriculture and the Lesotho AIDS Prevention Coordinating Agency indicate that maintaining current livelihood status in Lesotho would be a great achievement, considering that trends have been downwards for at least the last decade. With an HIV+ rate of up to 35%, any initiative "cannot expect to reduce absolute figures of vulnerability", improve livelihoods or assist in eradicating poverty. A dampening thought for the global community working to halve world poverty by 2015.

Ways forward What are some of the ways forward within this context of increasing vulnerability for many Basotho? ¡

Recognising the incremental downward spiral of households in Lesotho.

This cannot be addressed through an emergency food response alone, but that requires a rethink in Lesotho's macro-economic policies as much as its policies within key line Ministries, such as Agriculture. The current 117

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drafting processes for Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper provide an opportunity for such a review of the allocation of national budgets and priorities across the sectors, with a specific focus on targeting the most vulnerable people; Rethinking the government's safety net policies. At a practical level, this should include a food security monitoring system that enables current harvests to be compared in a consistent and transparent way with both long and short term averages, and linked to the operationalisation of nutritional surveillance systems.

Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to implement its new extension policy, which encourages the development of farmer associations with their own farmer extension faciliators. This is in line with similar extension initiatives within Zambia and Malawi, as well as pilot areas within Lesotho, which have been found effective in supporting poor farmers. This implies a coordinating and support function for government extension officers, responding to the needs of farmers'groups who are are much in tune with the local context of resource poor farmers.

The provision of effective input and output marketing systems that are suitable for smallscale farmers, and focus on providing safety nets to enable the poorest households to access seeds, other inputs and advice or support.

The agricultural input supply policy and system should encourage development of the private sector who are discouraged by the current government subsidies policies; A national effort to promote homestead food production by vulnerable groups and individuals, favouring gardening methods requiring less (heavy) labour. This should have a specific focus on the production and dissemination of appropriate and robust seed varieties, for staples and vegetables, which are more resistant to climatic variation and which are currently not supplied through commercial seed marketing systems.

Development and dissemination of Food-based Dietary Guidelines for Lesotho, that can inform the selection and promotion of appropriate homestead crops that are recommended for those who are chronically ill and for improved child nutrition; A review of the land policy, to enable orphans to retain their rights to inherit land as well as enabling them to access land for homestead gardens, such as through linkages with the 'School Gardens' (and other institutional gardening) programmes.

Some of these issues are included in the Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme, which being implemented jointly by CARE and the Ministry of Agriculture and supported by DFID. This Programme works to address some of the underlying causes of household vulnerability - by providing a development response to a humanitarian challenge and by 118

supporting and strengthening enabling policies within Lesotho which enable vulnerable people to realise their rights to livelihood security. The programme includes 4 elements : establishing a Challenge Fund to support the work of existing service providers promoting homestead food production by poor vulnerable households; strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to roll out its policy of client-led agricultural extension ; development and dissemination of materials on good agricultural practices as promoted by different organisations in Lesotho (and in support of the new extension system), and an action learning framework to understand how (whether and which) households are coping with the increasing intensity and frequency of shocks and the support mechanisms that can be provided by government and non-government agencies in the short and long term.

The Livelihoods Recovery approach is not new. Instead, it is a common sense way of dealing with food insecurity - and one that has been advocated by CARE in the Consortium for Southern African Food Emergency (C-SAFE) in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaliland: linking the saving of lives with improved health and nutrition, productive assets, and agricultural production and profitability.

Food insecurity can be addressed through direct means, such as food distribution, and this is clearly necessary for the most vulnerable households.

But it can also be addressed through a livelihoods approach in which vulnerable households are regarded as part of a community, and survive through strategies that include local production systems, local employment, reciprocity between households, and strengthened external support systems.

This think piece highlights the importance of taking an integrated approach, exploring the underlying causes of a food crisis and supporting a combined humanitarian and development response to address them.

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