Winter 2018/19 ISSUE
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FIRST COMMENT IN THIS ISSUE: • EASEMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT • SUING ‘PERSONS UNKNOWN’ TO PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS • RIGHTS OF WAY • GOVERNMENT: CHAMPION OF NEW HOMES • PRODUCT FOCUS - DEVELOPERS’ INDEMNITY POLICY
Leading Title Insurance
Welcome to the Winter edition of our newsletter for 2018/19. In this issue we have a contribution from Paul Butt, of Rowlinsons Solicitors, who looks at a case where a dispute over ‘easements’ reached the Supreme Court. We are sad to announce that this will be the last contribution from Paul who retires at the end of this year. From all of us at First Title, we would like to thank Paul for his fantastic contributions over the years and wish him a long, healthy and happy retirement. Kevin Lee, of Hill Dickinson LLP, looks at the recent rise suing ‘persons unknown’ to protect property rights. Finally, one of our London-based Commercial Underwriters, Nagina Hussain, has written a piece around Rights of Way.
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FIRST COMMENT
Easements in the Supreme Court by Paul Butt Consultant Solicitor Rowlinsons Solicitors
Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2018] UKSC 57 This case was originally in the High Court in 2015. Since then it has been to the Court of Appeal in 2017 and, in November 2018, it ended up in the Supreme Court – and at what cost to those involved, I wonder? And I don’t just mean financial cost but also personal stress and worry for the various parties. The case involves alleged ‘easements’ enjoyed by the owners of Regency Villas, a timeshare resort, over the Broome Park Estate. This, we are told, was once the home of Field Marshall Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. The timeshare website states:
“Situated seven miles south of the medieval City of Canterbury in the beautiful Kent countryside the central attractions on the 268 acre Broome Park Estate is the historic Jacobean Mansion House and the championship standard Golf Course.. The Regency Villas complex comprises of 26 delightful holiday homes set in their private grounds, within the surrounds of the beautiful old Broome Park country estate, which dates
back to the 16th Century, thus creating an ideal setting for a tranquil holiday… Golf is available to all owners on the 18-hole championship standard golf course… The recreational facilities available to owners and visitors during their stay include: indoor swimming pool, sauna, squash, tennis, leisure suite, croquet table, putting green and snooker.”
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The snag for the timeshare owners was that the right to the free use of these ‘recreational facilities’, which had been granted originally in 1981 were being disputed by the subsequent purchaser of the servient land, Diamond Resorts. According to George Edwards, the Chairman of Regency Villas Management Committee “Diamond Resorts are the largest leisure resort owner in the World and this was a classic David and Goliath legal battle, a case of a large corporation demanding golf and leisure charges to which they were not entitled.” But was the right to use these facilities for free capable of being an easement? At the original trial the late Judge Purle QC found that the 1981 transfer created easements to use the gardens and sporting and recreational facilities on the Appellants’ land (the servient tenement) free of charge, even where such facilities had not been built at the time of the transfer. Whilst the Court of Appeal upheld the majority of the easements identified by the trial judge, it found that the transfer only granted rights over those facilities that existed at the time of the transfer. This meant that the timeshare owners did not have free use of the indoor swimming pool (which had been built in substitution of a filled in outdoor swimming pool) as a result. Diamond Resorts appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision in respect of easements granted and the timeshare owners cross-appealed the decision limiting their rights in respect of the indoor swimming pool. In the Supreme Court, the leading judgement was given by Lord Briggs (with whom Lady Hale, and Lords Kerr and Sumpton agreed). Lord Carnwath dissented. The Court considered in detail the previous leading case on what rights can amount to easements, (in Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131), and restated the principles laid down in that case in the light of modern conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Re Ellenborough Park, dismissed the appeal and granted the cross-appeal. After stating the facts, Lord Briggs first summarised the well-known and well-established conditions for 4
the recognition of a right as an easement. “Writing in 1954, Dr Cheshire described the four essential characteristics as follows:
i. There must be a dominant and a servient tenement; ii. The easement must accommodate the dominant tenement; iii. The dominant and servient owners must be different persons; iv. A right over land cannot amount to an easement, unless it is capable of forming the subject-matter of a grant.” He then accepted that the rights in question “may be treated as breaking new ground by comparison with Re Ellenborough Park, in three main respects. First, … the nature and extent of the recreational and sporting facilities granted at Broome Park was much greater, and their full enjoyment called for much more intensive management, than that afforded in Ellenborough Park. An 18-hole golf course and a heated swimming pool by their nature require more management and maintenance than an ornamental garden,… Secondly, Ellenborough Park was made available to a limited number of dominant owners, whereas the facilities at Broome Park were available to two, later three, different groups of timeshare owners and to paying members of the public. Thirdly, the cost of managing and maintaining Ellenborough Park was shared among the dominant owners, whereas in Broome Park it was at least expected to be undertaken by the servient owners. Additionally, the grant in this case can only be described as a right of “recreation and amusement”. It is a recreational right pure and simple (treating sport as part of recreation) whereas in Re Ellenborough Park the Court of Appeal fought shy of describing it in those terms, preferring to identify its essential feature as the provision of a communal garden for townhouses.” Lord Briggs went on to say that there was a principle “that the common law should, as far as possible, accommodate itself to new types of property ownership and new ways of enjoying the use of land. The timeshare development, which is
FIRST COMMENT quintessentially for holiday and recreational use, is just such a new type, and the common law should accommodate it as far as it can.” In support of this contention he cited various decisions from other common law based jurisdictions. “… recreational easements have become widely recognised in the common law world. Thus in Riley v Penttila [1974] VR 547, the Supreme Court of Victoria recognised as an easement the grant of land within a residential development ‘for the purposes of recreation” over a garden or a park, in favour of residential lots, … in Dukart v Corpn of the District of Surrey [1978] 2 SCR 1039 the Supreme Court of Canada recognised as easements the grant in favour of residential lots on a development plan of rights to use ‘foreshore reserves’ separating the lots from a bay... The Supreme Court stated in its declaratory order that “the right so granted includes the right to promenade freely across the whole of the ‘Foreshore Reserves’ and not merely to cross directly from the edge or front of Lot 38 to the waters of Boundary Bay”: pp 10701071. … in Blankstein v Walsh [1989] 1 WWR 277 the High Court of Manitoba recognised as an easement, acquired by prescription, recreational rights to use a communal playground, in favour of the owners of adjoining holiday cottages. In City Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General of the Northern Territory [2000] NTSC 33, 135 NTR 1 the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory recognised as an easement the grant of rights over a lakeside resort near Darwin for “private recreational purposes”, treating it as “clearly established that a right of recreation may be the subject of a valid easement.” Lord Briggs then went on to confirm that this was also the positon in English law. He held that a “grant of purely recreational (including sporting) rights over land which genuinely accommodate adjacent land may be the subject matter of an easement, provided always that they satisfy the four well-settled conditions which I have described. Where the actual or intended use of the dominant tenement is itself recreational, as will generally be the case for holiday timeshare developments, the accommodation condition will generally be satisfied. Whether the other conditions, and in particular the
components of the fourth condition, will be satisfied will be a question of fact in each case. Whatever may have been the attitude in the past to “mere recreation or amusement”, recreational and sporting activity of the type exemplified by the facilities at Broome Park is so clearly a beneficial part of modern life that the common law should support structures which promote and encourage it, rather than treat it as devoid of practical utility or benefit.” He then went on to consider the cross-appeal – whether the rights granted included only those in existence at the time of the 1981 transfer or whether they extended to all sports and recreational facilities that might be provided at any time. The Judge had thought it did, but the Court of Appeal thought it did not. Lord Briggs preferred the trial judge’s “simple and common-sense analysis”. The grant was “in substance the grant of a single comprehensive right to use a complex of facilities, and comprehends not only those constructed and in use at the time of the 1981 transfer, but all those additional or replacement facilities thereafter constructed and put into operation within the Park as part of the leisure complex during the expected useful life of the Regency Villas timeshare development for which the 1981 transfer was intended to pave the way. It is, in short, a right to use such recreational and sporting facilities as exist within the leisure complex in the Park from time to time. In that respect I agree with the judge’s analysis of this point … and disagree with the approach of the Court of Appeal, which treats each facility as the subject of a separate grant of rights, referable only to the separate locus in quo of each relevant facility at the time of the grant.” So, seemingly, a comprehensive victory for David over Goliath but anyone thinking of setting up a similar arrangement will need to bear in mind that in this case no obligation was imposed on the servient owner to maintain the golf course and other facilities – and there is no implied obligation at common law on the servient owner to maintain. This would need to be addressed in any future development making use of this decision.
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FIRST COMMENT
Suing ‘persons unknown’ to protect property rights by Kevin Lee Hill Dickinson LLP
It is standard practice (and has been for some decades now) to issue the proceedings against ‘persons unknown’ when seeking to remove trespassers from land. This is because the claimant usually does not know the identity of the trespassers. For example, a factory owner comes to work one morning to find five caravans parked on his car park. In these cases swift action can be taken. Under CPR part 55 an application for possession against
trespassers on commercial land can be listed for hearing two clear days after service. There is also provision under CPR part 3 for shortening the time for service and indeed the practice note issued by the Chief Master and Senior Master provides that in urgent cases “the court will consider fixing a hearing of the claim very soon after issue occasionally on the same day as issue”.
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There has recently been a rise in the use of proceedings against ‘persons unknown’ in other claims relating to interests in land, separate from the normal straightforward trespass action against a person who has entered land without the licence or consent of the owner. In the last 12 months there have been well publicised claims against protesters protesting against fracking (INEOS v. persons unknown (2017); Cuadrilla v. persons unknown (2018); UK Oil & Gas Plc v. persons unknown (2018); Europa Oil & Gas v. persons unknown (2018)). In each of these cases the oil company sought and obtained injunctions from the court to restrain anticipated or future trespass on land before it has taken place. These injunctions also restrained associated activity such as protesters locking themselves onto gates, concrete posts or indeed each other (‘lock-ons’), ‘lorry surfing’ (when a protester climbs on top of a lorry while it is moving, thus mimicking a surfer on a surf board) or from other forms of nuisance designed to disrupt operations, such as lying on the ground in front of a site. These injunctions have been criticised as offending the human right to protest and indeed the Court of Appeal will hear an appeal in the INEOS case in March 2019 as to whether it is right and proper to use the ‘persons unknown’ procedure where it is arguably possible to identify some of the protesters involved. A more recent and unusual type of claim is against what are known as ‘urban explorers’. These individuals sneak into buildings or climb up the exterior of tall buildings and cranes and then post social media messages and photographs recording their activities. They do this by evading the security systems in place. Obviously these individuals put themselves at great risk and indeed there have been a number of deaths and serious injury when an urban explorer has fallen to the ground. In Paris last October a train surfing urban explorer was killed instantly when he collided with a bridge. There have been two cases this year where this activity has been restrained by the English courts. In February 2018, Canary Wharf Investments Ltd issued proceedings against five named individuals and the generic category of ‘persons unknown’
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[2018] EWHC 1760 (QB). The lead named defendant was Rikke Brewer a well-known urban explorer and close friend of the now deceased Paris train surfer. Canary Wharf comprises many of the tallest buildings in the UK and indeed Europe, including the famous One Canada Square. It is a perfect location for an urban explorer. Prior to issuing the proceedings Canary Wharf had managed to identify and name five defendants, who had all been seen climbing on buildings within the Canary Wharf estate. It also claimed generically against ‘persons unknown’. The Canary Wharf case shows how complicated and costly these applications can be. For example, 69 claimants were named on the claim form as having freehold or leasehold interests in the relevant buildings. Extensive evidence had to be collated, not only of the previous trespasses but also of the anticipated trespass, to prove to the court that there was a ‘real and imminent threat’. In Canary Wharf some of the defendants attended court and did not deny that they had trespassed, nor that they had no legal right to do what they were doing, and so in some ways the claimants were pushing an open door. The court, in reviewing the authorities, said that the substantive law is clear and straightforward so far as a trespass is concerned. A landowner in possession is entitled to an injunction to restrain trespass, whether or not the trespass causes damage. When applying for an interim injunction, there must be evidence to support and establish that there is a real and imminent threat of trespass by the Defendants. Then, in May 2018, there came the case of Chelsea FC Plc v. Brewer and others [2018] EWHC 1424 (Ch). This was an application on the part of Chelsea FC for an injunction against Rikke Brewer and others from entering Stamford Bridge football ground. In this case, the evidence was that within the previous 12 months there had been at least four separate breaches of security when at least four identified individuals had climbed over security fences and gained access to Stamford Bridge. They then videoed their exploits and posted them on YouTube and other social media. Mr Brewer himself had been identified from the videos that he had
FIRST COMMENT uploaded from various social media accounts, and indeed in the light of this evidence he gave an undertaking to the Court not to repeat the trespass. In September 2018 Vastint Leeds BV v. persons unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch) came before the High Court in September 2018. This concerns the now derelict Tetley Brewery site in Leeds. The site was awaiting demolition and redevelopment. There had been trespass incidents involving travellers with caravans, but the company was also concerned about the risk of illegal raves being organised, which had occurred on other derelict sites owned by an associated company of the claimant. The claimant was also concerned about fly-tipping. It therefore sought an injunction to restrain trespassers and to protect against the particular risk of caravans, illegal raves and fly-tipping. The court recognised that the claimant faced a difficulty in identifying the persons likely to trespass on its property. It also was satisfied that there was, on the evidence, a real threat that trespass could be committed either by travellers or fly-tippers or, potentially, illegal ravers. Factors that the Court identified as relevant were what other steps the claimant could take to prevent the infringement; the attitude of the potential defendants and also the timeframe between the application and the threatened infringement. Clearly, applications should be made promptly and the evidence of real and imminent threat must be recent and credible.
financial loss to the claimant but also could amount to a real nuisance to the race-going public. All of these cases show that the courts are open to granting injunctive relief to prevent anticipated trespass to land. The court also recognises the difficulty in identifying potential defendants. But, one of the issues that will be dealt with by the Court of Appeal in the INEOS appeal (and indeed the UK Oil & Gas injunction is also subject to an application for permission to appeal) is whether claimants are too readily resorting to bringing claims against ‘persons unknown’. The argument is that the claimant should do all they can to identify as many defendants as possible, particularly if they are relying on past trespass as evidence of future trespass. It is said that issuing against a generic group such as “persons unknown intending to trespass onto the site known as etc.” is simply not good enough. At the moment claimants often trawl through social media to gather the evidence. In fact some of the best evidence is the exchanges between people on Facebook or Instagram, calling on people to congregate at a certain time or at a certain place. This evidence gathering can be a very costly exercise and brings with it the potential allegation of infringement of human rights, and in particular the right to privacy, when social media communications are used as the basis of evidence. The INEOS appeal will certainly be one to watch for in 2019.
Finally, in October 2018 in Jockey Club v. Persons unknown [2018] EWHC 3234 (Ch) the claimant, which owned Cheltenham racecourse, sought an injunction to prevent ticket touting on the racecourse. The claimant had been unable to obtain the names and addresses of particular touts and had therefore issued the action against ‘persons unknown’. Ticket touting was prohibited under the terms and conditions of admission to the racecourse and so any ticket tout entering onto the racecourse for the purpose of buying and selling tickets which were unauthorised sales did so, or at any rate very arguably did so, as a trespasser. The evidence established that there was a real problem with ticket touts at the racecourse and that it not only caused
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Rights of way by Nagina Hussain Commercial Underwriter
Since the case of Harris v Flower in 1904 the general rule governing rights of way and additional land was that, if you owned a plot of land which
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benefitted from right of way, you could not subsequently acquire a further plot of neighbouring land, and use the right of way to access that additional land.
FIRST COMMENT
Gore v Naheed & Ahmed [2017] EWCA Civ 369: Background This case concerned the issue of whether an existing easement to gain access to a parcel of land ‘plot A’ can be used to access an additional parcel of land ‘plot B’ which sits behind plot A. At first sight if applying the case of Harris v Flower rule the answer would appear to be no. The court however has provided further guidance in this case.
The case: Mr Gore owned a property called the Granary. The Granary enjoyed a right of access which was granted by way of 1921 Conveyance. Part of the access was over the neighbouring property owned by the Naheeds. Mr Gore used the access not only to reach the Granary but also to gain access to an adjacent garage. A dispute arose because vehicles delivering goods to the Naheeds premises which was a shop often blocked access to both the Granary and the garage. This led to a dispute over the extent of the easement granted by the 1921 conveyance. The Naheeds argued that Mr Gore did not have the right to use the access way to obtain direct access to the garage, as this fell outside the scope of the easement. The right of way contained within the 1921 Conveyance was in the following terms: “Together with the right for the Purchasers their respective heirs and assigns and others the owners and occupiers of the said granary….. with or without horses or other animals carts or wagons laden or unladen to go and return along and over the private entrance road or way coloured yellow on the said plan for all proposes connected with the use and occupation of the said granary but not further or otherwise.”
The area coloured yellow on the plan included an area on which the garage had been erected in 1994. When Mr Gore purchased the Granary he also purchased the garage land. It appeared to be agreed that the 1921 Conveyance entitled Mr Gore to drive a vehicle to the front door of the Granary and to park the car there for the purposes of loading or unloading. What was in dispute was the right for Mr Gore to use the driveway to obtain access to the garage for the purpose of parking the car. It was argued by the Naheeds that the use of the driveway was outside the scope of the easement granted in the 1921 Conveyance. The court of appeal found that the right of way could be used to access the garage for parking ancillary to the occupation of the Granary. We can establish from the judgment in this case that there is not a general principle that ancillary land may always be accessed by the right of way in favour of the principal land. •
It depends upon the wording of the original grant
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The wording of the original grant of the right of way must provide for ancillary use.
This becomes very important to consider if you already own a parcel of land and are seeking to purchase some adjoining land. You need to consider whether the easement you have already is sufficiently wide enough for you to access the adjacent land. You may wish to consider title indemnity insurance.
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FIRST COMMENT
Government: Champion of New Homes Buyers of newly built homes are to be championed by a new watchdog, with a New Homes Ombudsman to be created. The proposal, widely welcomed by MPs and others in the housing sector, was published in early October 2018, amongst a raft of other housing-related proposals. The key proposal is that of a New Homes Ombudsman to “champion the rights of homebuyers, protect their interests and hold developers to account”. It was announced by Housing Secretary, James Brokenshire MP at the recent Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham. He said this will give “confidence that when you get the keys to a new home you get the quality build you expect and the finish you’ve paid for”. Once the Ombudsman is established, aggrieved home buyers can expect to secure faster redress for properties that are defective. All new home
developers would come under the umbrella of the new ombudsman.
What’s the issue? The proposals are welcome, given recent housingrelated scandals around poor quality homes built by a few housing developers. One particular developer was criticised for misleading purchasers, and delaying repairs to homes that were poorly built. The media storm led to a public apology from the company, and a commitment to resolving outstanding issues. The latest developer affected, is now at the centre of widespread criticism about the quality of its houses. At least one homeowner has already issued proceedings against the developer after reportedly finding at least 80 defects in his property. 13
NHBC has, in its latest national new homes customer satisfaction survey, reported that an astonishing 98% of buyers of new homes reported snags or bigger defects to their respective house builder after completion. The evidence lays bare the urgent need to robustly address the quality issues in new houses. The prevalence of defects in new builds is undoubtedly a symptom of the pressure to build new homes in a national housing shortage crisis, where relatively few large developers dominate the market. With large property developers subcontracting out the work, there is a greater potential for a lesser quality of build; and unlike in some other EU countries, UK builders are not legally required to have a licence to build. Though the finished property needs formal sign off by local building control, the fact is that UK builders are not subject to robust regulation in any sense of the word. The race to erect new houses is undoubtedly under way, with government now aiming to build 300,000 a year by mid-2020s. The risk of an increase in sub-standard homes where time is of the essence has been recognised by the Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Excellence in the Built Environment: “In the quest for increasing output in terms of supply we must ensure that we do not sacrifice quality. Furthermore, where quality issues arise they must be addressed in a satisfactory and timely manner.” The APPG report, Better redress for homebuyers, was published in Summer 2018 14 16
following an open inquiry into the quality and workmanship of new housing for sale in England.
What’s proposed? The proposed New Homes Ombudsman will be a government-backed scheme. Its intended role is to support homebuyers facing problems with their newly built home, protect the interests of homebuyers, and hold developers to account when things go wrong. Government says house buyers should be confident that when they purchase a new home, they get the quality of build and finish they expected. MPs and others in the property sector have broadly welcomed the proposals. Katrine Sporle, The Property Ombudsman said: “We have always agreed that new homes should be covered by an Ombudsman, as consumers have no idea that when they buy a new home directly from a developer they will have no access to a redress scheme. This announcement will mean the housing market becomes a fairer place for all involved.” The scheme will be free for homebuyers at the point of delivery. Housebuilders would have to pay to belong to it, with the expectation that dominant builders will be required to pay proportionately more. The Government has yet to put flesh on the bones of these proposals, and says legislation will be passed requiring all new developers to belong to
a New Homes Ombudsman. However, we would anticipate that the recommendations of the APPG Report will be considered and adopted to a major extent. Though the Report has not been formally approved by MPs, its recommendations have been presented to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. The Report* explains in detail how a New Homes Ombudsman could help drive up standards in house-building and improve consumer rights. Affected homebuyers, the authors found, are “exasperated not so much by the existence of defects but rather by a builder’s failure or even refusal to put the defects right”. Notably, the most common concern for purchasers related to snagging issues. The Report’s key recommendations include: •
a New Homes Ombudsman scheme should be independent;
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it should be free to consumers;
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it should provide a quick resolution to disputes, within prescribed time limits;
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with the power to impose tough sanctions;
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able to make awards to consumers of up to £50,000 which should be made public;
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power to reverse a sale in extreme situations, and
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a minimum standard should be set for compliance inspections by government
Government has not indicated how long a period such a scheme could be accessed by new home buyers, but the APPG suggests it should cover the first two years following the sale, when the builder is still liable to the buyer for property defects. However, this has been criticised as a ‘let off’ for builders. Also, the Report’s suggestion that the Ombudsman should be non-statutory has also been criticised. As Eddie Hughes MP, says: “All purchasers of new homes in this country should be confident they are buying a high-quality product, no matter who built it or where they are in the country.” So what’s next? Government will now be working with consumers and industry to develop the proposals, but no timescale has yet been mooted.
* APPG Report Better Redress for Homebuyers
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Taking the headache out of property transactions for 35 years
Call: +44(0)207 160 8100 Email: info@firsttitle.co.uk Visit: www.firsttitle.co.uk First Title Insurance plc is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. First Title Insurance plc is registered in England under company number 01112603. Registered office: ECA Court, 24-26 South Park, Sevenoaks, Kent, TN13 1DU.
Leading Title Insurance
FIRST COMMENT
Product Focus:
Developers’ Indemnity Policy Background The insured approached First Title in connection with the purchase of two industrial facilities. Whilst there had been much speculation in the press in relation to what the site should be used for in the future, the insured was seeking to obtain planning permission for the site to redevelop it for residential and / or commercial purposes with ancillary infrastructure and amenity areas.
Challenge The development site proved challenging for both the insured and First Title. It is situated near a world heritage site and furthermore, due to the historical nature of the site being acquired over time, it is burdened with multiple risks. As a relevant planning permission had not yet been obtained, the insured needed a policy that would be wide enough to deal with a change of planning use for the development site in the Council’s Local Plan. The insured was concerned that ultimately the land would be transferred to a number of national house builders or companies that would purchase the site in phases but a risk could be enforced by a third party before planning had been granted by the Council. This development site was subject to a number of risks including but not limited to: mines and mineral exceptions on title, unknown freehold covenants (protective
entry), freehold restrictive covenants, rights and reservations pursuant to several historical conveyances and issues relating to lack of vehicular and pedestrian access.
Solution The Developers’ Indemnity Policy is designed to assist clients where they need to manage development costs at the pre-planning stage against the risks associated with the site. The policy minimises risk exposure which could ensure that the insured does not lose support from funders and option holders before planning has been granted. First Title in this case were able to offer cover for all the risks mentioned above during Stage 1 (preplanning) for a percentage of the full premium. The insured was extremely pleased with this approach as they were unclear what planning permission would eventually be obtained but needed to satisfy their board members that insurance covered off the risks that could affect potential use. Provided the insured pays the Stage 2 premium once planning has been granted, First Title’s cover from commencement is seamless. By establishing a clear and structured relationship between the insured and First Title from an early stage of a development project, insured and insurer can work together effectively. Consider a Developers’ Indemnity Policy to assist your transaction and discuss your specific requirements with an experienced underwriter in our team.
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To find out more about our products and services email info@firsttitle.co.uk or call +44 (0)20 7160 8100
www.firsttitle.co.uk
First Title Insurance plc is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. First Title Insurance plc is registered in England under company number 01112603. Registered office: First Title Insurance plc, ECA Court, 24-26 South Park, Sevenoaks, Kent TN13 1DU.