Felsted - The Cromwellian (Issue 6, 2019)

The Cromwellian Issue 6

June 2019

THE CROMWELLIANISSUE 6 JUNE 2019

Together we are team history…

1 | Page

CONTENTS PAGE PP3-4- inspirational introductory comments by Mr Pathak.

PP4-6- Dr Strange explains what a ‘real’ historian does…

PP6-14- Alex Bunn explores why the Nazi regime was defeated in World War Two. PP 14-15- Mr Pathak shares some great History books that he has read over the past year…

PP16- 17- Mr Pathak shares some advice about how to get the most out of Sixth Form History and Politics…

PP18-24- Olga Adhikari analyses an event that has perhaps done more than any other to shape the modern Middle East.

P25-33- Peter Hipkin’s 2018 Robson Prize essay prize entry evaluates the decline and fall of the British Empire.

PP34-35- Mr Pathak’s awesome summer quiz

EDITORIAL 2 | Page

As another academic year draws to a close, Mr Pathak offers a few musings on matters historical…

It sometimes seems to me that we are all prisoners of history. Whether we like it not, the past can cast a heavy shadow over the present. To watch the British political elite trying to make sense of Brexit over the last year has been excruciating at times- particularly, because so many of our politicians seem insistent about linking our current travails back to World War Two, and by doing so they are arguably mis-using the past. I would prefer to leave this particular field to the experts like ‘Professor’ Alex Bunn ( see pp 6-14 ) and of course, those still alive who experienced this cataclysmic conflict. A few weeks ago, I was pleased to see the media giving due weight to the memories and recollections of Normandy veterans. Unfortunately, they will not be with us for too much longer and we should listen to what they have to say whilst we still can. Returning to my main point, in my humble opinion, May, Corbyn et al have been engaged in a futile task over the last three years. Politicians of left and right have rather glibly promised a neat solution to a complex historical knot, the strands of which have been knitted together over centuries. After all, the English are embroiled in a psycho-drama over their place in Europe, which to name but a few case studies, has encompassed Julius Caesar’s jaunt, Saxon and Viking incursions, the Norman Conquest, Dutch and German-speaking monarchs, the Reformation, the Spanish Armada, and Napoleon’s and Hitler’s dreams of invasion. According to your political and historical tastes one can either see the European Continent as source of support and inspiration or as harbouring dangerous threats to our security, but either way it is perhaps naïve to assume that this particular Gordian knot can be severed quickly and easily.

That canniest of statesmen, Bismarck, probably got it right when he downplayed the ability of leaders to shape their political and historical destinies, arguing that ‘we cannot create the current of events, [we] can only float with it and steer.’ Thus, prisoners of history we remain, unless of course you happen to believe that all of the above is nonsense and that the great man or woman can always overcome broader historical trends and patterns and shape a nation’s destiny. That is a judgement for you to arrive at in your own time but in the meantime I would like to extend my thanks to Ms Scofield, Mr Maude-Barker and Dr Strange for their hard work on behalf of the Department this year and I would also like to wish the Upper Sixth ‘Team History’ legends of 2019 every happiness in the future, as they embrace life beyond the Reekie Building. In Riche, Cromwell and Armistead, we shall continue to be happy 3 | Page

prisoners of the past. Continuity rather than change will almost certainly be our watchword and as in many previous years I plan to spend much of 2020 eating satsumas and reading History books. I may even up-date a work book or two if I am feeling particularly daring. Free John Lambert!

WHAT DO REAL HISTORIANS DO ?

We are lucky enough to have a ‘real’ historian in the History Department and fresh from the publication of his article in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Dr Strange explains where his th research on 19 century US history will take him next…

Over the summer, I will be delivering a paper at a conference held at the University of East Anglia. The conference is called “Religion in American Life” and is designed to examine how religion has, not just shaped the history of the United States, but also continues to impact on American society today.

Conferences such as these are an opportunity for academics from institutions throughout the world to meet and discuss their research, and, in so doing, further their understanding of the subject. This conference will include papers not just on the history of religion in the United States, but also look at how it continues to affect topics such as politics, gender, race, class, and a variety of other issues.

My paper is titled ‘“Is it because they give you money?”: Ministers, Slaveholders, and Proslavery Theology in the Antebellum South’, and examines the role religion played in American slavery. Religion occupies a complicated position in American slavery, in that it was simultaneously used to justify and resist the institution. White ministers and slaveholders used passages from the Bible that focused on obedience to argue that slaves should be obedient to their masters, just as Christians are obedient to God. Slaves, however, looked at passages such as Moses leading the slaves out of Egypt to argue that God would eventually deliver them out of bondage and into freedom.

I will be looking at the relationship between white ministers and slaveholders, and how they wanted to use religion to ensure that slaves remained obedient.

Historians have previously argued that slaveholders wanted to be seen as 4 | Page

father figures to their slaves, and, in that role, respected white ministers actively sought their assistance in controlling their slaves. I argue, however, that slaveholders saw white ministers as a means to an end. The primary concern of slaveholders was making money, and keeping slaves docile was crucial in preventing them from rebelling. Due to this control, white ministers found themselves in a difficult position. Although they had mostly reconciled themselves to the idea of slavery, they did occasionally baulk at justifying the punishments masters inflicted on their slaves. To criticise a slaveholder, however, was extremely difficult, as these wealthy individuals had almost total control over social and political life within the slave states. White ministers also knew that their salary relied heavily on the donations of slaveholders; if ministers criticised slaveholders, they could potentially lose their positions.

The fact that ministers relied on slaveholders is highlighted in the title of my paper. The quote comes from a note that a slave added onto the bottom of a letter sent to a white minister in 1821. In the note, the slave comments that, whenever the minister preaches, he faces his white congregants and always keeps his back to the slaves. The slave then asks whether the reason for that is “because they give you money”? Slaves were fully aware that white ministers were in league with slaveholders in preaching a gospel of obedience and frequently rejected it, turning instead to their own form of Christianity, a fusion of African and white Christian traditions that can still be seen in the African American Baptist and Methodist services today.

Writing a conference paper like this requires a considerable amount of research. It builds on work I have previously done in the United States, spending weeks digging around in archives to find letters, diaries, and other primary sources from slaves, slaveholders, and white ministers. I also need to examine the work of other historians, to see how their arguments compare to mine, whether I agree with them, and whether they’ve raised some points that I haven’t considered. Reading through all the books and articles is a challenge but if I don’t do it, I run the risk of overlooking a historian who’s made a good argument that I need to engage with. This means that I will be spending a few days in the British Library with a stack of books, a pad of paper, and a pencil (you can’t use a pen in the reading rooms in case the books get accidentally

5 | Page

marked!) But then again, the idea of spending an entire day reading is something I always look forward to!

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE FAILURE OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA THE MUST CRUCIAL FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF WORLD WAR TWO ?

One of our foremost military history gurus, Alex Bunn gives a scholarly overview of a fascinating topic, inviting us to place greater emphasis on the Eastern Front as the crucial theatre of war…

The event in World War Two that many accredit for the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany was the loss at Stalingrad and the loss of the Sixth Army. This is sometimes used rather casually by historians as a turning point due to its almost legendary status; however, other historians point to earlier and less popularized events as the decisive moment that the tide turned against the German Forces. Although Stalingrad is often perceived as the first example of this shift in focus away from Germany having the initiative, earlier events that historians attribute to Germany's defeat include the failure to take Moscow in Operation Barbarossa and the failure to defeat Britain in 1940. On the other hand, it is argued by some historians that it was in fact a later event that sealed the Reich’s fate such as the collapse of Army Group Centre in Operation Bagration in 1944 or the D-Day landings by the Western Allies, but others may point to factors beyond the battlefield such as overstretched supply lines, poor military leadership and the outstripping of Germany's industrial production capabilities.

One factor that is substantially evidenced as a major factor in contributing to the eventual loss of World War Two by Germany, was its failure to knock out the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. When Operation Barbarossa began on June 22nd 1941 the German High Command was expecting a ‘Blitzkrieg’ or ‘Lightning war’ that would defeat the Soviet Union in six weeks.

Hitler himself was very confident of this and said of the Soviet Union that: ‘all you have to do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will crumble to the ground’. When the invasion began, the war was going smoothly for the Germans with them taking large amounts of Red Army prisoners, for example taking 650,000 POWs at Bryansk and Vyasma. However, after initial success the Wehrmacht began to get bogged down and in early August, Army Group Centre was forced to stop as Hitler ordered its armoured components to assist in capturing Ukraine instead of pushing on towards Moscow. The historian Victor 6 | Page

Suvorov argues that ‘once Germany turned its armies south towards Ukraine and stalled the offensive against Moscow the war was pretty much lost’. This argument of Suvorov’s assumes that the time lost for Army Group Centre prevented the capture of Moscow. The valuable window of time was thus eclipsed in which such an operation could have seen a high chance of success.

This argument is strongly evidenced by the fact that when Army Group Centre did eventually attack Moscow in October it failed due to the severe Russian winter of 1941. It also allowed the Soviets to prepare their defences thoroughly. Germany's failure to cause a collapse of the Soviet Union during the initial phase of the war in Operation Barbarossa, can be viewed as a major factor as to why Germany lost the war, corroborated by historians such as Suvorov. Whilst this was a crucial phase of the war that impeded Germany immensely, we may have to look away from the battlefields and towards the belligerent nations themselves.

Many historians argue that it was the industrial production capabilities of the Allies that vastly outstripped the Axis powers as being the key factor which turned the tide of war against Germany. During the conflict Germany steadily lost out in the war of productive capability by making several cataclysmic decisions such as declaring war on the United States of America, not retaining productive efficiency by constantly switching equipment and by driving women out of the workforce. Germany's decision to declare war on the U.S.A had extremely adverse effects for the Reich concerning their industrial production. The U.S.A was soon able to vastly outstrip Germany’s production capability. Some historians argue that Germany was already beaten once it was unable to keep up with the industrial output of the combined allied forces.

This leads on to the question of whether it was the production capability of Germany that lost it the war, or whether it was due to Germany's foolhardy declaration of war against the U.S.A. The historian Klaus P. Fischer said on the matter that ‘a major (and perhaps the prime) cause of [Hitler's] defeat was the power of the United States’ and this threat of American production power was arguably present long before an actual declaration of war. In fact, many historians believe that Hitler considered Germany at war with the U.S.A long before the official declaration. The historian Stephen Tempest says ‘the German opinion was that a formal declaration of war on the U.S.A wouldn't actually make much difference: the Americans were already their enemies for all practical purposes.’ U.S ships were already transporting convoys, had had engagements with German U-boats, were supplying Allied nations with Lend Lease goods and, after the summer of 1941, were also providing equipment to the Soviet Union. Therefore, one could argue that there is a vast array of evidence suggesting that the entrance of the U.S.A and the consequential 7 | Page

involvement of the full might of U.S industrial power is a prime cause for the eventual defeat of Germany in World War Two. However, wars are not won by equipment alone, and therefore industrial production capability cannot solely be attributed to bringing down the Third Reich.

In fact, one of the primary causes for Germany's defeat is often attributed to its inferior supply of manpower compared to the Soviet Union. Germany only had numerical superiority during the initial phase of conflict with the Soviet Union, i.e. in Operation Barbarossa. The failure of Operation Barbarossa allowed the Soviets to remobilize, thus losing Germany their numerical superiority, which could be argued as a potential factor in its eventual loss of World War Two. The German General Franz Halder said that ‘the Russian colossus...has been underestimated by us...whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen.’ The fact that the Soviet Union was able to draw on superior manpower pools, conscripting 29,574,900 men purely from their own state compared to the German Reich who conscripted 18,200,000 men from all over Germany and their occupied territories, as well as conscripting Soviet P.O.W.S who wanted to fight against the U.S.S.R, shows that the Soviets were much more able and willing to take large amounts of casualties in order to win a war of attrition against Germany, as evidenced by the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, one could argue that the most significant factor that ultimately led to Germany's defeat was its inability to match the manpower of the Soviet Union.

As well as facing the problems of the Soviet Union's superior manpower during the Russian Campaign, Germany also faced the geographical and meteorological problems of the vast lands of the USSR. During the initial offensive, the combined Axis forces advanced around seven hundred miles along a front expanding to eighteen hundred miles wide. This created horrendous supply problems which were exacerbated by the severe winter of 1941. German generals had expected a ‘Blitzkrieg’ style war and were unprepared to maintain supply lines in the long term. During the offensive the Soviets adopted a scorched earth policy which meant that the further the Axis forces advanced into Russia, the worse the issue became. By the winter of 1941 supply to German troops fighting the Soviet Union had slowed to a crawl due to bottlenecks on the railways in Poland and destroyed infrastructure in the USSR. In Albert Speer's biography he remarks that during the winter of 1941, ‘German forces were pushed back by a major Russian counter-attack near Moscow. With supply lines badly over-stretched—and temperatures of -34C (-29F) and below making German equipment nearly useless—even Adolf Hitler himself begins to realize that he has horribly underestimated Soviet strength.’

As well as evidencing the fact that supply lines were a major issue on the 8 | Page

Eastern Front, Albert Speer also describes how the low temperatures impacted the Barbarossa Offensive. The historian Andrew Roberts says that the reason German troops were so adversely affected was because Hitler, ‘believing himself to be as much an expert in meteorology as in everything else, Hitler, a world-class know-all, went on to state that "weather prediction is not a science that can be learnt mechanically. What we need are men gifted with a sixth sense, who live in nature and with nature – whether or not they know anything about isotherms and isobars. As a rule, obviously, these men are not particularly suited to the wearing of uniforms. One of them will have a humped back, another will be bandy-legged, a third paralytic. Similarly, one doesn't expect them to live like bureaucrats.’ This attitude of Hitler's meant that many soldiers died due to the cold, which in the winter of 1941 fell to -35C. The fact that so many soldiers died can be seen as a valid reason why the offensive ultimately failed. Furthermore, the Russian winter also rendered much of the German equipment useless; this subsequently affected supply as many transport vehicles were put out of action. It can therefore be argued that the evidence corroborated by historians, concerning the geographical and meteorological problems which the Germans faced during the offensive, was a defining factor in the eventual loss of the war with Russia and therefore of World War Two in general.

Dealing with supply issues was an incredible challenge for the Germans in the East on its own, but the problem became even worse once partisan movements were factored in. Partisan Movements are often overlooked in the history books and their importance in defeating the Axis powers is often neglected. The impact of these partisan movements was arguably extremely significant. During World War Two the Wehrmacht needed thousands of tons of supplies every day. The problem the Germans had in the Soviet Union was that, whilst they made headlong advances in the opening phases of the war, they neglected to leave sufficient troops behind to establish control of the ground they took. This meant that, behind German lines, by the end of 1941, 90,000 Soviet Partisans were disrupting supply lines almost without opposition.

Corporal Gran, a member of the German 445th Infantry Regiment, said of the partisan problem: ‘so far we have managed to reach Minsk. Our motor column had to make six stops owing to damaged bridges and four times we were stopped by enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. The stop between Slinim and Baranovichi was particularly long for we were ordered to repair a big bridge there, which had been destroyed by the guerillas about two hours before our arrival… We did not stop fighting these invisible men until we got to the front.’

The fact that German forces were having to battle through this onslaught to even reach the front shows that they were already disadvantaged long before 9 | Page

they entered battle. Such dire conditions lowered German morale and destroyed German infrastructure and German supply lines.

Perhaps though, in order to find an individual turning point in the war there should be a shift away from looking solely at the problems the Germans faced on the Eastern Front, to a serious miscalculation that happened before the war with the Soviet Union even began: the failure of the German Army and Air Force to force Britain out of the War in 1940. This failure can stem from Germany's inability to prevent the British Expeditionary Force escaping from Dunkirk, up to their eventual loss of the Battle of Britain in October 1940.

Germany was also forced to divert resources away from its ultimate struggle, which was the fight for Russia. The fact that Britain remained in the war meant that German forces had to remain in Western Europe and occupy the countries which they had invaded by 1941. This resulted in desperately needed men being unavailable to fight on the Eastern Front. This problem became more apparent as the war went on. From 1943 onwards, only around 60% of the Wehrmacht were in the East due to garrison duties in the Balkans, Italy, France, Benelux and the Scandinavian Countries. Germany's inability to gain an armistice with Britain was ultimately extremely detrimental. Britain could be compared to an untreated wound; at first it seemed a small problem and was more of an annoyance than anything else, but, as time went on, the wound became infected and grew larger, it became a serious hindrance in the German pursuit of ‘Endsieg’, or ultimate victory in the East. Later in the war, Britain would provide a springboard for allied forces to enter Europe, and the success of that leap could also be argued to be a major factor as to why Germany ultimately lost the war.

This springboard became a reality with the Normandy Landings of 1944.

Though popularised in Western media as the defining event where Europe was liberated and Germany was swept aside by American Forces, D-Day is often given too much significance for its actual involvement as a defining turning point in the war against Germany. D-Day occurred on June 6th 1944 at a very late point in World War Two. By the year 1944 one could argue that German military power had already been broken by the Red Army and many Russians certainly question the significance that D-Day is given. By 1944 it has been argued by historians that perhaps it was just a case of when, rather than if, the final defeat of Nazism would take place. The idea of D-Day being such a significant event in British and American history is summed up best by Winston Churchill when he says that ‘History is written by the Victors’, but this time there were a number of winners, each with their own narrative.

10 | Page

Even though, by 1944, the well-evidenced idea that the war was already lost for Germany is compelling, it could be argued that events which shortened the war prevented a possible revival of Germany's fortunes by stopping them from creating their ‘WunderWaffes’, or super weapons. Operation Bagration, which occurred just after D-Day on the Eastern Front, was pivotal as it shortened the war by several months or even a year. The offensive, according to the historian C. Peter Chen, was crucial because it resulted in the destruction of ‘Army Group Centre which was completely wiped out’. He says ‘the German forces not only suffered a major defeat, but without Byelorussia the supply lines to Army Group North were also lost thus the Soviet Union regained large amounts of territory and arguably shortened the war.’ However, whilst this offensive did shorten the war, the theses of various historians such as Dr. Robert Citino, who in his lecture argues that even by 1943 Germany was fighting a lost war, shows that Operation Bagration was an offensive that occurred too late in the war to significantly impact the end result.

But why is Germany said to have already lost the war by the end of 1943? This is perhaps due to two defining battles in that year. Perhaps the most widely held view amongst historians that one encounters whilst researching this topic, was that the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 was the decisive battle that rendered Germany unable to win. The historian Robert Dallek said this of Stalingrad: ‘It was the decisive defeat of Nazi arms in Russia that finally allowed people to say that this is not an invincible force and it can be overcome.’ Dallek is arguing that the moral and psychological effect of a Soviet victory at Stalingrad allowed everyone to see that Germany was able to be decisively beaten. In fact it is often theorized that if such a monumental disaster as the Battle of Stalingrad had not occurred for the Germans and they had taken the city early on without facing a war of attrition with the Soviets, then the war could have been prolonged substantially. The loss of Stalingrad was not just a psychological defeat for Germany but also a material loss of manpower and equipment that Germany was unable to replace. The 600,000 men, 1,500 tanks and 900 planes lost was a disaster for Germany, and was made much worse by the fact that Soviet industry by this point was vastly outstripping German industry. The historian Max Hastings says that, ‘once the Germans had been thrown back from Stalingrad, once they’d lost that battle, the war was never the same again’: certainly, German forces never advanced so far into Russia again.

Stalingrad is, according to Max Hastings, ‘the last attempt by Germany to win the ideological war against Stalin by fighting for a city of his namesake’. The loss of this battle by Germany was undoubtedly a massive propaganda gift for the Soviet Union and showed the world that Germany could be decisively beaten.

However, other historians accredit the reversal of Germany's fortunes to a second and perhaps much more important battle that occurred in the summer 11 | Page

of 1943. This was the Battle of Kursk. The historian Natalya Ovcharova, curator of Prokhorovka Museum, says: ‘the Battle of Kursk on the 12th July was a turning point in WWII for Germany…Some even believe that the Battle of Prokhorovka (Kursk) started the retreat of the Germans which ended in Berlin.’

Kursk was the last major German offensive of the war and it was one in which they were ground down to a stalemate by Russian forces. German forces lost 2,000 tanks as well as many men and other equipment. Perhaps what was most grievous for the Germans was the loss of the initiative. With the Germans being fought to a tactical stalemate by the Red Army, the initiative switched from Germany to the Soviet Union. After Kursk the German forces were faced with defeat after defeat and never really regained their footing. By this point in the war, the Germans were unable to replace the equipment and manpower that they were losing. The USSR was more than willing to engage in a severe war of attrition as they knew that they would be able to win. It can therefore be argued by historians such as Ovcharova that Kursk was a major strategic victory for Russia and ultimately, as the battle lost Germany the initiative, it can be evidenced as a defining factor as to why Germany lost the war.

On an entirely different level, one could argue that the war was lost before it even began and this was due to the ideological beliefs that Hitler held and implemented through his policies in the war. This war was a very different one from World War One and was, in essence, an exercise in genocide against what Nazi Ideology called the ‘untermenschen’ or subhumans. These ‘subhumans’ were European Jews and the Eastern Slavic population of Russia and, ironically, the people that Nazi-policy sought to exterminate may in fact have been their key to victory. It is often theorized that, had Hitler in fact rallied support for his cause among Baltic and Ukrainian peoples, the former of which had just been annexed and the latter of which had been subjected to repressive policies by the Soviet Government, he may have been able to prevent the partisan problem and would have had many new conscripts. But the fact is this was ideologically impossible. In this quote from one of Adolf Hitler's speeches, the incompatibility of this idea with existing Nazi ideology is most compellingly presented. Hitler said: ‘it [the Soviet Union] is truly a state in which the whole national intelligentsia has been slaughtered, and where only spiritless, forcibly proletarianized subhumans remain.’ This kind of thinking can be seen as influencing the numerous partisan groups previously discussed that sprang up; and may also explain part of the reason why Soviet troops were so determined not to surrender to Germany. The infamous Commissar Order, which ordered the categoric murder of any Soviet political commissars or crucially any soldier ‘who was thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist ideology’ meant that, after the war started, many Soviet soldiers did not want to surrender for fear of their treatment, meaning that often troops would fight 12 | Page

fiercely to the death. Soviet soldiers were right to fear surrendering to the Germans, as Soviet P.O.W.S were often treated incredibly badly with over 300,000 already dying by the end of 1941. Therefore, Nazi ideology during the war is often accredited by historians who believe it to be critical in turning popular opinion in the East against Germany. Ultimately, Nazi ideological beliefs turned what may have been a force for Germany against it and into a force for the Soviet Union. Its defeat can therefore be argued to be caused by prevailing National Socialist beliefs and policies.

In conclusion, it seems that there are two main factors or points of the war which are most strongly corroborated by evidence and historians as being the defining turning point of the war. The first of these points is the various factors which occurred due to Hitler's war with the Soviet Union. The Eastern Front, or more specifically the events or factors which occurred due to that conflict, can ultimately be seen as a major factor in bringing the Nazi regime down. This was due to the sheer size and magnitude of that front as well as the amount of fighting that occurred there. The initial failure to seize Moscow during Operation Barbarossa and therefore succeed in a ‘Blitzkrieg’ war was the turning point or at least started the inevitable shift. The subsequent supply issues, partisan problems and the beginning of Soviet mobilization caused by the failure of a quick war further shifted the balance. The die were almost certainly cast by the time of Stalingrad and Kursk. But perhaps one could argue that it was in fact American entry into the war that was the turning point. The American entrance into the war saw the Allies become immensely more powerful and their production capabilities increase enormously. The Americans’ involvement meant that huge Lend Lease programs for the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union occurred, meaning that both countries were able to recuperate from their losses to a much greater extent than Germany. As well as this, American entrance into the war resulted in U.S. mobilization and meant that, by 1944, it was ready for action. D-Day saw the Americans and British create a second front in north-west Europe, in addition to the Italian front, and ultimately made things much more difficult for Germany. In addition, Allied bombing campaigns in Germany had an impact on German society and caused a drop in morale. However, in conclusion, to answer the question, the defining factor, most corroborated by historical evidence, is Germany’s conflict with the Soviet Union. Even after American entry, the war was won by the ability of the Soviet Union to grind down Germany from 1941 to 1945.

Therefore, without Soviet involvement, World War Two would most likely have become a stalemate between the Allies and Axis, thus indicating that this is the defining factor which eventually brought Hitler down.

13 | Page

THE BEST HISTORY BOOKS THAT MR PATHAK HAS READ OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS Mr Pathak has spent much of the last year sitting on the battlements atop the West Wing of Pathak Towers, reading great History books. Here are some eclectic recommendations that might be especially thought-provoking for those of you considering History at university. Remember few things impress a History tutor more than evidence of having read widely…

Napoleon- A Life ( 2018 ) by Adam Zamoyksi Unlike other biographies of Napoleon, Zamoyski’s book focuses less on the French emperor’s military exploits which have been chronicled exhaustively elsewhere, and instead Zamoyksi delves deep into the complexities of Napoleon’s personality. What emerges is not the ‘Corsican ogre’ of legend but a surprisingly insecure and uncertain figure who fell into the trap of believing his own propaganda. I found the account of his final years on St Helena to be genuinely poignant and having finished the book, I wonder if for all his flaws history might have taken a happier course if he had remained master of Europe?

Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era ( 1990 ) by James M Mcpherson This is the best History book I have read over the last year. At a mere 862 pages it took some wading through but over the course of several months I was able to thoroughly immerse myself in a period of American history about which I had previously known relatively little. Another benefit of such a long book is that McPherson, an eminent academic at Princeton University, is able to explore the personalities and careers of key figures such as Lincoln, Davis, Lee and Grant, in real depth. I am also full of admiration for his even-handed approach and the way in which he sets the war in its broader political, social and economic context.

The Great Moghuls ( 1971 ) by Bamber Gascoigne I came across this book whilst getting ready to teach the Mughal era as an IB Higher Level topic and I would recommend this book to any student as a starting point for getting to grips with this particular period of Indian history.

The author, a former presenter of University Challenge, provides a clear but

14 | Page

scholarly introduction to a fascinating topic and his pen portraits of Babur and his successors really are illuminating.

Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-18 ( 2015 ) by Alexander Watson This excellent book by a British academic and ‘rising star’ has been garlanded with many awards. What marks this book out is the way in which it approaches a conflict with which we are familiar from a different perspective. For instance, before I picked up this book I knew relatively little about how Austro-Hungarian society coped with the traumas of the ‘Great War’, a topic that Watson explores in real depth. I also found out about other ‘golden nuggets’ I had not come across previously, such as the ‘singing war’ of 28th July 1914…

Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee ( 2017 ) by John Bew Having finished this book by a leading historian at King’s College, I am firmly of the belief that Attlee was one of our greatest prime-ministers. Dismissed by his detractors as dull and uninspiring he comes across in Bew’s biography as a man of hidden depths and great fortitude. I particularly enjoyed the stylistic device adopted by Bew, of starting each chapter with a reference to what Attlee was reading at particular moments in his life. Thus, we get an insight into Attlee’s intellectual hinterland and Bew also includes a preface that looks at the relevance of Attlee’s career to Corbyn’s Labour Party.

TRAPS TO AVOID IN THE 6TH FORM… Unfortunately, there is sometimes a minority students who do not make the most of the many opportunities on offer in the Reekie Building. By avoiding some of the clichés, stereotypes and traps below, you can maximise your chances of success; and of course, if you see signs of the behaviour patterns below in your friends and peers, please advise them that they are on the wrong path!

‘I can take my foot off the gas in the Lower Sixth and just cram at the end…’: just occasionally, this approach may work for a capable student at GCSE but teachers warn against it with good reason and it is huge pitfall in the Sixth Form. Remember that Sixth Form study- especially the 2nd year of the A Level and IB course- is more challenging and complex than GCSE study. Working hard for a month at the end of the course is therefore not really a viable option and

15 | Page

can be hugely stressful. After all, the mountain of knowledge is best ascended slowly and steadily, one step at a time…

‘Prep takes place every evening from 7pm…’: viewing ‘prep’ as something that happens in thirty minute ‘chunks’ every evening may have worked in Year 9, but you are a Sixth Form Team History legend now! You should be willing to work on an assignment at key points in the day when you are not in lessons, and these key points could be in the morning and afternoon, as well as the evening. Also, it is a sign of academic maturity that you are willing to read around the subject ( not just relying on Google…) and to work on a task until it is completed to the best of your ability.

‘I can write two essays in one evening…’: this is theoretically possible but will usually result in academic underperformance. It will almost inevitably lead to rushed work and cutting significant corners by not completing preparatory reading or a plan. If you have been given two weeks for an assignment, try and break the task down over a number of days, rather than leaving everything to the last minute…

‘I will be missing out on something if I don’t check my phone every five minutes’: civilisation will not come to an end if you fail to check your social media updates every five minutes. Phones can be hugely distracting so try and confine your use to set times of the day and remember that for Mr Pathak a quill is advanced technology…

‘There’s no point in doing the extra things my teacher suggests. Some of them don’t really relate to the syllabus and I am just interested in passing my exams’: this sort of approach confines you narrowly to the syllabus when History and Politics in the Sixth Form are so much more than this! It may be that your teachers are trying to widen your intellectual horizons in preparation for university and if you just ‘jump through the hoops’ will you really be able to discuss your academic interests in the depth required by a UCAS Personal Statement?

‘I am the class joker’: there is a time and a place for humour in the classroom but Sixth Form study is generally a serious business, so approach your studies in a mature fashion; and part of this is judging what is appropriate in a particular context. Very few people- either students or teachers- will thank you in the long run for disrupting their lessons with what you regard as witty repartee…

16 | Page

‘I am just here to study/ play sport/ play music/ act etc’: just as we would always say that to get the most out of Felsted life in the Sixth Form it is important to take full advantage of the many co-curricular and sporting opportunities that are on offer, the opposite is also true. You must remember that academic study must be your main priority. Whatever your post-Felsted plans they will almost certainly be reliant on achieving good grades.

‘I have loads of spares’: don’t view times in the day when you don’t have lessons as ‘spare’ time. It is not. It is to be used for independent study and if you don’t use this time wisely, you will be giving yourself too much to do each evening.

‘I missed a lesson but so what?’: if you miss a lesson, it is your responsibility to catch up- this is independent learning in practice and your teachers will often point you towards lesson resources and materials that you can work through on your own. Waiting until the end of the course in the Upper Sixth and then asking for extra lessons is not the way forward…

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM A PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION? A true IB History legend, Olga Adhikari- in typically scholarly fashion- analyses the complex causes of an event which perhaps more than any other has shaped the modern Middle East…

According to Val Moghadam, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 should be split into two parallel revolutions - the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian Revolution. As the Revolution had a unique multi and cross-class nature, it is plausible to put forward the assumption that not all participants in the Revolution were driven by religious ideology. Furthermore, when one takes into account the political context of the period leading up to 1979, it becomes apparent that the authoritarian regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi contributed to creating conditions in which a revolution would occur. Therefore, it can be said that political factors were equally important as religious factors in bringing around the Revolution if one is to assume the revolution as having branched causes.

What can be viewed as a main political cause of the Iranian Revolution is the authoritarian nature of the Mohammed Reza Shah’s period of rule (1941-1979) 17 | Page

which can be said to be composed of repressive approaches of national administration and the effective abolition of democracy and parliamentarianism in Iran. Primarily, the Iranian people rose against the Shah as he was an unpopular leader who was seen to be illegitimate. From the perspective of Twelver Shiite Iranians, the rule of the Shah was not in accordance with Velayat-e Faqih, a concept advanced by Khomeini in a series of speeches delivered in Najaf between January and February 1970. According to the theory, absolute power was to be granted to the faqih in the absence of the divine twelfth imam. Therefore, one would have the basis to denounce the Shah on accounts of the breach of Shi’a law. Another source of perceived illegitimacy of the Shah is the fashion of his restoration to power in 1953 through a CIA-backed coup which deposed the elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh. The removal of Mossadegh from power by foreign forces symbolised the end of democracy in Iran through the ushering in of the second Pahlavi dictatorship as well the enforcement of the belief that ‘most events (...) were (...) manipulated by foreigners’. The coup of 1953 especially contributed to the unpopularity of the Shah.

The Shah, on top of his unpopularity amongst Iranians who did not directly profit from his rule, ruled through repressive measures. The manner in which the Shah conducted his rule can be explained, but not justified, by the legacy left behind by Reza Shah and the negative experiences the Shah encountered as a ruler. In Shah of Shahs, Kapuściński puts under scrutiny a photograph of Reza Shah Pahlavi with his children and analyses the relationship between Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah, tensions present already at a young age.

While Kapuściński writes in a style bordering between literary fantasy and reportage, the point he makes that ‘when he [Mohammed Reza] became Shah many years later, he automatically (...) repeated Daddy’s behavior and (..) toward the end of his reign, invoked his father’s authority,’ conveys a certain sense of passiveness and desperation of character of the Shah which had a significant influence on his style of rule. This, in combination with multiple unsuccessful assassination attempts, such as the one in 1949, can be seen as reason behind his dissonance from Iranian reality and the subsequent failure of various plans and policies. Additionally, what can be sensed from a 1973 interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, is that the Shah believed in the righteousness of his authoritarianism and would stop at nothing to reform Iran; 18 | Page

however, he also quite harshly criticised what is widely seen as coming with progress - democracy. It can be said that to an extent the Shah truly wished to improve conditions in Iran. However, his dissonance from the needs and demands of the Iranian people prevented him from achieving exactly that.

While Val Moghadam puts forward the thesis that two parallel revolutions occurred simultaneously in Iran, the involvement of the Islamic clergy and Shiite ideology is inextricable from the 1979 Revolution itself. It is important to consider fundamentalist ideology in conjunction with a number of other socio-religious factors, namely the shifting role of the Islamic clergy in Pahlavi society, the effects of the Shah’s secularising reforms on the ulema, and the organisational function that the clergy played in the lead up to the revolution as opposed to the ideology in isolation. Consequently, the argument put forward emphasises the significance of the clergy’s enabling role in regards to the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah in 1979.

The contribution of the Shi’a ulema to the Iranian Revolution was able to occur owing to their traditional position in Iranian society as a highly regarded moral and ideological authority. Initially, the ulema’s main role in society was the provision of religious legitimacy for the Safavid rulers of Iran (1501-1736) in exchange for “economic and ideological power for the ulema”. As a result, for centuries under the Safavids the ulema were able to hold a position of prestige in society, preside over courts and education, control religious taxes, as well as hold large areas of waqf properties which enabled their financial independence from the rulers of Iran. However, in cases where the ulema’s sovereignty and power was not acknowledged, it is visible that the ulema would involve themselves in politics out of self-interest and a fear of loss of influence. For instance, Amjad describes the participation of the ulema in the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11), as being driven by their “monopolisation of the movement and increasing their role in the political process” - in this case, the ulema, at least a large faction of it, engaged in the fight for constitutional monarchy as their influence in Iran would be diminished under an absolute Qajar monarchy, which demonstrates the nature of their involvement in politics. In the context of the Revolution of 1979 what is crucial is the diminishing role of the ulema in Iranian society as a result of the secularising reforms of the Shah. Having discussed motives for prior political participation 19 | Page

of the ulema, it can be said that a motive for the ulema’s role in the Iranian Revolution was their diminishing power in Pahlavi society.

A main cause of the ulema’s participation in the Iranian Revolution, and its causation, was their dissatisfaction with reforms targeted at the religious superstructure of Iranian society passed during the so-called “White Revolution” (1963-79). In terms of the ulema, the policies which had the largest effect on them were the land reforms and social reforms. The Land Reform Act of 1962 focused on the redistribution of land to peasants threatened the possessions of the ulema which threatened the ulema’s income which was used to support madrasas and mosques, which contributed to ‘increased antagonism towards the regime amongst (...) the ulama’. Meanwhile, the 1963 enfranchisement of women and the 1967 Family protection law, which gave women a more equal position with marriages in terms of marriage and divorce with legal proceedings in that matter being moderated by civil courts instead of scholars of Ithnai Ashari Shi’a law as well as raising the minimum age for marriage to fifteen, challenged traditional Islamic Law. These actions undertaken by the regime directly targeted the activity of the Islamic clergy in Iran and therefore gave them a reason to participate in the revolution as they had become stripped of their socioeconomic privileges and position. The forced westernisation of Iranian society further allowed the ulema to create a common feeling of being targeted by the Shah amongst Iranians.

Often revolutions have their most basic and fundamental features overlooked; in the case of the Iranian Revolution the organisation of the Shi’a ulema is often neglected. Roger Homan especially underlines this organisational cause of the revolution as without it, there would be no way to disseminate Islamic ideology to the people. Owing to the repressiveness of the state, Islamic institutions were essentially the only autonomous organisations in Iran in the time leading up to the revolution and as a result of this autonomy were able to administer antipathetic sentiments towards the regime during the mimbar. Additionally, messages from Khomeini were distributed via tape recordings through mosques which allowed the Ayatollah’s charismatic speeches to reach the majority of Iranian society. As mosques are virtually omnipresent institutions in Iran, Islamic propaganda was distributed nationally which allowed for the news of protests and mass shootings to be disseminated accordingly and rile people 20 | Page

up to revolt. One might agree with Homan on his highlighting of the importance of the organisational role of the ulema as were a strong and sovereign threshold unavailable, the loss of the ulema and its network may have been ill-fated as an oppositional institution as was Radio Prague in 1968.

However, it can also be argued that without the organisational role of the ulema, the revolution would still have prospered under the guerilla organisations,Mojahedin-e Khalq, and Fedayeen-e Khalq who managed to radicalise the majority of the youth in urban areas by the 1970s.

The events leading up to the deposition of the Shah were highly associated with Islamic tradition; for instance, the politicisation of the martyrdom of the Imam Hossein and demonstrations against the Shah following the chronology of Islamic mourning customs starting with the mourning of the Qom Massacre, and therefore, it can be said that the revolution possessed a religious character.

Strictly in terms of ideology, the strain of ideology which developed under the Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates sought out a return to the fundamentals of Islam which in combination with the revolutionary character of Shi’ism may have contributed to the break out of the revolution. What is meant by revolutionary character is a collection of specific traits of the Shi’a strain of Islam, principally the intertwinement of religion and politics, their stubborn opposition to Sunni succession, and martyrdom in the face of the violent deaths of the imams. A phrase by the Imam Hossein encapsulates the character of Shi’ite revolutionary ideology perfectly - “death is better than life under oppressors”. Therefore, if one were to take Islamic ideology in isolation, it can be said that it had an influence on the decisions of the ulema in terms of their actions during the revolution.

What is integrated into the political and religious causes of the Iranian Revolution is the socio-economic discontent leading up to the overthrow of the Shah which manifested mainly in uneven development, the westernisation of Iranian society, and the failure of economic reform. From these causes of the revolution comes an argument for Islamic fundamentalism as a cause of the revolution; while as an ideology in isolation, it didn’t necessarily motivate the public, the exploitation of the struggles of disadvantaged social groups by the ulema can be said to have contributed to the Islamic character of the revolution. While historians taking a structural-demographic approach to the 21 | Page

Revolution focus largely on the issue of overpopulation and rapid urbanisation, one should also take into consideration the political discontent of the educated masses in urban areas, as well as the role of the ulema as a key participant and enabler of the revolution.

The failure of economic reform and the uneven economic development present in Iran at the time contributed to the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution as a result of dissent originating from clear financial and social inequalities. While Abrahamian and Axworthy both argue for positive social effects of the reforms of the White Revolution, such as the rise of the literacy rate from 26% to 42% and the expansion of health services in Iran, it can be argued that the Shah’s socio-economic reforms were successful insofar as expanding educational, health, and industrial services in urban areas while it neglected reform in rural areas. Despite the mechanisation of the agricultural sector, ‘low prices for staple foods’ and cheap imports decreased agricultural production overall which lead to high levels of rural unemployment. This can be seen as a failure of economic reform but what is more crucial is the unregulated urbanisation of cities from the increase of migration from rural to urban areas. Urban planning projects designed to accommodate rural migrants, such as the Tehran Comprehensive Plan, further failed to take into consideration social equality.

Correspondingly, the outskirts of Iranian cities became occupied by shanty towns plagued by alcoholism, crime, and other poverty-associated issues. The build-up of the urban poor served as a propaganda opportunity for the mullahs who ‘argued that moral laxity had endangered society and the only remedy was to enforce (...) religious laws.’ Therefore, it can be said that ineffective socio-economic reforms and uneven development in Iran contributed to social dissent, as well as providing a chance for the clergy to mobilise disadvantaged social groups under the banner of Islam.

An issue which concurrently gave voice to criticisms of the Shi’a clergy, scholars, and ordinary Iranians were the attempts at the modernisation and westernisation of Iran in a bid by the Shah to prove himself worthy of political respect. Brad Hanson claims that the Westoxification of Iran was ‘the most powerful socioeconomic, cultural force at work in Pahlavi Iran’ which is not to be taken lightly. The manner in which Western culture was imposed upon Iran in a variety of ways was a unifying point for many. The modernisation and 22 | Page

westernisation of Iran are linked to domestic American influence, which can be reflected by the arms trade between the U.S. and Iran as well as attempts at reforming traditional Iranian trade in favour of Western models of trade. As a result, a rallying point for revolutionaries became the interference of the U.S. in Iranian affairs; an effective tool for the unification of social classes against the Shah as the U.S. was often painted as corrupt and capitalist by left-wing movements and devoid of decency and imperialist by the ulema. Therefore, the White Revolution lead by the Shah, whose ‘dominant motivating ideology was (...) “modernism”’ failed in legitimising the rule of the Shah and modernising Iran as it attempted to do so along a Western model of development which accumulated criticism Westernisation also occurred along lines of privilege the granting of diplomatic immunity to U.S. personnel in Iran in 1964 caused a backlash in Iran, especially from Khomeini who was exiled following a speech criticising the measure. This criticism of Western culture and the apparent favouring of Americans over Iranians by the regime was further perpetuated through texts of religiously inclined authors, the best example of which is Jalal al-e Ahmad, the author of Gharbzadegi. A common theme in these texts is the comparison of Westernisation to a disease - the normalisation of such sentiments resounded with the oppressed social classes in Iranian society who had no political standing and that is how the ulema were able to exploit the anger of the masses directed at the forced, ineffective reform and align it to fundamentalist ideology through criticising the moral danger the Western way of life posed to Iran. These anti-Western sentiments which the ulema and scholars generated and exploited can be seen as having manifested through the burning of Cinema Rex in Abadan in 1978 and posters denouncing the U.S. displayed at demonstrations during the revolution. Nevertheless, the extent of the anti-Western sentiments within Iran can be disputed and better described as anti-imperialist. Marjane Satrapi’s auto-biographical graphic novel, Persepolis, portrays the young Marjane reacting against the rigour and regressive nature of the Islamic regime through listening to Western bands such as Iron Maiden and wearing Nike shoes smuggled in from Turkey. While this is a personal account of the revolution, it could be said that perhaps the anti-Western sentiments present in the revolution were an amplification of general anti-Imperialist sentiments which allowed for the relief of anger.

23 | Page

To conclude, while Islamic fundamentalism was not a principal cause of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, it was an effective method of uniting people under a common banner, as a result of the negative reaction towards modernisation and westernisation. Furthermore, in terms of religious causes, the ulema had an undeniable role in facilitating the revolution through their organisational network and position in Iranian society. However, strictly referring to the origins of the revolution, the principal cause undeniably stems from the unpopularity of the Shah and his reforms as well as the extent to which people were dissatisfied with them. It was because of this factor that social tensions began to form as a result of the lack of democracy rampant in Iran and the attack upon the traditional socio-political balance.

WHAT FACTORS FUELLED BRITISH DECOLONISATION ?

In 2018, one of Felsted’s finest historians, Peter ‘the Professor’ Hipkin, researched the decline and fall of the British Empire as part of his entry for Cambridge University’s Robson Prize.

Working independently, he read around the subject, mastered the intricacies of the topic and produced a really nuanced and well-crafted essay…

A trend in the recent historiography on decolonisation is to view the phenomenon as a piece of a bigger narrative of the breakdown of the imperial system in the context of a major structural shift in the international system.

Indeed Darwin (1991) rejects the notion that decolonisation was a “story of fifty separate chapters”1. On the contrary the central argument of this essay is that decolonisation was the culmination of decades of change in the nature of the interaction, and indeed conflict, between the colonized and the colonizer; in which international and metropolitan factors were hugely significant in accelerating developments, but were primarily determined by the interplay of nationalist movements and the decreasing inclination of the ever-dwindling pool of local collaborators to maintain imperial rule. Indeed, despite the fractured nature of many ‘nationalist’ movements in Britain’s Empire after World War Two, I would argue that decolonisation was fuelled primarily by events on the periphery of the empire. Nationalist movements provided the impetus for an accelerated process of decolonisation which was exacerbated by the external influences of international and metropolitan pressures. However, 24 | Page

the rise of nationalism on the periphery of the Empire was by no means inevitable. In many cases nationalism on the periphery arose from the incapability of the Colonial Office to appreciate local nuances in the geopolitical climate, perhaps most obviously in Malaya and the central African nations of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. However, undoubtedly metropolitan and international factors were also crucial. While the strategic value of colonial territories – particularly those in the Middle East such as Palestine and Suez - remained paramount, a vast empire became an economic burden when the unrest which stemmed from the nationalist factors on the periphery eroded the opportunity for economic exploitation. Moreover, the distinct changes in British political priorities and public opinion following World War II, specifically the implementation and ramifications of the Welfare State under Labour’s new mantra, ‘Let Us Face the Future’2 also contributed to the acceleration of decolonisation. The international context and the shifting global structures, most notably the creation of the United Nations and the escalating divisions between the two superpowers in their infancy, the USA and the USSR, also contributed significantly to the dismantling of the British Empire. However it was the contradictory actions of the USA with regards to the British Empire – ideologically opposed to the Empire but nonetheless satisfied to utilise the Empire as a buffer to the expansion of Soviet and Chinese hegemony – that weakens the international argument. Thus my view is that decolonisation was a ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon, in which it was the shifting of allegiances by the traditional power-holding elites from Colonial Office officials to nationalist movements - which gathered momentum as the metropolitan and international climates adjusted to the post-war establishment - which played the most crucial role. Indeed the notion that independence was granted from the top-down by the British seems rather outdated.

If indeed we take the view that decolonisation was a “revolt of the periphery”3; then it is important to establish that the growth of nationalism was by no means inevitable. As John Springhall notes, “the growth and influence of nationalism reflected the fact that the basis for cooperation between imperial rulers and colonial ruled had ceased to exist”4. Therefore the argument that nationalism primarily fuelled British decolonisation must be examined as part of the wider peripheral context; specifically that it was the erosion of the pool of collaborative elites within the colonies, as their political aims became more attainable through collaboration with nationalists rather than with the Colonial Office, that lay the groundwork for decolonisation. Consequently, an environment was established in many colonies within the Empire which was conducive to the growth of nationalism; which in many cases created a real sense of emergency in the metropole, in which case the most viable option for the British was to initiate a swift exit from Empire and attempt to maintain 25 | Page

trading privileges. This argument is perhaps most clearly evident in India, specifically through the development of pockets of rebellion – as was evident with the 1857 uprising which was concentrated in Oudh - into what was arguably an all-Indian nationalist movement, in the form of the Indian National Congress. The first real surge of nationalism in India occurred after the Colonial office passed the Rowlatt Acts in March 1918, which extended the wartime restrictions on civil liberties. This provocation triggered the calling of a national Satyagraha5 by Mohendas Karamchand Gandhi almost immediately. What followed was a series of hartals – a form of general strike – which culminated with the Amritsar massacre on 13th April 1919, in which General Dyer, having ordered all public meetings to be forbidden, ordered his men to fire upon the crowd of peaceful protests, resulting in 379 deaths. The Amritsar Massacre sharply divided public opinion both in Britain and in India; and was certainly conducive to the growth in membership of the Indian National Congress to two million by 19226.

The surge in popularity of the INC after World War One was compounded by the dwindling influence of both the Colonial Office and British businesses; which resulted in an increasing disaffection towards colonial rule and a firmer inclination towards nationalist movements. Indeed, following the implementation of a system of dyarchy in India as a result the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, India’s political classes received far more autonomy. As this newfound political autonomy developed at provincial level, the disposition of the indigenous elites to reject colonial influence increased, both exports and the ‘invisible earnings’7 generated by flows of capital investment decreased. Thus, nationalism in India was incredibly successful in dismantling the economic viability of retaining India as a colony, once the bedrock of British colonial policy.

The argument that peripheral factors primarily fuelled British decolonisation is further strengthened when the role of white settler communities in colonies is taken into account. Certainly these small concentrated communities particularly in the African colonies - exacerbated the nationalist sentiments, as their monopoly of wealth and administrative roles in the colonies was a cause for deep resentment amongst the side-lined local elites. This exacerbating factor was perhaps most clearly evident in Kenya; in which there was a sizeable white settler community of 30000 by 19488 mainly based in the ‘White Highlands’, an area of land bordering the indigenous Kikuyu tribe. As Springhall notes, this white settler community was ‘deeply entrenched’9 by the 1940s; and the colonial system of ‘multiracial government’10 secured near total control of Kenyan affairs by the white minority. Whereas in India the 26 | Page

British were repeatedly prepared to concede political powers in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 1919, the India Act 1935 and eventually by granting independence in 1947; in Kenya the powerful white settler lobbyists ensured that the upper echelons of administration were reserved for whites.

Undoubtedly, this stirred up bitter resentment amongst the indigenous Kenyans, in particular the Kikuyu, who had much of their land seized by the British settlers. The Kenya Emergency 1952-1960 ensued: in which Mau Mau rebels targeted these white settlers, as well as local chiefs, many of whom were in collaboration with the British. However in this instance it would be too simplistic to offer simply the nationalist explanation as the primary factor fuelling decolonisation. Indeed Kenyan independence, granted in 1963, was not so much a direct product of the Mau Mau rebels’ guerrilla warfare; as the British colonial forces had all but subdued the rebellion by 1958 through a process of ‘villagization’11 - in which suspected Mau Mau supporters were detained in enclosed camps - in conjunction with indiscriminate carpet bombing which left 11500 Mau Mau dead by the end of the Emergency12.

Rather, calls for independence were hastened after the horrors of the Emergency had been clearly exposed to the British public, in particular the brutality of British forces at the Hola detention camp in 1959, in which eleven detainees were killed for refusing to confess taking an oath for the Mau Mau. Here the inextricable links between the nationalist and metropolitan factors becomes evident, as the outrage in the metropole which stemmed from the intense nationalist rebellion by the indigenous population - which in turn had been prompted by the alienation caused by the monopoly of political power and seizure of Kikuyu land by the white minority - led to the replacement of ‘multiracial government’ with Kenyan majority rule under the new Colonial Secretary, Iain MacLeod.

Therefore, while in each instance nationalist movements were by no means inevitable, across the British Empire peripheral factors, whether that be the rejection of British business in India, the alienation caused by white settler dominance in Kenya or the failures of colonial policy, all resulted in varying forms of nationalist entities. Furthermore, the case that nationalism primarily fuelled decolonisation can be seen as particularly strong in a broader peripheral context; in which the basis for collaboration with colonial officials was eroded. This erosion occurred in India with the concession of political rights to Indians and in Kenya with the aforementioned alienation of the large Kikuyu tribe as a result of the white-settlers’ strengthening grip on administration. Once nationalist fervour and political conflict had consumed the colony, as was the case in each of the aforementioned case studies, the moral, and perhaps more significantly economic grounds for retaining 27 | Page

sovereignty over the colonies seemed implausible even for the most avid defender of the Empire.

Moving away from the argument that events on the periphery of the empire primarily fuelled British decolonisation, there is certainly a convincing case to suggest that metropolitan factors were influential in fuelling British decolonisation, although in many cases metropolitan factors were perhaps preconditions to British decolonisation rather than distinct causal factors. One precondition to British decolonisation in particular was the reassessment of the economic - and indeed ideological - value of retaining the Empire through the period of determined and persistent nationalist movements, which invariably weakened the economic argument in the metropole for retaining the Empire.

Moreover, the case in the metropole to retain the Empire was also significantly weakened by the state of domestic finances, as after both World War One and World War Two Britain’s ability to provide capital to colonies in order to exploit their protected markets was severely weakened. P.J Cain and A.G Hopkins summarise this precondition well as they write, “Britain’s ability to supply capital for overseas investment was more restricted after WWI, that her income from invisibles was less buoyant, and that she emerged from WWII as the world’s largest debtor”13. India provides the foremost example of this decreasing economic utility at an early stage. Indeed, British cloth exports to India fell from 1248 million yards in 1929 to 376 million yards in 193214 after the increase of the cotton tariff to 20% as a direct result of the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which granted greater financial autonomy to provincial governments. In many ways India was ahead of its fellow colonies in terms of diminishing economic utility. However, in 1957 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ordered a cost-benefit analysis of the Empire on purely economic grounds. This pragmatic analysis found that the economic risk of delaying independence was greater than the risk of granting it.

Another significant metropolitan precondition that certainly helped fuel British decolonisation was the marked change in public opinion on the subject of decolonisation; as when repression against nationalist movements became increasingly brutal and more widely covered in the British media, the moral argument for retaining the Empire seemed particularly weak. It is of particular interest to note the difference in public opinion following the Amritsar massacre in 1919 and the Hola detention camp incident in 1959. In 1919 despite leaving 379 dead and 1200 wounded, as John Cloake recognises, ‘many Britons thought him [ Dyer ] a hero for saving the rule of British law in India’15.

In contrast, in 1959, following the revelations about what had happened at the Hola detention camp, there was a furore amongst the British public in the immediate aftermath of the incident. In fact after the incident was debated in 28 | Page

the Commons, the Fairn Committee demanded that ‘shock treatment’16 and violence by British troops must end. The Colonial secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd was replaced by the progressive Conservative Iain MacLeod, and Harold MacMillan certainly tapped into the disgust amongst the liberal middle classes to aid his victory in the 1959 general election. Thus, it seemed apparent that there was a marked shift in the ideology of the expanding liberal middle class in Britain, which was a prerequisite for the acceleration of decolonisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

While the changing nature of British public opinion and the reassessment of the economic value of a large empire can certainly be viewed as preconditions for an accelerated programme of decolonisation, the changing political priorities of the Attlee government immediately after World War Two undoubtedly offered new impetus which drew upon the established preconditions. Specifically, the implementation of the Labour manifesto titled ‘Let Us Face the Future’ and the huge expenditure that ensued following the 1942 Beveridge report certainly marked a shift of priorities amongst Britain’s political class. In the year following the introduction of the National Health Service, expenditure on the project exceeded estimates by 40%17; and the economic woes facing the Labour government were compounded by the fuel crisis of 1947 after the worst winter of the century18. The ramifications for the Empire caused by the huge budget deficit that the Attlee government was operating were twofold. Firstly, the desperate need for commodities and basic supplies in the years immediately after the war - evidenced by the rationing of bread in 1946 - resulted in the increased exploitation of tropical colonies’ natural resources; and secondly Britain could no longer act as the creditor to emerging economies. Essentially, Britain’s woeful financial position after World War Two meant that Britain was unable to pay the subsidies to maintain an Empire, nor was it able to exploit the protected colonial markets through offering credit; and therefore imminent decolonisation appeared to be the most economically viable option for the largely pragmatic Labour government.

The third umbrella of factors that must be considered when analysing what fuelled British decolonisation is the international dimension. International factors were instrumental in either accelerating or decelerating decolonisation; as the changing world political climate and view of empires fluctuated. The most significant international power after World War Two was undoubtedly the USA, and therefore her role in British decolonisation must be given the greatest attention. Primarily, Britain’s financial dependence on the US after World War Two meant that the USA acquired huge leverage which could influence British colonial policy. The USA first obtained significant leverage over Britain through the Lend-Lease which was granted from 1940-45 to sustain the Allied war 29 | Page

effort, and during which the US paid Britain military supplies to the value of $31.4billion. Britain’s indebtedness was exacerbated by the ravaging effects of the war on public finances: in total 28% of Britain’s wealth had been wiped out by the war and there was a £3billion deficit on the sterling balances19. Peter Clarke noted that after Truman ended the Lend-Lease following the defeat of Japan that Britain could either ‘beg, borrow or starve’20. Indeed, Britain came close to starving with the rationing of bread in 1946; however, once again the USA assisted Britain, this time in the form of a $3750million loan negotiated by John Maynard Keynes in 1947. However, the crucial problem facing British policy makers in 1947 was the so-called ‘dollar gap’21, as British businesses needed dollars to import American goods. To resolve this issue it was agreed that sterling would be freely exchangeable with the dollar in the summer of 1947, and the pound sterling was also devalued from $4.03 to $2.08 in 1949 to further reduce the huge trade deficit. The final stage of American financial support which cemented the US’s sway over British policy makers was Marshall Aid in 1947; a policy which Clarke dubbed, ‘a form of enlightened self-interest’22. The total value of the aid given to Britain under the Marshall Plan was $3297million. All taken together, in the decade following World War Two, Britain was heavily indebted to the USA, and therefore the USA could significantly mould the timetable of British decolonisation. This influence was most prevalent in the Middle-East, and on the fiercely contested issue of Palestine in particular. Specifically, Britain had published its ‘White Paper’23 on Palestine in May 1939, in which Jewish immigration to Palestine was to be limited to 75000 over five years. However, this extremely low migration cap was undermined by the horrors of the Holocaust during the war; and in November 1945 Truman wrote to Clement Attlee to demand the immediate admission of 100000 Jewish refugees to Palestine, arguably to gain the Zionist vote in America. The extent of American influence on the question of Palestine was also felt in the United Nations; which in August 1947 through the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent Israel. Britain withdrew from Palestine within a year of this ruling on the 14th May 1948. The case study of Palestine exemplifies the hastening effect that American leverage could have on contentious global issues within the British Empire. Ultimately, the dire state of British finances and the lasting indebtedness to America weakened Britain’s real ability to shape the international scene, even within its own empire.

While in many ways America used the leverage acquired through its extensive financial programmes to impose her will on issues of particular controversy to the American people, such as the Palestinian question; in a broader sense the British Empire provided an incredibly useful buffer to the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in South East Asia and Africa. Indeed, in the context of 30 | Page

the Cold War, American anti-communist sentiment greatly surpassed anti-colonial sentiment. In Malaya, in which Chinese immigrants constituted 38.5% of the population24, the growth of communist inspired rebellion seemed especially likely. Malaya in particular evidences how international influences accelerated the growth of rebellion within empires – in this case how radical Soviet and Chinese communist ideas could trigger a surge in popularity of the Malayan Communist Party, and indeed the notion of nationalism in Malaya in general. Malayan nationalism had initially developed in March 1946 with the establishment of the United Malays Nationalist Organisation, after the announcement of the Malayan Union Scheme in January 1946 – which would have given equal rights to both the Chinese immigrants and the indigenous Malay; however, the Malayan Emergency was primarily driven by the long-established Malayan Communist Party, which was arguably given impetus by the announcement within the Soviet ‘Cominform’25 policy in October 1947, which called for “an armed struggle against imperialism”26. Consequently, on the 16th June 1948, three European planters were killed by Chinese communists in Malaya; and the MCP’s guerrilla army grew from 2000 in 1948 to 8000 in 195127 after the success of Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party had offered fresh impetus. Whilst in this case it is true that communist influences from the Soviet Union and China accelerated the growth of distinct anti-colonial nationalist movements; these movements achieved little to hasten Malayan independence. On the contrary the communist threat in Malaya offered a much greater incentive to retain control of the colony; both from American pressure to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, especially after the establishment of NATO in 1949, and from the economic advantages that the tin and rubber exports from Malaya offered to the ravaged British economy. This determination to contain the spread of communism by means of retaining sovereignty over Malaya was evident through the duration and ferocity of the warfare in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960; during which 400 British police officers were dispatched and 50 Europeans – the majority rubber planters - were killed within the first three years of the Emergency28. Moreover, independence was only eventually gained in 1957, following nine years of intense guerrilla warfare. The contradictory standpoint of the USA therefore weakens the argument that international factors fuelled British decolonisation; as ideologically, the Cold War took precedence over the war on imperialism within the American mind; which ultimately meant that the accelerating and decelerating effects of American policy on the decolonisation process fluctuated enormously.

In conclusion, the question of what factors fuelled British decolonisation is a complex one; as the causal factors appear to vary on an individual basis; whether that be Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia or the Middle East. Indeed, 31 | Page

the extent to which international factors either hastened or prolonged the collapse of the British Empire is opaque. Certainly in the Middle-Eastern theatre, American political opinion, which was largely in favour of the Zionist cause, had profound influence on the Colonial Office decision to create the state of Israel and abandon its mandate in Palestine. In contrast, the opposite was apparent in Southeast Asia in the Cold War context, where the containment of Chinese communism took precedence, and the British Empire was a useful tool to achieve this. It was this ambiguity in American policy, and indeed global policy, that created uncertainty with regards to the impact that the international climate had on fuelling British decolonisation. The causational relationship between metropolitan factors and the nationalist factors on the periphery is more symbiotic. In the post-World War Two world; in which self-determination and equal rights were advocated, unrest invariably ensued as grievances amongst the indigenous populations compounded. In all the aforementioned cases; whenever the colonial arrangements ceased to be mutually beneficial, support for nationalist movements inevitably grew, particularly amongst the western-educated elites. The shift of political priorities under the Labour government from the Empire to domestic affairs after World War Two provided fresh impetus for decolonisation in India; and in many ways this could be viewed as the first breach of the dam. However, the nationalist fervour expressed through the Congress movement had developed in India ahead of its time and in many ways was the prototype for other nationalist movements to follow. Increasingly after World War Two the colonial environment became more toxic for financial investment and towards white-settler immigration; which in turn eroded the economic viability of many of the African colonies and created a greater incentive for the British government to vacate the Empire on economic grounds. However, a marked shift in British public opinion was needed in order to facilitate a dignified departure from such a core aspect to the British identity. This shift in public opinion that was most evident in late 1950s was driven by the increasing ferocity of nationalist activities, particularly in Kenya and Malaya, which eroded the value of the Empire on moral grounds too. By the 1960s, the concept of Empire both in practice and in theory was totally unacceptable on economic and moral grounds. In each case, the erosion of the economic and moral viability of the Empire originated from the determination of the indigenous populations to fight for liberation; which eventually created an Empire that was beneficial neither for the colonizer nor the colonized.

32 | Page

MR PATHAK’S SUMMER QUIZ It’s the middle of the summer holidays and you are bored of the endless fun, missing the Reekie Building, that great reservoir of historical knowledge! Fear not, help is at hand with Mr Pathak’s exciting summer quiz on rulers and leaders, some of them quite obscure. Aspiring students of International Relations should be able to get lots of answers without reference to the inter-web…

1) Who was the first leader of an independent Chilean state between 1817 and 1823?

2)

Name the 2 French presidents who preceded Emmanuel Macron

3)

Name the 2 ( West ) German chancellors who preceded Angela Merkel

4)

What was the name of the last Habsburg emperor?

5)

What was the name of the last Qing emperor of China?

6)

What is name of the current PM of India and who preceded him?

7)

What was the name of the last French monarch, overthrown in 1848?

8)

What was the name of penultimate Saxon king of England?

9)

Name the 5 post-apartheid presidents of South Africa

10)

What was the name of the last Russian tsar?

11)

What was the name of the last German emperor?

12)

What was the name of the first Mughal emperor?

13)

What was the name of the last Mughal emperor?

14)

Who is the current president of Rwanda?

15)

Who is the current Speaker of the US House of Representatives?

16)

Who is the current president of the European Commission?

33 | Page

17) What is the name of the current Supreme Leader of Iran and his predecessor?

18)

Which 2 states were given by Napoleon to his elder brother, Joseph?

19)

Who was the founder of the modern Turkish state?

20)

What was the name of the British prime-minister assassinated in 1812?

21)

What was the name of the last Stuart monarch of England and Scotland?

22) UK

Name 2 countries in Asia which had female prime-ministers before the

23)

What was the name of Henry VIII’s elder brother who pre-deceased him?

SMELL THE KNOWLEDGE !

FREE JOHN LAMBERT !

34 | Page

We hope you have enjoyed reading Issue 6 of the Cromwellian. If you would like to get involved in editing or contributing to subsequent editions, please get in touch with Mr Pathak or another member of ‘Team History’…

35 | Page