FEDERAL REENTRY PROGRAMS: How Best to Measure Their Success? A discussion of the “Evaluation of a Federal Reentry Program Model.”

HON. STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN

In response to an era of mass incarcerations, state and federal courts have been implementing programs to assist select individuals upon release from prison. These programs aim to reduce the recidivism rate and encourage successful reintegration into society. As of January 2019, the total U.S. prison population topped 2.3 million people.1 Of that 2.3 million people, approximately 10% are in federal custody.2

Successful reintegration is a major a key component to reducing the prison population. As the graph in Figure 1 demonstrates, approximately 50% of all federally incarcerated people are sentenced to less than 10 years in prison, while only 2.6% are sentenced to life in prison.

In addition to those detained in federal custody, as of Sept. 30, 2018, there were 129,706 individuals on supervised release.4 The sentencing guidelines, though advisory, often set forth that a term of supervised release should be imposed as part of one’s sentence. A term of supervised release is often five years or less, but certain convictions allow for an order of supervised release that continues for life.5 As of May 2019, 97% of the federal prison population was also sentenced to serve a period of supervised release upon completion of their incarceration.6 If an individual violates a term or condition of his supervised release, he could be ordered by the sentencing judge to return to prison or have more stringent conditions imposed.

Conditions of supervised release that can be imposed include some of the following: do not violate any federal, state, or local law; report to your probation officer as directed; be truthful in all responses to inquiries from your probation officer; allow your probation officer to visit you at any time; take drug tests as required; pay fines as ordered; do not drink alcohol; be employed; support dependents; do not leave the judicial district without permission; and do not associate with known felons or anyone engaged in criminal activity.7

Navigating the transition from prisoner to law-abiding member of society while adhering to the conditions of supervised release can be challenging. Many who are returning from incarceration to their communities lack sufficient social support and the resources necessary to be successful.8 They face restrictions on where they can live and work and often have other obstacles to overcome, such as dealing with garnishments from prior child support orders and suspended drivers’ licenses. These hurdles can cause immediate setbacks. Probation officers, who supervise individuals on both supervised release and probation, help to navigate these challenges, but sometimes additional support is needed. In an attempt to provide this extra support and aid individuals as they “re-enter” society, federal courts began implementing reentry programs, after seeing successful results in the state courts.9 The overall goal of these reentry programs is to provide advice, support, and guidance to individuals as they rebuild their lives upon release from the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Because there is not one specific reentry program model that is used in the federal judiciary, it has been difficult for researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.10 Despite this challenge, the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law asked the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to study reentry programs. Specifically, the FJC was asked “to undertake a study to ‘assess the operational aspects, outcomes and cost-effectiveness’ of federal reentry programs.”11

To do this, the FJC determined that a model reentry program would need to be designed and then implemented in several district courts. The FJC would then analyze the data collected from these model programs and prepare a report. The designed model included two types of reentry programs: one presided over by a judicial officer and the other led by a probation officer without judicial involvement. The study then looked at the graduation rates, revocation rates, and recidivism rates, as well as the costs, associated with each program.

In May 2016, the FJC released its final findings in an article titled “Evaluation of a Federal Reentry Program Model” (hereinafter, the Evaluation). The Evaluation found “no reduction in revocations of supervised release as a result of participation in the reentry programs based on the model program policy”12 and “no reduction in felony arrests after release from prison as a result of participation in the reentry programs based on the model program policy.13 It further “concluded that the reentry program model was not cost effective as a means of reducing revocations and rearrests among newly released offenders.”14

This conclusion paints with a broad brush and implies that all reentry programs are not worth the court’s financial resources, or worse, are unsuccessful. However, there are many reentry programs in the federal court system that are having successes.15 Of course, this is not to say that these programs have it all figured out—each faces many challenges. But many of those involved in reentry programs have come to believe that reentry programs do good work and do produce positive outcomes. Reentry programs are helpful to the participants, are good for the community, and are a benefit to the judicial system.

I. The Study Design

In October 2009, the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law requested that the FJC undertake “a study to assess the operational aspects, outcomes, and cost-effectiveness of federal reentry court programs.”16 According to Judge Carnes, then-chair of the Committee, “the disparate and informal ways in which [reentry programs] are being implemented are presenting a substantial challenge to the Committee on Criminal Law, as it tries to identify those practices that best effect a positive result for offenders.” The FJC responded positively to the Committee’s request. In an effort to allow an independent source to design the model program, the FJC requested that the Probation and Pretrial Services Office of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (hereinafter, PPSO) create the model reentry program for the district courts that would be participating in the study. This model became the framework for how the reentry programs would operate.

The use of a model program was necessary because programs are designed so differently throughout the country. In fact, seats of court within one judicial district often conduct their programs differently. For example, the Southern District of Ohio has three seats of court: Cincinnati, Columbus, and Dayton. Each seat of court conducts a very different reentry program. The Columbus program is focused primarily on participants with drug addiction problems while the Cincinnati and Dayton programs focus on those who have a high risk of recidivism. In Dayton, the judicial officer presides over his program in the courtroom. It is a formal court hearing. The reentry program in Cincinnati is informal. Differences like these exist in reentry programs all over the country.17

Once the PPSO designed the model program, the FJC sought volunteer courts to participate. Specifically, courts that were willing to begin a reentry program or to re-start a program if one was already in existence. The participating courts also had to agree to follow the model program as designed. The model program was ultimately implemented in eight volunteer courts, located within these judicial districts: Central District of California at Los Angeles; Middle District of Florida at Jacksonville, Orlando, and Tampa; the Southern District of New York; and the Eastern District of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

To be eligible to participate in the study, an individual must not have had a conviction or pending violation for a violent crime or sex offense, must have had a score of at least 3 on the Risk Prediction Index (“RPI”), must have had more than 24 months remaining on his term of supervised release, must have had the mental capacity to participate effectively, and must have been geographically located in close proximately to the program’s site. Individuals were required to have at least 24 months remaining on their term of supervision. This was required because the program was designed to take a minimum of 12 months to complete and, thus, the participants would need to have at least 12 months remaining on their term of supervision at gradation to receive the benefit of having their term supervision reduced by 12 months.

To better understand the RPI criteria, it is helpful to have a general understanding of how the RPI is calculated and what it means. The RPI is a scale from 0-9 that predicts an offender’s risk of reoffending.18 The lower the number, the lower the rate of recidivism to be expected. The RPI includes several pieces of key information that have been determined to be risk factors: “the age at the start of supervision, number of prior arrests, whether a weapon was used in the instant offense, employment status, history of drug and alcohol abuse, whether the person ever absconded from supervision, whether the person has a college degree, and whether the person was living with a spouse and/or children at the start of supervision.”19 As the FJC explained:

The RPI score represents a broad estimate of the proportion of offenders with that score who will recidivate. For example, in theory, without referring to any specific sample of offenders, we would estimate that about 40% (actually in the range of 35% to 44%) of all offenders who receive a score of 4 will recidivate. Similarly, we would estimate that about 80% (i.e., between 75% and 84%) of the offenders who receive a score of 8 will recidivate… Thus, the theoretical score-by-score estimates are helpful in getting a general idea of the recidivism rates that are likely to be associated with each score, but variations from a clear increasing pattern should be expected. In addition, remember that the RPI cannot predict with certainty whether an individual offender will recidivate or not. That is, it cannot pinpoint whether someone who receives a score of 4 will be among the 60% of offenders who succeed or the 40% who recidivate.20

In each of the study sites, there were two treatment groups and one control group. The sites randomly assigned all eligible offenders to one of the three groups. The use of random assignment was designed to remove the selection process from the probation officers with the hope that the participants in each group would be roughly similar in all characteristics so that any differences in outcomes could be attributed to the effect of the program.21 Participants assigned to Group A were entered into a reentry program led by a district or magistrate judge and included a U.S. probation officer, an assistant U.S. attorney, a federal public defender, and a service provider, such as a mental health or drug addiction specialist. Participants in Group B were assigned to another reentry program that was comprised of the same group of people minus the judge. Both Group A and Group B followed the same program model. The only planned difference was that a judge was not to be involved in Group B. Finally, Group C was the control group. Participants assigned to this group experienced business as usual: they received a standard order of supervised release. These individuals were to be supervised by a probation officer just as one would be under “normal” circumstances.22 Each group was limited in size to 25 participants. This limitation in size, unfortunately, proved not to be an issue, as only the Southern District of New York was able to get enough participants to reach that limit.23

The model itself was comprehensive and was created with an eye toward evidence-based best practices and principles as set forth by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.24 Some key features included that the supervising probation officer for each participant is on the team and that all team members encourage the participants’ success and agree to use informal sanctions to address violations rather than seeking revocations through the court. The model also required weekly meetings with the participants in the first phase, then bi-weekly meetings and finally monthly meetings. Each participant was required to work with an approved community support person or attend support group meetings and obtain and maintain full-time employment or be enrolled in school. If a participant demonstrated an attitude supportive of crime, cognitive-behavioral programming would be required. Likewise, if substance abuse was an issue, treatment could be required. The model program consisted of four phases: (1) early recovery (minimum of 4 weeks); (2) primary treatment (12-24 weeks); (3) continued care and supervision (16-20 weeks); and (4) commencement phase (16-20 weeks).25

II. An Examination of the Study Implementation.

In May 2016, the FJC released the results of their multi-year study in the publication “Evaluation of a Federal Reentry Program Model” by David Rauma. The Evaluation was the final report of the FJC’s study.26 Beginning in August and September of 2011, most participating programs began randomly assigning participants to one of the three groups and continued doing so for approximately eighteen months. The last program concluded with the final participant graduating in October 2014.27

The study experienced a few key implementation challenges, largely because many subjects assigned to Groups A or B refused to participate in a reentry program. As a result, in addition to the three groups, a fourth group emerged, those who refused to participate in Groups A or B. Because consent was required for the treatment groups, all individuals assigned to Groups A and B were shown a short video outlining the reentry program and then asked to consent to the program terms. Almost 60% of those randomly assigned to Groups A and B did withhold consent and refused to participate. This group came to be called the “refusals.” Since Group C was comprised of those who were receiving standard supervision, consent was not necessary.

By the end of the study, there were a total of 95 participants in Group A, 86 in Group B, and 147 in Group C, which averages per site to approximately 16, 14, and 30 participants, respectively, per group. As demonstrated by these numbers, Group C ended up being much larger than Groups A and B. This occurred because, as participants refused to participate in Groups A and B, sites continued to randomly assign participants to the program to increase the number of participants in those groups. This naturally led to more participants being assigned to Group C due to the randomization.

Only New York reached the maximum number of 25 participants per group. However, Group A in New York was limited to 17 participants due to the presiding judge limiting the maximum number of participants in that group.

As you can see in Figure 2, Davenport and Des Moines had extremely low numbers of eligible participants. In fact, in Des Moines, every individual assigned to Groups A and B refused to participate. One would think that the numbers for the program in Los Angeles would resemble the numbers in New York. However, the Los Angeles program did not stay true to the model and only included participants who had a substance abuse problem and who were on the verge of having their supervision revoked. This became more akin to a “last chance” program. Thus, of the eight programs that originally were approved to participate, the Evaluation focused on five of the programs, completely excluding Davenport and Des Moines and partially excluding Los Angeles.

In what appears to be the response to the large number of participants who refused to participate and to equalize the size of the treatment groups, several programs reassigned participants to different groups from those to which they were originally assigned. This occurred most often in the Middle District of Florida, which made up three of the programs evaluated. The reassigning of participants to different groups undermined the positive effects of using randomized assignments in the first instance. Table 1 shows the extent of the reassignments in the Middle District of Florida.

In total, 66% of those randomly assigned participants in Jacksonville refused to participate. Unfortunately, that number increased to 69% in Tampa. This led to a high number of reassignment of participants to different groups. The Evaluation asserts that there was no evidence of bias in the reassignments, and there is no reason to doubt that is true. However, what is unclear is the effect that the reassignments had on the ultimate conclusions of the Evaluation. Tampa had the largest percentage of refusals, but, as you will see in a subsequent section, Tampa also had one of the highest successful completion rates, second only to Orlando.

To address the reassignments and attempt to maintain the randomization, the Evaluation did present data both as to the “original group assignments” and as to the “final group assignments.” The “original group assignments” data maintains the randomization but since many of the participants did not receive the treatment as originally assigned it makes it challenging for this data to be of any significant use.

III. The Study Results Program Outcomes

The Evaluation broke down the treatment program outcomes into four categories:

Graduated; Terminated from Program; Left Program, Satisfactory Progress; and Left Program, Unsatisfactory Progress. Graduated means that the participant met the program requirements and was able to graduate from the program, thus receiving a 12-month reduction in his supervised release term. Terminated from the program is for those participants who violated one or more terms of the program. The two “Left Program” categories are for those who left the program voluntarily and the assessment of their progress was determined by the reentry team.30 The outcomes are set forth below in Table 2. Based upon the outcomes, Group A had a success rate of 56.9% and Group B had a 52% success rate.

Table 3: Revocation Rate at 24 Month Follow-Up34

Recidivism

Recidivism is typically measured by criminal acts that result in rearrest, reconviction, or return to prison, with or without a new sentence, during a three-year period following one’s release from prison.35 When the Evaluation looked at the recidivism rate for the participants it saw a similar result to that of revocations. To remove some of the discretionary factors that could affect the revocation numbers, the Evaluation looked at the rates of felony and misdemeanor arrests for participants in each group and compared them to those who refused to participate. The conclusion from the Evaluation is that there were no statistically significant differences in the arrest rates between any of the groups.36 The results are set forth in Table 4. These results, however, show that a higher percentage of Group A participants were rearrested than any of the other groups.

IV. A Discussion and Criticism of the Evaluation

Revocations

When the Evaluation talks about revocations, it is referring to when an individual has had his supervised release revoked for violating one or more of the conditions of his supervision. When this happens, the individual is often ordered to return to prison. To determine the number of revocations that occurred in the study, the Evaluation looked to the number of revocations of supervised release from all those randomly assigned to participate in the study, including those who ultimately refused to participate. The Evaluation found that the revocation rate between those in Groups A, B, and C compared to the revocation rate of those who refused to participate was comparable 24 months after release from prison.31 The Evaluation concluded that there was no significant difference between revocation rates after 24 months on supervision between those on standard supervision (both Group C and the Refusals) and those participating in reentry programs.32 Stated another way, “the overall conclusion is that assignment to one of the reentry programs did not decrease a participant’s probability of failure in any given time period.”33 The results are set forth in Table 3.

The FJC undertook an enormous project in response to the Criminal Law Committee’s request. Not only were the final results published in the article at the heart of this discussion, but the FJC previously published separate reports on six of the participating courts and the costs of the programs for those same six courts. Those earlier reports give much more detail and background for each program.

The FJC’s use of a model program and its attempt to run a true experiment is commendable, even though it ultimately is flawed. The conclusion that the Evaluation draws is that the reentry programs that followed this particular model have no statistically significant difference in the rates of revocations and recidivism compared to those individuals on standard supervised release. And thus, because there is no statistically significant difference, the programs are not cost-effective.37 However, there are certain aspects of the study and the model which deserve further development.

Random Assignment is not beneficial.

By using the randomized assignment of participants to each of the three groups the study should have been able to stay true to its desire for a true experiment. However, there are two problems with using random assignments in the fashion used in this study.

First, by its nature, randomization removes the screening process from a probation officer. I wonder what the result would have been if the study had been able to select participants the same way that reentry programs around the country typically select them. I am not aware of any programs that use random selection. In my experience, participants are selected from a pool of individuals who meet certain criteria, much as in the study, but who are also screened by a probation officer and, importantly, who volunteer to participate. In doing it this way, not only do participants seek out the opportunity to be in a reentry program, but the probation officer can determine whether or not the program would be a good fit for the participant and whether the participant would benefit from the program.

Some individuals will successfully reenter society with little or no help needed from their probation officers. Others may be doomed to repeat past behaviors even with all the help and assistance that can be provided. Yet others struggle, and with the support of their probation officers and/or reentry programs, they can find success. It is this last subset of people who should make up the participants in reentry programs. A desire to make meaningful progress must be present for an individual to be successful in a reentry program, but using randomization likely led to the inclusion of individuals who may not have been as eager or willing to make meaningful progress. Randomization treats all participants equally regardless of their attitude or desire to be law-abiding. For better or worse, the use of random assignment removes the human element from the equation. Admittedly, any selection process is subjective and makes comparing and contrasting programs more challenging. But since the selection process plays such a large part in the ultimate overall success of reentry programs, the use of random assignments in the model programs had a negative effect on the results of the study.

Second, a major unforeseen problem with the use of randomized assignments was that almost 60% of those assigned to a reentry program, i.e., Group A or Group B, refused to participate. 38 This then reduced the total number of individuals participating in the study while increasing the size of Group C. As seen in the data above in Table 1, the Middle District of Florida reassigned a large number of its participants, and in Des Moines, seven out of seven individuals refused to participate.39

The refusal rate was high for reasons that were not determined, however, such a refusal rate in “the real world” is not an issue because the individuals who participate in reentry programs do so on a voluntary basis. A better approach would have been to seek volunteers to participate in the reentry programs and then randomized those who were assigned to the three groups. This would have still allowed for a comparison of Group A to Group B, as well as those in Group C. This also would lead to a more similar comparison of those individuals in reentry programs and those on supervision in Group C. This is because those in Group C would have volunteered to participate and would have a similar mindset at the beginning as those assigned to Groups A and B.

RPI numbers were not evenly distributed.

Another problem with the selection process utilized by the model is that it did not account for varying RPI scores other than that all those eligible had an RPI above 2. By not giving further consideration to the RPI of the participants, the programs ended up with an average RPI per group that varied dramatically. Despite this variation, the Evaluation found that it could still make comparisons. For example, in Orlando, 81.8% of participants in Group B had a high RPI (a score of 6-9), compared to Group C which had only 53.8% of participants in that high RPI range. See Table 5 for other comparisons. Also, Table 6 sets forth what those numbers looked like as originally assigned compared to the numbers as they were implemented after the Middle District of Florida reassigned several participants. The most drastic change was in Group A in Tampa, where it went from 90% of its participants having a high RPI at the time of initial assignment to 76.5% after reassignment. The reverse occurred in Orlando where Group A went from 50% with a high RPI up to 66.7% after the reassignment.

There are benefits to having a program made up of participants with both medium and high RPIs as well as drawbacks, but when some groups have dramatically higher numbers of participants with high RPIs compared to other groups in a study, it leads one to doubt whether you can properly compare the outcomes of those groups.

Breaking Down the Conclusions Program Outcomes

As indicated in Table 2, the average “Program Outcomes” showed that Group A had a 56.9% graduation rate compared to 52% for Group B. Thus, Group A was arguably more successful than Group B, based upon those percentages. However, when you look at the actual number of graduates, due to the small sample size of the study, there was no meaningful difference between the program outcomes of Group A and Group B. Group A had 41 total graduates compared to 40 for Group B.

The Evaluation concludes that reentry programs were successful for half the participants. However, the raw data set forth in Table

7 shows a different result. In Tampa, for example, 11 participants graduated from Group A, but only four graduated from Group B. In contrast, New York had only nine participants graduate from Group A, compared to 15 participants who graduated from Group B.40 The Evaluation does not explain why Group A was more successful in Tampa or why Group B was more successful in New York. The results are mixed, to say the least. Group A in Orlando had an 88.9% success rate compared with a success rate of only 40% for Group B in Tampa. Based on the small numbers of participants in the study, the results just do not tell us enough to make meaningful conclusions.

Recidivism and Revocations

The Evaluation failed to find evidence that the model program had an effect on the rates of revocations or recidivism. However, there are so many social issues that go into those rates that comparing them across different courts and programs can be challenging. According to Jeffrey Butts and Vincent Schiraldi, authors of Recidivism Reconsidered: Preserving the Community Justice Mission of Community Corrections:

Recidivism is not a robust measure of effectiveness for community corrections agencies. When used as the sole measure of effectiveness, recidivism misleads policymakers and the public, encourages inappropriate comparisons of dissimilar populations, and focuses policy on negative rather than positive outcomes…. Recidivism is at least in part a gauge of police activity and enforcement emphasis and, because of differential policing practices in minority communities, using recidivism as a key measurement may disadvantage communities of color. Relying on recidivism defines the mission of community corrections in law enforcement terms, relieving agencies of their responsibility for other outcomes such as employment, education, and housing.”42

A similar criticism can be applied to the use of revocations. Revocations are left to the discretion of the probation officer and the judicial officer, each of whom may recommend or order revocation at a higher rate than others. The same societal concerns mentioned by Butts and Schiraldi can affect the rate of revocations. Instead of focusing on revocations and recidivism, we should focus more on positive outcomes such as social development, criminal desistance, employment, sobriety, literacy, mental health, community involvement, and family relationships, to name a few.

Cost-Effectiveness

A comprehensive cost analysis was performed for each program participating in the study. The total costs ranged from a high of $163,774 in the Southern District of New York to a low of $28,851 in Tampa. In a short and oversimplified explanation, the Evaluation broke down team members’ salaries into hourly rates and then multiplied the rate by the number of hours reported. The model intended for service providers’ costs to be included if such costs were paid by the government. However, despite the model requiring the use of a service provider in the programs, New York is the only program of the final five which did so. The service provider in New York was paid by the employing agency so there was no cost to the government.43

The model program required an extensive time commitment. During phase one of the model, which typically lasted about four weeks, the programs met weekly, then moved to bi-weekly for the next three to six months, and finally meeting only monthly the final four to five months. This equates to approximately 21 program meetings per year. Thus, the cost of implementing such time-consuming programs will undoubtedly be higher than those programs who meet less frequently.

It should be no surprise that the cost of Group A is significantly higher than Group B due to the cost of the judicial officer(s) and courtroom deputy.45 Even judicially run programs’ costs can vary depending on the court resources utilized. Programs that have formal courtroom hearings often require not only the judge, but also a courtroom deputy, court reporter, and court security officer(s),46 in addition to the reentry team who would otherwise be present. The inclusion of so many additional court personnel does increase the cost of the program. Add to that the more frequent meetings required by the model, and the cost increases greatly. Contrast those costs to a program that meets informally: An informal meeting does not require the attendance of a courtroom deputy, court reporter, or court security officer.

In addition, other factors led to cost disparities outside the inclusion of a judicial officer and court staff. The cost disparities in Group A compared to Group B in the Eastern District of Wisconsin was much larger than just the extra personnel utilized in Group A. The addition of the magistrate judge only accounts for $35,974 of the $79,379 difference between the two groups. The cost for the probation officer alone was approximately $20,000 more for Group A then Group B. This was mainly due to the probation officer in Group A spending a significant amount of time updating and reviewing progress reports as well as attending team conferences (382.8 hours versus 46.7 hours).47 Group B did not have team conferences.

When calculating the cost of reentry programs to include the “hourly rate” for the judge, as the Evaluation did, will certainly increase the cost. However, one can argue that the judge’s time should not be included as an additional cost but should instead be additional job responsibility for the judge. Judges often participate in court governance, committees, and perform other duties that are not specially part of their duties as a judge. Judges who participate in reentry programs still perform all the essential functions of their job. Of course, the amount of time devoted to the program has to be reasonable and not too demanding.

Another way to look at the cost effectiveness of these types of programs is to look at the cost of incarceration. For fiscal year 2018, the cost to imprison one offender through the Bureau of Prisons was $37,449 per year—more than the total cost of Group B in each of the three cities in the Middle District of Florida.48 To be clear, the cost to run Group B in Tampa is less than the cost to incarcerate one person for one year. Even if the reentry program in Tampa can only help one person be successful and thereby not return to prison, the program will have saved money. Not to mention, the cost to prosecute is not included in the cost to imprison figure listed above.

V. Other Measurements of Success.

The Evaluation stated that “revocation and recidivism are not the only measures of program effectiveness—employment, sobriety, and quality of life are other possible indicators of a program’s effectiveness at reintegrating former prisoners into society.” 49 However, “because revocation and recidivism [could] be most easily measured, compared across supervision populations within and between districts, and have financial consequences for the operation of the federal criminal justice system,” the FJC limited its study to only revocations and recidivism.50 By doing this, the FJC ignored key elements that lead to a successful program.

By studying only revocations and recidivism rates in the Evaluation, the questions asked were simple: (1) was an individual revoked or not, and (2) was he arrested or not. This is a very binary approach. What if one looked at more than just the answers to those two questions and instead looked at various other measurements? A better picture of the effect of reentry programs would be seen. What if someone who has a long felony record is arrested for a minor misdemeanor, e.g., possession of less than 100 grams of marijuana, which then forms the basis to revoke his supervision? This is a new law violation that could lead to revocation and thus, is a negative outcome. But what if it was looked at another way? What if more focus was placed on this individual being charged with “only” a minor misdemeanor as opposed to another felony? This is a more positive outcome. What if an individual had a history of being arrested quickly after being released from prison, and then he was able to not reoffend for over three years? This is the type of outcome, more positive than negative, that should be considered.

Employment is a key factor in determining whether or not someone who has been released from prison will be successful on supervision.51 Looking at employment rates of the participants in a reentry program versus those on standard supervision is another factor that should be considered in determining the success of a reentry program. Literacy is also a significant indicator of employment success. Nationally, three out of five incarcerated individuals are illiterate.52 Thus, another way to measure success could be to measure the literacy rates of participants in reentry programs compared to those individuals on standard supervised release.

Having a support network is a tremendous asset for those who are reentering society. Family reunification and active parental involvement is another factor that should be evaluated when determining the success of a reentry program. Fathers who are released from prison often must mend broken relationships with their children while many also face a large child support debt. The fathers who can mend their relationships with their children are often able to use those relationships as motivation to be successful.53 Measuring improvement in family relationships would also be beneficial to understanding overall success. Community involvement is also another indicator of success. It is a pro-social activity that provides the participants with opportunities to fill their time with positive activities as well as gain praise from others.

Measuring these social factors can prove to be difficult. However, much of this information is collected when a probation officer determines an offender’s RPI. In fact, for the programs that participated in this study, each prepared a table that compared the characteristics of participants by group. It included the following characteristics for participants in each group: gender; ethnicity; race; instant offense; substance abuse treatment as a condition; mental health treatment as a condition; education; RPI items including average age, average number of prior arrests, weapon involved, employment, history of substance abuse, college degree, living with spouse and/or children, and whether absconded from previous term of supervision; and key assessment items including highly motivated to change and strong social support.54

VI. A Different Model is Proposed.

Minor tweaks to the model are all that is necessary to see the desired results and to make the programs fiscally responsible. The reentry program in the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati is a program that has seen some successes. It is an informal program that incorpo- rates both a professional mentor as well as utilizes peer mentors—individuals who have previously completed the program.55 The reentry team in Cincinnati is similar in composition to Group A of the model program. The team consists of a magistrate judge, a law clerk who takes notes, the probation officer who prepares monthly updates, an assistant U.S. attorney, an assistant federal public defender, the professional mentor, a pastor, and the peer mentors.

During the first three weeks of each month, the participants meet weekly with the professional mentor who engages them in candid discussions while encouraging them to support one another. This group, affectionately known as PIT (the Positive Influence Team), provides guidance and utilizes peer support to influence positive behaviors and thinking. The opportunity for the participants to meet in a safe setting with someone who they respect and with others who have gone through, and are going through, the same struggles has proved to be so beneficial to the success of the program.

Reentry court occurs on the fourth week of the month. The team meets for 30 minutes prior to the session to discuss how each participant has been doing since the previous meeting and to discuss any issues that have arisen during that time. Then, everyone comes together, for approximately two hours, where the progress of the participants is assessed and any problems or issues that each may be experiencing are discussed. It is in this session where goals are set, and participants earn credits. For each month that a participant meets his goals, attends all PIT meetings, and otherwise is successful, the participant earns up to 30 days, or 30 credits, towards a reduction in the term of his supervision. Once a total of 365 days is earned, the participant is eligible to graduate from the program and is officially awarded a one-year reduction in his term of supervised release. Ideally, it takes each participant one year to complete the program. However, setbacks often occur where not all credits are awarded each month, so it often takes 14–16 months to successfully complete the program.

In this model, the professional mentor and peer mentors spend the most time meeting with the participants and directly working with each one to cultivate a relationship of trust and support. The time commitment of all court related team members is limited to approximately three hours per month. The probation officer, who is the reentry specialist for the office, supervises the participants as if they were not participating in reentry court. For Cincinnati, this model has provided a good balance between meeting the needs of the participants and minimizing court resources by utilizing mentors.56

VII. Conclusion

The FJC undertook a tremendous task. The goal of implementing a model reentry program was lofty and faced unexpected challenges. However, the Evaluation was thorough in the data collection, as well as pointing out weaknesses in the results and addressing likely criticisms. Unfortunately, the sample was too small and there are too many variables to come away with a solid conclusion. The take-away should be that it is difficult to study reentry programs, but that researchers need to keep trying. As the data in this study shows, results vary widely. In some courts, Group A did a much better job than Group B and vice versa. Moreover, the cost of the programs also varied wildly.

Successful reentry programs are about the people—the people who lead them and the people who participate in them. Each reentry program can follow the same model or set of guidelines, but the pro- grams will be different because the people who participate in them are different. The success of a program is about the connections that are made—the connection between the participant and the team, as well as with the other participants. To have a successful reentry program, everyone must not only do their assigned part but also must have the ability to connect, foster, and mentor the participants. The participants need to be engaged and hold each other accountable for their actions.

Reentry programs do good work and can make a difference in the successful reintegration into society. Even if reentry programs are successful less than 50% of the time, to those that have success, it is well worth the time and court resources. 

Hon. Stephanie K. Bowman is a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Cincinnati. She is the judicial officer who oversees the reentry program in Cincinnati. This article is a shortened version of a thesis paper written by Judge Bowman while participating in the Bloch Institute LLM Judicial Studies program at Duke University School of Law. She would like to thank Professors Mitu Gulati, Jack Knight, and Ben Grunwald for their advice, guidance, and support through this writing process. She also owes a great amount of gratitude to Erin Remotigue, Magistrate Judge Michael Merz, and Magistrate Judge Michael Wilner for editing this paper.

Endnotes

1Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, Prison Policy Initiative, https://www. prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.

2The total number of federal inmates as of Feb. 16, 2020 was 174,751 (Population Statistics, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www. bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp), and the average daily detention population for the U.S. Marshal Service based upon Fiscal 2018 data is 55,872 (U.S. Marshalls Service, Prisoner Operations Fact Sheet 2019, Apr. 3, 2019).

3U.S. Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts Federal Offenders in Prison May 2019, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ research-and-publications/quick-facts/BOP_May2019.pdf.

4Post Conviction Supervision, Judicial Business 2018, https://www. uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/post-conviction-supervision-judicialbusiness-2018.

5Those individuals typically sentenced to a lifetime of supervision are not often not eligible for reentry programs.

6Supra note 3.

7See AO Form 234B (Rev. 09/11) Judgment in a Criminal Case, https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/criminal-judgment-forms/ judgment-criminal-case.

8Chidi Umez Et Al., Nat'l Reentry Res.Ctr., Mentoring as a Component of Reentry: Practical Considerations from the Field (2017) 6 (June 2017).

9Matthew G. Rowland. Assessing the Case for Formal Recognition and Expansion of Federal Problem-Solving Courts, Fed. Probation, Dec. 2016, at 6–7.

10Rodney Villazor, Reentry Courts: An Examination of the “Provocative Proposal” in Practice, 28 Fed. Sentencing Rep., at 253–258.

11David Rauma, Fed. Judicial Center , “Evaluation of a Federal Reentry Program Model” (2016).

12Id. at 37.

14Id. at 49.

15See Matthew Denis, Reentry Court Aspires to Give Released Prisoners a Chance to Succeed, Register-Guard, (2019). (“Reentry Court statistics show that the revocation rate (being sent back to prison) for participants is 26 percent less than all other supervised release programs in Oregon.”)

16Letter from Judge Julie E. Carnes, Chair of the Criminal Law Committee, Federal Judicial Center, to Judge Barbara J. Rothstein, Director, Federal Judicial Center, Oct. 14, 2009.

17For a more detailed look at the reentry programs in the Southern District of Ohio as well as other districts, see Hon. Michael J. Newman and Matthew C. Moschella, The Benefits and Operations of Federal Reeentry Courts, Fed. Law., Dec. 2017.

18Supra note 11, at 7.

19Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts Off. of Probat. and Pretrial Servs., An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment 6 (2011).

20Supra note 11, at FN21.

21Id. note 11, at 4.

22Id. at 5.

23Id. at 12, tbl. 4.

24Id. at 7.

25Id. 7–8.

26Throughout the duration of study, the FJC published other reports which provided additional information on the study. See Fed. Judicial Center , Process Evaluations of Six Programs in Four Districts (2015) and Costs of Study Programs at Six Sites (2015).

27Supra note 11, at 11.

28Id. at 14

29Id. at 15.

30Id. at 20.

31Id. at 27–31.

32Id. at 2.

33Id. at 36.

34Id. at 30.

35Recidivism, Nat'l Inst. of Just., http://nij.ojp.gov/topics/ corrections/recidivism#extended-nav-section-4 accessed Mar. 22, 2020.

36Supra note 11, at 39.

37Id. at 2.

38Id. at 12.

39Id.

40Id. at 21–22.

41Id. at 21.

42Jeffrey A. Butts & Vincent Schiraldi, Recidivism Reconsidered: Preserving the Community Justice Mission of Community Corrections, Nat'l Inst. of Just. (Mar. 2018).

43Supra note 26, at 6.

44Supra note 11, at 49.

45The programs in New York, Orlando and Tampa utilized both a Magistrate Judge and District Judge to varying degrees.

46The cost of the court security officer was not incorporated into the cost estimate as it was determined that that officer would be otherwise performing security in the courthouse. Supra note 26, at 5.

47Id. at 15–16.

48Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF): A Notice by the Prisons Bureau on 11/19/2019.

49Supra note 11, at 2.

50Id. at 3.

51Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment among formerly incarcerated people, Prison Pol'y Initiative (July 2018) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ outofwork.html.

52Illiteracy by the Numbers, Literacy Project, https://www. literacyprojectfoundation.org , accessed Feb. 23, 2020.

53Pajarita Charles Et. Al., Parenting and Incarceration: Perspectives on Father-Child Involvement during Reeentry from Prison,” 93 Social Service Review 2 (June 2019), at 218–261.

54Supra note 26, at chapter 2, 3 and 5, tbl. 1.

55From 2017-2022, twenty-seven individuals have participated in the SDOH program with sixteen having successfully completed the program.

56The professional mentor is compensated for the PIT meetings through the Probation Department’s Second Chance Funds. Other individuals who are Supervised Release also attend these meetings as ordered by their supervising officer. The professional mentor, pastor and the peer mentors volunteer their time to attend reentry court. For more information on PIT please go to www. positiveinfluenceteam.org evacuations, safe houses, visas, and acting as a lifeline of communication on security and general needs. Their work has been a godsend to the judges, especially those left in Kabul. Judge Vanessa Ruiz of the D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Patti Whalen—a retired trial judge from Vermont who personally trained the Afghan judges both in the United States and in Afghanistan, Justice Susan Glazebrook—a Supreme Court Justice from New Zealand and the president of the IAWJ, Judge Robyn Tupman—Judge of the District Court of New South Wales in Australia, Judge Mona Lynch—Supreme Court Justice of Nova Scotia in Canada, Judge Gloria Potayos—Magistrate Judge in Spain, and Judge Anisa Dhanji—Commonwealth Scholarship Commissioner in the United Kingdom, all know the details of the Afghan women judges’ saga with granular detail. They have worked every day since July 2021 to try to help get the Afghan women judges to safety. They continue to work on the Afghan women judges’ behalf, every day. Their dedication to this cause is unparalleled, and they are personally aware of all the details of their diaspora. 

Judge Lisa Walsh has been a trial and appellate judge in Miami, Florida for 15 years. She is also an adjunct professor of appellate advocacy at St. Thomas Law School. She serves as International Director for the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ) and Director for the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ). She was the 2015-2016 President of NAWJ. In 2016, she passed a national resolution calling on all judges to “make appointments that are consistent with the diversity of our society and the justice system.” She leads the US efforts to support refugees who were women judges in Afghanistan.

Endnotes

1TF Hawk, a rescue organization that dedicated itself to the rescue of at-risk women from Afghanistan, coined this term. According to its principal, because most of the Special Immigrant Visas were granted to men who contracted to work for the U.S. government or its contractors, for the first time in human history, women and children were rescued last.