British reactions to the Katyn massacre 1943-2003

Foreign & C om m en w ea lth

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

KATYN

British reactions to the Katyn Massacre, 1943-2003 • Foreword • ‘Britain and the Katyn Massacre: An Introduction5 • The Katyn Massacre and Reactions in the Foreign Office. Memorandum by Rohan Butler, Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 10 April 1973, and Annexes • Selected documents

Published by the FCO Historians to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary o f the discovery o f the Katyn Massacre on 13th April 1943

Front cover: Reporters from German-occupied Europe inspecting the graves at Katyn, April 1943

FOREWORD The Katyn massacre was a dreadful atrocity which, to this day, provokes strong emotions.

During the Cold War, the Soviets refused to discuss Katyn. Though circumstantial evidence of Soviet guilt was considerable, definitive proof remained elusive. It was only in the early 1990s, with President Gorbachev’s admission of Moscow’s culpability and the subsequent release by President Yeltsin of documents identifying Stalin and Beria as the principal perpetrators, that the truth was finally exposed. This served the process of reconciliation between Poland and Russia.

Successive British governments had no illusions about the likelihood of Soviet responsibility for the massacre. But in the absence of conclusive evidence, they like other Western governments, remained reluctant to accuse the Soviet authorities of the crime. Though they condemned the massacres in the strongest terms, the refusal publicly to charge the USSR with responsibility for Katyn angered many, in this country and beyond, who wished to see justice done. It is in recognition of those feelings that this report is published today.

The report, whose publication coincides with the 60th anniversary of the discovery by the Germans of the mass graves in Katyn, traces the development of the British response to the massacre.

The centrepiece is a previously unpublished memorandum by the late Dr. Rohan D’Olier Butler, Historical Adviser to Secretaries of State from 19631982. He was set the task in 1972 of bringing together, for internal use, all the available evidence from British official records.

The ‘Butler memorandum’ documents in detail the views of the British Government on Katyn from 1943 on. It therefore gives an accurate account of what the British Government knew about Katyn, and why they maintained the public line about the massacre throughout the Cold War. To bring the Katyn story up to the present day, the FCO Historians have supplemented the Buder memorandum with an introduction, which covers the whole period 1943-2003, along with a small selection of further documents.

This is more than a historical compilation. It raises the issue of how ministers and officials handle public discussion about crimes and allegations

of crimes against humanity. As the former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said “we have learned that we should be braver about separating our need to deal with tyrannies from our need to avoid offence to them.� We should remember his words as we deal with the evil still done to our fellow human beings in the world.

The terrible suffering inflicted on the people of Poland under the Nazi occupation is well known. Far less is known about the sufferings inflicted during the 1939-41 Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, of which the Katyn Massacre was a part.

Large numbers of Poles were forced to leave their country for good during and after the War. Many settled in this country where we have been honoured to welcome them as fellow citizens. The publication of this History is an opportunity to reflect on the sacrifices and bravery of the Polish nation which contributed so much to the final Allied victory.

The publication also serves as a reminder of the Europe we have left behind.

We now live in a more secure, prosperous and democratic Europe, in which historic enmities are replaced by co-operation. As the Polish Prime Minister noted at the time of the 60th anniversary of the massacre, Russians were also severely hurt by the totalitarian system. We welcome the fact that in changed times the UK, Poland and Russia can work together in building the new Europe.

Denis MacShane Minister for Europe April 2003

BRITAIN AND THE KATYN MASSACRE: AN INTRODUCTION On 13 April 1943, the German Government announced the discovery of over 4,400 graves in the forest of Katyn, near Smolensk, attributing the crime to the Soviet Union. This was swiftly followed by counter claims from Moscow that the Germans themselves were responsible for the massacre in 1941. For the next 50 years public controversy as to responsibility tended to dominate and overshadow the human tragedy of the wartime atrocity.

Amidst the crossfire of claim and counter-claim the British line— like the rest of the Western Alliance—remained substantially the same from 1943 until 1990, namely that, in the absence of conclusive documentary proof of responsibility for the massacres, no official public statement imputing guilt could be made.

Though successive Ministers and officials, more latterly with greater frequency and candour, expressed their view that the circumstantial evidence pointed The German excavation o f the graves at Katyn, A pril 1943 towards Soviet culpability, this did not go far enough for the campaigners who comprised the ‘Katyn lobby’, including the émigré Polish community, as they sought the unequivocal labelling of the Soviet Union as the guilty party. Britain’s official response to the Katyn massacre remained the focus of public interest, speculation and suspicion.

The transfer to the Public Record Office of the British Government’s wartime records in 1972 did not end the controversy, and it took more than 50 years—the span of the Cold War—before the truth about Katyn

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could be documented with certainty. President Mikhail Gorbachev’s admission of Soviet guilt in April 1990 was outlined in a communiqué issued by the Soviet news agency TASS laying blame for the crime at the door of the NKVD, forerunner of the KGB. Finally, in 1992, documents handed over to the Polish President by President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation established beyond doubt that the crime had been committed on the express orders of Josef Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union, despite contemporary Soviet denials and counter-accusations of German guilt. In the aftermath of these revelations in Moscow, the FCO confirmed in 1994 that all FCO files over 30 years old concerning Katyn were now in the public domain. During the following year the records of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) concerning Katyn were also transferred to the Public Record Office and a History Note was published to explain their significance.1 The present history, and other selected documents here re-produced, take this openness a step further by tracing British reactions to Katyn as a contribution to the research and understanding of a tragic event in the Second World War.

Historical Background On 17 September 1939 the Red Army invaded eastern Poland, executing the secret additional protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.2 Eastern Poland was swiftly occupied by Soviet forces and later annexed to the Soviet Union. Thousands of officers, most of them reservists, and soldiers (about 240,000) were taken into detention. The Soviets did not give them POW status. Further widespread arrests of Polish citizens in these occupied territories were initiated and in February 1940 the first of four waves of mass deportations began. A vast number of Poles, estimated at more than one million, were deported to labour camps in Siberia, Kazakhstan and in the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union by the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June 1941. Most perished from cold and hunger. Sir Owen O’Malley, in his later capacity as HM Ambassador to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, asserted that in their 20 months’ occupation of eastern Poland:

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it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, even if the Soviet Government did not humiliate the Poles by treating them as an inferior race, as the Germans undoubtedly have done, the amount o f human suffering inflicted by them on the Polish race was not less than that inflicted by Nazi Germany during the same period.3

Though the crushing German victories which characterised the first weeks of the campaign in Russia caused a reversal in Soviet policy towards Poland, the Polish Government-in-Exile nevertheless considered that it was still at war with the Soviets. It was clearly important to the Allied cause to bring an end to this state of war between two Powers, each of whom was at war with Germany. HMG itself urged a Soviet-Polish reconciliation and advised Moscow that it would be beneficial to adopt a generous attitude towards their Polish prisoners. The commencement of Polish-Soviet negotiations produced serious dissension at the highest level among the London Poles, the major concern surrounding the preservation of Poland’s eastern frontier which had been fixed by the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) after the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. Eventually, on 30 July 1941, a Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed in Molotov signs the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939; London by the Polish Prime Minister, Ribbentrop (back, centre) and Stalin ( right) look on General Wladyslaw Sikorski, and the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky. This established diplomatic relations between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union and recognised that the Soviet-German secret protocols of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland had dost their validity’.4 Subsequently, on 14 August 1941, the Military Convention signed by both governments granted an Amnesty’ (a term that gave grave offence to many Poles) to all Polish internees and created a Polish Army, made up from Polish military personnel captured in 1939, to fight alongside the Red Army. But repeated questions from senior Polish figures about the fate and whereabouts of their missing officers, last heard of in the Kozielsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk camps in early 1940 were left 111

unanswered.5 The Soviet failure to give a satisfactory response on this issue was at the heart of the constant friction that increasingly beset every aspect of Polish-Soviet relations. Difficulties arose over arrangements for the welfare of Poles in the Soviet Union and cooperation between the Red Army and the vast majority of Polish officers proved impossible. General Wladyslaw Anders, appointed Commander in Chief of the Polish forces in the Soviet Union, finally led his army, salvaged with great difficulty from Soviet POW and labour camps and denuded of the missing officers, into the Middle East in the spring of 1942. polish pows. 1939 Thereafter, it operated with distinction as the Second Polish Corps in conjunction with British forces in North Africa and Italy.6 Matters came to a head on 13 April 1943 when the Germans announced the discovery of the Katyn graves and accused the Soviets of killing the Poles. Two days later General Sikorski met the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Downing Street to discuss the Katyn revelations.

The Polish record of the conversation summed up Churchill’s thoughts on the issue as follows: Unfortunately, therefore, the German revelations are perhaps true. We know what the Bolsheviks are capable o f and how they know how to be cruel; I know all this and I understand your many difficulties. I often, very often, share your point o f view. I Iowever, no other policy is possible. Our duty is to proceed in such a manner to save the fundamental aims agreed by ourselves and to serve them as effectively as possible.7

According to the Foreign Office’s record of this meeting it was only recorded that Churchill had said: T observed this was an obvious German move to sow discord between Allies’. However, in manuscript he added to the note the words CI may observe, however that the facts are pretty grim’.8

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Reporters from German-occupied Europe inspecting the graves at Katyn, April 1943

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The Katyn revelations exacerbated tensions within the Polish Government-in-Exile in London and caused further problems for the British Government already concerned by fragile Polish-Soviet relations.

Though IIMG publicly rejected the German claim they looked to Moscow to provide compelling evidence to dispute the enemy’s case: We do not believe the German story about the discovery o f bodies o f Polish officers and intelligentsia. Nevertheless 7,1)00-8,000 known Poles have disappeared from Camps near Smolensk. The only complete way o f giving the lie to the German story is for the Russians to produce the live bodies.

This so far they have not done. It is probable that the Germans have discovered bodies o f individual Poles, some o f them identifiable...9

Neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, managed to persuade the Poles to issue a statement that the Katyn issue was a piece of Nazi propaganda or to withdraw the Polish Government’s appeal to the International Red Cross to investigate the German claims.

Within 10 days the Soviet Union had broken off diplomatic relations with the Poles. In a minute to the Foreign Secretary on 28 April, Churchill expressed his regret at the Soviet-Polish breach and the circumstances that brought it about, but declared that it was ‘no use prowling morbidly round the three-year old graves of Smolensk’.10 ITowever, the split between the London Poles and Moscow was final. It would be used by the Soviets as a pretext to embark on their ultimately successful policy to install a subservient administration in Poland on the coat tails of the advancing Red Army and accompanying NKVD.

Katyn in the Cold War The exigencies of wartime prevented the Western Allies from venting their suspicions of Soviet involvement in the Katyn massacres. But as the Grand Alliance began to fall apart in the 1940s and the Cold War between East and West emerged, critics of the Soviet Union looked to Britain. It was hoped that London, now seemingly free of the constricts of wartime diplomacy, could point the finger rather more decisively at Moscow.

FIMG’s refusal to do so, despite an American Congressional enquiry and growing circumstantial evidence of Soviet guilt, disappointed many.

Instead the British Government took the view that, in the absence of definitive proof, they would suspend judgement on responsibility for

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Katyn. By the early 1970s, over three decades had elapsed since the crimes in the forests of Katyn and the available evidence of Soviet guilt had become considerable, if not conclusive.

1971-72 saw an upsurge in public and political interest in Katyn. Writers, MPs and the Polish émigré community in the UK questioned what the British Government had known about Katyn - and when - and condemned their perceived equivocation on the issue. Media interest was high, stimulated by publications such as those of Louis FitzGibbon and the screening in April 1971, despite Soviet and Polish protests, of a BBC2 programme entitled ‘The Issue Should be Avoided’. The focus was sharpened further by the transfer to the Public Record Office in 1972 not just of the 1941 official British files, in accordance with the 30-year rule, but of files covering the rest of the wartime period until 1945. These included many of the documents referred to in the Butler memorandum, among them O’Malley’s despatch of 24 May 1943.11 This despatch provoked graphic headlines such as the Daily Telegraph's ‘Bodies like sardines in tin at Katyn killing.’12 With public pressure mounting, the FCO decided to take stock of its policy on Katyn and to review its evolution since the discovery of the Polish graves in 1943. The Butler Memorandum, reproduced in its entirety for this publication, was the result. Written by the Secretary of State’s own Llistorical Adviser, the Memorandum provides a comprehensive account of developments in British policy from the announcement of the graves’ discovery through to 1972. Though the Head of the FCO’s East European and Soviet Department (EESD) concluded that there was nothing in the memorandum, and the evidence it presented, to suggest that there was any need to revise ITMG’s position on Katyn, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Anthony Royle (later Lord Fanshawe), took a rather different view: Whilst responsibility o f either nation for this dreadful massacre is “not proven” in the legal sense, it is clear that most distinguished and middle level officials in this office over the years “sense” from both records and/or talks and/or involvement in some way that the Soviets were responsible ... If reasons o f state and our alliance with Russia at the time had not been paramount - if we had no foreign policy influence bearing upon us — an impossible scenario! I feel certain that we would in 1945 and should now in 1972 put the finger o f shame on the Soviet Union. ! 3

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For all of Mr. Royle’s strictures, however, FCO policy continued unaltered; Butler’s final paragraph—‘We see no advantage in breaking the silence that we have preserved for nearly 30 years on the Katyn massacre’14—remained the order of the day.

Despite the apparent finality of the Historical Adviser’s concluding paragraph, the Katyn Massacre continued to be the focus of controversy and debate. From the UK perspective, it was the ongoing campaign for the erection of a memorial in London dedicated to the victims of Katyn that kept the issue most vividly alive until the memorial’s unveiling in September 1976. The memorial controversy, which preoccupied a surprisingly broad spectrum of government Ministers and officials throughout the period 1972-6, frequently centred on detail—planning permissions, inscriptions, ceremonial arrangements, military bands - but at its focus was the question of the British Government’s position on guilt for Katyn. Despite the ‘Katyn Lobby’s’ increasing frustration with LIMG’s official position on the massacres, FCO policy remained, as Lord Aberdare stated in the House of Lords in June 1971, that ‘Fier Majesty’s Government have absolutely no standing in this matter.’15 The Katyn Memorial Fund Appeal, a campaign by the Polish émigré community and sympathetic British public figures to raise money for the monument, was first mentioned in Dtqennik Polski (the London émigré press publication) on 11 November 1971. Its Committee, chaired by Lord Barnby, included Lord St. Oswald and Mr. Airey Neave MP (ViceChairmen) and Mr. Louis FitzGibbon (Honorary Secretary), and had a notable patron in Mr. Winston Churchill MP, grandson of the former Prime Minister.16 However, the very idea of a monument proved controversial. As early as 24 January 1972 the Polish Ambassador in London, Mr. Artur Starewicz, told Sir Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under­ secretary of State in the FCO, that the campaign troubled both him and his Soviet colleague, Mr. M.N. Smirnovsky. Brimelow reminded the Ambassador that this was a private initiative and HMG was powerless to intervene.17 On 23 February 1972, however, when Airey Neave wrote to Sir Alec Douglas-Home asking whether there would be any objection to siting the monument in a Royal Park, he was told that the Secretary of State ‘strongly opposed’ the idea which he considered to be ‘an act of political significance’.18 In May 1972 the Katyn Committee proposed the erection of a twentyfoot high obelisk at the Cromwell Road Triangle.19 Though the FCO had no direct locus on the question of a memorial, they were conscious of its vin

potential impact on relations with Poland and the Soviet Union. While some officials agreed that the ‘success of the Memorial Appeal has shown the strength of feeling on the subject, and it is right and proper that there should be a memorial to the victims in the country where many of their relatives and comrades have made their homes’, others took a different view. The latter included the Head of EESD, who saw ‘no reason why I IMG should authorise a monument to the victims of Katyn rather than to those of any other atrocity which occurred in a foreign country during the War ... I see it simply as a question whether or not we wish to create a gratuitous irritant in our relations with both Poland and the Soviet Union, with effects that could well last for a long time.’20 Concern for the damage to bilateral relations was well founded. On 13 September Sir John Killick, HM Ambassador in Moscow, was told by Mr. S.P. Kozyrev, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister: Attempts have again been made recently in Britain, with aims hostile to the Soviet Union, to propagate the slanderous invention o f Goebbels propaganda about the so-called Katyn case . . . according to the British press, the initiators o f this campaign have already received the approval o f the local authorities to set up such a memorial obelisk in the London Borough o f Kensington and Chelsea . . . The Ministry expresses the hope that the British Government will take all the appropriate measures for its part to oppose this provocative act, which can only bring damage to Soviet/ British relations.

Sir John Killick reminded Kozyrev that ‘this was not a matter within the direct responsibility of HMG\ Kozyrev warned, however, that ‘if we were really anxious to improve relations, we must be careful not to poison the atmosphere’.21 Indeed, this was exactly what some officials thought supporters of the Memorial were striving to achieve. As an EESD minute of 18 September commented, ‘whatever may be Mr Neave’s motives, his associates in the Katyn Memorial project include a number of émigré Poles who are bitterly anti-Soviet (not surprisingly, in view of their experiences) and see the proposed erection of a monument to the victims of Katyn chiefly as a political act’.22 The Head of EESD’s view was clear: I continue to believe that it is the duty o f the FCO to consider above all British relations with Poland and the Soviet Union; and consequently we should advise that everything possible be done to ensure that any Katyn memorial that may be put up is (a) inconspicuously sited and (b) not provocative in any respect, particularly in its inscription.23

In October 1972 Kensington and Chelsea Council’s Amenity Committee accepted a second proposal from the Katyn Committee for the Memorial to be erected in St. Luke’s Gardens, Chelsea with an inscription IX

mentioning the date 1940 and saying ‘The conscience of the world cries out for a testimony to the truth’.24 Sir Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under­ secretary, regretted that the date 1940 ‘incriminates the Russians and would have adverse political consequences’, but did not object to the proposed inscription if there were no date. ITe supported the Head of EESD’s idea that Mr. Anthony Royle, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, should speak to Mr. Neave but was ‘doubtful’ about exerting influence on the Borough Council, considering it more appropriate merely to ‘inform’ them that mention of a date ‘will involve the Government in controversy which they are anxious to avoid’.25 In fact the memorial had now become a ‘major irritant’ in HMG’s relations with the Polish Government, Poland’s Foreign Minister himself raising the question directly with the Secretary of State.26 At a meeting with Mr. Neave on 17 October, Mr. Royle reiterated that the Soviet Union and Poland would regard the monument ‘as a political act’ and it would ‘be very damaging to our relations’. He asked whether the Memorial Committee ‘could see their way to reconsidering the whole project’ or at least deleting the date. But Mr. Neave remained resolute, warning that if ‘HMG endeavoured to stop the project, there would be a fight’.27 On 8 February 1973, the Polish émigré press reported that the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea had approved in principle the application to erect a monument in St. Luke’s Gardens, and that the wording of the inscriptions was ‘settled’.28 Sir Thomas Brimelow warned against FCO intervention: ‘There would almost certainly be questions in Parliament if we were to approach the Borough Council in an effort to stop the erection of this monument.’29 But news that the monument had received Council approval angered the Polish and Soviet Governments. On 26 February, Mr T.F. Brenchley, HM Ambassador, reported from Warsaw that ‘the Katyn memorial issue is still clouding Anglo/Polish relational at this level’.30 This was particularly unfortunate in view of the current negotiations over a major Anglo-Polish industrial contract.31 On 7 March, the Soviet Ambassador complained to the Secretary of State that the project was ‘in obvious contradiction to the assurances which had been given to the Soviet Government about the British desire to improve relations. The Soviet Government again requested that the British Government should take all appropriate measures to see that the so-called memorial was not erected.’ Sir Alec Douglas-Home responded by reiterating that ‘HMG had no control or influence over the Borough Council’ and added that this is what ‘could happen in a free democracy’.32 In the event, however, and to the evident relief of FCO officials, the impending clash over the monument was averted when the London Diocesan Advisory Committee turned down the Katyn Memorial Project

at St Luke’s on the grounds that the disturbance to existing tombs might distress local residents, and the memorial '[was] not in keeping with the Church’s principle of reconciliation’.33 The Secretary of State commented: 'I think leave well alone.’34 February 1974 saw a Labour Government under Harold Wilson assume office, but it was soon made clear that this signalled no change of policy towards the Katyn memorial.35 Writing to Lord Barnby on 3 April, Mr. Roy Hattersley, the new Minister of State, explained: 'it would be wrong for me to give you the impression that the present administration would be any readier than their predecessors either to be associated with the plan to erect a memorial in this country or to promote a new enquiry into the circumstances of the massacre’.36 Sir Thomas Brimelow, now Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS), recommended that 'we should stand firmly on the line that Her Majesty’s Government were not involved. We should decline to be drawn on the question whether we ought to have been involved.’37 Mr. Hattersley concurred: 'we must continue to explain to East European Governments that HMG is neither responsible for nor prepared to restrict the activity of private organisations (including the Established Church!)’.38 In December 1975 Press reports indicated that, following the failure to secure the St. Luke’s Gardens site, Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council had offered a site in their cemetery in Gunnersbury Park, within the authority of the London Borough of Hounslow. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet and Polish Governments continued to reject the argument that the memorial was a private venture39 and representatives from their London embassies made personal calls on the Mayor of Kensington and Chelsea.40 Ultimately, none of the three governments, British, Polish or Soviet, was in a position to exert effective pressure on the Council. Even the latter two governments were persuaded that continued attempts to persuade the Council to change or modify their plans might result in public controversy far more damaging than the erection of the memorial itself.41 When the Secretary of State, Mr. James Callaghan, met the visiting Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in late March 1976, the Soviet Foreign Minister did not raise the matter.42 On 5 April, in anticipation of the memorial’s completion, Mr. Louis FitzGibbon of the Katyn Memorial Fund asked the Ministry of Defence about Service representation at the unveiling, planned for 18 September 1976.43 The FCO advised the MoD against any official representation: ‘if HMG were to make any move which might be taken as official support for the memorial project, our political relations with both the USSR and xi

Poland could be severely affected’.44 Field-Marshal Sir Michael Carver, Chief of the Defence Staff, confirmed, that with 'regret’, it would 'not be possible for the three Services to be represented’.45 Lord St. Oswald received a similarly negative reply from the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Roy Mason.46 The inauguration of the foundation stone of the Katyn Memorial in Gunnersbury took place on 1 July 1976. Despite increased pressure in the next few months from Katyn supporters in Parliament, the Katyn Committee and members of the public, the Government’s decision not to be represented at the unveiling remained unchanged. On 17 September, the day before the ceremony, the FCO issued a statement to the press: 'The decision not to be represented is in no way intended to diminish the very great respect and gratitude which the British Government has felt and will continue to feel for the sacrifices of our Polish allies during the Second World War. LIMG has consistently expressed its deep revulsion at the tragic massacre of Katyn.’47 The Government’s reluctance to be The Katyn Memorial Gunnersbury represented officially was shared by her NATO allies. The US Government was an exception, being represented by a junior Private Secretary. ,

Official Soviet official reaction to the unveiling of the memorial was muted; the Polish Government was equally taciturn. Norman Reddaway, HM Ambassador in Warsaw, reported that, though the unveiling provoked little official reaction in Poland, widespread access to Western radio meant that 'many Poles know all about it’. The Ambassador speculated that although the Soviet authorities were angry that the memorial had materialised, the Polish Government’s own reaction was somewhat different: 'For they have had it both ways; officially the British Government has shown that it does not wish to lend support to a case which remains technically unproven, and as a result it is most unlikely that any complications will result for our bilateral relations. At the same time, there has been massive publicity for a cause which is undoubtedly close to all Polish hearts (including, I suspect, the very nationalist hearts of Polish communists); and the finger has clearly been pointed at the Russians.’

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Reddaway concluded that although 'most Poles could understand the pressures by the Soviets on HMG not to associate themselves with the memorial, they were inevitably saddened that we had not felt able to support a venture which, at last, did justice to the dead of Katyn by indicating where the guilt lies’.48 The Minister of State, Lord GoronwyRoberts, commented on this despatch that while there remained inconclusive evidence for the responsibility of Katyn, 'our own position can only remain as it is, and even if positive proof emerged, we would not have a special function of endorsement’.49 Meanwhile, within the UK the lack of official British representation at the unveiling provoked critical media comment, some expressions of public dissatisfaction and a flurry of Parliamentary Questions.50 Sir Frederic Bennett MP, Vice-Chairman of the Katyn Memorial Fund Committee, called for a Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate responsibility for Katyn. In an internal minute, the Head of the FCO’s News Department commented: It was right that I IMG should not be drawn into the unveiling and all that. It will continue to be right for HMG not to get officially involved with the emigre nostalgia and its political backing. But if it is the case that there is now no reasonable doubt about where the responsibility for the massacre lies, could we not use an appropriate PQ to get ourselves o ff the hook, i.e. to get away from the deadpan repetition o f a verdict o f ‘not proven’ and indicate that we accept the overwhelming burden o f evidence o f Soviet guilt?5l

The Head of EESD, however, contended that 'Governments cannot ascribe responsibility on a basis of probability, but only of an objective assessment of conclusive evidence. It is a simple fact that responsibility for the massacre has never been proved.’52 Other senior officials concurred: 'Any variation from the public line taken by successive British Governments in the past’, wrote one, 'will do some damage to AngloSoviet and Anglo-Polish relations . . . Ministers will also be open to the charge of inconsistency’.53 It was agreed that any statement or answer to Parliamentary Questions should maintain the line that 'HMG consider that this is not a matter on which it is appropriate for the Government to pronounce judgement’.54 On 11 October 1976, the new Secretary of State, Mr. Anthony Crosland, replied in this sense to two PQs tabled by Mr. John Biggs-Davison MP, both on the subject of representation of HMG and the Armed Forces at the unveiling of the Katyn memorial. Mr. Crosland added that:

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The memorial bears the Polish national emblem in a manner derogatory to the present Polish Government ... If the memorial had been simply a memorial to the dead, 1 should have gladly authorised official attendance at it. But it was clear that the purpose o f the memorial was wider than simply to honour the dead at Katyn.55

After the initial flurry of criticism, reaction to the Katyn Memorial subsided. Periodically, allegations of new evidence incriminating the Soviets appeared in the press, but without specific reference to the British Government.56 This lull was broken in 1979 with the election of a Conservative Government led by Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. As an administration perceived by many as far more sympathetic to the views of the Katyn campaigners, the issues of Service representation and Ministerial attendance at the annual Katyn commemoration became prominent once again. On 14 June 1979 Lord St. Oswald wrote to Air. Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Defence, requesting that the Band of The Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars play at the annual commemoration held at the Katyn Memorial in Gunnersbury in September.57 Though FCO officials remained reluctant to sanction any official British presence at the ceremony, Conservative Ministers proved more forthcoming, and in July the AloD was advised that a military band should indeed attend the ceremony.58 On 4 September, the FCO News Department announced that the Band of The Queen’s Royal Irish Plussars would play at the annual commemoration at the Katyn Memorial as a 'gesture of respect to our Polish allies who died in the Second World War’. This implied 'no attribution by the British Government of responsibility for the massacre at Katyn, a matter on which the present government, like their predecessors, have no definite position’.59 The question of a Ministerial presence at the commemoration was more contentious. On 10 September 1979 the Secretary of State, Lord Carrington, advised Airs Thatcher against a Alinisterial presence, as this 'would be difficult to reconcile with the Government’s position that, like its predecessors, it has no definite view as regards the attribution of guilt for the Katyn massacre’.60 The Prime Alinister’s Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) responded on 12 September: The Prime Minister does not agree that there should be no Ministerial presence at this year’s ceremony. It was at her wish that Mr. Airey Neave attended the unveiling in 1976 and was present again last year. The Prime Minister wishes a junior Minister to be present this year . . . The Prime Minister will want to review the matter again next year and may then decide that a more senior Minister should be present.61

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Predictably, the presence at the ceremony of both the band and a Minister, Mr. Geoffrey Pattie, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force,62 provoked hostile comment from the Polish and Soviet Embassies in London. The latter remarked that 'this small matter of the Katyn ceremony would not help the climate of AngloSoviet relations’.63 A similar pattern evolved in 1980. Senior officials again advised against sending an official representative to the memorial ceremony, particularly in view of the provocative wording of the invitation ('the 40th Anniversary of the murder of 15,000 Polish prisoners of war by the NKWD [j/V]’).

‘But’, the Deputy Under-Secretary added, referring to the Prime Minister, 'she probably won’t agree’.64 The Minister of State, Mr. Peter Blaker, although sympathetic to officials’ arguments, finally opted to follow 1979 practice, 'based on an assumption that the Prime Minister will react this year similarly to the way in which she reacted last year’.65 The MoD’s view that official representation should, as in 1979, be at junior Minister level was endorsed by Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington.66 The band of The Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars played at the Katyn Memorial commemoration in September 1980 and a junior Defence Minister, Mr. Barney Hayhoe, represented the Government.

As in 1979, the presence of a Minister and military band at the ceremony troubled Moscow and Warsaw. On 18 September the Soviet Embassy in London expressed 'the Soviet Government’s regret at this obviously unfriendly action by the British Government’.67 The Polish Government, too, was keen to avoid any heightening of tensions with the USSR at a time when its own internal political upheavals were already attracting hostile attention.68 Mr. Marian Dobrosielski, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador in London, complained to Mr. Kenneth Pridham, HM Ambassador in Poland, that ‘Poland was being used as an instrument for the creation of tension with the USSR at this very delicate stage of international relations’.69 The political significance of Katyn for intra-Eastern relations, however, was already being overshadowed by the broader tensions developing within the Soviet bloc.

Solidarity, Glasnost and the Soviet Admission, 1980-92 During the 1980s the question of responsibility for the Katyn massacre acquired a symbolic importance in die context of dynamic developments within the Soviet bloc. This was particularly true in Poland itself, where the mass expression of joy and enthusiasm that had greeted the Papal election of Karol Wojtyla, the Cardinal Archbishop of Cracow, in 1978 xv

was iii sharp contrast to the growing intolerance and distrust of ordinary Poles for the Communist regime. The independent trade union Solidarity, emerging from the frustration engendered from years of industrial strife coupled with fresh anger arising from food price hikes, had attracted 10 million members. It was banned following the military crackdown of 13 December 1981 and the proclamation of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the new Military Council of National Salvation.

Meanwhile, the unofficial and illegal annual celebrations of the April anniversary of the discovery of the bodies at Katyn grew larger each year.70 Just as the impetus for any lasting change in the Polish political situation had to come from the Soviet Union, so too did any initiative for the resolution of the Katyn controversy. The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 and his initiation of a policy of Glasnost (Openness) was to prove crucial for Poland and for the Katyn issue. At a meeting in Moscow on 21 April 1987, Jaruzelski and Gorbachev agreed to the creation of a joint Soviet-Polish Historical Commission to enquire into ‘blank spots’ in the history of their bilateral relations. These included controversial matters such as the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which led to the partition of Poland, the subsequent deportation of more than one million Poles to the Soviet Union in 1939-1941, and the Red Army’s failure to relieve the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. They also agreed to investigate the Katyn Massacre.71 In the UK, the 1980s saw dwindling public, press and Parliamentary interest in Katyn, although the Historians and Research Analysts within the FCO continued to keep a close watch on emerging evidence or documentation. The issue was brought back to official, as well as public attention, in 1988. Mr. Gorbachev’s forthcoming visit to Poland from 1116 July prompted interest in Parliament and speculation that he would raise the Katyn issue. A brief for the Secretary of State, Sir Geoffrey Howe, correctly concluded that it was ‘premature’ to look for an admission of Soviet responsibility at this stage.72 Indeed, Gorbachev made little reference during his visit to the Historical Commission’s work, though he described Soviet-Polish relations as being more ‘open and filled with commitment’ in an address on 11 July.73 On 11 July 1988 in the House of Lords, Lord Chelwood asked the Government whether they had reached any conclusions about responsibility for the Katyn massacre. Lord Glenarthur, Minister of State in the FCO, replied: xvi

Successive British Governments have made clear their shock and repugnance at the Katyn massacre. None o f the studies to date has produced conclusive evidence o f responsibility, nor the fate o f those interned in Ostashkov and Starobielsk. We await with interest the findings o f the joint Soviet-Polish Historical Commission which, we understand, is currently studying the matter.7"*

This reply provoked critical comment. Professor Norman Davies of the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies at the University of London, wrote to Lord Glenarthur on 20 July expressing doubts about the effectiveness of the Commission, ‘an inter-Party body, with not a single independent historian to its name’.75 A covering minute by Eastern European Department (EED) acknowledged: The implication o f Professor Davies’s remarks, i.e., that we should not trust the findings o f the Commission, may be justified. The Commission has been set up by the two regimes, it will not be given access to anything the Soviet authorities do not wish to have examined, and its workings may be subject to official pressures from both sides. Nevertheless there is some evidence that both Governments may now be willing to see the truth about Katyn revealed, and that the Commission will gain access to further archival evidence that still exists— if any exists at all, which must be open to considerable doubt— and there is at least a fair chance that the Commission will produce a reasonably objective assessment.76

Lord Glenarthur’s reply also prompted strong criticism from Lord Bethell and others who believed that Ministerial attendance at the annual ceremony at the Katyn Memorial since 1979 implied acknowledgement of Soviet responsibility.77 Lord Bethell wrote to Mr. Charles Powell, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary: Our Foreign Office, even in 1943, amid the demands o f war, was pretty well convinced o f Soviet guilt for the Katyn massacre. Since the war other evidence has emerged to support this conclusion, including a Commission o f Fnquiry set up by the United States Congress. There is no Western historian, to my knowledge, who still believes that Nazi Germany was responsible . . . I was quite surprised when the FCO came up with the old T976 answer’ to Tufton Chelwood’s PQ on the matter . . . I do hope that the FCO will now take another look at this vexed question and decide to change the wording o f the answer put forward whenever the question is asked.78

XVII

Reproduced from u Memorandum of ilie Polish Government-in-Exile ‘Facts and Documents Concerning Polish Prisoners o f War captured by the USSR, during the 1939 Campaign ’

Preparing a response, the Head of Eastern European Department submitted that: ‘The main argument for maintaining the present position is that no new evidence has appeared which would justify such a shift . . .

The chief argument for modifying our position is that the Soviet Union itself appears to be willing to re-examine the question.’ He noted that Sir Bryan Cartledge, HM Ambassador in Moscow, favoured a ‘tactical shift.

He thinks that a British statement hinting that Stalin was responsible would avoid difficulties with the current Soviet Government.’ The Head of EED recommended a reply to Lord Bethell accepting the ‘significant historical evidence pointing at Soviet guilt’, but stressing that the evidence remained ‘inconclusive’.79 On this basis the Assistant Under-Secretary xvui

advised the Secretary of State: ‘there are no new objective factors to justify a change in our public line. Any such change would be based on a subjective decision that in domestic political terms it is expedient to do so.’ He noted, however, ‘the new element’: ‘the “Gorbachev factor”, i.e. the possibility—I put it no higher—that the Russians may before long be prepared to face the truth (if that is what it is) in this matter as they are beginning to do in others’.80 The Secretary of State approved a modification of the position that there was insufficient evidence to accuse the Soviet Union of responsibility: ‘the time has come to point the finger more clearly at the Russians’.81 The Prime Minister concurred.82 The modified line was deployed in answers to PQs put by Mr. David Atkinson, MP and Lord Chelwood on 27 August 1988. The latter hoped that the Government could ‘go further’ than the reply to his PQ of 11 July. Lord Glenarthur responded: There is indeed substantial circumstantial evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility for the killings. We look to the Soviet/Polish commission on Katyn to settle the question once and for all.83

It was acknowledged that the Government could be asked whether this amounted to a change in the official view on responsibility for Katyn and if so, why. The Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Geoffrey Howe noted: Since we cannot o f course point to any new evidence, the Secretary o f State considers that it would be better to take the line that our view has not changed; all we have done is to acknowledge the substantial circumstantial evidence; and (as in the PQ) we look to the Commission to settle the matter once and for all.84

Lord Glenarthur’s reference to the ‘substantial circumstantial evidence’ of Soviet responsibility received a ‘low-key but generally favourable’ reception in the media. Looking further afield, EED noted that: ‘France and Italy report little public interest and a neutral government stance. The West Germans are convinced of Soviet responsibility but (like the Danes) take the view that this is a matter for historians. The State Department’s informal view is that the available evidence points to Soviet responsibility.

Our new line therefore takes us somewhat further from the European and closer to the US line.’85 Interest now focussed on the work of the Soviet-Polish Historical Commission. Mr. S.J. Barrett, LIM Ambassador in Warsaw, reported the publication in the Warsaw weekly Odrod^enie on 16 February 1989 of the 1943 Red Cross report on the Katyn massacre, with a short introduction xix

by Professor Jarema Maciszewski, head of the Polish side of the Historical Commission. The Ambassador commented: This is the first time that the sensitive 1940 date for the Katyn massacre has appeared in an official publication in Poland. The publication o f the document is a remarkable step by the Poles given that the question is the subject o f research by the joint Polish/Soviet Commission. This move was foreshadowed by a recent article in the Government daily which called for the release o f Polish material on Katyn without waiting for the results o f the joint Commission’s work ... it demonstrates Polish impatience with the lack o f apparent progress on Katyn ... 'The clear implication is that blame for the delay lies with the Soviet side.86

Odrodqenie also published a commentary by Professor Wlodzimierz Kowalski, stating that the copy of the report now in the Public Record Office had been passed to the Foreign Office in June 1945 but had been ‘classified’. This was picked up by the British press on 17 February87 and aroused the interest of the Minister of State, Mr. William Waldegrave: Is this new evidence? Is it true that the FCO kept the Polish Red Cross report in secret files to avoid damaging Anglo-Soviet relations at a sensitive time? Is it true that the report was sent to Mr. Hankey, who sent it to London where it was filed? Should we finally change our position on Russian guilt over Katyn, and if these allegations are true come clean and show a bit o f British glasnost?88

The Head of EB’D explained to Mr Waldegrave that the Polish Red Cross Report had been passed to the Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw, Mr. R.M. Hankey, by Air. Skarzynski, Secretary General of the Polish Red Cross in 1943. In 1946, Mr. Hankey passed it to London, where it was classified fop Secret because Air. Hankey warned that ‘if it were known that Mr. Skarzynski had given us a copy, his life would be in danger’. The report had, however, been publicly available for over twelve years, having been transferred to the Public Record Office in 1977. Aloreover, ‘most (if not all) of its significant evidence has been in the public domain for many years’ as Skarzynski had given a comprehensive testimony, covering 30 pages of the transcript, to the 1952 US House of Representatives Select Committee hearing on Katyn.89 In regard to ‘British glasnost’ over the question of Russian guilt, EED argued that there was:

xx

[A] broad consensus among experts that the circumstantial evidence for Soviet responsibility for the massacre is overwhelming. But there is no proof.

The Polish side o f the Polish-Soviet historical commission which is looking at Katyn and other ‘blank spots’ in Polish/Soviet history has urged the Soviet side to give it access to Soviet archives (likely to be those o f the NKVD or Soviet military intelligence) which might contain such proof. So far they have not succeeded.

The publication of the Red Cross report in Poland with Professor Maciszewski’s introduction constituted an ‘unprecedented indication of Polish impatience’: For the first time, the Polish authorities have acknowledged that there is evidence pointing to Soviet guilt. There are reports in today’s British press that in another remarkable move, the Polish authorities have decided to change the wording and date on the Warsaw memorial to the victims of Katyn.

The Soviet position was also evolving: Moscow Radio on 20 February carried a piece on the Polish Red Cross report which referred to evidence that the massacre could have taken place in early 1940. If so, “there could only be one perpetrator, the N KVD”. This is a remarkable development which may indicate that the USSR is about to admit responsibility. On the other hand it may not; it is clear that there has been a fierce internal debate in Moscow over Katyn.w

The Head of EED suggested that the British Government’s line should remain unchanged, but anticipated future pressure if the Commission’s progress was slow, and possible questions ‘from the Katyn lobby or even the USSR, on whether we ourselves are still withholding any evidence on Katyn’. Library and Records Department (LRD) were requested to investigate,91 and Mr. Waldegrave asked to be kept informed. Meanwhile, he agreed to maintain the current line on Katyn, though remarking that T don’t think Britain’s role has been very glorious in this’.92 Mr. Waldegrave’s comments were circulated to Sir Geoffrey ITowe, who recalled his own view that the ‘old line was untenable’.93 Developments concerning Katyn were proceeding apace in Poland.

Following articles in the official press, such as the Odrod^enie articles and a feature in the weekly Polityka on 18 February pointing to Soviet responsibility for the massacre, the Polish Government seemed to be moving towards an official accusation of the Soviet Union. At a press conference on 21 February, the Government’s press spokesman, Mr. Jerzy Urban, referred to Polish press articles and the Radio Moscow xxi

commentary acknowledging the Polish Red Cross report as strong circumstantial evidence of NKVD guilt for Katyn. This led EED to comment: ‘The Polish authorities appear to have decided that unilateral action over Katyn is now the best way of prompting progress over the question on the Soviet side/94 HM Embassy in Warsaw also reported a speech on 24 February 1989 by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Olechowski, who said that the historical blank spots in Polish-Soviet relations remained a continuing concern to the Polish authorities who hoped for an acceleration in the work of the Joint Commission. Moreover, a plethora of items on Katyn appeared in the Polish press in late February leading an Embassy official to assert that: The Poles have certainly broken the silence in no mean fashion, and the press is now full of items on Katyn. These abound in hints, allusions and descriptions of circumstantial evidence. But the Polish authorities have stopped short of pronouncing on Soviet responsibility.

That remains a matter for the Joint Commission/95 As Solidarity and the Polish opposition were holding round-table talks with the Party and Polish Government in Warsaw, talks which were to result in the collapse of Communism in Poland, the Joint Commission met in Moscow between 28 February and 2 March 1989. Mr. Urban informed a press conference on 7 March that the Polish historians had presented the Soviet side with an experts’ report on the Polish and Western documents relating to Katyn, and that in the view of the Polish side, ‘everything indicated that the crimes were perpetrated by the NKVD’. However, a communiqué issued that same day following a Politburo meeting cautioned that ‘the work of the Joint Commission could not be accomplished under the pressure of stirred emotions. Blank spots should not be used for anti-Soviet aims.’ A report to the FCO from Warsaw noted: Through Urban, the Polish authorities have for the first time placed the blame for Katyn directly on the Russians ... The latest meeting of the Joint Commission does not appear to have produced the desired move on the Soviet side and the Polish side must resign themselves to a further wait’.96 In the autumn of 1989 when the first Solidarity Government had been formed, there were further developments on Katyn in Poland. On 30 September in the Sejm (Polish Parliament), the Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kulski, ‘gave one of the clearest statements yet from the Polish Government on the Katyn question’. Mr. Kulski reiterated Mr Urban’s earlier reference to NKVD responsibility for the XXII

massacre and stressed the need to uncover the full truth about the crime as quickly as possible and to punish those responsible. The Polish Government had asked the Soviet Union several times to reveal all their archival evidence, and believed that the Katyn question raised not only moral but also social, political and legal issues. ‘The Government’, he promised, ‘will spare no efforts to ensure that the truth is fully revealed to the satisfaction of all Poles, that compensation is guaranteed for the victims and their families and that those responsible for the crime are sent to trial’.97 On 12 October 1989, the Polish press reported that the Polish Prosecutor General had forwarded a request through diplomatic channels to his Soviet opposite number for an investigation into the Katyn massacre. The request referred to Polish and Soviet international obligations, on the grounds that Katyn constituted ‘genocide’ and as such was not subject to statutory limitations.98 In a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow on 23 November, Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity Prime Minister since August, requested an honest appraisal of past crimes and misdeeds. Mr Gorbachev replied that he was ‘more than ready to cooperate’.99 Nevertheless, as the months passed and the April anniversary approached, there was still no sign of the Joint Commission’s report, leading Professor Norman Davies to write on 27 March 1990: ‘I wonder, in fact, whether it is not time for the FCO to rely on its own judgement.’100 In reply, Mr. Waldegrave maintained that he saw ‘no need for a particular statement to mark the 50th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, unless new evidence emerges by then which turns the substantial circumstantial evidence of Soviet responsibility into conclusive proof.101 In the early spring of 1990, unofficial reports from the Soviet Union indicated that the Soviet Government might acknowledge Stalin’s responsibility for the Katyn massacre to mark the 50th anniversary of the killings in April. These rumours proved correct. During President Jaruzelski’s official visit to the Soviet Union between 12 and 16 April, Mr. Gorbachev presented him with copies of documentary material concerning Katyn,102 and on 13 April TASS issued a historic statement:

xxm

The question o f clarifying the circumstances surrounding the deaths o f Polish officers, interned in September 1939, has been raised over a long period o f time in meetings between representatives o f the Polish and Soviet Governments and more widely in public. Historians from the two countries have been engaged in the thorough research o f the Katyn tragedy, including a search for documents. Very recently Soviet archivists and historians have discovered documents concerning Polish soldiers, who were held in the Kozelski, Starobelski and Ostashkovski camps by the Soviet NKVD. It emerges from these documents that in Apnl-May 1939, out o f about 15,000 Polish officers, held in these three camps, 394 were transferred to the Gryazovetski [Griazovietz) camp. The remainder were ‘handed over’ to the NKVD responsible for the Smolensk, Voroshilovograd and Kalinin regions and were never mentioned in NKVD records again.

The archive material as a whole leads to the conclusion that responsibility for the crimes o f Katyn belonged to Beria, Merkulov and their assistants.10^ The Soviet side expresses deep regret over the Katyn tragedy and declares that it is one o f the most serious crimes o f Stalinism. Copies o f the discovered documents will be handed over to the Polish side. The search for the archive material will c o n tin u e .“*

The British Ambassador in Warsaw observed Polish reactions to the statement: Many o f the published reactions from politicians and historians have emphasised that the Soviet statement is by itself insufficient and opens as many questions as it answers. [The Solidarity Trade Union Chairman| Walesa in a statement somewhat cooler in tone than |the Government Spokeswoman| Niezabitowska’s, called the Soviet statement ‘a long awaited act o f moral justice’, but pointed to several important issues which remained outstanding: punishment o f those responsible for the massacre, compensation for families o f the victims and free access to sites o f the atrocities in the Soviet Union . . . Not surprisingly the positive response to the confession has been muted by a feeling that it was long overdue.

Nevertheless, the act o f coming clean, however belatedly, provides a necessary foundation for the development o f normal bilateral relations.*05

The Polish press also criticised Britain’s role, claiming that the ‘Foreign Office has long had access to proof of NKVD responsibility but refused to recognise this officially’. Similar allegations were made in the British press. On 18 April 1990, Mr. Waldegrave asked the PUS, Sir Patrick Wright, ‘if we think that our rather legalistic and mealy-mouthed approach to this issue over the last 45 years has actually paid any dividends in terms of relations with the Soviet Union or with the Poles? Are there any lessons to learn for the future?106 In response, the PUS asked the FCO’s xxiv

Research and Analysis Department 'to look at the attitude taken to this over the years, and to form a judgement’.107 On 23 May 1990 the FCO’s Director of Research submitted to the PUS his response to Mr. Waldegrave’s questions about the impact of HMG’s Katyn policy on relations with the Poles and Soviets.

He took account of a minute of 24 April by the head of the FCO Historians, who, after placing successive positions on Katyn in the context of emerging evidence, commented that: 'When considering the merits of the 1943-1988 line on Katyn, it is worth noticing Lord Aberdare’s observation in 1971 that “Governments are not at liberty to voice half-formed views, speculations or suspicions” though “historians are free to discuss this mystery and no doubt they will continue to do so”.’108 The Director of Research explained that until 1988 HMG’s policy was to suspend judgement because 'conclusive evidence’ Lavrenti Beria was lacking. 'But’, he conceded, 'clearly, political factors also played a part’, which varied according to the times: the wartime alliance; the wish to avoid ‘unproductive anti-Soviet propaganda’; and the desire not to upset relations with the Soviet Union during the years of détente in the 1970s. Though the Director of Research admitted that ‘HMG’s approach on Katyn until 1988 was, as Mr. Waldegrave says, mealy-mouthed’, it was not, he suggested, 'much out of line with that of our major allies’. This policy had 'succeeded in postponing Katyn as an explicit issue in our relations with the Soviet Union and Poland until the 1970s’ but ‘it brought no particular Vsevolod Merkulov benefit to British interests. The question perhaps is what real damage might have been done to British relations with the Soviet Union or Poland, or more widely, if Ministers had gone further, earlier than 1988 and in isolation from our major allies, towards acknowledging the weight of evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility’:

XXV

Any shift in our policy not supported by our allies would certainly have caused surface tension, for a time, in bilateral relations with both the Soviet Union and Poland. In the absence o f any fresh and conclusive evidence, there would have been accusations that this was a deliberately unfriendly act, politically motivated, an attempt to sabotage détente etc. ... In relations with the Soviet Union, real British interests might have suffered. A contract or two might have gone elsewhere. And our allies might have felt that we were gratuitously complicating the atmosphere e.g. at the CSCE negotiations.109

The Head of the FCO’s Library and Records Department (LRD) did not entirely agree, however. There was little evidence in the FCO archive, he noted, to suggest that—excepting the period of the Second World War— Britain’s allies had any significant influence on her Katyn policy: ‘Keeping in step with our Allies may have been implicit, [but] it was not explicitly considered in the papers I have seen’, he concluded.110 The Director of Research also addressed the question of why LIMG’s attitude to the massacres had apparently remained so constant, if not indeed ossified: The main lesson to be leamt, perhaps, is that any longstanding policy should be regularly re-assessed, especially if it is in any way controversial, and looked at again with special care if background circumstances are undergoing a process o f change . . . But once the Russians had agreed to investigate the issue jointly with the Poles, the odds against an eventual proof or admission o f Soviet guilt shortened considerably. The Government would have been badly wrong-footed if our line had not changed well before the Russians did, in the end, admit to what they had done.111

Again, however, the Head of LRD demured: if the main lesson o f Katyn is that long-standing policies should be regularly re-assessed ... then the lesson has already been well learned since few policies can have been so regularly dusted o ff and re-examined as Katyn. Present concern would appear to be more about why the FCO did not come up with a different answer before 1988 rather than how many times the question was looked at. The weak link in the chain seems to be the drift from 1979 onwards which demonstrates the well-known problem o f trying to have it both ways and not changing policies with which, at the time, we are comfortable.112

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XXV11

Britain’s refusal to attribute blame for the Katyn massacres was, he concluded, less conditioned by fears of damaging Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-Polish relations, and more due to the philosophy, articulated by Lord Aberdare in 1971, that it was ‘not the responsibility of Governments to act as a sort of historical arbiter ... [which] could create a dangerous precedent’. Mr. Waldegrave remained unconvinced, describing the Aberdare comments as ‘the sort of nonsense that politicians should not be allowed to talk: our line was not value-free itself, and being tough about precedents is what ministers are employed for’.113 The Secretary of State himself, Mr. Douglas Hurd, agreed: ‘we have learned that we should be braver about separating our need to deal with tyrannies from our need to avoid offence to them’.114 In )une 1990 further evidence of Soviet culpability emerged with the discovery of the mass graves of 3,920 Starobelsk Poles near the village of Piatikhatki on the outskirts of Kharkov. In the same month the bodies of 6,200 Ostashkov Poles were unearthed at Mednoye near Kalinin (now Tver).115 The grim fate of the Poles in the Starobelsk and Ostashkov camps had finally become certain. More was to come. In October 1992, HM Embassy in Warsaw reported that the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, had sent Mr. Lech Walesa, the Polish President, ‘proof that Stalin ordered the Katyn massacres and claims that his successors, including Gorbachev, suppressed the truth’. This telegram stated that ‘the most significant document is described by the Polish press as a Politburo decision, dated 5 March 1940, authorising the shooting of 14,700 Polish officers and 11,000 other imprisoned Poles’. The document was signed by Stalin and the NKVD chief, Beria, among others. In addition, there was a second folder of documents which ‘reportedly demonstrate that all CPSU General Secretaries, including Gorbachev, knew of the existence’ of the incriminating 1940 document. According to a 1959 KGB report, some 21,857 Poles had been murdered by the NKVD after March 1940. The Ambassador commented: The Katyn massacres are the most sensitive point in recent Russo-Polish relations. These documents merely confirm Polish certainties, and the Poles are well aware that they are being used by Yeltsin to attack Gorbachev and the Communist Party. Nonetheless there is a genuine sense o f gratitude to Yeltsin for having righted a wrong. It remains to be seen whether there will now be claims for compensation from the victims’ families.116

Although Russian media coverage of the disclosure focused upon Mr. Yeltsin’s political motives in aiming to ‘counteract enduring sympathy for xxvm

Gorbachev in the West’, the historical relevance was not entirely obscured. Sir Brian Fall, HM Ambassador in Moscow, wrote that the ‘horror’ of Katyn ‘competes for attention’ with later reports to successive General Secretaries, from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Gorbachev, ‘on the need to prevent the truth coming out’. Sir Brian continued: ‘The documents were kept in “File Number One”, held in a special section of the Central Committee’s secret archive, with outside access limited to the General Secretary of the CPSU in person . . . The substance of these revelations . . . underlines Yeltsin’s status as the man who put an end to Soviet Communism’s cover-ups’.117 Moscow’s revelations of 1990 and 1992, coupled with the further discoveries of mass graves, led to renewed Parliamentary and public interest in the availability of British records about Katyn. James Pawsey MP asked four PQs on the subject between November 1990 and 1991,118 and Louis FitzGibbon, the prominent Katyn author and campaigner, continued to allege a British Government cover-up over knowledge of the massacre.119 Indeed, it was noted in December 1992 that since the Soviet admission in April 1990 no less than 13 PQs had been asked on a variety of Katyn related subjects, some pertaining to issues of responsibility and others to the possibility that perpetrators were resident in the UK. When some questioners asked about the availability of records, the Head of the FCO Historians stated that, although eight papers were retained by the FCO from 1943 on Polish-Soviet relations, only one of these concerned Katyn, and was ‘withheld for reasons of provenance rather than content’.120 All these papers were re-reviewed during 1993, and in response to further questions from Mr. Pawsey the Minister of State, Mr. Alastair Goodlad, confirmed in July 1994 that six previously closed files would be available at the Public Record Office from late August. It was also confirmed that none of the remaining files in the FCO related to the Katyn massacre, and that to the best of the FCO’s knowledge' there were no files on Katyn over thirty years old which were not in the public domain.121

Katyn, 1992-2003 Although 1992 ended all speculation as to the facts, the issue has continued to provoke controversy. The release to the Public Record Office in 1995 of formerly retained SOE archives, including material on Katyn, provoked a critical reaction in the Polish press and elsewhere and renewed allegations that the British Government had always been aware that the massacre had been perpetrated by the Soviet authorities. The

xxix

President of the Federation of Poles in Great Britain, Dr. Zygmunt Szkopiak, protested on these lines in a letter of 30 June 1995 to the Prime Minister, Mr. John Major. In response Mr. Major asked for an examination of the SOE documentation, but following a review of the documents the FCO Plistorians reported on 20 September 1995 that there was ‘nothing new in the SOE papers as regards the question of Soviet guilt: indeed, these papers are far less explicit or categoric than the equivalent FO material, long since released into the public domain’.122 In his reply to Dr. Szkopiak on 19 December 1995, the Prime Minister acknowledged that: For many people, both here and in Poland, Katyn is a subject on which feelings remain very strong. This is entirely understandable, and I asked for an examination o f the SOE papers to see if they had in any way affected the British Government’s policy on the Katyn tragedy . . . close study o f the papers has revealed nothing new about the Government’s policy on the question o f Soviet guilt. . .123

The position was further clarified in the FCO History Note published in February 1996: FO and SOE records make clear what line HM Government took, and the political and legal considerations behind it. These records are in the public domain and nothing in recently released papers conflicts with statements made by the British Government on Katyn in 1943 or thereafter. There was no question o f a “cover-up”. Until 1990, HM Government accepted that conclusive proof o f Soviet guilt would only be obtained with the full cooperation o f the Soviet Government. When such cooperation seemed as if it might be forthcoming in 1987 ... the British Government stated that “there was indeed substantial circumstantial evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility for the killings”. 124

The year 2000, the 60th anniversary of the killings, saw further public interest in Katyn and important statements by both the Polish and Russian Governments. In April, the Polish President, Mr. A. Kwasniewski, apologised in a speech for the ‘Katyn lie’ perpetuated by successive Communist governments. Poland’s Parliament passed a resolution thanking Polish émigrés for having had the courage to uncover the truth, and also expressing gratitude to the US Congress for appointing the House of Representatives Select Committee in the 1950s. A Research Department minute noted that the resolution ‘did not refer to the UK . . . but perhaps we were conspicuous by our absence from it’.’125

xxx

In a letter to the Secretary of State of 12 May 2000, Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Katyn Association, criticised British policy in the past and insisted that the Government should ‘find a way without an apology of expressing regret that the cover-up lasted as long as it did under successive Governments’.126 Mr. Cook agreed: ‘I personally have never doubted that Stalin was responsible for the Katyn massacres’, he wrote and conceded that ‘previous administrations could have been more candid earlier about Soviet guilt.127 Acknowledging the sensitivity of the issue and expressing a commitment to greater openness on the issue he instructed the FCO Historians to revise the existing History Note to reflect these sentiments and to lay bare the considerations that governed British policy.128 However legalistic or excessively equivocal HMG’s official position on Soviet responsibility for Katyn may have appeared to some, there is no doubt that British Ministers and officials remained—from the German discovery of the bodies in 1943 onwards—appalled by the atrocities committed at Katyn and elsewhere. Until the Soviet admission of culpability in 1990, the British Government had no evidence which conclusively proved Moscow’s responsibility, however likely their guilt seemed to most observers. Still less could British policymakers provide any substantive explanation for the Soviet killings, beyond general observations on the criminal cruelty of Stalin’s regime and the violent paranoia of its leader. It has been suggested that the Soviet leader, mindful of Communist Russia’s defeat before Warsaw in 1920, wanted the captured Polish officers—‘hardened and uncompromising enemies of Soviet authority’, as Beria described them—executed for fear that they would form a kernel of resistance to Moscow’s invasion.129 Speculation has also fallen on sinister Gestapo/NKVD collusion, arising out of the 1939 Pact, a thesis to which Rohan Butler himself was not entirely unsympathetic.130 But neither a definitive explanation for Soviet actions, nor categorical proof of their guilt, lay in the British archives, and in the absence of such evidence the British Government remained unwilling to make an authoritative statement on the provenance of the massacres.

Instead, HMG sought to open up to public scrutiny as much of their documentation on Katyn as they could, on the basis that it was not so much ‘the function of governments to enter into historical debates, as to xxxi

make the records available on which that debate can be pursued by others’.131 Though ultimately the full truth of what really happened in the forest of Katyn in 1940—and why—can only be answered from the Russian archives, the publication of this history represents a British contribution to promoting further understanding of a terrible event in Polish—and European—history.

1 F C O 1 lis to r y N o te , The Katyn Massacre: an S O E Perspective, N o . 10, ( 1 9 9 6 ) .

2 S e e Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D, Volume V ll ( H M S O , 1 9 5 6 ), p p .2 4 6 - 2 4 7 .

3 O ’ M a lle y d e sp a tc h , 2 9 A p r il 1 9 4 3 , C 4 8 5 0 / 2 5 8 / 5 5 ( P R O F O 3 7 1 / 3 4 5 7 1 ) .

I Ib id . H o w e v e r , th is d id n o t m e a n th a t th e S o v ie ts had a b an d o n e d th e ir c la im to e a ste rn P o la n d and th e y p o in te d to the e le c tio n s o f O c to b e r 1 9 3 9 in ‘W e ste rn U k r a in e ’ a n d ‘W e s te rn W h ite R u s s i a ’ w h ic h p ro d u c e d N a tio n a l A s s e m b lie s th a t im m e d ia te ly p assed u n a n im o u s r e s o lu tio n s a p p e a lin g fo r a d m is s io n in to the S o v ie t U n io n .

D e s p ite

th e

te n se

a tm o sp h e re

and

irre g u la ritie s

su rro u n d in g

th e se

‘p le b is c ite s ’ , th e y

re m a in e d , in th e v ie w o f th e .Soviet a u th o r itie s , th e w a r tim e ju r id ic a l b a sis fo r the in c o rp o r a tio n o f th e se te rrito rie s in to th e S o v ie t U n io n . U ltim a te ly , e a ste rn P o la n d w a s o c c u p ie d by th e a d v a n c in g R e d A r m y in 1944.

T h e C u r z o n L i n e fr o n tie r , n a m e d a fte r th e p ro p o sa ls p ut by th e F o re ig n S e c re ta r y L o r d C u r z o n in

1 9 2 0 a n d ro u g h ly c o r re s p o n d in g to th e N a z i- S o v ie t d e m a r c a tio n lin e o f 1 9 3 9 , w a s agreed by th e A llie d le ad e rs a t T e h r a n (N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 ) a n d c o n fir m e d a t th e Y a lt a C o n fe re n c e (F e b ru a ry

1 9 4 5 ). In te r w a r

e a ste rn P o la n d w a s d iv id e d a m o n g th e L ith u a n ia n , B e lo r u s s ia n a n d U k r a in ia n S o v ie t S o c ia lis t R e p u b lic s a fte r 1 9 4 5 .

5 S . K o t , Conversations with the Kremlin and Despatches from Russia ( L o n d o n , 1 9 6 3 ) pp. 1 1 2 -1 1 4 , 143.

h P o lis h C u ltu r a l F o u n d a tio n , The Crime o f Katyn (L o n d o n , 1 9 6 5 ). S o m e 7 0 ,0 0 0 m e n and a ro u n d 4 4 ,0 0 0 c iv ilia n s , th e fa m ilie s o f so ld ie rs, le ft S o v ie t te rrito ry .

7 G e n e ra l S ik o r s k i In s titu te G S I . K O L I / D C N W / 4 4 , 1 5 .IV .4 3 . G e n e ra l W la d y s la w S ik o r s k i w a s P r im e M in is te r o f the P o lis h G o v e rn m e n t in E x ile fr o m its fo r m a tio n in P a r is in O c to b e r 1 9 3 9 a n d tr a n s fe r to L o n d o n in M a y 1 9 4 0 , u n til h is d e a th in J u l y 1 9 4 3 fo llo w in g an a ir c ra sh a t G ib ra lta r. * M e m o r a n d u m o f c o n v e r s a tio n b etw e e n P r im e M in is te r and G e n e ra l S ik o r s k i, 15 A p r il 1 9 4 3 , C 4 2 3 0 /2 5 8 /G 5 5 ( P R O F O 3 7 1 /3 4 5 6 8 ).

9 T e le g r a m to W a s h in g to n , 16 A p r il 1 9 4 3 , C 4 2 3 4 / 2 5 8 / 5 5 ( P R O F O 3 7 1 / 3 4 5 6 8 ) .

10 C h u r c h ill to E d e n , 2 8 A p r il 1 9 4 3 , C 4 7 9 8 / 2 5 8 / G 5 5 ( P R O F O 3 7 1 / 3 4 5 7 1 ) .

II R e p ro d u c e d in S e le c te d D o c u m e n ts .

1 ’ M r . I. C o lv in a n d e d ito ria l in Daily Telegraph, 5 J u l y 1 9 7 2 .

13 M in u te by M r . R o y le , 2 0 O c to b e r ’l 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

14 S e e p ara. 6 8 o f th e B u tl e r M e m o r a n d u m .

15 Pari. Debs, 5th ser.,

H. o f L ,

v o l. 3 2 0 , co l. 7 7 3 , and v o l. 3 2 2 , co l. 9 6 1 : see para. 2 o f th e B u tle r

M e m o ran d um .

16 R e s e a rc h D e p a r tm e n t M e m o r a n d u m , 31 Ja n u a r y 1 9 7 2 ; K a t y n M e m o r ia l F u n d A p p e a l p a m p h le t ( E N P

10/ 1).

17 E E S D m in u te , 2 5 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

18 C o rre sp o n d e n c e b e tw e e n N e a v e a n d D o u g la s -H o m e , 2 3 F e b ru a ry a n d 3 M a r c h 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

19 F itz G ib b o n ( K a ty n M e m o r ia l F u n d ) to D e p a rtm e n t o f th e E n v ir o n m e n t o f 2 3 M a y 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

20 E E S D s u b m is s io n , 1 1 J u l y 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

21 M o s c o w te le g ra m s N o s . 1 4 3 8 and 1 4 3 9 , 13 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10 /1 ); see a ls o Documents on British

Policy Overseas (D B P O ) Series 111, Volume 1 ( H M S O , 1 9 9 7 ), N o . 106. T h e P o lis h F o re ig n M in is te r , M r .

S te fa n O ls z o w s k i, r e in fo r c e d these s e n tim e n ts w h e n he sp o k e to S ir A le c D o u g la s - H o m e o n 2 5 S e p te m b e r d u rin g th e m e e tin g o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s S e c u r ity C o u n c il in N e w Y o r k . H e d e sc rib e d th e p ro je c t as ‘a m a tte r o f so m e p o litic a l d e lic a c y . T h e r e w a s a d an g e r th a t its re p e rc u s s io n s o n r e la tio n s w ith B r ita in a n d P o la n d a n d b e tw e e n B r ita in , P o la n d a n d the U S S R c o u ld c a u s e la s tin g d a m a g e .’ T h e S o v ie t A m b a s s a d o r in

xxxti

W a r s a w a ls o raise d th e issu e w ith

h is B r itis h c o u n te rp a rt, M r . T . F .

B r e n c h le y , c o m m e n tin g th a t the

m e m o r ia lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s p u rp o se w a s c le a rly p o litic a l a n d c o u ld d am a g e S o v ie t- P o lis h r e la tio n s .

S e e E E S D m in u te , 2 8

S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 2 ; B r e n c h le y to E E S D , 11 O c to b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

22 D B P O , op. cit., N o . 1 0 6, n o te 5.

23 M in u te by H e a d o f E E S D , 2 5 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 1 0 / 1 ) .

24 E E S D m in u te , 8 O c to b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1). â&#x2013; 5 M in u te by S ir . T . B r im e lo w , 9 O c to b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

S e e n o te 21 ab ove. ~7 R e c o rd o f m e e tin g b e tw e e n M r . R o y le a n d M r . N e a v e o f 17 O c to b e r 1 9 7 2 ( E N P 10/1).

28 E E S D m in u te , 9 F e b ru a ry 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 10/2).

~} M in u te by S ir T h o m a s B r im e lo w , 9 F e b ru a ry 19 7 3 ( E N P 10/2).

30

W a r s a w te le g ra m N o . 5 9 o f 2 6 F e b ru a ry 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 3 /5 4 8 /7 ).

In S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 4 a larg e A n g lo - P o lis h c o n tr a c t w a s c o n c lu d e d fo r th e m a n u fa c tu r e in P o la n d , un d e r

lic e n c e , o f M a s s e y -F e r g u s o n -P e r k in s tra c to rs a n d e n g in e s. S e e m in u te by M r . J u l i a n A m e ry , M in is te r o f S ta te , 12 F e b ru a ry 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 10/2). " R e c o rd o f c o n v e r s a tio n b e tw e e n S o v ie t A m b a s s a d o r a n d S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 7 M a r c h 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 10/2).

33 E E S D m in u te , 9 A p r il 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 10/2).

34 U n d a te d m in u te b y S ir A . D o u g la s - H o m e , A p r il 1 9 7 3 ( E N P 10/2).

In F e b ru a ry

1 9 7 4 , the C o n s e rv a tiv e P a r ty u n d e r P r im e M in is te r M r . E d w a rd H e a th lo s t th e G e n e ral

E le c tio n and w e re succe e d e d by a m in o r ity L a b o u r G o v e rn m e n t, led by M r . H a ro ld W ils o n . A se co n d G e n e ral E le c tio n w a s held in O c to b e r 1 9 7 4 , w h ic h th e L a b o u r P a rty w o n by an o v e r a ll m a jo r ity o f three.

36 M r . H a tte r s le y to L o r d B a r n b y , 3 A p r il 1 9 7 4 ( E N P 10/3). ' 7 M in u te b y S ir T . B r im e lo w , 3 0 O c to b e r 1 9 7 4 ( E N P 10/3).

38 M in u te by M r . H a tte r s le y , 1 N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 4 ( E N P 10/3).

39 O ra l C o m m u n ic a tio n d e liv e re d by the S o v ie t M in is te r C o u n s e llo r , 16 Ja n u a r y 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); record o f c o n v e r s a tio n b e tw e e n M r . S e m e n o v a n d D e p u ty U n d e r -S e c re ta r y ,

16 Ja n u a r y ( E N P

0 5 4 / 1 ); P o lis h

A m b a s s a d o r to M r. H a tte r s le y , 2 9 Ja n u a r y 1 9 7 6 w ith e n c lo s e d le tte r fr o m M r . S ta r o w ic z to T o w n C le rk o f R o y a l B o r o u g h o f K e n s in g to n and C h e lse a o f 2 0 Ja n u a r y

1976 (E N P

0 5 4 / 1 ); m e e tin g b e tw e e n

M r.

H a tte r s le y a n d M r . S ta r o w ic z , 3 M a r c h 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); record o f c o n v e r s a tio n s b e tw e e n D e p u ty U n d e r ­ s e c re ta r y a n d M r . S e m e n o v o n 9 and 19 M a r c h 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

40 F ile N o te o n K a ty n M e m o r ia l, 2 7 Ja n u a r y 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

11

S u b m is s io n fr o m H e a d o f E E S D to M r . H a tte r s le y , 11 F e b ru a ry 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

42 M in u te by H e a d o f E E S D , 2 6 M a r c h 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

43 M r . F itz G ib b o n to F ie ld M a r s h a l S ir M ic h a e l C a rv e r, 5 A p r il 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

44 M in is tr y o f D e fe n c e to E E S D , 15 A p r il 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

45 F ie ld M a r s h a l S ir M ic h a e l C a rv e r to M r . F itz G ib b o n , 2 0 A p r il

1 9 7 6 ; F itz G ib b o n to C a rv e r, 18 Ju n e

1 9 7 6 ; C a rv e r to F itz G ib b o n , 2 2 J u n e 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

4fi L o r d S t. O s w a ld to M r . R o y M a s o n , 19 J u l y 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); a n d rep ly , 3 0 J u l y 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

17

M in is te r o f S ta te to L o r d B e th e ll, 2 3 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

,s D e s p a tc h fr o m H M

A m b a s s a d o r W a r s a w , 2 8 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 . T h e issu e o f S o v ie t p re ssu re o n H M G

o v e r the K a t y n M e m o r ia l w a s raise d in P a r lia m e n ta r y Q u e s tio n s by M r . T o b y Je s s e l M P a n d M r . J e f f R o o k e r M P o n 2 6 A p r il a n d 11 O c to b e r 1 9 7 6 re sp e ctiv e ly . S in c e th e L a b o u r G o v e rn m e n t had c o m e in to o ffic e in F e b ru a ry 1 9 7 4 th is m a tte r h a d n o t been raise d by re p re se n ta tiv e s o f th e S o v ie t U n io n in th e ir d is c u s s io n s w ith F C O M in is te r s , b u t th e q u e stio n had been d isc u sse d o n f o u r o c c a s io n s by S o v ie t E m b a s s y and F C O o f f ic ia l s . S e e M in u te by H e a d o f E E S D , 8 O c to b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

49 M in u te b y L o r d G o r o n w y -R o b e r ts , M in is te r o f S ta te , 18 D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

S() S e e c r itic a l a rtic le s, eg in the Daily Mail, 16 and 2 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 ; The Times, 17 a n d 2 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 ; Daily Telegraph, 2 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 ; Guardian, 2 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

51

M in u te by H e a d o f N e w s D e p a rtm e n t to H e a d o f E E S D , 21 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 . ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

XXX111

52

S u b m is s io n by H e a d o f E E S D , 3 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 6 w ith a tta c h e d d ra ft s ta te m e n t fo r use in P a r lia m e n t

a n d fo r press b rie fin g o n H M G ’ s d e c is io n n o t to be rep resented a t th e K a ty n m e m o ria l c e r e m o n y o n

18

S e p te m b e r ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

Si M in u te by A s s is ta n t U n d e r -S e c re ta r y , 6 O c to b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ). sl M in u te

fr o m

P r iv a te S e c re ta ry to L o r d G o r o n w y -R o b e r ts to

Head o f E E S D

and a tta c h e d re v ise d

s ta te m e n t a n d re p ly to P Q o f 8 O c to b e r 1 9 7 6 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

55 E C O te le g ra m to W a r s a w N o . 4 2 0 o f 2 0 O c to b e r 1 9 7 6 ; P a ri Debs., 5th ser., H o f C, v o l. 9 1 7 , c o ls . 3 7 - 3 8 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

Fhe e m b le m on the m e m o ria l, as 77 le Times rep orted on 15 D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 5 , w a s to be ‘a

c ro w n e d eagle su rro u n d e d by barbed w ire , to s y m b o lis e th e c o n tin u e d e n s la v e m e n t o f P o la n d ’ .

56 S e e E N P 0 5 4 /1 1 9 7 7 ; E N P 0 5 4/1 1 9 7 8 ; a n d E N P 0 5 4 /1 1 9 7 9 . v/ L o r d S t. O s w a ld to M r . F r a n c is P y m , S e c re ta ry o f S ta te fo r D e fe n c e , 1 4 J u n e 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

88 S u b m is s io n by H e a d o f E E S D to A s s is ta n t U n d e r -S e c re ta r y , 2 J u l y 1 9 7 9 ; M in u te by A P S to M in is te r o f S ta te , 5 J u l y 1 9 7 9 ; M o l ) to A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 13 J u l y 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 )

y> S ta te m e n t by E C O N e w s D e p a rtm e n t, 4 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ). w A P S to S e c re ta r y o f S ta te to P M ’ s P r iv a te S e c re ta ry (O v e rs e a s A f fa i r s ) , 1 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

1,1 P M ’ s P r iv a te S e c re ta ry (O v e rs e a s A ffa i r s ) to A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 1 2 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

M r . N e a v e , c h i e f o p p o s itio n s p o k e s m a n o n N o rth e rn Ire la n d fr o m 1 9 7 5 , had been k ille d by a te r ro r ist b o m b e x p lo s io n in h is ca r a s he w a s d riv in g fr o m th e u n d e rg ro u n d c a r p ark a t th e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s o n 3 0 M a rc h 1979. f’2 L e tte r s b e tw e e n M r s . T h a tc h e r a n d L o r d B a r n b y , 12 a n d 14 S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

63 E C O te le g ra m to W a r s a w N o . 7 0 9 o f 6 S e p te m b e r

1979; F C O

te le g ra m to M o s c o w

No. 539,

14

S e p te m b e r 1 9 7 9 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

64 M in u te by D e p u ty U n d e r -S e c re ta r y , 16 J u n e 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

05 M in u te by A s s is ta n t U n d e r -S e c re ta r y , 18 J u n e 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

^ A P S to S e c re ta r y o f S ta te to P M ’ s P r iv a te S e c re ta ry (O v e rs e a s A f fa i r s ) , 2 7 J u n e 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); P M ’ s P r iv a te S e c re ta ry (O v e rs e a s A f fa i r s ) to M o D , 3 0 J u n e 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); P y m to L o r d S t. O s w a ld , 3 J u l y 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

S e e F C O te le g ra m to W a r s a w N o . 4 1 4 , 18 S e p te m b e r 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

68 T h e L o n d o n K a ty n c e r e m o n y w a s sc h e d u le d to be held th re e w e e k s a fte r th e h is to ric s ig n in g o f th e a g re e m e n ts in P o la n d

b e tw e e n S o lid a r ity a n d

the C o m m u n is t P a r ty

p ro v id in g fo r th e First free and

in d e p e n d e n t trad e u n io n s in a W a r s a w P a c t state .

m W a r s a w te le g ra m N o . 3 1 2 , 18 S e p te m b e r 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

70 S e e , f o r e x a m p le , le tte rs fr o m B r i t i s h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E S D , 1 1 , 1 8 a n d 3 0 A p r il 1 9 8 0 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ); m in u te by E a s t E u r o p e a n S e c tio n , R e se a rc h D e p a rtm e n t, 15 A p r il 1981 ( E N P 0 5 4 / 1 ).

71 S e e

Keesing’s Record o f World Events, V o lu m e

X X X I V , ( L o n g m a n , 1 9 8 8 ), pp. 3 5 6 5 5 - 5 6 .

72 In a b a c k g ro u n d b r ie f fo r the S e c re ta ry o f S ta te ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ) it w a s n o te d th a t in a d is c u s s io n a m o n g S o v ie t h is to r ia n s p u b lish e d in th e M a y

19 8 8 issu e o f th e S o v ie t jo u r n a l International Affairs, o n e o f the

p a r tic ip a n ts, re fe rrin g to d o c u m e n ta r y e v id e n c e o n K a ty n , said th a t th e C o m m is s io n had ‘n o t y e t d isc o v e re d a n y th in g e s s e n tia lly n e w ’ .

73

Keesing ’s , V o l. X X X I V ,

74 P a r i Debs.,

5lhser.,

pp. 3 6 0 6 5 - 6 6 a n d 3 6 3 0 1 .

H o f L , v o l. 4 9 9 , c o l. 7 0 4 .

P r o fe s s o r D a v ie s to L o r d G le n a rth u r, 18 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

Ih S u b m is s io n fr o m E E D , to P S to L o r d G le n a rth u r, I A u g u s t 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

77 F C O te le g ra m N o . 3 3 3 to W a r s a w o f 21 A u g u s t 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

78 L o r d B e th e ll to M r . P o w e ll, P r iv a te S e c re ta ry to th e P r im e M in is te r , 14 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

ll) S u b m is s io n by H e a d o f E E D , 2 2 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

80 M in u te by A U S , 2 5 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

81 L e tte r fr o m A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , to M r . P o w e ll, P S to th e P r im e M in is te r , 2 7 J u l y

1988 ( L R R

3 3 5 / 1 0 ) . O n e K a t y n c a m p a ig n e r, M r . W in s to n C h u r c h ill M P , added in a p o stsc rip t to a le tte r to S ir

xxxiv

G e o ffr e y H o w e o n 2 2 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ‘I a m d e lig h te d to k n o w th a t y o u w ill be ta k in g ste p s to m ak e c le a r th a t H M G is in n o d o u b t th a t the U S S R w a s re sp o n sib le fo r the K a ty n m a ssa c re (see W .S .C . W a r M e m o ir s V o l I V ) ’ (W R C . 0 2 7 / 7 ). " U n sig n e d m in u te on le tte r fr o m A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te to M r . P o w e ll, P S to th e P r im e M in is te r , 2 7 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

83 Pari. o I

Debs., 5,h ser.,

H o f L , v o l. 5 0 0 , c o l. 3 6 8 .

M in u te fr o m A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te to E E D , 2 9 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ). ss S u b m is s io n fr o m E E D to P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 2 8 J u l y 1 9 8 8 ( L R R 3 3 5 / 1 0 ).

86 W a r s a w te le g ra m N o . 102 o f 17 F e b ru a ry 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

87 Se e

88 m

Daily Telegraph o f

17 F e b ru a ry 19 89.

M in u te fr o m A P S to M r . W illia m W a ld e g ra v e , M in is te r o f S ta te , to H e a d o f E E D , 17 F e b ru a ry 1 9 8 9

( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

9

Se e B u tle r M e m o r a n d u m , n o te 5.

m S u b m is s io n by H e a d o f E E D , 2 2 F e b ru a ry 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

91 Ibid.

92 U n d a te d m in u te by M r . W a ld e g ra v e ; m in u te fr o m A P S to M in is te r o f S ta te to H e a d o f E E D , 2 7 F e b ru a ry ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

43 M in u te by A P S to S ir G e o ffr e y H o w e , 3 M a r c h 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

44 B r itis h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E D , 2 4 F e b ru a ry 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

B r itis h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E D , 2 M a r c h 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

>(' B r itis h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E D , 10 M a r c h 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

7 B r i ti s h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E D , 12 O c to b e r 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ). s B r i ti s h E m b a s s y , W a r s a w to E E D , 16 O c to b e r 1 9 8 9 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

99 The Annual Register,

19 8 9 (L o n g m a n , 1 9 9 0 ), pp. 1 1 5 -1 6 .

,(K) P r o fe s s o r D a v ie s to L o r d G le n a rth u r, 2 7 M a rc h 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

111

M r . W a ld e g ra v e to P r o fe s s o r D a v ie s , 10 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

102 M o s c o w te le g ra m N o . 7 0 3 , 17 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

103 L a v r e n ti P a v lo v ic h B e r ia w a s head o f the N K V D at th e tim e o f th e m a ssac re in A p r il 1 9 4 0 . V s e v o lo d N ik o la y e v ic h M e r k u lo v w a s B e r ia ’ s d e p u ty a n d c lo s e st c o lle a g u e . In th e a fte r m a th o f th e in te rn a l p o w e r stru g g le w ith in th e h ig h e r e c h e lo n s o f th e C o m m u n is t P a rty o f th e S o v ie t U n io n th a t fo llo w e d S t a l i n ’ s d e ath in Ja n u a r y 1 9 5 3 , b o th w e re s h o t ( B e r ia in J u l y , M e r k u lo v in D e c e m b e r). M e r k u lo v w a s a w a rd e d the O rd e r o f L e n in o n 2 7 A p r il 1 9 4 0 s h o rtly a fte r th e e x e c u tio n o f th e P o lis h o ffic e r s .

104 M o s c o w te le g ra m N o . 7 0 5 , 18 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

11,5 W a r s a w te le g ra m N o . 3 0 3 o f 18 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ). L e c h W a le s a w a s C h a ir m a n o f th e S o lid a r ity fre e trad e u n io n 1 9 8 0 -1 9 9 1 . F o llo w in g th e im p o s itio n o f M a r tia l L a w in D e c e m b e r 1981 he w a s in te rn e d fo r a y e a r a n d w a s a w a rd e d th e N o b e l P e a c e P r iz e in 1 9 8 3 .

95.

M a lg o r z a ta

N ie z a b ito w s k a

h is to ria n o f P o lis h Je w ry .

w a s a j o u r n a lis t o n

B e tw e e n

H e serv ed as P re sid e n t o f P o la n d fr o m

Tygodnik Solidarnosc

( S o lid a r ity

1990-

W e e k ly ) and

a

1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 sh e w a s P re ss s p o k e s w o m a n o f th e fir s t S o lid a r ity -le d

g o v e rn m e n t.

106 M r . W a ld e g ra v e to S ir P a tr ic k W r ig h t, 18 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

I()/ M in u te s o f 19 a n d 2 5 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

I()S M in u te by H e a d o f H is to r ia n s , 2 4 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

109 S u b m is s io n fr o m D ir e c to r o f R e se a rc h to P U S , 2 3 M a y 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

110 M in u te by H e a d o f L R D , 4 Ju n e 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

111 S u b m is s io n fr o m D ir e c to r o f R e se a rc h to P U S , 2 3 M a y 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

112 M in u te by H e a d o f L R D , 4 Ju n e 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 /1 ).

113 U n d a te d m in u te b y M r . W a ld e g ra v e ( L R R 3 3 4 / 1 9 ).

114 M in u te by A P S to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 1 1 J u n e 1 9 9 0 ( L R R 3 3 4 / 1 9 ).

115 M in u te by H e a d o f H is to r ia n s , 15 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 ( L R R 3 3 4 / 1 9 ).

XXXV

116 W a r s a w te le g ra m N o . 5 7 9 , 15 O c to b e r 1 9 9 2 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

117 M o s c o w te le g ra m N o . 2 2 8 6 , 19 O c to b e r 1 9 9 2 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

118 Pari Debs., 6,h ser., H o f C , v o l. 1 8 4 , co l. 4 9 .

119 E E D m in u te , 2 5 Ja n u a r y 1991 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

1211 M in u te by H e a d o f H is to r ia n s , 15 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 ( L R R 3 3 4 / 1 9 ).

121 M r . G o o d la d to M r . P a w s e y , 2 6 J u l y 1 9 9 4 ( L R R 3 3 4 / 1 9 ).

122 M in u te fr o m C h ie f H is to r ia n , F C O to head o f C e n tra l E u r o p e a n D e p a rtm e n t, 2 0 S e p te m b e r 1 9 9 5 ( L R R 3 3 4 /0 1 5 ).

123 M r . M a jo r to M r . S z k o p ia k , 19 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 5 ( R H A 3 3 4 / 0 3 0 , 2 0 0 0 ) .

124 F C O H is to r y N o te , The

Katyn Massacre, p. 9.

125 M in u te o f 2 4 M a y 2 0 0 0 ( R H A 3 3 4 / 0 3 0 ) .

126 S ir F re d e ric B e n n e tt to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , 16 M a y 2 0 0 0 ( R H A 3 3 4 / 0 3 0 ) .

127 S e c re ta r y o f S ta te to S ir F re d e ric B e n n e tt, 19 J u n e 2 0 0 0 ( R H A 3 3 4 / 0 3 0 ) .

128 T h e F C O H is to r y N o te , The Katyn Massacre, had d e a lt w ith a n a rr o w a n d s p e c ific is su e re la te d to n e w ly a v a ila b le re co rd s. In ord er to f u l f i l M r C o o k â&#x20AC;&#x2122; s re q u e st fu lly , a b road er s u rv e y w a s re q u ire d . It h a s been n e c e ssa ry to r e v ie w a ll r e le v a n t d o c u m e n ta tio n , w h e th e r a v a ila b le in th e P u b lic R e c o r d O f f i c e o r w ith in th e a rc h iv e s o f th e F C O . T h e v ie w s o f o th e r g o v e rn m e n t d e p a rtm e n ts, w h e re re le v a n t, are re p re se nte d in d o c u m e n ts file d w ith F C O re co rd s.

129 A lle n P a u l, Katyn: Stalinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Massacre and the Seeds o f Polish Resurrection (A n n a p o lis , M a r y la n d , 1 9 9 6 ), p p .3 5 3 - 3 5 5 . T h e P o lis h v ic to r y o u ts id e W a r s a w ( A u g u s t 1 9 2 0 ) h a lte d the R e d A r m y â&#x20AC;&#x2122; s a d v a n c e in to P o la n d and e nd ed S o v ie t id e as o f e x p o r tin g r e v o lu tio n o n th e b a y o n e ts o f th e R e d A r m y . S ta lin had w a tc h e d th e se e v e n ts u n fo ld as c o m m is s a r o f the R e d A r m y g ro u p a d v a n c in g in to so u th e rn P o la n d .

130 S e e B u tle r M e m o r a n d u m , p ara g rap h s 2 4 - 3 3 .

131 M in u te by H e a d o f H is to r ia n s , 2 4 A p r il 1 9 9 0 ( E N P 3 3 1 / 1 ).

XXXVI

THE BUTLER MEMORANDUM: NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

Dr. Rohan D ’Olier Butler (1917-1996), Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign (and later Commonwealth) Affairs from 1963 to 1982 and Fellow of All Souls, Oxford from 1938 to 1984, was described on his death as ‘a magisterial figure of penetrating intellect’.1 His scholarly endeavours in the field of 18th century French history culminated in 1980 with the publication of his monumental work Choisen/: Father and Son 1719-1754, a study b early years of Louis X V ’s chief minister and the intellectual climate of his times. In recognition of the excellence of Choiseul, Rohan Butler was in 1982 awarded a Laureate of the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in Paris — the first person outside of France to receive such an honour, and a unique distinction for a work

I

written in English.

Appointed by the Foreign Office in 1963 as Historical Adviser (a post which had been in abeyance since 1929), Dr. Butler became Senior Editor of the Foreign Office series Documents on British Foreign Policy and was instrumental in continuing this into the post-war period as Documents on British Policy Overseas. Dr. Butler also produced a number of authoritative internal memoranda on such diverse subjects as the Relinquishment of Abadan in 1951, the status of Stettin and most significantly in the context of this history, the Katyn Massacre.

This previously unpublished memorandum was prepared in response to an upsurge in public and Parliamentary interest in Katyn during 1971 and 1972.

The first draft of the memorandum, comprising some 35 paragraphs, was submitted in September 1972. But following detailed comment from other F C O experts, and in the light of the growing controversy over the Katyn Memorial project described earlier in this history, Rohan Butler revised and extended his memorandum, taking the Katyn story up to the autumn of 1972. The memorandum was finally printed for internal circulation in the Departmental Series of Eastern European and Soviet Department as D S 2/73, dated 10 April 1973. It is reproduced here in its entirety with its original footnotes and annexes.1

1 Independent, 5 N o v e m b e r 1996.

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DS No 2/73

THE KATYN MASSACRE AND REACTIONS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM BY THE HISTORICAL ADVISER CONTENTS I

The Basis

Paras l - 4

D isco very o f the g raves in 1943 and the primary reports (paragraph l); the "Katyn Campaign" o f 1971 and HMG's public stand looking back to 1945 (paragraphs 2-3 ); e a rly British diplom atic evalu atio n s now becoming p u b licly a va ila b le (paragraph 4 ).

II

4 i

W artim e Reactions (1943-1945)

Paras 5 - 2 3

Rupture of S o viet-P o lish rela tio n s and comment

by S ir A C lark Kerr; Mr Eden deplored Nazi cynicism in exploiting the a lle g e d ly S o viet m assacre (paragraphs 5-6 ); S ir O O 'M alley's desp atches o f 1943 and 1944 drawing on Polish testim ony to S o viet re sp o n sib ility commanded notable support in the Foreign O ffice (paragraphs 7 -10 ); some doubts, h ow ever, c a s t on the German c a se (paragraphs Il-l4 ); Research Department evalu ation o f German and So viet reports tended to support the la tte r and promoted a suspension of British judgm ent, since maintained (paragraphs 15-17 , 48); the v a lid ity of the So viet report h a s , how ever, sin ce been s e v e re ly questioned (paragraph 18); yet some pointers again st the German c a s e (paragraphs 1 9 -2 3 ).

HI

The Russo-German C ontext (1939-1943)

The Soviet-G erm an agreem ents o f 1939 suppressed the ju rid ic a l ex isten ce o f Poland l

l

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Paras 24 - 33

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and apparently involved NKVD-Gestapo cooperation; German orders in 1940 in connexion with Polish o ffic e rs in Russia; Some suspicion of some German understanding or condonation o f th eir fate (paragraphs 2 4 -3 3 ).

IV

The Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946)

Paras 34 - 47

HMG held alo of at Nuremberg from the S o viet accusation o f German gu ilt but did not wish to appear to oppose it; a suggestion in the Foreign O ffice that the inculpation of one of the su sp ect nations might not en tire ly exculpate the other (paragraphs 3 4 -4 0 ); evaluation of a report from M Skarzynski (paragraphs 41-3 ); the Russian c a se suffered h e a v ily from the om ission of the Katyn charge from the Tribunalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s fin al judgment; subsequent disparagem ent of Russian testim ony at the incon clu sive hearings did not, how ever, correspond with the contemporary opinion o f the British W ar Crim es Executive (paragraphs 4 4 -7 ).

V

The C on gression al Enquiry (1950-1952)

Paras 48 - 55

An American C on gression al enquiry into the Katyn M assacre in 1951-2 did not produce any new evidence of co n clu sive sig n ific a n c e . This n o n -ju d icial enquiry w as not w e ll received in the Foreign O ffice w h ere, h ow ever, there w as a growing dispo sitio n to agree with its predictable verd ict of S o viet guilt (paragraphs 4 8 - 5 5 ) .

VI

Later D evelopm ents (1952-197 2)

Paras 5 6 - 68

In 1956 an IRD unattributable brief referred to b e lie f in S o viet resp o n sib ility (paragraph 56); Mr Khrushchev's alleged o ffer to Mr Gomulka to accept re sp o n sib ility (paragraph 57); German publication in 1957 of alleged NKVD order for liquidation o f prisoners in 1940 (paragraph 58); Lord Lansdowne's letter of I960 (paragraph 59); further publications on Katyn from 1960s; suspension of judgment on Katyn has been in creasin g ly strained by the accum ulation of pointers to S o viet resp on sib ility; d espite public p ressu re, how ever, there is no evident advantage in departing from the p o lic y of disclaim ing British standing in "the murder 2

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and disappearance o f Polish o fficers on Soviet territory" (paragraph 2) o r, in "breaking the silen ce that we have preserved for nearly 30 years on the Katyn massacre" (paragraphs 6 0 -8 ).

ANNEXES

ÂŤ

A.

A rticle by Mr Ian C olvin in the D aily Telegraph: 17 August 197 2

B.

Memorandum by Professor B H Summer of Research Department: 17 February 1944

C.

Paper by Sir Denis Allen:

25 October 1945

D.

Memorandum by Mr F B Bourdillon of Research Department:

10 April 1946

E.

Tehran telegram No 210 from Sir Reader Bullard: 15 February 1946

F.

Nuremberg telegram from British W ar Crim es Executive:

4

4k *

3

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6 July 1946.

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THE KATYN MASSACRE AND REACTIONS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM BY THE HISTORICAL ADVISER

I.

The Basis

1.

At this time of day it is hardly n e c e ssa ry , even were it p ossib le to try to re a s se ss in d etail the g risly and conflicting evidence as to resp o n sib ility for the Katyn M assacre. This evidence w as orig in ally presented in the reports following the German announcement on 13 April 1943 o f the d iscovery in Katyn Forest near Smolensk of the mass graves of 1 0 ,0 0 0 or 12 ,0 0 0 (in fact o f something over 4 ,0 0 0 ) Polish o ffic e rs , some bound with rope, a lleg ed ly Russian, and a ll shot by b u llets adm ittedly German. Such ea rly and, in intention at le a s t, authoritative records included those published from the German side in 19 43, from the Soviet side in the following year and some from Polish q u a rte rs, as follow s(i)

German reports o f 26 April and 10 June 1943 by Lieutenant Ludwig V o ss, M ilitary Police Secretary in a Sp ecial Commando of the Secret M ilitary Police concerning the d iscovery of the graves at Katyn and their excavation from 29 March to 7 June 1943 .1

(ii)

Undated German medical reports o f 1943 by P rofessor Gerhard Buhtz and Dr Huber on the e x c a v a tio n .2

(iii)

Protocol, dated 30 April 1943 at Sm olensk, o f the German-sponsored International Forensic M edical Commission (representatives from German-dominated countries plus Sw itzerlan d ), which visite d the graves on 29 -3 0 April 1943 .3

(iv)

Eight-point report of 17 April 1943 compiled by the Polish Red C ross in W arsaw , and presented to the German authorities th e re , concerning a six â&#x20AC;&#x201D;hour v is it

These reports, together with related police documents and e v id e n c e , are printed ln Am tliches M aterial zum Massenmord von Katyn (Berlin, 1943), pp 15 -3 6 .

Ib id , pp 38-113 .

Ib id , pp 114 -3 5 .

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to Katyn the preceding day by Mons K J S k a rz y n sk i, its S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l. 4 (v)

Report, dated 24 January 1944 at Sm olensk, o f the S o viet "Special Commission for ascertaining and investigatin g the circum stances of the shooting of Polish O fficer Prisoners by the G erm an-F ascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest" , ie the Russian enquiry under the chairm anship of Academ ician N N Burdenko during September 1943-January 19 4 4 . This report included a report of the in vestig atio n s from 16 to 23 January 1944 of the Russian experts in forensic medicine headed by Professor V I P ro zo rovski. 5

(vi) "Facts and documents concerning Polish prisoners of war captured by the USSR during the 1939 campaign": a

Ibid, pp 1 3 7 -8 , in the text included in a telegram sent by the Polish Red C ro ss to the International Red C ro ss on 21 April 1943 .

(A slig h tly varian t English text is printed in US C o n g ress, House o f R epresentatives S e le ct Committee on the Katyn Forest M assacre 1 9 5 1 - 2 . H earin g s. . . - USGPO, W ashington 1952 - part 3 pp 3 9 7 - 8 , as part of the evidence then submitted by M S k a rz y n sk i.)'

The eig h t-p oin t report o f 17 April 1943 w as based upon a fiv e point report of 16 April by M Skarzynski to the Polish Red C ross; c f (vi) below and note 6 . M Skarzynski subsequently explained (ib id , p 390) that th is measure o f Polish collaboration with the German auth orities w as undertaken "according to the instructions re ce ived by the Underground": c f further note 11 b elow . The eig h t-p oin t report w as subsequently included in a longer and unpublished report by M Skarzynski to the Polish Red C ro ss; c f ibid pp 3 9 6 -7 , a ls o paragraphs 4 ( v ) , 41-3 b elow . M Skarzynski further included in his evidence to the C on gression al Committee in 1952 part of a report of the Polish Technical Commission on the Progress o f Work at Katyn: c f ibid pp 4 0 6 -1 0 .

The S o viet report w as published in Pravda and Iz vestiy a on 26 January 19 44. An English te x t, as included in Annex B below , w as printed in So viet M on itor, Nos 4151-9 o f 26-27 January 1944: C 1171/8/55 of 1944 (file referen ces are henceforth of the same year as the document in question u n less otherw ise in d ic ated ).

The report is co n ven ien tly reproduced with an English tran slation in US House of R ep resen ta tives, S e le c t C om m ittee, op c it part 3 , pp 2 2 8 -3 0 9 ).

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report of February 1946 comprising 454 pages duplicated in English, together with a summary of it dated March 1946, drawn up by a S p ecial Commission appointed by the former Polish government in London (N 4406/ 108/ 55). It would appear that this report was w ritten by Dr Viktor Sukiennicki and has come to be regarded as the main report on Katyn by the authorities o f the Polish em igration. 6 (vii)

A Polish "Supplementary Report on Facts and Documents concerning the Katyn massacre" o f October 1947 prepared in London (N 2599/2599/55 of 1948)7 supplemented the report o f February 19 46. This supplement included ex tracts (eg p 1805, p 1811, pp 1814-5) from a report there unascribed but in fact by Dr Marian W o d zin sk i, expert in fo rensic medicine of the Technical Commission o f the Polish Red C ro s s , working at Katyn from 29 April to 3 June 1943

2.

There has been a recent re v iv a l o f concern with Katyn in G reat Britain, notably as a re su lt o f the "Katyn Campaign"9 there in 1971.

This cam paign, seeking to clinch So viet re sp o n sib ility for the m assacre, w as promoted in cooperation with the Polish em igration in London and else w h e re , and w as larg ely o rch estrated , with cath olic o v erto n e s, by Mr Louis F itzG ibbon.9 The campaign coincided with BBC te le v is io n programmes on Katyn on 19 April and 13 October 1971, and w as follow ed by a rtic le s published by Lord Bethell in the Sunday Times magazine of 28 M ay 197 2 and by Mr Ian C o lvin in the D aily Telegraph o f 5 Ju ly and of 17 August (Annex A) . In the light o f this revived in te re st it

A text of the report o f February 1946 is printed op c i t , part 6 , pp 1636-1801 (cf a ls o J K Zawodny, Death in the Forest - Notre Dame, 1962, p x v i) . This report in c lu d e s, p 1716, an ab stract of M Sk arzyn ski's report of 16 April 1943: c f note 4 a b o ve.

A text o f the Supplementary Report is printed U S House of R ep resen tatives, S e le c t C om m ittee, op c l t , Part 6 , pp 1802-23 .

Dr W o d zin sk i's report, dated London, September 19 4 7 , but apparently based on contemporary records , is published in fu ll in Zbrodnla Katynska (London 1948), pp 19 9 -2 4 1, and in an English tran slation o f the third edition of th is book en titled The Crime of Katyn (Polish C u ltu ral Foundation, London, 1965), pp 191-228 .

Louis FitzGibbon, The Katyn C over-U p (London 197 2), Introduction et p a ssim .

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w as decided that in public statem ents (c f, how ever, paragraph 65 below) it should be explained as n ec essa ry that the position o f HMG remains as p re vio u sly explained in Parliam ent, notably by Lord Aberdare in the House o f Lords in a debate there on the Katyn "mass murder in Russia" on 17 June 1971, and subsequently on 29 June and 21 Ju ly. In the debate Lord Aberdare stated that "Her M a jesty 's Government have a b so lu tely no standing in th is matter" , and on 21 July he grounded th is upon the circum stances that "we are speaking of the murder and disappearance o f Polish o ffic e rs on So viet territory" . 10 3.

This w as the line taken in parliam ent in 1945 in the run-up to the Nuremberg tria ls (cf paragraph 34 b elo w ). W hile this prudent and longheld position p e r s is t s , it is noticeable that a ll three of the recent a rtic le s have featured records drawn from the recen tly opened wartime a rch iv es of the Foreign O ffice and containing strong exp ression s of vie w on Katyn b y, n otab ly, Sir Owen O 'M alley, HM Am bassador to the wartim e Polish Government in London. Thus it may not be am iss to attempt some a d v a n c e -s u rv e y , how ever summary, of our e a rly records on Katyn which may sooner or later receive sudden p ublicity from British re search ers or indeed from in vestig ato rs from the So viet Union or other c lo s e ly in terested c o u n trie s.

4.

The most important British diplom atic evalu ation s of the e a rly evid en ce on the Katyn m assacre would appear to b e, with relevan t minutes: (i) Sir Owen O 'M alley's despatch No 51 of 24 May 1943 (C 6160/258/55) commenting upon the original German re v e la tio n . (ii) S ir Owen O 'M alley's despatch No 25 of 11 February 1944 (C 2099/8/55) commenting upon the report of the S o viet S p ecial Com m ission. (iii)

Memorandum of 17 February 1944 by P rofessor B H Sumner of the Research Department on the S o viet report (C 2957/8/55: Annex B).

(iv) Paper o f 25 October 1945 on Katyn by M r, later Sir D en is, A llen o f Northern Department (N 16482/664/55: Annex C ) , arising from parliam entary questions .

H ansard, 5th s e rie s , H of L, v o l c c c x x , co l 7 7 3 , and v o l c c c x x ii, co l 961.

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(v) Memorandum o f 10 April 1946 by Mr F B Bourdillon of Research Department on the new ly a vaila b le "Polish Red C ro ss Report on the Katyn M ass Graves" comprising two reports of 1943 and 1945 re sp e c tiv e ly by M Skarzynski (N 5269/108/55: Annex D ). H II.

W artim e Reactions (1943-1945)

5 .

The timing o f the German announcement of the Katyn m assacre turned out w ell for the G erm ans. It came at a period of tension between the S o viet government and the Polish government in London. The Polish governm ent, like the German, requested an in vestig ation by the International Red C ro ss . The S o viet and British governments did not agree with t h i s , and the S o viet government severed relatio n s with the Polish government on 25 April 1943 . On the same day a private le tte r w as apparently w ritten from Katyn by Lieutenant Gregor S lo w en czik , a jo u rn a list from Vienna then attached to the p ropaganda-service o f the headquarters o f Heeresgruppe M itte at Smolensk . Lieutenant S lo w e n c z ik , who had become the lo c a l German superintendent of the propagandist exp loitation o f the Katyn M a ssa cre , is reported to have w ritten , with some self-e n la rg em e n t, on 25 April: "My proudest su c ce ss has come today: breaking o ff of diplom atic relatio n s between the USSR and Poland - Everybody is congratulating m e." Lieutenant Slow enczik claim ed to be the propagandist "inventor" (Erfinder) of Katyn, and that in re p ly to his in itia tiv e on th is he had received the approval of H itler h im self with "the order to cooperate with the Poles and to do everything p o ssib le to enable the fam ilies to get the names of the victim s and to get everything on the bodies of the victim s" .

Documents (i) and (ii) above are now printed by Louis FitzG ibbon, op c i t , pp 95-110 and pp 177-180 re s p e c tiv e ly , together with (pp 113-5) a telegraphic report of 15 May 1943 on Katyn from the Polish underground to the Polish governm ent, en closed in S ir O O 'M alley's despatch No 52 o f 24 May 1943 (C 6161/258/55) .

Documents (i) and (ii) were e x te n s iv e ly used by Mr C o lv in , who a ls o used document (iii) v e ry sum m arily. He has not so far drawn public attention to document (iv) though it a lso is now in the open f i le s , unlike document (v) which is due for r e le a s e , together with the other records for 1946 on 1 January 1977 under the th irty -y e a r rule .

Lieutenant G Slow enczik to Frau C zizek (in V ien n a), Katyn, 25 April 1943; text of le tte r printed in Die Neue Zeltung (organ of US M ilitary Government in Munich), 1 February 19 4 6 . A lso U S House of R epresentatives , S e le c t C om m ittee, op c i t , part 3 , p 3 9 2 .

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In the run-up to the breach o f S o viet-P o lish relatio n s Sir Archibald C lark Kerr, later Lord Inverch ap el, HM Ambassador in M oscow , had telegraphed on 20 A pril 1943 (C 4396/258/55): "Most s e c re t. My own feelin g is that although the Poles may be thinking In terms o f a rupture, it is not at th is that R ussians are aim ing. They are rather looking about w ild ly for a means to defend th e m s e lv e s. The Polish Am bassador (in Moscow) of course b e lie v e s what the Germans sa y is tru e . In a horrible w ay it seem s to fit in with the Poles' sto ry of the disappearance o f 8 ,3 0 0 o ffic e rs (cf paragraph 8 b e lo w ). Then anger and unconvincing terms of Russian den ials suggest a sen se of g u ilt.

This is disturbing for it is uncomfortable to re fle c t upon the consequences o f an enquiry which might show that g u ilt w as th ere . I fe e l therefore that to pursue the proposal made to the International Red C ro ss might be to court something little short o f a d is a s te r." This p assage is the o n ly contem porary reaction from Sir A C lark Kerr to the Katyn d isclosu re so fa r tra c e d . The lis t o f British evalu atio n s (cf paragraph 4) does not include any fu ll a ssessm en t of the evidence by our em bassy in M oscow .

This con sid erab le om ission w as noticed in the Foreign O ffice at the tim e, but it w as judged prudent not to ask that it be fille d . On 4 M ay, Mr Anthony Eden (Lord Avon) in parliam ent deplored "the cynicism which permits the Nazi murderers of hundreds o f thousands of innocent Poles and R ussians to make use o f a story o f mass murder, in an attempt to disturb the unity o f the A llies" . 13 7.

On 24 May 1943 Sir Owen O 'M alley, in a bold, able and em otive d esp atch , strongly presented the c a se for Russian re sp o n sib ility for the Katyn m assacre about A p ril-M ay 1940, in accordance with the German th e s is , a s ag ain st the Russian th e s is o f German re sp o n sib ility for the k illin g s in the autum of 1941. (The co rp ses w ere n early a ll wearing thick w in ter-cloth in g .) In this despatch Sir O O 'M alley employed su b stan tially the method w hich he subsequently described in relation to his second despatch: "I sa y 'it would be fu tile to try to appraise the trustw orthiness o f the testim ony o f w itn e sse s' on eith er s id e , and re ly rather on arguments drawn from circum stances in resp ect of which there is no dispute" . (Letter o f 13 April 1944 to S ir Alexander Cadogan: N 16482/ 664/55 of 19 45). This cogent if rather sweeping d ism issa l of a mass of conflicting evidence from eith er side enabled S ir Owen to concentrate upon arguments la rg e ly drawn from Polish sources in London.

8.

The Polish arguments notably included: (i)

13

Before and, p a rtic u la rly , a fte r the restoration of S o viet-P o lish relatio n s in July 1941 repeated Polish enquiries were made about some 1 5 ,0 0 0 Polish

H ansard, 5th se rie s , H o f C , v o l 389 , co l 30 .

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CONFIDENTIAL prisoners including over 8 ,0 0 0 o ffic ers held in three camps at K ozielsk, O stashkov and Starob ielsk t i ll the spring of 1940 , and subsequently missing from the to ta l of some 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 Polish prisoners in the S o viet U nion. These Polish enquiries e lic ite d from the Soviet authorities e v a siv e and confused rep lies (eg S talin in December 1941: "All Poles have been released " ; "they have escaped . . .to Manchuria1) *^with no suggestion that the prisoners had been removed to the Smolensk a r e a .

W h e rea s, after the German re ve la tio n , the So viet government quickly maintained that the Poles had been in camps near Smolensk and had been overrun by the advancing G erm ans.

In cid en tally, in May 1942 M r, now Sir Frank, Roberts o f C en tral Department minuted (C 4929/19/55) on th is "burning question" for the Poles that "the S o viet behaviour has been to sa y the le a st very odd and disingenuous" . At th at tim e , how ever, Sir A Clark Kerr w as instructed not to intervene in "this R usso-Polish question" in support of the Polish Am bassador, who w as currently c ritic isin g A n g lo -Soviet negotiations for a t r e a ty . (ii)

R elatives of the Polish prisoners had received le tte rs from them up to mid-April 19 40, roughly the period when they were murdered by the Russians according to the German accu satio n . T hereafter, according to g en erally accepted testim ony, no lette rs were re c e iv e d . A Polish authority has commented on this absence of " letters w ritten after the spring of 1940 up to June 22 , 1941 - one such le tte r could o ffset the whole German accu satio n ." 15 It is remarkable that this statem ent w as held to stand without q u alification ten years a fter the publication in 1952 of a le tte r of 18 March 1941 from the Polish Red C ro ss in W arsaw to the Committee of the International Red C ro ss in G en eva, stating in part: "The Polish Red C ro ss has received a large amount of lette rs from prisoners detained in o ffic ers prison camps in Russia until Spring 1940. From then on , until November, a ll correspondence with o ffic ers interned in Russia c e a s e d . Since November, some le tte rs , but in negligible q uantity, were received ag ain ." !**6*10 The same le tte r, how ever, stated that the Polish Red C ro ss

M arshal Stalin to G eneral S ik o rsk i, 3 December 1941: Documents on P o lish -S o v iet Relations 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 , (General Sikorski H istorical In stitu te , London, 1961) V o l l , pp 232-3 .

C f J K Zawodny, Death in the F o re st, p 87 .

U S House of R ep resen ta tives, S e le c t C om m ittee, op c i t , part 3 , p 387.

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CONFIDENTIAL had learnt in July 1940 that 400 Polish o ffic e rs from the three "frontier camps" and a lso one a t P avelish tch ev Bor had been transferred to two camps at G razovec in the Vologda d is tric t. The few late le tte rs may ve ry w e ll have come from these few su rvivo rs .*7 So fa r, h ow ever, no proof o f th is circum stance has been tra c e d . In its absence yet another q u estion , and a key o n e , in regard to Katyn must be held to remain open, te c h n ic a lly at le a s t , even i f seem s u n lik ely that the g en e rally accepted testim ony should be u p se t.

9.

Both the above arguments bear h e a v ily again st the Russians and find con sid erab le support in the circum stantial e v id e n c e , as in regard to the clothing of the v ic tim s , the dating of new spapers found upon th em , and the com pression of corp ses tellin g again st their having been tampered w ith .18 This evidence adds up om inously. It includes ve ry damaging i f not w h olly co n clu sive evidence from a Polish M ajor S o lsk i w hose d ia ry , found at Katyn, broke off at an entry for 9 April 1940 describing h is transport from a ra ilw a y -s ta tio n near Smolensk in a p riso n -van "somewhere to a forest; it looks like a summer re so rt. Here a thorough personal s e a r c h ."18 P rofessor S tan islaw Sw ianiew icz , unlike M ajor S o ls k i, survived to te s tify that on 30 April 1940 at a station near Sm olensk he w as detached by the R ussians from a p riso n -train of Polish o ffic e rs from K o z ie ls k , *1820 in a ll probability the camp o f origin of most of the Polish corp ses at Katyn. 2i Such is the grim testim ony to be weighed ag a in st the p o s sib ility in logic at le a s t , in regard to the broad sign ifican ce of argument (i) ab o ve, that in 1941-2 the Russian a u th o rities, with their

1

18

In support of th is of the evidence of M S k arzyn sk i in U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le ct Committee,op c it part 3 , p 403 .

C f J K Zawodny, op c it pp 8 3 -6 ; House of R ep resen tatives, S e le ct Com m ittee, op c i t , part 1, pp 10 -12 , 2 5 - 6 , part 2 , p 4 2 , part 5 p 1610, part 6 , pp 1812, 1817; The Crime o f Katyn (cf n 8 above) pp 201, 2 0 6 , 216; J M a c k ie w ic z , The Katyn Wood Murders (London, 1951) pp 145-6 , Am tliches M aterial zum Massenmord von K atvn . pp 116 -17.

^

C f J K Zawodny, op c it p 110.

20

The Crime of K atyn, pp 5 7 - 6 0 , a ls o pp 21f. The substance o f this accou n t, which P rofessor Sw ianiew icz had reported to the Polish au thorities in 194 2, is cited anonym ously in U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t , part 6 , p 16 62.

21

C f ib id , p 1 7 9 3 -4 .

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n ative se c re tiv e n e ss and o rien tal concern for f a c e , might have been relu ctan t to admit to Polish enquirers that the w orst period o f the w ar for Russia had included a m assive adm inistrative breakdown w hereby thousands of Polish prisoners were le ft to German mercy through S o viet incom petence: if not, indeed, through S o viet e v il design in co n ven ien tly abandoning Polish lead ers to their fate under the Germans as S o viet fo rces in fact did three years la te r in the W arsaw uprising (cf,h ow ever, para 30 below and para 3 o f Sir Reader Bullard's telegram of 1946 at Annex E). In any c a s e , though, argument (ii) may seem to be s t ill the g ra v est o f a ll the pointers to Russian g u ilt, and one which has never been s a tis fa c to rily co u n tered .

10 .

It may be hardly n e c e ssa ry to retrace further S ir O O 'M alley's fo rcefu l arguments pointing to S o viet g u ilt, re c e n tly revived at length

by Mr C olvin and Mr FitzG ibbon. They have underlined the degree o f a ss e n t which these arguments commanded in the Foreign O ffic e , not le a s t from S ir A lexander Cadogan who minuted on 18 June 1943: "There may be evid en c e, that we do not know o f, that may point in another d ire ctio n . But on the evid en ce that we h a v e , it is d iffic u lt to escap e from the presumption of Russian guilt" (C 6160/ 258/ 55). Such a ss e n t had a lread y been in d icated , i f s u c c in c tly , in S ir L W oodw ard's o ffic ia l h isto ry o f British Foreign P olicy in the Second W orld W ar (vol i i , p 626; short versio n of 19 6 2 , p 204). Neither Mr C o lv in nor Mr FitzGibbon c ite s Mr Eden's minute o f 25 February 1944 to Mr W inston C h u rch ill (C 2420/8/55) on Sir O O 'M alley's second despatch: "The present despatch strengthens the con clu sion reached in the e a rlie r one that the cum ulative e ffe c t of the evid en ce is to throw seriou s doubts on Russian d isclaim ers of re sp o n sib ility . . . I understand that P ro fessor [Sir D onald] Savory has sent you a copy o f h is own in vestig ation into th is q u estio n .

His r e p o r t .. . is based on Polish m aterial. The co n clu sio n s it reach es are borne out by S ir O O 'M alley's a n a ly s is . N everth eless the evid en ce is con flictin g and w h atever we may su sp e c t, we s h a ll probably n ever know." The Prime M inister replied next day: "This is not one o f those m atters where absolute certain ty is eith er urgent or indispensable" .

11.

On the d ay before he wrote to the Prime M in ister, Mr Eden had minuted (C 2099/8/55): "All the same it is puzzling that the Germans should have kept this information bottled up so lo n g ." It may appear e s p e c ia lly puzzling sin ce on German o ffic ia l a d m lssio n 22a Polish working party attached to the German forces had dug up Polish co rp ses at Katyn in the summer of 194 2, apparently w ith foreknow ledge that they should be there: w hereas such knowledge is said in Am tliches M ater i a l ^

^

Am tliches M a teria l, pp 9 - 1 0 , 2 5 - 6 .

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to have been obtained by the German S ecret M ilitary P olice o n ly in February 1943 . If th is in te rv a l o f six months or more seem s c u rio u s , the German o ffic ia l ve rsio n of 1943 w as sig n ific a n tly modified at the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946 by C o lo n el Friedrich Ahrens who had commanded the German S ig n als Regiment 5 3 7 , based at Katyn, sin ce h is a rriv a l th e re , purportedly in November 19 41.23 C o lo n el Ahrens te s tifie d th at in Decem ber 1941 or January 1942 he had firs t seen a cro ss marking a g rav emound and th at he sub seq u en tly reported to the German m ilitary in tellig e n ce that h is men had told him that shootings had taken p lace at Katyn. The German in te llig e n c e in d icated in rep ly that th ey w ere a lre a d y inform ed.

12.

In 1944 S ir O O 'M a lley , supposedly w ith the encouragem ent of the Prime M in ister, sought considered opinions on the reports o f the Germansponsored In ternational Forensic M edical Com m ission and o f the S o viet S p e c ia l Com m ission from two o f the most eminent British m edical a u th o ritie s , Lord Adrian and S ir Bernard S p iis b u ry . In a le tte r o f 16 February 1944 (C 5093/8/55) Lord Adrian made the sig n ifica n t point that the International Com m ission "have not stated any opinion as to the date o f the shooting . A ll th ey sa y is that one sk u ll out o f many showed changes which according to the exp erien ce o f P rof. Orsos imply at le a s t three ye ars b u ria l. C le a rly th ey are not prepared to endorse P rof. Orsos' opinion, though they are read y to sta te i t . I do not think the changes are w e ll recognised signs o f long burial - th ey are not mentioned in the ordinary tex t books - and the wording o f the C om m ission's reports su g g ests v e ry c le a rly that Prof. O rsos w as the on ly one who attached much importance to them." P ro fessor Orsos w as the Hungarian member o f the Com m ission and is said to have been a prison er in Russia during the F irst W orld W a r. At a copious dinner at Sm olensk, on the evening before the C om m ission's enquiry began, P rofessor O rsos had treated his German h o sts to an an tisem itic effu sio n (C 7 261/258/55 of 19 43). On h is return v ia Berlin, P ro fessor O rsos w as evid e n tly in touch with the German au th o rities there and "he w as e s p e c ia lly thanked for succeeding

C f , h o w ever, A lbert Praun, Soldat ln der Telegraphen und Nachrichtentruppe (WĂźrzburg, n d - 1965f) p 14 8 , in connexion with a routine v is it by G eneral Praun to the NKVD v illa at Katyn on 24 Septem ber 1941, an in terestin g date in the light o f the S o vie t R eport.

C f In ternational M ilita ry Tribunal, Trial o f the M ajor W ar C rim in als (Nuremberg 1 9 4 7 -9 ), v o l XVII, pp 2 7 5 -9 7 .

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in h is effo rts to ach ieve a ve ry serious w o r t h y , expert opinion, able to w ithstand any sc ien tific c ritic is m ." 25 Thus there is some suggestion that P rofessor Orsos # the member o f the Com m ission who "showed the g rea test in tere st in the w ork2 6 a t Katyn, masterminded its report in a sen se agreeable to the G erm ans.

13 .

Lord Adrian did not then know that h is estim ate of the work of P rofessor Orsos coincided ve ry c lo s e ly w ith that o f Doctor Marian W od zinski o f the Polish Red C ro ss team at Katyn. There on the morning of 30 April 19 43, Dr W o d z in sk i, an apparently re lia b le w itn e s s , had observed the rem oval of the one sk u ll and "watched P rofessor Orsos' post mortem exam ination closely" .27 W h ereas P rofessor Orsos and the other members of what Dr W odzinski c a lle d "the so c a lle d European Com m ission o f Experts in Forensic Medicine" spent a bare two days at Katyn, Dr W odzinski w as the expert w ho, under German su rv e illa n c e , superintended the excavation and subsequent reburial of o ver four thousand co rp ses there between 29 April and 3 June 1943 . He controverted P ro fe sso r Orsos and concluded: "It w as not p o ssib le to gauge by the degree o f putrescence and decom position alone e x a c tly how long the bodies had lain under the ground."28 It w as on other co u n ts, e s p e c ia lly the dating of documents on the corp ses up to A p ril-M ay 1940 o n ly , that Dr W odzinski came to accep t presum ptive, but not c o n c lu s iv e , evid ence o f Russian g u ilt.

14 .

Thus it seem s as c le a r as anything now can be in regard to the Katyn M assacre that s tric tly m edical evidence must be treated as in c o n c lu siv e . This is in accordance with the main finding of Sir Bernard S p ilsb u ry , who in his turn replied on 8 A pril 1944 to S ir Owen O 'M alley "that from the m edical fa c ts d isclo se d it is not p o ssib le in my opinion to se ttle the co n troversy betw een the R ussians and the G erm ans. I am how ever im pressed by the m icroscopical evid en ce of p reservatio n given by the Russians as in favour o f the shorter rather than the longer period o f b u rial." (C 5093/ 8/ 55). The opinions of English exp erts c le a rly

Telegram of 8 May 1943 from German M in ister in Budapest: U S House of R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t . part 5 , p 1407.

25

The Crime o f K atyn, p l 9 5 .

27

Ib id , p 196.

28

Ibid, p 226 .

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could not go v e ry far but both S ir B Spilsbury and Lord Adrian tended to support the Russian c a s e ag a in st the German. Nor did th is m edical tendency stand a lo n e .

15 .

On 17 February 1944 a Research Department memorandum (Annex B) w as prepared by P rofessor B H Sumner, a notable and im partial Russian sc h o la r. U nlike Sir Owen O 'M alley, P rofessor Sumner attempted an evalu atio n of the d etailed evidence produced by the S o viet S p e cia l C om m ission. In th is eva lu a tio n , he a lso took account o f the report of the International Forensic M edical Com m ission but not of the other reports printed in A m tliches M a te ria l, which were not a v a ila b le to h im . The Research Department memorandum advanced a number of ob servation s and c o n c lu sio n s, notably: (i)

(ii)

(iii)

W h ereas the enquiry by the International Forensic M edical Com m ission w as conducted with extreme ra p id ity , the So viet en quiry, except in its fin al s ta g e s , w as apparently protracted and lasted s e v e ra l m onths. (The International Com m ission signed the protocol of its v is it to the scen e o f the m assacre a fter spending two d ays at Katyn, 2 9 -3 0 April: c f, h ow ever, paragraph 13 for the work o f the Polish Red C ro ss Com m ission. Imm ediately a fter the Russian reoccupation of Smolensk S o viet in ve stig ato rs claim ed to have arrived there on 26 September 19 4 3 . It is n o tic ea b le , h ow ever, that the S o viet experts in fo ren sic m edicine on ly began th eir work of exhuming 925 corp ses on 16 January 1944 and fin ish ed it on 23 January, the day before the signature of the S o viet report: cf,fu rth er, paragraph 37.)

The So viet report did not furnish re p lie s to arguments (i) and (ii) in paragraph 8 a b o v e .

On the bodies at Katyn, according to the S o viet Com m ission as summarized by the Research Department memorandum (paras 12-13) , "were found nine documents with d ates on them ranging between 12 September 1940 and 20 June 1941 (ie the day before the German attack on the USSR). . .i f the documents are genuine and genuinely belonged to the persons on whom they w ere found, they would c o n c lu siv e ly prove that th ese persons were a liv e after the date (M arch-M ay 1940) g iven by the Germans for the alleg ed So viet sh o o tin g s. . .

A strong point in favour o f the genuineness of th ese nine documents is that no document w as found after the 20th June 1941. If S o viet au thorities were forging or substituting docum ents, why not com pletely c le a r th em selves and incrim inate the Germans" , who only captured Smolensk on 16 Ju ly 1941?

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"The report o f the [Soviet]C om m ission may be said to make out a good, though not a c o n c lu siv e , c a se for the perpetration o f the m assacres by the Germans" .

16 .

P rofessor Sumner's measure o f acceptance of the S o viet report has not g en erally b een matched by la te r research and opinion in the Foreign O ffice (cf paragraph 65 b elo w ). At the tim e, how ever, the on ly sub­ sta n tive criticism in important minutes on the Research Department Memorandum (C 2957/8/55) came from Sir A lexander C ad og an , who strongly objected to its callin g the So viet Commission "a strong one" , and discounted both Russian and German evidence (cf paragraphs 35 and 36 b e lo w ). This minute alone is cited by Mr C o lvin in his a rtic le of 17 August 1972, though he b riefly mentions that se v e ra l other o ffic ia ls "praised the approach of the Research Department a n a ly s is , which restored a valu ab le am biguity." In fact Mr D enis A llen thought it "a good paper"; and Mr Frank Roberts and Sir W illiam M alkin, the Legal A d vise r, minuted s u c c e s s iv e ly on 7 March 1944: "This u sefu l paper fasten s on the w eak n esses in the German c a s e , which have indeed alw ays been apparent, but it does not to my mind d ispose o f the w eak n esses in the Russian c a s e .

F K Roberts" .

"It looks to me as i f the e s s e n tia l point w as the genuineness o f the documents mentioned in paragraphs 12-13 (cf paragraph 15 (iii) a b o ve ). If both the documents and their connection with the bodies were g en u in e, they are p ra c tic a lly co n clu sive in favour of the Russian case; i f they were fak ed , the inference the other w ay is alm ost ir r e s is tib le . W e are not lik e ly e v e r to know the truth about th is , but it should at any rate ju s tify a suspension of judgment on our p a rt. H W M." 17 .

Other members of the Foreign O ffice then considered that P rofessor Sumner's memorandum rather told again st the o b je c tiv ity o f Sir O O 'M alley' d e s p a tc h e s. On the first of th ese Mr D A llen had commented at the time (minute o f 4 June 1943 on C 6160/258/55) that one p assag e "leading up to a fin a l ghoulish visio n of Stalin condemning the Poles to the knacker's ya rd . . .seem s to serve no other purpose than to arouse a n ti-S o v ie t p a ssio n s and prejudices in the read er's mind." Now M r, la te r Lord, H arvey minuted on 20 March 1944: "The Polish Government have plumped headlong for the German c a s e . S ir O O 'M alley in h is firs t d esp atch , wrote a b rillian t reconstruction of even ts according to Polish v ie w s which he endorsed. Thanks to FORD we now have an o b jec tive a n a ly s is of the So viet c a s e . Sir W M alkin, who has read a ll the papers on the su b je ct, has now recorded that the S o viet c a se is stronger than w as first thought and c a lls at any rate for suspension o f judgment" .

A gainst Mr H arvey's reference to "an o b jective a n a ly sis o f the S o viet

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case" Mr Roberts noted that the memorandum w as "written from the S o vie t point o f view" . S ir W M alkin's v ie w of the importance of the la te -d a te d documents w a s , h ow ever, follow ed in a short co verer o f 26 March to the memorandum, prepared for circu latio n to The King and W ar C abin et and approved by S ir A lexander Cadogan and Mr Eden. 29 This covering note concluded: "The truth may n ever come to lig h t .

But m eanwhile the evid en ce at present a v a ila b le would seem to require a suspension of judgment in regard to the w hole affair" (C 2957/ 8/ 55).

This represented the considered view o f the Foreign O ffic e .

18 .

If th is considered v ie w , avoiding Judgment on Katyn, has been su b s ta n tia lly maintained in the Foreign O ffic e , recent review there in confidence has s e v e re ly questioned the v a lid ity o f the S o viet report o f 1944 on grounds o f circu m stan tial e v id e n c e , not le a s t in regard to the la te -d a te d documents (cf paragraph 6 5 ). These nine documents , described w ith some d e ta ils in the Russian rep ort, have not been published in fu ll. Nor, ap p aren tly, have th ey been seen by anybody other than R ussians except for a party o f seven teen foreign jo u rn a lists whom the S o vie t au thorities esco rted to Katyn in January 1944 along with M iss Kathleen H arrim an, daughter o f the American Am bassador in M oscow , and Mr John F M elb y, a Third S e cre ta ry in h is Em bassy. M iss Harriman, la te r Mrs M ortim er, su b sequently explained to the C o n g ression al Enquiry of 1952 that the documents w ere d isp layed to them in g la s s c a s e s in a museum In Sm olensk. At the C o n g ression al Enquiry both Mrs Mortimer

In regard to the circu lation given to the evalu atio n of Katyn

by S ir O O 'M alley and by the Research Department Mr C o lv in , in h is a rtic le o f 17 August 197 2, em phasized what he described as the "opposition to the truth as seen by Mr O 'M alley." It would ap p ear, h ow ever, that Mr C o lv in is in error in making out th at the Research Department memorandum, with the annexed report o f the S o vie t C om m ission, "were both printed and circu lated on a w ider sc a le o f d istribution than Mr O 'M alley's two re p o rts . " S ir O O 'M a lle y 's despatch of 1943 and P rofessor Sumner's memorandum with annex were both given restricted King and W ar C ab in et circu lation in C o n fid en tial P rint. S ir O O 'M a lle y â&#x20AC;&#x2122; s second despatch w as circu lated in typ escrip t to members o f the W ar C abinet owing to a p erson al ruling

by S ir W inston C h u rc h ill, as noticed by Mr C o lv in . It w as a g a in st th is d ifferen ce in presentation that S ir O O 'M alley protested to S ir A lexander Cadogan in a le tte r o f 13 A pril 1944 , which for some reason is file d among the papers on Katyn in 1945 (N 16482/ 664/ 55).

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CONFIDENTIAL and Mr M elby revoked th eir previous con clu sion s o f German g u ilt for Katyn, on b alan ce, d espite the appreciable doubts which th eir reports of 1944 c a s t upon the S o viet p re se n ta tio n .30 The p ress-corresp on d en ts on the tour to Katyn appear to have been somewhat non-com m ittal and our Embassy in M oscow reported on 25 January 1944: "Some of the American correspondents told the Press Department of People's Com m issariat for Foreign A ffairs that they were not ve ry impressed" (C 1097/8/55).

19.

In the Russian account the nine late-d a ted documents were part of the re la tiv e ly sm all residuum (146 documents is one figure) from the rem oval under German au sp ices from the corp ses o f o ver three thousand docum ents, as te s tifie d in Polish evidence .3 1 In the light of dubious a lleg a tio n s in the S o viet Report (Annex B, pp 2 8 -2 9 ) that the Germans extracted late-d a ted documents from the co rp ses and in serted other docum ents, it may be worth noticing that the Germans allow ed more freedom than the Russians in the handling o f docum ents, but: (1)

the exhumation team of the Polish Red C ro s s , who placed such documents in envelop es at the g ra v e s id e , had no right to examine the docum ents,

(ii)

the documents w ere taken some m iles by a German d esp atc h -rid er, often accompanied by a P o le, to an o ffic e of the German m ilitary p olice under Lieutenant V oss where they "were taken over by the German a u th o rities. The prelim inary in vestig atio n s and the ascertaining o f names were done jointly" by Germans and Polish re p re s e n ta tiv e s , and the en velop es were opened in the presence of both. The documents w ere put into new en velop es which "were placed at the e x c lu siv e d isp o sa l o f the German au thorities ;â&#x2013; 3 2

(iii)

the more important documents , e s p e c ia lly d ia ries , were im m ediately tran slated by a Polish woman o f German origin . This Volksdeutsche w as observed to tran sla te into German "only such ex tra cts from the d ia ries as were compromising to the S o v ie ts . C o n v e rs e ly , she

C f U S House of R ep re sen ta tives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t , part 7 , p 2145 .

J K Zawodny, op c i t , p 88 .

U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t , part 3 , p 408 .

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CONFIDENTIAL om itted many paragraphs th at w ere anti-G erm an. " 33 It is uncertain w hether such documents w ere returned and rep laced in th eir e n v e lo p e s . (iv)

Documents which could not be deciphered on the spot "were sent by the Germans to a fie ld -la b o ra to ry in Sm olensk, w h ere, without the a s s is ta n c e of P o le s, th ey w ere treated by laboratory methods in a more thorough w ay by German personnel working under the p erson al direction o f P rofessor Buhtz" . 33

These arrangem ents appear to have been unchallenged by the P o le s.

Su b seq u en tly, h ow ever, Mr F B Bourdillon commented on the Polish Supplem entary Report o f October 1947 (cf paragraph l.v i i ) : "It somewhat g lo s s e s o ver the effo rts made by the Germans to prevent the Poles seeing the papers found in the g raves un til th ey had been inspected by the G e stap o , or from taking anything away" (N 2599/ 2599/ 55 o f 1948 : c f a ls o Annex D .)

20.

At the end of the w ar, Norwegians from Sachsenhausen concentra­ tion -cam p , notab ly a certain Erik Jo h a n se n , stated that documents had been forged there and placed on the co rp ses found at Katyn, w h ich â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;w ere a c tu a lly th ose of p risoners from Sach sen h au sen . The la tte r alleg atio n may appear p a rtic u larly im p lau sib le, although it could square with circu m stan tial testim ony in the S o viet report Annex B, pp 30 -32 ) that the Germans brought lorryload s o f co rp ses to Katyn by n ig h t. The Norwegian sto ry w as carried by Reuters and the BBC at the end o f June 1945 and w as quoted in the S o viet p r e s s . In th is connexion a telegram o f 1 Ju ly 1945 from S ir A C lark Kerr noticed w ith referen ce to the reported German faking o f documents for Katyn: "This supports findings o f S o viet Com m ission that Germans w ere responsible" (N 7 8 22 / 66 4/ 55 ). E arlier, and in d ep en d en tly, an entry for 29 November 1943 in a cla n d estin e d iary kept by a Norwegian p risoner in Sachsenhausen had referred to the se cret employment there o f Jew s in "a sp e c ia l SS p rin tin g -sh o p . . .surrounded on e v e ry side by an impenetrable double fence o f barbed w ir e . . . That printing-sh op is em ployed in forging documents and m oney, turning out a ll the fraudulent printed matter o f which the Third Reich makes u s e .

So much is beyond doubt. . . It's taken for granted that the th irtyeight Jew s em ployed in there w ill n ever come out. " 34

Crim e o f K atyn , p 2 0 9 .

Odd N ansen, Day a fte r Day (trans K John; London 1949) p 446.

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21.

C o in cid en tally with the later Norwegian report, linking Sachsenhausen with Katyn, in June 1945 Stockholm s-Tidningen w as cited for a statem ent from an unnamed, high-ranking SS o ffic e r "that the 'Katyn m assacre' of Polish o ffic ers w as faked by Ribbentrop and G o eb b els. Bodies from German concentration-cam ps were d ressed in Polish o fficers' uniforms and taken to K atyn."3536 This contrasted with circum stantial Polish evidence that the corp ses at Katyn could hardly have been tampered with and that most i f not a ll of those id e n tifie d , some 2 ,9 0 0 out o f over 4 ,0 0 0 , came from K ozielsk.36 Mr Roberts, h ow ever, subsequently reported from M oscow , that on 28 December 1945 at a Russian tria l of German so ld iers for a tro cities in the Leningrad d istric t one defendant ca lle d DĂźrer had a lle g e d ly admitted to having been present at the German shooting and burial at Katyn of fifteen to tw enty thousand Polish o ffic ers and others (N 2247/108/55 o f 1946). W hy the Russians did not adduce this striking testim ony at Nuremberg is an interestin g field for sp ecu latio n .

22.

C ertain reports which reached the Foreign O ffice in 1944 a lso d eserve attention . One o f 27 March from the Press Reading Bureau in Stockholm had reported an interrogation by a member o f its s ta ff, Mr W a s k ie w ic z , of a serious young P o le, M Pawel Ociepka from near K atow ice, who had ju st escaped from the W ehrm acht, to Sw eden. In September 1943 he had returned on lea ve to Upper S ile s ia where he found that the opinion on Katyn was (translation from French) "that the R ussians had a ssa ssin a te d around 2000 o ffic ers and the re st fe ll victim to German m a ssa c re s, organized to in crease the im pression cre a te d . As a fa ct

35 D aily Herald o f 28 June 1945: 36 C f note 18 above .

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N 78 22/ 664/ 55.

CONFIDENTIAL corroborating this theory 0(ciepka) in stan ces that two w ive s o f o ffic e r p risoners from Katowice (Mme M a lik , w ife o f a lieutenant on the r e s e r v e , and Mme Ja n c ik , w ife o f a captain on the a ctive list) had at first received o ffic ia l notices announcing the death of th eir husbands in concentration-cam ps in Germany and afterw ards discovered their names on the l i s t , published in Upper S ile s ia , of those a ss a s sin a te d at Katyn" (C 4357/131/55).

23 . Three w eeks after th is report another of 18 April 1944 from the same bureau reported in French an interrogation by M W a sk iew icz of five P o le s, a s s e s s e d as good informants reflectin g average Polish opinion in W arsaw when th ey le ft it in January 1944: "On Katyn the prevailing opinion is to accu se the Germans of being the a u th o rs. One of those interrogated again c ite s the example of two lad ie s o f h is acquaintance whose husbands had'died' at Oswiecim [A uschw itz ] and w ho, after having found their names on the Katyn l i s t , went to seek new s from the G estapo and have not reappeared." On this paper Mr D enis A llen commented, not with sp e c ia l reference to Katyn: "These Stock­ holm interrogations o f Polish esca p ers . . .show a striking unanimity on most important points and in gen eral bear out a ll our information from other so u rce s." (C 5616/131/55). It could n everth eless be that in 19 43-4 there w as circu latin g in Poland a generic fo lk tale or inspired rumour w hereby two lad ie s in each large town made the same tragic d is c o v e ry .

It i s , h ow ever, n oticeable that the w ives in Katowice were named and to some extent id en tified , w hile the informant from W arsaw claim ed personal acquaintance with the two women grim ly stated to have v a n is h e d . If the two sto ries w ere , as on the face of i t , d istin c t but concordant, then th ey would appear to ra ise a seriou s q u estion , if not o f German gu ilt for the Katyn m assacre at le a s t of some in terested German tampering w ith g raves th e re .

Ill

The Russo-Germ an C ontext (1939-1943)

24.

In the debate on Katyn in the House of Lords on 17 June 1971 (cf paragraph 2) the Earl o f L au d erd ale, who had been Balkan and Danubian Correspondent of The Times in 1939-194 1, observed: "The N aziS o viet P a ct. . .w as one of the g rea test b etra ya ls in h is to ry , and that Pact is the context o f th is d e b a te ."37 The Ribbentrop-M olotov Pact of 23 August 1939 w as pegged down after the d efeat and partition of Poland in the G erm an-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of 28 September 19 3 9 . Attached to th is trea ty w as a se cret additional p ro to col, signed that day in M oscow and reading: "Both p arties w ill tolerate in their te rrito rie s no Polish agitation which a ffe c ts the territo ries of the other

H ansard, Pari Debs , 5th se rie s , H of L , v o l CCCXX, co l 7 6 1.

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p a rty . They w ill suppress in th eir territo ries a ll beginnings o f such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable m easures for th is p u rp o se ."38 Lord B ethell, who took a prominent part in the debate on Katyn, has commented on this sin iste r provision: "In practice th is meant that the Gestapo held regular meetings with the NKVD, its So viet eq u ivalen t, to coordinate their effo rts against any Poles so fo o lish as to try to rein state their country's independence"39- if not a lso ag ain st any Poles so unfortunate as to be s p e c ia lly capable o f trying la te r.

C o n tacts between the G estapo and the NKVD notably dated back to the purge of M arshal Tukhachevsky in 1937 . This w a s , in the vie w of a high SS o ffic e r then in the G estap o, "a preparatory step towards the rapprochement between H itler and S ta lin . It w as the turning point that marked H itler's decision to secure his Eastern front by an a llia n ce with R u ssia, w hile preparing to attack the W e s t . "4° 25 . A further confid en tial protocol to the G erm an-Soviet Treaty of 28 September 1939 provided for exchange of German and S o viet n ationals .

M Khrushchev in his memoirs, for what th ey may be w orth, re ca lled his h is organization of the so vietizatio n of Lvov "during the period ju st a fter the signing of the Ribbentrop-M olotov Pact" and the a c tiv ity then o f the sin iste r "Comrade S e ro v, the People's Com m issar o f Internal A ffairs in the U kraine. Serov's duties required him to have co n tacts with the G estap o . A G estapo rep resen tative used to come to Lvov on o ffic ia l b u s in e s s . I don't know what sort of a network the G estapo had in the U kraine, but it w as ex ten sive . The co ver for th is network w as an exchange agreement whereby people on G erm an-occupied territo ry who wanted to return to their homes in the former Polish territo ry now occupied

by S o viet troops were allow ed to do so; and lik e w ise anyone in the Ukrainian population on S o viet territo ry who wanted to return to Germanoccupied Poland could do th a t." *4041 It appears that Polish prison ers were in fa ct exchanged both w ays , 42 And in 1945 it w as in the context of

Documents on German Foreign P o licy 1918-1945 (London 19 49f) , S e ries D , v o l VIII, p 166 .

-3q 40

N icholas B ethell, The W ar H itler Won (London 1972), p 337 .

W a lte r S c h elle n b erg , The Schellenberg Memoirs (trans.

L H agen, London 1956) p 4 9 .

41

Khrushchev Remembers (ed E C rankshaw , London 1971) , p 141.

42

C f J K Zawodny, op c i t , p 128.

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the Katyn m assacre that M M ik o la jc zy k , Polish prime m inister from Ju ly 1943 to November 1944 , stated his certain knowledge "that there w as an agreem ent between the Germans and Russians concerning the exchange of Poles and U k ra in ia n s, and that the Germans would not accep t the Polish o ffic e rs offered in that exchange ."43 26 . For the S o viet U nion, according to one au th o rity, her trea ty of 28 September 1939 with Germany w as by then "the product o f fear" .44 By the Soviet-G erm an communique issu ed at the time of th is tre a ty the S o viet Union departed from her n eu trality to the exten t of pu b licly undertaking to engage with Germany "in mutual co n su ltation s with regard to n e c e s sa ry measures" in the even t of G reat Britain and France refusing to make peace and thus becoming a lle g e d ly "responsible for the continu­ ation of the war" .45 Such w as this Soviet-G erm an renew al of th eir "fierce friendship" (Lloyd George) from the nine tee n -tw en ties . In the ensuing economic negotiations the Russians surprised the Germans by their forthcoming n ess , and a senior member o f the German Embassy in M oscow considered that for th e German w ar-effo rt th ese negotiations w ere "a tremendous success" .

It has been p lau sib ly suggested that the Germans on their side were afraid that the thousands of Polish o ffic e rs in the S o viet Union might e v en tu a lly be unleashed ag ain st them , as indeed the survivors were (cf paragraph 3 0 ).

47 27 . It would appear to have been in December 1939 that a RussoGerman conference w as held in C racow "about the repatriation o f the Poles under Russian domination" . At the end o f January 1940 the Polish

S tan islaw M ik o la jczyk , The Pattern of S o viet Domination (London 1948), p 3 9 .

Adam B Ulam, Expansion and C o ex isten ce (London, 1968), p 2 8 6 .

Documents on German Foreign P olicy 1918-1945 , S e ries D , v o l VIII, p 167 .

G ustav Hilger and A lfred G M e y e r, The Incompatible A llie s (New York 1953), p 317 .

This date is given as December 1940 in M Sk arzyn ski's eviden ce o f 1952: U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Committee , op c i t , part 3 , p 4 0 2 . Subject to further research , h ow ever, it would appear from the sequence of his other evidence and of gen eral even ts that the year should probably be 1939.

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Red C ro ss was "told by the Germans to prepare camps to re ce ive Polish o ffic e rs who were supposed to come back from interment [ s ic ] in S o viet R u s s ia .. . Of course this news ele ctrifie d the fam ilies and the w hole n atio n , 14 ,0 0 0 fam ilies , a figure which we didn't know e x a c tly th en .

There w as feverish work started at o n c e . W e organized refugee camps at T erespol, at the border o f the then zone between Germany and Russia" , 48 The Germans told the Polish Red C ro ss that since Russia had not ratified the G eneva and The Hague conventions "we could not expect any news from our men in Russia and that we must w ait for the individual men to w rite fir s t, that no inquiries could be made to R u ssia ." 4 ÂŽ 28 . In a lette r recen tly published in the D aily Telegraph , on 1 April 1971, Mr A M itrega, a su rvivor from the Soviet camp at Starobielsk (cf paragraph 8 above) for Polish o ffic e rs , re ca lled that on 5 A pril 1940 "we were told by the Russian camp commander that we were going to be handed over to the Germans in occupied Poland. But it turned out later that th ey never arrived th ere ." 4 9 The cam p-authorities at S tarob ielsk are stated to have received "from the cen tral o ffic e " 50 lis t s designating Polish prisoners for tran sp ortation . Seventy nine o f them, instead of vanishing like their comrades and those from the third camp of O stash k ov, survived on tran sfer to another camp at P avelish tch ev Bor (cf paragraph 8 .ii) . Some prisoners at Starob ielsk noticed that the group d estined to su rvive included not on ly a com paratively large number o f "Reds" such as C o lo n el Berling, la ter Commander o f the Polish forces with the Red Arm y, but a lso "the m ajority of Starob ielsk 'V olksdeutsche'"5*.

29 . According to a much later account by a pseudonymous defector from the NKVD, "the liquidation of the Polish o ffic e rs at Katyn" w as "a ty p ic a l operation" by NKVD "operational troop s" . "The whole op eration , which has led to such vio le n t con troversy in the w e s t, w as considered e n tire ly routine and unremarkable in Soviet R u ssia. I did not work in the State Secu rity system at the time of the m a ss a c re , but during my time in the State Security Service body, GUKR Sm ersh, and in p articu lar when I w as

Ibid , p 385 .

C ite d , L FitzGibbon, The Katyn Cover-Up p 25 .

U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t C om m ittee, op c i t , part 6, p 16 70.

Ib id , pp 1671-2 .

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CONFIDENTIAL working in its Third A dm in istration , I met people who p articipated in and helped to organize th is mass m u rd e r.. . The sm all group of Poles such as B erlin g , which the NKVD needed a s d ecoys to put in th eir shop w indow , had alread y been picked o u t ."52 From much e a rlie r testim ony from P rofessor Sw ian iew icz (cf paragraph 9 above) it would appear that the reception of cen tral d ire c tiv e s at Starob ielsk w as c lo s e ly matched at K o z ie ls k , whence the transport of Polish o ffic e rs began on 3 A pril 19 4 0 . The names of the o ffic e rs in d ivid u a lly se lected for in clu sion in each transport w ere dictated in te le p h o n e -c a lls from M oscow to the cam p-auth orities at K o zielsk , so that "some o f us [p riso n ers] hazarded the g u ess that a F ran co -B ritish -S oviet mixed com m ission (or perhaps a Russo-Germ an one) w as deciding which Polish o ffic e rs w ere to be sent a b ro a d . . . If the Germans w ere in v o lv e d . . . I fa iled to see how it could be in their in tere st to get the Polish o ffic e rs transferred from Russian to German captivity ."53 Nor, according to M M ikolajczyk (paragraph 25) did the Germans now se e t h is . Though it appears that there w as no m ass­ k illin g o f Polish o ffic e rs in German prison-cam ps .

30.

It may or may not have been grim co in cid en ce, h ow ever, that at ju s t about the time that the R u ssian s, on the German a ccu sa tio n , were perpetrating the Katyn M a ssa c re , Herr Hans Frank, German G overnorG eneral of P olan d , told a conference of German p olice o ffic ia ls on 30 M ay 1940: "The o ffe n siv e in the W e st began on 10 M a y. On that day the centre of in te re st shifted from the even ts taking p lace here . . .

W e must u se the opportunity in our hands . The FĂźhrer said to m e. . .the men c a p a b le ^ lead ersh ip whom we have found in Poland must be liquidated" .

The conference resu lted in the German "Operation AB" , liquidation o f the Polish le a d e rsh ip . At about the same tim e, "about A pril or M ay, or maybe the firs t day of June, but not la t e r , 1940"55 according to M S k a rz y n s k i, his su p e rio r, Dr W G o rc z y c k i, D irector *534

A I Romanov, Nights are Longest There (trans . G Brooke , London 197 2), pp 136-7 .

53 54

55

The Crime of K atyn , p 5 0 .

International M ilitary T ribunal, Trial o f the M ajor W ar C rim inals . v o l v i i , pp 4 6 8 - 9 .

U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t C om m ittee, op c i t , part 3 , p 387.

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of the Polish Red C ro ss , received a verbal order from a rep resen tative o f the German Governm ent-G eneral "to c lo se the camps (at Terespol) , tellin g us that the o ffic ers won't come back ".55 (By October 1 9 4 0 , in connexion with Soviet recruitment of Poltsh o ffic e rs , M M erkulov, Deputy Head of the NKVD, was reported a s saying of those from K ozlelsk and Staroblelsk "we made a great m istake with them".

According to another Poltsh so u rce, M Beria s a id , "There are not many le f t , because w e made a great mistake in turning the m ajority of them over to the Germans 6) 31.

Unlike the defector from the NKVD and Mr Robert C o n q u est, *57 P rofessor A B Ulam of Harvard U n iversity, an expert o f Polish origin on S o viet a ffa irs , has argued that "while S o viet secu rity fo rces have n ever been known to su ffer from humanitarian inhibitions , the Katyn action w as . . . u n ch aracteristic of S o viet p ractices on such o ccasio n s . The most lik e ly conjecture is": that the G erm ans, with their con tacts betw een the G estapo and the NKVD, by "their im portunities led the S o viet o ffic ia ls to sanction the frightful ste p . The spring o f 1940 before the German attack in the W e st w as the period o f the g rea test S o viet n ervou sn ess about German in ten tion s, and the g rea test eag ern ess not to provoke H itle r." 58 There is no proof that German im portunities did stim ulate the Russians to the Katyn M a ssa c re . But there is the evid en ce now that some German au thorities had prompt knowledge o f a d estin y for the Polish o ffic e rs in Russia which would e n s u re , by w hatever m ean s, that th ey would not then be returning to Poland: and that at p re c is e ly the time that the Germans were organizing th eir own liquidation of the Polish leadership and that the Russians w e r e , on the la te r German a ccu sa tio n , slaughtering the Polish o ffic e rs at Katyn.

32.

This conjunction may appear p articu larly ominous in the light not o n ly o f the terms o f the se cret protocol o f 28 September 1939 but a lso o f the b asic circum stance that neither for Russia nor for Germany w as there a Polish state ju rid ic a lly in ex isten ce in 19 4 0 . It may be doubted w hether it w as lik e ly that the R u ssian s, then seeking to appease Germ any, would have k illed thousands of P oles originating from the German G overnm ent-G eneral without some kind of understanding or condonation from the Germans . Russian resp ect for the ju rid ica l position w as grimly underlined p re c ise ly in K ozielsk camp, where Polish o ffic e rs originating from eastern Poland then under S o viet sovereign ty were s tric tly segregated

The Crime of K atyn, p 97: c f a lso Annex D la s t paragraph.

57

C f Robert C onquest, The G reat Terror (New York, 1968) p 483 .

58

A B Ulam . . op c i t , p 344 .

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from those originating from the German G overn m en t-G en eral. On the testim ony of P rofessor Sw ianiew icz "this segregation of prisoners according to an a rtific ia l and imposed new State allegiance" 59 w as relaxed on ly on 3 A pril 19 4 0 , the day on which the transports from K ozielsk began.

33 . It is supposed that the origin al German announcement in A pril 1943 o f 10 ,0 0 0 or 1 2 ,0 0 0 dead at Katyn (cf paragraph 1) w as designed to include in advance the Polish prisoners not only from K ozielsk but a lso from those other two camps w hose inm ates are n early a ll untraced to th is d a y . If there w as a measure o f Germ an-Russian understanding in regard to th ese Polish victim s it evid en tly had not extended to the p recise lo c a litie s o f th eir liq u id ation . N e verth e le ss, it seem s hardly p o ssib le to rule out some suspicion of such an understanding in general term s.

On 15 A pril 1943 M S k arzyn sk i, on h is w ay to Katyn, w as received in Smolensk by Lieutenant Slow enczik (cf paragraph 5), who represented to him that the Polish nation should now join the Germans in th eir fight ag ain st R u ssia. M Skarzynski re p lie d , on his own re c o lle c tio n , "that e v e ry Pole would be d eep ly shocked by th is d isc o v e ry , but in ev ita b ly w ill link this matter with the fact that it w as done at a time when R u ssia, the present enemy of Germany, w as their friend and a lly , on the b a s is , again, of th is tRibbentrop-M olotov] p a c t." 60 If th is Soviet-G erm an friendship did embrace some understanding as to the fate of the Polish o ffic ers in R ussia, th at might help to exp lain the depth of the lastin g ob scu rity shrouding th ese even ts and, more p a rtic u la rly , the d iscrep an cies in the otherw ise su rp risin g ly c a su a l German accounts o f th eir subsequent d isco very o f the Katyn M assacre (cf paragraph 11 $ b o v e ). If th is w as the c a se the Germans would by 1943 have had the R ussians trapped s in c e , w h atever e ls e the la tte r s a id , th ey could hardly admit to th eir new a llie s that they had butchered thousands of P oles at the su g g estio n , or with the co n n ivan ce, o f the N azis.

IV

The Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946)

34 . In the autumn of 1945 the prospect of the Nuremberg Tribunal on W ar C rim inals revived British parliam entary in tere st in re sp o n sib ilitie s for Katyn. On 10 October Mr Hector M cN eil, Parliam entary Under­ se c re ta ry o f State for Foreign A ffairs , stated in the House of Commons:

The Crime of K atyn, p 5 0 .

U S House of R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c l t , part 3 , p 392 .

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"As the victim s were of Polish n atio n ality and the site o f crime is on S o viet s o il, and having regard to the terms o f the Three-Power D eclaration issu ed at M oscow on 1st November, 1943 , it would be d ifficu lt and inappropriate for His M a jesty 's Govemament to take the in itia tiv e in this m atter." (Hansard, H of C , vo l 4 14 , co l 250) . On 25 October Mr D enis A llen prepared a paper (Annex C) summarizing previous developm ents in regard to the Katyn m assacre and annexing a draft b rief for a parliam entary debate which did not in fa ct take place . This draft b rief notably included the following p assag es: "HMG. . .nave no direct evidence on the su b ject in their own p o s s e s s io n .. . They have o f course studied the reports published by the German and So viet Com m issions w hich in vestig ated the scene of the m assacres in 1943 . In th eir opinion the S o viet report, which w as drawn up after a lengthy period of in v e stig ­ ation by ve ry distinguished and highly q ualified Russian e x p e rts, provides su fficien t prima facie evidence o f German gu ilt to ju s tify the inclu sion o f th is charge in the indictment again st the major German w ar crim inals 35.

On 25 October 1945 M r, now Sir Thomas, Brimelow, then in Northern D epartm ent, minuted his agreement with Mr A llen 's paper su b ject to one sig n ifican t reservatio n to a p assag e in it along the line o f S ir W M alkin's minute of 7 March 1944 (cf paragraph 16 a b o v e ). On this Mr Brimelow observed (N 16482/664/55: Annex C): "The So viet in v e s ti­ g a tio n s, i f accepted as genuine, show that some Poles were k illed at Katyn after March 19 40. They do not prove that they were a ll k illed after that date . In other w o rd s, the S o viet in vestig ation s inculpate the Germans without en tire ly exculpating the S o viet a u th o ritie s. On the other hand, the evidence now a va ila b le about German mass murders makes it im possible to attach credence to German evidence which might be designed to mask German crim es. W e must therefore suspend judgment."

36 . This suggestion that the gu ilt of one o f the su sp ect nations in regard to Katyn need not n e c e s s a rily exclude some measure of g u ilt on the part of the other may seem sp e c ia lly interestin g in the light of fore­ going considerations . And the suggestion might in cid en tally have a bearing upon Sir A C adogan's e a rlie r assum ption that "a ll evidence from both sid es is faked" (C 2957/8/55) and upon Mr C o lv in 's g lo ss on that (last paragraph in Annex A ). Mr Brimelow's second point, concerning German m ass-m urders,w as a lso only too re le v a n t. Mr Eden's criticism of Nazi cynicism (paragraph 6) had been even truer than he then knew .

On 19 April 1943 , six days a fter the German announcement of Katyn, the German au thorities began the mass k illin g s in the W arsw g h etto , and some of the other German liquidations were comparable in technique to that o f K atyn, where few er than five thousand dead were found. Apart from 28

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some six m illion Jew s exterm inated by the Germans during the Second W orld W a r, figures admitted by them show that at le a s t 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 Russian prisoners died in th eir h a n d s .61 37 . The line taken in parliam ent by Mr McNeil and in Mr A llen 's subsequent b rief (cf paragraph 34) w as su b stan tially follow ed by HMG through the Nuremberg t r i a l s , which began prelim inary hearings on 14 November 1945 . The indictm ent of German defendants included the ch arg e, framed by the S o viet prosecu tor, that in September 1941 ele ven thousand Polish o ffic e rs who were p risoners o f war had been k illed in the Katyn fo r e s t .62 The figure o f 11,00 0 corresponded with one o f the more surprising statem ents in the S o viet report o f 1944 (annex B), claim ing that "the to tal number o f corp ses as counted by the m ed ico -leg al exp erts w as 11,000": according to the rep ort, a ls o th ere , of th ese e x p e rts, "925 co rp ses were taken from the g raves and examined" . The figure o f 11,0 0 0 in the S o viet indictm ent at Nuremberg apparently resu lted from a last-m in u te S o viet alteration from the origin al figure of 925 in the c h a rg e .63 This alteration would in cid en ta lly seem calcu lated to estop the kind of point made by Mr Brimelow.

38 . A le tte r o f 25 January 1946 from M r, la te r Sir Richard, Beaumont in the Foreign O ffice instructed C o lo n el P h illim ore, the British Junior C o u n sel at Nuremberg, that the onus o f preparing th is c a se again st the Germans should be le ft " se ve rely to the Russians"; any help should be confined to "purely m echanical fa c ilitie s" (N 568/ 108/ 55). During the tria ls the Katyn charge w as handled e x c lu s iv e ly by the R u ssia n s. The A tto rn ey-G en eral, S ir H artley S h a w cro ss, had w ritten to Mr Ernest Bevin on 28 December 1945 (N 108/108/55 of 1946): "We did our b est

C f G erald R eitlinger, The House Built on Sand (London 1960) , p 9 8 .

C f International M ilitary Tribunal, Trial of the M ajor W ar C rim inals , v o l I , p 54 .

C f U S House of R ep re sen ta tiv es, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c it part 7 , p 1946 . Further evidence in th is connexion, and on British and American re se rv a tio n s, is apparently a v a ila b le in Negotiating with the Russians (ed Dennett and Johnson, 1951), u n availab le at the time o f w ritin g .

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to persuade the Russians not to include the charge about Katyn in the indictm ent, but they in sisted on doing s o , although I b elieve they are rr>wa little doubtful of the wisdom of th eir d ecisio n ." Sir H Shaw cross added that he w as unhappy about the situation which might a rise if evidence were ca lled on this is s u e .

39 . On 15 February 1946 Sir Reader Bullard, HM Ambassador at Tehran, telegraphed an explanation of his personal b elie f that the Russians were responsible for the Katyn M assacre (N 2111/108/55: Annex E) . Mr J G alsw orthy of Northern Department minuted on this that Sir R Bullard's "doubts may be w ell founded - and shared by many others - but there could be no question o f our 'blowing* the Russian c a se eith er in public or in p riv a te , a n d , in many w ays , it might be as w e ll that Katyn should be disposed of once and for a ll - onto the Germans Mr D A llen considered that Sir R Bullard's telegram added nothing new and did not c a ll for re p ly . Mr F Roberts, then Acting C ou n sellor at M oscow , stated in M oscow telegram No 681 o f 18 February (N 2228/108/55): "I share Sir R Bullard's feeling that the S o viet ca se is as yet 'not proven' . But I a lso re c o lle c t that Sir W illiam M alkin, after review ing a ll the documentary and other evidence in London, regarded the Polish c a se again st the S o viet Union as far from proven." Mr Roberts warned that "whatever the fa c ts . . . the e ffe c t on A n g lo-Soviet relatio n s of any apparent tendency on our part to accept the German ca se about Katyn would be calam itous." A week la ter a lette r from Mr Beaumont to M r, now Sir Patrick, D ean, at Nuremberg (N 2228/108/55) w hile reaffirming the line given to C olonel P h illim ore, represented "the p o litica l d e sira b ility of our appearing, in our dealings with the Russians th em selve s, to accept the S o viet c a s e , and I hope that a ll concerned at Nuremberg w ill interpret our general instru ction s 'to hold aloof' in this se n se ."

40.

On 25 March 1946 Sir Donald S avo ry, the Member o f Parliament who sp e c ia lly interested him self in the Katyn M assacre from a Polish point o f view (cf paragraph 10 a b o ve ), sent Mr B evin, with a copy to the A ttorn ey-G en eral, what was there described as "a supplem entary report" from Polish m ilitary sources in London, bringing the Katyn evidence "up to date" (N 4406/108/55: c f paragraph 1 v i a b o v e ).

Mr R M A , later Lord, H ankey, then visitin g London from our Embassy in W a rsa w , minuted on this paper on 10 April in the light o f the Nuremberg Trial: "I w ish the Russians would drop it , m yself; the whole thing s tin k s. But we can't butt in ." In an ensuing minute o f 10 May Mr C P C de W e sselo w of Northern Department commented in conclusion: "The fact that the Russians have brought it up at Nuremberg is evidence on the whole in their favour." 30

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41.

Mr F an key had on 10 March 1946 remitted to Research Department (N 5269/108/55) another report on Katyn which had been given to him "by M Kazimierz S k a rz y n sk i. . . The report is too long to have tran slated by the con fid en tial tran sla to r o f HM E m bassy__ If it were known that M Skarzynski had given us a co p y, his life would be in danger. . . The report shows that they [Polish Red C ro ss ] refused to c e rtify when the deaths were presumed to have taken p la c e , s t ill more who w as respons­ ib le for them, but that the Germans m is-used the name o f the Polish Red C ro ss in their propaganda campaign." Mr Hankey added: "M Skarzynski him self has been known to me since 1937 and I regard him as an ex c ep tio n a lly trustw orthy and honest man. He visite d Katyn him self at the ou tset of the e n q u irie s. My own comment on the a ffa ir is that the Poles in Poland seem to have seen through the German plan and to have behaved w ith greater wisdom than the Poles in London." On 10 A pril Mr Bourdillon summarized this report, filed in en tirety only in the original Polish typ escrip t of six ty p a g es, in a memorandum entitled "Polish Red C ro ss Report on the Katyn M ass Graves" (Annex D ).

42.

It would not appear that M Sk arzyn ski's report on N 5269/108/55 has ev e r been published; so that this file may co n ceivab ly contain fresh evidence on Katyn of some im portance, though perhaps not much in vie w o f the amount of other evidence from M Skarzynski now in p rin t.64 In any c a se the firs t part of Mr Bourdillonâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s memorandum adduced from cr M Sk arzyn ski's report 00 that the tech n ical commission of the Polish Red C ro ss which worked at Katyn "does not seem to have fe lt any doubt that the shooting w as carried out by So viet authorities in the spring o f 1940, on the sp o t. They accep ted , in fa c t, the German accou n t, w hich, they s a y , w as confirmed by the lo c al inhabitants" with whom members of the commission were able to talk fr e e ly . In his summing up Mr Bourdillon further follow ed M Skarzynski in stressin g the gravamen ag ain st the R u ssian s, from the stopping of the Polish lette rs (cf paragraphs *65

Notably that from 1943 (cf paragraph 1 iv and note 4 above) and from 1952 (cf note 4 and paragraphs 8 i i , 19 i i , 27 , 3 0 , 33).

Mr Zawodny, in writing Death in the F o re st, w as a lso able to use a considerable amount of manuscript m aterial from M S k a rz y n sk i.

65

C f, US House of R ep resen tatives, S elect Committee, op c i t , part 3 , pp 38 4 f .

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8 ii - 9 a b o ve ). And we now know66 that the above argum ents, together with others g en erally along the lin es p reviou sly noticed (cf paragraphs 8 -9 a b o ve ), figured prominently in M Sk arzyn ski's concluding recapitulation in this report of what he considered to be "the irrefutable evidence of d irect S o viet resp o n sib ility in the Katyn massacre" .

43 . Mr Bourdillon, how ever, also ob served , having regard to M Skarzyn ski's report, the o ffic ia l Soviet report and certain other so u rce s, notably Lieutenant Slow enczik's lette r (cf paragraph 5) and M O ciepka's testim ony (cf paragraph 22): "There is some ground for suspicion against the G erm ans. Their report ('Amtliches M aterial') is not ve ry convincing in its e f fe c t . The precautions taken to hedge round the Polish Commission and the international m edical commission were such as to lead to the conclusion that the Germans had something serious to h id e. . . It seem s c le a r, to o , that a ll w as not righ t, from the German point of v ie w , with the documents a s found on the b o d ie s." Mr Bourdillon concluded (Annex D) that "as the w riter of the Polish Commission Report o b served , 'In the Katyn a ffa ir the German co n scien ce, i f it is right to u se such a term in speaking of a nation which barbarously murdered so many m illions of human b ein g s, is not in my view w h olly clean'" (cf paragraph 3 3 ).

44 . During the tria l at Nuremberg the So viet prosecution submitted the Soviet S p ecial Com m ission's report of 1944 and claim ed that it "fully established" German g u i l t . 67 The Soviet C h ie f Prosecutor, G eneral Rudenko, and his deputy, C o lo n el P okrovsky, who considered "the Katyn Forest incident as common knowledge" ,68 in itia lly re siste d requests by Herr Stahm er, counsel for M arshal G o erin g , to c a ll w itn e sses but then proposed, i f the subject were opened, to c a ll ten w itn e sses to the S o viet ca se . In th is connexion Mr Ju stice Jackson, the ch ie f American leg al rep resen tative at Nuremberg, subsequently explained that in general "in the in terests of expedition it w as n e c e ssa ry to forego callin g of w itn e sses so far as p o s s ib le ."69 The tribunal ruled on Katyn on 29 June 1946 to "limit the whole of the evidence to three w itn e sse s on either side because the matter is only a su b sid iary 67*9

Thanks to the valu ab le tran slation by Mr D Tonkin on ENP 10/1 of 197 2 of the conclusion of this report by M Skarzynski. The bulk of this report, how ever, remains untranslated and so unavailab le for th is memorandum .

67

International M ilitary Tribunal, op c l t , vo l x v , p 2 8 9 .

^

Op c l t , vo l x i i i , p 4 3 0 .

69

U S House of R epresen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t , part 7 , p 1950 .

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alleg atio n of fact" .70 Mr Patrick Dean minuted that day (N 8771/108/55) to Sir Orme Sargent, then Permanent U n d er-S ecretary, that the British prosecution "already have instructions to take no part in this b u s in e s s ... and the British judges are aware of the snags . W ith luck we sh a ll avoid trouble" .

45 . Subsequently a British n o n -leg al and u n official a n a ly s t, Mr G F Hudson, an Oxford sc h o la r, c ritic iz e d the Russian leg al performance at Nuremberg in an able if perhaps slig h tly angled a rtic le on "A Polish Challenge" in International A ffairs for April 19 5 0 . This line of criticism reappeared in a la te r publication by the Royal Institute o f International A ffairs in which Mr S Lowery commented that G eneral Rudenko's attempt at Nuremberg to have the S o viet report on Katyn accepted without d is c u ss io n , together with "the fa c t that Rudenko tw ice changed his ground when confronted with German testim o n y, were an eloquent te s t­ im onial to the w eak n esses of the S o viet ca se ; m oreover, the large amount o f m aterial in the hands of the Polish Government in E x ile, w as not submitted as e v id en c e" . ^ The deduction of the w eakness of the S o viet c a se from the hearings at Nuremberg does not correspond with contemporary British leg al and p ress opinion. A telegram of 6 Ju ly 1946 from the British W ar Crim es Executive (N 8817/108/55: Annex F) informed the Foreign O ffice that from the hearing o f evidence on Katyn the "Soviet c a se has undoubtedly emerged v e ry much enhanced." This telegram provides another rare specim en, a fter that from Sir W M alkin (paragraphs 16 -17 ), of British leg al evalu ation o f d etailed evidence concerning the Katyn M a s s a c re . In both c a se s such le g a l opinion rather tended in Russian favo u r. Professor P rozorovskl, chairman o f the S o viet medicoju d icia l commission of 1944, w as now described as "undoubtedly a most e ffe c tiv e w itn e s s " , whose informed and confident handling of the keyissu e of the la te-d a ted documents w as p articu larly n o tic e d . The report from the British W ar Crim es Executive concluded: "Altogether although not o f course co n clu sive the evidence emerged strongly in favour of the S o viet c a se and the German report w as la rg e ly discred ited and their evidence unim pressive" .*3

International M ilitary Tribunal, op c i t . v o l XVII, p 273 .

Survey o f International A ffairs 1939-1946: The Realignment of Europe (London, 1955), p 147.

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46 . One might suppose that there w as some inclination at Nuremberg to favour the Russian rather than the German ca se over Katyn. Concerned British leg al opinion, how ever, had sc a rc e ly dem onstrated this before the hearings of 1-2 Ju ly and Mr Dean minuted on the telegram o f 6 July: "The British team , who are not v e ry cred u lou s, told me that the Russians had much the b est of the argument and in their view rig h tly so" . The Times of 3 July 1946 had carried a report from Nuremberg sta tin g , in particular: "While the m ystery was le ft in alm ost as much confusion as when the defence entered re b u tta ls, on the weight of the evidence the tribunal heard yesterd ay and today from six w itn e s s e s . . .it cannot be said that the German a ssertio n that the murders were committed before the Smolensk area w as occupied in Ju ly 1941 w as w e ll maintained" . Two years la te r, on 3 March 1948, Mr H ankey, in thanking Count Raczynsky for a copy of the Polish Supplementary Report of October 1947 (cf paragraph 1 vii) , "told him that when the question came up at Nuremberg our law yers had been im pressed by the weight of evidence produced by the Russians to show that it had in fa c t been done by the Germans and that the Russians had had ve ry much the b est of the argument" . (N 2599/2599/ 55 ).

47 . In the fin al pleas at Nuremberg Dr Stahmer on 5 Ju ly 1946 claim ed that no confirmation of German guilt for Katyn could be found in the S o viet rep ort. Lord Ju stice Lawrence, the British President of the Tribunal, observed that it was strange that Dr Stahmer had not offered in evidence the report o f the Germ an-sponsored com m ission. (It squared rather i l l in some particu lars with some of the German evidence at Nuremberg: c f paragraph 11 a b o v e .) Mr Ju stice Jackson later commented that "at the c o n c lu sio n , neither side w as sa tisfie d with its own showing and both asked to c a ll additional w itn e s s e s . The S o v ie t, e s p e c ia lly , complained that they had been allow ed to c a ll on ly 3 of the 120 w itn e sse s that appeared before the Soviet com m ission. The trib u n al, w is e ly , I th in k, refused to hear more of the su b je ct. The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the ch a rg e . " 7 ^ This may to a certain extent suggest a co rrective to Sir W inston C h u rch ill's observation that at Nuremberg "the S o viet government did not take the opportunity of clearing them selves of the horrible and w id ely b elieved accu sation again st them and of 34

U S House of R epresentatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op cit part 7 , p 1951.

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V

The C o n gression al Enquiry (1950-1952)

48.

In connexion with the tenth an n iversary of the Katyn M assacre on the reckoning of the Germans and o f the Polish em igration, notably G eneral A n d ers, in London the la tte r wrote to Mr Bevin on 16 June 1950 (NP 1661/3) requesting the support of HMG for the appointment of an internation al tribunal to in vestig ate the Katyn M assacre in the context o f a Polish indictm ent, communicated by G eneral A n d ers, o f the S o viet Government for i t . British support w as refused to G eneral Anders on 6 Ju ly in the same w ay that the Prime M inister had sh ortly before refused such a request from the S c o ttish -P o lish S o cie ty . It had been minuted that this re fu sa l had been based upon se v e ra l co n sid e ra tio n s, foremost of which: "(a) an in vestig ation could be co n clu sive only with the co­ operation o f the S o viet Government which of course would not be obtain­ able . (b) As a propaganda stunt Katyn is too c lo s e ly identified with Dr G oebbels." In ensuing minutes Sir Andrew Noble, an A ssista n t U n der-Secretary of S ta te , wrote on 1 Ju ly 1950 that "the only advantage to be gained from reopening th is question would be propaganda m aterial for use again st Russia; but Information Research Department do not consider that this would be a fruitfu l source of such material"; and S ir W illiam , now Lord, Strang on 2 July: "Like Sir W M alkin, I have a lw a ys suspended Judgment about re sp o n sib ility for the Katyn massacre" .

49 .

M eanwhiie a "Committee for the in vestig ation of the Katyn M assacre" had been formed in the United S tates under the Chairmanship of Mr B liss Lane, a former American Am bassador to Poland, and with the support of Polish em igres. A gainst a background of rising in terest in America in the thick of the Cold W a r, and in a somewhat d ifferent context - the a c tiv itie s of an American "Forced Labour Coordination 35

W inston S C h u rch ill, The Second W orld W ar (London 1948f) v o l IV, p 181.

C f International M ilitary Tribunal, op c l t , v o l I , pp 171-341.

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Committee" , not considered at the highest le v e l in the Foreign O ffice M r, la te r Sir P eter, W ilkinson o f Information Research Department mentioned in a le tte r of 23 August 1951 to M r, later S ir Edward, Tomkins at our Embassy in W ashington (PR 14/67 o f 1951): "We agree that the S o viet authorities were v e ry su c c e ss fu l in turning the even ts at Katyn ag ain st the P o le s , but the general conclusion reached here by those having a c c e ss to the con fid en tial m aterial w as that the R ussians w ere the cu lp rits - a conclusion shared, I b e lie v e , by Mr C h u rc h ill, according to the account given in the IVth Volume of his w ar memoirs" (cf note 7 3 ).

This statem ent in an informal and con fid en tial le tte r at middle le v e l is notable from that period for its sp e cific indication of acceptance in the Foreign O ffice of Russian gu ilt for Katyn.

5 0 . A month la te r, on 27 September 1951, Mr Tomkins reported (NP 1661/ 3) that C ongress had se t up a committee under the chairm anship o f R epresentative Ray Madden of Indiana to in ve stig ate the Katyn M assacre .

Mr Tomkins wrote: "The State Department do not take th is developm ent v e ry se rio u sly and they su spect that it is prompted la rg e ly by in tern al p o litic a l m o tiv e s. M ost of the members o f the Committee are o f Polish origin or th ey have large numbers o f Poles in th eir co n stitu en cies . The demand for this enquiry does not a rise from the d isco very of any new evidence" . In Northern Department Mr L H M a ssey minuted on th is: "The re a l evidence - at Katyn - was c a re fu lly obliterated by the R ussians in 19 4 4 . There seem s to be no u se fu l purpose in raisin g th ese ghosts n o w . That matter could have been raised at the Nuremberg tria l b u t, as is w e ll known, the Russians opposed it" . The la s t sentence at le a s t of th is minute may seem , on e v id e n c e , to be rather sh arp ly angled ag ain st the Russians .

51.

The hearings o f the C o n gression al Committee ground on . One of the most sen sa tio n a l w itn e sses w as an anonym ous, hooded Pole who te s tifie d as John Doe75 on 6 February 1952 to having watched S o viet troops execute 200 Polish o ffic ers by night at Katyn in November 1939 a further d iscrep an cy of d a te . Mr K D Jam ieson o f our Embassy in W ashington commented in a le tte r o f 9 April 1952 (NP 1661/9) on this w itn e ss: "His story does not seem to be p articu larly c o n v in c in g .. . An ex -P o lish o ffic er who w as C h ief o f Intelligence to Anders in R ussia and who is now in Peru v is ite d us r e c e n t ly .. . He w as v e ry scornful of th is 63

C f U S House o f R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c it part 2 , pp 14 3 -16 0 .

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w itn e s s , and indeed of the whole conduct of the in ve stig atio n ." It did take c o g n iz a n c e , h o w e ve r, o f a number of German diplom atic documents contem porary with the d isco v ery o f Katyn which are of supplem entary in terest; 7 6this is a lso true of some h ea rsay ev id en ce7 7 from S ta lin 's captured so n , Jacob D zh u g ash vili.

52.

Among the most interesting evidence taken by the C o n g ression al Committee w as that o f M Skarzynski (cf paragraphs 8 i i , lg i i , 27 , 3 0 , 3 3 ), o f Mr Ju stice Jackson (cf paragraph 47above) and a lso o f M Boris O lsh an sk y, form erly an a ss o c ia te p ro fesso r in Voronezh State U n iversity and a p erson al friend o f Academ ician N N Burdenko, the chairman o f the S o viet Sp ecial Com m ission on Katyn. M O lshansky confirmed the account which he had p revio u sly given in a le tte r published in June 1950 by S o ts ia lls tc h e s k il V e s tn ik , a journal produced by Russian em igres in A m erica. By th is account the then ailing P rofessor Burdenko, in a p rivate con versation in his fla t in M oscow in A pril 19 4 6 , told M O lshansky in regard to Katyn; "There is no doubt such 'Katyns' were and w ill be happening. . . W e had to make a com plete d en ial o f the w id ely spread German a c c u s a tio n . On personal orders o f S talin I went to the place where the g raves w ere found. It w as a spot check and a ll bodies were four ye ars o ld . Death took place in 19 4 0 . . . A c tu a lly , for me as a d octor, the question is c le a r and there is no argument about i t . Our comrades from the NKVD made a great b lu n d e r. "78 Academ ician Burdenko died in November 19 46, and once again M O lsh an sky's evid en ce is but circu m sta n tial. If the statem ents o f P rofessor Burdenko and M O lshansky w ere a c c u ra te , th ey v irtu a lly d estroy the v a lid ity o f the report o f the S o viet S p e cia l C om m ission.

53 . On 9 April 1952 the British C abinet endorsed the opposition of Mr Anthony Eden to a suggestion from R epresentative O'Konski, a member of the C o n g ressio n al Com m ittee, that it should hold formal hearings in the United Kingdom (AU 1661/12). Endeavours by the committee to 37

U S House of R ep resen tatives, S e le c t Com m ittee, op c i t , part 5 , pp 1339-1416; a lso note 25 ab ove.

Ibid , part 4 , p 777 .

J K Zawodny, op c l t , p 158 .

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secure the cooperation of Her M ajesty's Government in releasin g c la s s ifie d documents'79 and in other w ays were a lso su c c e s s fu lly re s is te d . Mr Eden had minuted: "I d islik e a ll this ve ry much" .

(NP 1661/5). In London Representive Madden and others conducted only p rivate h earin g s, of G eneral Anders among o th ers. On 2 July 1952 the C o n g ression al Committee presented its Interim Report on the Katyn M assacre (NP 1661/13). This report was interim only in re sp e ct of procedure and w as accepted in the Foreign O ffice a s the com m ittee's fin al v ie w on the re sp o n sib ility for the m a ssacre. To the surprise of fe w , probably, "this committee unanim ously fin d s, beyond any question of reason ab le doubt, that the So viet NKVD (People's C om m issariat of Internal A ffairs) committed the mass murders of the Polish o ffic e rs and in te lle c tu a l lead ers in the Katyn Forest" .80 54 . In Northern Department Mr G Little] ohn-Cook minuted on 30 Ju ly 1952: "The [C on g ression al] report has an obvious p o litic a l bias and has not been drawn up in an e x c lu s iv e ly ju d icia l fa sh io n . Some of the e v id e n c e . . .is by no means co n clu sive and some is even co n trad icto ry.

The most obvious example of th is is the evid en ce g iven by the notorious 'hooded w itn e s s â&#x20AC;&#x2122; . . . It has been suggested by the Polish p ress in this country that such evidence should never have been in clu d ed, as it tended to d iscre d it the remainder o f the evidence" . Subsequently even Mr A irey Neave , a prominent supporter of the Polish c a se again st Russia on K atyn, described the C on gression al Enquiry as "an abortive attempt" . 81 5 5 . At the tim e, how ever, Mr Little]ohn-Cook further pointed out that the S o viet authorities had refused an in vitation to particip ate in the co n g ressio n al enquiry, and he exp ressed h is personal b e lie f in So viet g u ilt. He noted that w hile Information Research Department w ere , like the S e cre ta ry of State h im self, again st d iscu ssion o f the m assacre in the U nited Nations as requested by the C on gression al Com m ittee, IRD had observed that "the gu ilt o f the Russians seems more and more probable" . If time has since borne out that o b servatio n , it has not 38

C f a lis t o f relevan t documents on AU 1661/4 of 19 5 2 .

C f U S C o n g ress, House o f Representatives/Report No 24 30 , Interim Report of the S e le c t Committee . (USGPO 1952), p 28 .

A irey N eave, Foreword in Louis FitzGibbon, The Katyn C o v e r-U p .

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CONFIDENTIAL contradicted an im m ediately following one by Mr H A F H ohler, then Head of Northern Department. In expressing general agreement with Mr L ittlejo h n -C o o k , Mr Hohler observed in a minute o f 31 July 1952 (NP 1661/13): "Although there is strong circum stantial evidence against the S o viet Governm ent, there is no con clu sive proof".

VI

Later Developments (1952-197 2)

56 . In the decade after 1952 in terest in Katyn mainly lapsed and its sporadic re v iv ia l produced re la tiv e ly little new evidence , ce rtain ly of any co n clu sive kind. In 1956 in the United S tates the m assacre of Katyn w as again raised in C o n g ress, but with no p ositive re s u lt. On 17 April that year The Times carried a brief report from W arsaw that in the context of "the a n ti-S ta lin drive" under M Khrushchev, he had "indicated that the So viet Government has now appointed a [new] C om m ission, to in vestig ate the Katyn murders." Arising from this report, which follow ed a v is it by M Khrushchev to W arsaw that M arch, Information Research Department produced a brief on "The Katyn Wood Murders" on 28 April 1956 (PR 117/939). This brief w as circu lated by IRD to u n official recip ien ts as a non-attributable background paper. It stated: "Western opinion has for some years been in no doubt that the m assacre in 1940 of more than 4 ,0 0 0 Polish o fficers w as among the most brutal crim es committed by the Government of the So viet Union at any time in its history" . Subsequently, in 19 60, Mr R H M ason, then Head of Northern Department, explained that this brief of 1956 had "quoted from the Report of the US S e le ct Committee and accepted its conclusions . This paper w as an independent research study and has no o ffic ia l statu s: it cannot be represented as embodying the o ffic ia l view of HMG" (NP 1661/2) .

57 .

M Khrushchev's in itia tiv e s in 1956 produced a sto ry, to be found years later in a number of p laces , 8 2 that he had offered to re ve a l the truth of So viet resp o n sib ility for Katyn but that M Gomulka, who was being re h ab ilitated , had refused because of the strain which this would

C f the Polish emigre w eekly Tydsien Polskl of 21 August 1965; Erwin W e it, Ostblock Intern (Hamburg 197 0) , pp 7879; Neue ZĂźrcher Zeitung of 29 April 1971 and L FitzGibbon, op c it pp 3 6 -7 ; Mr R Baker's lette r of 13 May 1971 from W arsaw on ENP 10/1, and Mr K H M Duke's minute of 15 September 197 2 on ENP 10/1.

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place upon the Polish communist lead ersh ip . One account83 adds that according to a story subsequently circu lated by the Russian-born G eneral M ieczyslaw M oczar , Polish M inister of State Farms from A pril 19 56, he had at that time v a in ly supported M Khrushchev again st M Gomulka in favour of re v e la tio n . The recorder of th is story refers to the g en eral's "fairy t a l e s . . . How a ll that w as p o s s ib le , M oczar does not sa y - he was him self then only ch ief o f the communal authority of a Polish voivodship and Gomulka w as s till p ro scrib ed . "84 Even if Gomulka w as by then on his w ay in again , there are other d iffic u ltie s in regard to M Khrushchev's attitu d e85 and some uncertainty as betw een his two v is its to W arsaw of March and October 1956 . If there is some truth in the sto ry its importance is obvious but subsequently Count R aczynsky referred to it as a rumour. 86 58 . In the follow ing ye ar another fragm ent concerning Katyn surfaced in a German new spaper, 7 -Tag , published in K arlsruhe. On 7 Ju ly 1957 th is popular journal printed a report a lle g e d ly dated from the NKVD o ffic e at M insk on 10 June 19 40. This purported document stated in particular: "In accordance with the order o f the Main O ffice o f the NKVD dated February 12, 19 4 0 , the liquidation of the three camps for the Polish p ris o n e rs-o f-w a r in the area of *c[ities] K ozelsk, O stash k ov, and Starob elsk w as com pleted. . .on June 6 of th is y e a r. . . On the b a sis of the above-m entioned order, Camp Kozelsk w as liquidated firs t in the period from March 1 to M ay 3 in the area o f Smolensk by the organs o f the M insk N K V D . "87 it does not appear that the provenance of this tex t has e v e r been d ivu lg ed . There is no proof that it is genuine, but some suggestion that it may be .88 jt had been said e a rlie r that the Germans had captured NKVD records in Minsk and had in 1943 linked the Katyn M assacre with NKVD from M in sk .89

83 84 85

86

87 88 89

Erwin W e i t , loc c i t .

Ibid.

C f N icholas B ethell, Gomulka, His Poland and His Communism (London, 1969) p 214.

C f L FitzG ibbon, op c i t , p 3 5 .

J K Zawodny, op c i t , pp 114-5 .

Ibid C f Tosech M acklew icz , op c i t , p l 5 8 , a lso pp 18 2-3 .

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59 . In 1960 the Earl of Arran , who had served in the Diplomatic S ervice and the M in istry of Information during and a fter the w ar, p riv ately ra ised the question w hether Her M a jesty 's Government should not now ex p ress a b e lie f in Russian g u ilt for Katyn. It w as in th is connexion that Mr Mason noticed the IRD b rief of 1956 (cf paragraph 5 6 ). Lord Lansdowne, then a Parliam entary U n d er-Secretary o f S ta te , replied to Lord Arran in a lette r of 30 November 1960: "We were not able to accept as su ffic ien t evid en ce the findings o f the S e le c t Committee o f the United S ta tes House of R epresentatives published in their report in 19 5 2 . The S e le c t Committee , as you know, had no Ju d icial statu s and Her M a je sty 's Government has n ever subscribed to its c o n c lu sio n s. I can find no evid en ce from exam ination of the file s that 'the unequivocal view ' of the Foreign O ffice w as ev er that th is revolting crime had been committed by the R ussians . In 1944 , after the publication of the S o viet Investigating C om m ission's report, d esp ite the w eight of evidence tending to incrim inate the S o viet U nion, the whole state o f the question w as so confused that judgement by us w as suspended. No new evidence has appeared subsequen tly to ju s tify any change of attitude on our part." (NP 1661/2) .

60 . In the United S tates in 1962 Mr J K Zawodny, a Professor at the U n iversity of P e n n sylvan ia, published his Death in the F o re st, ascribing re sp o n sib ility for the Katyn M assacre to the So viet Government in what is s t ill the most sc h o la rly a ss e ss m e n t, from the Polish an g le, of the bulk of the e v id e n c e . Another important Polish contribution, to Russian detrim ent, to the literatu re on Katyn w as made in the publication by the Polish C u ltu ral Foundation in London in 1965 of The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents , an English ve rsio n of Zbrodnia Katynska of 1948 (cf note 8 a b o v e ). A piece of fresh er evid en ce appeared in 1969 with the English publication of My T estim ony, w ritten two years e a rlie r by A natoly M archenko, a S o viet d is sid e n t. He re ca lled meeting in Vladimir gaol in the middle n in e te e n -six tie s a fo re ste r who had been there for tw enty y e a rs "after he had a c c id e n ta lly w itn essed the slaughter of the Polish o ffic e rs in the Katyn Forest" .90 This fo re ster has been cred ib ly id en tified a s Boris M enshagin in connexion with comparable evidence from the Russian clan d estin e (Samizdat) jo u rn a l, "A C hronicle o f Current E ven ts" .91

90 A natoly M archenko, My Testimony (London 1969), p 157 .

91 C f le tte r from Peter Reddaway in The Times of 16 February 1971, a lso Uncensored Russia (ed P Reddaway, London 1972), p 2 2 2 .

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61.

These cirdnpistances were reca lled In the D aily Telegraph of 22 July 1971 in connexion with a report o f the previous day in the Isra e li new spaper M aariv, featuring Mr Abraham Vidro, a former Polish c itiz en and inmate of Soviet labour-cam ps. Mr Vidro claim ed that in one camp he had met a S o viet M ajor Sorokin who said that he had su p ervised the departure of thousands of Polish o ffic ers from a camp to Katyn F orest, where they were shot. Mr Vidro added that in another labour-cam p he had met S o viet Lieutenants Su slov and Tikhonov, one of whom co n fessed <\ to taking part in the k illin g . This new evidence is s t ill on ly h earsay but it grim ly complements the e a rlie r evidence in favour of So viet resp o n si b i l i t y for K atyn. In the face of such developm ents both the So viet and « the communist Polish authorites have g en erally maintained th eir notable relu ctan ce to revert to Katyn. One effort of S o viet reb u ttal^ 2 w as b lea k ly trad itio n al on the pattern of 1944 .

62.

The only fresh testim ony suggesting German g u ilt came in a le tte r in The Times of 27 February 1971 from Mr Henry Metelmann who had served in the German army on the eastern front in the Second W orld W a r.

Mr Metelmann did "not think th a ta t that late time of the war G oebbels managed to fool German so ld iers in Russia on the Katyn is s u e . For it came much too clo se to our p rofession alism and to our sen se o f re a lism . . .

W e German so ld iers . . .knew v e ry w e ll that the Polish o ffic e rs were dispatched by none others than our ow n: " Mr Metelmann exp lain ed , h o w ever, that he had not been to Katyn and his conclusion is in i t s e lf quite in c o n c lu siv e , though it may be compared with e a rlie r evidence in the German context (cf paragraphs 20 -3 3 above) .

63 . In the same year of 1971 Mr Louis FitzG ibbon, a p u b licist, produced h is Katyn: a crime without p a r a lle l. The great bulk o f the main text (pp 19-161) of this book appears to be lifted alm ost verbatim , though with a number o f om issions and some v a ria tio n , from the Polish publication o f 19 6 5 , The Crime of K atyn . This i s , how ever, only listed among other books in Mr FitzGibbon's bibliography. By this remarkable d evice the arguments and view s of Polish sources are liab le to be taken by unsu sp ect­ ing read ers for those of Mr FitzGibbon h im self. A year la te r Mr FitzGibbon produced another book, The Katyn C over-U p (London 1972),in which he in c id e n ta lly exp lain s that '"Katyn - A crime without p a ra lle l’ w as finished in six w e e k s, writing again st the clock and at n ig h t."93 The second of th ese books,unlike the fir s t, is described on the titlep ag e as

"The truth about Katyn" in S o viet W e e k ly , 16 October 1971: cf L FitzGibbon, The Katyn C o ver-U p . pp 1 4 2 -5 .

Op c i t , Introduction.

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"Compiled by Louis FitzGibbon" . The Katyn C over-U p d escrib es the author's promotion in 1971 of the "Katyn Campaign" , b rie fly noticed in paragraph 2 a b o v e .

64 . The ye a r of th is campaign w as a lso that of the debate on Katyn in the House o f Lords (cf paragraphs 2 and 24) . In the course of this debate Lord H ankey, with his e a rlie r personal ex p e rie n ce, referred to the key is s u e , s t ill,o f the dating of the documents on the c o rp s e s . On th is he contributed what one may fe e l to b e, in logic at le a s t , alm ost the la s t word in the w ay o f u n o ffic ial pronouncement: "One has to sa y that there is a co n ceivab le resid u a l doubt on this su b je c t. I am not in any v e ry great doubt m a yself, I am a fra id , as to where the blame l i e s .

I only sa y that if you want le g a l evidence , there is a legitim ate re sid u a l doubt, and I do not think that it has been p o ssib le to c le a r it up on the evidence which has hitherto been released" .94 65 . Subsequent research in the Foreign and Commonwealth O ffice has indeed c a s t grave doubt upon the v a lid ity of the S o viet Report o f 1944 , not le a s t as regards the au th en ticity o f the la te-d a ted documents produced by the R u s s ia n s ^ (paragraph 15 iii above) . In g e n e ra l, h ow ever, the opinion of Lord Hankey has la rg e ly matched that in the Foreign and Commonwealth O ffice where the terms o f Lord Lansdowne's le tte r of November 1960 (paragraph 59 above) were su b sta n tia lly reproduced in November 1970 in a le tte r from Lord Lothian in rep ly to Mr Louis FitzGibbon, and in one o f May 1971 from Mr Anthony Royle to Mr M ichael Hamilton M P. The la te r le tte r, h ow ever, a lso included an assuran ce that "the Government is not unaware of the w id ely held conclusion to which the evid en ce appears to lead" , and a sim ilar le tte r w as sent by Mr Joseph Godber in rep ly to Mr Wedgwood Benn MP at the end o f June 1971. It w as considered in the Foreign and Commonwealth O ffice that such a phrase should p referab ly not be u se d , though it should not be repudiated, in P arliam ent. There Lord A berdare's statem ent in the debate on 17 June (cf paragraph 2) had not won ready acceptance as the la s t w o rd .

)

66.

In th is connexion Lord St Oswald and Mr A irey Neave approached the Secretary of State in Ju ly 1971 and a b rief w as prepared in the Foreign

94 H ansard, Pari D ebs, 5th s e rie s , H of L, vo l CCCXX, co l 754 .

95 C f the a n a ly s is of 1 November 1972 by Mr D Tonkin on ENP 10/1.

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and Commonwealth O ffic e. This paper stated in particular: "It is cle ar from past papers that the working assum ption in the Foreign O ffice has alw ays been that the Russians were probably the g u ilty p a r t y .. . Never­ th e le s s it has alw ays been HMG's p olicy to refrain from stating p u b licly or o ffic ia lly that we consider the Katyn m assacre w as committed by the R u s s ia n s .. . There are n everth eless certain con strain ts which make it d ifficu lt for HMG to avoid comment a lto g e th e r.. .if we are not to appear in co n sisten t or d isin gen u ou s. . . Letters from M inisters to Members of Parliament over the years have a lso hinted at the Governm ent's presumpti of So viet g u ilt, w h ilst avoiding any definite pronouncement." This presumption has been cum ulatively strengthened.

67 . This b rie f, how ever, drew attention to "an inherent w eakness" in the position o f Lord St Oswald and Mr A irey Neave in seeking to "secure pronouncement estab lish in g beyond contention" the authorship of the Katyn M assacre: "They are com pelled to argue eith er (a) that the fa c ts about Katyn are w ell-kn o w n , ie the S o viet Government w as g u ilty , in which ca se no further effort to e sta b lish the authorship o f the crime wouid appear to be n e c e s s a ry , or_ (b) that some new enquiry is first n e c e ssa ry to e sta b lish the fa c ts to u n ive rsa l s a tisfa c tio n , in which ca se ' it must be asked why HMG should now be expected to ex p ress a public v ie w i f the evidence is s t ill incom plete, and w hether any new enquiry would be lik e ly to succeed without the cooperation o f the Polish and S o viet Governments" (ENP 10/1).

68.

That logic s t ill s ta n d s , and a lso the conclusion: "We see no advantage in breaking the silen ce that we have preserved for n early 30 y e a rs on the Katyn m assacre ."

ROHAN BUTLER 10 April 1973 .

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DS No. 2/73

ANNEXES

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ANNEX A (The D a lly Telegraph 17 A u g u st, 1972)

RUSSIAN GUILT FOR KATYN MASSACRE REAFFIRMED A second w ar-tim e d isp atch by Sir Owen O 'M a lle y , form er British A m bassador to the P olish G overnm ent, has now come to lig h t show ing th at in 1944 he reaffirm ed R ussian g u ilt for the m assacre o f 1 0 ,0 0 0 P olish o ffic e rs In Katyn W o o d , n ear Sm olensk In B yelo-R u ssla , In M a y, 1 9 4 0 .

Other o ffic ia l papers In the Public Record O ffice show th at the Foreign O ffice fa ile d to print or c irc u la te his second report o u tsid e the W ar C a b in et.

But It sen t round a le s s In c isive report o f its ow n.

C o n stern ation about the Katyn m assacre mounted In Downing S tree t a fte r the fir s t d ispatch In M a y , 1 9 4 3 , from Sir O w en, then Mr O 'M a lley .

This spoke o f thousands o f co rp se s packed lik e sa rd in es In m ass g ra v e s , a ll sh o t In the back o f the h ead . Hls evid en ce pointed to a S o v ie t crim e o f g en o cid e.

On Jan . 2 4 , 1 9 4 4 , a fte r the Red Army had reoccu p led the Sm olensk a r e a , a S o v ie t com m ission o f inquiry v is ite d Katyn W ood and produced v iv id docum entary and o ra l e v id en c e th at the m assacre w as by "the German F a s c is t a u th o ritie s . " â&#x20AC;&#x153;B rillia n t, convincing" "I think Mr O 'M alley should be ask ed v e ry s e c re tly to e x p re ss h ls opinion on the Katyn W ood Inquiry, " w rote Mr C h u rch ill to Mr Anthony Eden (now Earl of Avon) then Foreign S e c re ta ry . â&#x20AC;˘. i "All th is Is m erely to a sc e rta in the f a c t s , b ec au se none o f us should e v e r speak a word about It. " The fir s t O 'M alley report had gone to the King and C ab in et o n ly .

C

J,. .

.

Mr O 'M alley responded w ith a second d isp atch on Feb. 1 1 , 1 9 4 4 , w hich c o lle a g u e s d escrib ed as " b rilliant and co n vin c in g . " It came a t a time when the Am erican P re sid e n t, Mr R o o s e v e lt, w as seek in g to do a d e a l w ith the S o v ie t le a d e r, J o s e f S ta lin , a t the ex p en se of the P o le s .

"There w as a d iffe re n c e ," Mr O 'M alley pointed o u t, "between the methods em ployed by the German Governm ent on the one hand and the S o v ie t Governm ent on the oth er fo r con vin cin g the world of the truth o f the c o n clu sio n s w hich each has le v e lle d a g a in s t e a c h .

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"The Germans (In 1943) re lie d prim arily upon the findings o f an in tern ation al com m ission o f p a th o lo g ists and c rim in o lo g is ts , o f whom two came from G erm any, 11 from s a t e llit e or occu p ied s ta te s and one from S w itze rla n d .

"They rein fo rced th eir c a s e by bringing to Katyn a p u rely P olish d e le g a tio n , a d eleg atio n from the P o lish Red C ro ss S o c ie ty and d ele g a tio n s from Lodz and Poznan.

"Guilty co n sc ie n c e " "The Russian G overnm ent, on the oth er han d , re lie d m ainly on the report o f a p u rely R ussian Com m ission com posed o f eight Governm ent o ffic ia ls who had the a s s is ta n c e o f a m e d ic o -le g a l sub-com m ission o f fiv e R ussian s c ie n t is ts ," Mr O 'M alley w ro te .

He w ent on! "We s h a ll be s lig h tly more in clin ed to cred it the opinion of the in tern atio n al exp erts brought by the Germans than the opinion o f a sub-com m ission com posed e x c lu s iv e ly o f R u ssian s; fo r, sin ce it would have c le a rly strengthened th eir c a s e if the S o v ie t Governm ent had in vited British and American s c ie n tis ts to p a rtic ip a te in the in v e s tig a tio n , one can o n ly suppose that a g u ilty c o n sc ien c e prevented them from doing so .

"It w o u ld , I th in k , be fu tile to try to ap p raise the tru stw o rth in ess o f the testim ony o f w itn e s s e s exam ined by e ith e r the R ussian or the German G overnm ent.

"Both w ere in a p o sitio n to intim idate the s o ld ie r s , s e rv a n ts , p ea sa n ts or oth er lo c a l re sid e n ts c a lle d upon to g ive e v id e n c e , and both are n o to rio u sly prone to u se in tim id atio n .

"My d isp a tch o f M ay 2 4 , 1 9 4 3 , made no re fe ren c e to any part o f the v e rb a l evid en c e g iven to the German in v e s tig a to rs , and fo r the same reason I do not propose to d is c u ss sim ila r evid en c e g iven to the R ussian in v e s tig a to rs . " Mr O â&#x20AC;&#x2122; M a lle y proceeded to compare the m edical evid en c e in both re p o rts , the R ussians a lle g in g that the 90 0 b od ies th ey exhumed w ere in a fa ir sta te o f p re se rva tio n and so lik e ly to h ave been k ille d during the recen t German occu p a tio n .

He pointed o u t, h o w e v e r, th at accord in g to the R ussian account th ese 1 0 ,0 0 0 P olish p riso n e rs liv in g in labour camps b efore the German in vasio n of Russia must have p a sse d into German c a p tiv ity and been sh ot in 19 4 1 w ithout a sin g le man escap in g in the p re va ilin g co n fu sio n .

Yet the R ussian com m ission it s e lf spoke o f p riso n ers escap in g when Sm olensk d is tric t w as overrun and being rounded up again by the G erm ans.

"The u n exp lain ed s e t of fa c ts is the sam e w hich has dom inated this co n tro v e rsy throughout, nam ely th at no sin g le inquiry about th ese men out o f some 500 a d d resse d by the P olish Red C ro ss S o c ie ty to the S o v ie t a u th o rities w as e v e r a n sw e re d , and th at no in q u iries o f the P o lish Governm ent e lic ite d an y d efin ite or

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c o n sis te n t inform ation about them from the S o viet Governm ent.

camps

"If th ey h a d , a s the S o viet Government now a lle g e , been tran sferred to labour 1 , 2 and 3 , w hy did not the S o viet Governm ent s a y so long ago ? "

The A m bassador concluded that "the d e fe c tiv e nature o f the R ussian report makes th ese doubts even stronger than th ey w ere b e fo re . S tron g er, an yh ow , in the vie w o f w ell-in fo rm ed p ersons in the U nited Kingdom.

"I am s a tis fie d that the g reat m ajority o f re sp o n sib le British jo u rn a lists have during the la s t nine months come round to the same opinion a s I have held throughout.

R eceived in s ile n c e As to the Prime M in ister's enjoin der fo r s e c r e c y , he added: "Let us think o f th ese things a lw a y s and speak o f them n e v e r. To speak o f them n e v e r is the a d vice w hich I have been giving to the Polish G overnm ent, but it has been u n n e c e ssa ry .

"They have re c e ive d the Russian report in s ile n c e . A fflic tio n and re sid e n c e in th is country seem to be teaching them how much b etter it is in p o litic a l life to le a v e unsaid th ose things about w hich one fe e ls m ost p a s s io n a te ly . " This d is p a tc h , signed according to formula "Your M ost Obedient Humble Servant" w as awkward to the men in W h ite h a ll, trying to work out long-term aim s w ith R u ssia.

His "argumentation is d e v a sta tin g ly c o n vin c in g , but I cannot s e e the advantage from b ro ad castin g h is c o n c lu sio n ," w rote a Foreign O ffice o ffic ia l He sug g ested circu la tin g the report to the King and W a r C abinet o n ly . Mr Eden marked th is p roposal "Yes, c e rta in ly . " But op p osition to the truth a s seen b y Mr O 'M alley w ent fu rth er. On the strength o f a se c u rity ruling by the Prime M in ister that the report should be c ircu la ted to the W ar C abinet "in a se a le d b o x ," an o ffic ia l g ave the order that the d ispatch w as not to be printed for the record but circ u la te d a s a typ e sc rip t on ly This came to the A m bassadorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ea rs and he com plained. Sir A lexan d er Cadogan Permanent U n d er-S e cre tary a t the Foreign O ffice w rote him a soothing le tte r o f ex p la n atio n .

Valuable am biguity M eanw hile the USSR se ctio n o f the Foreign O ffice R esearch D epartm ent had been in stru cted to make an a p p ra isa l o f the S o viet Com m ission o f Inquiry report on the Katyn m a ssa c re . This British o ffic ia l document and the verbatim S o v ie t o ffic ia l

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S e v e ra l B ritish o ffic ia ls p ra ise d the approach o f the R esearch Department a n a ly s i s , w hich re sto re d a va lu a b le am biguity to the d ista n t happenings , but one a ss e rtio n in it Sir A lexan d er could not stom ach.

He o b jected to h is departm ent referrin g to the R ussian Com m ission of Inquiry a s "a strong o n e . " "That is a b so lu te n o n s e n s e ," he w ro te , "however 'strong' the C om m issioners on e ith e r sid e may b e , th ey are sim ply in stru cted to m anufacture a c a s e , or find th em selve s in anoth er m ass g ra v e . " To p re se rve b a la n c e , he added to th is stric tu re : "All evid en c e from both sid e s is f a k e d ," though c le a r ly o n ly one sid e could h ave needed to fak e its e v id e n c e .

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ANNEX B

REPORT OF THE SOVIET SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE KATYN MASSACRE

a ,â&#x201E;˘

MUSI

SECRET C 2957/8/55 The attached paper has been prepared by the U .S .S .R . Section of the Foreign Office Research Department. It Is an a n a lysis of the report published on the 24th January of the Special Commission set up by the Soviet Government to in vestig ate the shooting of Polish officers at Katyn. A copy of the Soviet Commission's report is annexed.

This report should be read In conjunction with despatch No 51 of the 24th May 1 9 4 3 , from His M ajesty's Ambassador to Poland, commenting upon the report of the German Commission to Investigate the Katyn m assacre, which was circulated as Foreign Office Print, "Poland, " Section 1 , of the 3 1st Mav 19 4 3 . y An e sse n tia l point seems to be the genuineness or otherw ise of the nine documents alleged in the Soviet Government's report to have been found on the bodies and referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the annexed paper by F O R D If both the documents and their connexion with the bodies are genuine/they are * p ra ctica lly con clu sive In favour of the Soviet ca se ; If they are faked , the Inference the other way Is almost Irresistib le. The truth may never come to light. But meanwhile the evidence at present a vaila b le would seem to require a suspension of judgment In regard to the whole a ffa ir.

Foreign Office 26th March 1944

THE SOVIET VERSION OF THE KATYN ATROCITIES 1 . This paper attempts an a n alysis of the fu ll versio n , as given In the Soviet Monttor, of the report of the Soviet "Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Clrdumstances of the Shooting of Polish O fficer Prisoners by the G erm an-Fascist Invaders In the Katyn Forest. " 2.

The conclusions of the paper a re :(l)

(11)

W hether the Soviet or the German account Is accep ted , an appalling tragedy occurred In Katyn Forest near Smolensk.

Both accounts agree that 1 0 - 1 2 ,0 0 0 Polish prisoners of w ar, alm ost a ll o fficers who had origin ally been captured by the Russians In September 1 9 3 9 , w ere shot there by single p isto l shots In the back of the head.

The Soviet accounts states that the Polish prisoners of war fe ll Into the hands of the Germans In July 1 9 4 1 , when they captured Sm olensk, and were shot by them between September and December 1941.

The German account sta te s that they w ere shot by the Russians between March and May 1 9 4 0 . The first announcement of the m assacre w as given to the world by the Germans In April 19 4 3 .

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(ill)

Neither account suggests any d efin ite reason why the shootings should have been carried out at the p recise time when they w e re , but the date of the German rĂŠvĂŠlation# April 1943# Is sig n ifican t.

It promptly followed the first public m anifestation of extreme tension between the Soviet and Polish Governments# and It had the desired effe ct of causing the rupture of o ffic ia l relation s and of Intensifying mutual h o s tility .

(lv)

The only formal German document which appears to have been Issued on the Investigations held In April 1943 Is the text of the protocol signed by the German International Forensic M edical Commission# published In the German press on 5th May 19 4 3 . The Information Department of the German Foreign Office published In September a booklet on Katyn# containing this protocol and other m aterial # but no copy of It seems to be a v a ila b le . W hereas the German enquiries which Included one international Forensic M edical Commission and two Polish Commissions# were conducted with extreme rapidity# In about a fortnight, the Soviet enquiry# except In Its fin al stages# w as apparently protracted and lasted se ve ra l months. A llied press correspondents were brought down to Katyn during the la s t few days of the enquiry.

(v)

The Soviet evidence Is not co n clu sive In certain Important re sp e c ts.

This fa ct te lls against the accusation that the evidence w as simply manufactured by the G .P .U .

(vl)

The Soviet m edical evid en ce, which Is not yet a vaila b le In full# requires expert judgment. So far only aboutone-tenth of the bodies have been examined. The Germans sim ilarly appear to have examined only about one-tenth of the b od ies. According to the Soviet account some of the Poles had been shot at a different date elsew h ere and their corpses had been brought to Katyn. To this further com plication must be added the fact that the Russians were Investigating graves which had already been Investigated by the Germans.

(vll) Making fu ll allow an ce for what has ju st been stated In (v) and (vl) # the report of the Special Commission may be said to make out a good# though not a co n clu sive # c a se for the perpetration of the m assacres by the Germans. (vlll)

The Soviet report does not throw any light on the question why the Sovtet Government never told the Polish Government#desplte its repeated requests for Information# that these Polish prisoners of w ar had been captured by the Germans. The first Sovtet statement that this had happened was made In reply to the German accu sation s In April 194 3.

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(lx)

Nor does the report furnish any answer to the Polish contention that no letters or Information from the prisoners were received after their removal In A prll-M ay 1940 to Katyn from three other cam ps, whereas before their removal news had been received from them.

3. An an alysis of the Soviet enquiry Is attempted In the following para graphs :4 . There is as yet no information as to when the Special Commission was set up. The first reference to Its existence was made In a public Soviet statement on the 1.7th January (the same date as the Soviet Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rejoinder to the Polish Government's reply on the Curzon Line proposal). At the same time Mr Balfour reported that the commission had been Instructed to work at great pressure and produce Its report rapidly. It did so: the report w as signed on the 24th January and published on the 26th.

It Is c le a r, however, from the commission's report that the Initial enquiries were made, not by It, but by the Extraordinary Commission for Investigating German A tro c itie s, which got to work In the Smolensk region Immediately after the Russians had recaptured Smolensk, the 25th September la s t.

5. The Special Commission was a strong one. It consisted of eight members, three of whom are members of the Extraordinary Commission for Investigating German A trocities. One of these three, Burdenko, chief surgeon to the Red Army, was the chairman of the Special Commission: he has certainly had much experience of this sort of Investigation. One of the other members was a medical expert, C olonel-G eneral Smirnov.

6. A sp ecial committee of eleven m edico-legal experts was set up by the Special Commission to conduct the medical Investigations. Several of them have been mentioned previously as conducting sim ilar Investigations on the corpses of Russian victim s of German atrocities In the Smolensk region.

They exhumed and examined 925 bodies between the 16th and 23rd January: quick work; but not so quick as that of the handpicked German International Commission of Forensic M edical Experts w ho, according to the German p re ss, "thoroughly and sc ie n tific a lly Investigated the mass graves" In three days (28th-30th April 1943). The Germans exhumed 982 bod ies, though not a il In those three d ays. Seventy per cent of them were reported as having been Identified through documents or other material evidence on them. Thus, In each c a se the number of bodies examined was only about one-tenth of the estim ated number of co rp ses. Neither the Germans nor the Russians seem to have stated how many post-mortems were h eld , but they were apparently very few .

7.

Allied press correspondents sent down to Katyn regarded the medical evidence as the most Important. So far only the conclusions of the m edico-legal experts have been published, but not the protocols of their examination of the 3

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b odies.

Subsequent m icroscopic and chem ical an alyses were to be made.

8. Only an expert could express an opinion on the technical side of the medical c o n c lu sio n s, which te s tify "that there are ab solu tely no bodies in a condition of decay or disintegration and that a ll the 925 bodies are In a sta te of preservation - In the Intltial phase of d esiccation of the body, " and which date the shootings "back to about two years a g o , l e , between September and December 1 9 4 1 ."

There Is nothing In the report to show whether the m edico-legal experts knew ,before reaching ÂŤtheir conclusion as to the d a te , that the evidence of the w itn e sses examined by the Special Commission (not by them) had given the autumn of 1941 as the d ate.

The German International Forensic M edical Committee certain ly knew that the Germans had dated the shootings In the spring of 19 4 0 . This committee reported (not on the medical evidence) that the shootings took place In March and April 1 9 4 0 , and that "various degrees and forms of decomposition are to be fo u n d ......... caused by the w ay the corpses were piled up within a pit and the poslton of the p it. In addition to mummification on the surface and along the sides of the mass of corpses, humid maceration [ t e , softening] Is found In the centre parts o f the mass of co rp se s. " Other data "clearly point to primary stra tific a tio n . " According to a Danish path ologist, who w as deputed by the Germans to v is it the g ra v e s , there w as among the experts considerable disagreement about how to form an opinion as to the time of death owing to the condition of the corp ses; "on the borders of the graves the corpses were mainly skeletons and d ry, whereas In the middle of the mass of corpses they w ere moist and w e ll-p re s e rv e d ......... most of the corp ses w ere so surprisingly w ell-p reserved that the structure of the organs and e s p e c ia lly the contents of the stomach and the Intestines were definable" even after three y e a rs.

9 . The condition of the bodies w as comparable with that of the bodies of Russian c iv ilia n s and prisoners of war murdered by the Germans In other burial places In and near Smolensk towards the end of 1941 and early In 1 9 4 2 , and examined this autumn a fter the recapture of Smolensk by m edico-legal ex p e rts, some of whom were the same as those conducting the Katyn Investigation.

10.

The description of the clothing and manner of shooting was c lo se ly sim ilar to , and In certain points Identical w ith , that given by the Germans; e g , the victim s were shot In the back of the head with a p istol, In exactly the same manner as many of the Soviet victim s shot by the Germans In occupied U .S .S .R . This would Involve a long drawn out m a s s a c r e a n d a repeated su ccession of single shots - both of which points w ere testified to by a number of w itn e ss e s .

11.

The Germans said that a ll shots were from a pistol with a calib re of le s s than 8 mm.

The Soviet medical experts reported that p isto ls of two calib res were used; "In the bulk of c a s e s , those of le s s than 8 mm, le 7 .6 5 mm or le s s , and in a 4

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le s s e r number of c a s e s , those of more than 8 mm, ie 9 mm. " The War Office confirm that the Russians are not known to use a 7 . 65-mm p isto l but that German officers and police w idely use such a pistol though It Is not a regular army weapon.

12.

On the bodies were found nine documents with dates on them ranging between the 12thSeptember 1 9 4 0 , and the 20th June 1941 (le the day before the German attack on the U .S .S .R .) . Six of the documents were dated receip ts; two were letters received from German occupied Poland and Eastern G alicia; one was an unmalled postcard to W arsaw . If the documents are genuine and genuinely belonged to the persons on whom they were found they would co n clu sively prove that those persons were a liv e after the date (M arch-May 1940) given by the Germans for the alleged Soviet shootings.

According to the German enquiry, the la te st dated document w as the 22nd*Aprll 19 4 0 .

13.

A strong point In favour of the genuineness of these nine documents Is that no document was found after the 20th June 1 9 4 1 . If Soviet authorities were forging or substituting documents, why not com pletely c le a r them selves and Incriminate the Germans by providing documentary evidence that the Poles were a liv e a fte r, or at any rate up to , the 16th July 1 9 4 1 , when the Germans captured Smolensk and according to the Soviet account the Poles fe ll Into German hands ? As It Is, there Is a gap of some w ee k s, the 20th Ju ne-16th July 1 9 4 1 , during which (as far as the documentary evidence goes) It Is th eoretically possib le for the Poles to have been shot by the Russians; though, It Is true,the Germans could not use this argument because they have committed them selves to M arch-M ay 1940 as the time of the m assacre.

14 .

Over a hundred Russian w itn esses from the lo c a lity , or previously employed in Sm olensk, were examined by the Soviet auth orities. It Is not surprising that the foreign correspondents were unfavourably Impressed by the few w itn esses that they heard giving evid en ce, since they were apparently giving It for the second time.

The evidence of some of the w itn esses was given at great length In the report of the Special Commission, though riot apparently in ex ten so .

It Is notoriously d ifficu lt to gauge the cred ib ility of w itn esses when one has not seen and heard them. Further, It has to be remembered th at, apart from the possible role of the G . P .U . , most of the w itn esses were giving evidence as to what happened, on their account, two years ago. The same consideration applies with s till greater force to the w itn esses In the German enquiry la st A pril, since they had to give chapter and verse for what was alleged to have happened not two but three years ea rlier.

Some o f the most Important evidence given by the Soviet w itn esses was h earsay, le , Inadmissible (In an English court of law) a s establishing that the statement Is tru e, though It may prove that the statement was made.

Allowing for the above co n sid eratio n s, the following observations may be made on the evidence given by some of the w itn e sses.

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15.

The Soviet ch ief of one of the three Katyn camps of the Polish prisoners stated that In July 1941 orders for the evacuation of the camp did not reach him, but that on his own resp on sib ility he had attempted to secure railw ay cars from Smolensk for the evacuation of the Poles In the face of the very rapid German advance; the responsible railw ay o ffic ia l In Smolensk had been unable to supply them. This o ffic ia l also gave corrobora­ ting evidence.

16 .

The non-receipt of evacuation orders and the failure to secure transport at the la st moment sound extrem ely probable given the conditions In Smolensk In July 1 9 4 1 .

This does not, however, In any w ay account for the fact that, according to o ffic ia l Polish statem ents, the Soviet authorities never told the Polish authorities what had happened, although from October 1941 onwards they repeatedly pressed the Soviet authorltes for information as to what happened to the Katyn prison ers, no definite Information was forthcoming. It was only In April 1943 when the Germans launched their version of the Katyn atrocities that the Russians defin itely stated that they had failed to evacuate the Polish prisoners In July 1 9 4 1 , with the resu lt that they had fallen Into the hands of the Germans.

If this Is s o , the only possible explanation seems to be that there had been terrible confusion and that the GPU or other o ffic ia ls had blundered badly or disobeyed orders and had taken refuge In evasion and extreme procrastination In order to save their faces and perhaps their sk in s.

17.

Numerous local w itn esses testified to the presence of the Polish prisoners in German hands between mid-July and September 1 9 4 1 . The evidence of three Russian peasant women was sp ecia lly Important and was reproduced In great d eta il. They had been employed at this time In "the Headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion" In the Katyn fo rest. They gave the names of Its commanding officer and others at this headquarters and a full account of what went on In and near the headquarters. It was these officers and this battalion w hich, according to this evid en ce, carried out the massacre In the autumn of 1 9 4 1 . This, of cou rse, Is to tally denied by the Germans, but, as far as is known, they have not denied the existence of that battalion In the Katyn fo re st, or the names of the officers and others given In the Russian evidence.

18 .

The evidence of a professor of astronomy In Smolensk, who was forcibly appointed by the Germans assistan t-m ayor of Smolensk, showed that the mayor, another Russian (who was hand-ln-glove with the Germans and subsequently decamped with them when they were driven out of Smolensk), had been told by the Germans that the Polish prisoners had been shot by them.

Two entries In a note-book of the mayor's supported, though they did not co n clu sively prove the truth o f, the evidence given by the assistan t-m ayor.

19 .

A number of local w itn esses gave evidence of having been tortured by the Gestapo and compelled to testify in February and March 1943 (te, before

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the first public German announcement of the Katyn graves on the 11th April) that the Polish prisoners had been shot by the Russians In the late Spring of 19 4 0 . One of these w itn e sse s, aged 7 2 , described how he had been sp ecia lly trained In advance to give evidence before one of the two Polish commissions which the Germans sent to Katyn. The names of this and one other w itness had been given by the Germans In their account of the shootings. These two men were later searched for by the Germans, but succeeded In escaping their clu tch es. Five other w itn esses , who had been sim ilarly named In the German account, had died or remained In German hands.

20.

Evidence was given showing th at, besides the Poles shot In Katyn Forest, other Poles killed by the Germans elsew here were transported by lorry to Katyn In March 19 4 3 , and thrown Into the common g raves. If these Poles were killed at a different date from the Katyn P o les, this fact might help to explain some of the confusion and discrepancies In the different accounts of the state of the bodies.

r

r

21.

Five hundred Russian prisoners of war from Camp No 126 In Smolensk were employed at the end of February and beginning of March 19 4 3 , in transporting the corpses mentioned In the previous paragraph and In the "preparation of the graves In the Katyn Forest," l e , In removing everything from the pockets of the dead Poles: after examination by the Germans, these objects and documents except those dated after April 19 4 0 , were put back Into the pockets, while the remainder were burnt.

N evertheless, as has been seen above In paragraph 1 2 , some documents dated after April 1940 were Inadvertently overlooked.

The evidence for this "preparation" rests so lely on the testimony of a Russian local woman who harboured one of the prisoners of war who had escaped, but was subsequently caught and shot by the Germans: he told her the work he had been engaged upon, that it was now finished, and that his fellow -prisoners were now being shot.

The fact that about 500 prisoners of war were removed from Camp No 126 at this time w a s , however, vouched for by two Russian doctors working in the camp, who were later rescued by the advancing Red Army. One of the Germans sponsored versions Issued in April 1943 mentioned that Russian bodies had been discovered on the site , and that they were believed to be political crim inals executed by the GPU. 22.

No reference was made at this point (or elsewhere) In the Soviet report to the young fir trees planted on the g ra v e s, which figured prominently In the German account and have been made much of by the Poles. The German "coroner" and the head of one of the two Polish commissions sent to Katyn by the Germans described them In April 1943 as "about three years old." The International commission sent to Katyn by the Germans at the same time, after calling in one expert, a German fo rester, found that they "are at least five years o ld , small trees which have developed poorly in the shade of large tre e s, and were transplanted to the spot three years ago. " The trees must have been removed at the time of the German enquiry, so that the Soviet commission could not report on them direct; but the trees would 7

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have been there at the time the Russian prisoners of war w ere at work on the g ra v e s, u nless they were planted Immediately a fter they had finished their work.

The om ission In the Soviet report of any reference to the fir trees might be regarded as a point damaging to their c a s e , but It ca n , on the other hand, be regarded as a point In favour of the Soviet evidence being genuine, since the Soviet au thorities can hardly have overlooked the use made by the Germans of the fir trees and, If they had been cooking the evid en c e, they ought to have provided something to counter the German account.

23.

Very ju stifia b ly much has been made of the Polish contention that no lette rs or Information of any kind were received from the Polish prisoners at Katyn, after they had been removed there In A prll-M ay 1940 from three other cam p s, w hereas previous to the move letters had been received from them. This confirms Poles In their b elie f that the prisoners were shot by the Russians In the spring of 19 4 0 .

It might have been expected that the R ussians, In proving that the Poles were In fact a liv e until they fe ll Into the hands of the Germans, would have produced evidence to this effe ct from Poles In Russia and disproved the above Polish contention. The Special Commission did not do so . One piece of evidence on this matter from a different quarter h a s, how ever, appeared In Pravda. A few days a fte r the Issue of the com m ission's report a delegation from the First Polish Corps In the USSR, headed by Its commander G eneral Berllng, visited the Katyn graves and held a requiem m ass. One of the d elegation , according to the Pravda correspondent, told him that he had been In one of the Katyn camps until June 1 9 4 0 , had then been transferred elsew h ere , and In February 1 9 4 1 , had received a letter from a Polish o fficer friend (name and regiment given) from that Katyn camp dated January 1 9 4 1 .

24.

During the fin al week of the Soviet Investigation a party of A llied (but not neutral) correspondents were taken down to Katyn. Though Inclined to b elie ve the Soviet account, some of the correspondents, according to Mr Balfour were not favourably Impressed by what they saw and heard. Up to the p resent, at any ra te , only two accounts from the British correspondents have appeared In the British press , and It looks as If the Soviet censorship w as being p articu larly cautious In what It w as prepared to p a ss.

25 .

The G erm ans, Immediately after their announcement of the d iscovery of the g ra v e s, sent two Polish com m issions and an International forensic medical commission (picked by them selves) to Katyn. Much publicity w as given to their acco u n ts, which were of course In every resp ect favourable to the Germans. The A llied jou rn alists were not sent to Katyn until n early four months after the recapture of Sm olensk, but (unlike the situation In April 194 3) m ilitary operations have been In fu ll swing near Smolensk ever since Its recapture.

Foreign O ffice Research Department (Soviet Union Section) 17 February *1944 8

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(Translation) STATEMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO ESTABLISH AND INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SHOOTING BY GERMAN FASCIST INVADERS OF CAPTIVE POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN WOODS. By decision of the Extraordinary State Commission for the establishm ent and investigation of the crimes committed by the German F ascist invaders and their accom plices / a sp ecial commission w as formed to estab lish and investigate the circum stances of the shooting by the German F ascist Invaders of captive Polish o fficers in the Katyn Woods (near Smolensk).

The Commission Includes — N N Burdenko, member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and member of the Extraordinary State Commission (chairman of the commission): A lexei T olstoi, member of the Academy of Sciences and member of the Extraordinary State Commission; Metropolitan N ikolai, member of the Extraordinary State Commission; Lieutenant-G eneral A S Gundorov, chairman of the A ll-S la v Committee; S A K olesnikov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent So cieties; V P Potemkin, member of the Academy of S c ien c es, People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR; C olonel-G eneral E I Smirnov, Chief of the Central M edical Service Administration of the Red Army, and R E Melnikov, chairman of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee In order to fu lfil the task which had been assigned to it , the commission appointed the following experts in forensic medicine to participate in its w ork:— V I Prozorovskl, Chief Expert in Forensic Medicine of the People's Com m issariat for Health of the USSR and D irector o f the Scien tific Research Instttute of Forensic M edicine; V M Smolyaninov, Med. D r., Professor of Forensic Medicine of the Second Moscow M edical Instutute; P S Sem yonovskl, Senior Scientific W orker o f the State Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine of the People's Commissariat for Health of the USSR; Dotsent M D Shvaikova, Senior Scientific Worker of the State Scien tific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine o f the People’s Commissariat for Health of the USSR; and Professor D M Vyropaev, Chief Front Pathologist, Major of the M edical Service.

The Special Commission had at its d isposal voluminous data submitted by N N Burdenko, member of the Extraordinary State Commission, his colleagues and m edico-legal experts who arrived in the city of Sm olensk on the 26th September 1 9 4 3 , immediately after its liberation and made a prelim inary study and Investigation of the circum stances of a ll the crimes committed there by the Germans.

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The Special Commission verified and estab lish ed on the spot that 15 kilom . from the city of Sm olensk, on the Vitebsk highw ay, In the region of the Katyn W o od s, on what Is known as the Goat H ills, 200 metres south -w est of the main road In the direction of the D nieper, there were graves in which were burled Polish war prisoners shot by the German occupation I s ts .

On the orders of the Special Commission and In the presence of a ll the members of the Special Commission as w ell as the m edico-legal ex p e rts, the graves were opened. In them were found a large number of co rp se s, In Polish army uniform. The total number of corpses as counted by the medico­ le g a l experts w es 11 ,0 0 0 .

The m edico-legal experts made a thorough examination of the exhumed bodies and the documents and material evidence found on the bodies and Inside the g raves.

Sim ultaneously with the opening of the graves and the examination of the b o d ies, the Special Commission questioned numerous w itn esses from among the lo cal population, whose depositions d efin itely estab lish the time and circum stances of the crimes committed by the German o ccu p atio n lsts.

The depositions of the w itn e sses revealed the following fa c ts : KATYN WOODS The Katyn Woods had alw ays been a favourite pleasure hunt for the population of Smolensk. The population of the surrounding d istricts took their c a ttle to graze In the Katyn Woods and gathered their firewood there.

There were no restrictio n s forbidding a c c e ss to the Katyn W oods.

This w as the position In the Katyn Woods until the beginning of the w ar.

As late as the summer of 1941 the Pioneer Camp of the Industrial Insurance Organisation w as to be found In this wood. It was closed only In July 1 9 4 1 .

W ith the capture of Smolensk by the German forces of occupation an en tirely new regime w as Introduced In the Katyn W oods. It was h eavily guarded and signs w ere posted In many places warning that persons found In the woods without perm ission would be summarily shot.

E specially strongly guarded was that section of the Katyn Woods known as the Goat H ills as w ell as the territory on the banks of the Dnieper w here, within some 700 metres o f the graves of the Poltsh war p rison ers, stood the country resthom e of the Smolensk Department of the People's Commissar for Internal A ffairs. With the arrival of the G erm ans, the premises of the rest homes were occupied by a German Institution which called Itself "Headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion. " POLISH WAR PRISONERS IN SMOLENSK DISTRICT The Special Commission estab lish ed the fact that prior to the capture of Smolensk by the German occupatlonlsts , Polish war prisoners, officers and so ld ie rs , were working In the w estern d istric ts of the ob last building and repairing highw ays. These Polish war prisoners were housed in three sp ecial camps: Camps Nos. l-O N ,2-O N and 3-ON , located 2 5 -4 5 kilom . to the w est of Sm olensk.

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According to the testimony of w itn esses and documentary d ata, It has been established that owing to the situation that arose after the outbreak of h o stilities the camps could not be evacuated In time and that a ll the Polish war prisoners as w ell as part o f the guards and personnel of the cam ps, were taken prisoner by the Germans.

V M Vetoshnikov, a major o f the State Security Service and former commandant of Camp No 1-ON, when Interrogated by the Special Commission, stated: . . . I was awaiting an order to liquidate the camp but communica­ tions with Smolensk were Interrupted. Then I m yself, with a few fellow workers drove to Smolensk to find out what the position w as. In Smolensk I found a tense situation. I appealed to the traffic director of the Smolensk sector of the W estern Railway, Comrade Ivanov, and asked him to supply the camp w ith waggons to carry away the Imprisoned P o le s, but Comrade Ivanov replied that I could not count on obtaining waggons. I also tried to get in touch with Moscow to receive permission to move on fo ot, but I did not succeed.

"About this time Smolensk was already cut off by the Germans from the camp, and I do not know what happened to the Imprisoned Poles and the guard which had been left in the camp. " Engineer S V Ivanov, who In July 1941 replaced the Traffic D irector of the Smolensk sector of the W estern R ailway, stated to the Special Commission: "The administration of the camps for Polish prisoners of war appealed to my department In order to receive waggons to transport the P o le s, but we had no free waggons. M oreover, we were unable to send waggons on the line to Gusino where most of the Polish prisoners were to be found, as this line was already under fire . Therefore we were unable to meet the requests of the administration of the camps. Thus the prisoners of war remained In the Smolensk province. " The fact that Polish prisoners were to be found In camps In the Smolensk Oblast was supported by the depositions of numerous w itn esses who saw these Poles near Smolensk In the first months of the occupation and until September 1941 Inclu sive.

The w itn ess Marla Aleksandrovna Sashneva, a teacher of the primary school in the villag e of Zenkovo, told the sp ecial commission that In August 1941 she kept In her house In the villag e of Zenkovo a Polish prisoner o f war who had escaped from the camp. ". . . . The Pole w as In Polish m ilitary uniform, which I Immediately recognised a s during 19 4 0 -4 1 I saw on the road groups of Polish p risoners, who were working on the road under guard . . . . The Pole Interested me, b ecau se, as I subsequently learn t, he had been a teacher In a primary school In Poland before he was called up for m ilitary se rv ic e . As I m yself had finished the Pedagogical Technical Institute and was preparing to be a teacher, I talked with him. He told me that he had passed through a teacher's sem inary, and had then passed through a m ilitary school and was a lieutenant of the re se rv e . At the beginning of m ilitary operations In Poland against Germany he was called up for active service and stationed In Brest-Lltovsk where he w as Imprisoned by the Red Army. . . . He had been more than a year In the camp In Smolensk.

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"When the Germans arrived they seized the Polish camp and Introduced a se ve re régime there. The Germans did not consider the Poles to be human b ein g s, they Ill-treated and mocked them In every w ay. There w ere c a se s when Poles were shot for nothing at a ll.

Then he decided to esc a p e . In speaking of him self he said that his w ife w as a ls o a teach er, and that he had two brothers and two s is te rs . . . " When he le ft on the follow ing day the Pole gave his surname, which Sashneva wrote In a book. In the book which Sashneva showed to the Special Com m ission, "Practical E xercises In Natural Scien ce," by Y agodovskl, the follow ing Inscription Is to be found on the la s t page: "Loek Yusef and S o fia , Gorod Zam ostye, IJlltsa Ogorodnaya, Dorn 25. " In the lis ts published by the Germans , Lieutenant Yusef Loek, No 3 7 9 6 , Is mentioned as having been shot at Goat H ills in the Katyn Wood In the spring of 19 4 0 .

Thus It appears from the German communiqué that Yusef Loek w as shot a year before he w as seen by w itn ess Sashneva.

The w itn ess N V Danllenkov, a peasant from the c o lle c tiv e farm "Red D aw n ," of the Katyn Rural C ou n cil, stated that "In August and September 1 9 4 1 , when the Germans cam e, I met Poles working on the road In groups of from fifteen to twenty men. " Similar depositions were made by the follow ing w itn e sses :Soldatenkov, the former head of the v illa g e of Borok; A S K olachev, a doctor of Smolensk; A P O globlln, a p riest; T I S e rg e ye v, m aster roadmaker; P A Sm lryagln, an engineer; A M M oskovskaya, an Inhabitant of Smolensk; A M A le k se e v , president of the c o lle c tiv e farm In the village, of Borok; I V K utsev, a plumber; V P G orodetskl, a p riest; A T Bazeklna, a book-keeper; E N V etrova, a teacher; I V S a v v a te e v , an em ployé on the station of G nezdovo, and others ROUND-UP OF POLISH WAR PRISONERS The presence of the Polish w ar prisoners In the d istric ts round Smolensk In the autumn of 1941 Is a lso confirmed by the fa ct that the Germans staged numerous round-ups of these war prisoners who had escaped from the cam ps.

The w itn e s s , I M Kartoshkln, a jo in e r, stated: "In the autumn of 1941 the Germans were looking for fugitive Poles not only In the w oods, but even ca lled the p olice In for search es In the v illa g e s at night. " A former head of the v illa g e of Novyo Batekl, M D Zakharov, stated that In the autumn of 1941 the Germans became more energetic In "combing out the v illa g e s and woods in the search for Polish p rison ers.

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CONFIDENTIAL The w itn e s s , N. V. D anilenkov, a peasant from the co lle ctive farm â&#x20AC;&#x153;Red Dawn/' stated: "We were subjected to sp ecial round-ups Intended to d iscover Polish prisoners who had escaped from their guards. My house was searched in this fashion two or three tim es. After one search , I asked the head man, Konstantin Sergeev, whom they were looking for in our villag e Sergeev said that an order had been received from the German Command to the effect that a ll houses were to be searched, as Polish prisoners of war who had escaped from the camp were hiding in our v illa g e . After some time the searches ce ased . " The w itn e ss, T. E. Fatkov, a co lle ctive farm er, stated: "Round-ups intended to d iscover the Polish prisoners of war took place on several occasions That was in August and September of 1 9 4 1 . After September 1941 these searches ceased and no one saw any more Polish p risoners. " SHOOTING OF POLISH WAR PRISONERS The above-mentioned "Staff of the 537th Construction Battalion " housed in the country house on the Goat H ills, did not engage in any construction work Its a c tivitie s were conducted in great se crecy .

W hat this "Staff" was re a lly engaged in was shown by the depositions of many w itn e ss e s , including the w itn esses A. M. A lekseyeva O A M ikh ailova, and Z. P. Konakhovskaya, Inhabitants of the villa g e of Borok in thÂŤ d istrict of the Katyn Rural Council.

In accordance with the orders of the German Commandant of the Katyn settlem ent, they were sent by the Head of the villag e of Borok - V I Soldatenkov - to work as servants for the personnel of the "Staff" in the abovementioned country house (dacha).

On their arrival at Goat Hills they were informed through an interpreter o f a number of restrictio n s: they were forbidden to lea ve the dacha or walk in the w oo d s, to enter the rooms of the dacha without being called for and accompanied by German so ld ie rs , to remain in the dacha at night. They had to come to and go from their work by a stric tly defined path and escorted by so ld iers.

This warning was given to A le k sey eva, M ikhailova and Konakhovskaya through an interpreter by Lieutenant-Colonel A m es, the head of the German establishm ent, who called them to him one by one for this purpose In reply to a question about the personnel o f the "Staff " A. M A lekseyeva stated: "About thirty Germans were in permanent residence in the dacha at "Goat H ills" ; the senior man was Lieutenant-Colonel A m es, and his adjutant was Senior Lieutenant Rekst. There was a lso Lieutenant Hott and W achtm eister Luemert, Quartermaster Corporal Roze, his a ssista n t Izike Oberfeldwebel G renew sky, who superintended the e le ctric p lan t, a photographer 13

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who was an Obergefreiter whose name I do not remember, a translator of Volga-German origin whose Christian name was Johann, but whom we ca lled Ivan, a cook the Germans ca lled G u stav, and a number of others the Christian names and surnames of whom I do not know. " Shortly after they began their w ork, A le k sey ev a , M ikhailova and Konakhovskaya began to notice that some "shady business" was going on at the dacha.

A M A lekseyeva stated: "The translator Johann warned us several times on behalf of Arnes that we must hold our tongues and not talk about what we saw of heard at the dach a.

"Moreover, I guessed from a number of circum stances that the Germans were up to some "shady business" at the dacha . . . .

"In the latter part of August and for the greater part of September 1941 se ve ra l trucks came nearly every day to the house on the Goat H ills.

"At first I did not pay much attention to this fa c t, but later on I noticed that each time these trucks drove Into the v illa 's grounds they would stop for a half hour and sometimes for an hour somewhere on a country road leading from the main highway to the house.

"I noticed this because of noise of the engines would ce a se shortly a fter the trucks had been heard to enter the grounds. In the silen ce one could hear the sound of separate shots being fire d . The shots were heard at short but nearly regular In tervals. Then the firing would cease and the trucks would drive up to the house.

"German sold iers and non-commissioned o fficers would aligh t.

Talking lou d ly, they would go off to the bath-house to w ash , after which they would get drunk. The bath-house was kept heated constantly in those d a y s.

"On the days when the trucks used to a rriv e , additional soldiers came to the dacha from some German m ilitary unit. Bunks were sp e cia lly prepared for them In the so ld ers' c a sin o , which had been organised In one o f the dacha. On these days a large number of meals were prepared In the kitchen and double portions of spirits were served at tab le.

"Not long after the a rriva l of the trucks at the d acha, these soldiers went out In the woods with their arm s, obviously to the place where the lorries stopped,as half an hour or an hour later they returned on the lorries together with the sold iers who were permantly quartered In the dacha.

"In a ll probability I should not have begun to observe and notice how the noise of the lorries coming to the dacha ceased and then began again.

If every time when the lorries were approaching they did not send us (me, Konakhovskaya and M ihailova) Into the kitchen If we were at that time standing outside the d acha, or did not allow us out of the kitchen If we were already In the kitchen.

"These circum stances and the fact that I had noticed traces of blood on several occasion s on the clothes of two G efrelters compelled me to take 14

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CONFIDENTIAL a clo se interest in what was happening at the dacha. It was then I noticed strange interruptions in the movements of the lorries and the fact that they stopped in the wood. I also noticed that the traces of blood were alw ays on the clothes of the same people - the two Gef re iters one o f them tall and red -h aired , the other o f medium height and blonde.

"From a ll this I concluded that the Germans were bringing people to the dacha on lorries and shooting them. I even guessed approximately where this was taking p la c e, a s , when I used to go to the dacha and leave it , I noticed newly-dug earth in several places not far from the road The area of this newly-turned earth increased every day. In the course of time the ground in these places reassumed its normal appearance. " In reply to a question out by the Special Commission as to what sort of people were shot in the wood near the dacha, A lekseyeva replied that Polish prisoners of war were being sh o t, and in confirmation of her words she told the following story: "There were days when no lorries came to the dacha but none the le s s soldiers le ft the dacha for the wood, from which frequent * single shots could be heard. On returning, the soldiers alw ays went into the bathroom and then got drunk.

"Then there was another Instance. One day I was detained at the dacha later than usual; Mihailova and Konakhovskaya had already gone out. I had not finished the work on account of which I had remained behind when a soldier came in unexpectedly and said that I could le a v e . He referred in this connexion to an order given by Roze. He him self accompanied me as far as the road.

"When I was walking away along the road about 150 or 200 metres from the turning which led to the dacha, I saw a group of Polish prisoners of war about thirty men in a l l , walking along the road under a strong German esco rt.

"I knew they w ere Poles because before the w ar, and for a certain period o f time after the arrival of the Germans, I met Polish prisoners of war on the road dressed in the same uniform with the four-cornered forage caps which distinguish them.

"I remained at the side o f the road in order to see where they were being le d , and I saw that they turned the com er towards the dacha at Goat H ills.

"As I was at that time already observing atten tively the happenings at the dacha, I was interested in this circum stance. I walked back a little along the road, and, hiding in the bushes on the roadside, I w aited. After 20 or 30 minutes I heard the ch aracteristic and already fam iliar single shots.

"Then everything became clear to me and I walked quickly home.

"From this fact I also concluded that the Germans were obviously shooting the P o les, and not only during the day when we were working at the dacha, but during the night in our absence.

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"We guessed several times that Poles were arriving at Goat Hills in view of the tense atmosphere which used to reign in the dacha at such times . . . .

"All the o fficers used to leave the dacha and no one was left in the building except a few guards, and the W achtm elster constantly checked up on a ll posts by telephone . . . " O A M ikhailova stated: In September 1941 shots were often heard in the wood at Goat H ills. At first I did not pay attention to the lorries which used to drive up to our dacha. They were covered both at the side and on the top, painted green, and were alw ays accompanied by n .c . o s . Then I noticed that these lorries never came into our garage, and were never unloaded.

These lorries drove up very freq u en tly, e s p e c ia lly in September 1941.

"Amongst the n . c . o s . , who alw ays drove in the cabs side by side with the chauffeurs, I began to notice a ta ll p ale-faced man with red hair. When the lorries drove up to the dacha, a ll the n . c . o s . , as though under ord ers, went into the bathroom and washed them selves there for a long tim e, after which they got very drunk in the dacha.

"On one occasion this t a ll, red-haired man, on leaving the lorry came into the kitchen and asked for w ater. When he was drinking the water I saw blood on the cuff of the right sle e v e of his uniform. " O A M ikhailova and Z P Konakhovskaya once saw in person how two Polish p rison ers, who had obviously escaped from the Germans and had been recaptured, were shot.

About this M ikhailova made the following statement: "One d a y , as u su a l, I and Konakhovskaya were working in the kitchen and we heard a noise not far from the dacha. We went to the door and saw two Polish prisoners surrounded

by German s o ld ie rs , who were explaining something to Corporal Roze. Then Lieutenant-Colonel Ames approached them and said something to Roze. We hid o u rs e lv e s , as we were afraid that Roze would beat us for having shown such curiosity; but we were n oticed, and Mechanic G linew sky, on Roze's ord ers, sent us into the kitch en , and they took the Poles away from the dacha.

A few minutes later we heard s h o ts. The German soldiers and Corporal Roze, who returned shortly afterw ard s, were talking anim atedly. I and Konakhovskaya, being anxious to find out what the Germans had done with the Poles whom they had caught, again went ou tsid e. Am es's adjutant, who had gone out by the main entrance at that very moment, questioned Roze in German, and Roze replied in German that "everything was in order. " I understood these words as the Germans frequently used them in conversation amongst them selves. From a ll that had happened I was certain that these two Poles had been shot. " A sim ilar statement on this question was made by Z P Konakhovskaya.

Terrified by what was happening at the dacha, A lek seyeva, Mikhailova and Konakhovslaya decided to find some convenient excuse for ceasing to work at the dacha. Profiting by a reduction in their "wages" from 9 marks to 3 marks per month at the beginning of January 19 4 2 , they refu sed , at M ikhailova's proposal to go to their work. The same day a German lorry drove up for them, took them to the dach a, and, as punishment, they were placed in a cold room, Mikhailova for eight d a y s, A lekseyeva and Konakhovskaya for three d ays.

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A fter they had been detained for this period they were a ll se t fre e .

During the period o f their work at the dacha A le k s e y e v a , M ikhailova and Konakhovskaya were afraid to te ll each other of what they had seen of the goings-on a t the dacha. It w as only a fter they had been arrested and w ere sittin g in the cold room that they exchanged view s on th is subject one night.

When M ikhailova w as questioned on the 24th December 1 9 4 3 , she stated : "It w as then that we first d iscu ssed what w as happening a t the dach a. I told them everything I knew , but it appeared that Konakhovskaya and A lek seyeva a lso knew a ll th ese fa c ts , b u t, like m y se lf, w ere afraid to talk about them. It was then that I learned that the Germans in Goat H ills w ere shooting Polish prisoners of w ar, as A lek seyeva told us that on one occasion in the autumn o f 1941 when she w as going home from work she h e rse lf saw the Germans driving a large group of Polish prisoners of w ar into the wood at Goat H ills and la te r heard shots in the same p la c e . " Sim ilar depositions to this e ffe c t were made by A lek seyeva and K onakhovskaya.

After comparing their o b serv a tio n s, A le k s e y e v a , M ikhailova and Konakhovskaya came to the firm conviction that in August and September 1941 the Germans were engaged in mass shootings of Polish prisoners of w ar at the dacha at Goat H ills.

A lekseyeva*s statem ents were supported by the deposition of her fa th e r, M ikhail A le k s e y e v , whom she told of her ob servation s regarding the work done by the Germans when she w as s t ill working at the dacha in the autumn of 1 9 4 1 .

"For a long time she told me nothing, " said M ikhail A le k s e y e v , "but when she came home she used to complain that it w as terrible to work at the dacha and she did not know how to get aw ay from it. When l asked w hy it w as terrib le for h er, she told me that she often heard shots in the wood.

Once when she came home she told me in se cret that the Germans were shooting Poles in the wood a t Goat H ills. When I heard my daughter sa y th is , I warned her s e v e re ly that she must not te ll anyone e ls e of th is , or the Germans would get to know of it and the whole of our fam ily would su ffe r. " D epositions regarding the bringing o f Polish prisoners of w ar in sm all groups of from tw enty to thirty men escorted by from fiv e to seven German so ld iers

to Goat H ills were a lso given by other w itn e sses questioned by the Special Commission: P G K is e le v , a peasant from the farm Goat H ills; M J K rivo zertsev, a join er from the station Krasney Bor in the Katyn W oods; S V Ivanov, a former head of the station of Gnezdovo in the area of the Katyn W oods; I D S a v v a te e v , a worker on the same statio n ; M A A le k s e y e v , chairman o f the c o lle c tiv e farm o f the v illa g e of Borok; A P O globlin, p rie st of the Kuprtnskaya Church; and o th e rs .

These w itn e sses a lso heard shots coming from the wood a t Goat H ills.

Important light on what took place in the house on Goat H ills in the authumn of 19 41 w as thrown by B V B a zilevsk y, p ro fesso r o f astronom y, director of the Smolensk O bersvatory.

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During the firs t days o f the German occupation of Smolensk P rofessor B azilevsk y w as fo rcib ly appointed by the Germans a ss ista n t head of the c ity (burgom elster), w hile law yer B G Menshagln w as appointed burgom elster. M enshagln w as a traito r who enjoyed the p articu lar confidence o f the German command, and p articu larly o f von Sch w etz, the commandant of Sm olensk, and who subsequently le ft with the Germans.

At the beginning of September 1941 B azilevsky asked Menshagln to apply to Commandant von Schwetz for the re le a s e from Camp No 126 for W ar Prisoners o f one Z h lglln sk y, a teach er. M enshagln com piled, and later Informed B azilevsk y that his request could not be granted, s in c e , according to von S c h w e tz, "Instructions had been received from Berlin to Institute the most se ve re regime with regard to the w ar prisoners and allow ing no leniency to be shown in this m atter. " "I involu n tarily asked Menshagln what could be more severe than the regime a lread y ex istin g In the cam p," w itn ess B azilevsky te s tifie d .

"Menshagln gave me a strange look an d , bending toward me, said In a low tone: 'It could b e ! The Russians at le a s t may die by th em selve s, but the Polish prisoners have been ordered to be sim ply ex term in a ted .1 "What Is th a t?

How am I to understand what you s a y ?

I exclaim ed.

" 'You must understand It lite r a lly . A d irective to this e ffe c t has been received from B e rlin ,' said M enshagln,and Immediately asked me, 'for the sake of everything h o l y , ' not to mention a word of It. "A fortnight a fter the above-m entioned conversation w ith Menshagln I w as again received by him , and I could not help asking: W h at Is the news about the Poles ?' M enshagln w as slow In rep lyin g , but fin a lly answ ered: 'It Is a ll o v e r. Von Schwetz told me that they have been shot somewhere not far from S m o le n sk .'"

Seeing how disturbed I w a s , Menshagln again warned me o f the n e c e s sity of observing the s tric te s t se crecy regarding this a ffa ir, and then began to explain to me the p olicy o f the Germans on this q uestion. He said that the shooting of the Poles w as a link In the general chain of H itler's an ti-P o lish p o lic y , which had become much more ru th less a s a resu lt of the conclusion of the R usslan-P olish Treaty.

B azilevsky a ls o told the Sp ecial Commission about his conversation with Sonderfuehrer H lrsch feld , of the seventh department of the German commandant's o ffic e , a German from the Baltic who spoke Russian w e ll.

"Hlrschfeld told me with brutal frankness that the harmfulness of the Poles and their Inferiority had been h is to ric a lly proven, and hence the reduction of the Polish population would serve as manure for the so il and make It p o ssib le to extend German's lebensraum . In this connexion H lrschfeld boasted that there w ere no in telle ctu als at a ll le ft In Poland, since a ll had been hanged, shot or thrown Into concentration cam ps. "

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B azilevsk y's evidence w as corroborated by the w itn ess I E Yefim ov, a p h ysics professor to whom B azilevsk y had spoken o f his talk with Menshagin that same autumn of 1 9 4 1 , and who w as interrogated by the Special Com m ission.

Documentary confirmation o f the statem ents made by B azilevsky and Yefimov is given by an entry made in M eshagin's own handwriting in his notebook.

This notebook, containing seventeen incom plete p a g e s, w as found In the file s o f the M unicipal Administration of Smolensk a fte r the town had lib erated by the Red Army.

The fa c t that this notebook belonged to Menshagin and that it is in his own handwriting w as confirmed both by the d isp o sitio n s o f B azilevsk y who w as w e ll acquainted w ith M enshaginâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s handwriting, and a ls o by a graphological expert opinion. To judge from the dates given in the notebook, its contents re fe r to the period from the firs t days of August 19 41 to November o f the same y e a r.

Amongst a number of various notes on ad m inistrative questions (about firew oo d , the supply o f e le c tric ity , trad e, & c .), there are a number o f notes made by Menshagin ob viou sly as reminders o f orders from the German Command in Sm olensk.

From th ese notes It is p ossib le to get a fa irly c le a r idea o f the questions w ith w hich the M unicipal Administration d ealt in its ca p a city as an organ fu lfillin g a ll the d irection s of the German . Command.

The firs t three pages of the notebook contain a d etailed exposition of the procedure for organising a Jew ish ghetto and o f the system of re p ressive m easures to be used ag ain st the Je w s. On the tenth p a g e, dated the 1 5 th August 1 9 4 1 , stands a note: "All escaped Polish prisoners o f w ar are to be arrested and handed o ver to the Commandant's o ffic e . " On page 15 (undated) is w ritten: "Are there any rumours amongst the population about the shooting o f Polish prisoners o f w ar a t Goat H ills (to Umnov). " It is c le a r from the firs t e n try , firs tly that on the 15th August 19 4 1 there w ere s t ill Polish prisoners in the Smolensk a re a , and in the second place" that they w ere being arrested by the German a u th o rities.

The second entry g ives evidence of the fa c t that the German Command disquieted by the p o s sib ility o f the spread of rumours regarding the crim es they had committed amongst the c iv ilia n population, had issu ed sp e c ia l orders to 7 the e ffe c t that this as sumption of theirs should be checked.

Umnov, who is mentioned in the e n try , w as head of the Russian p olice in Smolensk during the firs t months o f its occupation.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN PROVOCATION During the winter of 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 , the general m ilitary situation took a sharp turn for the w orse as far as the Germans were concerned. The armed might of the Soviet Union w as stead ily Increasing, the unity of the USSR with Its a llie s was growing stronger. The Germans then decided on an a ct of provocation, making use to this end of the crimes they had perpetrated In the Katyn Woods and laying these crimes at the door of the Soviet au th o rities.

In this w ay they expected to sow discord between the Russians and the Poles and cover up the traces of their own crim e.

A P O globlln, priest of the villag e of Kuprlno, In the Smolensk rayon, stated: . . . After the events at Stalingrad, when the Germans began to fe e l Insecure, they raised this question. There were rumours amongst the population to the effe ct that 'the Germans were putting their a ffairs in order.

When the Germans began to prepare the Katyn provocation, their first task was to find " w itn esses," w ho, under the influence of p ersu asion , bribery or th rea ts, would give the Germans the statem ents which they required. The attention of the Germans was attracted by the peasant Parfen G avrilovich K iselev , bom In 18 7 0 , who lived on his farm which w as nearer than any other to the dacha at Goat H ills.

They summoned him to the Gestapo before the end of 1942 and, threatening him with persecution, demanded that he should give fictitiou s evidence to the effe ct that he knew that in the spring of 1940 the Bolsheviks had shot Polish prisoners of war at the dacha of the Administration of the People's Commissariat for Internal A ffairs (U .N .K .V .D .) at Goat H ills.

In connexion with th is , K iselev stated: "In the autumn of 19 4 2 , two policemen came to my house and told me to appear at the Gestapo at the station of Gnezdovo. The same day I went to the G estapo, which was situ ated In a tw o-storied house by the side of the railw ay station . There was a German officer and an Interpreter In the room which I entered. The German officer began to question me through the Interpreter - had I been living long In this a re a , what was my w ork , and how w ell off was I ?

"I told him that I had lived on my farm In the area of Goat Hills since 1907 and worked as a farmer. As to my financial p osition , I said that I w as -having a fa irly d ifficu lt tim e, as I w as an old man and my sons were fighting.

"After a short conversation on this them e, the o fficer said that according to Information In the p ossession of the G estapo, the staff of the N .K .V .D . had shot Polish officers In 1940 In the Katyn Woods In the area near the Goat H ills, and he asked me what testim ony I could give on this question. I replied that I had never heard whether the N .K .V .D . had shot anybody at Goat H ills, and explained to the o fficer that this was hardly p ossible as Goat H ills was an en tirely open and thickly populated p la c e , and if anyone were shot there the whole population of the neighbouring villa g es would know about It.

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The o ffic e r told me that I must, none the l e s s , make a statem ent to this e ffe c t as such shootings were a c tu a lly alleg ed to have taken p la c e . I w as promised a large reward for a statem ent o f this kind.

I told the o ffic er again that I knew nothing about these sh o otin g s, and that nothing o f the kind could have happened before the w ar In our d is tric t. In sp ite o f th is , the o ffic er Insisted that I should make a fa ls e statem ent.

A fter the firs t conversation concerning which I have Just sp oken , I w as not ca lle d to the Gestapo for the second time until February 19 4 3 . By this time I knew that people from other v illa g e s In the neighbourhood w ere being ca lle d up to the Gestapo and that they were being asked to make the same statem ents as I had.

In the G estapo the same o ffic er and Interpreter whom I had seen a t the firs t Interrogation again demanded that I should make a statem ent to the effe ct that I was an e y e -w itn e ss o f the shooting of Polish o fficers a lleg ed to have been conducted by the N .K .V .D . In 19 4 0 . I again told the German o ffic e r that this was a li e , a s I had not heard of any shootings before the w ar and that I would not make a fa ls e statem ent. But the Interpreter would not liste n to me, he took a manuscript document from the table and read it through. It said that I, K is e le v , lived on a farm In the region of Goat H ills, and m yself saw N .K .V .D . workers shoot Polish o ffic ers In 19 4 0 . Having read this document through, the interpreter asked me to sign it. I refused to do so . Then the Interpreter began to put pressure on me to do so by abuse and th reats. At la s t he said : "Either you w ill sign straight a w a y , or we w ill k ill you - choose!"

"Terrified by his th re a ts, I signed the document, having made up my mind that It would be the end of the matter. " Subsequently, after the Germans had organised v is its to the Katyn graves by various "delegations", they com pelled K iselev to appear before a "Polish delegation" which had a rriv e d .

K is e le v , who had forgotten the contents of the protocol which he had signed at the G estap o , became confused and fin a lly refused to speak.

The G estapo then arrested K is e le v , and having beaten him m e rcilessly for a month and a h a lf, again Induced him to agree to make "public statem ents As regards th is , K iselev stated : "In re a lity things did not turn out a s they ought to have done. " In the spring of 1943 the Germans announced that In the Katyn W ood s, In the area of Goat H ills, they had discovered the graves of Polish o ffic ers who were alleged to have been shot by the N .K .V .D . au thorities In 19 4 0 .

Shortly afterw ards a G estapo tran slator came to my house and led me to the wood In the area of Goat H ills.

When we le ft the house and remained a lo n e , the Interpreter warned me

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that I must forthwith te ll the people whom I should find In the wood a ll the d e ta ils a s they had been se t out In the document which I had signed In the G estap o.

When I reached the wood I saw opened graves and a group of people whom I did not know. The Interpreter told me that they were "Polish delegates" who had arrived to look at the g rav es.

When we came up to the graves the "delegates" began to ask me In Russian various questions about the shooting of the P o le s. But as more than a month had elap sed sin ce I w as summoned to the G estap o , I forgot everything which had stood In the document which I signed.

I began to make m istak es, and fin a lly , I said that I did not know anything about the shooting of Polish o ffic e rs . The German o ffic e r became very angry and the interpreter dragged me roughly aw ay from the "delegation " and sent me packing.

On the follow ing d a y , in the morning, a m otor-car drove up to my farm and In it there w as a G estapo o ffic e r. He found me In the farm yard, told me that I was under a rre s t, put me In the c a r, and drove me off to the Smolensk prison . . . .

After my a rrest I w as interrogated se v e ra l tim es, but they spent more time In beating me that questioning me. The firs t time they ca lle d me up, beat me hard, cursed me, told me that I had made fo ols of them and then se n t me back to my c e ll.

The next time I w as ca lle d fo r, they told me that I must make a public statem ent to the effe ct that I w as an e y e -w itn e s s o f the shooting of Polish o ffic e rs by the B o lsh evik s, and that until the G estapo was convinced that I would do this co n scien tio u sly I should not be released from the prison. I told the o ffic e r that it would be b etter for me to remain In prison than to te ll people lie s w hile looking them in the e y e . A fte r this they beat me hard.

There w ere se v e ra l such Interrogations accompanied by b ea tin g s, a s a re su lt of which I lo st a ll my stren gth , began to lo se my h earing, and could not move my right arm.

About a month after my a rre s t, a German o ffic er ca lled for me and said : "Now you s e e , K is e le v , where your stubbornness has led you. W e have decided to execute you . Tomorrow we sh a ll take you to the Katyn Woods and hang you . " I.asked the o ffic er not to do th is. I tried to persuade him that I w as not a su itab le man to play the part of an e y e -w itn e s s of the sh ootin g s, a s I w as a bad lia r and would be bound to make m istakes. The o ffic er remained unmoved. A few minutes later some so ld iers came Into the o ffic e and began to beat me w ith rubber truncheons.

I w as unable to stand the beatings and tortures and agreed to appear publicly with a fictitio u s story of the shooting of the Poles by the B olsheviks.

A fter that I w as released from the prison on condition that on the first demand of the Germans I would speak to "delegations" In the Katyn W o o d s ... .

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In every case before they took me into the wood to the opened g ra v e s, the interpreter came to my house, called me into the yard , took me to one side in order that no one should hear, and for half an hour compelled me to learn by heart what I had to say about the shooting of Polish officers alleged to have been carried out by the N .K. V.D . in 19 4 0 .

I remehiber that the interpreter spoke to me approximately as follow s: "I liv e in a farm in the area of Goat Hills not far from the N .K .V .D . dacha.

In the spring of 1940 I saw how they brought Poles into the wood and shot them there at night. " And it was essen tia l to state word for word that "this was the work of the N .K .V .D ."

After I had learned by heart what the Interpreter told me, he used to take me into the wood to the open graves and compelled me to repeat a ll this in the presence of the new ly arrived "delegations. " My sto ries were stric tly controlled and directed by the Gestapo interpreter.

Once I spoke to a "delegation" and they asked me: "Had I personally seen these Poles before they were shot by the B olsheviks. " I was not prepared for such a question and replied in accordance with the fa c ts , that i s , that I had seen Polish prisoners of war up to the beginning of the war as they were working on the roads. The Interpreter then dragged me to one side and sent me home.

"I beg you to b elieve that my conscience was troubling me the whole time as I knew that in reality the Polish officers had been shot by the Germans in 1 9 4 1 , but I was unable to do anything e ls e as I lived under constant threat of further arrest and tortures. " The statement of P G K iselev regarding his being summoned to the G estapo, his subsequent a rre st, and his being beaten up are confirmed by the following people who live with him: his w ife Aksinya K iselev a, born in 1870; his son V asili K iselev, born in 1 9 1 1 ; his daughter-in-law Marla K iselev a , bom in 19 18 ; and the master roadmaker Tlmofee Ivanovich Sergeyev, bom in 1 9 0 1 , who rented a room in K iselev's farmhouse.

The injuries inflicted on K iselev in the Gestapo (injury to the shoulder, severe lo ss of hearing) are confirmed by a report of a medical examination.

The Germans in their search for w itn esses subsequently took an Interest in the sta ff of the station of Gnezdovo, two and a half kilometres from Goat H ills.

In the spring of 19 4 0 , more Polish prisoners of war arrived at this sta tio n , and the Germans obviously wanted to obtain statements to this effect from the railw ay w orkers. With this end in view the former statio n master at Gnezdovo, S V Ivanov, a station w orker, I V S a vva teev, and others were summoned to the G estapo.

As regards the circum stances of his being summoned to the G estapo, S V Ivanov, bom in 18 8 2 , stated: "This took place in March 1943. I was 23

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Interrogated by a German o fficer In the presence of an Interpreter.

An o fficer asked through the Interpreter who I was and what post I occupied at the station of Gnezdovo before the Germans occupied the d is tric t, and asked me whether I knew that in the spring of 1940 several trains carrying large groups of captured Polish officers had arrived at the station of Gnezdovo.

"I told him that I knew th is.

"This o fficer asked me whether I knew that in the same spring of 1940 shortly after the arrival of the Polish o ffic e rs , they were a ll shot In the Katyn W oods.

"I told him that I knew nothing about this and that it could not be tru e, because the captured Polish officers who had arrived at the station of Gnezdovo in the spring of 1940 had been seen by me throughout 1940 and 1941 engaged in road-making work until the Germans occuped Smolensk.

"The officer then told me that if a German officer said that the Poles had been shot by the B olsheviks, it must have been so . 'Therefore, continued the o ffic e r, 'you.have nothing to be afraid of and you may with a quiet conscience sign a protocol to the effect that the captured Polish o fficers were shot by the Bolsheviks and that you were an eye-w itn ess of th is .'

"I told him that I was an old man, that I was already 61 years of age and that in my old age I did not want to put any sins on my conscience.

I could only state that Polish prisoners of war had in fact arrived at the station of Gnezdovo in the spring of 1940.

"The German officer then began to urge me to make the statement which he required, promising me that if I did so hewould transfer me from my duties as watchman at a crossing and make me once more station-m aster at Gnezdovo, the post which I had occupied under the Soviet regim e, and would see that I was w ell looked after m aterially.

"The Interpreter emphasised that my testim ony,as being that of a railw ay worker from the station of Gnezdovo,the nearest one to the Katyn W o od s, was of exceptional importance to the German Command and that I should not regret it if I gave a statement to this e ffe ct.

"I understood that I had fallen into an extrem ely difficu lt situation and that a poor fate awaited me, but none the less I again refused to give fa lse evidence to the German o fficer.

"After that the o fficer began to shout at me, threatening me with beating and shooting, and stating that I did not re a lise what was to my own benefit. H owever, I stuck to my guns.

"Then the translator drew up a short protocol in the German language on one page,and gave me the contents in his own words.

"In this protocol there was w ritten , according to the tran slator, only the fact of the arriva l of Polish prisoners of war at the station of G nezdovo.

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When I began to ask that my deposition should be written not only in German but a lso in R ussian, the o fficer fin a lly lo st his temper, beat me with a rubber truncheon, and drove me out of the building#. " I V S a v v e e te v , bom in 1 8 8 0 , stated: . . . "in the Gestapo I stated that there had in fact arrived at the station of Gnezdovo in the spring of 1940 several trains with Polish prisoners of war and that the latter proceeded fu rth er in lorries but I did not know to what d estination. I a ls o added that I subsequently met these Poles many times on the M oscowMinsk road, where they were engaged in repair work in sm all groups. The officer told me that I was m istaken, that I could not have met Poles on the road as they had been shot by the B olsheviks, and he demanded that I should make a statem ent to this e ffe c t. I refu sed .

"After prolonged threats and p ersu asion , the o ffic er took counsel of the interpreter In the German language, and the interpreter thereupon drew up a short protocol and handed It to me to sig n , explaining that It set out the contents of my statem ents. I asked the interpreter to allow me to read the protocol for m yself, but he abused me roundly and told me to sign at once and clear out. I hesitated for a minute, the interpreter took hold of a rubber truncheon which was hanging on the w all and flourished it In my direction. After that I signed the protocol which had been placed before * me. The interpreter said that I could go home and that I was not to say a word to anyone or e ls e they would shoot me. " The search for w itn esses was not limited to the above persons. The Germans p ersisten tly tried to find former workers of the N .K .V .D . and compel them to give the fa lse testimony which they required. Having by chance arrested E L Ignatyuk, a workman formerly employed in the garage of the N .K .V .D . Administration for the oblast o f Sm olensk, the Germans p ersisten tly tried to get out of him by means of threats and beatings a statement to the fact that he was in re a lity not a garage workman but a chauffeur; and that he hlmc^if had driven Polish prisoners to be shot.

W ith regard to this question, E L Ignatyuk, bom in 19 0 3 , stated: "When I was called up for the first time for interrogation by Alferchik the head of the p o lic e , he accused me of agitation against the German authorities and asked in what capacity I worked in the N .K .V .D . I told him that I was employed in the garage of the Administration of the N .K .V .D . for the Smolensk Oblast as a workman. Alferchik tried to induce me at the same Interrogation to make a statement to the effe ct that I worked for the Administra­ tion of the N .K .V .D . not a s a garage workman but as a chauffeur.

"Alferchik, not having obtained the statement which he w anted, became extrem ely annoyed, and, together with his ad ju tan t, whom he called 'George* he wrapped my head and mouth in a ra g , took off my tro u sers, put me on a # table and beat me with rubber truncheons. After that they again called me up for Interrogation and Alferchik demanded that I should make a fa lse statement to the effe ct that the Polish o fficers in the Katyn Wood were shot the N K V D organisation in 19 4 0 , a fact which I could say was w ell known to me as being *

by

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a chauffeur who had participated in the transport of the Polish officers to the Katyn Wood and had been present at their shooting. If I agreed to give a statement to this e ffe c t, Alferchik promised that I should be released from prison and that he would find me work In the p o lic e, where I should have good living conditions; If n ot, they would shoot me. . . .

"I was Interrogated for the la st time at the police station by Investigator Alexandrov, who demanded from me the same fa lse testimony regarding the shooting of Polish officers as Alferchik had done, but here again I refused to make fa lse statem ents.

"After this Interrogation they again beat me and sent me to the G estapo. . . . I n the Gestapo they demanded from me ju st as they had done at the police station that I should make a fa lse statement regarding the shooting of Polish officers In the Katyn Woods In 1940 by the Soviet authorities a fact which I could say was known to me In my capacity as chauffeur. " â&#x20AC;&#x2122;W itn esses" named In the book Issued by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing the data fabricated by the Germans In the "Katyn case" Included, besides O G K iselev, Godezov (alias Godunov), bom 1877; Grigori S llv e rs to v , bom 18 91; Ivan Andreyev, bom 1917; M ilhall Zhigulev, bom 19 15; Ivan K rlvozertsev, bom 1 9 1 5 , and M atvei Zakharov, bom 1893.

Investigation has established that the first two (Godezov and Sllverstov) died In 19 4 3 , before the Smolensk Oblast was liberated by the Red Army; the next three (Andreyev, Zhigulev and Krlvozertsov) left with the Germans, or may have been forced to leave with them, and the la st - M atvei Zakharov, formerly a coupler at Smolensk Station, who had worked under the Germans as elder of Novlye Batekl villag e - was found and questioned by the Special Commission.

Zakharov told the Commission by what means the Germans secured from him the fa lse evidence they sought In the "Katyn c a se . " "At the beginning of March 19 43," Zakharov te stifie d , " an employee of the Gnezdovo G estapo, whose name I do not know, came to my house and said that an officer wished to see me.

"When I went to the G estapo, the German officer said to me through the Interpreter: W e are aware that you worked as a coupler at the Smolensk Central Station. You w ill have to te stify that In 1940 waggons with Polish war prisoners passed through Smolensk on their way to Gnezdovo Station, and that later on the Poles were shot In the woods at Goat H ills .1 "In reply I said that waggons with Poles had passed through Smolensk on their way westwards In 19 4 0 , but that I did not know their destination. . .

"The officer said that If I refused to give evidence he would force me to do so . After these words he took a rubber truncheon and commenced to beat me. Then they laid me on the bench and the officer both beat me. I do not remember how many blows were delivered because l soon lost conscious n ess.

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"When I came to, the officer insisted that I sign the protocol of the examination, and losing courage after the beating and the threat of being shot, I gave false evidence and signed the protocol. When I had signed the protocol, I was released from the Gestapo. . . .

"A few days after my summons to the Gestapo, about the middle of March 1943, the interpreter came to my house and told me to go so the German general and confirm my evidence to him.

"When we came to the general, he asked me whether I confirmed my testimony. I said I did, because on the way the interpreter had warned me that if I refused to confirm the testimony, I would get a bigger dose of what they had given me the first time in the Gestapo.

"Being afraid of a repetition of that torture, I said that I confirmed my testimony. The Interpreter then ordered me to raise my right hand and told me that I had taken the oath and could go home. " It has been established that the Germans used persuasion, threats and torture in order to obtain the required testimony also from other persons, v i z . , from N S Kaverzner, former assistan t chief of the Smolensk prison; V G Kovalev, former employee of that prison and from others.

As the search for the required number of w itnesses was not crowned with su c ce ss, the Germans stuck b ills a lio v e r Smolensk and the surrounding v illa g e s #in the following form, an original copy being included in the material held by the Special Command:"APPEAL TO THE POPULATION 'Who can provide data regarding the mass murder committed by the Bolsheviks in 1940 on captured Polish officers and priests in the wood 'Goat H ills' near the road from Gnezdovo-Katyn ?

W h o saw motor lorries going from Gnezdovo to 'Goat H ills'?

W h o saw or heard shootings ? Who knows inhabitants who can describe this a ffa ir?

"A reward is offered for every statement.

"Communications to be sent to Smolensk, German Police, Museum Street No 6, or Gnezdovo, German Police, House No 10 5, by the station. "(Signature) VOSS "Lieutenant of Field Police "3rd May 1943" A similar statement was inserted in the Smolensk newspaper Novy Put (No 35 (157) of the 6th May 1943) published by the Germans.

That the Germans promised rewards for the testimony which they 27

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required In the "Katyn case" has been stated by the following w itn e s s e s , res Idents of Smolensk, who were questioned by the Special Commission:O E Sokolova, E A Pushchlna, I I Bychkov, G T Bondarev, E P U stinov, and many others.

FRAMING OF EVIDENCE AT KATYN GRAVES W hile searching for "w itnesses," the Germans commenced to frame evidence at the graves In the Katyn Woods; to remove from the clothing of the Polish war prisoners they had killed a ll documents dated later than April 19 40, le , the time when, according to the German provocative versio n , the Poles were shot by the Bolsheviks; to remove a ll material evidence that might upset this provocative version.

It has been established by the Investigation conducted by the Special Commission that for this purpose the Germans made use of Russian prisoners of war numbering about 500 men, who were sp ecially chosen from Prisoners of War Camp No 126.

The Special Commission p ossesses many depositions made by w itnesses on this question.

Amongst them special attention Is merited by the description of the medical personnel of the above-mentioned camp.

Dr A T Chlzhov, who worked In Camp 126 during the period when Smolensk was occupied by the Germans, stated: ". . . about the beginning of March 19 4 3 , a number of groups totalling about five hundred men were taken from the Smolensk prisoner-of-w ar camp No 126. They were selected from the p h ysically strongest prisoners In order that they might be sen t, It was sa id , to take part In entrenchment work. Subsequently not a single one of these prisoners returned to the camp. " Dr V A Khmyrov, who also worked under the Germans in the same camp, stated: "I know that about the second half of February or at the beginning of March 19 4 3 , about five hundred captured Red Army men were sent from our camp to a destination of which I am not aware. These men were said to have been sent away for entrenchment work, and for this reason they took the men who were In the best physical condition. . . . " Identical depositions were given by medical sister O G Lenkovskaya, medical siste r A I Timofeeva, and the w itnesses P M Orlovo, E G Dobroserdova and V S Kotchetkov.

The destination to which the five hundred Soviet prisoners of war in Camp No 126 were sent Is made clear by the deposition of the witness A M M oskovskaya.

Citizen Alexandra Mikhailovna M lskovskaya, who lived on the outskirts of the town of Smolensk, and worked during the period of occupation In the kitchen of one of the German military units , submitted a statement on the 5th October 19 4 3 , to the Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of 28

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When she was summoned, she told the Special Commission that In March 19 43, before she went out to her work, she went for wood Into her shed, which stood in her yard on the bank of the Dnieper, and there she found a man whom she did not know and who proved to be a Russian prisoner of war.

A M M oskovskaya, born 1922, stated : ". . . . From my conversation with him I learnt the following:"His surname was Yegorov, his Christian name N ikolai, a man from Leningrad. From the end of 1941 he had been kept In the German Prisoners of War Camp No 126 in the town of Smolensk. At the beginning of March 19 4 3 , h e, together with a column of prisoners numbering several hundred men, was sent from the camp to the Katyn Wood. There Yegorov and the others were compelled to open graves In which there were corpses dressed in the uniform of Polish o ffic e rs, to drag these corpses out of the graves and to take out of their pockets documents, le tte rs, photographs and a ll other a rtic le s. The Germans ordered with great strictness that nothing should be left In the pockets of the corpses. Two prisoners of war were shot because after they had searched the corpses a German officer found certain papers on the corpses.

"The a rtic le s, documents and letters taken out of the clothes In which the corpses were dressed were Inspected by German o ffic e rs, and then the prisoners were compelled to put part of the papers back Into the pockets of the co rp ses, the remaining ones being thrown on to a heap of articles and documents which had been taken out In this manner and which were subse­ quently burned.

"Moreover, in the pockets of the corpses of the Polish officers the Germans'compelled them to Insert certain papers which they had taken from boxes or suitcases which they had brought with them (I do not exactly remember which).

"All the prisoners of war lived on the territory of the Katyn Wood In appalling conditions, under the open sk y, and they were strongly guarded .

"At the beginning of April 1943, a ll the work which the Germans had ordered appeared to be concluded, as for three days they did not compel any of the prisoners to do any work. . . .

"Suddenly they made them a ll get up one night without a single exception and took them somewhere. The guards were strengthened.

Yegorov suspected that something was wrong and began to observe clo sely what was happening. They walked for three or four hours In an unknown direction. They stopped at a glade In the wood by the side of a hole.

They saw how a group of prisoners was separated from the main body, driven to the hole, and then the shooting began.

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"The prisoners became re stiv e , began to make a n o ise, began to stir. Not far from Yegorov some men from amongst the prisoners threw themselves on the guard and other guards ran up to this place.

Yegorov profited by this moment of confusion and ran towards the darkness of the wood hearing shouts and shots behind him.

"After this horrible story, which Impressed Itself on my memory for a ll my life , I took pity on Yegorov and asked him to come with me Into my room to warm himself and hide until he regained his strength.

But Yegorov did not agree to do th is. He said that any cost he must try that night to break through the line of the front and Join the units of the Red Army.

"But Yegorov did not leave that evening. The following morning when I went to see him he was still In the bam. He said that he had tried to leave during the night, but after he had gone 50 yards he felt himself so weak that ho was compelled to return. Evidently he was feeling the effect of hla prolonged exhaustion In the camp and the hunger of the past few days.

We decided that he should remain with me for a day or two In order to regain his strength.

"I gave Yegorov a meal and went out to my work.

"When I returned home In the evening my neighbours, Marla Ivanovna Baranova and Yekaterina Viktorovna Kabanovskaya, told me that during the d ay. In the course of a round-up, the German police had discovered a Red Army prisoner In my shed and had taken him away with them.

In connexion with the discovery of Yegorov, a prisoner of w ar. In M oskovskaya's barn, she was summoned to the G estapo, where they accused her of having hidden a prisoner of war.

When she was Interrogated by the G estapo, Moskovskaya stubbornly dented that she had nothing to do with the prisoner of w ar, and maintained that she knew nothing of the fact that he was In her shed. Moskovskaya was released from the G estapo, partly because they did not obtain any admission from her and also because the prisoner of w ar, Yegorov, had evidently not given Moskovskaya aw ay.

The same Yegorov tolf Moskovskaya that part of the prisoners of war working In the Katyn Wood had not only been exhuming corp ses, but had also been engaged In bringing corpses to the Katyn Wood from other p laces.

The corpses which they had brought with them were thrown Into the hole together with the corpses which had previously been exhumed.

The fact of the delivery of a large number of corpses shot by the Germans In other places to the Katyn graves Is confirmed In the deposition of P F Sukhachev, an engineer-mechanic.

P F Sukhachev, bom In 1 9 12 , an engineer-mechanic of the system "Roslavkhleb, " who worked under the Germans as a machinist In the Smolensk municipal flour m ill, submitted on the-8th October 1943, an 30

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application that he should be summoned.

When he was summoned by the'Special Commission, he stated: ", . . . On one occasion during the second half of March 1943 I spoke at the mill with a German chauffeur who knew a little Russian. I learnt from him that he was carrying flour to the villag e of Savenkl for the military unit there, and that on the following day he would return to Smolensk. I asked him to take me with him In order to be able to buy some fats In the v illa g e . I reckoned that If I travelled on a German lorry I should not run any risk of being held up at the Permit Control point. The German chauffeur agreed to do so for payment. The same d a y, about 10 o â&#x20AC;&#x2122;clock at night, we left on the road from Smolensk to Vitebsk. There were two of us on the lorry m yself and the German chauffeur. The night was bright and moonlit, but a mist covered the road and lowered the v is ib ility . About 22 or 23 kilom. from Smolensk, near a destroyed bridge on the road, there was a b y-p ass which involved a fairly sharp drop. We were already dropping from the road to the by-pass when a lorry suddenly came towards us out of the mist In the opposite direction. Possibly because the brakes on our lorry were not In order, possibly because of the lack of experience of our chauffeur, we did not succeed in braking our lo rry, and as the b y-p ass was fa irly narrow , we collided with the lorry which was coming towards u s. The collision was not a severe one, as the chauffeur of the other lorry had succeeded In turning to one sid e , as a result of which the sides of the lorries collided with a glancing blow. However, the lorry coming towards us had Its right wheel over the embankment and was leaning on its sid e.

Our machine was s till standing on its w h eels. I and the chauffeur Immediately jumped out of the cabin and went up to the lorry which had been knocked over. I was astounded by the strong sm ell of corpses which obviously came from the lorry. On going nearer I saw that the lorry was carrying a load covered with tarpaulin and tied down with ropes. The ropes had broken through as a result of the collision and part of the load had fallen on to the embankment. It was a terrible load. They were the corpses of people dressed in military uniforms.

So far as I remember there were six or seven men round the lorry; one of them was a German chauffeur, two were Germans armed with automatics and the rest were Russian prisoners of w ar, as they spoke Russian and were dressed accordingly.

The Germans roundly cursed our chauffeur, then tried to get the lorry righted. Two minutes later two more lorries drove up to the place of the accident and stopped. From these lorries a group of Germans and Russian prisoners of w ar, about ten men in a ll, came up to u s. By their united efforts they began to raise the lorry. I took advantage of a convenient moment and quietly asked one of the Russian prisoners of war: "What is a ll this ?"

He replied quietly to me: 'We are carrying corpses every night to the Katyn W ood. " The lorry which had been thrown on to Its side was s till not righted when a German n .c .o . came up to my chauffeur and myself and told us to drive on at once. As our lorry had not suffered any serious damage our chauffeur 31

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drove a little to one s id e , made his way out on to the road and we drove on.

As we drove by the two lorries which had subsequently appeared, and which were a lso covered with tarpaulin, I again experienced the horrible sm ell of c o rp se s. " Sukhachev's deposition was confirmed by the deposition of Vladimir A fanasyevlch Yegorov, who during the period of occupation served in the police force as a co n stable.

Yegorov stated that his duties Involved his guarding the bridge where the road from Moscow to Minsk crossed the road from Smolensk to Vitebsk, and towards the end of March and during the first days of April 1943 he observed that on several occasions large lorries covered with tarpaulin and sm elling strongly of corpses drove by during the night In the direction o f Smolensk. In the cabs of the lorries and behind, on the tarpaulin, there sat a number of men, of whom some were armed and w ere , without doubt, Germans.

Yegorov told him of his experiences to the chief of police for the villa g e of Arkhlpovka, Kuzma Demyanovich G olovnev, who told him to hold his tongue, and added: "This is not our b u sin ess. It Isn't for us to meddle In German a ffa irs . " Testimony to the effect that the Germans had carried corpses on lorries to the Katyn Wood was a lso given by Flor Maksimovich Y akovlev-Sokolov, bom In 18 9 6 , a former agent for supplying the restaurants of the Smolensk Restaurant Trust, and under the Germans - Chief of Police for the Katyn D istric t.

He stated that he him self had seen on one occasion at the beginning of April four lorries covered with tarpaulin turn In from the road to the Katyn W ood. Several men armed with automatics and rifle s were sitting on them.

A strong sm ell of corpses came from these m achines.

The above-m entioned depositions made by w itn esses enable one to conclude with complete clearn ess that the Germans had shot Poles In other areas as w e ll as In the Katyn W oods. They had a triple purpose In bringing the corpses to the Katyn W oods: firstly , to wipe out the traces of their own crim es; seco n d ly, to lay the blame for their crimes on the Soviet authorities; and, th ird ly, to Increase the number of "Bolshevik victim s" In the Katyn Woods g raves.

"EXCURSIONS" TO KATYN GRAVES In April 19 4 3 , when a ll the preparatory work on the graves In the Katyn Woods was com pleted, the German occupatlonlsts launched a big press and radto campaign attempting to charge the Soviet authorities with the atrocities they them selves had perpetrated against the Polish war p risoners. One of the methods of this provocative publicity was the organisation of v is its to the Katyn graves by the Inhabitants of Smolensk and Its en viron s, as w ell as by "delegations" from cou n tries occupied by the German Invaders or 32

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The Special Commission Interrogated a number of w itnesses who took part In the "excursions" to the Katyn graves.

The w itness K P Zubkev, a pathological doctor, who worked In Smolensk as an expert In forensic medicine, told the Special Commission: "The clothing on the corpses, esp ecially the g reatcoats, the shoes and the b e lts, were In fairly good condition. The m etallic parts of their dress - the buckles on their b e lts, buttons, hooks, the studs In their b oo ts, &c. , were only slightly rusted and in some Instances the polish of the metal was preserved. Such tissues as could be seen on the corpses - the face,neck and hands - had In general a dirty yellow colour. In some Instances a dirty brown colour. But there was no complete destruction of the tissu es and no decomposition. In certain Instances one could see naked sinew s of a whitish colour and a part of their m uscles. W hile I was at the open graves people were working at the bottom of the hole disentangling the corpses and taking them aw ay.

For this purpose they made use of spades and other Instruments, and also took hold of the corpses with their hands, dragging them by their arm s, their le g s , and their clothes from one place to another. Not In a single case did I see a corpse fa ll to p iec es, nor did I even see a single limb tom off.

In view of the foregoing I came to the conclusion that the corpses could not have been In the ground for three y e a rs, as the Germans had stated , but considerably le s s . Knowing that the decomposition of corpses proceeds faster in mass graves than In single o n es, and even more so when there are no c o ffin s, I came to the conclusion that the mass shooting of the Poles had taken place about a year and a half previously and could be placed In the autumn of 1941 or the spring of 1942. As a result of visiting the g raves, I became firmly convinced that this horrible monstrosity was the work of German hands."

Depositions to the effect that the clothing on the co rp ses, the metal p a rts, the footw ear, and also the corpses them selves were w ell preserved, were given by many w itnesses Interrogated by the Special Commission who had taken part In the excursions to the Katyn g raves, including: I Z Kutsev, the head of the Smolensk water-supplying system; E N Vetrova, a teacher of the Katyn School; N G Shchedrova, a telephone-opera tor In the Smolensk Communications Department; M A A lekseev, an Inhabitant of the villag e of Borok; N G K rivozertsev, an Inhabitant of the villag e of Novle Batekl; I V S avvateev, a worker from the station of Gnezdovo; E A Pushchlna, an Inhabitant of Smolensk; T A Sldoruk, a doctor of the Second Smolensk Hospital; P M K esarev, a doctor of the same h osp ital, &c.

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO COVER TRACES OF THEIR OWN CRIMES The "excursions" organised by the Germans did not achieve their purpose.

It was clear to a ll those who visited the graves that they were the victims of a crude and obvious German Fascist provocation. Hence the German authorities began to take steps to force the doubters to keep quiet.

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The Special Commission has In Its p ossession the depositions of a large number of w itn esses who told how the German authorities persecuted anyone who doubted or who d isbelieved their provocative statem ent. They dism issed them from their jo b s , they arrested them, they threatened them with shooting. The commission estab lish ed that there had been two c a se s of shooting for failure to keep sile n t. This penalty was Imposed on the former German policeman Zagalnov, and on A M Yegorov, who had worked on the opening of the graves In the Katyn W oods.

D epositions regarding the persecution by the Germans of people who expressed their doubts a fter visitin g the graves In the Katyn Woods were given by M S Zubareva, a charwoman of D ispensary No 1 In Smolensk; V F Kozlov, an a ssista n t of the sanitary doctor of the Stalin Urban D istrict Department of Health of the town of Smolensk; and others.

The former Chief of Police for the Katyn D istric t, F M Y akovlev-Sokolov, stated: "A situation arose which caused serious consternation In the German Command, and Instructions were Issued hurriedly to a ll police o ffic ia ls that they were at a ll co sts to put an end to harmful conversations and to arrest anyone who expressed d isb elief In the "Katyn C a se. " "Instructions were Issued to me In my capacity as chief of police for the d istrict at the end of March 19 4 3 , by Oberleutnant Braung, the German Commandant for the villag e of Katyn, and at the beginning of June by Kamenetskl, the Chief of Police of the Smolensk Rayon.

"I convoked an Instructional meeting of the constables of my d is tric t, whom I Instructed to arrest and bring to the police station anyone who expressed d isb e lief or who questioned the truth of the German statements regarding the shooting of Polish prisoners of war by the Bolsheviks.

"In fu lfillin g these orders given by the German authorities I was acting against my co n scien ce, as I was certain that the 'Katyn C ase' was a German provocation. I became convinced of this when I m yself took part on an 'excursion' to the Katyn W ood. " Seeing that "excursions" of the local population to the Katyn graves did not ach ieve their purpose, In the summer of 1943 the German forces of occupation gave the order to clo se the g raves.

Just before their retreat from Smolensk the German occupation authorities hurriedly covered up the traces of their crim es. The country house that had been occupied by the "headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion" was burned to the ground.

The Germans searched the villag e of Borok for the three girls - Aleksevna, M ikhailova and Konakhovskaya - In order to take them away with them and p ossib ly to k ill them. The Germans a lso searched for their principal w itness P G K ise le v , but he succeeded In hiding him self, together with his fam ily.

The Germans burnt his house.

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The Germans a lso tried to se ize other •’w itn esses" — the former station -m aster of Gnezdovo, S V Ivanov; the former worker at the station I V S a w a te e v ; and a lso the former w agon-coupler from the Smolensk sta tio n , M D Zakharov.

In the la s t few days before their retreat from Smolensk the German F ascist forces of occupation searched for Professors B azilevski and Yefemov The la tte r succeeded in avoiding evacuation or death only by having hidden them selves in good time.

The German F ascist in vad ers, how ever, did not succeed in covering up their traces and hiding their crim es.

The m edico-legal in vestig ation of the exhumed corpses proves incontrovertlbly that the shooting of the Polish w ar prisoners was effected by the Germans them selves.

The report of-the experts in forensic medicine is given b elo w :THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS IN FORENSIC MEDICINE In accordance with the instructions of the Special Commission for estab lish in g and investigating the circum stances of the shooting by the German F ascist invaders in the Katyn Woods (near the town of Smolensk) of captured Polish o ffic e rs , the commission of experts In forensic medicine composed of — V I PROZOROVSKI: Chief Expert in Forensic Medicine o f the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR and D irector of the State Scien tific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine of the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR; V M SMOLYANINOVA: Professor of Forensic M edicine at the Second Moscow State Medical In stitu te, Doctor of M edical Scien ces; D N VYROPAEV: Professor of Pathological Anatomy, Doctor o f M edical Scien ces; Dr P S SEMYONOVSKI: Senior Scientific A ssistan t of the Tanatological Department of the State Scien tific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine of the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR; DOTSENT M D SHVAIKOVA: Senior Scien tific A ssistan t of the Legal-Chem ical Department of the State Scien tific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine of the People's Commissariat o f Health of the USSR; A ssisted b y— MAJOR OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE NIKOLSKI: Chief expert in Forensic M edicine o f the W estern Front; 35

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CAPTAIN OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE BUSOYEDOV: Expert in Forensic Medicine of the Nth Army; MAJOR OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE SUBBOTIN: Head of the Pathological and Anatomical Laboratory No 92; MAJOR OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE OGLOBLIN: SENIOR LIEUTENANT OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE SADYKOV, S p ecialist; SENIOR LIEUTENANT OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE PUSHKAREVA; during the period from the 16th to the 23rd January 19 4 4 , conducted the exhumation and the examination from the point of view of forensic medicine of the corpses of the Polish prisoners Interred In the graves on the territory of Goat H ills in the Katyn Wood about 15 kilom . from the town of Smolensk.

The corpses of the Polish prisoners were burled In a common grave about 60 X 60 X 3 metres In s iz e , and. In addition, there was a separate grave about 7 X 6X 3 .5 m etres. 925 corpses were taken from the graves and examined.

The exhumation and the examination of the corpses from the point of view of forensic medicine was conducted with a view to establishing — (a) the Identity of the deceased; (b) the cause of death; (c) the period which had elapsed since burial.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE (See the m aterial at the d isposal of the Special Commission) OBJECTIVE DATA See the protocol of the examination of the corpses from the point of view of forensic medicine.

CONCLUSION The commission of experts In forensic m edicine, taking Into consideration the resu lts of the examination of the corpses from the point of view of forensic m edicine, has reached the following co n clu sio n s:— When the graves were opened and the corpses taken from them it was established that — (a) amongst the mass of corpses of Polish prisoners of war there are corpses In civilian d ress; their number Is only an Insignificant proportion of the total number of corpses examined (only two out of 925 corpses taken out of the grave); these were wearing shoes of m ilitary pattern; (b) the clothing on the corpses of the prisoners of war showed that they belonged to the o fficer c la ss and partly to the rank and file of the Polish army; 36

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(c)

cu ts In the pockets and the b o o ts, pockets turned Inside out and tears In the p o c k e ts, discovered when the clothing w as being exam ined, show that the whole o f the clothing of each corpse (the o v e rc o a t, the tro u s e rs , & c.) a s a rule showed signs of a search conducted on the co rp ses;

(d)

In certain instances when the clothing w as examined the pockets were found to be Intact. In these p o c k e ts, and a ls o In pockets which had been cut and torn , under the lining of the uniform . In the trouser b e lts , in the cloth s In which they wound their fe e t .

In their h an d kerch iefs, were found p ieces tom from n ew sp ap ers, b roch u res, prayer books, postage stam ps, se ale d and open le tte rs , re c e ip ts , notes and other documents and a ls o valu ab les ( a bar of g o ld , gold d o lla rs ), p ip e s , p en k n ives, cig arette p a p ers, han d kerch iefs, and so on;

(e)

on part of the documents (even without sp e c ia l Investigation) we found dates going back to the period from the 12th November 1 9 4 0 , to the 20th June 19 4 1;

(f)

the fabric of the clo th in g , e s p e c ia lly the o v e rc o a ts , uniform s, trousers and s h irts , has been w e ll preserved and could on ly be tom with on e's hands with great d ifficu lty;

(g)

a few of the corpses (twenty out of 92 5) have their arms bound behind their backs with w hite plaited bonds.

The condition of the clo th es on the co rp ses and p articu larly the fa c ts that the uniform s, s h irts , b e lt s , trousers and under-pants w ere fasten ed ; that they w ere wearing boots or sh o es; that their sc a rve s and tie s were fastened round their n eck s; that their braces w ere fasten ed and their sh irts w ere Inside th eir tro u s e rs , bear w itn ess to the fa ct that there had been no previous exam ination of the trunks or extrem ities of the c o rp se s.

The good sta te of preservation of the skin on the head and the ab sen ce eith e r here or on the skin of the ch est or b e lly (except in three c a s e s out of 925) of any c u ts , g ash es or other signs of expert exam ination, indicate th a t, to judge by the corp ses exhumed by the commission of experts in fo ren sic m edicine, there had been no previous examination of the corp ses from the point of view of forensic m edicine.

The su p erficia l and internal exam ination of 925 corp ses g ives ground for a ssertin g the ex isten ce o f b u llet wounds in the head and n e c k . In four in stan ces in conjunction with Injuries to the bones of the vau lt of the sk u ll in flicted by a d u ll, hard, heavy o b je c t. M oreover, In an Insignificant number of c a se s we found abdominal Injuries as w ell a s head in ju rie s.

The c a v itie s where the b u llets entered w e re , a s a ru le , sin g le , more seldom double . They w ere situated in the nape of the neck near the o c cip ita l protuberance, or near the great o c cip ita l c a v ity or at its edge. In a few Instances the c a v ity where the b u llets entered w as found at the back of the neck opposite the fi r s t , second or third vertebrae o f the neck.

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The cavities through which the bullets left the head were usually found In the region of the forehead, occasionally In the region of the temples and parietal bones. In tw enty-seven cases the bullet wounds were blind (te there was no exit cavity) and at the end of the canal made by the bullet under the soft cover of the s k u ll, In the bones of the sk u ll, In the covering membrane and In the substance of the brain were found deformed, slightly deformed, or completely undeformed . . .

(Russian: obolochechnye) b u llets, used for firing from automatic p is to ls , chiefly of 7.65-m m calib re. The size of the entrance cavities In the bones round the nape allow one to conclude that the shooting was done by firearms of two calibres: In the vast majority of the cases - less than 8-mm, te 7.65-m m . and le ss; In a sm aller number of cases - above 8-mm, te 9-mm. The character of the fissures In the bones of the skull and the discovery In certain Instances of traces of powder in the entrance cavity proved that the shots were fired either polntblank of almost pointblank .

The relations to each other of the entrance and exit cavities show that the shots were fired from behind with the head bowed forward.

The canal made by the bullets went through v ita lly important parts of the brain or near them and the destruction of the tissu es of the brain was the cause of death.

The injuries to the bones of the vault of the skull caused by a d u ll, hard, heavy object should be taken In conjunction with the bullet wounds of the head; they themselves did not cause death.

The examination of the corpses from the point of forensic medicine, which took place In the period from the 16th to the 23rd January 19 4 4 , Is evidence that there are no corpses In a state of putrid dismemberment or decomposition and that a ll 92 5 corpses are In a good state of preserva­ tion - at the first stage and In the loss of moisture by the corpse (which was observed most frequently and clearly In the area of the chest and abdomen, sometimes In the extrem ities. In the ea rliest stage of adlpocere; in the high proportion of adlpocere In the corpses exhumed from the bottom of the grave); In the conjunction of the loss of wax by the tissu es of the corpse and the creation of adtpocere.

Special attention should be paid to the fact that the muscles of the trunk and of the extremities have preserved Intact their macroscopic structure and almost their ordinary colour.

The Internal organs of the chest and abdomen have preserved thetr form and in a large number of Instances the muscles of the heart when seen In section had retained their clearly Individualised structure and the colour peculiar to them, while the brain revealed Its charactertc structural peculiarities with a sharply expressed boundary between the grey and white matter. In addition to microscopic examination of the tissu es and organs of the bodies, the experts in forensic medicine obtained corresponding material for subsequent microscopic and chemical Investigation In laboratory conditions.

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CONFIDENTIAL The peculiarities of the soli In the place where the bodies were found had a certain Influence on the state of'preservation of the tissue and the organs of the corp ses.

When the graves were opened and the corpses were taken out and exposed to the a ir, they were subjected to the Influence of the warmth and damp of the spring and summer of 1943. This might also have affected the quick develop­ ment of the process of the decomposition of the corpses.

However, the degree of loss of wax In the corpses and the formation of adlpocere In them, the sp ecially good state of preservation of the muscles and internal organs, as w ell of the clothing, give ground for maintaining that the corpses had been In the ground for a short time only.

If the condition of the corpses in the graves on the territory of Goat Hills Is compared with the condition of the corpses In other cemeteries In the town of Smolensk and Its Immediate environment, e . g . , Gedeonovka, Magalenshchlna Readovka, Camp No. 12 6 , Krasny Bor, etc. (see the report of the experts In forensic medicine dated the 22nd October, 1943), It must be admitted that the burial of the corpses of the Polish prisoners on the territory of Goat Hills took place about two years ago. This Is fully confirmed by the discovery In the clothing on the corpses of documents excluding the p ossibility of earlier burial (see point D In article 36 and the description of the documents).

On the basis of these data and the results of the Investigations, the Commission of m edico-legal experts:Considers as established the fact that prisoners of w ar, officers and partly privates of the Polish Army, were done to death by shooting.

Maintains that thts shooting occurred some two years ago, l . e . . In the period between September and December 19 4 1.

Regards the discovery by the medico-legal commission of experts of valuables and documents In the clothing of the corpses bearing the date 1941 as proof that the search of the bodies carried out by the Germanfa sc ist authorities In the spring and summer of 1943 was not thorough and that the documents discovered are evidence that the shooting occurred after June 19 4 1.

Observes that In 1943 the Germans conducted autopsies on an extremely Insignificant number of corpses of Polish prisoners of war.

Notes that the method of shooting the Polish prisoners of war Is identical with the method of shooting peaceful Soviet citizens and Soviet prisoners of war so w idely practised by the German-Fascist authorities on the temporarily occupied territory of the U .S .S .R ., Including the towns of Smolensk, Oryol, Kharkov, Krasnodar and Voronezh.

(Signed)

V. I. PROZOROVSKI, V. M. SMOLYANINOVA, D. N. VYROPAEV, DOCTOR P. S. SEMYONOVSKI, DOTSENT M .D . SHVAIKOVA.

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DOCUMENTS FOUND ON BODIES Besides the data recorded In the deposition of the medico-legal commission, the time of the shooting by the Germans of the captive Polish officers (autumn 1941 and not spring 1940 as the Germans claim) Is established also by documents found on the opening of the graves dating only to the second half of 1940 but also to the spring and summer (March-June) 19 41.

Of the documents discovered by the experts In forensic medicine, the following deserve special attention: â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1. On corpse No 92: A letter from W arsaw , addressed to the Red C ro ss, c/o The Central Bureau for Prisoners of W ar, Moscow, U lltsa Kulbsheva 12*. Letter written In Russian. In this letter Sofia Zlgon asked to be Informed of the wereabouts of her husband Tomash Zlgon. Letter dated 12. IX.4 0 . On the envelope there Is a German postal stamp, 'Warsaw IX.4 0 ," and stamp, "Moskva Pochtamt 9 Expedltslya, 28. IX.40 Goda," and note In red Ink In the Russian language: "Find the camp and forward for transmission to ad d ressee, 1 5 .X I .40.

(Signature Illegible.)

2. On corpse No 4: A postcard, registered No 0112 from Tarnopol with a postal stamp "Tarnopol 1 2 .X I .40. " The manuscript text and the address have lost their colour.

3. On corpse No 101: Receipt No 10293 of 1 9 .XI. 1939 given by the camp at Kozelsk In respect of the receipt from Edward Adamovich Lewandowsky of a gold watch. On the back of the receipt there is a note dated 14th March 1 9 4 1 , regarding the sale of this watch to Yuvellrtorg.

4 . On corpse No 45: Receipt (number Illegible) given on the 1 6 .XI 1 .19 3 9 by the camp at Starobelsk In respect of the receipt of a gold watch from Vladimir Rudolfovich Arashkevlch. On the back of the receipt there Is a note dated 25th March 1 9 4 1, to the effect that the watch had been sold to Yuvelirtorg.

5. On corpse No 71: A paper Ikon with a picture of C hrist, found between page 144 and 14 5 of a Catholic prayer book. On the reverse of the ikon there Is an Inscription of which the signature If legible â&#x20AC;&#x201D; "Jadwlnja," "4th April 1941."

6. On corpse No 46: A receipt of the 6th April 19 4 1, issued by Camp No 1-ON, regarding the receipt from Arashkevlch of money to the amount of 225 roubles.

7. On the same corpse No 46: A receipt dated the 5th May 1 9 4 1, given by Camp No 1-ON, regarding the receipt from Arashkevlch of money to the amount of 102 roubles.

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8. On corpse No 101: A receipt dated the 18th May 1 9 4 1 , Issued by Camp No 1-ON , regarding the receipt from Z. Levandowskt of money to the amount of 175 roubles.

9. On corpse No 55: A postcard In Polish not sent o ff, addressed to W arsaw , Bagatelja 1 5 , K v .4 7 . Irene Kuczlnskaya, dated 20th June 1 9 4 1 . Sender Stanlslaw Kuczlnsky.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS The date In the possession of the Special Commission, nam ely, the testimony of more than one hundred w itn esses questioned, the material submitted by the m edico-legal ex p e rts, documents and material evidence removed from the graves In the Katyn W oods, point with undeniable cla rity to the following co n clu sio n s:— 1. The Polish prisoners of war located in three camps w est of Smolensk and engaged in road building work up to the outbreak of the war remained there a lso after the German forces of occupation overran Smolensk up to September 1941 in clu sive.

2 . In the autumn of 1 9 4 1 , the German occupation authorles effected the mass shooting of the Polish prisoners held In the above-m entioned camps In the Katyn W oods.

3 . The mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war In the Katyn Woods was carried out bya German m ilitary institution camouflaged under the name of "Headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion," at the head of which were Lieutenant-Colonel Amos and his a ssista n ts Oberleutnant Rekst and Leutnant Hott.

4 . In the beginning of 19 4 3 , when the general m ilitary and p olitical situation deteriorated for Germany, the German occupation authorities under­ took a series of provocative measures aimed at charging the Soviet authorities with crimes they them selves had committed for the purpose of stirring up antagonism between the Russians and the P oles.

5. (a)

To this end — the German F ascist Invaders, by means of persuasion , attempted bribery, threats and barbarous torture, attempted to find "witnesses" among the Soviet citizen s from whom they tried to obtain fa lse testimony to the effe ct that Polish prisoners of war had been shot by Soviet authorities In the spring of 1940;

(b)

in the spring of 19 4 3 , the German occupation authorities brought bodies of Polish prisoners of war they had shot e lse w te re and laid them In graves dug up In Katyn Woods with the aim of covering up the trace of their own crimes and increasing the number of "victims of Bolshevik atrocities" in the Katyn W oods;

(c)

When preparing for their act of provocation, the German occupation 41

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CONFIDENTIAL au thorities used some 500 Russian prisoners of war to dig up the graves in the Katyn Woods , to remove the Incriminating documents and the m aterial evid en ce. Upon completion of work the prisoners were shot by the Germans.

6. The data submitted by the m edico-legal experts estab lish ed beyond a ll doubt the fo llo w in g :— (a) (b)

The shooting took place in the autumn of 19 4 1; the German executioners who shot the Polish prisoners of war used ex a ctly the same method of firing a p istol In the back of the head as had been used by them In the w h olesale slaughter of Soviet citiz en s In other tow ns. In p articu lar, O ryol, Voronezh, Krasnodar and Sm olensk.

7. The conclusions drawn from the testim ony of w itn e sses and the findings of the m edico-legal experts regarding the shooting by the Germans of the Polish prisoners of war In the autumn of 1941 are fu lly confirmed by the m aterial evidence and documents found in the Katyn G raves, 8. In shooting the Polish prisoners of war In the Katyn W oods, the German F a scist Invaders were co n siste n tly carrying out their policy of p h ysica lly exterm inating the Slavonic p eo p les.

(Signed)

N N BURDENKO Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and member of the Extraordinary State Commission (Chairman of the Commission) ALEXEI TOLSTOI Member of the Academy of Sciences and member of the Extraodlnary State Commission METROPOLITAN NIKOLAI Member of the Extraordinary Commission LIEUT-GENERAL A S GUNDOROV Chairman of the A ll-S la v Committee S A KOLESNIKOV Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red C rescent S o cieties V P POTEMKIN Member of the Academy of S c ien c es, People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR COLONEL-GENERAL E I SMIRNOV • Chief of the C entral M edical Service Administration of the Red Army R E MELNIKOV Chairman of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee

Smolensk 24th January 1944 42 CONFIDENTIAL

SS-A-^-r

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KATYN SECRET

N 16482/ 664/ 55

M ajor Guy L loyd , MP has given notice that he proposes to ra ise on the adjournment at the firs t opportunity the question of the murder of o v er 1 0 ,0 0 0 Polish o ffic e rs In the Katyn Forest near Sm olensk. It Is lik e ly that M ajor Lloyd w ill seek to g ive a p o litic a l flavou r to the matter

by Indicating that the murderers should be sought in Soviet Russia rather than In Germany.

The news of the murders w as firs t given to the world by the Germans In April 19 4 3 .

The moment must have been chosen d e lib e ra te ly ; It coincided with a period of extreme tension In P o lish -S o v ie t re la tio n s. The Polish Government imprudently Invited the International Red C ross to conduct an im partial Investigation of the matter and the So viet Government Immediately se ize d upon this pretext to p recipitate a fin al breach of diplom atic re la tio n s betw een them selves and the Polish Governm ent.

The German action thus served its Immediate purpose; but the Germans did not a llo w matters to re st th ere. In order to ex tract the utmost propaganda valu e out o f the story they invited two parties of Poles to v is it the scene of the murders and a lso an International Committee of experts In fo ren sic m edicine.

This Committee spent three days a t Katyn a t the end of April 1943 and Its report w as published. It estab lish ed that the victim s had a ll been shot In the nape of the neck and that their bodies had been buried in mass graves above which fir trees had been p lan ted , which a t the time of exhumation appeared to be about three years o ld . Documents found on the bodies a ll dated from the period late 1939 to e a rly 1 9 4 0 , the la te s t date being that o f a Russian new spaper of the 22nd April 19 4 0 .

The e ffe c t, and no doubt a ls o , the Intention, of this report w as to Indicate that the Poles had been shot In the spring of 1940 a t the time when the Russians w ere In p o ssessio n of the Smolensk a re a . There were additional reason s why this explanation w as accepted as p lau sib le In Polish c irc le s .

W hen the Soviet Armies invaded Poland In September 1939 they took prisoner about 1 8 0 ,0 0 0 Poles including about 1 5 ,0 0 0 o ffic e rs . At the beginning of 19 40 some 9 to 1 0 ,0 0 0 o ffic e rs and 6 ,0 0 0 other ra n k s , p olicem en, and c iv il o ffic e rs w ere known to be in three p articu lar prisoner of w ar camps in the So viet U nion. In March 1940 these o ffic e rs and men are known to have been moved from these three cam ps. It is not known for certain whither they w ere taken but there Is a good d eal of presum ptive evid en ce that their destin ation w as Katyn. It is a fact that although le tte rs had been received from the three camps in which th ese men w ere up to the end of March 19 4 0 , the le tte rs abruptly ce ased a fte r that d a te. Between October 1941 and April 1943 the Polish Government had addressed repeated enquiries to the So viet Government about the fate of these men. The Polish Government n ever re ce ived any except com pletely e v a s iv e and uninform ative re p lie s .

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The o ffic ia l Russian version of the story w as not made known until January 1944 when a report was published prepared by a sp ecial commission set up by the Soviet Government to examine the situation on the spot Immediately a fter the recapture of Sm olensk by the Russians In September 19 4 3 . This report was designed to prove that the Poles had been shot by the Germans in the autumn of 1 9 4 1 , the explanation being that the prisoners had perforce been le ft behind by the Russians at the time o f the German advance through the Smolensk area In July 1941 and that they had fa lle n Into German hands a t this tim e. The evidence adduced by the commission In support of this contention Is by no means c o n c lu siv e . The opinion of m edical experts Is adduced to show that many of the corpses were n ot, as had been alleg ed In the German rep ort. In an advanced state of decomposition and could not have been burled for a period of over three y e a rs . The principal Item Of evidence co n sists of nine documents alleg ed to have been found on the bodies, a ll of them dating from between the 12th September 1940 and the 20th June 1 9 4 1 . If these documents were genuine they seem co n clu sive In favour of the Russian c a s e . On the other hand It Is Impossible to sta te that they may not have been forged. M oreover, the Russian report made no reference to the three year old fir trees of which much had been made by the Germans and It a lso contained nothing to explain the absence of lette rs from the men a fter March 1940 and the subsequent failu re of the Soviet Government to provide the Polish Government with any Information concerning their w hereabouts. These lacunae might however be Interpreted a s favouring the genuineness of the Soviet rep ort, since If It had been com pletely forged the Russians might have been tempted to manufacture answ ers on these points. The S o viet Government's failu re to provide Information might reasonably be a ttrib u tab le, In the chaotic conditions prevailing during the German a d van c e, to Russian adm inistrative In efficiency.

A reference to the Katyn murders has been Included In the Indictment of the major German war crim inals at the request of the R ussians. W e have hitherto taken the lin e that It was not for HMG to take the Initiative In this m atter. We have In fa c t, no direct evidence of our cwn and the best leg al a d v ic e , Including that of the late Sir W illiam M alkin ,h as been that the published reports ju stified no more than a suspension of judgment on our part.

It seem s that this Is the line which the Government must take In replying to any motion In the adjoum em t. We can ju stifia b ly argue that the Russians have produced prlma facie evidence In support of their case but that the whole matter Is s t ill sub ludlce and we do not know what further e v id en c e, If a n y , may be produced. A draft Is attached Indicating the general lin es of the argument which the Government speaker might fo llo w .

D ALLEN #

W ar Crimes Section Mr Robb

25th October 194 5 2

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I agree with Mr Allen except as regards the two lin es marked "A" The Soviet Investigation s, If accepted as genuine, show that some Poles were k illed at Katyn after March 19 4 0 . They do not prove that they were a ll killed after that d ate. In other w ord s, the Soviet Investigations inculpate the Germans without en tirely exculpating the Soviet au th orities. On the other hand, the evidence now a vaila b le about German mass murders makes it im possible to attach credence to German evidence which might be designed to mask German crim es. We must therefore suspend judgment.

The Germans are however to be brought to trial on this charge.

We should do our best at the trial to see that the truth em erges. n

M eanw hile, so far as public statem ents are concerned, we cannot do more than say that there is a prima facie ca se against the Germans.

We may fe el that there is a lso a prima fa c ie ca se against the R ussians, but we cannot say so . I agree therefore with Mr A llen's draft b rie f, THOMAS BRIMELOW 25 October 1945 I don't think we want a lot of evidence by both sid es on this matter at Nuremberg, if it can be avoid ed , and we should not suggest that we do.

Draft amended accordingly.

P DEAN 26. x.

This matter has not been raised again in the House a fter a ll.

r

[D ALLEN]

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MEMORANDUM BY MR F B BOURDILLON OF RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 10 APRIL 1946 TOP SECRET

;

N 5269/108/55

POLISH RED CROSS REPORT ON THE KATYN MASS GRAVES This report is of considerable h istorical in terest, as it gives the personal evidence and im pressions o f the only Poles who saw the graves when fir s t opened, and who saw corpses and such of the documents and other objects found on them as the Germans thought fit to show them.

The Polish Red Cross Society in W arsaw were invited to take part in the exhum ations, and a lso in the publicising of the facts about the m assacre in Poland. They p ersisten tly refused the latter request, but appointed a commission of about 10 persons who went to Katyn which is a few miles from Sm olensk, and worked there for about 2 months.

Some 75 corpses had previously been dug up: they them selves dug out some 40; altogether 4 .2 4 3 were dug out during the commission's sta y, mainly by Russian prisoners of war under German ord ers, and searched for documents by lo cal inhabitants Impressed by the Germans for the purpose. All were fin ally reinterred by the Russian prison ers. The operations were interrupted with the coming of warm weather and do not appear to have been resumed before the Red Army regained Smolensk.

The documents having been looked through by the Gestapo the Polish commission were then given the task of listin g them and the names and particulars of the persons they concerned; after which the documents were removed and not seen again. n

The Polish commission were able to talk free ly with the local (Belorussian) inhabitants; but were otherwise allow ed no freedom of movement, and no communication with Poland during their operations.

The report states that the bodies were in a ll c a se s so far decomposed that no recognition was p o ssib le. Clothing and badges of rank etc . were w ell preserved; and the clothing seemed to fit. There could be no certain ty that the documents belonged to the bodies on which they were found and in some cases papers found on two corpses actu ally related only to one o ffic e r.

The commission does not seem to have fe lt any doubt that the shooting was carried out by Soviet authorities in the spring of 1 9 4 0 , on the spot They accep ted , in fa c t, the German account, w hich, they s a y , was confirmed by the lo cal inhabitants. They did n ot, how ever, see the young fir trees which had been planted on the g ra v e s , these having been already removed; so they could make no Inference as to the date at which they had been planted there.

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The commission noted that the Germans took great precautions that none of the Poles should look for long at the p a p ers, or keep any of them; and p articu larly that they should have no opportunity o f hiding any of the b u llets found in the b o d ie s, these being a ll of German origin.

The documents found, which Included se rvic e p ap ers, le tte rs , notebooks, d iaries and n ew sp ap ers, in no c a se bore a date la te r than June 19 4 0 .

Other documents bearing on the m assacre are A

(i) (ii) (Hi)

B

(l)

(tl)

(iii)

(iv)

the German radio and press accounts of the d isc o v e ry , the report of the Germ an-spnsored international medical com m ission, the o ffic ia l German report ("Amtltches M aterial zum Massenmord von Katyn", 1943); the Soviet sp ecia l commission's report o f January 1944 (In Konovalov, "Russo Polish R elations", p .8 2 ) a ls o jo u rn a lists' accounts of the same month. depositions of the Czech and Bulgarian members of the Germ an-sponsored commission stating that their e a rlie r statem ents were made under duress and were untrue.

Dr Hayek's statem ent was broadcast from Prague on 1 0 .7 .1 9 4 5 . Dr Markov's is summarised In the Neue Zurcher Zeltuna of 2 2 .2 .1 9 4 5 . a lette r purporting to be w ritten by Lieut. Sloven zik , who looked a fter the Polish commission at Katyn for the German propaganda o ffic e , published In the Monde of 3 0 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 5 in which the w riter claim s to have "invented" Katyn.

This lette r was published in the Neue Zeltung, organ of the US M ilitary Government at Munich on 1 . 2 . 1 9 4 6 . a secret se rvic e report, received via Stockholm in March 1 9 4 4 , according to which two Polish women livin g at Katow ice, who had e a rlie r been Informed that their husbands had died in German concentration camps were la te r told that their husbands' corpses had been found in the Katyn g raves.

Ill

The German c a se is that over 8 ,0 0 0 Polish o ffic er p rison ers, who were removed from camps in the spring of 1 9 4 0 , were not heard of again: that lo cal inhabitants testified to the transport of prisoners to Katyn and to the hearing o f shots; that medical evidence proves the deaths to have taken place in 1 9 4 0 , confirmed by that of the growth of trees planted on the g raves.

The Russian cas-e is that the Polish o fficers were s till working in camps in the Smolensk area when the Germans overran it in 1 9 4 1 ; that they 2

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were then shot and burled, with other corpses from other a re a s , under such conditions as to enable a ca se to be made out against the Soviet au thorities.

The Russians contend that the medical evidence proved death to have taken place after the German conquest; and that the Germans forced local inhabitants to give fa lse statem ents.

There is some ground for suspicion against the Germans. Their report ("Amtliches Material*') is not very convincing in its e ffe c t. The precautions taken to hedge round the Polish commission and the international medical commission were such as to lead to the conclusion that the Germans had something serious to hide. It w a s , moreover, painfully obvious to the Polish commission that the Germans were only interested in the publicity value of the whole proceedings. It seems c le a r, too, that a ll was not right, from the German point of v ie w , with the documents as found on the bodies. L a stly, the practice of mass murder was a regular part of the German war-tim e policy towards Slavonic n atio n s, whereas if this was a case of the Russians applying German methods, it was unique. And there is no doubt that the bullets were German.

It s till seem s, how ever, very d ifficu lt to suppose that the 8 ,0 0 0 Polish o ffic e rs , who had been corresponding with their relatives until April 1 9 4 0 , were suddenly and so com pletely isolated that no word was received from them for the 13 months up to the time of the German in vasion, and that none escaped to te ll the t a le , nor has any one been found to testify to their continued existence during that time. The Russian attitude on this point was lame and inconsistent.

Possibly the Polish sto ry, reported by Sir O. O 'M alley, is tru e, namely that a drunken Red Army officer was heard to say of Katyn that it was "a tragic m istake". But, as the w riter of the Polish commission Report o b se rv e s, "In th e Katyn a ffa ir the German co n scien ce, if it is right to use such a term in speaking of a nation which barbarously murdered so many millions of human bein g s, is not in my view w holly clean".

F B BOURDILLON

Note One or two points in the above need correction in the light of the fu ller information contained in the (London) Polish roneo'd book dated February 1946 and the supplementary memo dated March 1946 (N 4406/108/G ).

F BB

7 .5 .4 6

10th A p ril. 194 6

Research Department, Foreign O ffice.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX E

TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 210 FROM SIR R BULLARp DATED 15 FEBRUARY 194 6 SECRET

N 2 1 11/ 10 8 / 5 5

Nuremberg trial Is not my b u sin ess but as Soviet Prosecutor has accused the Germans of Katyn murders and my evidence su ggests that the charge Is at le a s t "not proven" I venture to send this telegram .

h

2.

For over a year before the d isco very of mass grave In Katyn Forest many Polish o ffic ers and o ffic ia ls concerned with concentration o f Polish troops in Russia p assed through Tehran. Some like Anders and Kot w ere Important some unimportant. There w as alw ays talk about number of troops co lle ctin g and a lw a ys d a lly speculation as to the fa te of thousands of Polish o ffic e rs who had been held as prisoners of the Russians In one p la c e . S e veral times Poles talked o f th is In front of me, wondering w hether there could be an y truth In a tale that a shipload o f prisoners had been lo s t In the W hite Sea or w hether the m issing o ffic e rs had perhaps been sen t to a remote place and the R ussians eith er w ished to hide them or (an Improbable hypothesis) had lo s t the re co rd s. They said to a ll enquiries about the o ffic ers on that l i s t , R ussians a lw a ys said "There are no more" or "They must be about somewhere" e tc . Kot Informed me that In rep ly to a la s t ea rn est appeal V lshlnsky low ered his eye and said "Ikh Nyet" t . e . "They are not there". I repeat that a ll this happened during the period before the d isc o v e ry o f the bodies In Katyn fo re st. Never according to the Poles I saw did the Russians give the rep ly "In hurry of retreat from the Germans we le ft these o ffic e rs behind and we do not know what happened afterw ards ". It w as only when the bodies w ere discovered that the Russians (after I b e lie v e an Interval for thought) made that statem ent.

3.

One other sm all piece of evid en c e. Two British su b jects who la te r became R .A .F . o ffic e rs were In G .P .U . prison In Moscow when the Germans attacked R ussia. They Informed me that a ll p o litic a l prisoners In M oscow including them selves were immediately moved fa r to the East. It seem s u n lik ely that the R ussians would le a v e behind thousands of Polish o ffic e rs who might co n ceivab ly be employed again st them.

4.

If (as I p erso n ally b elieve) Katyn murders w ere committed by the Russians (p o ssib ly without authority as In the c a s e of the execution of the C zar and his fam ily by Sverdlov) it would be unfortunate If the Russians managed to fob It off on the Germans before a court In which the British share Is so Important

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NUREMBERG TELEGRAM FROM

\

â&#x2013; BRITISH WAR CRIMES EXECUTIVE DATED 6 TULY 1946 SECRET

N 8 8 17/ 108/ 5 5

For Dean and S cott-F ox repeated for S in c la ir.

Su b ject Katyn Forest murder of 1 1 ,0 0 0 Polish O ffic ers.

A fter hearing 3 w itn e ss e s for the defence and a sim ilar number fo r the prosecution So viet c a se has undoubtedly emerged v e ry much enhanced and they are v e ry p lea sed w ith the w ay It has gone. The d efence fir s t c a lle d the O fficer Commanding the Signals Regiment w hose H .Q . w as situ ated c lo s e to the mass g raves from September 19 41 onw ards; his evid en ce w ith regard to the d isco very o f the mass graves w as not ve ry Im p ressive. A fter hearing rumours o f the shooting his men d iscovered a cro ss In the w in ter o f 1 9 4 2 -4 3 round which a w o lf had been scratch in g . Shortly a fte r human bones w ere brought to him and he spoke about the matter to other o ffic e rs but admitted that he did not report the m atter In w ritin g . In the spring o f 1943 a P rofessor Butz arrived and proceeded to e x c a v a te the g ra v e s. Although th ey w ere not more than 30 metres from the road to the Regimental H .Q ., the C olonel had n ever noticed anything during the long time the unit had been station ed there until the Incident o f the cross and w o lf occu rred . This w itn e ss w as follow ed by an O fficer from the Army Group Sig nals who handled a ll se c re t m essages and who said that he n ever handled any order to k ill Polish prisoners and any order to this e ffe c t must have gone through his h an d s. He w as confronted w ith a captured document annexed to the S o viet report showing th at In September 1941 Elnsatz Commando B and a ls o Elnsatz Commando M oscow w ere situ ated a t Smolensk and adm itted that he did not handle s e c re t orders betw een the Elnsatz Commandos and th eir superior au th o rities In the S .S . The third w itn e ss w as the G eneral In charge of the w hole Sig nals o f the Army Group w hose H .Q . w as a ls o n earb y. He had co n sta n tly been along the track from September 19 41 onwards and had n ever n oticed anything unusual nor had he an y knowledge o f Polish p rison ers being in the neighbourhood.

He made v irtu a lly the only good point on b eh alf of the d efence th at no German Signals Regiment would know ingly have pitched its H .Q . p ra c tic a lly on top of th ese mass g ra v e s . The prosecution c a lle d firs t a P rofessor o f Astronomy whom the Germans had com pelled to be Deputy Mayor o f Sm olensk during the occu p ation . This P rofessor reported being Informed by the M ayor, who w as a co lla b o ra to r, o f the Germ ans' d ecisio n to k ill Poles In September 1 9 4 1 . He w as subsequently told that they had been k ille d and it w as c le a r that the Mayor had been so informed by the German Commandant. This secondhand evid en ce w as g rea tly improved by defence co u n sel in cro ss-ex am in atio n a s he e lic ite d that the w itn e ss had p erso n a lly known the p lac e in th e[fo rest]so extrem ely w e ll it being a re so rt o f the resid en ts of Smolensk and had been there o ff and on u ntil the German occupation a fte r which it became a forbidden a re a . He a ls o e lic ite d that In August^ 1940^ nam ely some months a fter the Germans alleg ed that the murders took p la c e , the Deputy Mayor had spent his h olid ay w ith his w ife a t K ozelsk and

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seen the Poles in the camp in which it is common ground that they were form erly detain ed . The w itn ess further stated that although he had not seen the Poles a fte r the Germans moved in his students told him that they were w alking along the road through the fo re st by which the g raves w ere subsequently found. He had never been told the p recise location of the graves by anyone.

This w itn ess w as follow ed by a Bulgarian member of the German com m ission.

He gave evidence at length of the very perfunctory nature o f Com m ission's exam ination. They only spent some 7 or 8 hours at the site altog eth er and em phasised that everything they w ere shown had p revio u sly been d iscovered or exhumed. He was le s s convincing in his explanation of why he had signed the joint report finding that the murders had been committed in April or May 1940 but his explanation that they were a ll put under pressu re to sign at a m ilitary a irfie ld in Russia w as not p o ssib le and the e ffe c t of his evidence w as g en erally to d iscred it the German report. The third w itn ess w as the principal member of the Soviet in ve stig atio n . He w as undoubtedly a most e ffe c tiv e w itn ess and te stifie d to having p erso n ally exhumed some 5 ,0 0 0 bodies at K iev, Kharkov, Smolensk and other p la c e s . He spoke in great d eta il of the condition o f the bodies and o f the very carefu l in vestig ation made. His commission had made a most carefu l autopsy of 92 5 bodies only 3 of which had apparently been perfunctorily examined p re v io u s ly . He explained the condition of the clothing which had been searched and gave d e ta ils of a few documents found. They included receip ts dated April and May 1941 and a le tte r from a w ife to the So viet Red C ross bearing a W arsaw and Moscow postmark in September 1940 as w e ll as postcard with the stamp of the Tarnopol Post O ffice dated 13th November 19 4 0 .

He has p erso n ally d iscovered a le tte r dated 20th June. His m astery of the d eta ils of th ese documents w as com plete and his evid en ce d elivered con fidently and q u ick ly, but o b vio u sly not p arro tw lse. He went on to d eal w ith the b u llet c a se s vyhich were found in the graves which w ere those o f a calib re which the German w itn e sse s had admitted applied to the German p isto ls and which he stated bore the in itia ls o f a German firm G eco. This evid en ce w as g reatly fo rtified by a captured document produced by the Americans being a telegram dated May 1943 from an o ffic ia l of the Government G eneral to the defendant Franks o ffic e in Poland stating that members of the Polish Red C ross who had been visitin g Katyn at the invitation of the Germans had been ve ry much disturbed a t finding bu llet c a se s marked G e co , a w e ll known German firm . The conjunction between this document showing German b u llet c a s e s found in the graves in May 1943 by the Poles and by the S o viet commission a year later in January 1944 w as most convincing. He w ent on to give reason s why the bodies could not have been burled as e a rly as 194 0 and concluded by comparing the method of k illin g w ith that in the many other c a s e s w hich he had p erso n ally in vestig ated where German action w as not dispu ted. Altogether although not o f course co n clu sive the evidence emerged strongly in favour of the Soviet c a se and the German report w as larg e ly d iscred ited and their evidence unim p ressive.

C opies sent to W ar Crimes E xecu tive, Lansdowne House

2 CONFIDENTIAL

.

Despatch from Sir Owen O’Malley, 24 May 1943

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Mr* O’M alley» 51.

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Dated

24th May, 1943.

1 31st Hay, 1943.

R eceive d in R e g is try J

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Disappearance o f P o lish o ffic e r s In the Union of Soviet S o c ia lis t Republics Refers to h is despatch No. 43 (U 2011/58/72).

Describes how the murder o f the P o lish o ffic e rs in the fo re s t o f Katyn in 1940 looks to h is P o lish frien d s v/hose r e la tiv e s and frie n d s have disappeared * He points out the almost certain ty of Russian iruil£- * and discusses the a ttitu d e to be adopted bv His * M ajesty's Government.

Poland.

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Last Paper.

References.

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This despatch.

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unorthodox and disquieting

I n the first th i r t e e n p a r a g r a p h s Mr. O ' M a l l e y c o n f i n e s h i m e e l f to a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e e v i d e n c e as t o G e r m a n o r R u s s i a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y foz* t h e K a t y n massacres.

T h i s is u s e f u l a n d t h e m a t e r i a l is s k i l ­ fully usemblea. u n t n e e v i d e n c e a v u i l a o l e it i s , 1 t h i n k , not d i f f i c u l t to share h i s c o n c l u s i o n that at any rate a strong presumption exists that the Russians ■were r e s p o n s i b l e .

I n tne n e x t fi v e p a r a g r a p h s Mr. O ' M a l l e y e m b a r x s v m a t he u o m i t s is a " s o m e t i m e s p a r t i a l a n d obviously defective" reconstruct!on of what may nave h a p p e n e d at K a t y n , l e a d i n g up to a f i n a l g h o u l i s h v i s i o n o f b t a l i n c o n d e m n i n g t h e P o l e s t o t h e k n a c k e r ’s yard.

This passage seems to serve no otner purpose t h a n to u r o u e e a n t i - G o v i e t p a s s i o n s a n d p r e j u d i c e s in the r e a d e r s mind.

1 upon

M r. O'Malley t h e n a p p l i e s h i m s e l f to the q u e s t i o n o f h o w s u c h patsioxie a n a p r e j u d i c e s m a y b e s t be t urned to account.

B y w a y o f a d e v i o u s urguraent a b o u t the infiltration of morals into international politics he r e c o m mends, w hile r e c o g n i s i n g the p r e s e n t n e c e s s i t y o f a v o i d i n g p u b l i c a c c u s a t i o n s o f o u r -»ussian a l l i e s , tiiat w e s h o u l d a t l e a s t r e a r e B s t h e b a l a n c e i n o u r o w n m i n d s a n d in a l l o u r f u t u r e d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t refu s e to f o r g e t the S o v i e t c r i m e o f K a tyn.

O u r future dealings w i t h the R u s s i a n s s nould in fact b e g o v e r n e d b y the m o r a l n e c e s s i t y o f " v i n d i c a t i n g the s p i r i t o f t h o s e b r a v e , u n l u c k y m e n a n d ..notifying the l i v i n g to the dead".

In effect Mr. O'Malley urges that we sh o u l d f o l l o w tne example w h i c h the Poles themselves a r e u n h a p p i l y so p r o n e t o o f f e r us u n d in o u r d i p l o m a c y a l l o w our h e a d s to be g o v e r n e d b y o u r hearts.

The m i n u t e s on Mr. O ' M a l l e y ' s e a r l i e r d e s p a t c h in U 2 0 1 1 / 5 8 / 7 2 s u g g e s t t h a t t. i s is t h e o n e t h i n g a b o v e all to be a v o i d e d , a t any rate in o u r d e a l i n g s wi t s soviet RU38id.

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Next Paper.

24794 ia/42 F.O .P.

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Northern Department.

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I agree with Mr. Allen*s dissection or this despatch into three very different and unequal parts.

I do not think that many people who have been able to follow this question at all closely would disagree with Mr. 0*Malley*s conclusion that the presumption of guilt rests very strongly on the Soviet Government.

It is obviously a very awkward matter when we are fighting for a moral cause and when we intend to deal adequately with war criminals, that our Allies should be open to accusations of this kind and to others relating to the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Poles and to their subsequent treatment in Soviet Russia.

However, as Mr. O ’ Malley says himself, there is no point in our assisting German propaganda on these issues and there is no reason why we cannot maintain our own moral standards and values whilst at the same time endeavouring In every v/ay possible to improve our relations with the Russians and incidentally perhaps to bring about an improvement in Soviet conduct.

It is unfortunately the case that tUae Polish case has rather tended to go by default owing to the circumstances in which the Katyn question first became public knowledge.

It would, therefore, I think, be useful for the facts assembled by Mr. G'Malley in paragraphs 1 to 13 to be circulated at all events to the Cabinet.

But I cannct help feeling that his subsequent imaginative reconstruction of the scene in paragraphs 14 to 17, and more particularly paragraph 17, and his moral observations in paragraphs 19 to 24 cast very little light upon this problem and merely leave the reader with the impression that Mr. O ’ Malley is working up Cu maximum prejudice against the Soviet Union.

The last paragraphs of his despatch therefore m m PWfcgr tend# to discount the impression left by the introductory factual paragraphs.

I know that Mr. O'Malley is very anxious that this despatch should be circulated, I think myself that there would be advantage in printing and circulating to the War Cabinet paragraph^ 1 to 13 only without the last sentence of paragraph 13 and v/ithout the passages I have marked in paragraphs 7 and 10.

7th June,

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Copy No.

Mr. O ’ Malley to Mr. Eden.— (Received 31sf May.) British Embassy to Poland.

(No. 51.)

45. Lowndes Square. S. H\ 1.

Sir. 24th May , 1943.

M Y despatch No. 43 o f the 30th A p ril dwelt on the probability that no confederation in Eastern Europe could plav an effective part in 'European politics unless it were affiliated to the Soviet tlovernment, and suggested that so long as the policy o f this Government was as enigmatic as it now is it would be inconsistent with British interests that Russia should enjoy a sphere o f influence extending from Danzig to the iEgeau and A d ria tic Seas.

The suppression o f the Comintern on the 20th .May may be considered to have brought to an end what was in the past the most objectionable phase o f Soviet foreign policy and to entitle the Soviet Government to be regarded less distrustfully than formerly. I t is not. then, without hesitation that I address this further despatch to you, which also gives grounds for misgivings about the character and policy o f the present rulers in Russia.

2. W e do not know fo r certain who murdered a lot o f Polish officers in the forest o f K atyn in A p r il and M ay 1940, but this at least is already clear, that it was the scene o f terrible events which w ill live long in the memory o f the Polish nation. Accordingly, I shall try to describe how this affair look's to inv Polish friends and acquaintances, o f whom many had brothers and sons and lovers among those known to have been tuken off just three years ago from, the prison camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov to an uncertain destination • how it looks, fo r instance, to General Sikorski, who there lost Captain Fuhrman his form er A .D .C . and close personal friond; to M. Morawski, who lost a brother in­ law called Zoltowski and a nephew; or to M. Zaleski. who lost a brother and two cousins.

3. The number o f Polish prisoners taken by the Russian armies when they invaded Poland, in September 1939. was about 180.000. including police and gendarmerie and a certain number.of civilian officials. The total number o f army officers was round about 15,000. A t the beginning o f 1940 there were in the three camps named above round about 9,000 or 10.000 officers and 6 000 ol her rallies, policemen and civil officials. Less public reference has been made to these 6,000 than to the 10,000 officers, not because the Polish Government are less indignant about the disappearance o f other ranks than altout the disappearance o f officers, or were less insistent in enquiries for them, but because the need o f officers to command the Polish troops recruited in Russia was more urgent than the need to increase the total ration strength o f the Polish army There is no reason to suppose that these 6,000 other ranks and the police and the civilians were treated by the Soviet Government differently to the officers and mysterv covers the fa te o f all. For the sake o f sim plicity,'however, I shall w rite in this despatch only o f the missing officers, without specific reference to other r ml s to police prisoners or to civilians. O f the 10,000 officers, only some 3 000 or 4 000 were regular officers. The remainder were reserve officers who in peace tim e earned their living, many with distinction, in the professions, in business and so on. ' “ i n , ,°f T ’ wT d T nt ™ "nd the “ " ‘P 8 ai Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov that, under orders trom Moscow, the prisoners were to be moved to camps where conditions would be more agreeable, and that theV mmht look forw ard to eventual release. A ll were cheered bv the prospect o f a change from the rigours which prisoners must endure to the hazard's and vicissitudes o f relative freedom in Soviet or German territory. Even their captors seemed to wish the prisoners well, who were now daily entrained in parties o f 50 to 350 fo r the place at which, so they hoped, the form alities o f their discharge would he completed. A s each prisoner was listed for transfer, all the usual particular^ about him were rechecked and reregistered. Fresh finger-prints were take.

T h e prisoners were inoculated afresh and certificates o f inoculation furnished to f42— 49] 10

2

them. Sometimes the prisoners’ Polish documents were taken away, but in many | such cases th'p^yvere4rQturned before departure.

A ll were furnished with rations for the journey, aiid,‘ as a mark o f special regard, the sandwiches furnished to senior officers were wrapped in clean white paper— a commodity seldom seen anywhere7 in Russia. Anticipations o f a better future were clouded only by the fact that 400 or 500 Poles had been listed for further detention, first at Pavlishchev Bor and eventually at Griazovetz. These were, as it turned out later, to be the only known survivors o f the lost legion, and some o f them are in England now; but at the time, although no principle could be discovered on which they had been selected, they supposed that they had been condemned to a further period o f captivity; and some even feared that they had been chosen out for execution.

5. Our information about these events is derived for the most part from those routed to Griazovetz, all o f whom were released in 1941, and some of whom— notably M. Komarnicki, the Polish M inister for Justice— are now in England.

6. Entrainment o f the 10,000 officers from the three camps went on all through A p r il and the first half o f May, and the lorries, lined with cheerful faces, which took them from camp to station, were, in fact, the last that was ever seen o f them alive by any witness to whom we have access. U n til the revelations made by the German broadcast o f the 12th A p ril. 1943, and apart from a few words let drop at the time by the prison guards, only the testimony o f scribblings on the railway wagons in which they were transported affords any indication o f their destination. The same wagons seem to have done a shuttle service between Kozielsk and the detraining station; and on these some o f the first parties to lie transported had scratched the w ords: “ Don’ t believe that we are going home,” and the news that their destination had turned out to be a small station near Smolensk. These messages were noticed when the vans returned to Smolensk station, and have been reported to us by prisoners at Kozielsk, who were later sent to Griazovetz.

7. But though o f positive indications as to what subsequently happened to the 10,000 officers there was none until the grave at Katyn was opened, there is now available a good deal o f negative evidence, the cumulative effect o f which is to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers o f responsibility for the massacre. « 8. In the first place there is the evidence to be derived from the prisoners’ correspondence, in respect to which information has been furnished by officers’ fam ilies in Poland, by officers now with the Polish army in the M iddle East, and by the Polish Red Cross Society. Up till the end o f March 1940 large numbers o f letters had been despatched, which were later received by their relatives, from the officers confined at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov; whereas no letters from any o f them (excepting from the 400 moved to G riazovtez) have been received by anybody which had been despatched subsequent to that date. The Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941, and there is no easy answer to the question why, i f any o f the 10,000 had been alive between the end o f M ay 1940 and July 1941, none o f them ever succeeded in getting any word through to their families.

9.

In the second place there is trie evidence o f the correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government.

The first request for information about the 10,000 was made by M. Kot o f M. Wyshinsky on the 6th October, 1941. On the 3rd December, 1941, General Sikorski backed up his enquiry with a list o f 3,845 names o f officers included among them. General Anders furnished the Soviet Government with a further list o f 800 names on the 18th March, 1942. Enquiries about the fate o f the 10,000 were made again and again to the Russian Government verbally and in w ritin g by General Sikorski, M. Kot, M. Romer, Count Raczyfiski and General Anders between October 1941 and A p ril 1943. The Polish Red Cross between August and October 1940 sent no less than 500 questionnaires about individual officers to the Russian Govern­ ment. T o none o f all these enquiries extending over a period o f two and a half years was a single positive answer o f any kind ever returned. The enquirers were told either that the officers had been released, or that “ perhaps they are already in Germany,” or that “ no information ” o f their whereabouts was ava il­ able, or (M. Molotov to M. Kot, October 1941) that complete lists o f the prisoners were available and that they would all be delivered to the Polish authorities “ dead or alive.”

But it is incredible that i f any o f the 10.000 were released, not one o f them has ever appeared again anywhere, and it is almost equally incredible, i f they were not released, that not one o f them should have escaped subsequent to May 1940 and reported himself to the Polish authorities in Russia

L , or Persia. That the .Russian authorities should have said o f any Polish officer in ^ i- S o v ie t jurisdiction that they had “ no information ” also provokes incredulity; v )T it is notorious that the N .K .V.D . collect and record the movements o f indi­ viduals with the most meticulous care.

10. In the third place there is the evidence o f those who have visited the grave: first, a Polish commission including, among others, doctors, journalists and members o f the Polish Assistance Committee, a former president o f the Polish Academy o f Literature and a representative o f the Mayor o f W arsaw ; secondly, auother Polish commission which included priests, doctors and representatives of the Polish Red Cross Society; thirdly, an international commission of criminologists and pathologists, o f which the personnel is given in Annex I. The report o f this commission forms Annex I I to this despatch, and the reports o f the two Polish commissions add little to it. I t is deposed by all that several hundred identifications have been established. A ll this evidence would normally be highly suspect since the inspections took place under German auspices and the results reached us through German broadcasts. There are fa ir grounds fo r presuming that the German broadcasts accurately represented the findings o f the commis­ sions, that the commissions' findings were at any rate in some respects well founded, and that the grounds were sound on which at any rate some o f the identifications were made.

11. In the fourth place there is the fact that a mass execution o f officer prisoners would be inconsistent with what we know o f the German army. The Germany army has committed innumerable brutalities, but the murder by them o f prisoners o f war, even o f Poles, is rare. Had the German authorities ever had these 10,000 Polish officers in their hands we can be sure that they would have placed some or all o f them in the camps in Germany already allotted to Polish prisoners, while the 0,000 other ranks, policemen and civil officials would have been put to forced labour, in such case the Polish authorities would in the course o f two years certainly have got into touch with some o f the prisoners; but. in fact, none o f the men from Kozielsk, Starobielsk or Ostashkov have ever been * heard o f from Germany.

12. Finally there is the evidence to be derived from the confusion which characterises explanations elicited from or volunteered by the Soviet Government.

Between August 1941 and the 12th A p ril, 1943, when the Germans announced the discovery o f the grave at Katyn, the Russian Government had, among other excuses, maintained that all Polish officers taken prisoner in 1939 had been released. On the other hand, in conversation with the Polish Ambassador, a Russian official who had drunk more than was good for him, once referred to the disposal o f these officers as “ a tragic error.” On the lflth A p ril, immediately a fter the German announcement, the Soviet Inform ation Bureau in Moscow suggested that the Germans were misrepresenting as victims o f Russian barbarity skeletons dug up by archaeologists at Gniezdowo, which lies next door to Katyn.

On the 2<ith A p ril M. Molotov, in a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, ¿aid that the bodies at Katyn were those o f Poles who had at one time been prisoners o f the Russians but had subsequently been captured by the Germans in their advance at Smolensk in July 1941 and had been murdered then by them.

On a later occasion, and when the German broadcasts gave reason to think that some bodies were sufficiently well preserved to be identifiable, the Russian Govern­ ment put forw ard a statement that the Polish officers had beep captured by the ’ Germans in July 1941, had been employed upon construction work, and had only been murdered shortly before the German “ discovery” was announced. This confusion cannot easily be understood except on the assumption that the Russian Government had something to hide.

13. The cumulative effect o f this evidence is, as I said earlier, to throw

serious doubt on Russian disclaimers o f responsibility for a massacre. Such doubts are not diminished by rumours which have been current during the last two and a half years that some o f the inmates o f Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov had beep t r a n s i t e d towards Kolyma, Franz Joseph Land or Novaya Zemlya, some or all o f these being killed en ro-ute. It may be that this was so, and it may be that some less number than ten thousand odd were destroyed and buried at Katyn; but whether the massacre occurred (if it did occur) in one place or two places or three places naturally makes no difference to Polish sentiments These will accordingly be described without referepce to the uncertainty which exists as to the exact number o f victims buried near Smolensk.

14. W ith all that precedes in mind it is comprehensible that the relatives and fellow-officers o f the men who disappeared should have concluded that these had in fact been murdered by their Russian captors and should picture their [4 2 - 4 9 ]

B 2

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last hours— somewhat as follows— with bitter distress. The picture is a composite one to which knowledge o f the district, the German broadcasts, experience Russian methods and the reports o f visitors to the grave have all contributed*-^ but it is not so much an evidentially established description o f events as a reconstruction in the light o f the evidence— sometimes partial and obviously defective— o f what may have happened. But it— or something like it— is what most Poles believe to have happened, and what I myself, in the light o f all the evidence, such as it is, incline to think happened. Many months or years may elapse liefore the truth is known, but because in the meantime curiosity is unsatisfied and judgment in suspense, we cannot, even i f we would— and much less can Poles— -make our thoughts and feelings unresponsive to the dreadful probabilities o f the case.

15.

Smolensk lies some ¿0 kilom. from the spot where the common graves were discovered. It has two stations and in or near the town the main lines from Moscow to W arsaw and from R ig a to Orel cross and recross each other. ' Some 15 kilom. to the west o f Smolensk stands the unimportant station o f Gniezdowo, and it is but a short mile from Gniezdowo to a place known locally as Kozlinaya Gora or “ The H ill o f Goats.” The district o f Katyn, in which this little hill stands, is covered with primeval forest which has been allowed to go to rack and ruin. The forest is mostly coniferous, but the pine trees are interspersed here and there with hardwoods and scrub. The month o f A p r il normally brings spring to this part o f the country, and by early M ay the trees are green; but the winter o f 1939-40 had been the hardest on record, and when the first parties from Kozielsk arrived on the 8th A p r il there would still have been occasional patches o f snow in deep shade and, o f course, much mud on the rough road from the station to the H ill o f Goats. A t Gniezdowo the prison vans from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov discharged their passengers into a barbed-wire cage surrounded by a strong force o f Russian soldiers, and the preparations made here for their reception must have filled most o f the Polish oflicers with disquiet, and some indeed with dismay who remembered that the forest o f Katyn had been used by the Bolsheviks in 1919 as a convenient place for the killin g o f many Czarist oflicers. For such was the case, and a Pole now in London, Janusz Laskowski, tells me that when he was eleven years old he had to listen every evening to an account o f his day’s work from one o f the executioners, Afanaziev, who was billeted in his mother’ s house. From the cage the prisoners were taken in lorries along a country road to the H ill o f Goats, and it must have been when they were unloaded from the lorries that their hands were bound and that dismay gave way to despair. I f a man struggled, it seems that the executioner threw his coat over his head, tying it round his neck and leading him hooded to the p it ’s edge, for in many cases a body was found to be thus hooded and the coat to have been pierced by a bullet where it covered the base o f the skull. But those who went quietly to their death must have seen a monstrous sight. In the broad deep pit tneir comrades lay, packed closely round the edge, head to feet, like sardines in a tin, but in the middle o f the grave disposed less orderly. Up and down on the bodies the executioners tramped, hauling the dead bodies about and treading in the blood like butchers in a stockyard. When it was all over and the last shot had been fired and the last Polish head been punctured, the butchers— perhaps trained in youth to husbandry— seem to have turned their hands to one o f the most innocent of. occupations : smoothing the clods and planting little conifers all over what had been a shambles. It was, o f course, rather late in the year for transplanting young trees, but not too late; for the sap was beginning to run in the young Scots pines when, three years later, the Polish representatives visited the site.

IB. The climate and the conifers are not without significance. The climate o f Smolensk accounts for the fact that, though the Germans first got wind o f the existence o f the mass graves in the autumn o f 1942, it was only in A p r il o f 1943 that they published to the world an account o f what had been unearthed. The explanation is surely t h is : not that the German propagandists had chosen a politically opportune moment for their revelations, but that during the winter the ground at Smolensk ia frozen so hard that it would have been impossible to uncover corpses without dynamite or such other violent means as would have destroyed the possibility o f identifying dead bodies. The winter o f 1942-43 was exceptionally mild and the German authorities probably got to work as soon as the soil was sufficiently soft. The little conifers also deserve more attention than they have received. In the first place they are presumptive evidence o f Russian gu ilt; for, considering the conditions under which the German army advanced through Smolensk in July 1941 in full expectation o f early and complete

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victory, it is most unlikely, if the Polish officers had been murdered by Germans

4 "

md not Russians, that the Germans would have bothered to cover up their victim s’ 'graves with young trees. In the second place, one o f these young trees under examination by a competent botanist would reveal beyond any possibility o f doubt whether it had last been transplanted in M ay 1940 or some time subsequent to July 1941. Perhaps this test o f Russian veracity w ill presently be made.

17.

The political background against which the events described paragraph 15 are viewed by Poles is by contrast a matter o f undisputed history, including as it does all the long story o f partitions, rebellions and repressions, the Russo-Polish w ar o f 1919-20, the mutual suspicions which this le ft behind it, the unannounced invasion o f Poland by Russia in September 1939, the subsequent occupation o f h alf Poland by Russia and the carrying into captivity o f some million and a h a lf o f its inhabitants. M oie recently comes the virtual annexation o f the occupied eastern parts o f Poland, the refusal o f the Russian ■Government to recognise as Polish citizens the inhabitants o f the occupied districts, the suppression o f relief organisations for Poles in Russia and the persecution o f Poles refusing to change their own for Russian nationality. When Poles learned that, in addition to all these misfortunes, round about 10,000 men o f the best breeding stock in Poland had (according to Russian accounts) been either dispersed and “ lost ” somewhere in the Soviet Union or else abandoned to the advancing German armies, or had (according to German accounts) been found to have been murdered by the Russians, many o f them naturally concluded (though I do not here give it as my own conclusion) that the Soviet Government’s intention had been to destroy the very foundations upon which their own Poland could be rebuilt. This sinister political intention imputed by Poles to Russia poisoned the wound and enhanced the sufferings o f a nation already outraged and dismayed by the conduct of. the Soviet Government.

Some Poles, remembering L en in ’s attitude to the holocausts o f 1917 and subsequent years, and probing the dark recesses o f Stalin’ s mind when he took ( i f take he did) the dreadful decision, compare disciple with master. Lenin would have broken apart the heads o f ten thousand Polish officers with the insouciance o f a monkey cracking walnuts. Did corpses pitching into a common grave with the precision o f machines coming off a production-belt sim ilarly satisfy a nature habituated to manipulate blood and lives with uncompassionate detachment? Some at any rate so interpret S talin’s mind. “ These men are no use to us,” they imagine him as saying; “ in fact they are a nuisance and a danger. Here is an elite o f talent, here is valour and a hostile purpose. These stallions must not live to sire a whole herd o f hostile Christian thoroughbreds. Many o f the brood-mares have already been sold to Siberian peasants and the camel-pullers o f Kazakstan.

Th eir foals and yearlings can be broken to Communist harness. R id me o f this stud farm altogether and send all this turbulent bloodstock to the knuckers.”

18. The inen who were taken to Katyn are dead, and their death is a very serious loss to Poland. Nevertheless, unless the Russians are cleared o f the presumption o f guilt, the moral repercussions in Poland, in the other occupied countries and in England o f the massacre o f Polish officers may well have more enduring results than the massacre itself; and this aspect o f things, therefore, deserves attention. A s \ have as vet seen no reliable rejx>rts on public feeling in Poland and German-occupied Europe, my comments w ill relate only to our own reaction to the uncovering o f the graves.

19. This despatch is not prim arily concerned with the reaction o f the British public, press or Parliam ent, who are not in such a good position as I lis M a jesty’s Government to form an opinion as to what actually happened.

W e ourselves, on the other hand, who have access to all the available information, though we am draw no final conclusions on vital matters o f fact, have a considerable body o f circumstantial evidence at our disposal, and I think most o f us are more than half convinced that a large number o f Polish officers were indeed murdered bv the Russian authorities, and that it is indeed their bodies (as well, maybe, as other bodies) which have now been unearthed. This being so, I am impelled to examine the effect on myself o f the facts and allegations, and to adjust my mind to the shocking probabilities o f the case. Since the Polish Government is in London and since the affair has been handled directly bv yourself and the Prim e M inister with General Sikorski and Count Raczviiski, it may seem redundant for me to comment on it, as I should naturally do were the Polish Government and I both abroad; but. though all important conversa­ tions have been between Ministers and the leaders o f the Polish Government, my contacts have doubtless been more numerous than yours during the last few weeks

in

w ith Poles o f all kinds, and they have possibly spoken to me w ith less reserve , H0 than to yourself. I hope therefore I may, w ithout impertinence, submit to y w ' i A the reflections which follow .

20. In handling the publicity side o f the K a tyn affair we have been constrained by the urgent need fo r cordial relations w itli the Soviet Government to appear to appraise the evidence w ith more hesitation and lenience than we should do in form in g a common-sense judgm ent on events occurring in normal times or in the ordin ary course o f our private lives; we have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation o f our intellectual and m oral judgm ents; we have been obliged to g ive undue prominence to the tactlessness or impulsiveness o f Poles, to restrain the Poles from pu tting their case clearly before the public, to discourage any attem pt by the public and the press to probe the u gly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities which in the ordin ary affairs o f life would cry to high heaven fo r elucidation, and to withhold the fu ll measure o f solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as a large number o f Poles now are. W e have in fa ct perforce used the good name o f England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and. in view o f the immense importance o f an appearance o f A llie d unity and o f the heroic resistance o f Russia to Germany, fe w w ill think that any other course would have been wise or right.

21. T h is dislocation between our public attitu de and our p rivate feelings we may know to be deliberate and inevitable; but at the same tim e we may perhaps wonder whether, by representing to others something less than the whole truth so fa r as we know it, and something less than the probabilities so fa r as they seem to us probable, we are not incurring a risk o f wnat— not to put a fine point on it— m ight darken oui>vision and take the edge off our m oral sensibility.

I f so, how is this risk to be avoided 1 22. A t first sight it seems that nothing less appropriate to a p olitical despatch than a discourse upon morals can be im agined; but yet. as we look at the changing nature o f the international w orld o f to-day, it seems that morals and international politics are becoming more and more closely involved w ith each other.

Th is proposition has im portant consequences; but since it is not universally accepted I hope the fo llo w in g remarks in support o f it are not out o f place.

23. Nobody doubts that morals now enter into the domestic politics o f the U n ited Kingdom , but it was not always so. There was a tim e when the acts o f the Governm ent in T^ondon were less often the fr u it o f consultation and compromise in the general interests o f all than o f the ascendancy o f one class or group o f citizens who had been tem porarily successful in the domestic arena. I t was realisation o f the interdependence o f all classes and groups o f the population o f England, Scotland and W ales which discouraged the play o f intestine powerpolitics and set the w elfa re o f all above the advantage o f the strong. S im ila r causes arc producing sim ilar results in the relations o f States to each other. “ D u rin g the last four centuries o f our modern era,” w rites P rofessor Pollard , “ the last w ord in political organisation has been the nation; but now that the w orld is being unified by science and culture ” the conception o f the nation state as the largest group in which human beings are organ ically associated with each other is being superseded by the conception o f a larger, it may be o f a European, or indeed o f a w orld-w id e u nity; and “ the nation is taking its place as the bridge, the h alf-w ay house, between the individu al and the human fa m ily .”

Europe, and indeed the world, are in process o f in tegratin g themselves, and “ the men and women o f B rita in ,” as yon said at M aryland. “ are a live to the fa ct That they live in one w orld w ith their neighbours.” T h is being so. it would l>e strange * i f the same movement towards the coalescence o f smaller into la rger groups which brought about the infiltration o f morals into domestic politics were not also now b rin gin g about the infiltration o f morals into international politics. This, in fact, it seems to many o f us is exactly what is happening, and is why, as the late M r. H eadlam M orley said, “ w hat in the international sphere is m orally indefensible generally turns out in the long run to have been p o litically in ept.”

I t is surely the case that many o f the p olitical troubles o f neighbouring countries and some o f our own have in the past arisen because they and we w ere incapable o f seeing this or u n w illin g to adm it it.

24. I f , then, morals have become involved w ith international politics, i f it 1 be the case that a monstrous crim e has been committed by a foreign Government— jalbeit a frien d ly one— and that we, fo r however valid reasohs, have been obliged to behave as i f the deed was not theirs, may it not be that we now stand in danger

7•

\

o f bemusing not only others but ourselves : o f falling, as Mr. Winant said recently at Birmingham, under St. Pau l’s curse on those who can see cruelty “ and burn »not ” ? I f so, and since no remedy can be found in an early alteration o f our public attitude towards the Katyn affair, we ought, maybe, to ask ourselves how, consistently with the necessities of our relations with the Soviet Government, the voice o f our political conscience is to be kept up to concert pitch. I t may be that the answer lies, for the moment, only in something to be done inside our own hearts and minds where we are masters. Here at any rate we can make a compensatory contribution— a reaffirmation of our allegiance to truth and justice and compassion. I f we do this we shall at least be predisposing ourselves to the exercise o f a right judgment on all those half political, half moral, questions (such as the fate o f Polish deportees now in Russia) which will confront us both elsewhere and more particularly in respect to Polish-Russian relations as the war pursues its course and draws to its end; and so, if the facts about the Katyn massacre turn out to be as most of us incline to think, shall we vindicate the spirit o f these brave unlucky men and ju stify the living to the dead.

I have, &c.

O W E N O ’M A L L E Y .

C

Annex 1.

List o f Personnel composing the Commission of Criminologists and Pathologists.

Dr. Spoleers, Professor o f Ophthalmology at the University o f Ghent.

Dr. Markow, Instructor in Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University o f Sofia.

Dr. Tramsen, Assistant Professor o f Anatomy at the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Copenhagen. .Dr. Saxen, Professor o f Pathological Anatomy at the University in Copenhagen.

Dr. Palmieri, Professor o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University o f Naples.

Dr. Miloslawich, Professor o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University o f Agram.

Dr. de Burlet, Professor o f Anatomy at the University of Troningen.

Dr. Hajek, Professor o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Prague.

Dr. Birklè, Coroner o f the Roumanian Ministry o f .Justice and First Assistant at the Institute o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Bucharest. ^ Dr. Na ville, Professor o f Forensic Medicine at the University o f Geneva.

Dr Subik, Professor o f Pathological Anatomy at the University o f Bratis­ lava and head o f the Public Health Service o f Slovakia.

Dr. Orsos, Professor o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University o f Budapest.

Dr. Buhtz. Professor o f Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University o f Breslau.

Dr. Costedoat, Medical Inspector.

Annex 2.

Katyn Wood : Text o f Protocol, Berlin.

The report o f the international commission of scientists on the examination o f the mass graves at Katyn Wood in the main section reads as follows : From the 28th A p ril to the 30th A pril, 1943, a commission composed o f leading representa­ tives o f forensic medicine at European Universities and other prominent University professors o f medicine have conducted a thorough scientific examina­ tion of the mass graves o f Polish officers in Katyn Wood. The discovery o f those mass graves, which was recently brought to the attention o f the German authorities, prompted Reich’s Chief Health Officer, Dr. Conti, to invite experts from various European countries to inspect the Katyn site in order thus to contri­ bute to the clarification o f this unique case. Members o f the commission person­ ally heard the testimonies o f several Russian native witnesses who. among others, confirmed that during the months o f March and April. 1940, almost daily big railway transports with Polish officers arrived at the station o f Gniesdovo, near

13

8

K atyn , where the Polish officers alighted and were then transported in a prisoners’ motor van to K a tyn W ood and were not seen again; the commission further took * cognisance o f the discoveries and facts thus fa r established and inspected objects o f circum stantial evidence. Accordingly, up to the 30th A p ril, 1943, 982 bodies . V were exhumed, o f which approxim ately 70 per cent, have been identified, w hile papers found on others must first be subjected to careful prelim inary treatment before they can be used fo r identification. Bodies exhumed prior to the commis­ sion’ s arrival were all inspected, and a considerable number of bodies were dissected by Professor Buhty and his assistants. U p to to-day seven mass graves have been opened, the biggest o f which is estimated to contain the bodies o f 2,000 Polish officers. Members o f the commission personally dissected nine corpses and submitted numerous specially selected cases to post-mortem. I t was confirmed that all those so fa r exhumed died from bullets in their heads. In all cases, bullets entered the nape. In the m ajority o f cases only one bullet was fired. T w o bullets were fired only rarely and only one case was found where three bullets had been fired into the nape. A ll the bullets were fired from pistols o f less than eight mm. calibre. The spot where the bullets penetrated leads to the assumption that the shot was fired with the muzzle pressed against the nape or from the closest range.

T h e surprising regularity o f tne wounds . . . permits the assumption that the shots were fired by experienced hands. Numerous bodies revealed a sim ilar method o f tyin g the hands; and in some cases stabs from four-edged bayonets were found on bodies and clothes. The method o f tying is sim ilar to that found on the bodies o f Russian civilian s that were earlier exhumed in K atyn Forest. The assumption is justified that a ricochetted bullet first killed one officer, then went, into the body o f one already dead in the pit— the shootings aooarently being made in ditches to avoid having the bodies transported to graves. The mass graves are situated in clearings in the forest, the ground being completely levelled off and planted w ith young pines. The mass graves were dug in undulating terrain which consists o f pure sand in terraces, the lowest goin g down as fa r as the ground water. Bodies lay, practically without exception, face down, closely side by side and in layers one above the other, clearly ledged methodically at the sides o f p its and more irregu la rly in the centre. The uniforms o f the exhumed bodies, accord­ ing to the unanimous opinion o f the commission, were, especially w ith regard to buttons, rank insignia, decorations, form o f boots, etc., undoubtedly Polish. They had w inter wear. Frequently furs, leather coats, knitted vests and typical Polish officers’ (;aps have been found. Only a fe w bodies were those o f other ranks. One body was that o f a priest. The measurements o f the clothes correspond w ith the measurements o f the wearer. No watches or rings were found on the bodies, although from the exact date and time found in entries in several diaries, the owners must have had these'objects up to their last days, even hours. Comments found on bodies— diaries, correspondence, newspapers— are from the period o f theautumn o f 1939 to March and A p r il 1940. The latest hitherto established date is that o f a Russian newspaper o f the 22nd A p r il, 1940. There were varying degrees o f decomposition o f the bodies, differin g according to the position o f the bodies w ithin the grave and their juxtaposition to each other. A large number o f skulls were examined for changes which, according to the experiences o f Professor Orsoa, are o f great importance fo r the determination o f the time o f death. These changes consist o f various layers o f calcareous tu ft-lik e incrustation on the surface o f the already loamy brain matter. Such changes are not to be observed on bodies that have been interred fo r less than three years. But this change was observed to a marked degree on the skull o f the body No, 526, which was found w ith a', surface layer in one big mass grave.

Intercepted telegrams from German MFA, April-May 1943 MOST SECRET. TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND K E Y : NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.

GERMAN PROPAGANDA INSTRUCTIONS.

No:

117150

Dixie; 5til ¡Any, 1943.

From: Ministry o f Foreign A ffa irs, Bii LIN. To:

A il Stations.

No:

347.

Circular.

Date; 14th A pril, 1943.

[German recypherJ. The story of the finding o f the bodies o f 10,000 Polish o ffic e rs in the wood a t KATYN, given by the Press News Service on Tuesday evening, is to be given the widest publicity.

The documentary evidence is to be so presented in commentaries, that i t must be brought home not only to ENGLAND but to the whole [one group] world, what the peoples o f EUROPE, delivered according to English and North American plans to the SOVIET UNION, could expect from a victorious, drunken, soviet army o f occupation.

The comments at to-day’ s meeting of the F o r e ig n Press, arxi current reports from "korres.pondenz"

regarding the opening of the mass grave and the id en tification o f the bodies, are also being s^nt.

Please telegraph as to the [? reaction in tne press].

A g e n c ie s anu c o rre sp o n d e n ts a re r e q u ir e d t o f u r n is h f u l l r e p o r t s .

Please acknowledge receipt.

BRAUN von 3TU, fi.

D irector (R).

F.0.C3).

M O ST SECR ET. TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND K E Y : NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE

HUSSO-rtƻSU

VISION.

No:

j -<r-' o n r 1 i i ú ¿ d

Date: 22nd May, 1943.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BERLiN. To:

All Stations.

No:

tfultex 459.

Date: 15th May, 1943.

[German recypherl.

Verschiusssache C. For information and as a guide to conversation.

The discovery of mass-graves of Polish officers near SMOLENSK has caused an extraordinary sensation in world opinion and particularly in Polish emigré circles.

Both the G e m m Red Gross and the Polish emigré Government in LONDON referred the matter to the international Red Gross and asked that a delegation should be sent to investigate; but the Soviet Government, whose relations with the Polish emigré Government had for seme time been veiy strained, principally on account of the question of POLAND’ S eastern frontier, used the ooportunity to make capital for their own view that ¿astern POLAND belonged to the SOVIET UNION, and also to disembarrass thomselves of the uncomfortable S a KORSK i Government; they therefore broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish emigré Government on 25th April 1943.

Against this resounding success of German propaganda the SOVIET had nothing to set but fairy­ tales about "archaeological grave discoveries’ 1, and the lie, which has been refuted by official documents, foreign journalists, and neutral medico-legal authorities, that the Polish officers had been murdered by the Germans.

The British and North Ameriain Governments recognised that the rupture of relations between the SOVIET UNION and the Polish emigré Government would have undesirable consequences, not Director (4)

2,

not only for P O L A N D S relationship to the SOVIET UNION, but also for their own. ana further that in view of the Atlantic Charter the effect on the smaller States would not he favourable; they therefore set themselves to work at once and made vigorous efforts to put an end to the conflict.

As a result the Polish emigrtf Government published a declaration which was moderate in tone though its content was intransigent. it avoided the question of the International Red Cross being called an, but emphasised the integrity and unqualified sovereign rights of the Polish Republic, and referred to the Polish-Soviet agreements of 30th Juhr, 1941, and 4th December, 1941; it also repeated earlier demands that the Poles now in the SOVIET UNiGN should be released and that, action to help them should be continued.

Further mediation was rendered difficult because in the first place it was impossible to accede to the Polish point of view on the real question at issue, namely the eastern frontier of POLAND, without giving up one»s own, further because the British Goverrment had already admitted the Soviet ambitions on Eastern POLAND, and finally because the Soviet Government saw no kind of ground for renouncing its claims.

These efforts produced nothing but an ambiguous observation by ST a U n in a letter to the "Times" correspondent, and SiKOKSKl's declaration on the subject, and these made no change in the fundamental attitude of the two parties.

VYSHiNSKI•s aggressive pronouncement to representatives of the British and North American Press criticised the Polish Government for evacuating the Polish array from the SOVIET UNION, also on the ground of espionage

by Polish officials, and also for approving the attempt of a group of Polish contnunists to organise a •Polish Division' in the SOVIET UNiON, but this rather complicated the position and provoked in ENGLAND a m North AMERICA a feeling of bitter disillusion. ‘ The Polish-Soviet conflict is a splendid example of the differences which exist between the Allies.

The behaviour of the Soviet Government proves that its object is the bolahevisaticn of POLAND and indeed of EUROPE, and further that it is still pursuing its claim to the lsm8dlate hegemony of eastern and south-eastern EUROPE, and that when the Polish and other emigre Governments in LONDON entertain hopes of effective support from ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES, those hopes are a complete illusion.

Please acknowledge receipt.

[Sneyphered signature].

STBBNGRACET .

Despatch from Sir Owen O’Malley, 11 February 1944 B R I T I S H E M B A S S Y 'JO POLAND, 45 LOWNDES SQUARE, 3.

1

11 February, 1944«

CAoqc, On January 24th the soviet Government issued the report of a sp ecial commission appointed fo r "ascertain in g and "investigating the circumstances of the shooting o f Polish ’O ffic e r Prisoners by the German-Fascist invaders in the Katyn ’F o re s t."

This report appears in f u l l in the "so v ie t War

Hev/s" o f January 27* 28 and 51 and February 1, runs to some 20,000 v/ords, and fin is h e s with the conclusions which are enclosed herein*

Having d ealt with the German account of

th is a f f a i r at some length in my despatch No* 51 o f May ?a , 1943.

I ought perhaps nov/ to deal with the question o f what new lig h t , i f any, is thrown upon it by our A lli e s who, having regained possession o f Smolensk, have been able to r e v is it the scene o f the massacre and make an enquiry on the spot, 2,

There was a d iffe re n c e between the methods employed by

the German Government on the one hand and the Soviet Government on the other fo r convincing the world o f the truth o f the accusations which each has le v e lle d against each.

The

Germans r e lie d prim arily upon the fin d in gs o f an in tern atio n al commission o f fourteen path ologists and crim in ologists o f whom two came from Germany, eleven from s a t e lli t e or occupied s ta te s , and one from Switzerland,

‘ Basing i t s e l f on the

fin din gs o f th is body, the German Government to ld i t s sto ry to the world through every a v a ila b le p u b lic it y agency, and they rein forced th e ir case by brin g in g to Katyn a purely Polish delegation composed of weilknown Poles from many d iffe re n t professions and classes o f society , a delegation from the Polish / The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, ¡v i.C . , M . P . , e t c ., etc*, etc.

P o lish Red Cross Society, and d elegatio n s from Lodz and Poznan.

The Russian Government on the other hand r e l i e d mainly upon the report o f a p u rely Russian commission composed o f eight Government o f f i c i a l s who had the assista n c e o f a m e d ic o -le g a l sub-commission composed o f f i v e Russian s c ie n t is t s .

The

Russian Government and the German Government, however, acted a lik e

in t h i s , that they both in v ite d fo r e ig n jo u r n a lis t s to

v i s i t the scene o f the crime, and both d id th e ir b e s t to make the v i s i t a pleasant one.

The most u p -to -d a te s le e p in g -c a rs

were provided by the Russians and aeroplanes by the Germans fo r th e ir gu ests; and in both cases, a ft e r a busy day among the corpses, these were served w ith smoked salmon, c a v ia re , champagne and other d e lic a c ie s .

In both cases a r e lig io u s

ceremony term inated the proceedingsÂť 3,

No d e fin it e conclusions can, I th in k , be drawn from

the d iffe re n c e s between German and Russian procedure, except perhaps that v/e 3 h a ll be s l i g h t l y more in c lin e d to c re d it the opinion of the in te rn a tio n a l experts brought to the spot by the Germans than the opinion o f a s c i e n t i f i c sub-commission composed e x c lu s iv e ly o f R ussians; fo r since i t would c le a r ly have strengthened th e ir case i f the Soviet Government had in v ite d B r it is h and American s c ie n t is t s to p a r t ic ip a t e in the in v e s tig a tio n , one can only suppose that a g u ilt y conscience prevented them from doing so, ened by the f a c t s , f i r s t ,

'This in c lin a t io n is stren gth ­

that P o lish v is i t o r s to the graves

(in c lu d in g members o f the Underground Movement) who hate Germans and Russians eq u ally were in no doubt that the l a t t e r had c a rrie d out the massacre; and secondly, that the jo u r n a lis t s who accompanied the Russian in v e s tig a to rs from Moscow were, with the exception o f Miss Kate

Harrlman, not

favou rably impressed by the Russian evidence or* the means by which i t was e li c i t e d .

4,

Both Germans and Russians r e lie d , among other things,

upon two classes o f testimony: f i r s t , v e rb a l testimony given at f i r s t or second hand by in d iv id u a ls who might be supposed to have personal knowledge o f what occurred at Katyn in A o r il and May 1940 (according to the German sto ry ) or in the la s t four months of 1941 (according to the Russian s t o r y ); and secondly, the fin d in g s o f experts who examined the corpses.

I t would,

I think, be f u t i l e to try to appraise the trustw orthiness o f the testimony of witnesses examined by eith er the German Government or the Russian Government.

Both were in a p o sitio n to intim idate

the s o ld ie r s , servan ts, peasants and other lo c a l resid en ts who were c a lle d upon to give evidence, and both are n otoriou sly prone to use intim idation.

Both a lle g e that m aterial w itnesses

had been murdered by the other sid e .

The Germans, fo r instance,

say that the Soviet Government i t s e l f gave orders fo r the destruction o f the executioners employed by them; w hile the Russians a ffirm that the Gestapo liq u id a te d no le s s than 500 Russian p rison ers who had been ordered to open the graves at Katyn and a s s is t with the examination o f the corpses,

i t was

f o r th is reason that my despatch Wo. 51 made no referen ce to any p a rt o f the v e rb a l evidence given to the German in v e s tig a to rs ; and fo r the same reason I do not propose to discuss s im ila r evidence given to the Russian in v e stig a to rs although i t occupies not le s s than nine tenths of th e ir re p o rt, 5.

Since I enclosed in my despatch Wo, 51 the fin d in g s

o f the German (in t e r n a t io n a l) S c ie n t ific Sub-commission, i t i s only f a i r that I should annexe to the present despatch the j. in dings of ohe Russian S c ie n t ific Sub-commission (s e e enclosure

1.0 , 2 ).

me fo llo w in g are the most important discrepan cies

between the two,

Bie German Sub-commission claims to have exhumed/

exhumed. 982 "bodies: the Russian 925«

The Germans say that "a

"considerable number oi‘ bodies were d isse c te d ": the Russians say "no extern al examination of the bodies ........ and no "m edico-legal examination o f the bodies ........ had been e ffe c te d "p re v io u sly ".

The Germans say that "there v/ere varying

"degrees of decomposition of the b od ies; that a la rg e number "o f sk u lls v/ere examined" fo r certain changes which only occur three years a fte r death, and that "th is change was observed to "a marked degree on s k u ll No. 526": the Russians say that "there are absolu tely no bodies in a condition o f decay or "d is in te g ra tio n ", that "the bodies had not remained in the earth "fo r long" and that "the shooting dates back t o ............. .. ’'between September and December 1941*"

The Germans say the

la te s t document found on any corpse was dated A p ril 22, 1940: the Russians say that numerous documents v/ere found with dates between September 12, 1940, and June 20, 1941*

I t would be

rash to draw any conclusions from these discrepancies; but i t would be very in te re stin g i f His M ajesty’ s M inister in Berne could get an opinion on the whole matter from Dr* N a v ille , Professor o f Forensic Medicine at Geneva, who was a member of the German Gub-commission, and is apparently the only n eutral

¿~c / u Ç 'f e *

and acc e ssib le expert from either side* 6*

Dismissing as more or le s s u n re lia b le the v e rb a l

accounts of supposed eye witnesses and the fin d in gs of the s c ie n t ific commissions on both sid e s, le t us summarize the Russian story and see whether i t a ffo rd s reason fo r doubting the conclusion te n ta tiv e ly reached in my former despatch on the su bject, namely that i t was by order o f the Soviet Government that the Polish o ffic e r s v/ere massacred, 7,

'Iho Russian report may be summarised as fo llo w s : Before/

J

<K a »

■

Before the capture o f Smolensk by the Germans, Polish prisoners were quartered in three camps 25 to 45 kilometres west o f Smolensk.

A fter the outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s the

camps could not be evacuated in time, and a l l the Polish war prison ers as w e ll as some members o f the guard were taken prisoner by the Germans.

Polish prisoners were seen working

on the roads round Smolensk in August and September 1941 but not la t e r .

German so ld ie rs frequ en tly combed the neighbouring

v illa g e s fo r escaped Polish prison ers.

Access to the

l o c a li t i e s where the executions took place was s t r i c t ly barred, but lo rry -lo a d s of Polish prisoners were often seen bein g driven th ith er and many shots were heard.

The report then

passes on to the spring of 1943 when the Germans were a lle g e d to have been preparing the ground fo r the announcements made on th eir broadcast system on A p ril 12th of that year, and states that witnesses were tortured by the Germans into givin g f a l s e evidence of Russian c u lp a b ilit y ; that 500 Russian p riso n ers, subsequently murdered, had been employed in March 1943 by the Germans to dig up the corpses and to introduce fo rged documents into their pockets, and that lo r r y -lo a d s o f corpses were brought to Katyn in March 1943,

in short

the

Russian case amounts to t h i s : - that the occupants o f the camps at K ozielsk, S torobielsk, and Ostashkov were moved in A p ril and May 1940 to three Russian labour camps near Smolensk, captured by the advancing German armies in July

1941 ,

and shot

at various dates during the subsequent four months, Q,

I f the evidence of the Soviet Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s witnesses

and experts could be tru sted , i t would be ju st p o ssib le to b e lie v e in the truth of the Russian story; but i t would nevertheless be very d i f f i c u l t to do so because i t makes at le a s t /

le a s t one esse n tia l assumption which is in c re d ib le , and because i t leaves altogeth er unexplained at le a s t one indisputable set of fa c ts which urgently req u ires explanation b e fo re we can accept the ooviet Government’ s account o f events* 9»

The Russian story assumes that about 10,000 Polish

o ffic e r s and men, employed on forced labou r, liv e d in the d is t r ic t of Smolensk from A p r il 1940 t i l l July 1941 and passed into German c a p tiv ity when the Germans captured i t in July 1941 without a s in g le one of them having escaped and fa lle n again into Russian hand3 or reported to a Polish consul in Russia or to the Polish Underground Movement in Poland*

This is quite

in c re d ib le : and not only is i t in c re d ib le to anyone who knows anything about p riso n e r-o f-w a r labour camps in Russia, or who pictures to him self the disorgan ization and confusion which must have attended the Russian ex it and German entry into Smolensk, but the assumption which I have described a3 e sse n tia l to the Russian case is a c tu a lly destroyed by the words o f the Russian in v e stig a tin g commission it s e lf *

The commission

asserts that many Polish prisoners did in fa c t escape a ft e r the d is t r ic t of Smolensk hud been overrun by the Germans, and describes the frequent"round-ups’1 of escaped prisoners which the Germans organized.

The Russian story gives no explanation

of why in these circumstances not a s in g le one of the Poles N

t

i

who were a lle g e d ly tran sferred from K ozielsk, o ta ro b ie lsk and Ostashkov to the labour camps Nos. 1 0. N. , 2 0. N. , and 3 0. N* has ever been seen or heard of a liv e again* 10*

Go much fo r the assumption e s s e n tia l to the cred ib­

i l i t y o f the Russian story,

'Hie unexplained set of fa c ts is

the same set o f fa c ts which has dominated th is controversy throughout, namely that from A p ril 1940 onwards no sin g le le t t e r or message was ever received by anybody from the Poles/

Poles who were u n til then at K ozielsk, otarobielsk and v*

Ostashkov (excepting the 400 to 500 sent to G riazovetz); that no sin gle enquiry about these men out of some 500 actu ally addressed "by the Polish Red Gross Society to the Soviet a u th o rities was ever answered, and that no enquiries "by representatives of the Polish Government e lic it e d any d e fin ite or consistent information about them from the Soviet Government* I f they had, as the Soviet Government now a lle g e , been tra n sfe rre d from Kozielsk, S tarobielsk and Ostashlcov to camps Nos* 1, 2 and 3 0*N*, why did not the Soviet Government

3 ay

so

long ago?

11*

To a l l th is I am a fr a id I can only re p ly , as I did

in my previous despatch on the same su bject, that, while "we do not know fo r certain who murdered the Polish o ffic e r s "bu ried at Katyn . . . the cumulative e ffe c t o f the evidence " i s to throw serious doubts on Russian disclaim ers of "re s p o n s ib ility "*

The defective nature of the report now

issued by the Russian commission of enquiry makes these doubts even stronger than they were b efo re.

Stronger anyhow in the

view o f w ell informed persons in the United Kingdom, fo r having made enquiries through appropriate channels, I am s a t is fie d that the

m ajority o f responsible B ritis h jo u rn a lis ts have

during the la s t nine months come round to the same opinions as I have

myself throughout*

Consistently with th is , the

Russian report was co ld ly received by the 3 r it is h press* 12*

Let us chink of these things always and speak of

them never.

To speak of them never is the advice which I

have been givin g to the Polish Government, but i t has been unnecessary*

They have received the Russian report in silence*

A f f li c t i o n and residence in th is country seem to be teaching them/

them how much "better i t is in p o l i t i c a l l i f e

to leave unsaid

those things about which one fe e ls most passion ately, I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, S ir , Your most obedient humble Servant,

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY V. Abrarinov, The M u rd erers o f K atyn (New York, 1993) N. Davies, H eart o f E u rop e: A S hort H istory o f P o la n d (Oxford, 2001) Deutsche Informationsstelle, A m tlich es M a teria l zum M a ssen m ord von K atyn (Berlin, 1943) L. FitzGibbon, The K atyn C over-U p (London, 1972) ------ , K atyn : U npitied a n d Unknown (London, 1975) -----

, The K atyn M em oria l (London, 1977)

S. Kot, C o n v ersa tio n s w ith the K rem lin a n d D esp a tch es fr o m R ussia (London, 1963) A. Paul, K atyn: S talin 's M a ssa cre a n d th e S eed s o f P olish R esu rrectio n (Annapolis, Maryland, 1996) Polish Cultural Foundation, The C rim e o f K atyn (London, 1965) US Congress House of Representatives, S e le c t C om m ittee o n th e K atyn F o rest M a ssa cre 1951-2, H ea rin gs (Washington DC, 1952) J.K. Zawodny, D eath in th e F o rest (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1962)

LIST OF PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FCO HISTORY NOTES H istory N otes are produced by the FCO Historians in the Records and Historical Department (RHD) o f the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. For information contact: Historians, RHD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Old Admiralty Building, London S W1 A 2AF; Tel: 020 7008 1125; e-mail: historians@fco.gov.uk Korea: Britain and the Korean W ar 1950-51:

1.

Ju n e 1990

S e c o n d e d itio n ( r e v is e d ) J a n u a r y 1 9 9 5 IS B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 53 7

The FCO: Policy, People and Places, 1782-1995:

2.

A p r il

1991

F i f t h e d itio n ( r e v is e d ) A u g u s t 1 9 9 7 IS B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 72 3

Locarno 1925: Spirit, suite, and treaties:

3.

O c to b e r

1991

S e c o n d E d i t i o n ( r e v is e d ) A u g u s t 2 0 0 0 IS B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 82 0

4. FCO Records: Policy, Practice and Posterity, 1782-1993:

A u g u st 1992

S e c o n d e d i ti o n ( r e v is e d ) N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 3 IS B N 0 9 0 3359 50 2 5 . FCO Library: Print, Paper and Publications, 1782-1993: ISBN 0 903359 49 9

Women in Diplomacy: The FCO,1782-1999:

6.

M a rc h

1993

M a y 1994

S e c o n d e d i ti o n ( r e v is e d ) M a y 1 9 9 9

ISBN 0 903359 78 2 7. "My Purdah Lady". The Foreign Office and the Secret Vote, 1782-1909: September 1994 IS B N 0 90 3 3 5 9 52 9

8. F C O

Library & Records,

1 7 8 2 -1 9 9 5 : Ju n e 1995

IS B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 55 3

9.

Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department

1 9 4 6 -4 8 : A u g u st 1995

(F re e )

IS B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 60 X

10.

The Katyn massacre: an SOE Perspective:

Fe b ru ary 19 96

IS B N 0 90 3 3 5 9 64 2

11. Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives:

S e p te m b e r 1 9 9 6

S e c o n d e d itio n ( r e v is e d ) J a n u a r y 1 9 9 7 IS B N 0 90 3 3 5 9 69 3

12.

Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives: Part II* M a y

I S B N 0 9 0 3 3 5 9 71 5

1997

13. British policy towards enemy property during and after the Second W orld W ar: April 1998 ISBN 0 903359 75 8 14. "A most extraordinary and mysterious business": The Zinoviev Letter of 1924: February 1999 ISBN 0 903359 774 15. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State: - A Brief History of the Office and its holders: April 2002 ISBN 0 903359 85 5