United Kingdom, United Nations and Divided World 1946

Cakl

101-

FCO

Ii

HISTORIANS

OCCASIONAL

PAPERS

No. 10 United

Kingdom,

United

Nations

and

divided

world

1946

Foreignand CommonwealthOffice

March 1995

FOREWORD The end of the Cold War has brought the functions and mechanisms of the in United Fifty Nations the years ago, once more under public scrutiny.

Second Allies World War, the the were concerned aftermath of victorious institutions their wartime coalition with establishing which would transform Occasional Papers into peacetime The in this edition of collaboration. essays Organisation World Britain's in, towards, the new and attitude role explore during 1946, the first full year of peace. Two of them, those by Dr Edward for Dr Johnson Louise Fawcett, a seminar and prepared were originally Editors Documents Overseas 30 British Policy hosted the the on of on which September

by Dr Ann Lane and myself are based 1992. Contributions in largely upon material DBPO the contained recently published volume on The United Nations: Iran, Cold War and World Organisation, 1946-1947.

Conference, At the time of the San Francisco British and statesmen United diplomats Nations.

They hoped the that were still optimistic about Council function for the the Security would as a great-power concert international States United that the of affairs, management would be committed henceforth to the maintenance of world peace, and that Union, Soviet disturb beginning to whose ambitions were already in London, be it bound by that would policymakers solemn obligations Clement hesitate Attlee October in 1945, to repudiate. announced, would intended his `to United Nations the the that government make success of foreign Yet, Dr Johnson in his their the primary object of policy'. as explains ideals during 1946 lofty dissipated. the course of such were soon paper, former Divisions the amongst wartime allies and misuse of the veto came Security Council British the to tiltyard to a and, while reducing close General Assembly for its delegates `vitality', the they praised also in instructions Russian `rigid their that their colleagues were complained in habits'. their and aloof demonstrate issue did to the absence of unity amongst the one more Council did Security the crisis that arose the than permanent members of Soviet Iran.

In her the paper, which examines over of northern occupation both during Allied in the context this question conduct and after the of Second World helped `bring the War, Dr Fawcett contends that Britain Cold War to Iran, by encouraging the Americans the Russians, alienating it finding itself in then a position was too weak to act alone'. and where Russia diplomats if British have much needed might well wondered in Persia Anglo-Russian encouragement. was almost as old as the rivalry Great Game and, in 1946, British Lane Dr had, suggests, to as officials in decide whether this or a new game was being played. Developments No

Soviet Stalin's ideology to achieve perceived and use of eastern 19th-century indicate that the to of methods and vocabulary ends seemed Cold War. In longer imperialism to the appropriate an emerging were no identify diplomats British to some success, endeavoured, not without event, the defence of British interests in Iran with the strategic requirements of American global strategy.

Europe,

in an attempt The British also ended by working closely with the Americans Spain.

Loathsome in United Nations Franco limit to pressure on the regime his Labour have been himself though the latter's to and survival might Ernest Bevin lead that to to might colleagues, was anxious avoid any move Soviet fresh civil war in Spain and a further influence of expansion Moreover, Franco's Spain have been to peripheral whilst westwards. may Cold United Nations War, its by the politics the of consideration As I British to establish precedents threatened to that the avoid. wished Foreign dangers in Office the the than my paper, argue was more aware of that the Organisation the benefits that could accrue from accepting might intervention international in domestic the sanction affairs of sovereign Council Like Security in the so many other matters raised and the states. in 1946 it was a question of principle General Assembly is as alive which Nations.

United today as it was at the foundation the of

Keith Hamilton Library and Records Department

Office

Foreign & Commonwealth HISTORIANS Occasional

Papers

March

No. 10

1995

CONTENTS Page United Britain the and Edward Johnson Britain, Louise

Coming Iran the and L'Estrange Fawcett

Bevin and Iran: Ann Lane

Great

DBPO:

of the

Game

Revisited: Non-Intervention Franco's Spain Nations and Keith Hamilton

Note

1946

Nations,

5

Cold

Cold as

22

War

33

War

Great in 1946

Britain,

the

United

Contributors on Volumes

Copies

46

64

published

of this pamphlet

and

in preparation

deposited be will

with

65

the National

FCO Historians, Library

Records and

Department,

Clive House, Petty France, London Crown Copyright ISBN 0 903359 56 1

SW 1H 9HD

Libraries

BRITAIN

AND THE UNTIED 1946

NATIONS

Edward Johnson

In September 1946, the Foreign Office prepared a draft brief for a speech General in the Attlee to the to be made by the Attorney government has United Nations (UN). Its first sentence noted that, 'the Prime Minister foreign factor in is United Nations that the the our overriding emphasised 1 In the event, this was scrubbed from the brief at the behest of the policy'.

Secretary, Ernest Bevin. 2 The removal Foreign sentence of the offending for indeed done because inaccuracy, Attlee had this claim made not of was 3 by foreign because UN in British but the the the role of policy, post-war beginning late summer of 1946, the Labour government to see that the was for. it had hoped UN was not quite the forum for international peace that in Soviet had by then enough behaviour The British the experience of UN the to see that the elevated role that some government organs of it had be The to to allotted was unlikely realised. purpose of this ministers is Attlee the to the attitudes examine and policy of government paper the UN in 1946 and to identify the reasons for the erosion of towards in British for UN the governmental circles. support in July Charter When the Attlee government UN 1945, to the came power San Francisco Conference. been had the signed at only recently States and to a lesser degree in Britain in the United Expectations were Organisation Nations Charter its high that the new United and would into did lapse The that the once more not conflict. grand world ensure Soviet USA, Union Britain held the the the and great powers, alliance of UN, be through their the that the promise could, cooperation wartime The indications into however the post-war world. of success were carried on Charter its the the structure and of new organisation were the mixed: hammered the allies the at the out among agreements product of from August to October Oaks Conference 1944. And, although Dumbarton the there had been an impasse over the nature of voting, and specifically Oaks, Dumbarton had been this the apparently role of great power veto at February Yalta in 1945. the at settled at conference wartime

1 FO 371 59755, Public Record Office, Kew. 2 See the minute by Gore Booth, 2 Oct. 1946, Ibid.

3 See Attlee's speech to the UN Nations Association at the Albert Hall, is in FO 371 50891.

5

10 Oct. 1945. A copy

The

UN that emerged as a result was the product of a planning process that had begun early in the war and which had been largely initiated by the US and British Soviet Chinese later to the governments and which and Roosevelt The began in February 1942 responded. governments government 4 in its planning for a post-war British began the peace, while with the Reconstruction Economic Department Foreign Office the and of under Gladwyn drawing Jebb Power Plan' for `Four the up a post-war Ă˝' The international in September 1942. subsequent process of organisation for hardening flowed through plans peace and post-war security ebbed and ideas the policy making process in both states and encompassed a range of for basis the the post-war organisation. as States' plans had evolved from a tension between universalism United for body form basis the the post-war and a of great power condominium as into the the post-war through the continuation of grand alliance world. idea had for four Roosevelt's been big China the three original powers, plus to act as enforcers of post-war security: this would be a great power alliance disarmed.

Roosevelt being four that the other states considered with all during had the war and the continuation worked well nations of this security be basis the should relationship order of any post-war and post-war Underneath for be this there to organisation. alliance room was regional Churchill by a position which was shared organisations, and early on by the British Foreign Office, but the four power alliance was to be dominant in 6 However, the enforcement the arguments security. of post-war against a favour in restricted organisation of a universal and regional structures international be to the proved organisation were compelling and eventually basis of the plans which the Americans British Dumbarton took to the and Oaks in 1944.

The

While

the idea of the great powers acting in alliance to maintain the favour in the security of of a universal post-war world was rejected international body embodying the sovereign equality of states, the UN's founders could not escape the dominant role of the major powers in the United Nations Organisation. Thus their importance was recognised in the 4 This February in 1942 of the Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign the creation was Policy which was divided into a number of sub-committees, one of which was a Special subInternational Organization committee on which met from October 19,42 until March 1943 Charter for a new international body; the basis of a draft and laid see RC Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Searchfor Post .

War Security, (London: University of North Carolina (Press, 1990), pp. 6-19, and C Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), pp. 1626-33, and 1639-1640.

5 See FO 371 31525.

6 See Hull op.cit., pp. 1642-43.

in

Security

Council

the and them veto to the permanent granted status United founders In bestowed the of taking this step, the powers on them.

Nations recognised allies would that the cooperation of the major wartime Without for the success of the organisation. be a pre-requisite the hope lay UN to could not cooperation and goodwill of all three powers the the basis of a post-war world order.

The UN in British Policy - 1945 Nations in United What then was the British government's the position on 1945? In order to answer this question we have to examine the reasons why first for in British the the place. embarked peace on the process of planning for British The There were a number this. proposals that were of reasons American 1942 onwards drawn up from September the that presupposed be lines thinking to establish a post-war would along some government Thus felt be British international the to the organisation. able to need US ideas in to their overtures with some of own order to establish respond for initiator British the position as an government's of plans peace and not a follower In did lose British to the any particular, of others. not wish rn.ere States interests United British initiative to the to protect and wished international Power The Four through plan organisation. any post-war Britain's be post-war position would weakened and visualized the recognised British interests of and world power status as a and protection promotion Britain's for international in body. fundamental support a post-war element for British to the a postan added support was moreover in for British US into lay the to tie the the need which war organisation Set hostilities. the after against the end of assuming global responsibilities from USA, had its isolationist the triggered tradition absence which of the international League of Nations, of a post-war organisation membership foreign dedicated to peace was a means of justifying a global policy while idea US Thus that the to the moral sentiments public. any of appealing British plans for the United Nations were based on some form of sentiment 7 faulty.

Utopianism was clearly or expression of woolly

There

dimension

in British differences However, there were some circles governmental within Nations in British United be 1945 on the priority the the to to role of given in Labour foreign policy. The political leadership the government were of Attlee UN. In internationalist keen the their particular, supporters of spirit, Party Labour internationalism the the traditional, and was of embodied 7 See Lord Gladwyn Principles United Nations: Charles Webster in `Founding the and citing Objects' in E Jensen and T Fisher (eds), The United liingdam - The United Nations, (London: .

Macmillan, 1990) p. 36.

7

Nations.

He had chaired to the success of the United greatly committed Armistice Post-war Committee had the important and which played a for the end of hostilities leading role in planning and played a consistent in idea international Bevin the part promoting of a post-war organisation. had also been a member APW but Bevin realised, the of committee, Attlee UN distinct British that the possibly after could not supplant a foreign policy: it could be an important in that policy but not, at least part in 1945, a substitute for it. He saw, in the w; -, that Jebb's original Four Power Plan had done, that Britain's freedom (' action would be restricted in the post-war for United Nations be that the world and support would defending Britain's interests one means of global as well as retaining Britain's world power status. 8 In addition State, Philip Noel-Baker, to these there was Bevin's Minister of 'an unrivalled internationalism disarmament, ' and a champion of and international to ensure post-war passionate advocate of an organisation 9 It Noel-Baker Charles Webster, Professor peace. was along with another international did for the ardent supporter of organisation, most of who work in UN San the British the preparatory the government stage of after Francisco and before the UN met for the first time in 1946.10 At the official Sir Alexander level, Cadogan Underthe Permanent Secretary Foreign Office had been deeply involved in the wartime the at discussions on the UN and had represented Britain Halifax along with at Dumbarton Oaks. He had therefore formation key in the played a role of importance the UN Charter the to the UN was and that Attlee attached demonstrated Cadogan, have to move to when who might expected Washington, Britain's first permanent was appointed to the representative UN in February 1946.

Support

for

UN and an understanding the the of position and the of behind it forcibly Gladwyn by Jebb, in July 1945 in realities were expressed I I his 'Reflections San Francisco'.

Jebb Sought to contrast the enthusiasm on interest in the UN which the American and public expressed, to the cynical disillusion felt, as he saw it, by the British. Jebb was keen to stress the vital 8 See A Bullock, Ernest Benin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, (London: Heinemann, 1983) pp.

110-111.

9B Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) p. 94.

10 Ibid.

11 Documents British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series I, Volume I, The on Conferenceat Potsdam (HMSO, 1984). No. 407. Other volumes in Series I cited in this paper 1991) and Volume VII, The United are Volume VI, Eastern Europe, 1945-1946 (HMSO: Nations: Iran, Cold War and World Organisation, 1946-1947, (HMSO: 1995). .

Charter formation in had the the and of role that the played initiatives: British identified it to those parts of which owed their origins 99 important 1,2,23,24,25,37,38,44,47-50 the article articles and In Secretary General interventionist UN the the addition role. giving an Economic Staff Committee Military British the suggestion and was a purely in Social Council Bruce which report was and on the was modelled Colonial Policy ideas: British Declaration the was also accordance on with British Jebb British in In that the this, noted essentially origin. spite of UN5 in the the to their of creation not emphasise achievements appeared letting the USA take the leading light instead. This was mistaken because 12 The UN Britain's, 'major foreign the achieved objectives'. political Nations United bound the Soviet the USA to its global responsibilities, it difficult Union to solemn obligations, be to repudiate, and which would British

independence integrity the of small states, an gave security and factor for the British government. important Although this paper did not behalf British it the reflect any official attitude on of government, received the support of some Foreign Office colleagues and Bevin did see it. Webster its Reconstruction jG Ward Department the content while praised of was for distributed Office be Foreign to to the press a circular stimulated with HMG's the line that the, 'UNO conveying and the rest of'Whitehall was impressing first Depts it (sic) the need to make main objective and on all a f3 priority and a success'. to

Foreign Office the officials within were not so sanguine about the United Nations however.

After Cadogan UN, Sir the to the role of went Orme Sargent replaced him as Permanent According Under-Secretary. to Charles Webster, Sargent was keen to reduce the importance UN in the of foreign in British the policy and undertook a change personnel within 14 department Reconstruction UN's the aimed at undermining prominence.

Secretary, Permanent It is also interesting to note that when Deputy for the paper, 'Stocktaking Sargent had been responsible VE Day' after for British foreign to provide pointers policy at the end of the which aimed This for Wartime Foreign in Europe.

Eden then paper, prepared war Secretary made no reference to the post-war international body. 15 Other

There role

Office in Foreign thus tension the some was about the appropriate that the UN should play in British foreign policy at the beginning of

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., the minutes by Webster, 19 Sept. 1945 Sept.

Ward, 20 1945. and

14 R Smith Soviet Charles Officials British Webster British Bevin, in `Ernest citing and Macmillan, Policy 1945-47' in A Deighton, (ed) Britain and the First Gold War, (London: 1990) p. 39.

15 See DBPO, Series I, Volume I, No. 102.

9

1946. And, moreover, UN there was a dilemma the the about role should in While built the play post-war politics. organisation was on great power Soviet Union inclined the to support unity and cooperation, was more a division of the world into spheres of influence, Frank three-way something Roberts from Moscow September in Ward 1945.16 made clear noted the British dilemma, that any failure of Britain and the US to endorse this role for the UN would lead to Soviet sabotage of the organisation, while at the British US bargain the time, the same could not expect . support any over 17 influence, for US iversalism UN. spheres of given the support and the u.

The

British

Nations United linked the therefore to position on closely was the position on the Soviet Union. As the UN was based on the cooperation in in UN, the their the of major powers, any rift relations would show up in UN the the and conversely souring of relations would eflect the policy line towards the Soviet Union.

From 1946 onwards senior officials in the Foreign Office began to adopt a much firmer line towards the Soviet Union Soviet from behaviour, backing the they and a position received which of Bevin, although he was prepared the benefit of to give the Soviet Union 18 doubt Roberts long in the they sent a stream of' after were. particular dispatches from Moscow in which he sought to explain Soviet behaviour and for British United With to the provide recommendations policy. regard Roberts Nations, in March Union Soviet 1946 that the noted would see the UN as a body based on the cooperation allies and that of the wartime if that cooperation fractured, then so would the UN. The Soviet Union UN interests its be the that to the would ensure could never used against Roberts international Soviet that that the extent conceded of conception 19 Soviet terms. negotiations was predicated on reaching agreement on In

to this type of advice, addition Soviet by attitudes provided was Ministers, in Soviet backed actions Eastern Europe generally and in the Britain Propaganda

for this hardening the ammunition of behaviour Foreign in the Council of in their occupied zone of Germany, in forums of the United Nations.

Soviet Union in UN 1946 the the and

Veto the and

in the Security

Council:

16 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 30.

17 Ward minute 8 Oct. 1945 FO 371 50826.

18 For a discussion of the change in British attitudes towards the Soviet Union, see Smith, op.

Rothwell, Britain Cold V. War, 1941-1947, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982) the cit., and and chap. 5 passim.

19 See DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 82.

The basic difference UN the the to among emerge when great powers was General Assembly and the Security Council met for the first time in London in January it was clear that the allied cooperation 1946. From the beginning for the success of the UN was going to be a hard won so necessary It seems to be the case that the British were eager to avoid commodity. display discord in forums United Nations.

An the the any public of early of indication Iranian trying to the of this was the British policy stop of bringing Council Security in before the Iranian the government situation January 1946. The British wished to avoid an open and public rupture of Soviet Union, instead the through with relations preferring a resolution diplomatic Soviet Union Iranians: the channels the with and a course by US by Iranians the the themselves. government opposed and The Soviet Union did not appear to be so inclined to avoid a break with her wartime in Iranian issue had the allies and certainly them not once put Council. dock It Council Assembly for the the the the the of was use of and Soviet by Union the purposes propaganda combined with the abuse of the Council in inflamed Anglo-Soviet the that veto relations and aggravated an already worsening condition.

During

the first

session of the Security Council, the Soviet Union raised a number of questions on the agenda which appeared to be aimed at causing the British government maximum embarrassment as well as complicating friendly In Greece Indonesia the relations with western states. cases of and immediately, Ukrainian were which raised almost the Soviet and focused the attention delegations Council British the the of on presence of In Greece the British were charged by the Soviet troops in those territories. delegation being international The threat to a with peace and security.

Soviet move was a response to having the Iranian brought before the case Council It had Greece the time. the same at previously raised subject of at Council Potsdam in Foreign Ministers the and of and clearly wished to humiliate drive US between the British them the and a wedge and had been American hostility towards British there government as a popular 20 Greece in Greek In the the the actions at end of war. relating case to Bevin noted that Gromyko had refused to accept a statement the Cabinet, from the chairman Security Council British had the that the of not presence 21 The immediate had been the alleged threat. constituted situation through the use of the consensus procedure resolved all sides whereby Council by the sense the the accepted a statement chairman of summarising However, brusque language the the the of arguments of all parties. use of

20 See GL Goodwin, Britain United Nations, (London: the and .

21 CM(13) 46,7 Feb. 1946, CAB 128/5.

11

OUP,

1957), p. 74.

and open dependent

did condemnations not serve the position on great power cooperation.

UN the of

irum as a1

Ukrainians had f端r In the Indonesian the to case, called a commission investigate the presence of British troops in the territory: this the British but Dutch the opposed merely refused to endorse any terms of reference be The Dutch to the troops allow presence examined. which would Council, Ukrainian in failed Bevin had but had the supporting resolution been forced to warn van Kleffens, the Dutch UN to the that epresentativf: in Far East if British the Dutch government the could not expect support 22 disassociated Council. in from difficulties British they themselves the This apparent Soviet policy to the of seeking to cause embarrassment British by using the Council as an instrument heightened of propaganda was by what the British saw as the misuse of the veto in the Council.

The veto had been a source dispute Oaks Dumbarton to the extent of at of 23 Conference future UN. the very success of the threatening of the and the It was a major area of discord among the great powers and in essence went to the core of the understanding that each had on the role that the UN in international All had the should play post-war relations. great powers of been agreed on the need for a veto to be exercised solely by them in the Security Council body, its but the the of new post-war extent of use was to divide them at Dumbarton Oaks and was only to be resolved, and then it Conference Yalta in February 1945. temporarily, the would seem only at The British position at Dumbarton Oaks had been that the veto should not be used when one of the great powers was itself a party to the dispute discussion.

This lines that to act as a the under argument was supported on judge in justice.

But restraining one's own case offended against natural in there was also a political that the British were sensitive to the argument, if it would look like that view an absolute veto right were to be sanctioned, the endorsement, through the UN, of a great power hegemony which would UN be if the to the undermine effectiveness of only smaller powers were UN It in Britain's the subjects the of action. case alienate would, Commonwealth it those states and smaller powers which was vital to include in one successful operation of the UN. 24

Soviet delegation US The position the the team at of and part of Oaks had been in favour of the right of absolute veto by the Dumbarton The the great powers, as a recognition of realities of post-war world politics.

22 CM(14) 46,11 Feb. 1946, CAB 128/5.

23 See Hilderbrand, 183-208. op. at., pp.

24 See Hilderbrand Series DBPO, 185 I, Volume and op. cit., p.

12

1, No. 407.

in the unrestricted use of veto was essential order to retain great-power to avoid the situation smaller powers took unity and moreover whereby decisions in the Security Council then obliged some of the great which interests.

In to their powers act against response to the view that the great be thus against powers would able to avoid action an enforcement themselves, were they to be aggressors, the supporters of the absolute veto in line the that of argument effect signify such a situation would adopted the demise of the UN an yway and render the veto and other parts of the 25 meaningless. organisation The

British

impasse key in by breaching to the the play were a role veto Yalta.

While the compromise proposing still at which at was accepted Oaks, Cadogan be Dumbarton that the suggested great powers should not in if the to that they themselves veto use procedural allowed matters, and dispute, during denied be to they the the a would right of veto were parties VI of the [what was to become chapter first stages of pacific settlement Charter].

However, the realities of the post-war world, and again reflecting they could retain the right of veto as parties to a dispute when enforcement Charter]. [what be VII to the action was contemplated was chapter of Oaks, Although it Dumbarton this did not gain acceptance at was Roosevelt by US the adopted subsequently and government and eventually

by Stalin at Yalta26, and was incorporated into the UN Charter as article 27.

However

Soviet to they experience what considered were abuse in the the the of of weeks of start of proceedings veto within a matter Security Council.

Thus where the `Yalta formula' had been designed to the secure great power cooperation while at the same time not alienating Union deliberately Soviet be to the appeared smaller powers, using the disclose divisions between the the to among great powers, not only veto itself and Britain but also between Britain and the USA, to a lesser degree, Roberts Bevin, France.

The Soviet Union to to was, as was explain defending its interests in an organisation in which it was in a minority. the British

In February 1946, for example, the Soviet Union and Egypt charged AngloFrench forces in the Lebanon and Syria with being a threat to international for designed in This pro the quo peace and security. part as a quid was 25 See Hilderbrand 184. op. cit., p.

26 See D Dilks (ed), The Diaries Cassell, 1971), Sir Alexander Cadogan (London: 1938-1945, of Cadogan Series disputes DBPO, Volume I, No. Hilderbrand 669 I, 407. that was the p. and source of the compromise and claims Leo Pasvolsky, the US government's chief planner on 210for Hilderbrand, the pp. war post organisation was responsible op. Cit., proposal; see 211.

Council, Security but Iranian the the also case on agenda of placing of the In Western US the the tensions a to create event, powers. amongst Anglo-French troops would withdraw that resolution expressing confidence Soviet by delay the on the government ostensibly was vetoed without but likely been it had Soviet to carried more not amendments grounds that British French deny in order the public the to governments and 27 Council.

August from In 1946, Security the the of support endorsement Soviet Union also vetoed a US resolution which called for the creation of a Greek Ukrainian investigate to government charges that the commission international threat to conflict with the peace and was .,rovoking was a Albanians.

While this had the effect of dropping the charges against the Greeks revealed the erosion of great power unity on the public stage. in its 1946, three of times to all, resorted veto nine Soviet issues.

The British right to accepted the which were on membership by for doubted but the the reasons offered membership, veto applications Trans-Jordan Soveit delegates for their conduct.

Thus, Eire, Portugal and Soviet diplomatic because did have the they relations with were vetoed not Mongolia Albania Union, 28 and as a quid pro quo for the exclusion and of from the UN through Western pressure on the General Assembly.

In

the Soviet

Union

Council, Security his views on the opening In relaying the weeks of Cadogan `a let it be known being that the Council used as, was clearly forum for mischievous divorce that the propaganda' of economic and and Security from Council its the the continuous nature of social affairs and Soviet Union licence the the to sessions compounded situation and gave a Cadogan that these to exploit it for propaganda purposes. was convinced Council frivolous factors issues be the two to encouraged raised and that Cadogan's further besides Bevin that role needed a of security. agreed with diagnosis but felt that it was too early in the day [April] to seek a 29 remedy. increasing the the to cause of use and abuse of question veto was become it British 1946 throughout to the more of a and was to concern in issue Cabinet discussed 1946 in The 1947. the and early problem Soviet Union in being by the that the veto was already abused recognised it directly issues, it that concerned, only to then with which was was raising 30 formal In February decision. to record a which sought veto any resolution

The

27 See Goodwin, 73. p. cit., op.

28 See Annex III to brief Right Veto, FO The 371 59789. to on 29 See Cadogan to Bevin, 18 Apr. 1946 Cadogan, Bevin to and 800/508.

30 CM(16) 46,18 Feb. 1946, CAB 128/5.

14

27 Apr.

1946, FO

31 Bevin gained Cabinet to seek a review of the use of the veto, approval Cabinet March but from this position By British the the were to retreat.

Charter, follow to the accepted that any change could only an amendment 32 October, Foreign in By harm the than good. which would result more Office noted that the British would prefer to retain the right of veto, 33 and Bevin's line Britain the Cabinet that supported should seek an agreement Soviet Union last be the that the of used as a weapon veto would with Council.

Security functioning to the the resort and not as one obstruct of however The British sought to avoid the convening of a public special Council if to the and preferred, of conference possible, more private use forum in Foreign Ministers as a which to reach agreement on the operation 34 But doubt there the that the proceedings veto. of was also no of the Security Council Charter had undermined in UN the and that confidence Council Security for in being, the the time the was regarded, as useless 35 international of peace. maintenance

The Role of Armed Forces and the Military Stiff Committee In addition to the direct attacks by the Soviet Union on the presence of British territories, troops in non-enemy the Soviet Union also sought to force the British and Americans to divulge the number of troops they had in line British these the countries, stationed a which saw as another way of 36 British Soviet Union had The troops. the making same point about raised it in the Security Council in 1946, but the resolution had been thrown out.

This merely indicating its intention led to the Soviet Union to table a first General in Assembly in York New the the to resolution second part of Office The Foreign the autumn the were opposed to the of same year.

Soviet it Bevin lead to the the that concern could move: expressing forces American in British many parts of the world, strengths and of Germany Austria, including becoming knowledge, and general eventually '37 interest divulge in 'not time. to at the present which was, our common Soviet The Chiefs of Staff were also emphatically to the proposed opposed fearing 'such disclosures Anglo-American that, give away move would for Greece in ' in British Iraq, in Europe and return weakness weakness and 38 The problem for the British was that the inaccurate Russian information.

31 Ibid.

32 CM(27) 46,25 Mar. 33 FO 371 59787.

1946, CAB

128/5.

34 CM(99) 46,21 Nov. 1946, CAB 35 See minute FO 371 59787.

36 See FO 371 59789.

128/6.

37 See Bevin to Inverchapel, 21 Oct. 1946, FO 371 59789.

38 See a copy of COS(155) 46 of 21 Oct. 1946, in FO 371 59790.

Chiefs Staff US State Department US the of would not support and Byrnes irritated Britain The British irritated this. that that were were on General Senator Vandenberg's UN Byrnes had accepted that the view 'town Assembly the, meeting and could not oppose was of the world' 39 inclusion items The British these types the of of agenda. were on however, able in part to deflect this attempt to embarrass them and create friction Russians Americans in by the the the turning the tables on with General Assembly for Bevin disclosures linked the typt ; of to asked when Staff Co; '-jmittee: when that had been the successful working of the Military British I; the to provide the established, government prepared would 40 information issue hesitation.

By the required of the without raising Military Staff Committee, the British were able to target the Soviet Union in ball back for failure MSC the their to work. the the and put court of Staff Committee The role of the Military in become to the was embroiled deteriorating from its 1946-48 the that relations among great powers such function Staff fulfilled.

The idea Military the primary was never of Committee had been a British one in order to give some direction to article 43 of the UN Charter League had that the which rectified a weakness for armed forces to be made available faced by providing to the Security Council in its enforcement there was role. In spite of its British origins, difference British for the the some within policy making community need on UN forces its feasibility.

Staff The Chiefs armed and a were not of idea forces the they sceptical of unnaturally of standing armed which 'moonshine'41 but they were aware that the political considered necessity of 'realism'.

Also, the their among seeking agreement major power overrode Foreign Office doubts UN feasibility the the the within of a armed over force and the success of the Military Staff Committee the more reflected divisions in Office the towards the UN. By the end of 1946, it was general differences there that were clear among the major powers on the nature of it by the force to be provided to the UN and the principles which which would operate.

Staff The British Military tabled the to position was of a sub-committee Committee in a paper, 'The Size and General Forces Location the at of 42 Disposal Security Council'.

This the the of of a statement constituted British held that the on the provision of armed understandings government Stafr forces and their underlying joint Planning It based on a principles. was 39 See Invercha.

Oct. FO FO, in 371 59789.

19 1946 to the pel 40 See FO 371 59795.

41 Jebb in Fisher and Jensen, op. rit., p. 34.

42 COS(46) 60 27 Feb. 1946. This CAB be but is A be in 80/100 missing. copy can should found in FO 371 57065.

16

43 Foreign in had been the memorandum, with consultation and prepared Office and approved Cabinet in March by the Defence Committee the of Staff Chiefs keen 1946.44 Iii this statement the of were of understandings, forces UN large that any to ensure that the was not provided with such British contribution did insignificant, they wish to see the would appear nor develop into exercise one which any one state to sustain permitted inclined large forces.

The British to support excessive and unnecessary were

by UN members to put all their forces at the idea of an open commitment UN, for the the disposal thereby the of a specific and curtailing need 45 And, in by British. the embarrassing pledge potentially a restatement British the against regionalism, position expected to see all great powers involved in any combined Military the the military operation aegis of under Staff Committee, thereby the tendency resisting of any one state to by dominating increase its influence in UN military particular operations 46 regions.

France and China While the USA, to the submitted similar statements MSC sub-committee by the requested date of April 1946, the Soviet Union did not move until September.

This delay on the part of the Soviet Union divisions how impasse should be managed. the apparent on created some Without by Committee, Military Staff the the all a statement members of the UN could not move forward on the provisions under article 43 and this inevitably lack in Security Council's the create a would of' confidence international deal The delay to threats to capacity with peace and security. by the Soviet Union linked Germany to probably was problems over 47 Council in Foreign Ministers, Office Foreign the the encountered of and Chiefs Staffdisagreed in be the the to taken to resolve the and of approach difficulty.

Bevin was opposed to discussion UN the on nature of armed 48 forces being allowed to aggravate Soviet Union, relations with the and Sargent instructed highlight the Foreign Office News department to the not 49 Staff Military Committee discussions.

Although deadlock in the apparent line to be taken against the the Chiefs of Staff pressed for a far harder Russians, 50 the Foreign Office took the view that while there was still hope it be 43, of reaching agreements under article would unwise to criticise the

43 See JP(46) 21,11 Feb. 1946 CAB 84/78.

44 DO(46) 9th mtg, 27 Mar. 1946 CAB 131 / 1.

45 COS(46) 60, FO 371 57065.

46 COS(46) 60 Annex, FO 371 57065.

47 British delegation May FO 57069.

UN FO, 371 17 1946, the to the at 48 Ward's minute 31 May 1946, FO 371 59666.

49 Sargent 18 June 1946, FO 371 57069. memorandum, 50 L,t_Col Haddon of the COS Secretariat to Sargent, 15 June 1946, FO 371 59666.

17

Union publicly. 51 The Foreign Office did recognise however that if, Conference, Paris Peace the after no movement was possible on the Staff Committee, it might be necessary for the British to consider Military Soviet importance Union, but the this that proceeding was of such without it would need to be discussed at Cabinet level. 52 Soviet

fact Soviet Union did in this the course of action as were saved force UN MSC to the submit a statement of principles on a ar-ied subin September The 1946.53 committee effect of this was to show that the Soviet Union fairly in it UN force, but the clear was expected of' a what including British The the western powers, major areas of were not so sure. division, which were to persist beyond 1946, lay in the Soviet insistence on from UN length the time each equal contributions permanent member, of a force should stay in the field and the location of forces designated for UN differences These MSC the the with work. other members of underlined Soviet Union held that the divergent the the views and western powers towards the role of the UN. The insistence on equal contributions was a Soviet Union dictate force, UN the to the the and way of allowing size of Soviet demand UN the that the and air naval especially elements, while forces withdraw UN three to that after months was an attempt ensure any did in Soviet toehold the to not gain a operation parts of close world interests. There was every indication be that initial UN intervention would by air and naval forces, precisely those in which the USA and Britain would be strongest, and the three month deadline sought to deny any western long banner Soviet Union UN. Finally term intervention the the the under as of it sought to deny for others the use of forces had no imperial territories, down for UN duty in imperial demanding force by that marked possessions UN in the to the national homeland. contributions should reside The

British

In contrast to the Soviet Union, the British position on contributions was based on the principle Equal those of comparability with of other states. for the British as they could not hope to contributions were a non-starter US in its Soviet Union in land the the match naval and air power nor However, British forces did British the that army. position would consider be roughly equivalent to those of the USA and the Soviet Union, which did 54 jell The British to the not appear with principle of comparability. position 51 Sargent to Hollis, 1July 1946, FO 371 59666.

52 Ibid.

53 A FO is in 371 59670. this copy of 54 COS(46) 60, FO 371 57065. The British also sought to include bases and logistic support but the principle of vaNing contributions as which could offset manpower contributions, these was never made clear; see, aide-memoire prepared for the COS, JP(47)30(F), 18 Mar. 1947, in DEFE 6/1. The British representatives to the Military Staff Committee were later

18

length UN forces location deployed be time their on of could and also on Chiefs before deployment interests.

The based British were on protection of Staff deadline the three of rejected month as militarily unsound, while the British demanded that forces allocated to the UN did not need to be based homeland Soviet Union the the on the state's territorial suggested: as freedom British position was understandably to of allow one which sought forces, down for UN including to those movement station a range of marked duty if necessary, Britain's the the across globe most of and make 55 shortage. manpower The divisions within the Military Staff Committee were to rumble on until August 1948 when in effect the deadlock over both principles and then the demise idea to the the size of contributions was cause of of a premature UN armed force under article 43 of the Charter.

It is interesting to note Staff Committee that the discussions in the Military never even approached field force in the very difficult the subjects of control once nor the of any financing. in is factors It issues have been these question of which major forces VII have subsequent peacekeeping which not operated under chapter Charter.

How important UN been have the to then they of more a would force its have through enforcement created political which would results 56 One intervention? feeling help discussions in Military the that the cannot Staff Committee issues these central were always avoiding and that the deterioration factor in the the general allied relations of was prime deadlock: its the MSC issues were merely a reflection this of not cause.

But, it is instructive to see that the British were not prepared to see the MSC discussions worsen a set of relations that were already plummeting.

The General Assembly: The

British had always wished to see the UN as near a universal body as but possible, at the same time accepted that the great powers should play a in international dominant the maintenance of role peace and security.

While the Soviet Union could use its veto in 1946 to defend its interests in in largely Western dominated body the Council, the Assembly was still a Soviet Union its isolated the and client states were relatively and which from which there was no escape through the veto. Even so, the Assembly forum in diplomacy flourish: which open was a could a method which was British if its to the anathema government, especially object was to create Soviet to admit that the British position on contributions that the of was not as clear as Union; see Annex to BMS(48), 6 July 1948, FO 371 72696.

5`' See the later DO(47) 47,27 May 1947, CAB 131/4.

56 This from is E Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, The Years of Western point , Domination 1945-1955, (London: Macmillan, 1982) pp. 103-104.

19

bad

feeling

amongst

the

major

powers

through

the

dissemination

of

propaganda.

In his summary first the the the of proceedings second part of of session of Assembly 1946, Bevin Soviet Union's the General that the of noted Molotov Vyshinsky little flexibility in representatives, their and showed 57 in being, `rigid instructions in habits'. they their positions, their and aloof The Soviet delegation was there to create pro) ins and their proposals on had not been tabled in good but troop information th rather to embarrass ti American Aiýoo the committees the British and governments. of' the Assembly had in some cases been operated dishonestly as in the example of Committee Manuilsky the Political the under chairmanship of and Sobolev. 58 In others, there were signs of future difficulties for the British as in the Fourth Committee in which the general atmosphere was tense as delegations intent for the some of were upon pressing widespread political independence for development the economic with no regard and social of 59 discussion.

In Secretary State the territories this, the under support of of for Colonial Affairs noted that there was evidence from this Committee beyond that states with no colonial to the responsibilities were eager go Charter by conferring a power of UN supervision on all colonial territories, 60 development a which was unfortunate.

Bevin was not too despondent however about the working Assembly the of in 1946, but he wished had been more the US delegation active.

Throughout the session in New York from October to December, the Americans had shown a lack of direction: Byrnes had been a let down, and Dulles, Vandenberg Mrs Roosevelt although and were more respected, the British were finding it necessary to take the lead in playing the western hand, which presumably it directly firing Soviet in line the put more of 61 attack.

Not

for 1946, everything the British though. In October was gloom the progress of the UN in the social, economic and cultural welcomed

Bevin fields

57 Bevin to Attlee, 4 Jan. 1946 (sic), relaying his Observations on the 2nd part of the Ist session General Assembly Oct-Dec 1945 (sic) in FO 800/508.

It should be noted that this is the of dated in the original in 1946 and the wrongly and should refer to the Assembly meeting memorandum

be dated

1947.

`'8 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 See the Cabinet paper, CP(47)5,16 Jan. 1947, the memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CAB 129/16; the background briefs to this can be found in CO 936/l/5.

61 Bevin to Attlee, Observations, 3 Jan. 1946 (sic) FO 800/508.

20

for in his keen he the specialised agencies, and to express and regard was 62 British in UN's forums during the the the year. performance Conclusion UN 1946 drew to a close, an audit on the British experience the of justified have Bevin's Shawcross's changing would statement on the role of in British foreign policy. In particular the organisation the way the Security Council, the centre-piece of the UN in which great power cooperation was failed live its had disappointment, to to up vital, expectations was a major Bevin, least The had to not who was never as optimistic as others. veto been misused thereby impairing in which, by the usefulness of the Council, late 1946, the British had no confidence.

Sargent, never a great believer in in November UN, declare doubts Bevin Britain's that the suggested should Security Council.

Bevin the the effectiveness about of was to publicly desist, 63 but he had already indicated to Attlee his disappointment with it, 64 and in a private meeting with the representatives of the permanent 6 his lack in it. members was to state of trust As

Bevin

had British UN hopes the their the and as government pinned on for had The British the conduit continuation of great power cooperation. important how UN by they the they the personnel shown regarded Cadogan likes to them, the appointed represent specifically and the of British Military Staff Committee.

And, the the team the members of on British had shown themselves UN to the to emphasize anxious not use differences with the Soviet Union, a policy which appeared to have reaped few gains at the end of the year. Perhaps as George Kennan, the American interpreter State Department international realist official, of politics and in Roberts: his Frank noted memoirs, author of containment, and echoing Stalin UN flawed in it importance the that the to sense attached only was influence. in so far as it maintained hegemony great power and spheres of The UN would thus be expected to serve as a way of enlisting British and for American in the these the climate maintenance support of spheres and 66 1946, this was not possible. of

62 Bevin to Attlee, [n. d], notes for a Commons debate for 22-23 Oct. 1946, FO 800/508.

63 See the correspondence between Sargent and Bevin, 27 Nov. 1946, FO 371 59720.

64 Cadogan to Attlee Bevin, FO 7 Nov. 800/508.

1946, relaying views of 65' See Peck's minute relaying Bevin's position in FO 371 59720.

66 G Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (London: Hutchintion, 1968) p. 220.

21

BRITAIN,

IRAN

AND THE Louise

COMING

L'Estrange

OF THE

COLD

WAR

Fawcett

Cold War Britain's in the the origins of was seen role quite recently dominated by Cold War historiography two was as a relatively minor one. laid the the competing schools which orthodox and revisionist approaches: Union Soviet United feet for the the the and of conflict at responsibility having States respectively.

Rightly other players were seen as or wrongly, 1980s however, importance.

By this picture the was only peripheral in beginning the opening to change, resulted of state archives some foreign British some new policy, and produced pioneering of studies Cold in War its impact The context. a and significance conclusions about during have `post-revisionist' the past that appeared works wave of so-called 1 Britain's decade or so bear testimony to this rediscovery of role.

Until

in Iran, British has Post-revisionism, to the policy meant case of as applied from Britain's that of a minor to a major actor, and to some role elevating for Cold War, `blame' large the the part of a extent thereby transferring United States, Union Soviet the the to to either or previously attached interpretations has necessarily The move away from traditional Britain. in Iran British I, and elsewhere. policy of a number of critiques produced British have that things, policy was argued, among other among others, destabilising it Iran by `hypocrisy that to was and arrogance', characterised Cold War into helped conflict, turn the country while a zone of and hastening the demise of British influence in the region. 2 detail in in but I I will return these more a moment, to some of points `over-zealous' first like to respond to a question sometimes asked of would have been in namely too we not search of new evidence: post-revisionists hard on Britain? I would say no. I don't think we have. In my book Iran and the Cold War. I was equally hard on the Russians, and only slightly less hard Americans in for latter it is difficult the the their on to case see why not in Iran, in contrast to their wartime had been previous involvement allies, What I would say is that if British policy in Iran often appears in minimal.

Given be it to retrospect unjustifiable, was nonetheless understandable.

I For a survey of the literature and competing approaches with particular reference to British policy, see Anne Deighton's introduction to her edited volume Britain and the First Cold War, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 1-7.

2 See Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War. The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), and my contribution to Anne Deighton, ofi. cit., `Invitation to Cold War: British Policy in Iran, 1941-1947', pp. 184-200.

22

East, Middle in influence, the and Britain's global power and particularly it is that she comprehensible quite given the pressing concerns of war, her in her be believed Iran to and own, that towards were pursued policies is It Iran. interests, best also perhaps those than of rather allies' those that time, the policies the of circumstances under understandable, for thought hastily no one conceived, times even rashly perhaps and were at in for long their term policies, particularly of consequences much cared or looking Yet desperate at these events the early we are now months of war.

Britain in interested hindsight benefit why not so much and are of with the did what she did, but what the consequences of British policy were and it is in I this short paper. that there will concentrate my attention in in Iran 1940s For those unfamiliar developments that turned the the with Cold War theatres, I will into one of the first non-European the country invaded Iran briefly summarise 1941-1947. the events of the period was The in 1941.

British Russians by the the autumn of and occupied and in Iran Americans little later the management to to of the assist came a (This in Iranian line, government various areas. and to advise the supply US fact in become beginning the presence a permanent of what was to was Shah Reza ) Revolution 1979. in the country - at least until the Iranian of his both known Pahlavi, the reigning pro-German monarch, who made Iranian his troops to the presence of allied on opposition and sympathies invasion forced leave the to and country on the eve of the allied soil was Mohammad his by son malleable, young, and comparatively was replaced Reza. its by deeply the economy, society no area of occupation, affected was A of weak succession unscathed. system escaped entirely and political intervention, the political to provided allied exposed governments, 1941-1947 The instability background to a period of years and change.

Iran impact by by the the war on of many provoked crises, punctuated were but also by the struggle for control of the country's most important resource: War Cold from in decisive However, the this period viewpoint a event oil.

Soviet decision, in 1945, the to of creation the the support autumn of was Azerbaijan in Iran's of province two autonomous northern governments USSR The fell Soviet to continued the of occupation. within zone which Iran in its by the after troops these northern movements retaining support direct in of wartime treaties. contravention war Iran

in Iran the USSR of annexation the necessarily was not sought but Azerbaijan, important rather and resource-rich province of strategically least friendly in Tehran influence regime would greatly relieve at where a Stalin doubt No dilemmas.

Soviet Union's would many security one of the

What

23

have preferred in Tehran, lines the pro-Soviet government a along of those imposed in Eastern Europe, but he for to ultimately was willing settle a in the north, and of course the political major oil concession and economic influence that such a concession would bring. Yet while the British, as we influence the to shall see, were on whole willing concede such a sphere of Iran, the United States was opposed. By to the USSR, at least in northern the spring of 1946 and with the lessons of Eastern Europe fresh in mind, the United States was to provide Iranian to strong support efforts to resist Soviet pressures, inside and outside the United Nations forum. The result firm US Iran, diplomacy by the of a policy over as well as some crafty Iranians first Soviet themselves, the was abandonment of the autonomous Iran's decisive rejection northern regimes and secondly of the proposed Soviet oil deal. In short, the Iranian round of the Cold War had been won States. by the United In order to examine Britain's in Iranian I the role crisis, and make no bones about subscribing to the post-revisionist view which place would Britain I propose to examine British squarely at the centre of the conflict, Iran in levels: firstly British Iran's three at to policy policy with regard developments; internal and situation secondly, British policy with regard to developments finally British powers and external and policy with regard to Britain's own long term interests in Iran and the region.

Of course all these three areas overlap, but for the purposes of this paper it is helpful to make such a division in order to demonstrate and clarify Britain's role in the development of the Cold War in Iran.

Britain's attitude towards Iran In 1941, in discussing for Iran, Viscount the joint plans of occupation Halifax `the dual be that the the wrote result of might occupation disappearance Iranian the of government, perhaps temporarily, perhaps forever. But I cannot say that their conduct has been of such a kind as to impose any deep obligations 3 This and other similar on us'. statements idea how Britain Iran beginning 1940s. the the provide an of at of viewed Attitudes Iran, at least since the 1930s and until the end of the towards Second World War and beyond, were characterised by a certain dislike, if Iranian not contempt of officials, and such attitudes naturally played a part in determining decisions. policy

3 FO 371/24580,

Halifax

to Amery,

1 Aug. 1940.

24

let for To this these attitudes? question, attempt an answer accounts Russian Since in British the the pre-war period. policy us quickly examine It in Iran.

Revolution Britain been 1917, had the predominant power of Anglo-Persian formally its the through position was unable to consolidate Curzon's India Agreement: Iran `buffer to to attempt protect secure as a 4 British influence in Middle East', but the results of their the and a pillar of Reza Shah did fall into the policies were similar. not perhaps entirely Foreign India Offices have desired, did but that the mould and nor would he seriously challenge British interests, even in his attempt to renegotiate irritation the oil concession, this was certainly to although a cause of Britain.

However in the late 1930s the situation As changed. war with Germany Iran assumed a new importance for two reasons: first, approached flourishing Germany Iran between a economic relationship existed and and the country was, on the whole, pro-German; Iran, second, particularly once the USSR joined the allies was a vital wartime Iran supply corridor. must be compliant, but Reza Shah's attitude both towards the breaking links of Germany Iranian with and towards the prospect of allied troops entering in both soil -- negative cases - convinced the British government that `the benefit be drawn from 5 Shah'.

The greatest would the elimination the of Shah, as we know, left Iran in September 1941, spending his last days in South Africa, where he died in 1944.

What

The Shah's removal have important Many to was political consequences.

Iranians happy hirn but to the manner of his demise did not were see go, for New political the country's augur well political stability. parties came few individuals backing the and went, often at whim of a the with of one or foreign There other power. appeared momentarily to be a real chance for Iran to establish democratic government and practices, but this opportunity frustrated involved in Iran the was none of external powers was seriously democracy. interested in promoting The British, in particular found dealing Majlis irksome: the with new particularly each successive administration for its A many pro-British and were apathy or corruption.

- was criticised typical Foreign Office comment at the time was that Persia was simply not 6 Majlis `ripe for democracy... is it become the unless sat on a nuisance'.

Growing in Iran led the trends to suggestions new political unease at even 7 be suspended altogether, least `fettered', that the Majlis the or at while British in few individuals.

There their trust trusted placed a chosen and 4 Malcolm E. Yapp, '1900-1921: The Last Years Qajar Dynasty', the of and R. W. Ferrier (eds.), Twentieth Century Iran, (London: 1977), p. 20.

F0371/27217, India Office to FO, 14 September 1941.

The Camtls Must Co. An Autobiography, (London: 1961), p. 230 6 FO 371/31385, FO minute, 10 Apr. 1942.

7 FO 371/31385, Tehran to FO, 10 and 21 Apr. 1942.

25

in H. Amirsadeghi

See also Sir Reader

Bullard's,

none proved entirely although prime. ministers, were a series of pro-British Britain's More from British the contentious satisfactory was viewpoint.

Sayyid Tabataba'i, had helped for individual Ziya bring like support who an Reza Shah to power, or for the tribal leaders in southwest Iran, whom it British Not be believed, to interests. counted could support was on Qavam, Ahmad like independent-minded prime minister who surprisingly an first came to power in January 1946 and was committed to pursuing a nonforeign Britain.

When he finally to policy, aligned was unwelcome US in Soviet troor ýs, the the succeeded, with assistance, ridding (--)entry of British were only too happy to see him go. `A man who would have s, ild the devices', if Rougetel's his Ambassador John Le left British to pass own was 8 Qavam's demise in Arguably his two comment on marked the years power. for the establishment end of any real chance of a reformist and truly in independent Tehran. government The

destabilising

dangerous

impact in the

and potentially political of the by introduced Iranian matched was major occupation changes direct fed Iran's her the as a result of economy allied armies, war. wheat network of troops and communications was given over to the transport industries, her directed towards meeting allied wartime notably oil, supplies, It Iran's be to that some extent, was, unavoidable economy should needs. harnessed to the war effort, but the resulting disruption was perhaps unduly deep both extensive and provoked resentment and misunderstanding among Britain's Iranians Iranians below). (see and among own allies went short of items, like kerosene transport essential wheat, and sugar, and all available The inflation by country requisitioned. was was wracked with wholesale 400% between fĂśr 1941 And 1944. nearly rising prices and when, example, basic items became a major problem, Britain's shortages of response was to ` for `hoarding, blame Iranians In obstructionism short and smuggling'. in Britain's Iran during the early part of the occupation record was not a happy one and led to frequent accusations of `high handedness', most notably States. 10 from the United developments further Two important during to the occupation served in first demonstrate British this high-handedness the the was way policy: of handled in Britain both that the concessions of which whole question of oil, fields, in its in the general and response to a series of oil strikes southern oil leaders tribal the second was the discreet encouragement to southern given Soviet influence in in a widespread the to spread of rebellion aimed check 8 FO 37175458, `General Rougetel Le Bevin, Persia, 1948', in 1947 to and review of events 17 Jan. 1949.

9 FO 371/31419, Eden to Clark-Kerr, 3 Nov. 1942.

10 See Fawcett, 112-113. op. cit., pp.

26

interests British Iran. In both cases a rather short-sighted prevailed, view of 1I As the most individuals. despite the genuine efforts of certain enlightened have in Britain Iran to the to tried an set example might power important in Britain Iranians: They have the tried to appease short might also allies. had an obligation to ensure that the Persian way of life should proceed with disruption: this obligation the minimum possible was clearly not met.

Britain and external powers If

Britain's

management destabilising,

Iranian

the

internal

level

at was of affairs her in too the potentially so which she managed was way in involved Iran: the two the relationships with major powers external Soviet Union and the United States. In the case of the USSR it was clear by the need to secure Soviet cooperation that British policy was tempered in the war effort. It was also conditioned desire to prevent

by Britain's Soviet meddling in the south. The result, not surprisingly, was a tendency to disregard Soviet the some of the more undesirable consequences of Iran.

The B: fish position was summed up in an FO occupation of northern `So long Russians don't interfere in Persia, the nnnutee: as with our sphere have to put up with those goings on in their sphere provided that we shall 12 interfere their actions do not embarrass us politically or with supplies'.

This consideration Iranian guided British policy throughout the crisis, and important perhaps one of the most that can be drawn about conclusions British policy in this period, from it that and one which clearly separates States United by Britain the that to pursued was was ultimately prepared Iran's integrity in territorial sacrifice order to satisfy the Russians and Britain's hold Iran thereby to protect secure and consolidate on southern her own vital interests there. Thus when faced with a succession of crises, USSR's desire by its long-term the the to achieve provoked war and in Iran, British designed to the to resorted a series of expedients ambitions Russians Iranian larger the the the cake while retaining give a piece of part Once the nature of Soviet intentions for themselves. became clear, it was Iran Soviet be by the that the threat to northern could met suggested Iran, idea form introduction local throughout an of a self-government of Tripartite into later incorporated the more ambitious which was 13 idea Commission British For the the meant of self-government scheme.

11 Bevin

for example, was anxious to secure reforms in the AIOCC concession, describing the Iranian oil industry as a `fertile field for reform'. Bevin, like Bullard also strongly opposed Party Tudeh idea the tribes to the expansion of any of rallying support among southern check influence. Both these issues are discussed in greater detail in Fawcett, chi. cit., Chapter 6.

12 FO 371/1388, FO minute, 18 Jan. 1942.

13 This files Relevant PRO discussed in detail is Fawcett, in 162-4. scheme op. cit., pp. include F0371/45436,45437,52661 and 52667.

27

that while the Russians might have a free hand-in in the south. would enjoy similar privileges

northern

Iran,

the British

in the oil concession crisis of 1944 -- not finally resolved until 1947 demand British, Soviet for for by the the an oil conccssion, obvious - caused fearful implications USSR delivering `blank the the of an reasons, were of AIOC the negative', which might expose conct scion to similar scrutiny and discussion British further block the government' or f7oal of acquiring 1 t for itself in in Iran. both 1944 it 1947 concessions other parts of and .. its Russians `it (British) to the that was made clear policy to was not part of from ' Russia in Persia'.

If Britain 5' obtaining prevent oil north was USSR's in Iran, it to the then obtaining an oil concession unopposed was in to the the creation really opposed of pro-Soviet autonomous regimes Kurdistan?

The Azerbaijan and answer, as already suggested, was probably Soviet influence long in the north, no, as as was really contained and face formally implementing through the the preferably saving measure of idea.

The just how to contain the provincial councils problem was of course USSR Soviet the the and prevent nightmare scenario absorption of of Persia, which as one Foreign Office official put it would allow the USSR have `to acquire been the warmwater ports which almost a pathological Great.

Peter They interpose between Baku the since craving would and India a vast defence area... They would acquire oil resources of great value, in Britain's Middle East the to the point position whole shake of 16 collapse..., Similarly

This is where it seems that Britain in trying to meet the miscalculated Soviet threat by condoning the USSR's efforts to regain a foothold in north Persia. For one thing Soviet ambitions be could not contained within neatly Obviously defined boundaries. in the USSR sought a `friendly government' Tehran, just as they did in Berlin, Warsaw Yet Prague.

British or policy USSR its demands.

It fรถrward the to merely encouraged also press with had the effect of further Persians, the alienating and to some extent the Americans.

It is not difficult to see how the ambiguity interests between to a serious clash of ultimately States in Iran.

United

As far went

British policy of the USSR and

led the

United States British Iran the policy regarding as was concerned from a rather smug superiority Britain's knowledge greater reflecting

14 FO 371/61974,

`Summary of the Soviet-Persian ail agreement', 31 Oct. 1947 and FO minute on the above dated 23 Oct. 1947.

15 See FO 371 /45430, correspondence between British Prime Minister and US President and accompanying minutes, 15 Jan. 1945.

16 FO 371/45434, FO minute, 10 July 1945.

28

in

dealing

Iranian

an allairs, with and experience by the urgent need to secure US support tempered Iran, 17 to a rather desperate last ditch attempt to it, `take on' Iran, as Roosevelt put after the extent Soviet became the threat the apparent. nature of and

only slightly attitude for the allied effort in Americans to the get Britain's of weakness 18

it From the very beginning the was evident that the of allied occupation disagreement Iran. frequent British found in Americans themselves over and Atlantic America's high-minded based the of approach strict application on Charter and later UN principles, Britain's logic own position of clashed with There delegations disguised between hostility two thinly the and policy. was in Tehran, Americans for its Britain the with political criticising 19 the handling 'machinations', for its `highof supplies, and, as noted, handed' Iranians Britain in general. They suspected towards attitude of `imperial in Iran to pursuing style' policy aims and were often anxious distance themselves from British policy altogether, favoured in an approach by US in Tehran during the particular the early part of the minister Louis Dreyfus, for known his anti-British occupation, a man sympathies.

That the US government British remained unhappy policy towards with Iran in general, and in particular disapproved of the apparently complacent Britain that attitude adopted towards the USSR both on questions such as Azerbaijan is evidenced by subsequent the oil concessions and status of for In late 1945 George US the then statements. example, ambassador Allen, admitted his suspicions that Britain had reached a `tacit deal' with Iran the USSR whereby the latter would be given a `free hand' in northern its Britain hold be `It the consolidated while on south. most would ' Washington London, `that is impression the so warned unfortunate... which intensified British be lukewarm the that already prevalent are and merely desirous of protecting their interests. '20 Surprise and disappointment were fainthearted for Britain's Iranian support also expressed at appeals to the in United 1946, United Nations. Iran's first attempt, to the to early appeal Soviet interference Bevin by Nations Security Council against was opposed formed it his `too `half plan', and stressed anxiety at placing a who called 21 formed Security Council.

This led heavy to the a strain' on newly Secretary US US Britain's of concern attitude of' about while expressions in Washington States Brynes told the British Ambassador that he though it

17 Early US-British 112-14. discussed Fawcett, in pages relations are op. cit.; see especially 18 Ibid., p. 119.

19 Ibid., p. 113.

20 `Invitation to Cold War', op. czt., p. 194.

21 FO 371/52661, FO to Tehran, 2 Jan. 1946; ibid., FO to Washington, 5 Jan. 1946.

29

dissuading `inadvisable for a great power to assume responsibility... of' a small 22 from invoking it UNO fit'. the thought country machinery of the whenever When, partly at US prompting, the Iranian government made a second Council Security in March, did its Britain to the appeal early offer support, it is Britain during deliberations. back that took the noteworthy yet a seat Britain had, of course been embarrassed by a complaint by Iran's made Tudeh Party (Communist) in Greece British against activities and Indonesia, but during Iranian the whole discussion the of case, which but troop revolved not only around withdrawals, also the question of oil 23 Britain Clearly she did not want her own concessions, appeared reticent. in Iran the to receive similar exposure. Indeed it was the position south of fear of drawing undue attention to British oil concessions in Iran - changes Oil Company that might oblige the Anglo-Iranian to reform the nature of its operations led British initiative that the to that government oppose an the whole question of oil concession in Iran be placed under UN control. 24 So we find that in the critical 1946, Britain kept months of early a low Iran, States United decisively the surprisingly profile over With moving Iranian The US to the forefront then Wallace of affairs. ambassador, Murray, he `decline British perceived what called a of prestige and in Iran'.

He also considered leadership from Iran of that the departure Reader Bullard as ambassador in March and his replacement the following Rougetel, by John Le month a man with `no area experience', could only 25 heighten impression.

And if the Iranian indeed to this serve case was a for United Nations, debatable it the that victory a point given seemed to Soviet influence in the north through the endorse a permanent sphere of American-led award of an oil concession, then it was undoubtedly an one, for ultimately the UN appeal only served to expose the many contradictions British in its in Iran. to of policy, particular with regard position southern There

is little doubt then that British policies helped to step up the pace of US involvement in Iran, while of course determining that the direction such involvement British take would would not necessarily coincide with interests.

For the US perceived that it needed not only to restrain the USSR but also Britain, fertile for Iran field to the while prove a was American interests.

Hence `marriage expansion of a of convenience' interests Americans the combining principles and was quickly effected, with Soviet in Iran British the checking pretensions and gradually assuming

22 FO 371/52661, Washington to FO, 7 Jan. 1946.

23 See Fawcett, op. cit., pp. 165-66.

24 FO 371/52669, Foreign Office to Tehran, 30 Mar. 25 See Fawcett, op. cit., p. 129.

30

1946.

is difficult It in interests Western to the region. of as protector mantle into Iran however, that the conversion a zone of of escape the conclusion British Cold War that to to as of policy much owed almost as conflict early the USSR.

Britain's long term interests in Iran Iran during Second internal Britain's the towards the of situation attitude her War, World towards together powers and attitude external with its long-standing be developments to reference cannot understood without interests in I included have thus the country. economic and strategic Britain's interests in Iran as a third long-term level and concluding of in British I have touched them analysis of on my policy, although already is in Iran, Britain's interests known, previous comments. economic as well its AIOC; lay largely in the exploitation Iran's by the of oil resources in interests lay both in interests the those strategic and protecting oil Iran important British India. being buffer the to security of empire, an for her When one considers Britain's Iran, given relations with example, interests in the country long-standing it is easy to see why there was little interest in in Tehran. independent real shown promoting government strong Qavam, `Nationalist' Ahmad like `democratic' or or prime ministers Muhammad Mussadiq for that matter be to to welcome were unlikely Britain, since they were bound in the long run to upset Britain's interests in Reza Even like if distinctly the country. a strong-willed, ruler undemocratic Shah, had proved It could thus perhaps be said that weak, troublesome.

Commission The Tripartite Britain best. and malleable governments suited had they been successful may have provided the sort of central proposals, However, to Britain. government these proposals acceptable were, as we know, considered unacceptable by most Iranians. 26 be it in considering Britain's can powers, relations with external Union Soviet how long-standing interests dictated The seen again attitudes. its for it had been, it be threat, so was, at always courted a potential must When favours to avoid any unseating of Britain's in this the south. position likely 1946 the there was no option anyway, as events of seemed unfolded, but for the United States to be encouraged to pick up the pieces of British for increasingly Hence Bevin the strident appeals of and others a policy.

Similarly

26 See further 141.

F. Azimi,

Iran. The Cri i

Democracy, (London: of

31

I. B. Tatiris,

1989), pp. 140-

more active 1946.27

US policy,

appeals

that

finally to were

bear fruit

only

early

in

Yet,

States, while important the United ally, was also a potential an in Iran's oil, it advocated threat: it was interested the dismantling of old imperial British hostile in the times systems, so were cautious, and at even in Iran. American `principles' their dealings with the Americans and an in Iran Britain.

Louis to reputation unblemished were an annoyance Dreyfus's in in the that the view, expressed early occup; tion, supporting British believed that `if given enough rope wf- might the advisor programme hang ourselves in Iran', 28 was not altogether Britain US unjustified. needed help in Iran, but wanted it on British terms. Ultimately, Britain's of course, hopes regarding its the containment or education of wartime allies were frustrated.

The Russians would not be contained, Americans the and would footsteps. follow in British What Britain did help bring Cold to not the was War to Iran, by encouraging the Russians, alienating the Americans and then finding itself in a position where it was too weak to act alone: it was perhaps the worst of all possible worlds. And in the bargain, the British had in Iranians, the permanently succeeded alienating many of whom even joint `satans' who led the today link the British and the Americans the as country

to crisis.

Was Cold

War in Iran inevitable?

It is impossible to say, but Britain, as the documentation both in but also in the United this country, available States29 amply demonstrates, was certainly a prime actor in the process Soviet US in led UN forum in 1946, and in the the that to the standoff United States decision to extend containment to Iran.

27 See in particular 28 Y. Alexander

Alan Bullock,

Ernest Benin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951,

(London:

1983).

and A. Manes (eds. ), The United States and Iran: a Documentary History, (Maryland: 1980), p. 101.

29 The is to be found in the US National Archives in Washington relevant documentation under the classification: US Department of State, Record Group 59

32

BEVIN AND IRAN: Great Game as Cold War Ann Lane

The first necessityof any game is to know what the object of the game is. If it is to make ground, certain rules are looks It if destroy then to others. appropriate, one's opponents, if influence Russian is British the to rather as aim eliminate than to limit it or even merely to increasetheir own. In such Americans to the there a game are no rules and we must get first. this understand JT Henderson, Eastern Department, 4 July 19461

One

been historians has to preoccupation contemporary of post-revisionist for Cold War. For Britain's the the the measure of establish responsibility I intend however, the this to take as a premise paper, purposes of Cold War failure, that the observation was a combination of misjudgement and misunderstandings on all sides, which were steadily compounded until a been This had position achieved. said, the question arises as to stand-off it became this that so uneasy period one of cold war rather what made had been in than true peace. Formerly, a sense of peace areas maintained influences form by the of of great powers converged, some where demarcation by between these areas of tacit or actual, which a agreement, interest Wars influence or was accepted. occured when one or other of the demarcation.

In lines to the change of one sense great powers attempted Great Powers from different times: the early post-war years were no earlier differentiated, being two these particularly of were still existed, although Britain herself, by the term super-power, from Britain, the through while interests her of global position as a major retained existence continued different, however, What this the was period made world scene. player on involvement degree high the on the part of the required of political ideological because to the the component players, which was so of principal The opinions

expressed in this paper are the authors'

be taken as an own and should not

expression of official government policy.

1 Documents The VII, I, Volume Series Overseas DBPO), British Policy (hereafter cited as on 1995). Other United Nations: Iran, Cold War and World Organisation, 1946-1947, (HMSO, Conversations, 1945: Conferences Series Volume II, in I in this paper are and volumes cited London, Washington and Moscow, 1945, (HMSO, 1985) and Volume VI, Eastern Eurofee 194546, (HMSO, 1991).

33

Cold War conflict. Any discussion of the. foreign policies of the protagonists in this period, and the consequences of these artiotis, is incomplete without . factor influenced that the to this poll(-, '. constant reference way British policy in Iran was designed to protect her As a localised conflict, interests interests she was prepared to through accommodation preserve had But her the the game rules of now with allies as necessary. wartime Charter, indeed The Atlantic lofty the principles and of the changed.

Organisation, United Nations the recent experiences combined of wit! international fascist totalitarianism, had introduced to tone a new irroral politics. in in Anglo-Russian There 1945 the new about rivalry was nothing Middle East.

Throughout Mediterranean the nineteenth and century, as Empire decayed, so Russia had sought to extend her influence the Ottoman Britain, interests by her south and south-east. were conditioned whose East to India, had made it a maxim of the Middle trading routes through 2 foreign policy that such Russian expansionism be By the should prevented. in in for twentieth the this century abundance mid quest oil, which existed in Anglo-Russian had this the raised stakes considerably rivalry. region, During the Second World War this rivalry was quelled by the mechanism of into Russian Iran British but division of and zones3 a was revived immediately the war in Europe ceased. The difference in 1945 was that the balance had shifted as the Soviet Union from the war a much emerged in had been its than politics player world she outbreak. stronger at States was also keen to develop Furthermore, her economic the United British interests in this region: indeed, officials were well aware that an American be if Soviet be to presence would required encroachment were However, Britain did not want that presence to replace her own prevented. it bolster her Herein be that to so existing position might sustained.

- only for Britain lay one of several complications East her Middle in pursuing in this period policies But the 1946 crisis in Iran took on particular importance to the British, as to the Americans, as a result of the emerging perceptions of the underlying long-term foreign Their Soviet trend and policy. motivation governing Soviet in immediate by the of reactions were conditioned part experience Russians, in Eastern Europe domination Balkans the the of and where imposing their influence all others and, more were systematically excluding 2 See further Edward Ingram, 'Great History Review, II, I, January 1980.

3 The political arrangements in this Occasional Paper.

Britain's

Great

Game:

in Iran during the Second World

34

an introduction',

International

War are discussed elsewhere

determined imposition a the ominously, of' political and on By in line with the the teachings economic of communism. conformity the extent to autumn of' 1945, British officials were increasingly considering Moscow's boundlessly fundamentally and which policy was revolutionary Sub-committee' In December Joint Intelligence had 1944, the expansionist. in Soviet Union least the that the the concluded post-war world, would at Great Britain be prepared to 'experiment and with with collaboration America in the interests of world security' if she suspected that and only being taken seriously, would she attempt to expand collaboration was not frontiers 'stir in Greece, her military Middle East trouble the and and up India. ' At this stage the JIC felt confident enough to conclude that relations Russia depend largely would very with on the ability of' each side to for its desire 'She the the other of sincerity of convince collaboration: will influence her to adopt a policy of opportunism extend wherever possible leaving the onus of challenge to the rest of provoking a major war, without 4 the world'. seemed

this judgement seems shrewd. But as British officials and following fifteen Soviet the to sought over policy-makers months explain ideological bogey designed the of an to undermine the policy, so warfare its British took hold. That it did so was position at all weakest points, due interwar to the clearly experiences of policy-makers and advisers who had witnessed the rise of totalitarianism linked with a messianic ideology during these years, the consequences of which were all too apparent across Europe. It is unsurprising, perhaps, that presented with another example of legitimised totalitarianism, this time apparently through the mechanism of demagoguery, communist that a parallel should be drawn. Thus, in April 1946 Christopher Warner, Department in the then head of the Northern Foreign Office, in his often quoted paper, 'The Russian Campaign against it', its this country indicative to and our response title very of a growing felt moved to write that to ignore the sense of persecution, possibility of a between connection present Soviet policy and Marxist-Leninist teachings be irresponsible as would as it had been to disregard Mein Kampfs With

hindsight

This

being degrees, in the political taken, to various view was reporting from Moscow Embassy during the first three months of 1946 the emerging in by in JIC Much the and was reflected an assessment produced mid-April. in documents in Soviet intentions these the to given was attention nature of Iran. In a despatch of 30 January, the British Charge d'Affairs in Moscow, Frank Roberts, wrote that it seemed as if Britain, 'with doubtful American

DBP),

Series I, Volume VI, No 78.

Ibid., No. 88.

35

backing', was facing 'constantly increasing Soviet pressure in the whole zone Six Dardanelles'.

British between India to the vital security and weeks Tehran, he in later, following the Soviet-Iranian warned that negotiations influence Anglo-Soviet agreement on zones of unless there were some prior incrementally domination Soviet Union her to the extend over would seek the whole of Iran: I cannot produce concrete evidence of Soviet designs to Gulf South Persian the to control and secure an outlet on Persian oil, and indeed such evidence would never be is in Moscow.

But I my obtainable am convinced, and so American colleague, that these are Russian objectives. These Russians immediate the are not of course objectives and realise that to attempt to attain them would mean a risk of 6 (which they will not take). war Britain herself had clearly defined interests in this region which had been down Post-Hostilities Sub-committee in by May Planning 1944. the set Included list Britain's interests important their on of most strategic were the Middle Eastern Mediterranean the protection of and vital oil, sea 7 Despite Cabinet decision the to withdraw communications. subsequent from India, this position was reaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff in the Spring in April, 18 British 1946 they that the argued, a report of of position when in the Middle East was essential influence to prevent the spread of into Mediterranean 'the Africa, throughout the Eastern that and noting Middle East 'of immense the extremely oil supplies of vulnerable' were 8 Commonwealth'.

At much the same time, pressure was importance to the Fuel being applied in the Cabinet by the Minister Power, Emmanuel of and Shinwell, for a foreign policy in the Middle East which gave priority to the in Iran.

He had good reason: the concessions south-west protection of influence in the region British the through was exerted predominantly Oil Company Anglo-Iranian (AIOC), which operated the Abadan refineries, in Given largest British dependence time the the this world. at at this stage it is Middle East that the spectre of the extension oil, unsurprising on of Soviet influence into Iran was of considerable concern.

Bevin was well aware of the significance of Iranian oil: indeed, at the Foreign Ministers Moscow Conference in he December 1945, had of Stalin interfere Stalin Abadan to the not with oil concessions. warned for but Britain their to significance characteristically appeared understand 6 Ibid., No. 86.

7 Elisabeth Barker, Churchill War, Eden Macmillan, (London: and at Thomas, Armed Truce, (London: Sceptre, 1986), pp. 309-10.

8 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No 90.

36

1981), pp 290-91; Hugh

9 However, the and the politically, unsettled was region gave no guarantees. had March 1946 for Soviet British troops scheduled early and withdrawal of left the way open for the various factions to compete for power. In such Iran found fertile had and was no ground already communism vacuums Tudeh The left-wing was not communist, party, though nominally exception. increasingly sympathisers which were a willing tool of communist nonetheless Iran. in force labour the south-west themselves active among making destabilisation, Bevin dangers Recognising the potential of political Commission joint Anglo-Russian-American Moscow to resolve a suggested at This Anglo-Russian by scheme was viewed the problems withdrawal. raised for differing by all other parties concerned albeit reasons, with suspicion, first became be Iran's in January, the to major subject problems and debated by the Security Council.

Bevin had several problems in evolving a policy toward the protection of the in Iran.

For Atlantic Charter AIOC's thing, the one position contained dealing with self-determination and equality passages of access to raw There Iranian the the was also question of materials. government's wish to its Government Labour resources, a policy nationalise with which a its in hardly to a nationalisation committed programme of own, was a Furthermore, in the spring to 1946, Bevin quarrel. position of was Soviet instead that unconvinced policy in Iran was expansionist, preferring behaviour 'in their oil interest rather than a to seek the explanation their of desire to acquire fresh territory 째 ' He to or an outlet warm water ports'. reiterated this to his officials at a meeting in the Foreign Office on 18 April he had obtained, that since the Russians when argued through their Iranians April, 5 in the agreement with on the north, they concessions be interfere in the south. I1 to would unlikely His

less Christopher Warner, in the passage officials were convinced. dealing Iran in his Memorandum 2 April, had with of noted that the in danger lay Soviet the that greatest possibility a stooge government would in Tehran its Moscow, be through to which would, emerge subservience interfere AIOC Two later, to the concessions. with weeks used as a means Robert Department, Howe, the head of Eastern a paper to submitted British Bevin which that argued policy should continue as at present while Council UN Security Iranians to to rely on the the to encourage and seek be the given to the also should consideration of elections, supervision 9 DBPO, Series I, Volume II, No. 308 10 CM 25 (46), 18 March 1946 in Empire British Roger The Louis in Wm. by the quoted Middle East 1945-51, Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism, (Oxford: .

Clarendon, 1984), p. 54.

11 DBPG, Series I, Volume VII, No. 35 note 9.

Howe defined 'Soviet in this tactics' case as possibility of adopting which the possible encouragement of the existing anti-Soviet autonomy movement in south-west Iran.

Bevin, however, by be the arguments to of those who as yet swayed Russia, Soviet believed that Britain was confronting was still an expansionist in follow British Lord inclined the to the traditional region. policy more Bullock has described how in the spring of 1946, Bevin was considering it East be Middle to whether might possible organise a reconstructed under British leadership to take the place of India. He was also toying with the idea of approaching the Russians directly with the offer of a straightforward 12 'spheres influence' in Iran.

During the war the question recognition of of Russian it be British to encourage to of whether a would advantage oil 'fair' discussed had been and several views of concession under conditions in London, Office Within Foreign there was an the problem the emerged. influential Anglo-Soviet believed be that relations could group who improved in this region if it could be demonstrated to the Russians that the British did not intend to corner all the Iranian This oil resources. view, of Soviet JIC Union by being the the that course, squared with of presented West long her the to seeking security and willing so co-operate with as from a geographical interests were acknowledged.

Indeed, point of view, Iran this made much sense since the mountainous areas of northern were hope British to exploit. the not ones which could reasonably in Tehran, However, Sir this was not the opinion of the British Ambassador Reader Bullard.

It was his conviction that the Soviet Union would be selfin in he demanding their perceived consequently purpose sufficient oil and Soviet In long to the term extend concessions as part of a strategy sphere.

May 1945 he recorded his view that 'on what the Russians do in North including in the last analysis, Persia depends the fate of Persia as a whole 13 Accordingly fate in he the the of our vital oil supplies south'. spent much Government Soviet incursions.

Iranian to the the resist of war encouraging 1946, Bevin in to were the continued options presented mid-April Nations, Iranian United through the monitoring while tackling of affairs initiating British Abadan level, local and political peculiarly problems at at to make to encourage the existing anti-Soviet agitation separatist movement itself heard. Of these, Bevin firmly ruled out the latter which he regarded 14 'a dangerous The first being pursued, and so as very policy'. was already

The

12 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary,(London: 13 Quoted in Louis, obi. cit., p. 63.

14DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 35 note B.

38

Heinemann,

1983), pp. 242-43.

line developing his attention he now turned the of approach to second background. labour his in keeping him movement with which appealed to East should be responsible for the He believed that countries in the Middle 15 fields Abadan The were oil and social welfare of' employees. economic fertile for owing to the general communist sympathisers ground proving by force being the poor pay and generated which was work unrest among discussed Bevin May, During this the third week of conditions. working AIOC, he Sir William Chairman Fraser, the whom point of with issues immediate being by to the to take raised encouraged steps address the labour councils in Abadan and to bring working conditions into line with 16 AIOC Shortly began the best western the standards. afterwards, Tudeh delegation MPs Party, the negotiations with of while a cross-party for themselves. travelled out to Abadan to see conditions At the same time, Bevin was also considering how to involve the United States more closely with Iran. While in general the Americans had favoured Security in Iran be dealt by the the to post-war problems allowing with Council, British they also regarded this area as primarily a responsibility. for leave British to the the initiative to and continued in matters pertaining Iran's However, during March, the exploitation resources. of when the early Russians had failed to withdraw their troops from the northern provinces as States United had 1942 the terms the the under of agreement, required in felt sufficiently Moscow to make strong representations alarmed which did indeed, after a short interval, produce the desired Soviet announcement impending Despite their timetabling this success, and withdrawal. confirming British American Soviet the the bankruptcy of and policies of checking United Nations in Iran through the the primarily mechanism of activities In Tehran, by May, Security Council, the the too end of all apparent. was in Soviet Eastern Europe, takeover already observed seemed to pattern of While had be in the process of being repeated. actively politicians who in influence being Soviet the the south-west arrested, were opposed itself Party, be Tudeh to steadily aligning which seemed of the activities development the the central a which communists, were expanding, with firm hand. increasingly disinclined to a meet with seemed authorities Lord Inverchapel Clark Archibald Kerr, by 9 June Writing then to and on Bevin in Washington, Ambassador that the speculated newly appointed Russians might shortly achieve what he now seemed increasingly to accept 'obviously Iran the them: entirely subservient to as their objective of making is already very inclined Persian Prime Minister to take his orders from

15 This point is 56-57. by Louis, expanded upon op. nit., pp.

16 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 47.

39

Moscow'. 17 Lord Inverchapel instructed to raise the question with the was State Department.

Two days later, John British Balfour, Minister in Washington, Loy Henderson, Eastern head Middle Affairs met of at the State Department, handed him an aide-memoir four the and outlining identified Office 18 Foreign in by April. the possible policy options Henderson less He British than was welcoming. suspicious was personally of in Iran laid for blame the present crisis on the the policy and much of Reader Bullard's determindly 19 shoulders of anti-Soviet stance.

Furthermore, the State Department was sensitive to the slightest suggestion Anglo-Russian lines which it saw as inimical of an carve up on traditional to Somewhat the principles on which the new peace should be established Henderson for tartly, that the sake of British prestige in the commented States and elsewhere he hoped that the British Government United 'were in no way seriously contemplating any return, even as a pis-aller, to situation 1907' he being 'as bogey of' which assumed was used a with which to scare Indeed, American the Persian Prime Minister'. public opinion, as evidenced in the press, was censorious of British policy in Iran which it defined as the 'protector "oriental feudalism" in 20 the interests of British imperialism'. of In replying to Henderson's Be Am-,, -'-an had that 째'w charges, s(rved iii: ( , been `doubtless thinking division Persia into British Russian of a of and influence', but added, 'We had no such scheme in mind'. 21 This spheres of disingenuous. little In 5 July, Betirin wrote was a subsequent a minute of in be 'require that the Soviet Government might asked what they of us feel in to order sure that the British are not going to interfere with them Baku?... the facts are that we have no intention int' of rfering with their interests in Persia in hands commercial north and return off expect a 22 ' interests in Persia. attitude towards our south

Meanwhile, the JIC had produced a further assessment of Russia's strategic interests and intentions in the Middle East. 23 Dated 6 June, it noted that this region was of particular strategic concern to the Soviet Union where the centre of gravity of her industry resided in the Caucasian oil fields.

They had now concluded that the Russians, in keeping with a general determination to diminish any strong power or -'ombination of powers in 17 Ibid., No. 59.

18 Ibid., No. 59 note 8.

19 See Louis, op. cit., p. 58.

20 DBPO, Series 1, Volume VII, No. 59.iv.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., Series I, Volume VII, 23 Ibid., No. 58.

No. 61-i-

40

Commonwealth British in as a saw the areas which she was vulnerable, he it in Middle East that threat easier to the would also and, moreover, Anglo-US less because Britain solid there than elsewhere of the oppose British is Perhaps this observation of also a measure combination. further A the their paper produced perceptions of own vulnerability. day, stated that if the supply of oil from the south Iranian oil fields following its 'the industry British be loss total the to of equivalent were cut off would impossible be it to make requirements, exclusive of motor spirit, and would from loss The JIC the that there this up whole of concluded other sources'. 'no doubt that the Russian threat to our position in Persia was a very was be real one, and their tactics could, moreover, equally well used against us in the same way in Iraq. ' The analysis Soviet had become policy of less definite became in these noticeably speculative: as more appreciations their assertions as to the reality of the Soviet threat, so a tailoring of policy 24 Soviet further inevitable. into Iran to check any encroachment was At the Cabinet meeting on 17 June, which Bevin missed owing to the Paris Shinwell fuelled existing concerns at the crisis which was Peace Conference, Abadan Office in fields, both Foreign building the the oil up and chastised for Staff' Chiefs disinclination their to treat the question of apparent and in Orme his be Later day, the view would suitable gravitas. same with what Sargent, held a meeting at the Foreign Office, attended by Eric Berthoud Fuel Power.

This in from the Ministry of and resulted preparation of a Bevin in Paris, further to the policy paper, addressed which reconsidered 25 in light It different the the of present crisis. was not substantially options April, innovation from the Eastern Department paper of an although was for the organisation the recommendation offensive. of publicity full his of constitutes of rare summaries which one reply, 26 In his his had failed into to take thinking, officials view, was ascerbic.

AIOC's to causing the present crisis through their the contribution account Office Foreign Tudeh had labour the the understood policies, nor archaic Sargent, he had he Party programme reminded already remarked which, as He in for its relative many respects. wanted to see the crisis moderation 'vigorous application by the AIOC defused through of a social programme for As the other their workpeople'. suggestions with and consultation Office dismissed in Foreign he the any suggestion of paper, again contained 'we back be intervention the that exactly where we were on grounds shall he in 1907'. While he liked the recommendation offensive, of a publicity Bevin's

the

24 Ibid., No. 58. ii.

25 Ibid., No. 60. i.

26 Ibid., No. 60.

41

wanted Indeed,

this the

to

beyond

the

bounds

extend question of a publicity discussed at the Russia Committee on dealing local the as a means of with towards the evolution of an organised Soviet the threat. aspects of perceived

publicity. of' anti-communist been had also raised and offensive it 11 June. 27 Bevin's endorsement of' in Iran first the was problems step directed against all offensive publicity

Clearly

Sargent by Bevin's the tone sent a personal minute stung of riposte, to the Foreign Secretary in which he defended the substance of tim paper.

As to the possibility intervention, he Foreign Office that the explained of favoured but this merely pointing was not advancing as a option, out that influence Addressing to the option the a spheres of existed. reference 'that Persian it him he to that the arrangement, observed seemed situation is drifting in that direction He continued: quite regardless of our policy'.

'You will remember has already suggested that the Persian Prime Minister in that both we and the Russians should def ye our res-)ective interests Persia have tripartite and some we suggested a reply suggesting Russian interests in British the north and about understanding oil oil interests in the south'. 28 ility be last the to the possi', seems serio-,.-, -mention of of a in The for influence Iran. in its spheres of explanation arrangement American but lies in sensibilities, abandonment partly more an awareness of Soviet important In the the of nature about policy. was growing certainty in Tehran, by the British Ambassador this process, the report submitted Office Foreign John Le Rougetel, in beginning the the at which arrived of British for July was critical and proved the decisive influence the on policy 29 Reader Rougetel had Le Bullard the replaced remainder of year.

Service from Foreign in following latter's March. the thfe retirement Middle East but Le. Rougetel he had, Admittedly, specialist, was not a as in Roumania, Representative British Political witnessed the establishment influenced Soviet in Balkans hegemony the clearly of and this experience in assessing Soviet policy in. Iran. He made it clear that he his judgement Soviet direction, that, an attempt was communist under was now convinced from Iran and that the Tudeh British influence being made to eliminate had left-wing, Party, now come under although progressive originally because this Communist The object of attack was the AIOC domination.

In in Iran.

British mntluence instrument to addition of was the principal TL. is,

fact,

recommendations

encompassing

a publicity

27 Ibid., No. 56.i and No. 58 note 3.

28 Ibid., No. 61.

29 Ibid., No. 63. i.

42

offensive,

the

stepping

up

of

from Soviet influence present efforts to wean look to the west rather to and the encouragement elements of progressive he than to the Tudeh the question of' a general party, also addressed Russians.

To he this opposed, on the settlement was unequivocally with ideological in field the that to grounds either attempt such an arrangement in in Iran, had been before there the or sphere of oil relations some in Russian the quantifiable progress checking advance, would amount to an indication Russians the to reof weakness which would merely encourage In double Bullard's their this, endeavours. of course, was an echo of in the earlier and, the attitude as wartime period, conflicted with it Department's be impossible that own view to reach some sort might not regarding concessions in Iran. of understanding the Iranian

Prime

Minister

Bevin seemed inclined now to accept the Le Rougetel thesis. In any event, he regarded it as unwise to attempt Russia Paris the anything with while 30 Conference While he urged that the AIOC increase their was underway.

Abadan labour force, Bevin efforts to resolve their problems the with British determination resolved on a policy designed to demonstrate to retain her position in south-west Iran, a position for which he was prepared, if necessary to risk British lives. At the Cabinet meeting on 15 July, one day after the declaration fields, Bevin of a general strike in the Abadan oil detailed announced plans, which had been prepared in conjunction with the Chiefs of Staff, to protect by force if East oil and British necessary, Middle personnel employed in this region. 3' What

killed

the idea of a spheres of influence then, was the arrangement, belief that Soviet policy in Iran was based not on oil considerations, but being part of a general campaign was waged against the British position not just in the Middle East, but throughout the world. Indeed by the autumn of 1946, Howe was writing in response to a to Sargent in early October, from Managing Director Shell, Sir Andrew Agnew, the that suggestion of 'outside the area occupied by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession, be basis to an endeavour should made work on a commercial with the Russians', form, it is impossible that 'On present Russian to avoid the Soviet Government [ie this that the position conclusion would use in Persia] their to continue present policy concessions south-east of influence British British in in oil and supplies general undermining 67 in his Bevin's this minute to the acceptance of particular'. emerged clearly Clement Minister, Attlee, he 1947, in which Prime dated 13 January

30 Ibid, No. 59. i.

31 Ibid., No. 64.

67 Ibid.., No. 72.

43

Department's incorporated his the substance views as expressed of he concluded: Howe's paper of 4 October.

Pessimistically, I feel we should the try to reach an understanding with AngloRussians on oil matters through the the extension of Oil Agreement... The Russians may not like to join American international by the sponsored originally an organisation Americans be harm in British, but the to there and seems no 32 join. them to asking In

in

in Iran

in 1946 be the of one sense events may spring and summer Game Britain Great Russia the continuation which and regarded as a of in Asia throughout had played the nineteenth and early years of the Iran British by buffer twentieth the centuries. was still regarded as a state; Russia remained And just the great rival and potential enemy. as the diplomats Britain had been statesmen and of nineteenth century uncertain Russia's frontier in the about ultimate objectives changes and concessions into Russian dependency Persia the transformation north or of a so as to Russian Indian Ocean in the to the access ensure so mid-twentieth Russians doubtful they to the remained century as whether wanted oil or in Tehran. the government control of into the the First World War, two new factors had been introduced Following discovery in Iran, became the the of oil equation. country of importance increasing to Britain and by 1945, the AIOC concessions were British Empire.

Moreover, to the the regarded as vital of well-being British Russian had before 1914 aligned the and governments although forces in Iran, 1918, themselves with rival conservative and progressive since Bolshevik Russia had increasingly in Iran to sought use radical nationalism British. the against During

Partition,

favoured in had which so often response interests, to perceived again as problems of great power now surfaced Britain considered how best to protect her interests in Iran in the post-war Russians But had If the such a policy also considerable short-comings. world. free in hand the north, could they not then use were allowed a relatively in Tehran and eventually this to extend their influence over the government draw the whole of Iran into their bloc. the solution

the British

There was another fundamental difference between the situation in 194546 and that which had existed in the days of the Great Game, and this was derived from the experiences of war and its aftermath. The triumph of the

32 Ibid., No. 74.

44

in Europe had opened the way to a vast expansion of communist in developments 1946 beginning by Moreover, influence. the of power and be feared British had Europe would officials which set precedents eastern Soviet Ideology of explanation a plausible offered repeated elsewhere. it fact in 1946 diplomats British for important But that the was more policy.

Soviet for instrument the establishment of control. was also an effective Russians interest, disclaimers influence With or without the of or spheres of Of for local their own ends. course, this also radicals could always use her Britain own military was acutely aware of occurred at a moment when 1946 by Thus, that the the summer of convinced and economic weakness. did influence her Soviet Union she not wherever seek to extend would interests identify firm British their perceived meet resistance, the sought to As American in Iran with the broader a global strategy. requirements of defensible interests be these to as peculiarly soon ceased consequence, British and came to be regarded more specifically and thus as anti-Soviet Western. The Great Game with its buffer states, and its spheres intrinsically Cold War influence interest, in whose rules and was subsumed a nascent of had yet to be determined.

Red Army

45

REVISITED

NON-INTERVENTION Great

Britain,

the United

Nations

Franco's and

Spain

in 1946

Keith Hamilton

Secretary Early in Clement in March 1946 Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Attlee's Labour him letters two offering contrary government, received first, from The Trades Walter Citrine, the the Secretary-General advice. of Union Congress General Council's (TUC), informed him of the TUC for World Unions' Federation Trade endorsement of a of resolution calling Spain.

The Franco's a breach of diplomatic relations with second, written by a Mrs M. Alexander Torquay housewives, behalf called on of a group of for Spain to be left alone and protested against any sanctions which might Spanish She interfere food Britain.

Britain to to supplies objected with being drawn by an ungodly France and Russia into a confrontation with Spain, adding `hands off our Seville oranges and cheap wine 1 have not ...

As a former trade tasted a drop of wine or tasted a chicken for six years'. line leader diplomats take a strong who could with union when they seemed dimensions issue, Benin have been the to social not appreciate of an might Citrine.

Franco's Civil Spanish to triumph sympathise with expected in the War had been assisted by the former Axis powers, he had continued to during latter World War, and his repressive the the ensuing consort with democratic Allies. by to the the rule was an affront principles enunciated Bevin had been speaking for party and government December 5 when on 1945 he told the Commons that their attitude was `quite plain. We detest 2 [Franco] Yet, Foreign Secretary the the regime'. as of a country which, having survived the austerity of war, now faced the strictures of peace and fully he British importance Spain to the the reconstruction, was aware of of He bring the to that any attempt and world economies. also understood in Spain internal international through the changes about application of in longhave implications the pressure might set precedents and which could detrimental Britain's be to run global position.

The opinions

expressed in this paper are the authors' own and should not be taken as an

expression of official government policy.

1 Documents I, Volume VII, Series United British Policy Overseas (hereafter DBPO), cited as on Nations: Iran, Cold War and World Organisation, 1946-1947 (HMSO, 1995), No. 26. i. Other Potsdam, Series Conference in I The I, in Volume 1945 this paper are volumes cited at (HMSO, 1984); Volume II, Conferences and Conversations, 1945- London, Washington and Moscow, 1945 (HMSO, 1985); Volume III, Britain and America- Negotiation of the United States Loan, 1945 (HMSO, 1986); Volume V, Germany and Western Europe, 11 August - 31 December1945 (HMSO, 1990); Volume VI, Eastern Europe, 1945-1946 (HMSO, 1991).

2 The Torus, 6 Dec. 1945, p. 6ii.

46

Spain Franco's in doubt.

In July 1936, personal views on were never Spanish Civil General War began, he the the of when was chairman Council TUC identified defenders he the of and readily of the with And, Republican Labour the cause. along other with members of indignant he in the was at movement, way which the non-intervention policy French initially British he backed, the and governments, which worked to of Nationalist forces.

Nevertheless, the the advantage of as his biographer, Bevin `did not deceive himself with the belief Alan Bullock, has remarked, for for Spain denounce hypocrisy to the that to call arms and of non3 Spanish The imbroglio be intervention had to was a sufficient answer'. set Second in its broader international the the context and, after outbreak of World War, British policy towards Spain was largely concerned with limiting Franco be his tempted to might as give erstwhile such assistance associates in the Axis camp. The British may have disapproved of the politics of the Caudillo, his Germany, they the to complained over and export of wolfram German U-boats in Spanish of ports, and the activities non-internment of Eastern Division Front.

But Blue they were also aware of the the the on in the Mediterranean. benefits they derived from Spain's non-belligerency Germany Nazi Only when victory did British the over seemed certain, begin Franco his to to give serious consideration government ousting and fascist-styled Falange. in the allies Bevin's

In October Ambassador

1944, Lord Madrid, at

Templewood,

British to who was about retire as Allies Franco, that the suggested should warn threat of economic sanctions, that their post-war possibly with the additional jeopardised him be if did he for better the would not change relations with his Attlee, Prime Deputy then the character administration. of who was if democratic He doubted Minister, a was of a similar opinion. government in Spain Spanish be he established at once and, given could xenophobia, but he Britain the thought that might value of overt action, questioned field' deny `in France States United the to the economic with and work Spain facilities. 4 Senior officials of the Foreign Office were even Franco's Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary, the more cautious. little Britain its do there was could considered abandoning general without in internal foreign the of non-interference policy affairs of countries unless they threatened to indulge aggression, and he argued that it was impolitic 5 for ideological And `in the luxury of economic sanctions while ends'.

3 Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. 1, Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940 (Heinemann: London, 1960), pp. 586-8.

4 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. IV (HMSO: London 1975), p. 30.

5 Ibid.

47

Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, favoured collaborating with the United States in putting diplomatic pressure on Franco, Churchill opposed in Spain.

Evidently further bringing conflict about any action that might risk Eden: he `You in warned mind, with the prospect of economic sanctions begin with oil; you will quickly end in blood. ' There would then, he feared, be the danger of the communists gaining a foothold in Spain and of that `infection' spreading quickly to France and Italy. 6 By the end of the war in Europe, British policy towards Spain was one of 7 The Foreign Office thought a friendly Spain desirable `cold correctitude'. for reasons of strategy and trade, but did not think it possible to be on democratic to terms cordial was offensive with a regime whose continuance San Francisco At the temptation to trouble-makers. sentiment and a Conference in the spring of 1945 this meant Britain's of a endorsement from Mexican-sponsored membership of the new world resolution excluding help installed had been the of any country whose regime with organisation United Nations forces of powers that had fought the against -a phrase intended Spanish to the with assistance of republican exiles and construed 8 Stalin's Churchill Spain.

Potsdam But to resisted apply specifically at in Allies in Europe `let that the this pass plea cancer should not emotional Britain United States break the that off all should and and silence', in forces Franco in democratic `to relations with order render support to the Spanish to the as pain and enable people to establish such a regime have The Prime Minister like [would] to to their seen respond would will'. lines.

Spain democratic in the establishment on of a constitutional monarchy favoured Stalin He nevertheless that might simply action such as argued Franco's isolating leading his those elements position, regime and strengthen in Moreover, his deserting his had been the general to rally to that cause.

United by it the the conflict principle, would with endorsed opinion, Nations, that one country should not interfere in another's domestic affairs.

Churchill had `the 'There that very we added, consideration was also', important trade relations by which we secured oranges, iron ore and wine and received

a market

for our manufacturers.

'9

internal interference Spain's in three arguments affairs, the against force by legal the the the tactical, economic, were employed with equal and Hoyer in Britain. There was, as Frederick Labour administration incoming Department, Office's Head of the Foreign Western Millar, recognized, These

6 Ibid., pp. 31-2.

7 DBPO, Series I, Volume V, No. 13.i.

8 Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography (Harper 9 DBPO, Series I, Volume I, No. 194.

48

Collins:

London

1993), pp. 534-5.

favour Potsdam in be find `some fairly trying to to at of' said something Russians for form the otherwise resolution' of anti-Franco might anodyne become more obstinate on points to which Britain attached importance and Americans impression it `prothat the the to the giving risk of was run 100And the British government Franco and reactionary'. eventually agreed to Conference in inclusion the the protocol of' a statement which seemed San it Francisco Spain that the to resolution, making clear reaffirm simply 11 justify...

[UN] did not possess the `qualifications necessary to membership' , , On 20 August Bevin stated in Parliament that it was for the Spanish people 12 Spain days in later, Sir Victor decide Mallet, two the to and, regime Madrid, Alberto Martin Artajo, Templewood's Spanish told the successor at from Foreign Minister, the existng regime `ought now to that the evolution Franco, be pressed forward that as soon as possible, and as long as he in be between the to power, must greatest obstacle good relations remained Spain and the rest of the world'. i3 Henceforth British diplomacy coupled Franco to go, with a marked reluctance to official and private pressure on itself with the cause of any would-be successor administration. associate institutional in Spain the reforms and almost complete Franco's in July British for the of government reconstruction gave cause 1 `t Municipal for following the optimism. cautious elections were scheduled discussions continued fitfully March, between representatives of the regime Juan Don de Borbรถn, in the pretender to the Spanish throne, and and February into possible the latter flew to Lisbon with a view to entering Franco.

Meanwhile, with negotiations reports of increasing public support for the early replacement Franco by left, the of a broad coalition centre of Foreign in Office it in the right confirmed the view that and moderate was interests best Spain for internal be the this to of' to situation allowed 15 But Bevin foreign interference. develop without ignore could not easily the fact that both at home and abroad large sections of public opinion were for action on Spain. The left in France was particularly in impatient vocal Franco's demanding in December 1945, 12 the removal and, notes of join Britain States French government United them that the proposed and 16 diplomatic State Spain.

Within in breaking the off relations with for the idea of tripartite The Department there was some sympathy action.

Modest

10 Ibid., No. 195.

11 Ibid., No. 603.

12 DBK), Series I, Volume 13 Ibid.

V, No. 13.

14 Ibid., No. 5.

15 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 18.i.

16 DBPO, Series I, Volume V, No. 104; Fareign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, Vol. V, pp. 698-9.

49

Americans

had already indicated to the British that they were considering a Acheson, during diplomatic Spain, Dean who rupture of relations with and Secretary State, Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference the of was acting Madrid, informed French States Ambassador United the that the at who further He be to retire, would not stated that the was shortly replaced.

United States was ready to take part in an informal `to of views exchange 17 discuss frankly and realistically The Foreign this question'. all aspects of Office was reluctant to go even this far. British that a thought officials inhibit diplomatic it be that rupture of would relations would premature, democracy, if be towards that there to progress on consultations and were Spain they should proceed through normal diplomatic the channels without Mallet, attendant publicity meeting. of a ministerial who could envisage no Spanish the peaceful solution of monarchy problem except a constitutional in by in government ushered a provisional which there was a strong military breach Spain `produce that element, considered might a of relations with feared that the risk of a He, nevertheless, the rapid collapse of Franco'.

United Nations be `very that the violent upheaval would considerable and faced hands be hornet's then their time would with a new nest at a when [were] full enough with more urgent problems'. 18 In

December Paris 21 Attlee, telegram to a of who was Office, Foreign French the the charge of proposal rejected that it would be resented by the bulk of the Spanish people disorder, Franco. hasten back to renewed civil would if fall Franco to there was no alternative explained, were

in temporarily on the grounds fearful of who, And, Attlee as

administration which could readily assume power: the government-in-exile of the veteran Giral, favoured did Jose French, by the not republican, which was much Spanish Moreover, there even enjoy general support amongst other emigres. for diplomatic reasons maintaining relations with were sound practical Spain. If they were to withdraw Britain, France their missions from Madrid, States best deprive United the their themselves means of and would of Franco's the monitoring and moderating actions of and would government, German be unable to ensure the success of Allied policies regarding assets 19 Such Spain. have in little to carried and nationals considerations seem Constituent French On January 1946 17 the weight with parliamentarians. break Assembly France Paris that should off at resolved unanimously into Giral's Spain diplomatic Franco's contact with relations with and enter This State Department the with a pretext to return government. provided Spanish Balfour, John British January 18 the to the question, and on again

17 Ibid.,

pp. 706-7.

18DBPO, Series I, Volume V, No. 104.

19 Ibid.

50

favoured Washington, Acheson that a threeat was warned still Spain Franco the on regime which would condemn power pronouncement Franco be that they to would not recognise prepared and assert indefinitely. 20 Minister

in London Bevin's received words were unfavourably where State doubt beginning Department's `sense to the of reality as officials were Spain'.

The French had, the after all, seemed to reinforce vote regards Spain. in It British case for allowing to take their matters course certainly Spaniards, including Franco, Mallet infuriated many opponents of who, from French `for have historic the they whom a resented crticism explained, In dislike and whom they despise for their feebleness during the war'. blasts Franco did far lead Mallet's against repeated not opinion very unless Spaniards by to the themselves they were really calculated expedite action done Spanish be by leaders. this closer unity amongst could only party and Bevin may have been worried This indeed was the nub of the problem. been have be `world that the opinion' and afraid situation could not about but he was not ready to back the formation held much longer, of an 21 The had been to administration. government reluctant alternative from Switzerland Don Juan's journey Bevin facilitate to Portugal, and Bevin, he, Mallet's Britain's that suggestion should state readiness rejected in Spain based democratic to recognise constitutional monarchy a on insisted Bevin that the government could not contemplate principles. directly in Spanish affairs, and its actions `must be confined intervening to Spanish finding towards the a satisfactory people solution of stimulating 22 their own problems'.

Acheson's

Millar to explain, in a minute of 7 February, the illogicality hard, Franco limits `pressing to certain get of within of a policy [whilst] the opposition taking no active steps to encourage elements out,... ...

Government'.

Britain to agree on an alternative might end up with the Franco's before regime might collapse any alternative worst of all worlds: lead the to civil war. and resulting confusion was ready could government Oliver Harvey, Superintending Under-Secretary Nevertheless, as of if Franco Western Department, pointed out, pressure on were not stepped Spain his in he `funking opponents would cling on and would go on a up d'etat'.

The in his have been to only practical option seems opinion coup for Mallet be for Britain to support to a monarchical restoration and in Madrid, instructed to urge the opposition group which was mainly It fell to Hoyer

20 DBB), 21 Ibid.

Series I, Volume VII, No. 18.ii.

22 Ibid., i.

51

depose immediate `to to take action conservative, monarchical and military, Sargent, Cadogan's Franco Orme invite Don Juan Sir to and return'. be Permanent Under-Secretary, to thought there successor as was much 23 for Labour But, Bevin later the this said course. remarked, adopting as 24 in Spanish he to the party were opposed and when principle monarchy, discussed Spain with Harvey and Hoyer Millar on 18 February nothing was Mallet Franco's Bevin said about encouraging simply expressed opponents. doubts about whether Don Juan would prove satisfactory, and reasserted that he wanted to do nothing that would precipitate a civil war and saw no in Britain's from Spain. in Ambassador Moreover, advantage withdrawing a Georges interview French Minister, Bidault, Foreign the subsequent with he independent that to take who stressed action was under great pressure Spain France Giral talked to the on and of appointing agents government, Bevin maintained between that British opinion royal and was neutral as 25 Franco. to republican alternatives Office Spain, its `world the towards reconsidered attitude On February 9 United General Assembly, Nations the opinion' reacted. in London, Panamanian-sponsored which was meeting endorsed a resolution recommending member states to `take into account the letter and spirit' of been San had Francisco Potsdam `in the conduct agreed at what of and Spain'.

The British delegation their future relations with were able to Foreign The Office this support motion. was also ready to proceed with a joint note, drafted by the State Department, in March 4 and published on British, French for United States the the which and called governments Franco' `peaceful of withdrawal and the establishment of a caretaker freely Spanish to government which would allow the people an opportunity determine from they wanted. Much more worrying the type of government the British point of view was the French response to the execution in Spain, 21 February, including Cristino Garcia, hero ten communists, on of a of the 26 French Despite Spanish had that the resistance. wartime men claims been convicted French the on criminal and not political were charges, indignant frontiers Spain. the to their at news and proceeded close with Then, on 27 February, Bidault addressed fresh notes to the British, Soviet Paris States if United be they them and at embassies asking would France in Spanish in taking the to the question prepared associate with up United Security Council.

The notes referred Nations to the execution of Garcia and to `concentrations Franco-Spanish Franquist the troops' on of Whilst

Foreign

23 Ibid., ii.

24 Ibid., No. 77.i.

25 Ibid., No. 18 and ii.

26 Ibid.

52

Franco's 'constituting.. borders, that challenge policy, real and claimed .a democratic ideals, [risked] international both to the principles right and of international jeopardizing In peace and security'. a situation creating Anglo-American-Soviet declaration February the they cited of addition, 1945 on liberated Europe, which had affirmed the Allied purpose `to aid by former Axis by the to the satellites solve peoples of accord common 27 democratic means their pressing political and economic problems'. ill-timed.

Since first least, its meetings proposal was, to say the Council had been beset by a during January, the Security Red Army's Iran.

And, the occupation of northern wrangle over prolonged Russians fulfilling little their treaty obligations the and of prospect with Council March, it forces 2 likely by the that their seemed withdrawing 28 in The British be any preoccupied with another crisis. were would soon Soviet in to a major reassessment of what amounted case already engaged Russians Not did intentions. the a only seem set upon establishing aims and frontiers, belt of subservient their they also appeared satellite states around 29 Britain's in Mediterranean The basin. to predominance the contest ready insurgents by in Greece, Russian demands for communist a say part played Tangier in Tripolitania, in the future governance trusteeship of and a and Turks future Soviet the the upon pressure over control of the straits British between the Aegean and the Black Seas, all served to reinforce 1946 the Joint Intelligence fears. By March (JIC) was sub-Committee in its lands beyond immediately the that to those adjacent predicting Russia would `adopt her frontiers to a policy extend of opportunism influence wherever possible without provoking a major war', and to this end Communist Parties in Russia would `use, in the way she thinks effective, 3째 international

The French in London,

other countries and certain

organisations'.

Spain. in Franco's This analysis seemed particularly the case of appropriate from Moscow Russians be Reports to that the suggested reluctant would transfer present of power and that they considered witness a peaceful favourable Spain in In to the spread of communism. a telegram conditions February, 3 the substance of which was subsequently to communicated of George Office, Kennan, States United d'affaires Foreign the the charge at State Department Moscow, the that, politically as well as warned Russians in Spain in it `key territory' the recognized a which strategically, 27 FRUS 1946, Vol. V, pp. 1043-4.

28 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, Chapter I, passim.

29 Keith A Hamilton, `The quest for a modus vivendi: the Danubian satellites in Anglo1945-6', FCO Historical Branch Occasional Papers, No. 4, Eastern Europe Soviet relations, (London, 1992), pp. 4-18.

30 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 78.

53

Kennan Spain, important for `highly influence'. them to gain observed, was Soviet France (1) important flanking to the to was position and mind: an Italy, in both of which countries the Russians hoped eventually to achieve a Morocco'; dominant backward (2) `entry to peoples of political position; an Latin American direct (3) influence to the a potential and world. channel of He also noted Spain the western to the that entrance controlled Mediterranean, Soviet Union `close being to to the a sea was a which 31 littoral Roberts, friend Frank in Kennan's power'. opposite number and In letters the British Embassy at Moscow, was of much the same opinion.

March Russians February 2 he 14 to Hoyer Millar that the of and argued Spain into it be `plunged to that would content see anarchy' and would suit forced `with them if Western to their governments were conduct policies ideological from dating By he the thought the prejudices past'. contrast, Soviet government in `much too realistic to be guided by such considerations Eastern dealings Europe.

They their own with states of work there with done Germany have Franco has helped people who quite as much as and 32 is bad if

whose past record

as

not worse'.

in Information from Spanish sources further indicated that the communists Spain were determined to the to provoke a civil war. Moreover, according Salvador de Spanish diplomat, Madariaga, Franco `in order to veteran in Spain Spain in keeping his passions maintain aimed at position political 33 fever for he Communist heat, this purpose menace'. at and relied on the it is hardly surprising In such circumstances that Bevin rejected the French in He ill-advised'.

Cooper, 2 `most Duff telegram a proposal as of warned fear Britain be March, that must careful not to provoke another civil war, from Spaniards `effectively themselves overthrowing preventing of which was Franco'. He added: feel difficult this time that there at problems we when are so many ... in the world requiring elsewhere urgent solution and when economic in food important it is to are and conditions so parlous a state, most in keep Spain tranquil it become to and not allow yet another area Russians interests Big Powers The the the of on the which may clash.

Spain, hand too to trouble and over are only other anxious make ... for intervention direct there. would welcome any opportunity reviving indeed The fear of starting deter they them civil war would not it. would welcome

31 FRUS 1946, Vol. V, pp. 1033-6.

32 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 18.iii.

33 Ibid., No. 18.

54

French, Bevin reasoned, were simply `playing the Russian game and for Moscow Under with yet another opportunity making mischief'. providing his left-wing Bidault from colleagues, seemed all too ready to put pressure 34 day to day issues before long-term complications.

The

Bevin was in any event convinced that the French had an `erroneous belief 35 fall hasten Franco'. in the possibility the of effective outside action to of And whilst he continued to insist that the British government wished to departure Franco's he and peaceful replacement, remained accelerate Mallet's imposition the to contemplate either recall or of reluctant if Even universally applied, there was no guarantee that economic sanctions. down Franco, bring in they the and might well end such sanctions would Britain It Franco to that was so anxious that avoid. was war estimated civil it four least that would take months of an oil embargo and could survive at bring Spanish to the the about collapse months of economy. eight Europe's Meanwhile, sanctions prejudice economic would recovery and Britain's financial In jeopardise to and commercial position. addition Spanish fruit, vegetables, wine and iron ore, Britain depended on importing Spain for two-thirds of its supplies of potash. The closure of the FrancoBritish had already Spanish frontier threatened to deprive agriculture of further Spain Spanish superphosphates and measures against could react 36 At Gibraltar. inter-departmental held upon an meeting at unfavourably Office 28 February Treasury's Foreign the the on representative was Britain Spain `that lot than they were more out of was getting a adament in.

The Spaniards to give credit were prepared putting for Britain had look if to elsewhere purchases then and dollars. have to too part all precious with would Spain international to no more amounted action against in Franco diplomatic relations could still retaliate a 37 damage British the economy. seriously

hold and sterling, Spain in it made Indeed, if even than a breach of way

that

would

derived from These were practical considerations current assessments of British needs. But Bevin's response to the French proposal also reflected broader about the powers and functions assumptions of the new world in The French Bevin's `one were, words, raising of the most organisation. difficult interpretation United Nations the and points of of contentious intervention by Charter', the to the notably extent which collective in legitimate directly internal the a situation was arising out of organisation

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., No. 26-iii.

36 Ibid., No. 18. ii.

37 Ibid., No. 26. i.

55

Charter 2 (7) the affairs of a sovereign clearly stipulated state. of in matters which Nations was not authorised that the United to intervene jurisdiction Franco's `essentially the were within of any state', and since it frontiers its the that taking government argument was not action outside its to that threat to tantamount constituted a peace was saying mere hostility that they existence aroused such on the part of other governments felt obliged it. In British to act against setting an eyes this meant Soviet During Union January February the unfortunate precedent. and and its allies had used British military involvement in Greece and Indonesia as a for internal Security bringing before the these the pretext affairs of countries Council, French Spain if in in the to the and were succeed making regime a for international it that other states, reason action was quite plausible including Britain France, before be the perhaps and might arraigned Council domestic from issues. far Moreover, it over essentially was clear from the French note that the Quai d'Orsay had given much thought to how they would frame their reference to Spain to the Security Council. 38 Article

The Americans James French initiative. doubtful were equally about this Byrnes, the United States Secretary in State, of complained of the way Britain America had been `put on the spot' by France advancing which and have been thought to a proposal the ramifications of which appeared not fundamentally interests through to the and which were of the contrary Western powers. 39 Yet, despite repeated representations by the British and United States governments, determined to persist. the French seemed Cooper Bidault Duff it March 18 told that a most create would on dangerous precedent if the United Nations, when faced by a situation they deplored, `were bound do impotence to to their all anything register own France intended it'.

Security Spanish to the to take the about question Council `situation friction international lead to as a which might or give rise 40 dispute'.

This, however, Bevin to a that was a contention explicitly Cadogan, To Britain's to rejected. representative permanent who was now March 23 Nations at New York, he telegraphed that there the United on justification for be that the continuance could no real claiming of the Franco regime was of itself likely to endanger the maintenance of peace intervene in This happen if to and security. other countries were would only Spain either in order to bring about a change of government because or of force in There the argument that the the outbreak was no of civil war.

Spanish troops presence of there was no evidence that

Pyrenees the on constituted a threat to peace: intended Franco's government to use them for

38 Ibid., No. 18.

39 FRUS 1946, Vol. V, pp. 1051-2.

40 DBPQ, Series I, Volume VII, No. 26.

56

for in by they any case modern which were quite unfit aggressive purposes, 41 Bevin was also opposed to the idea, floated by Bidault, of' standards.

Council Foreign Ministers. `Besides to the the matter of' affording referring by trouble, the the USSR a further opportunity of' making such action he for `set Council observed, might', an undesirable precedent other League Nations The had, he been of sidetracked remembered, occasions'.

Italian Corfu its bombardment in 1923, had the of and antecedents when, 42 Conference Paris. been referred to the Ambassadors' at The Foreign Office held to the view that change in Spain must necessarily be gradual, that it could only be retarded by excessive outside pressure, and influencing Spanish that the most effective way of opinion was to continue for dislike international the present regime and to seek to bring to show Spain becoming home to the Spanish the to people extent which was isolated from the rest of the world. But, though prepared to admit that the `doing British case was valid, Bidault continued to stress, the importance of Moreover, Bevin, French to the who was anxious not give a something'. discussions on Spain with `flatly negative reply', was ready to have tripartite United States Ambassadors in London French the that their and provided 43 This to restrain the was not sufficient were not publicised. meetings When, April, 17 Polish delegation French from further the on action. at Security Council draft New York submitted to the a resolution condemning international for Franco the regime endangering peace and security and United Nations diplomatic to members sever upon relations with calling it his Spain, France's In British gave enthusiastic representative support. initiative likely Polish to strengthen than weaken the seemed more eyes Franco's standing in Spain. It also threatened to stretch too far the remit of did Bevin Charter, Australian to the agree and only reluctantly support an for Council the the to establishment of a sub-committee of amendment Spanish Henceforth, British directed into the policy was question. enquire did not get out of hand, that it that the sub-committee towards ensuring itself Spanish to those the present considering activities of confined international might endanger which peace and security, and government become it did Spain before be tribunal that not a public which might diplomats At British the time same sought to avoid giving the arraigned. discussion impression that they to either wished stifle or that they were defending Franco. 43

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. See also Documents on British FareigmPolicy, 1919-1939, 1983), Nos. 631,632,635 and 643.

43 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 26. iii.

43 Ibid., No. 42.

57

Series I, Vol. XXIV

(HMSO:

fears Reports from Madrid British impact the to about seemed confirm of the debate in New York on politics in Spain. On 17 April Mallet informed Council Security Foreign Office in developments deeply the that the were Spaniards.

Franco: by A he later `He is resented wrote of most week a deal less unpopular than two months ago because he has cleverly great for fear in France hatred the cashed on national and and contempt of the Communists driving is be [sic] force the to which considered universally behind Polish move at UNO. ' And Mallet was by no means sure that the Spaniards, Franco `in their present not give mood', might patriotic a 44 in deciding In his hold to the majority a plebiscite. a minute of event of 24 April Sargent commented Spain United Nation's handling the that of on British Franco had `been to efforts get rid rid of as possible as quickly by intervention'.

Moreover, UN's this the completely wrecked policy of case Franco Polish hardly by against allegations such patently absurd was assisted Segerstady, `heavy-water' Herman as that the German specialist, von was Ocana heavily-guarded working plant at on atomic energy at a near Toledo, and that Spain had between 600,000 and 700,000 troops mobilised for action' with 200,000 massed in Catalonia All Mallet's that alone. staff find Ocana factory distillery, brick could and an alcohol at were a and Bevin frankly information his disposal, `the that, the at on admitted frontier likely French lead to the the situation on side of would seem more 45 international Spanish friction to than that on the side'.

The

it equally difficult how Spanish to understand Spain German in Allied conduct with regard to the assets of and acquisition German dangerous `undesirables' be the repatriation to could regarded as of international Indeed, Cadogan Security told the peace and security.

Council far April Spaniards been 18 had in that the so on co-operative Allied German in to take that this respect allowing missions over property, `favourably their that attitude compared of other with neutral Governments', German that the to the and great obstacle repatriation of 46 doubted Bevin's had lack been the transport. nationals officials of whether the Spaniards were doing all they might to round-up former German officials in Spain. 47 Nevertheless, they were indignant when the sub-committee, having decided that the regime in Spain constituted, not an existing threat international `likely to peace, but a situation to endanger peace and Assembly for the to that should call security', proceeded recommend a diplomatic They worried about the rupture of relations. were particularly Foreign

Office

found

44 Ibid., No. 42. i.

45 Ibid., No. 42. i ii. and 46 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Ist Year, 183.

47 DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. 42-iii.

58

Ist Series (New York,

1946), p.

Cadogan in As implications Bevin this to a proposal. explained of' beyond its June, it Council 14 telegram powers could mean the acting of interference `establish a right of any state, whenever with and would Security Council do for the to their own purposes wish might members of 4B Such encroachment jurisdiction leave ' domestic the could on sphere of so'. , foreign intervention in like Britain to a colonial power especially vulnerable in develop its affairs. The new world organisation a way quite could then Nations The United its by British that to conceived protagonists. contrary Office's federation Foreign but legal `not the a adviser explained, a was, it basis loose confederation', the and could of mutual only work on 49 its form toleration permitting each state own of government. legal

future Franco's Spain than the more was at stake of and the narrow interests its For it Bevin and strategic of neighbours. was economic involved. important that there should be a ruling on the legal principles Cadogan was thus instructed to put forward that the a resolution proposing Spanish question be referred to the General Assembly at its next meeting in jurists be hand then to examine the scope of the the autumn. at would Council, Charter Assembly the the the of and and rights could always 500 Court. from International But Council's handling the the a ruling obtain Cadogan's in be `as it to the proved words matter confused as was of 51 Gromyko, Andrei Soviet delegate, Council the to the tiresome'. wanted initiative its Assembly to the and opposed reference own and, whilst act on Council Polish the the original motion was not carried, remained seized of despite from Meanwhile, issue.

Parliament the pressure within and the for the government Bevin TUC to recognise Giral's government-in-exile, by Hoyer Millar he Mallet, to the and policy recommended whom clung October, in leaving Spain in in in Paris hope that the of matters alone met 52 depart Rumours be Franco would and peacefully eventually replaced. from Russians Paris to the that the effect seek an might emanating deprecated Franco in by British diplomats were with accommodation Franco Stalin Moscow: both Madrid too and and would risk sacrificing Roberts Nevertheless, Frank conceded that weapon. valuable a propaganda `to do business with dictatorial the Russians were prepared regimes rather in Spain installed '53 to the type than with moderate of regime we wish see .

Much

48 Ihid., No. 52.

49 Aid., No. 52. ii.

50 Ibid., No. 52.

51 Ibid., No. 52. iii.

52 Ibid., Nos. 55 and 77.i.

53 Ibid., No. 55.ii.

59

Russians For the moment it seemed unlikely that the would even agree to Benin's And Spanish being Assembly. the although referred to the question its legal it Assenmbly, own was with equipped as officials recognised that the September, by in be they committee, a position to clarify principles, would discussion initiating having too were a second thoughts about the wisdom of Western Hogg William September In 12 the there. of of' a paper happen in Department it impossible foretell to what would argued that was United Assembly. he `We to the the with reference should', observed fron Nation's best handling `at temporary the respite gain a matter, of discussions in instituting the these unprofitable proceedings at the cost of is be Assembly to there the nothing which might not go way we want...

54 Council'.

This further in discussion Assembly by the the or gained Assembly in New British the of remained policy up until the convening SecretaryNations Lie, the United York. but on 24 October Trygve General, publicly invited the Assembly to give `comprehensive to guidance' its United Nations `regarding difh'rent their the the members and organs of days later, Then, Franco the at the regime'. eleven relationship with Council Spanish instigation Polish delegate, the the the removed of its functions it items list from the so was exercising question of on which that it might be discussed by the Assembly. The prospect of the Assembly debating Spain, the apparent absence of any progress towards the removal its from TUC including Franco, domestic the at pressure, a call and of for a breach of diplomatic Brighton C-onkrence and econornic relations with Spain, 55 led Bevin to review his tactics. From New York, where he had Foreign Ministers, Bevin informed Attlee latest for the of gone gathering that he had no doubt that a twcÂş-thirds majority would support whatever initiative.

Britain favoured Spain he the taking and that now was put up on in Spain, democracy hoped that he could thereby promote He evidently b by injudicious home, `prevent others'., action and satisfy opinion at his `conniving

Still

at action anxious to avoid any move that might mean in logical if its sanctions, civil war and conclusion must end carried to which, Âť7 Bevin United Nations intervention', the making empty opposed military His be `we to threats which officials at willing carry through'. would not Franco draft New York prepared the a resolution which, after censuring freedom, inimical democracy fier `pursuing to and enduring policies regime Nations United free in for the presence of elections peace', called Sargent Office.

Foreign in This the met with a critical reception observers.

' Ibid., No. 77.

5' Ibid., No. 91.1.

56 Ibid., No. 91.

57 Ibid.

60

Franco's imply language to use that regime was which might was reluctant both in itself a threat to peace, and he f<)r(-saw difficulties to with regard He United Nations his the selection and and protection observers. of' form it the to make clear that of a country's also wished colleagues 58 But the British jurisdiction. domestic was a matter of' government delegates were well aware that they were engaged in a damage limitation in Slav Assembly that the the group and a vociferous minority exercise and determined Their American Latin on stronger action. states were efforts of Guille"rino Belt, leader draft to, the to sell a resolution of the relatively Cuban delegation little Belt `Dr. be to met with success: proved moderate lack began become the than to talkative and of progress active rather November, Byrnes indicated Then, 19 his on readiness to take alarming'. fortnight draft later, Senator Connally British Tom the and, a over of the States delegation Assembly's Committee Ist United to the submitted a for the continued Franco's from Spain draft appealing the exclusion of its Nations Franco following United the and agencies, resignation of and, holding the the establishment of' a provisional government, of a general The British hoped in Spain.

Assembly that this the would satisfy election for demands The deflect breach sanctions or a of'diplomatic relations. and Bevin but to prepared accept was was a ambassadors, withdrawal of most for American that a majority the then only on condition was secured 59 less it `more or as stands without strings attached'. resolution December 4 Spain The appointment on gave the of a sub-committee on Its composition in heavily British little cause for optimism. weighted was in British diplomat, favour of' the `interventionists' the and, of one opinion its meetings in the Security Council Paul Gore-Booth, `like a stage room, dinner party on a rostrum', intimate militated against any exchange of views The into two opposing camps and, sub-committee or coinlpromise. soon split it in favour for December, 8 Latin American voted a of a motion calling on French-sponsored breach of diplomatic Spain relations with and passed a foodstuffs. import Spanish recommending an embargo resolution on the of in Finally a confused debate in the main committee two tied votes ended Assembly's December, inter 12 the adoption, on a resolution of which and heads from that their member states recall of mission alia recommended Franco's Spain barred from United Nations be Madrid that and agencies Powerful British lobbying by delegates in the succeeding and conferences. food Nevertheless, blocking the French amendment they still on exports. inclusion in had to register their non-acceptance the the resolution of' of a if, `within that time', there a reasonable were not recommendation

511Ibid., No. 91. ii.

59 Ibid., No. 101.

61

in Spain

from its the consent of established a government authority be `adequate the governed, the Council to taken should consider measures This not only contradicted to remedy the situation'. the British view that it for Council, further Assembly, decide be the the to was action not whether `the thin edge of the sanctions taken, but it was also in Bevin's opinion 60 wedge'. deriving

All that was immediately This Mallet's in required was recall. was a course Bevin indicated had his it to which already readiness acquiesce; was not favoured. he He Commonwealth delegates had 7 November told one on futile in that he regarded the withdrawal as of ambassadors since no case it had in that he knew than embarrassing of anything other ended 61 Yet, Bevin informed Mallet 20 December, the part stalemate. as on by Britain States United in discussions New York the played the and at at least served to explode `the myth that either Government be quite would in Mallet to the this content see present regime continue power'. admitted He far from The the was so. was, nevertheless, about optimistic outcome. debate in Assembly had, the the the the effect of and passage of resolution he noted in a private General letter of 23 December, been `to inject Franco with new vitality and [had] given h.iin a great chance of once more Spanish He doubted if `emotional to appealing this nationalist pride'. phase' last few in but his be than there would more a months, estimate no could denying that `except for the persistent foreign pressure and agitation against Spain in which the British Parliament [had] taken a prominent and public have differently in Spain'.

It he part, events might moved was, admitted, a matter of `pure guesswork' whether, if Franco had been left alone, he would have lost most of his popularity disappeared.

Caudillo's But the and position had almost certainly been strengthened by his being able to pose as a bulwark against civil war and communism. 62 Bevin and his senior officials in the Western Department sympathised with Mallet's It is, however, that they would have agreed with analysis. unlikely British had `now engaged the Ambassador's that the assertion government deeply in the policy of intervention in Spanish affairs which themselves 63 Potsdam'.

Ever since the Spanish question had been raised in started at Council interference in the Security the British had opposed international domestic Much they the regarded as what affairs of a sovereign as state. they may have desired change in Spain, they were determined to uphold

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., No. 91.

62 Ibid., No. 106.

63 Ibid.

62

in Article

2 (7) Charter.

The dangers doing the enshrined of of in Assembly became too the the only apparent when autumn otherwise South Indian Africa's its Asian treatment took up an complaint against of further international to move portend a which seemed meddling community, 64 Commonwealth Empire.

The British in the internal affairs of the and have Charter by the to sought reciprocal advantage using could, of course, domestic developments in Europe.

There justice in eastern was challenge liberties Franco Artajo's those that the contention political which regime far `much democratic more sincere and above pretended were recognised had initiative in those taken the of some of countries which protestations' 65 But all too conscious Spain.

Soviet the the of power of criticising British the to embark machine, were reluctant on such a propaganda 66 venture. the principle

New York in by his fears Benin's diplomacy at was any case constrained of in further `free-for-all' the and of a peninsula expansion of communist a He in Spain influence be thought renewed civil war westwards. would a in view of the present political disaster' in Europe `major situation and in `heavy Britain's the Eastern commitments elsewhere, particularly He also felt that the British public `were already bearing a Mediterranean'. heavier burden and subject to more restrictions than any other', and that it be further `fair in handicap to them to the shape of ask accept a would not 67 Much he fellow his sanctions'. trade as sympathised economic with in Franco, he impose their to to opposition was not prepared unionists more British for he believed hardship it was for the people upon an end which Spain and the Spaniards to achieve. Unfortunately, Foreign Office records housewives do not reveal whether Torquay the or not of were able to Seville haute politique. their the marmalade oranges: stuff of was not obtain in Mrs Alexander 1946 neither that could, nevertheless, rest assured an Russia France in Spain. have their nor an unholy would way ungodly

64 Ibid., Nos. 84 and 100.

65 FRUS 1946, Vol. V, pp. 1082-3.

66 RWK Sloan of the Western Department suggested in August 1946 that `possibly bearing in mind the situation in Bulgaria, Roumania. or Poland, it may be desired that we should use Spain Charter to test the the to a live issue of domestic the wrangle over applicability of But the idea was opposed by his colleagues. DBPO, Series I, Volume VII, No. jurisdiction'.

77.

67 Ibid., No. 91.

63

NOTE

Dr

Dr

Louise

Joint Editor Documents British of on Policy Overseas and Historican in Records Library Department, and FCO, Formerly, 1990. since Lecturer, Department of International Politics, University College Wales, Aberystwyth, of 1967-1990.

Senior Lecturer in the Department Management, University of of Central England, Birmingham.

Johnson

Dr Edward

Ann

CONTRIBUTORS

Hamilton

Keith

Dr

ON

Assistant Editor Documents of on Britislz Policy Overseas and historian in Library Records Department, and FC: O 1991.

Formerly since Research Assistant Imperial the at War Museum, London, 1986-91.

Lane

L'Estrange

Fawcett

Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics St Catherine's College at CUF Lecturer in the Faculty of and Social Studies, Oxford University.

64

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