The Cicero Papers

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Foreign & Commonwealth

Office

THE CICERO

PAPERS

Further releases concerning the security breach Ankara, HM Embassy, in Second World the at

War, 1943-73

FCO Historians March 2005

CICERO and

`Snatch'

his Valet and the Security Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara Embassy, British the at

October

Between

1943 and March

Allied

in World cause

Embassy in Ankara

1944, the British

information leakage of source of a serious

Breach

was the

for disastrous have the that could proved

War Two. Ilyas Bazna, the valet to Sir Hughe Knatchbull-

Hugessen (aka `Snatch'), HM Ambassador to Turkey, was able, through poor security arrangements,

to photograph

documents, and secret

important of

large a number

German Germans Bazna he Embassy.

The the to the then cover name gave sold which Papers released to The National

CICERO.

the end of the war that the Security

not until identity

CICERO of

authorities

were able to establish the

involved Germans of several

the case officer, Maria Molkenteller,

Moyzisch,

in 2003 show that it was

(TNA)

This full M15 to the was affair. and give a account of was able

interrogation from the obtained Ludwig

Archives

CICERO with

Amt VI Headquarters

(SD), the Security Police of the SS, and Walter

Sicherdienst

Amt VI. Further information, Ostuf Schuddekopf,

Schellenberg,

this did not apply to Knatchbull-Hugessen's valuable

since

Schuddekopf`s

by Moyzisch,

Head of

Section of Amt VI. The latter felt most of the

documents provided by CICERO were very dated and of historical

dealt

of the

though of a somewhat negative character, came from SS

Head of the British

they

including

with

the

interest only. But,

personal notes, which were considered problem

of

British-Turkish

relations.

is probably nearer the truth than the exaggerated claims made analysis fictionalised in book his he and elaborated which

' it. Newly

Foreign released

authorities

including lengths trap the to to spy, elaborate went

Cabinet paper, without

Office

the Foreign

TNA to papers

Secretary's

in the film based on

British the that reveal

knowledge,

planting

security

forged War a

in the Embassy in late

the new papers also indicate that he spent

January 1944. For Knatchbull-Hugessen,

CICERO fallout from his his the the to trying the of clear name career much of rest of revelations.

2

The Consequences of CICERO's The potential

damage that CICERO

could

Activities

have inflicted

in being decisions Moscow, taken were and strategic

political

Major

was enormous.

Cairo and Tehran. A

in Cairo documents have the produced could planning number of proved fatal had they leaked. Fortunately,

one of them was ever in Knatchbull-Hugessen's

only

Although The others were never at risk. possession.

the code-name OVERLORD

was

date location in documents the to and of the operation were not passed over, referred compromised

by

Another

CICERO.

that the CICERO

possibility

potential

information

area of

damage

concerned

enabled Franz von Papen, the German

Ambassador to Turkey, to bring pressure to bear on the Turkish delayed a declaration of war by Turkey on the Allied

Government

which

side. The British desire to have

in September increased Italy 1943. British surrendered when on side

Turkey

the

forces

had then taken over a number of the Dodecanese Islands from their Italian garrison, Leros and Cos, and an attack on Rhodes, operation

including

contemplated.

November

ACCOLADE,

was

But the Germans tightened their grip on the area and re-took Leros in

1943. To mount an attack on Rhodes, Turkish

airfields were now needed

to provide bases for fighter protection.

At the Cairo Conference, between 3 and 7 December 1943, Churchill minute

on operation

Turkey

to enable the `fly-in'

ACCOLADE

for the preparation a plan

SATURN,

British of

operation. Mention

fighter

squadrons

together with his Foreign Minister SATURN minute on

Knatchbull-Hugessen.

minute

in

cover the British of President,

arrived in Cairo, copies

handed were over to the Turkish

President and

took notes to this end, which formed the basis, together

memorandum,

for a further CICERO for Turkey's

`Establishment term accepted

of Allied

haul. However,

Churchill's

entry into the War' Forces in Turkey

Both terms are misleading and the limited nature of Churchill's

ACCOLADE

that would

1943, the Turkish

Knatchbull-Hugessen, and

`Preparations was not a paper on

more generally

airfields

The latter was instructed to draft the minutes of the talks. No

doubt Knatchbull-Hugessen SATURN the with

of British

was also made of a possible infiltration

4 December into When, Black Sea. the on submarines

Churchill's of

produced a long

nor the in 1943.

minute must be noted.

25 December 1943, on was cancelled not for lack of air cover but

because of the decision to launch the assault on Anzio. Negotiations with the Turks 3

foundered talks also continued -

throughout

unreality. On 4 February 1944, all military military official

negotiating

January 1944 but took on an air of

supplies to Turkey were cut off and the

team returned to Cairo. Knatchbull-Hugessen

was told to avoid leakage had been

contact to the best of his ability. By that time the CICERO

effectively

plugged.

approached

Moyzisch

the results

Knatchbull-Hugessen's

Molkenteller and in

achieved

confirmed It

December.

that they never

seems likely

that

some

have been Germans; but to the passed on may well

they could have been of little more than academic interest. It was known Foreign

of

Office Foreign to the on the state of the negotiations reports

with the Turkish Foreign Ministry

Turkish

again

Minister

himself was

keeping

informed on the progress of negotiations

a number of diplomatic

that the missions

and there was no reason to suppose that he

did not discuss the matter equally freely with von Papen.

Two

other possible

consequences

of CICERO's

activities

have been suggested.

Moyzisch had argued that the documents enabled the German cryptographers

to break

important but investigated British found this to be untrue. The story an was cipher and leakage, the Germans became aware that there was no that, through this other was genuine threat of an Allied

into the Balkans. If this particular move

(and it rests on an entry in General Alfred CICERO Papen) then von perhaps Molkenteller technique manuscript

Jodl's diary and less direct statements by

earned all the money the Germans paid him.

disposes also of the myth the photostats, -

of CICERO's

mastery

she says, showed many duplicates

notes were largely

is true statement

indecipherable.

It is possible

of photographic and some of the

that CICERO

had a

confidant in the Embassy since, according to Moyzisch and Schellenberg, two fingers or thumbs which

did not look like the agent's own were visible

in several of the

photographs. In his own account, Bazna tells of having two female accomplices. first of these whom he names was completely -

The

innocent of the actions he attributed

to her. There is little reason to suppose that the second woman was not also a figment 2 his imagination. But this small mystery remains. of

Reactions in Berlin

In Berlin, CICERO's documents received a mixed reception. The German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was still smarting after being duped by operation MINCEMEAT

Allied an -

ruse which

pointed to an attack on the Balkans

in the

1943.3 Ribbentrop summer of had his own brother-in-law,

the ambassador.

At Hitler's

Ribbentrop court

in February Adana at

1943.

surprised to receive von Papen's telegram

of 27

President InĂśnĂź's meeting with Churchill

Thus Ribbentrop

was somewhat

October informing

him of CICERO's

for the scheme. Photographed

his approval gave

he offer although cautiously

tendencies of the Nazi elite were in evidence.

by CICERO contacted

but had passed him on to Moyzisch.

deal Moyzisch would only with

In turn, Schellenberg

but

documents were in German hands by 1 November

fratricidal the very soon

the kudos for this intelligence

relentlessly

in Ribbentrop's

against von Papen and the Turks - the latter compromised

eyes following

in Ankara

Albert Jenke, promoted to the post of Minister

in August 1943 to monitor intrigued

feud with von Papen and

also cultivated a long-standing

Jenke had been

factor that riled Ribbentrop,

alone -a

he knew that as

Walter Schellenberg to coup would accrue

had little time for Ribbentrop

CICERO

Thereafter,

SD. the and

CICERO to and attempted use

to

discredit the Foreign Minister.

On his return to Berlin Ribbentrop Berlin

and thoroughly

When

grilled

November, the end of until dried up and flowed

information

details

of the Cairo

finally

Ribbentrop

was ordered to the Foreign Ministry

to report, Moyzisch

but as CICERO

Instead the Foreign Minister

misinformation. lines in the Allied

coalition,

more reasoned viewpoint

would

conferences

the conclusion

interpretation an

in told to was stay

Moyzisch

deal with him only, the

Moyzisch again only when

Tehran and to

came

11 November. on

by

returned

were provided

that the material

was

thought the documents

to Ankara.

by CICERO British

not

fault showed

Schellenberg's which countered

rather

that the documents pointed, however vaguely, to a massive

4 'Allied invasion of Europe and the destruction of Germany.

As already discussed some debate exists about the impact British-Turkish

relations.

that CICERO

There is no doubt that von Papen made full use of the

in in he had its his attempting value, possession, whatever material After neutral.

British

Cairo, he warned the Turkish

requests for Turkish

reprisals'

had on

Foreign Minister

into the war would entry

to keep Turkey

that compliance

`inevitably

lead to German

destruction' `least be the consequences would whose complete

and Izmir. Von Papen was gratified

with

of Istanbul

to find out a few days later from CICERO that the

Turkish note to the British on 12 December was non-committal.

5

With the departure of

the British

in

delegation

military

February

early

1944,

von

Papen

informed

Ribbentrop that `this round in the campaign for Turkey has been won by us a ...

5 Balkan offensive could not now take place. ' Sir John Dashwood 's Investigation

forged the and

War Cabinet paper

On 17 January 1944, when the British authorities learned that von Papen had obtained intense have from documents British that this and aroused a source, secret must come in London.

high level very concern Franklin

D. Roosevelt,

liaison security investigation.

Churchill

in informed he turn told, and was the Foreign

the US President. Sir John Dashwood,

left for Ankara at the end of January 1944 to carry out an

officer,

investigation,

As part of Dashwood's

document a

might

Government Although

be expected that

to provoke betray

would

their

forged

-a

in Cabinet paper Embassy, the the contents of which, was planted Berlin,

Office's

War

if they reached

some reaction

German the the on part of

knowledge

the document

of

in

question.

the trap was laid for several days, there was no result and Dashwood by Victor forged Cabinet The paper, composed unsolved.

returned with the problem Cavendish-Bentinck,

the chairman of the Joint Intelligence

The War Cabinet remained War Cabinet

Committee,

was unique.

in it; there the archives of the was no copy unaware of

its and existence

known was only

to handful

of officials.

It was a

Cabinet by Office Foreign the printer, with a genuine perfectly genuine paper, printed and authentic required

but its contents were entirely

number

a considerable

fictitious.

deceit by all concerned. amount of

The whole

process

In particular,

Pierson

Dixon, the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, forged Anthony

Eden's initials

to indicate that the paper had been approved by the Foreign Secretary, when the latter had in fact never seen it, and was completely

its Without to oblivious, existence.

lie the printer would never have accepted the paper.

Knatchbull-Hugessen

this

6

himself was determined that any leakage had occurred not from

his own house but on a train journey,

from Cairo the the to either on way or meeting.

The papers known to be in the Germans' possession corresponded closely to the briefs he had carried in a brown travelling box he had left unattended, However,

after

accumulating

Dashwood was unconvinced

box, in the special train to and from Cairo. This

in his carriage while evidence

for

what

he was in the restaurant he called

the

`train

car.

theory',

that this was where the theft took place and fell back on

6

the assumption

place

Knatchbull-Hugessen's members of

reviewing security

that the theft took

in Knatchbull-Hugessen's

7 house. In

in Ankara, the British personal staff

had nothing on their records against his domestics. The butler

authorities

but known little English the to be able to none of other servants were could speak a indications being `all do English them the to are against able and read so'. However, footman butler, in habit that the the valet and were all noted of entering

Dashwood

day before time the they went to bed any of at and also study

Knatchbull-Hugessen's

his bedroom had to suite: access at night and equally In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the Brown box is house and that the Black box has

in Excellency's kept His always

it is difficult there all night, often remained

to avoid the conviction

that any of these persons may have had opportunities have duplicate boxes and may well with -these

for tampering

keys to the boxes

keys his his Excellency His set of on carries person. since What emerged therefore was that Knatchbull-Hugessen black box in his bedroom overnight together 'with' a key to a red circulation

kept his working

in a papers

and carried on his person the key to this box, box in which such papers were transported to

is key Chancery, from described key the which sometimes the to another and and as his safe and sometimes as the key to his brown travelling that Knatchbull-Hugessen rather than returning CICERO

box. There is little doubt

fault for leaving box the was at unattended in the Residence

it to the Chancery at night, and in leaving the key to it where

it.

Knatchbull-Hugessen hold did, of get could, and

was warned not to do

this in 1942, long before CICERO came on the scene but he persisted in doing so. The Security

Guard's

log for the period

from

1 September to 11 October

1943, for

days Ambassador 25 that the the that of spent in Ankara during this example, shows in 20 his kept box Residence he the on of the nights, and returned it to the period, Chancery on only five. It was no surprise that Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary

Office, Knatchbull-Hugessen Foreign the asked at

to do his work in

8 the Chancery in future.

Efforts to Clear Knatchbull-Hugessen 's Name 11 Knatchbull-Hugessen Ambassador

in newly

was transferred liberated

from Ankara

in September

Brussels. At that time

7

1944 to become

his responsibility

for the

it was suspected, especially

leakage at Ankara was not known for certain although

factor.

been have his Dashwood that the a contributory negligence might after report, When the British Government

found out the true story in 1945, Cadogan confided in but I

his diary on 14 August, that `Snatch ought, of course, to be court-martialled, 9 Knatchbull-Hugessen later Cadogan Two think this'. sent over must weeks

formal a

full The in but letter dated August 1945 28 this was never made public. reprimand a story of CICERO became public only in 1950 when Moyzisch of it in his book Operation

his account published

Cicero. In response to a Parliamentary

Question (PQ) by

W. S. Shepherd MP on 18 October 1950, the Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, told the House of Commons that: The Ambassador's

in valet succeeded photographing

a number of

highly secret documents in the Embassy and selling the films to the Germans. He would not have been able to do this if the Ambassador had conformed

to the regulations

governing

the custody of secret

lo documents.

On the minuting

draft PQ, Sir Andrew the to the of reply

Noble, the Under Secretary

Security Department, said `I do not know what we say if asked why Sir the overseeing H's punishment

was not something more than a severe reprimand.

It has always

"' far he lightly. too got off seemed to me that

The day after the PQ, Knatchbull-Hugessen then PUS, Sir William

into the Foreign Office and saw the came

Strang. Knatchbull-Hugessen

complained

that the Foreign

Office might have warned him that the PQ was coming up and perhaps given him the to discuss the wording of the reply. Knatchbull-Hugessen

opportunity

correspondence instruction

would

in fact infringe he did that not show

also argued that

any particular

security

he had been box from that the to given understand and which the papers

for him informed having The PUS taken of were apologised not was absolutely safe. the PQ, though he did not think that the Foreign Office substantially.

draft have the could altered

After reading the whole file, the PUS said that he had been left with the

impression that with such highly secret documents it was scarcely in conformity general security instructions

with

for him to have left the box or possibly his key to it,

anywhere within reach of foreign servants.

8

That same day, 19 October

1950, Shepherd wrote to the Secretary of State again Secretary The Ankara. have been to should sent

details OVERLORD asking why of

"details" that certain

be State `I that think of replied, we can absolutely OVERLORD

were

never

sent to

12 On Ambassador '.

the

of operation

15 October

1964,

in Secretary had Third Sir Edward Peck, to served as who wrote

Knatchbull-Hugessen

Ankara during the war, stressing that he did not want to go down in posterity having given away the date and details of OVERLORD.

as

Since Knatchbull-Hugessen

himself was not in a position to deny this in public he was anxious his obituary should do so. The Office

obituary on Knatchbull-Hugessen,

On 3 November which

in April The Times 12 on printed

covering the memorandum,

CICERO the of

affair

Knatchbull-Hugessen

1971.13

its aftermath. and

commented

The Foreign

that he was not sure about `our agreeing

`when all is said and done, he was responsible This view prevailed

at the time. After

1971, Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe,

former

Knatchbull-Hugessen's

the former Ambassador,

Knatchbullof writing

obituary

the contention

that there was no safe in

residence at the time of CICERO.

7 November on

There is no indication

1945 that Knatchbull-Hugessen's

original

him. But, Cadogan continued,

did in is be, harsh fact the that the succeed obtaining enemy may

documents entrusted to your charge '' .a

9

on

Cadogan

safe had been

be in Chancery 1943, January that this to the and should modified removedletter to Sir Hughe reprimanding

to Sir

in and

far enough went

the files at the time that the FCO agreed to the accusation being modified. did acknowledge

and

death on 22 March

MP and a good friend

did not feel that Peck's to make public

discussion

1971 and the Secretary of State on 14 April

the then PUS, on 2 April

he wanted

to any

for a serious leakage to the enemy'.

Knatchbull-Hugessen's

Hugessen, took up the cause of vindicating

1971. Mott-Radclyffe

Head of

Office's

Sir H's did He version of paper'. not want to stimulate any further

particular

In the letter

It is intended for the FO to look at and I hope agree to as background

Department

Denis Greenhill,

in

intended is `The not paper stated,

in the event of any of the false reports appearing'.

Security

supplementary

Peck to a memorandum also sent

1964 Knatchbull-Hugessen

he give his version

for publication.

led to Sir Edward Peck's

agreed to this, which

in his

`however that access to vital

Conclusion CICERO British

bring in bad to through the off a major espionage coup security was able

Embassy in Ankara and this must largely be ascribed to the carelessness by

Knatchbull-Hugessen the British

himself,

the leakage did not last for very long. CICERO

Fortunately, staff.

Knatchbull-Hugessen's

as the Dashwood enquiry cleared all other elements of

in service mid-July

entered

1943 but did not contact the Germans

in in late in October. his He January 1944 third the week and until gave about notice left at the end of February.

After

November/December months with

influenced was seriously

his material deteriorated,

1943, when his activities

events of great moment

important probably not very

Christmas

in the Middle

but the two

were at their peak, coincided

East. Although

it is, for example, unlikely -

the damage done was

that Turkish foreign policy

danger the enormous. was potential -

Christopher Baxter Historian, Foreign & Commonwealth

10

Office

I L. C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (London, 1969).

2 The above is taken from investigations into leakage of information to the German Intelligence Service from British Embassy Ankara (CICERO case). The file documents MI5's efforts after the event to piece together facts relating to a it became Allied leakage from involving interrogation the secrets which, of apparent the case espionage wartime serious from Dated 1944.

1945 Jan in 1943 01 in Turkey 1952 Dec 31, had KV German 6/8, The and occurred prisoners, of National Archives (TNA).

3 On 30 April 1943 a corpse draped in a British Army officer's uniform was washed up on a Spanish beach. Attached Allied Balkans.

The Spaniards full the briefcase body attack an on suggested plans which of to the was a passed these in in Madrid Embassy German mid-May. papers to the 4 Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London, 2003), pp. 423-25.

Pap Franz The Life Apprenticr: The Sorrerrr's W Rolfs, vom en (Lanham, Maryland, 1996), pp. 406-08.

Richard of 6 Clutton, minute for Strang, 4 January 1950, FO 370/2930.

7 The Chancery was cleared of complicity by the fortuitous fact that Mrs Stemdale Bennett, the wife of HM Minister at Ankara, had typed four copies of a document which Knatchbull-Hugessen was due to take to the conference in Cairo, in but Ambassador's the the had one the not three copies possession. This was the copy of corrected a misprint on and See Edward Peck, Rmvllections Germans.

Edward have Pak: discovered the 1915 to retirement to of reached which was Library), 39.

FCO from p.

(Unpublished the 1975 manuscript available aA copy of Dashwood's report, entitled `Leakages in Turkey. 1943/44', 7 March 1944, can be found in FO 850/128, TNA. 9 Diary entry for 14 August 1945 in David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogaa, O.M. 1938-1945 (London, 1971), p. 761.

Everett note, 25 October 1973, FCO 1O`Background to the CICERO Affair and Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen', 12/161, TNA "" ibid.

12ibid.

The Times, 12 April 1971.

13`Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen', 14 Background 12/161,

to the CICERO

Affair

and Sir Hughe

Knatchbull-Hugessen',

TNA.

11

Everett

note,

25 October

1973,

FCO