April 2002

would be the main subject of the meeting. The meeting would be timely in relation to the development of a global framework for the control of trans-boundary animal diseases under development by FAO. Dr Füssel reported that the EC would support a further 200,000 doses above that previously agreed, bringing the intended supply to the Caucasus region of 1,200,000 doses of oil-adjuvanted vaccine, of which 200,000 would be reserved for emergency use.

The Secretary also informed the Group that he would represent EUFMD in a Mission to Iran, on 5-15 October 2002. There would be a strong association in the mission of those currently or previously involved in the EUFMD Commission by the participation of Dr Per Have (representing the EU), and Yves Leforban, representing France, and Dr Tony Garland representing the WRL. It was agreed that strengthening surveillance in the region was of great importance since much of the concern for EUFMD, and work for EUFMD Research Group members concerns the need for identification of suitable vaccines and diagnostic reagents (reference sera) required in response to the threat of emergent virus strains from this region.

2. Matters arising from the 67th Executive Committee meeting, 25-26 April 2002

2.1 Capacity of FMD Reference laboratories during crisis situations

Dr Donaldson reported that reviews were ongoing of requirements for diagnostic capacity during FMD crises. It was suggested that Dr Garland would be invited to the Executive Committee meeting to report on this matter. Dr Have mentioned the contingency development plans including capacity figures. It was agreed that collation of information on the diagnostic capacity of the FMD laboratories in the EUFMD member countries, and the level of activity predicted under crisis situations would be very important to the identification of potential problems and solutions. It was noted that in 2001 dramatic increases in submissions had occurred to laboratories across Europe and that there may be limited “spare” capacity in the region to enable countries to undertake additional tests in support of others in a crisis. It was proposed that Dr Garland be invited to the Group to report on this matter. Dr Have mentioned that contingency plans were under development in Denmark which will include figures on capacity for FMDV diagnosis. The Secretariat will check OIE reports for similar information.

It was recommended that the Secretariat should establish a system for recording and reporting the level of submissions to the FMD laboratories on a yearly basis. It was also agreed that information should be collated on the number of submissions received during March and April 2001 as an indicator of the possible workload of laboratories during a crisis.

2.2 Review of “The minimum requirements for importation into Europe of live animals, fresh meat and offal of the bovine species”

Dr Donaldson reviewed the background to this issue, and the comments received from members of the Research Group concerning the document, prepared by the EU in 1993. He noted that in 2001 there was disparity between the export restrictions faced by the FMD affected countries in the EU compared to those in South America. The differences between recommended standards in the OIE Animal Health Code and the standards required in the EU were discussed. The group recognised that increased stringency of measures intended to reduce risk could have serious consequences for trade for EUFMD members in the event of an outbreak and therefore increase the potential agricultural impact. The group also recognised

that the original minimum requirements had been highly effective but that the epidemiological situation was now different, particularly in situations where vaccination had been suspended and later resumed and the immunity level of animals at slaughter would therefore be less certain. Dr Füssel highlighted that the latter situation is reflected in recently modified EU import conditions for fresh meat.

The basis for the time-temperature requirements for heat treatment of meat, and milk products, was discussed and it was agreed that current recommendations should be critically reviewed, since the validity of some of the published findings was questioned. The RG therefore proposes to review the risk associated with current heat inactivation methods for meat and milk. Dr Dekker was prepared to undertake this task. Other members should send all relevant data to him.

2.3 Development of Reference Sera

The availability of reference sera was a concern to members and the proposal of the Chairman that he and Dr Paton prepare a proposal on production of additional reference sera was strongly supported. This proposal would be available in time for the Executive Committee meeting in November.

2.4 Objectives of Phase XVII

The group recognised the high value of finishing the work of preparing the 3 new reference sera in this Phase.

It was also recognised that the impact of the 2001 epidemic had affected progress under the Phase. Dr Paton also reported that the current financial support to WRL for Phase XVII does not cover full economic costs as there is insufficient to cover personnel costs. The group recognised that since the start of the Phase XVII, new tests had received recognition by the OIE, and that greatly increased additional support is required. The importance of selection of suitable sera was re-iterated and the further standardisation and proficiency studies (including specificity checks on negative serum panels) should be conducted using reference sera to A22, O Manisa and Asia1 (Shamir) as part of Phase XVIII. A proposal (Appendix 42) that a plan for Phase XVIII would be developed by Dr Paton and Dr De Clercq was supported.

The meeting also recognised that the issue of virus detection tests is very important and currently not addressed in a co-ordinated manner by EUFMD. The group supported the proposal that ways and means to support an extension into this area be explored.

2.5 Guidance on the use of r values

The group recognised that to provide more precise estimates of cross-protection between vaccine strains and epidemic viruses would require a series of large controlled heterologous challenge studies. The value of the current system is evident from the relatively few examples of lack of protection in the field when a high r value has been obtained. A review of the precision of the methods, and predictive value for protection would be helpful, to update the earlier review of Dr Paul Kitching.