3. South & East Mediterranean

Of note are:  the possible continued circulation of FMD in the wild animal population in the Strandhza ecosystem, involving both Bulgaria and Turkey;  that most of Anatolia had not been vaccinated against Asia-1, presenting a high risk for potential explosive outbreaks;  the high incidence of type A in Anatolia, despite apparently suitable vaccines being used.

As a result of events, EuFMD organized several missions in July to September, and consultations with EC and FAO on possible responses. These missions were to Turkey (to plan wild boar surveillance, and a workshop to model potential FMD control options, and field mission on Asia-1); to Iran, Georgia and Egypt, and consultation on response to request from Tunisia for assistance.

The mission reports to Turkey are presented under different Items; that related to Asia-1 risk is presented here.

Mission to Eastern Turkey on vaccine effectiveness against Asia-1 A short field mission (Report in Appendix 4) was undertaken by an EuFMD/WRL and SAP Institute team, and made an intense investigation of villages affected by the Asia-1 incursions in August-September; the format of the study was designed to determine the effectiveness of the Asia-1 vaccination to reduce clinical disease (and through serology, on incidence). The team clinically examined over 300 animals and concluded that there was no evidence of a protective effect of vaccination. Despite this, the epidemic appeared to have spread only slowly in the vaccinated population; since vaccination did not seem to protect this may give some confidence that spread in non-vaccinated areas would not be explosive. However, with the kurban-bayram festival, there is a high risk for wider spread. The SAP Institute has developed a new vaccine with the new strain, for autumn vaccination. However, this could change if spread occurs to non-vaccinated areas of Anatolia.

Mission to Georgia - EuFMD The report (Appendix 5) was given by Dr Tsviatko Alexandrov, Short Term Professional officer, EuFMD. The mission (Dr Alexandrov and Dr Krnjaic, Serbia) was organized in response to findings reported by official services of the Russian Federation, of type O in disputed area of South Ossetia (an occupied territory of Georgia). Since the sequences (provided by ARRIAH to Pirbright) supported the hypothesis of spread from Turkey/Iran, possibly across areas of Georgia where FMD vaccines are used, provided by EC through EuFMD, a mission was undertaken with the objective of understanding the level of monitoring and surveillance in place and the likelihood that outbreaks may go unreported. The mission visited the areas neighbouring to FMD affected territories, and rapidly reviewed the state of contingency planning and capacity for FMD risk management.

On these two points: 1. the EuFMD project had provided adequate levels of diagnostic kits and training to enable detection and serotyping of FMDV , and serology for exposure, but it seemed likely that small outbreaks could go unreported, and larger epidemics occur because of the lack of state organized vaccination in internal areas of Georgia. 2. Significant deficiencies in contingency planning, and in capacity to mount effective response were found, and recommendations were made to focus project actions to improve emergency planning. (Note: these will be addressed under the current project - by intensified actions to progress

Contingency Plans before the next TCC project meeting in December).

Global FMD situation report The virological events were summarized by David Paton (Appendix 6) and a summary of the reported FMD events in September 2011 was provided by EuFMD Secretariat (Appendix 7).

Discussion

The situation in Turkey and the European neighborhood was of high concern to the Committee. Previous Asia-1 epidemics had reached Greece (in 2000), and the type O epidemic in 2010 had evidently reached to Bulgaria. The type A epidemic in 2011 in Turkey was perhaps as widespread and high risk as the type O in 2010 but had not yet received much attention. The effectiveness of the Asia-1 vaccine against the new strain was clearly a problem, but for unknown reasons, by September the incursion had not spread widely; this could change with the autumn festival and movements to the west for fattening. The impact of the routine use of the 3 PD50 vaccine in Turkey was questioned. Dr Bulut agreed that the problem is largely to do with young animals, which predominate in eastern Turkey (breeding area) and which do not receive a booster vaccination. The field effectiveness study indicates low cross-protection but a in potency test with challenge of asia-1 Shamir with the new strain is needed with high priority.

Dr Gibbens emphasized that the work done in Georgia is more of the type that he considers needs to be done, being assistance to Governments to formulate strategies that match their ability to deliver - and the need to look seriously at each place where EuFMD/EC spends money. He remained concerned there is also a mismatch between what is decided to be done and the capacity to deliver it. The point was noted, without there being an agreement on whether this implies more resources to be provided to enable delivery, or less. In all current projects, EuFMD support is given to countries to support their national control strategy in areas that are considered to support the EuFMD/EC strategy of reducing the risk to member states through better risk information or improved control in border regions. Dr Füssel brought to attention that some “distant” countries such as Pakistan are now effectively our neighbours, since in just a few months FMD epidemic strains from Pakistan emerge and are found in eastern Turkey. Early warning needs close functional co-operation and information sharing laboratories and reporting – of Pakistan-Iran and Turkey, at least. He also asked why Bahrain has become a “hot-spot” for FMDV surveillance; the animal importation there from many regions (Asia and Africa) needs more attention.