Appendix 2 – Provisional Agenda

Slide 22 Coordination and dissemination activities

• CRL established June 2006 • CA FMD-CSF • Diagnostic quality assurance • Training • Network of FMD Ref Labs and dissemination of information

– FMD BioPortal / ReLaIS • GFRA and Agra meeting

Slide 23

Conclusions on Risk

• Risk is from primary endemic areas in Asia, Africa and South

America • Topotype distributions • When to react? – Big upsurges in cases – which is when these countries tend to submit viruses – Extensions of topotypes – Spread to sporadically affected countries at border between endemic and free areas • Gaps in knowledge? – Problems of access to information – e.g. China and India – use surrogate neighbours and foster collaboration – Problems of lack of data - Africa – need to support surveillance and lab work (twinning concept of OIE?) • Priority areas remain Middle East (including former Soviet

States) and Sub-Saharan Africa – Mauretania cases indicate possible threat to N Africa with potentially similar vaccine matching issues as Egypt in 2006

Fo o t-an d-Mou th Dise ase: Si tu ati on wo rl dwi de a n d ma jo r e pi demi olo gi cal e ven ts in 20 05 -2 00 6

DRAFT EMP RES W at ch bullet in Jan uary 06

P rep ared by FAO EMP RES t eam an d EUFMD Commissio n Secret ariat

Appen di x 4

I. Signif icant FMD epidemiological events in 2005-2006

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is the most contagious transboundary animal disease (T AD) a ffecting clov en hoofed animals. Significant e conomic losses are p roduc ed by its high morbidity and the export trade r estrictions imposed on a ffected countries. T here ar e sev en r ecognised s erotypes o f FMD (O, A, C, Asia 1, SAT 1, SAT 2 and SAT 3), which di ffe r in distribution across th e world. Serotypes A and O hav e the widest distribution, occur ring in A frica, Asia and L atin Ameri ca. T ypes SAT 1, 2 and 3 a re curr ently restri cted to A fric a only and Asia 1 to Asia; the cap acity to invad e fre e a reas is common to all types and pe riodically SAT s are introduc ed into the near- east, and Asia -1 into west and east parts o f Eurasi a. In fe ction or va ccination ag ainst one serotyp e does not provide protection against the other serotypes.

T he years 2005-6 h ave se en some dram atic, in pla ces d evastating, events in FMD epid emiology, in the ne ar east, far- east, and A fric a. Since these ea ch occu rred in a reas not consider ed o ffi cially fre e (by the OIE) o f FMD, international attention has been limited compared to the epidemic in north-w est Europe in 2001. In the same period, no incursions o f FMD have b een report ed in countries or zones d ecla red o fficially free by th e OIE. T he unstable epidemiological situation in endemic regions is highlighted by this review, which analyses the distribution of the FMD serotyp es in 2004-2006, and ass esses the risks posed by FMD in spe ci fic regions, including the eme rgenc e and spre ad o f a s erotype A virus in the n ear –e ast ; the r esurgen ce o f FMD di ffer ent lineages o f type Asia 1 in Asia (China and Vietnam) and part of Russia and Mongolia; the introduction of type A into Egypt from sub-Saharan countries and the increased distribution of outbre aks caus ed by type O in Great Lake Countries in Afric a .

T he situation of FMD in infected a re as indicates that FMD types continually spread within endemic regions, and periodically and unpr edictably give rise to virus types that “ break immunity”” and cause r egional epidemics. Prevention o f FMD epidemics r equires a good understanding o f the virus types within a country or region and suffi cient surveillanc e to identify emergent in fe ctions befo re region al spread occu rs.

FMD in the near-e ast; regional epidemic caused by spread o f the A Iran 05 strain of FMD serotype A In mid-2005, a rapid escalation o f type A outbre aks occur red in Ir an, to which the locally produced vac cines did not protect; spread occu rred across west ern Ir an with severe impa ct in all ages of animal. T urkey was a ffe cted in the autumn, with first outbre ak in Nov ember, and widely dispersed in De cembe r 2005; the routine v ac cination (to types A Iran 96, O and Asia-1) provided little effective immunity against the variant virus. Following the animal movements associated with the kurban festival in January 06, type A outbre aks occu rred in most regions of th e country, including the strategic ally signific ant region o f T hra ce, which adjoins the non-v ac cinating European region (Gr ee ce and Bulgaria ). Intern ational r esponse to the incursions in T urkey wer e d elayed, sinc e notific ation to the OIE occu rred only a fter outbr eaks oc cur red in T hrace; onc e noti fied, as a r esult of immediat e FAO (EUFMD Commission) missions, 2. 5 million doses of eme rgen cy v accin e w er e provid ed by th e E U vaccin e bank to T urkey, which w er e used under FAO dir ection and succ eed ed in h alting outbreaks ijn T hra ce, but the epidemic continued and spread in Anatolia, peaking in June 06, and resulting in over 800 confirm ed type A outbreaks in the first 10 months of 2006, the worst situation for over 15 years (Figure 1). T he new situation required a switch in serotype A antigen in the vaccine (to A22) , and to meet the high demand , the international agen cies (EC/FAO) provided additional v accin e in August and Novembe r 2006 (2. 7 million doses); mainly for us e in west ern- centr al Anatolia, since this r egion is at high risk from the regula r inwa rd movement of animals from endemic r egions in the east (Figure 2 ) into fattening ar eas from wh ere in fection c an spread to the significant bovine populations in the west (Figure 3). T he virus strain involved has been named A Iran 05 by the FAO W orld re fer enc e Labor atory; outbreaks in 2006 in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and most recently Jordan (in December ) indicate a wider distribution and capacity of the strain for furthe r spread. .