ITEM 12 – FMD ANTIGEN AND VACCINE BANKS: SURVEY OF NATIONAL AND EC BANK HOLDINGS

Item 12 – FMD antigen and vaccine banks: survey of national and EC bank holdings

The report (Appendix 24) of the EuFMD survey of FMD antigen and vaccine bank holdings of member states and neighbouring countries in 2009 was presented by the Secretary. The detailed holdings (number of doses held, or totals for strains) were not presented to the Session for data security reasons. The Questionnaire in English and French was sent to all EuFMD Member States, North African countries and the Russian Federation; positive responses from 10 countries/FMDV bank managers in EuFMD member states/North Africa; responses received from each those which held antigen banks in 2007. Three of the banks are held in non-EU countries.

Only one known supply of vaccine from the vaccine banks had occurred in period 2007-April 2009, for supply to middle-East (Iraq in 2009). The type O and Asia-1 holdings are in line with WRL recommendations made to the 37th Session. Of concern was that of the eight different type A antigens held in 2009, only 4 banks hold >0.5 million doses of A22 Iraq, a relevant antigen for the current type A Iran 05 epidemic, and none hold a homologous antigen (serotype A Iran 05/A TUR06).

Discussion

The need for a Vaccine Bank Managers forum (VBM) was discussed and agreed; such a forum had been initiated under the EC funded co-ordination action on FMD and CSF, with some success, but the project had finished. There remains a need for exchanging information between VBM to avoid duplications or gaps, to find ways to share antigens in crisis situation, and respond earlier to new threats. The EuFMD was suggested as the body to initiate or continue to bring VBM together.

Conclusions

1. There remains a significant lag in response of vaccine producers and bank managers to change in the antigenic types circulating in the region; 2. WRL recommendations in 2007 for type A22 have not been applied by majority of banks; 3. Lack of a homologous A Iran 05/A TUR06 and thereby places reliance upon A22 Iraq or use of other type A if available at very high potency; 4. The lack of type A Eritrea in any bank is of potential concern, although very high potency type A 22 vaccines held by some banks have been shown to protect against the FMDV type A circulating in Egypt 2006 (and which remains circulating in 2009); 5. Lack of FMDV strains/antigenic types originating from virus pool 2 (South Asia, mainly the

Indian pool of FMDV types A, O and Asia-1) or pool 5 (West/Central Africa pool of O, A,

SAT1 &2). The risk associated with pool 2 and pool 5 FMD strains needs to be reexamined, as pool 2 has been a source of FMDV for Europe in the past (type A in the

Balkans in 1996, and O PanAsia 1 in 2001), and pool 5 viruses have entered North Africa at lEast twice in the past 10 years; 6. SAT 2 antigens: the holding size is generally small and with topotype/strains originating from Southern Africa. Relevance of these holdings to risk from circulating SAT2s is unclear and needs urgent re-evaluation.