37th Session of the European Commission for the control of Foot and Mouth Disease

REPORT

Eu opean Co missi n for th Contr I of Fo t-and- outh Di ease

Rome, Italy, 18-20 April 2007

Thi ty-Seventh session

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

AGA: EUFMD/07

REPORT

of the

THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

FAO HQs Rome, Italy

18-20 April 2007

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Rome, 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... iv LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 1 ON THE GLOBAL FMD SITUATION..................................................................................................................... 1 ON FMD CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD ................................................................................. 2 ON INTER-REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN FMD CONTROL ................................................................................... 2 ON FMD CONTROL IN TURKEY ......................................................................................................................... 3 ON THE EUFMD ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF FMD PREVENTION....................................................................... 3 I.R of Iran and the south Caucasus countries.............................................................................................. 3 ON PROGRESSIVE, INTERNATIONAL FMD RISK REDUCTION .............................................................................. 3 ON THE PROPOSED WORK PROGRAMME FOR UPCOMING BIENNIUM ................................................................... 4 ON THE REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (RESEARCH GROUP) ............ 4 ON TECHNICAL ISSUES WITH THE VACCINATE TO LIVE POLICY .......................................................................... 4 ON THE USE OF PREDICTIVE EPIDEMIC MODELLING ........................................................................................... 5 ON THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION, THE ELECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE RESEARCH GROUP OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL COMMITTEE........................................................................ 5 ITEM 1 - ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA ...................................................................................................... 8 ITEM 2 - OVERVIEW OF THE FMD SITUATION IN EUROPE AND OTHER REGIONS................... 8 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................... 8 RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 9 ITEM 3 - FMD CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD ................................................... 9 DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................................... 9 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................... 9 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 10 ITEM 4 - ON INTERNATIONAL RISK REDUCTION AND INTER-REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN FMD CONTROL .............................................................................................................................................. 10 GF-TADs, global risk reduction, and the technical support via the regional animal health centres ........ 10 Statement by the OIE ................................................................................................................................. 10 OIE/FAO network of FMD Reference Laboratories ................................................................................. 11 Co-ordination of research initiatives on FMD.......................................................................................... 11 DG-Research funded actions; Co-ordination Action for FMD and CSF laboratories, Improcon and Labon-Site projects, Epizone........................................................................................................................... 11 Global FMD Research Alliance (GFRA) .................................................................................................. 11 Global roadmap for development of improved tools for FMD control in endemic settings...................... 11 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 11 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 12 ITEM 5 - TREND IN ANIMAL TRADE AND PROSPECTS FOR RISK REDUCTION IN THE MIDDLE-EAST ................................................................................................................................................ 12 ITEM 6 - PROGRESS IN FMD CONTROL IN TURKEY .......................................................................... 12 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 13 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 13 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 13 ITEM 7 - EUFMD ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF FMD PREVENTION................................................ 14 IRAN AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS.......................................................................................................... 14 Iran ............................................................................................................................................................ 14 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 14 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 15 FMD control in the South Caucasus ......................................................................................................... 15 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 15 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 15 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 16 FMD control in Israel ............................................................................................................................... 16 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 16 i

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 16 ITEM 8 - REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR PAST BIENNIUM (2005 -2007)........ 16 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 17 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 17 ITEM 9 - PROPOSAL FOR WORK PROGRAMME FOR UPCOMING BIENNIUM............................ 17 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 17 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 17 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 18 ITEM 10 - REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESEARCH GROUP OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.......................................................................................................................... 18 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 18 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 18 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 18 Working group on Laboratory Biosecurity................................................................................................ 18 ITEM 11 - PROGRESS ON TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE VACCINATE TO LIVE POLICY............................................................................................................................................................. 18 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 19 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 19 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 19 ITEM 12 - CONFIDENCE IN THE USE OF PREDICTIVE EPIDEMIC MODELLING IN DECISION SUPPORT.......................................................................................................................................................... 20 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 20 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 20 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 20 ITEM 13 - STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS AND BUDGET FOR THE UPCOMING BIENNIUM ....... 20 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 20 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 21 ITEM 14 - ELECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE RESEARCH GROUP OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL COMMITTEE .......................................................................................... 21 ELECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE .................................................................................................... 21 ELECTION OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ................................................................................... 21 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................... 22 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 22 ITEM 15 - READING OF THE REPORT ..................................................................................................... 22 CLOSING CEREMONY ................................................................................................................................. 22

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LIST OF APPENDICES Page Appendix 1 .............................................................................................................

Agenda

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Appendix 2 .............................................................................................................

Overview of recent activities of the FAO Animal Health Service on FMD intervention Juan Lubroth

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Appendix 3 .............................................................................................................

Report of the FMD FAO World Reference Laboratory (WRL) David Paton, Nigel Ferris, Geoff Hutchings, Yanmin Li, Bob Statham, Nick Knowles, Don King, Julie Stirling

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Appendix 4 .............................................................................................................

Annual OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network reports - WRLFMD and OIE Ref Lab for FMD, Pirbright, UK: Nigel Ferris, Don King, Nick Knowles, Yanmin Li, Bob Statham, John Bashiruddin, David Paton - PANAFTOSA and OIE Ref Lab for FMD, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Ingrid Bergmann, Viviana Malirat - FGI ARRIAH and OIE Ref Lab for FMD, Vladimir, Russia: Valery Zakharov, Vladimir Borisov, Aleksey Scherbakov, Svetlana Kremenchugskaya - OIE Regional Ref Lab for the Sub-Saharan continent, Gabarone, Botswana: Hervé Coupier, Lindani Mozola, George Matlho

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Appendix 5 .............................................................................................................

Epidemic events and lessons learnt in the European neighbourhood – 2005 to present Keith Sumption

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Appendix 6 .............................................................................................................

GF-TADS - Global risk reduction and the technical support via the regional animal health centres Joseph Domenech

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Appendix 7 .............................................................................................................

OIE/FAO network of FMD Reference Laboratories David Paton

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Appendix 8 .............................................................................................................

Global FMD Research Alliance (GFRA) Martyn Jeggo

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Appendix 9 .............................................................................................................

Launch of a Global Roadmap for development of improved tools for FMD control in endemic settings Brian Perry

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Appendix 10 ............................................................................................................. 67 Report of the 3rd Roundtable meeting on FMD control in the Middle-East and North Africa EUFMD Secretary Appendix 11 ............................................................................................................. 74 Current situation of FMD in the Middle East - Perspectives and risks linked to animal movement OIE Regional representation for the Middle East Appendix 12 ............................................................................................................. 85 FMD in Turkey Naci Bulut Appendix 13 ............................................................................................................. 97 Report of the EUFMD/EC project on FMD surveillance in Iran -I Francis Geiger

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Page Appendix 14 ............................................................................................................. 125 Report of the EUFMD/EC project on FMD surveillance in Iran – II; Use of GIS in analysis of FMD outbreaks and vaccination coverage V. Otarod Appendix 15 ............................................................................................................. 130 FMD prevention and control in South Caucasus Carsten Pötzsch Appendix 16 ............................................................................................................. 134 FMD control in Israel Hagai Yadin Appendix 17A ........................................................................................................... 138 Report of the Executive Committee on Progress in the Implementation of the EUFMD Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 Keith Sumption Appendix 17B ........................................................................................................... 145 Report on the Activities of the EUFMD Commission in 2005 and 2006 Keith Sumption Appendix 18 ............................................................................................................. 151 Proposal for the work programme of the EUFMD Commission for the upcoming biennium EUFMD Secretariat Appendix 19 ............................................................................................................. 159 Relating to formation of a Management Support Group (MSG) for the Commission EUFMD Secretariat Appendix 20 ............................................................................................................. 160 Report of the activities of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee of the EUFMD Commission Kris De Clercq (Chairman of the EUFMD RG) Appendix 21 ............................................................................................................. 167 Summary of presentations to the Session of the EUFMD Research Group in Paphos, Cyprus, October 2006 Nesya Goris Appendix 22 ............................................................................................................. 170 Report on a simulation exercise on surveillance after emergency vaccination of cattle in normally FMD free northern European country Kris De Clercq Appendix 23 ............................................................................................................. 175 On application of methods for improving confidence in the outcome of surveillance for disease freedom Tom Murray Appendix 24 ............................................................................................................. 183 Minimum size of antigen stocks in the EU vaccine bank Aldo Dekker Appendix 25 ............................................................................................................. 188 Survey of the vaccine bank holdings in Europe among the EUFMD member states EUFMD Secretariat

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Page Appendix 26 ............................................................................................................. 189 Summary of the EUFMD/Co-ordination Action Workshop on improving capacity to undertake emergency vaccination programmes Tom Murray Appendix 27 ............................................................................................................. 190 Enhancing confidence in epidemiological models of Foot-and-Mouth Disease David Schley Appendix 28 ............................................................................................................. 205 Paper on epidemic modelling Review by the Secretariat Appendix 29 ............................................................................................................. 206 Financial Statements for 2005 and 2006 Administration and Finance Department of FAO Appendix 30 ............................................................................................................. 213 Proposal for revised budget for trust fund MTF/INT/011/MUL Secretary EUFMD Appendix 31 ............................................................................................................. 222 List of Participants

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List of Recommendations Considering that: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

there has been a deterioration in the control of FMD in the near-east in the past two years, with incursions of epidemics of two strains of type A in 2005-2006, and of type O in 20062007; the recent epidemics indicate that borders in the near-east have become more permeable to animal disease movement over the past few years, and epidemic events have often not been contained, leading to a higher FMD incidence, which poses an increased risk to Europe; early detection and warning of new epidemiologic events are a pre-requisite for effective management of FMD; the dynamic nature of the infection and the antigenic variation observed in the past two years, which requires continual monitoring in order to reduce the risk that vaccine banks in Europe will not contain suitable stocks, and which has required countries affected to change the vaccine specification in response; the multiplicity of routes of possible introduction into the European neighbourhood results in a complex and dynamic situation for risk management; vaccination to live is a preferred policy of a number of European nations if faced with FMD outbreaks, and this policy requires feasible contingency plans and access to stocks of vaccine suitable for use against the epidemic strain, and a suitable exit strategy; trans-boundary and interregional movements of FMD strains have also occurred in the past two years in other regions, and any increase in incidence of FMD in neighbouring or distant regions may increase the risk of introduction into Europe and its adjacent countries.

The Session comes to the following recommendations: On the global FMD situation Recommends: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

that FAO and the OIE continue to promote the application of FMDV typing, supporting the harmonization of reference laboratory services and, where necessary, sample shipment, to increase access to virus typing services and to build up a comprehensive picture of virus circulation; that regular recommendations on priorities for targeted FMD sample collection, weighted according to risk, are produced by the WRL together with the epidemiology ad hoc group to assist priority setting in sample collection efforts; that further development of the initiative to increase sharing of virus information deposited in databases, towards a comprehensive coverage of FMD strains in current circulation; development of greater capacity and application of full length sequencing to resolve questions of epidemiological spread patterns in the near-east; the development of standard procedures for scoring antigen bank priorities, in such a way that will assist other regions to score the most suitable antigens and vaccines for use in their situation; that FAO and OIE continue to promote the use of FMD vaccines that meet the OIE standards, and that the two organizations, through GF-TADs, give increased attention to monitoring the use of non-OIE standard vaccines in order to bring attention at the CVO level to the risks and consequences of ineffective or unsafe vaccines; that a standardized system for recording and reporting of FMD clinical signs should be developed and tested in EUFMD projects and by affected member countries, in order to improve early recognition of emergent viruses with altered virulence characteristics; research to identify rapid diagnostic indicators of changes in transmissibility and virulence; that FAO support the OIE/FAO network of FMD reference laboratories for the purpose of improving vaccine matching, and that the FAO Regular Programme fund the request from the Secretariat of this network for 20,000 USD per year, reporting back to the EUFMD Executive if not in acceptance. The Executive should monitor the progress of the network, ensuring that the support provided by the EUFMD and FAO Regular Programme to the World Reference Laboratory for FMD (WRL) is co-ordinated, complementary and cost-effective.

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On FMD control in the European neighbourhood Recommends: 10. that the international organizations, including FAO, OIE, EC, increase their efforts to promote commitment to the reporting of new epidemiologic events of FMD, and to implementation of measures that will effectively reduce the risk of outbreaks; 11. that the countries affected by FMD re-evaluate their control measures, particularly the effectiveness of the control of animal movement and marketing from affected areas and regions, and that increased attention is given to the organizational weaknesses that allow FMD to persist and circulate; 12. that the communication of risk information by the EUFMD Commission to member countries and observers be re-evaluated, to ensure timely information that adds value to current official information channels, and focuses on the needs of member countries for risk assessment; 13. that the EUFMD/OIE/EC Tripartite on FMD control in the Southern Balkans should continue to meet to review the measures in place to reduce FMD risk, and that of other priority livestock diseases, to Thrace region and the neighbouring areas in Greece and Bulgaria, but the partners should give more attention to involvement of non-EU Balkan countries. Additional items to be considered for the Agenda should be the preparedness for FMD including the status of contingency plans; the inclusion of non-FMD items should be agreed between the parties; 14. that the EUFMD Commission should continue to support the collection and typing of viruses, in response to the increasing movements of infection from Africa to the region, and to assist the neighbouring regions, such as north Africa and the eastern Mediterranean in their preventive actions, and that the priorities in 2007-8 should include west African and north-east African regions where there is lack of virus information, and in undertaking this should work through the Regional Animal Health Centres (RAHCs) established by FAO: OIE with the African Union (AU-IBAR) in Bamako and Nairobi; 15. that in order to improve the assessment of risk posed by new strains of FMD virus, the Commission should also promote and, where required, support, the gathering of FMD epidemiological information, with priority to areas where suitable vaccines are unknown or unavailable, working through the RAHCs, and with established Global Early Warning System (GLEWS) operated by FAO/OIE/WHO; 16. that the Commission should specifically promote and monitor risk reduction measures which will assist to reduce the FMD risks of transborder movements of animals and products across the eastern boundaries of Europe, including improved efficiency of vaccination programmes, early warning and response capacity in the border regions, and measures to reduce or mitigate illegal animal movements.

On inter-regional co-operation in FMD control Recommends: 17. that under the framework of GF-TADs, the Secretariat work closely with the OIE/FAO Animal Health Centres, to improve the communication of information relevant to vaccine selection and other preventive actions, and specifically to assist the efforts of the RAHCs in the middleeast (Beirut) and north Africa (Tunis), to promote the effective communication of FMD information and technical knowledge; 18. that the EUFMD Commission, in consultation with OIE and EC, and with the countries involved, invite participation in regular “Multi-partite” meetings for FMD control at the Eurasian interface (Turkish boundaries), and provide technical assistance to improve the monitoring and impact of vaccination and other control measures; 19. that as a component of a Global FMD risk reduction under GF-TADs, the Commission should assist the development of a long term plan (“Roadmap”) for FMD control in the region where Europe and Asia meet (Europe-West Asia); 20. that FAO, in consultation with OIE, EC and the Economic Co-operation organization (ECO), and with the countries involved, should also consider establishing regular multipartite fora on FMD risk reduction across the central and west Asian borders, to which EUFMD is invited to participate, since the boundaries of Iran with its eastern neighbours constitute an important potential barrier to westward movement of infections; 21. increased effort to promote the early reporting of epidemiologically significant events to the OIE and to ensure that relevant analyses or reviews conducted by the international organizations are communicated to member states to ensure greater awareness of changed

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levels of risk, especially when there is a possible need to change vaccine use or surveillance for new threats.

On FMD control in Turkey Recommends: 22. that he feasibility of the long term plan for FMD control in Turkey, developed between the Government of Turkey and the European Commission, should be re-evaluated in light of the recent epidemiology, and the possible reasons for failure recognized and addressed early in the planning and implementation process; 23. that the feasibility of achieving the much higher level of herd immunity to effectively drive FMD type O outbreaks to extinction should be re-evaluated, given the apparent failure of FMD control against the epidemic type O virus, using an apparently suitable vaccine. As part of this, other options, including greater emphasis on regionalization and effective local containment of epidemics, should be considered; 24. greater emphasis and support to epidemiology and predictive modelling over the next three years, to guide the setting of performance targets at national and sub-national level for control measures, including vaccination coverage, in Turkey and in the most affected countries in the neighbouring region.

On the EUFMD activities in support of FMD prevention I.R of Iran and the south Caucasus countries Recommends: 25. that the EUFMD Commission should continue to support the Iranian authorities in their efforts to establish an effective early detection and early warning system for FMD incursions, and to promote effective control; 26. that, having endorsed the activities proposed for 2007, further emphasis should be placed on identification and evaluation of options to reduce risk associated with animal movements, with a focus on identifying the patterns of movement of animals towards Turkey and the near-east; 27. further development of the outbreak investigation system and capacity of the CVL to undertake virus typing for early detection of new virus strains. Continued support should require that virus typing information is shared with the WRL and OIE/FAO Reference Laboratory network; 28. the feasibility of extending FMD vaccination and outbreak monitoring using, where possible, the epidemiological unit as the level of interest should be evaluated by the Commission, to support the countries in the region to manage their control programmes according to risk and using performance based indicators; 29. that, after the proposed activities to maintain and strengthen the buffer zone and capacity for FMD control in the southern Caucasus were supported, agreements with the countries should be reached to clarify their inputs to the future programme, and progress of FMD control reviewed by joint meetings with the countries concerned, and with EC and OIE; 30. that in-service training of staff in Government, and of private veterinarians engaged in disease control operations, must be promoted in FAO programmes. Political commitment to sustain training programmes should be sought.

On progressive, international FMD risk reduction Recommends: 31. that support is provided through the Secretariat to technically assist to develop the strategy under the GF-TADs on progressive FMD control, which has in view the eventual elimination of the infection as a threat to animal health; 32. that such an initiative for Global FMD control should be coordinated by FAO/OIE under GFTADs, and be assisted technically by bodies including the EUFMD Commission; 33. that FAO and OIE report progress on the status of the initiative, including the commitments, funding and progress in the implementation of the above, at each EUFMD Session; 34. that a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) or other form of agreement is reached between the Executive Committee and the management of FAO on the extent and modalities for the assistance provided by the Secretariat to the wider work of FAO on FMD; 35. that FAO increase its actions on FMD and that the Secretariat, subject to the agreement reached above, play a supportive role to ensure synergy between the programmes;

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36. that increased effort is made to ensure co-ordination between the EUFMD Research Group (RG) and the major European and international FMD research initiatives, and that a report is given at each Session on the progress of these research initiatives, to ensure the attention of member states and the international donors to significant developments, including any threats to scientific progress that arise; 37. that the EC increase its funding support, via DG-research, to speed up the development of improved FMD control tools, including novel vaccines, while at the same time continuing to support applied research to improve the utilization of current tools.

On the proposed work programme for upcoming biennium Recommends: 38. that wherever possible, the balance of activities should be addressed to ensure that sufficient attention is given to actions that will assist preparedness for FMD control by the member states, with particular attention to the needs of the western Balkans; 39. that further support for the Secretariat is provided and, as part of this, a management support group (MSG) is established to provide a bridge between the Secretariat and the Executive Committee, and include the EC as a key partner organization, with additional expertise from the Technical Committee and the WRL as required, to ensure co-ordination with the efforts of key partners in FMD control; 40. that the function of the MSG should include prioritization, co-ordination and monitoring of the progress of the ad hoc working groups established under the programme of the Standing Technical Committee (Research Group). The MSG should report to the subsequent Executive Committee for endorsement of decisions to create or disband groups, their specific tasks and duration. The working groups should be under the supervision of the Standing Technical Committee, to which they will report.

On the Report of the activities of the Standing Technical Committee (Research Group) Recommends: 41. that the working groups in 2007 should focus on the following, organized into ad hoc working groups under the umbrella of the Standing Technical Committee: a.

FMD epidemiological assessment and improving knowledge on virus circulation to improve preventive actions; b. monitoring of vaccination, including post-emergency vaccination surveillance; c.

FMD laboratory services and standardization (lab services group); d.

Application of quantitative models in decision support (modelling group).

In addition, following the recommendations of the 36th Session, a further group is proposed: the Ad hoc Working Group on capacity building of national experts on technical issues in FMD outbreak management and prevention (training group); 42. that according to the need for expertise and the available budget, the number of experts in the Standing Technical Committee should be reviewed during the next two years, with a view to expansion to address the disciplines in the depth required, and to address the need for specific expertise, and the ad hoc working groups should have the opportunity to invite additional participation from member and non-member states; 43. that in addition to the main working group tasks, the Technical Committee should review the feasibility and constraints: a. of a potential antiviral strategy for control of FMD in dense populations of livestock; b. of the application of full length sequencing for tracing FMD outbreaks as part of routine investigations.

44. greater CVO involvement in the upcoming workshops in 2007, after which the need for continuation of NSP workshops should be evaluated, and the lessons learnt summarized for member states.

On technical issues with the vaccinate to live policy Recommends: 45. that the outputs of the post vaccination surveillance workshops should be made available to the member states;

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46. that member states should test the practicability of surveillance policies after vaccination, and are encouraged to organize their own workshops along the model developed, to assist them to assess their capacity to carry out the chosen exit strategy; 47. that further work on quantifying confidence in disease freedom be undertaken by the Commission, with invitation to member states to participate in studies to optimize surveillance, for example in the Thrace region; 48. that the EU Vaccine Bank should hold at least 2.5 million doses for each of the vaccine strains, and at least 5 million for priority antigens for use against strains circulating in nearby regions; 49. that member states holding or considering to hold national reserves of antigen should make their own assessment of the minimum stocks required, and take into consideration the sixmonthly WRL/EUFMD Executive Committee report indicating the recommended high priority antigens; 50. that EUFMD should ensure that arrangements are in place that would allow FAO to purchase emergency stocks of vaccine and could be rapidly implemented when required, with those member states willing to provide part of their reserves for emergency actions; 51. strongly that member states organizing simulation exercises include scenarios that involve vaccination and test their preparedness to mount emergency vaccination programmes.

On the use of predictive epidemic modelling Recommends: 52. that potential models for use by an expert group should be subjected to a pragmatic peer review process, whereby the potential users become familiar with the structure and parameters and understand the most significant parameters which affect outcomes. An ad hoc working group should be formed, under the Standing Technical Committee and preferably in co-ordination with the OIE, to select the models of most interest, and initiate a pragmatic peer review process that involves the EUFMD member states, to guide the Executive and member states on the models of most potential use and on how such peer reviews could be organized at national expert group level; 53. that the ad hoc group consider developing a set of normalized parameters for FMD transmission and behaviour that could thereafter be a reference point for development and testing of models; and that the group use the above approach to identify key parameters that require new experiments to be conducted; 54. that the ad hoc group also consider if a European animal disease spread model should be developed, and identify the key activities and animal movement information needed to achieve this, using models developed for national epidemic forecasting. The work should involve consultation with DG-SANCO on the availability of animal movement data from the TRACES system; 55. that in order to improve models and ensure their relevance to disease control in countries such as Turkey, the opportunity to gain systematic animal disease epidemic data should be taken, and that the ad hoc group should advise the Commission on feasibility and data quality issues that affect model development for endemic countries in the region.

On the Membership of the Commission, the Election of the Executive Committee and the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee Recommends: 56. that the Executive Committee should take steps to increase the membership of the EUFMD Commission, in particular of countries in the east of the FAO European Region.

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REPORT INTRODUCTION Dr Peter de Leeuw, Acting Chairman of the EUFMD Commission, opened the 37th General Session and introduced Mr Alexander Müller, Officer-in-Charge, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department, FAO. OPENING CEREMONY Opening address by Alexander Müller, Officer-in-Charge, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department, FAO: Dr de Leeuw, Chairman of the EUFMD Commission, Members of the Executive Committee of the EUFMD, Delegates of the Veterinary Services of member states, Observers of the European Commission and OIE, and delegates of observer countries: It is a great privilege for me to open the 37th Session of the EUFMD Commission. I do this not only in my name, but also on behalf of the Director-General of FAO, Dr Jacques Diouf.

EUFMD is the first, and thus the oldest and most mature FAO Commission, and my Department is privileged to have hosted this Commission for more than 50 years. This is clear evidence that from the start, member states of FAO have promoted the international effort to control major transboundary animal diseases, in partnership with FAO. The trend of the past few years has been for greater integration and co-ordination of the international efforts, with FAO and OIE working together under the GF-TADs (Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases) agreement. The events of the past few years with HPAI have required FAO to respond to the new challenges, and the Organization has gone through a period of evolution in its mechanisms, which will continue as we strive to provide a better service to member states relating to TAD control.

It is evident that the role of FAO will continue to evolve, and the Director General has made clear that control of transboundary pests and diseases is a priority area for FAO actions over the next years.

EUFMD has always contributed to the FMD eradication process on the European continent, and as this has progressed, the importance of keeping a close watch on the virus circulation internationally and in particular at Europe’s footsteps has come to the forefront, and these tasks can only be conducted through the close and active international partnership with EC, OIE and the member states that supply specialist laboratory inputs. The role of the EUFMD Secretariat provides added value to the international system for early warning of animal diseases, including the newly established FAO/OIE/WHO Global Early Warning System.

I believe I am correct when I state that the tools for FMD control are basically available and becoming more and more sophisticated thanks to the activities of the EUFMD Research Group. I note with interest and support the development of wider initiatives including that launched at FAO yesterday (the Global Roadmap for development of improved tools for control of FMD in endemic settings), that should speed up the process of development and optimization for use by the most affected countries. FAO is ready to support these initiatives, which it considers are “pillars” of the international effort to improve FMD control through increasing the access of countries to affordable and effective control options. However, the fact that FMD persists in many areas of the world is basically due to insufficient political will to use the current tools. We are in a period of time when we observe increasing frequency and impact of animal diseases, of trans-boundary and unpredictable nature. This has to do with rapidly increasing domestic animal densities in many tropical and sub-tropical areas, to ever closer contact among different animal species and with man, with the globalization and liberalization of livestock and animal product trade, with much increased human mobility and other factors.

More than ever before, EUFMD has a crucial role to play for the interaction of member states’ CVOs on how to face the continuing and probably increasing disease risks. EUFMD is there to serve such purposes of a platform and fast intervention force.

In conclusion, I would like to single out a few personalities and institutions which have contributed, and continue to contribute, to EUFMD’s success:

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Dr Peter de Leeuw, for his leadership of the Commission, Dr Kris De Clercq, the able co-ordinator of the EUFMD Research Group; both Drs Joseph Domenech and Bernard Vallat for reconfirming their trust in EUFMD; the European Commission without whose support EUFMD actions would be very limited. All the member states of the Commission including the ones contributing to EUFMD’s staff and prominently the Governments of France and Ireland, the latter having for the third time in a row provided an Associate Professional Officer to the EUFMD Secretariat.

I perceive a strong general support for EUFMD and its vision and work programme as the platform for the fight against this devastating disease, and can assure you of all FAO’s support for this important body.

I wish you fruitful and rewarding deliberations in your Session.

Thank you.

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REPORT OF THE GENERAL SESSION

Item 1 - Adoption of the Agenda The Agenda (Appendix 1) was adopted as proposed.

Item 2 - Overview of the FMD situation in Europe and other regions The item was preceded by a short presentation by Dr Lubroth, Head of the Infectious Diseases Section, Animal Health Service, providing an overview of the regional projects to which the Animal Health Service of FAO is engaged (Appendix 2).

This was followed by the report of the FAO World Reference Laboratory (WRL) (Appendix 3) and the summary of the annual reports for 2005 and 2006 of the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network (Appendix 4).

Dr Paton provided the WRL report, and indicated that the predominant FMDV isolated from submissions to the WRL in 2006 was type O (64%); all isolates had been sequenced, and vaccine matching performed on 74 isolates, with a focus on type A (>50%) reflecting the high antigenic variability and problems for vaccine selection.

The WRL continued to produce for the EUFMD Executive, at six-month intervals, recommendations on virus strains for inclusion in the European banks. In the past two years changes had been made reflecting the type A regional epidemics.

The WRL had provided diagnostic kits, quality assurance (including the EUFMD/FAO serology and virology standardization exercises), and technical and training services on request.

He concluded that progress in FMD control had been limited, with incomplete understanding and appreciation of epidemiology in primary endemic regions and over reliance on past history of isolations rather than ongoing surveillance. There is a poor understanding of why pandemics occur, and a need for field studies to complement molecular epidemiology. Vaccine reserves reflect perceptions of greatest risk, which may be incorrect. The priorities for the WRL in 2007-8 would be to: • • • • •

continue and target strain collection and characterization; harmonize strain characterization; expand the reference laboratory network; roll out web-based information centre for reference laboratories; move to Annual inter-laboratory proficiency testing.

He added that 2007 would be the final year for the EU FP6 Coordinated Action on FMD and CSF, and therefore one priority would be to ensure sustainability of those parts which had proved valuable to partners.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

The work of the WRL, and that of the OIE/FAO network of FMD Reference Laboratories, has provided essential information to assist the Commission and member states in their actions against the disease.

Sample submission from some regions remains critically low, and the lack of information is a risk to the success of contingency plans against FMD in Europe.

The recent and rapid spread of type O PanAsia II lineage mimics the spread observed in the 1990’s, breaching biosecurity barriers in several near-east countries, and should be regarded with concern.

8

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

Item 3 - FMD control in the European neighbourhood The Secretary of the Commission, Keith Sumption, presented a paper (Appendix 5) on the recent FMD situation in the European region, emphasizing the epidemic events that had occurred in the past two years and the issues and lessons to be drawn relevant to the prevention and control of further such events. He drew attention to the: • •

•

regional pandemic of type A Iran 05, affecting Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and which reached Thrace region in January 2006; the regional pandemic of type O, new PanAsia lineage, with high virulence and mortality rates in young animals, affecting Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority areas, and which spread to Thrace in January 2007; the incursion of type A into Egypt, for the first time involving an African type A virus from sub-Saharan Africa (east Africa/the Horn).

The FMD control situation in the near-east had deteriorated in the past two years, and the current epidemics with type O and type A could not be considered to have ended. The frequency and severity of these incursions resembled the 1960s, requiring international emergency supplies of vaccine from the European bank, and missions conducted by EUFMD with EC support; in three of the countries switches in vaccine strain selection were required, with epidemic strains being adapted to make homologous vaccines. In addition several international meetings were organized

by EUFMD with OIE to communicate the risk situation. In his presentation he highlighted the failings in the international early warning, relating to lack of sample submission to the WRL from risk regions, lack of reporting of epidemiologic events to the OIE, and lack of capacity for early detection and containment of new outbreaks.

Discussion Concern was expressed by delegates on: • • •

the lack of early warning from Iran and Turkey on detection of the type A epidemic in 2005; the lack of clarity on the route and circumstances by which the east Africa type A virus had entered Egypt; movement controls within Turkey, to prevent high risk movements before and following the kurban festival, especially the failure to prevent movement of unsold animals from markets in Istanbul to the western provinces of Thrace region.

Dr Willeberg, CVO Denmark, asked to receive assurance from Turkey on the timetable for introduction of measures to ban high risk animal movements into Thrace region, including return of unsold animals from markets in Istanbul, and the biosecurity measures on vehicles visiting Thrace region, since both had been implicated in the introductions in 2006-2007.

The EC representative indicated that more effort was needed to ensure each individual outbreak in Turkey is rapidly investigated to rule out the presence of an exotic virus strain, and to identify feasible measures to prevent the illegal movement of animals to Iran and from Iran to Turkey.

The issue of preparedness in the Balkan region countries was raised. The delegate of Greece indicated a desire to have greater participation of Balkan region neighbours in the EUFMD/OIE/EC Tripartite meetings. The Secretary added that the Minister of Agriculture of Albania had made a similar proposal to the Chairman of the EUFMD, for a meeting point not only on FMD but on other livestock disease issues common to the region.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

The European region is at risk from at least five different and complex regions whose ecosystems of FMD viruses have high antigenic diversity.

The situation in the past two years has been highly unstable compared to previous biennium.

Epidemics continue to sweep through partially vaccinated populations in Turkey and Iran, highlighting the need for commitment to animal movement control and biosecurity at all levels.

9

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Identifying feasible control options that will reduce the risk associated with live animal marketing and movement practices in countries affected by FMD epidemics should be given a high priority. Best practices from other countries should be considered.

The EU vaccine bank and the EC/FAO agreement on the support to EUFMD have been extremely important in mounting effective and rapid response to FMD emergencies in Turkey.

The purchase of vaccine from a national bank operated by a member state has been important in enabling a response when the EU vaccine bank stocks was not sufficient.

Improvements are needed to the recording and reporting of FMD clinical signs in order to enhance early recognition of emergent viruses with altered virulence characteristics, and work is needed to identify diagnostic indicators of changes to transmissibility and virulence.

The close functional relationship between the EUFMD Secretariat, DG-SANCO and the World Reference Laboratory, and FAO structures has proven to be effective in enabling rapid response to crisis situation including delivery and monitoring of emergency vaccination programmes.

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

Item 4 - On international risk reduction and inter-regional co-operation in FMD control This item was opened with a presentation by Dr Domenech (FAO), and followed by short presentations from the OIE (Dr Bruckner), on the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network (Dr Paton), on Co-ordination of FMD Research in Europe under the DG-Research funded programmes (Dr Paton), on the Global FMD Research Alliance (Dr Jeggo) and on the Global Roadmap for Research Relevant to Endemic Countries (Dr Perry).

GF-TADs, global risk reduction, and the technical support via the regional animal health centres (by Dr Domenech).

In his presentation (Appendix 6), Dr Domenech summarized the co-ordination between FAO and OIE under the GF-TADs agreement, and the progress to implement supporting technical centres to serve the joint actions in the regions.

At the annual co-ordination meeting between FAO, WHO and OIE in February 2007, it was agreed that FAO and OIE should develop a strategy under GF-TADs for the long term control of FMD, with a view of elimination of the disease as a threat to livestock agriculture. A first GF-TADs ad hoc group consultation was held in FAO on the 16th April to develop a global FMD risk reduction strategy, and this would be developed into a paper for the Global GF-TADS Steering Committee meeting in July.

He added that as part of the above, FAO would increase its technical support for FMD prevention and control, in ways that would be complementary and co-ordinated with the EUFMD Commission.

Regarding field actions, the opportunities to assist national and regional FMD control would be strengthened through the activities of the joint FAO/OIE Regional Animal Health Centres (RAHC), to ensure efficient co-ordination of actions. The RAHC of most direct relevance to EUFMD are in Ankara (for central Asia), Tunis (for north Africa), Beirut (for middle-east), Bamako (for west and central Africa), Nairobi (for east Africa), and Gaborone (for southern Africa). The RAHC in Africa will be run jointly also with the African Union, to increase efficiency of co-ordination with AU programmes.

Statement by the OIE (by Dr Bruckner) To ensure global FMD control, the international standards of the OIE are a sufficient guide, but the major challenge will be to ensure that sufficient application is made in enough areas where infection is endemic to bring FMD under control. Commitment and capacity to undertake FMD control is lacking in many regions, and therefore as part of a wider effort to identify and address shortcomings, OIE has trained 50 to 60 experts to undertake Performance-Vision-Strategy (PVS) assessments around the world. OIE is in agreement with FAO that the GF-TADS initiative should develop and co-ordinate a global FMD strategy, and considered that the EUFMD Commission will be an important partner that would be expected to provide technical guidance and assistance. As part of this, OIE highly supports the improvement of the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS).

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OIE/FAO network of FMD Reference Laboratories (by Dr Paton) A statement was provided by Dr Paton on behalf of the WRL, which acts as Secretariat for the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Lab Network (Appendix 7). The network has succeeded to produce an annual combined report on FMD surveillance to both OIE and FAO. In addition to routine FMD virus characterization, the work programme of the network focuses on harmonization of vaccine matching tests, with a view to reducing the need to send samples between the partners, and increase the confidence in results performed by different methods. At present the annual network meeting is funded by the DG-Research Co-ordination Action, and he was pleased to note the offer received during the Session from FAO to fund a contribution of 20,000 USD to support the annual network work programme.

Co-ordination of research initiatives on FMD DG-Research funded actions; Co-ordination Action for FMD and CSF laboratories, Improcon and Lab-on-Site projects, Epizone Dr Paton summarized the above projects; two of these (Co-ordination Action, Epizone) support only meetings and co-ordination costs, the other two fund research activities. Since the WRL and Dr de Clercq are involved in one or both of these initiatives, the work can be co-ordinated to ensure that outputs are relevant to the needs of the EUFMD Research Group, and avoid overlaps.

The main issue to be faced is the uncertain funding future, since other diseases have replaced FMD as a priority for the EC. The European Technology Platform for Global Animal Health (ETPGAH) has assisted to identify priorities for funding by EC programmes, but there is a clear risk that applied research relevant to FMD control will lose out on funding, which will affect expertise in member states.

Global FMD Research Alliance (GFRA) Martyn Jeggo, Director of the Australian Animal health laboratory, Geelong, provided a summary of the progress of this initiative, formed between high security laboratories in UK (WRL), USA, Canada, Australia and ILRI (Nairobi) (Appendix 8). The model of co-operative research had been successful, in part because of a shared vision to create new vaccines and diagnostics for use in emergency campaigns in disease free regions, but also since each partner sought R&D funding mainly from domestic sources, and not in competition with each other. The progress made had been very good, and the challenges ahead were to increase the partnerships while maintaining coordination, and develop the second phase of work relating to the endemic countries where the technology needs are different. The development of the second phase had been mainly through the process of developing a “roadmap”, which had culminated in the launch in FAO on the previous day.

He indicated that in the challenge to ensure participation and communication of progress, EUFMD could play a major role, through extension of the activities of the Research Group. He therefore invited the Commission, through the Secretariat, to consider its role, given that the benefits of the R&D should be to the member countries.

Global roadmap for development of improved tools for FMD control in endemic settings The process leading up to the launch of the report on the 17th April 2007 was summarized by Dr Brian Perry (Appendix 9). The initiative arose out of the GFRA, but with emphasis on R&D for the endemic regions, and following a pathway process that had been used for other major long term initiatives, for example in R&D for malaria control. Some fifty persons had contributed to the Agra workshop, which had developed a long term vision that FMD would no longer be a threat to livelihoods of farmers, and roadmap of research actions that should contribute to making this possible. Concept notes had been prepared for co-ordinated research under six technical areas, including economic analyses that should assist strategy and policy development. Interest in funding several of these had been received from the Wellcome Trust, United Kingdom, and the EC (DGResearch).

Discussion A panel discussion was held with the presenters for the above item. The increased commitment by FAO to FMD control, and the development of the R&D initiatives were warmly applauded by delegates, and the need for the twin track approach on FMD vaccination, optimizing use of current

11

vaccines and development of novel vaccines with features required for use in emergency response and endemic regions, received general support.

The relationship with the ETPGAH in the co-ordination of FMD research was questioned; Dr de Clercq considered there was no competition, ETPGAH primarily recommended priorities to DGResearch for funding, and it will be for DG-research to consider if funding opportunities to be made available also meet the needs identified in the Roadmap. In addition, he stressed the danger of Europe focussing on the long term when there is a current need for improving FMD control through applied research, and the expected cessation of some FMD R & D in Europe because of funding switched to other diseases.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

4.

The Session noted with interest the agreement to establish joint FAO and OIE regional animal health centres. The development of the role of these centres will be important to the improvement of FMD surveillance and control campaigns.

Noted with appreciation the commitment of FAO to increase its technical support to FMD control, and to develop and implement this support in full consultation with the EUFMD and the OIE. Endorsed the Report of the WRL and the decision of the 74th Session of the Executive Committee to support the continuation of the contract with the WRL for services to the Commission, including external quality assurance and harmonization activities of the FMD reference laboratories.

The reports of the Global FMD Research Alliance, and that of the Agra workshop on development of a “global roadmap” for improved tools to control FMD in endemic settings, were noted with interest. The recommendation that research to develop better tools for FMD control and to optimize the use of existing tools be considered a high priority in Europe, was supported, in line with conclusions of the European Technology Platform for Global Animal health (ETPGAH).

Item 5 - Trend in animal trade and prospects for risk reduction in the middleeast The Agenda of the Session was re-organized such that discussion on this item took place under item 3. The situation report on the middle-east was provided in two papers, one being the report and recommendations of the 3rd Roundtable on FMD control in the middle-east (Appendix 10), organized by FAO and OIE, held in Damascus in November 2006 (to which the EUFMD had provided technical assistance to produce the report) and the paper provided by the OIE Regional Bureau (Appendix 11).

Item 6 - Progress in FMD control in Turkey A paper (Appendix 12) on the recent epidemic events and the progress in FMD control was presented by Dr Naci Bulut (SAP Institute) on behalf of the General Directorate for Protection and Control (GDPC). Two major epidemics had occurred in the past 2 years, with type A Iran 05 from November 2005 to the present, and a new variant of the type O PanAsia virus from October 2006.

Both incursions had resulted in multiple outbreaks in Thrace region, whereas before January 2006 that area had remained free of clinical disease for over three years. Both epidemics had peaked in late winter period, with over 100 outbreaks in Turkey in January 2006 and again in January 2007.

Both epidemics had severe impact, and had spread widely within a couple of months of the introduction. He highlighted the severe clinical signs associated with the type O virus and the mortality rate in young animals, in common with the reports from Iran and Israel. Although diffusion of the strain was rapid, spread within well vaccinated units was limited, and spread to small ruminants had not been proven. Primo-vaccinated and non-vaccinated young animals after maternal immunity period were most at risk, and he considered these the principal reservoir for continuing virus circulation. Fattening premises were frequently affected as these often receive such animals. The index case, on basis of molecular typing, was in west-central Anatolia in October 2006, but the actual entry points to the country were unclear, possibly via Iraq or Syrian borders.

Three outbreaks of FMD had occurred in Thrace in 2007, one type A, two type O. The last of these involved the same premises as an outbreak in June 2006, and involved animals transferred from the Anatolian side of Istanbul. The factors behind the peaks of infection were the movement of animals for the kurban festival, and movements to pasture in the spring, resulting in two peaks in 2006. Great effort had been made to achieve and maintain a high vaccination coverage in Thrace region, and western Anatolia; however cattle vaccination coverage less than 50% still occurred in

12

16 Provinces (out of 81) in eastern Anatolia, and sheep in Anatolia were vaccinated to a very low extent.

The GDPC thanked the EC and EUFMD for supply of over 5 million doses of bi- and tri-valent FMD vaccine for emergency response in 2006 and 2007; the reconstructed SAP Institute plant was now in full production and together with the EC donated vaccine, sufficient supply for full spring vaccination had been achieved.

The GDPC also thanked EC/EUFMD for support for epidemiological investigations in 2006 and 2007, including the ongoing training in outbreak investigation procedures.

The EU funded programme for FMD control in Turkey, involving three years of complete large and small ruminant vaccination, was scheduled to begin in autumn 2007, although the GDPC expectation was to begin in spring 2008, in anticipation of further delays.

Discussion Questions were asked on the potency of vaccines used, and their monitoring in the field, on the long term plan for FMD control, on movement control and stakeholder interest to participate in FMD control, and on the apparent difference between disease incursions into Thrace and the Caucasus in past two years.

In response, Dr Bulut considered that type A epidemics were more rapidly controlled compared to type O, leading towards elimination, since protection after vaccination was more durable with type A; sero-monitoring was conducted post vaccination in Thrace, and each batch of SAP Institute vaccine was also tested in trials with 30 non-vaccinated animals in the field, and also by a limited challenge test. Regarding the long term strategy under the pre-accession EU funding, for FMD elimination by six rounds of full vaccination of large and small ruminants populations through twice yearly vaccination with an oil based vaccine (PD50 of 6), he was of the opinion that success could not be achieved unless animal movement control was also brought under control. Dr Willeberg supported this point, and the Chairman reminded the Session of the enormous difficulty to achieve progress unless there is support from the major stakeholders, and questioned if this was the case, and how this support will be gained unless the incentives are clear.

Dr Füssel indicated that the first round of vaccination was due to commence autumn 2007. The Turkish delegation were not clear on this point, given the delays in funding, and had therefore planned to have SAP Institute vaccine produced to supply the normal requirements of the autumn 2007 campaign.

The delegate of Bulgaria stated that in response to the situation in Thrace, the monitoring programme involving sentinel animals had been brought forward; no sero-positives had been detected.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

4.

The EC and EUFMD support to the GDPC had played an important role in containment of the epidemics in Thrace in 2006 and early 2007, but uncontrolled circulation of virus in Anatolia and movement of live animals to Thrace carried a risk of re-introduction at any time.

In both of the recent major epidemics, early detection and containment of infection had not occurred, which allowed national dissemination of infection through the market chain.

Vaccination and movement control policy need to be reassessed with a view to achieving higher rates of immunity in animals before they leave the original area and enter the marketing chain.

A much reduced time delay between entry of new infections and confirmation by the authorities is required if national dissemination is to be prevented following future incursions.

The support of EUFMD/EC to outbreak investigation and epidemiology has been of benefit to the GDPC. Uptake and application within the Government services of the norms in the EC directive relating for outbreak investigation is needed to improve reporting consistency, quality and value for outbreak control.

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

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Item 7 - EUFMD activities in support of FMD prevention Iran and the South Caucasus Iran Dr Francis Geiger presented the report on the progress of activities in support of surveillance and control of FMD in Iran (Appendix 13). His report was followed by that of the FMD task force manager, Dr Otorod (Appendix 14). With 80 million small ruminants and eight million cattle, and land borders with endemically affected countries on the east and west, the FMD situation in Iran was important for the wider region, characterized by waves of FMD epidemics that usually spread onto Turkey and the middle-east. The unstable security situation in the region contributed to changing patterns of cross border movements, adding to risk of entry. With EC funding, the current project had begun in early 2006, and had focussed on establishing improved surveillance in seven pilot study regions, with a view to extension to the whole country if beneficial. Effort had been made to improve investigation procedures at local level, and analysis and response arrangements at national level, bringing together laboratory, vaccine production and epidemiology experts into the FMD task force, to improve early identification and response to new findings. This had enabled reporting of the new type O epidemic to Turkey and other neighbouring countries in September 2006, ahead of the index case in Turkey, and repeat warnings in December in relation to probable transborder movements for the kurban festival. Outbreak investigations showed that FMD is underreported, circulates the whole year, and vaccination coverage is insufficient at village level.

In large dairy units and fattening units, breaches in biosecurity and unregulated entry of animals were the usual reason for FMD outbreaks. Improving the alert system was a high priority to improve early warning; for control, the proposed focus in 2007 is on the identification of high risk points for outbreaks, and identification of control options for these. Given the uncertainties of the impact of the current vaccination programme, a large sero-surveillance study would be conducted under the project, after first establishing if local vaccine induces NSP antibodies. Finally he proposed that the experiences and capacity established under the project should benefit neighbouring countries, and that this could be achieved under an extension phase to the current project.

Dr Otorod, FMD Task Force manager, summarized the epidemiological analysis of FMD (Appendix 14). Through registration of over 75,000 epidemiological units, and electronic disease reporting at district level and upwards, the incidence of FMD in different production units and age classes had been estimated. The approach had identified “accumulation points” with abnormally high FMD incidence and those units close to the above where infection is probably the result of secondary spread. The project plan was to focus on the “primary” points for disease surveillance, as these were considered the most likely locations where new strains would be revealed. Control at the primary and secondary points was proposed as the focus of disease control policy. To reduce risk of circulation, they advocated improved vaccination around these points, to include all units in control zones.

He strongly advocated that control of FMD in Iran, and in the region, required regional collaboration, with improved and harmonized procedures for information sharing, and to assist the use of the epidemiological units approach to enable analysis at the level of population structure.

Greater use of GIS should assist to identify gaps and direct responses.

At regional level, he also advocated vaccination in a defined period for the middle east and central Asia), and a regional vaccination strategy with three times a year vaccination with strains providing coverage of the major subtypes, under a five-year project to follow from the current phase.

Discussion Warm appreciation was voiced by delegates of the information presented on FMD epidemiology and on the problems faced in control, and on the progress of the programme of activities.

The role of small ruminants was questioned, given the population in excess of 80 million. Dr Otorod considered they play a negligible role, based on the observed high incidence locations for clinical FMD; however as this question had been long foreseen, a programme of sero-surveillance had been designed for implementation in 2007 to investigate this. Since this is a new activity, training, equipment, and preliminary studies to determine if NSP are induced by local vaccines, had first to be completed.

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Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

The surveillance and control of FMD in Iran is of high importance to reduction of the risk to Turkey, the Caucasus and the middle-east, and continuation of the project in the next biennium was strongly supported.

In addition to the proposed activities, attention is needed to identify feasible options for reducing the risks associated with live animal trading and movement practices, including a better understanding of the transborder movements and mitigation measures.

Experience and expertise developed under the project should be of benefit to the wider region, including countries with limited access to Reference Laboratory services and where transport to the WRL is not feasible.

FMD control in the South Caucasus The status and progress of the FMD vaccination buffer zone and related surveillance and control actions was summarized by Dr Potzsch, Project Coordinator for the EUFMD/EC actions in support of FMD control in the South Caucasus countries (Appendix 15).

With support of the EC, the buffer zone along the borders with Turkey and Iran had been maintained, through supply of FMD vaccine purchased under tender for twice annual vaccination in 2005, 2006 and again in spring 2007. Sero-surveillance had been completed in 2005 and late 2006, and results presented for pre- and post-vaccination surveillance in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2006, indicating that the herd immunity remained satisfactory even six months after vaccination, and that it was likely FMDV incursions had occurred but did not spread as a result of the high vaccination coverage in most parts of the buffer zone. Further, results with locally produced vaccines did not provide evidence of interference with NSP tests, assisting surveillance for incursions. The results confirmed that the region was at high risk as a result of the type A and O epidemics in Turkey and Iran, but that the policy of buffer zone vaccination had been successful.

The three countries had not reported FMD in the past two years, although this may be as result of limited clinical signs under the vaccination coverage. Reliance on vaccination remains high, and given the current level of risk, reducing vaccination coverage would be premature. Greater control on the Turkish and Iran sides over the next two-three years may allow this to occur, if other safeguards are in place at the level of the national Services.

Capacity building at the level of national epidemiology units and reference laboratories remained a priority.

Discussion Questions posed included the reason for the lack of clinical signs reported in the animals groups and villages in which clusters of NSP positive animals were detected. The consensus from the discussion that followed was that sub-clinical infection with FMD in vaccinated and exposed cattle is possible, and has also been the experience in Turkey, but lack of detection or reporting by owners is also a likely explanation. Since the timing of sero-conversion is not clear, further investigations are needed, to ensure follow up of clusters soon after detection.

Dr Willeberg, on behalf of the Executive Committee, drew attention to the progress made over the past year, and considered that the useful results justified the effort.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

A consistent and long term co-operation between EUFMD/EC and the veterinary services of the three countries is needed to ensure national capacity to effectively prevent and contain FMD is put into place.

The supply of FMD vaccine under the project had resulted in satisfactory immunity levels that were maintained during the vaccination interval, in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The situation in Georgia requires clarification as the vaccination and surveillance were delayed. Some subregions, such as Nagorny Karabakh, had variable coverage that requires action to prevent recurrence.

Although lapinized FMD vaccines do not seem to induce NSP responses, they do not meet OIE requirements in terms of production method or quality assurance procedures. Since the results of serological tests also indicate a low and variable level of potency, their use cannot be supported.

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4.

5.

The trans-Caucasus region was at high risk in the period 2005-2007, and the detection of NSP clusters without reporting to the authorities should be considered with some concern.

At present, the capacity of the countries to detect and contain FMD is weak, and reduction or replacement of the current vaccination policy cannot be contemplated until substantial improvements have been achieved, or the situation improves in the neighbouring region.

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

FMD control in Israel A presentation (Appendix 16) on the epidemiology and control of the recent epidemic of type O PanAsia was provided by Dr Yadin, Kimron Institute, Israel, and included in this section since the experience of vaccination against the new virus lineage is relevant to vaccine selection and strategy in the wider region. The epidemic had proved much more difficult to control than others, with a high virulence in young animals, and the ease of spread indicated that biosecurity measures must be higher than usual to prevent spread; 26 outbreaks had been recorded, affecting cattle farms (20), small ruminants (3) and wildlife (gazelle, of which 100-200 had died). All outbreaks were close to the borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan or Palestinian Authorities. Even limited gaps in vaccination coverage had allowed outbreaks, so protection against this strain requires an excellent vaccine and well organized programme at herd level. The vaccine in use in cattle is produced by Merial and contains 3 type O (Manisa, Geshur 2/85, and 3030), 3 type A (A22, Iran 99, Eritrea 98) and Asia-1 (Shamir) antigens; sheep receive type O vaccine (containing the three antigens).

The Government of Israel strongly desired to see improved early warning in the middle-east and urged EUFMD/FAO with OIE to increase the technical information exchange to reduce the risk of this happening again. Gratitude was expressed for the early warning on FMD and LSD in Egypt which had assisted to prevent spread into Israel.

Discussion The risk posed by difficulty to control this epidemic even with quality vaccines applied in a systematic programme was a concern to many delegates. The infection of wild boar was noted with interest; it should be clarified if these act as the source (or recipient) of infection to domestic and other wildlife species (gazelle).

Keith Sumption highlighted the problem for early warning of the lack of reporting of suspected changes in virulence or transmissibility, and the need to develop or apply a standardized measure during field investigations. Without such a measure, these key features may be missed and false confidence gained from genetic or antigenic similarity to endemic FMDV strains.

Dr Füssel asked for a clear recommendation on whether a challenge test is needed to assess the potency of the O Manisa in the EU vaccine bank for use against the O PanAsia variant.

Conclusions 1.

2.

A reporting system that will improve detection of higher virulence should be identified by the Technical Committee and where possible evaluated for application in outbreak investigation, to improve the early detection of emergent viruses; The need for O Manisa/O PanAsia variant challenge test should be clarified, with a view to urgent commissioning of such a test if recommended by the Research Group.

Item 8 - Report of the Executive Committee for past biennium (2005 -2007) The report (Appendix 17A) had been reviewed by the 74th Executive Committee, and was presented by Keith Sumption. A report on the activities of the Commisison in 2005-6 was also tabled (Appendix 17B). The The basis for actions was the 2005-2009 Strategic Plan that had been adopted by the 36th Session; under this, the Commission should implement actions under five themes, balancing preventive actions, capacity building for FMD response, actions to support FMD control in neighbouring regions, and emergency responses. The heavy impact of the emergency responses had affected preventive actions and capacity building. Nevertheless some balance had

16

remained with preventive actions focussing on early detection of strain circulation, on the work of the Research Group, and in neighbouring countries.

Discussion Concern was raised by several delegates that despite some remarkable progress in some areas of work, the plan for the past two years had been overambitious, resulting in insufficient emphasis on activities to directly assist European countries to improve preparedness, and on the level of preparedness of the western Balkan countries. The Secretary agreed that some efficiency gains could be made, without sacrificing areas or activities, for example greater use of outsourcing and networking tools to engage experts in the member countries in aspects of the work programme.

The Chairman agreed that there was a need to improve priority setting, but the emphasis on emergency control was correct and had been forced by the circumstances. The need to balance technical actions with political pressure was raised, that more effort should be given to ensure countries fulfil their international obligations.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

The report was endorsed, and the Session noted with appreciation the high level of activities conducted in the past two years in pursuance of the Strategic Plan 2005-2009.

Prioritization of activities is needed to ensure that activities are carried out in a balanced manner, with lower impact of emergency events on delivery.

Although efficiency gains may be achieved by outsourcing certain activities to partners and institutions, further strengthening of the technical capacity of the Secretariat is needed.

Item 9 - Proposal for work programme for upcoming biennium The proposed work programme (Appendix 18) was based on the Strategic plan for 2007-2009, with some modifications to redress the balance of actions towards preventive and capacity building themes. This report had been endorsed by the 74th Executive Committee, modified with their comments and presented to the 37th Session for approval.

As a result of discussions in the outgoing Executive on the balance between activities, and to provide more support to the Secretariat and to the direction of the working groups under the Research Group, a Management Support Group (MSG) was proposed, to involve 1-2 members of the executive, representatives of partner organizations (SANCO), and key technical experts including the Chairman of the Research Group. It was further proposed in a paper to the meeting (Appendix 19) that the MSG should assist in planning and monitoring progress of working groups established under the Standing Technical Committee (Research Group). The Research Group would continue to play an essential role in providing continuity and critical mass of FMD expertise, and oversee any new groups formed to undertake short term tasks.

Discussion The concept of the management support group received a favourable reaction. The delegate of France received clarification that the ad hoc working groups would have time-bound tasks that the experts in the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee would serve between Sessions, and that the ad hoc working groups would involve the latter, not replace them. Several delegates spoke in favour of ensuring that relevant expertise outside the Research Group be used where appropriate, and that the proposed arrangement should assist their involvement and supervision.

The delegate of Greece proposed that the current Tripartite for FMD control in the Southern Balkans should continue, but with involvement of more countries, including Albania.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

The proposal of the 74th Executive for the work programme in the upcoming biennium was endorsed.

Decision on creation or cessation of working groups should be made at the Executive Committee, who should formally decide on the task and duration of each group.

Ad hoc working groups may provide an important contribution to the work programme of the Standing Technical Committee but should work under supervision of that Committee, to which they should report.

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Recommendations See list of recommendations.

Item 10 - Report of the activities of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee The Report for the Research Group for 2005-2007 was presented by Dr de Clercq, Chairman of the group (Appendix 20).

In his report he highlighted the key points relevant to the CVOs from the Closed Session held in Germany and the Session at Paphos, which had an open Session that had been very well attended (>140 participants) and where a number of technical breakthroughs had been presented of relevance to disease control. The work plan involved some 22 tasks in 13 items, and therefore could be said to be overambitious and in need for some prioritization; he supported the development of ad hoc groups to create focus on specific tasks.

Dr Nesya Goris then provided a summary of the three presentations (Appendix 21) voted by participants as most significant for each day of the Paphos Session. One concerned the improved tracing of outbreaks with full length virus genome sequencing, another the precision of vaccine potency tests results and its implications for vaccination selection, and a third the control of virus excretion by pigs through use of anti-viral compounds in feed.

The work of the RG focussed on applied research questions and several of the papers had been finalized for the 37th Session; others were in progress for clearance at the upcoming Closed Session. He supported the proposal under the previous item to theme the tasks of the group under a reduced number of key areas, and for the management support group to clarify the questions and priorities to be addressed.

Discussion The Chairman and the group were congratulated on the report, and warmly thanked for the quality of the work and outputs. Dr Willeberg stressed the value to veterinary services of participating in the open Sessions, since the subject matter is important to preparedness for FMD control.

Conclusions 1.

2.

The report of the Chairman was endorsed.

The workshop on the design and interpretation of post FMD vaccination sero-surveillance by NSP tests proved highly useful for laboratory experts, epidemiologists and CVOs.

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

Working group on Laboratory Biosecurity The Secretary reported on the status of the revision of the Minimum Standards for FMD Laboratories, which had been adopted at the 30th Session in 1993. The 74th Executive had requested a review of this document, and the initial review had identified several important areas where updating should occur, particularly on the commissioning procedures, staff training and operating procedures, decommissioning. The latter particularly relevant as some EU plants wish to operate only at BSL3+ when required. The financial implications of compliance require great care to ensure that changed requirements are shown to be necessary and advantageous, and therefore further time was needed in development and consultation and a proposal for change was not yet ready to be brought to the Session.

Item 11 - Progress on technical issues relating to the vaccinate to live policy Five papers were presented relating to vaccination to live:

18

•

•

•

the first two concerned issues with achieving disease freedom after use of emergency vaccination, with a report of the simulation exercise on surveillance after emergency vaccination in cattle (Kris de Clercq, Appendix 22), and a second paper which proposed working methods for application to improve confidence in the outcome of surveillance for disease freedom (Tom Murray, Appendix 23); two concerned antigen and vaccine banks, one proposing the minimum level of stocks for the European antigen bank (Aldo Dekker, Appendix24), and a second paper by the Secretariat on the survey of the vaccine bank holdings in Europe among the member states (Appendix 25); an information point on the recent workshop on improving capacity to undertake emergency vaccination programmes (Tom Murray, Appendix 26).

Discussion Dr Füssel drew attention to the difficulties of surveillance after vaccination in South America and raised a question of the level of expected NSP positivity after mass vaccination of European breeds.

Dr Bruckner expressed interest in the work on quantitative assessment of confidence in surveillance and considered that after further development and evaluation the methodology might be of relevance to assessment of country dossiers for disease freedom. Clarification on the recommendation on vaccine stocks was sought. Dr Dekker indicated that the assessment was for European stocks, each national authority should undertake its own risk assessment on quantities.

For antigen priorities, the six-monthly WRL/EUFMD List of Priority Antigens should be used as the guide. On the availability of national vaccine bank stocks to FAO/EUFMD for emergency actions; most respondents were favourable to the principle that national vaccine banks could be a potential supplier of antigen for international campaigns, providing that contractual arrangements were in place. Keith Sumption indicated delays had occurred in the supply of vaccine to Turkey because of the complexity of the arrangements to make a contract for procurement involving a national vaccine bank. Future questionnaires should request a response only from those holding national banks, since the EUVB is included in the survey.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Member states should consider organizing national simulation workshops to test their preparedness to undertake the surveillance needed to regain disease-free status after control of FMD outbreaks, in addition to participation in one or more of the regional workshops.

Sero-monitoring for FMD infection after outbreaks has its technical limitations, and work is needed on how additional indicators, such as the performance of surveillance system relevant to the claim that disease would be detected if present, could assist to build confidence that infection is absent.

Controlled studies on NSP antibody induction by vaccine from the EU vaccine bank have been usually small in scale, and there is a need to evaluate if a larger scale study is justified to determine the expected frequency of positives following mass vaccination if used in a vaccination to live policy.

With the exception of the six countries that report the retention of a national antigen bank for FMD, the majority of EUFMD member states are reliant on EU vaccine bank for potential supply in a crisis. The adequacy of vaccine stocks in the EUVB is therefore of exceptional importance for both response to outbreaks in EU countries and to potential actions to contain outbreaks threatening the disease free state.

A minority of the national vaccine banks have not maintained A22 Iraq in their reserve, whereas this has been a high priority recommendation in the WRL/Executive Committee Session reports for the past 12 months.

Several countries in the EU have advanced planning for mounting emergency vaccination campaigns against FMD, but very few countries have tested their capacity to mount a rapid vaccination campaign. The lack of readiness to deploy emergency vaccination could hinder the effective use of emergency vaccination.

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

19

Item 12 - Confidence in the use of predictive epidemic modelling in decision support In response to the request of the 74th Executive for a paper on this item, Dr David Schley, IAH, Pirbright (Appendix 27) had prepared a review paper which was presented to the Session.

He highlighted the need to ensure experts who will use models have a sufficient understanding of each and that normal process of peer review may fail since models are now so complex as to render a detailed peer review impossible. Validation by accurate production of epidemics is limited since large outbreaks are rare, or occur in settings very different from Europe. As a consequence there is a need for a new system of review that will assist European expert groups to become familiar and confident with the features and applicability of different models. Best practice in this area has become a form of practical review by the users in workshops conducted with experts on the model structure.

Following the paper, potential ways to proceed were proposed by the Secretariat (Appendix 28), since many of the member states do not have significant programmes on model development and therefore the few models that exist will require to become better known at the level of national experts groups, and an efficient process may be to convene a series of workshops.

Discussion Concern was voiced by several member states that a working group on FMD epidemic modelling should be under the supervision of members of the Technical Committee, highlighting the potential impacts of this work.

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The lack of new datasets on big FMD epidemics in free countries presents a major constraint to validate epidemic models on FMD epidemics, resulting in over-reliance on the 2001 epidemic datasets. This constraint is likely to be a long term feature as no major FMD epidemics have occurred in FMD-free countries that do not use vaccination since 2001.

Most epidemics are currently in non-FMD-free countries that use vaccination, and therefore present the best opportunity to validate models until the next major epidemic in free countries occurs.

There is need of a clear guidance and process to assist decisions makers and the expert groups that advise them, to select models that are fit for the purpose intended.

User-friendly epidemic models are increasing, leading to potential problems if used by persons who are unfamiliar with the basic assumptions and parameters It is important that users of the models understand the assumptions and have a sense of ownership of the parameters used, and that confidence can be built by agreeing on what goes into the model, and the critical parameters (sensitivity analysis).

Recommendations See list of recommendations.

Item 13 - Statement of accounts and budget for the upcoming biennium The Income and expenditure statements for the three Trust Funds operated by the Commission were provided by the Administration and Finance Department of FAO, for 2005 and 2006 (Appendix 29).

The budget proposal for contributions to the administration of the Commission by the member countries (to Trust Fund MTF/INT/011/MUL), as agreed by the 74th Executive, was presented by the Secretary (Appendix 30).

Discussion It was proposed by one member state that contributions should be fixed in euros rather than US dollars at the Session, to ensure the countries were clear in their expected level of contribution.

The Commission was asked to review the options and possibility for change before the 38th Session.

20

Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The Statements of Account for MTF/INT/011/MUL, MTF/MUL/004/MUL, and MTF/INT/003/EEC for 2005 and 2006 were endorsed.

The budget paper for 2008 and 2009 was agreed, as proposed by the 74th Executive Committee in Session paper 12.1, of an annual total contribution by the member countries to MTF/INT/011/MUL of US$528,890, and individual country contributions as indicated in Table 3 of the paper.

Attention was brought to the use of official names of member countries, specifically the recording of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The conclusions and recommendations of the 74th Session of the EUFMD Executive Committee were upheld by the 37th Session.

Currency exchange variations to the US dollar affect the level of contributions by member states, and a review of the feasibility of denominating the contributions in euro or dollars should be conducted before the 38th Session.

Item 14 - Election of the Executive Committee and the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee Election of the Executive Committee The following were elected unanimously, on the basis of receiving a proposal that was supported by at least one additional country nomination, and there being no additional proposed candidates:

Peter de Leeuw, The Netherlands (Chairman) Debby Reynolds, UK (First Vice chair) Ulrich Herzog, Austria (2nd Vice Chair) Members Carlos Pinheiro, Portugal

PROPOSER

SECONDERS

Germany

Belgium Denmark Hungary Sweden Slovakia Finland

Greece Germany

Ireland

Spain Lithuania

Spyros Doudounakis, Greece

UK

Jeko Baichev, Bulgaria

Lithuania

Nihat Pakdil, Turkey

Serbia

France Portugal Poland Ireland Netherlands

Dejan Krnjaic, Serbia

Norway

Germany Netherlands

Election of the Standing Technical Committee The proposed list developed by the outgoing Chairman and Executive Committee was endorsed without change: Kris de Clercq

Belgian National Reference Laboratory for FMD/Vesicular Diseases, CODACERVA-VAR

Bernd Haas

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, FLI, Germany

Donal Sammin

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Ireland

Aldo Dekker

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Lelystad, The Netherlands

Mark Bronsvoort

Epidemiology unit, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

21

Emiliana Brocchi

Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia e dell’Emilia Romagna, Brescia, Italy

Hagai Yadin

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Israel

Georgi Georgiev

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Bulgaria

Naci Bulut

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Turkey

Stefan Zientara

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, France

Soren Alexandersen

National Reference Laboratory for FMD / Vesicular Diseases, Denmark

Håken Vigre

Epidemiology Department, National Veterinary Institute, Denmark

Discussion The involvement of experts from non-EU countries was raised. The lack of involvement of the Russian Federation in the work of the Commission was raised, given that actions in the Caucasus and West Asia act to reduce risk to Russia and the CIS countries. Several delegates indicated their support for increasing the involvement and membership of the CIS countries.

Recommendations The Executive should review the number of members, bearing in mind the budgetary and other constraints to their potential participation.

The Executive Committee should take steps to increase the membership of the EUFMD Commission by countries in the east of the FAO European Region.

Item 15 - Reading of the report The Secretariat presented the draft final report, which was endorsed subject to the inclusion of the corrections and changes proposed during the reading by the member states, EC and OIE, to be included in the version to be circulated for comments.

Closing ceremony The Chairman, Dr de Leeuw, thanked the participants for their support and interest in the programme of the Commission, the EC for their support to the activities and active participation at all levels, and thanked the Secretariat and FAO for the organization and arrangements.

On behalf of the Secretariat, Dr Sumption thanked the Chairman and members and drew attention to the work behind the scenes of Nadia Rumich, Laura Contaldi, Claudia Ciarlantini, Sebastien Pesseat and Tom Murray over many months to prepare for the Session, while not neglecting the main tasks of ensuring activities continued at field level.

22

Appendix 1

THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE (EUFMD) PROVISIONAL AGENDA Rome, Italy - 18-20 April 2007

1.

Adoption of the Agenda

2.

Global FMD situation, region by region

3.

FMD control in the European neighbourhood: epidemic events 2005-2007 and the lessons learnt

4.

Activities in support of FMD prevention a) I. R of Iran b) the south Caucasus region

5.

Thematic item: The Middle-East and Mediterranean interface: trends in animal trade and prospects for risk reduction

6.

Progressive international FMD risk reduction: strategy, partnerships and plans

7.

Report of the EUFMD Executive Committee for past biennium

8.

Proposal for EUFMD programme of activities for upcoming biennium

9.

Report of the Chairman of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee a) Progress on technical items referred to the Group b) Report of the task force on laboratory containment

10.

Technical issues with the vaccination to live policy: a) Progress on post-vaccination surveillance (PVS) b) Vaccine banks

11.

Technical issue: progress in predictive epidemic modelling

12.

Financial matters

13.

Election of the Executive Committee and Standing Technical Committee

14.

Any other business

23

Appendix 2 Overview of recent activities of the FAO Animal Health Service on FMD intervention Juan Lubroth

Recent Extra budgetary Activities in Foot-and-Mouth Disease Intervention

EMPRES and EU-FMD

Early Warning Early Reaction

Enabling Research Coordination

Prevention and Response

24

EMPRES EMPRES Coordinator Coordinator Lubroth Lubroth

EU EUFMD FMD

Programming Programming Roeder Roeder Amanfu Amanfu El ElIdrissi Idrissi Martin Martin

Assistant Assistant Dennington Dennington

Wildlife Wildlife Newman Newman

Bacteriology Bacteriology Amanfu Amanfu El ElIdrissi Idrissi

Virology Virology Roeder Roeder

GLEWS GLEWS Martin Martin

Reference ReferenceCentres Centres Dauphin Dauphin Kamata Kamata

Communications Communications (Website (Website and and Publications) Publications) Murguia Murguia Harris Harris Larfaoui Larfaoui

Database Database Integration Integration &&Risk Risk Analysis Analysis

FMD Roeder Ferrari

de de la laRoque Roque Le LeMenach Menach Bridges Bridges Kamata Kamata Newman Newman De DeSimone Simone

Rinderpest / GREP Roeder Ferrari Njeumi

Data Data Management Management && Information Information Systems Systems Pinto Pinto Kamata Kamata Le Le Menach Menach von von Dobschuetz Dobschuetz Newman Newman Disease Disease&& Rumour Rumour Tracking Tracking von von Dobschuetz Dobschuetz Kamata Kamata Le Le Menach Menach Bridges Bridges Njeumi Njeumi Schoustra Schoustra GIS GIS Mapping Mapping // Analysis Analysis Unit Unit De DeSimone Simone

Symposia

Travel / Visas Blasi

DG Correspondence

BTORs

LOAs

Blasi

Dennington

Schoustra

Mensah

Mensah

Mensah

Blasi

Alemany

Alemany

Alemany

Alemany

EU FMD COMMISSION: MEMBER COUNTRIES

MTF /INT/003/EEC EU - FMD Recipient

Inter Regional

Donor: European Commission ( 100 %)

01 Jan 1982 - Jan 2000 01 Jan 1982 - 31 Dec 2008 Original Approved Budget 3,441,461 Latest Approved Budget 12,219,680

25

TCP/RER/2903 (2/VIII/RER/028) Strengthening Active Surveillance for Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and other Exotic Diseases in Thrace Region 250,684 The overall objective of the project is to strengthen the national and regional capacities for active surveillance. Such surveillance is essential for long-term prevention of TAD emergencies and the development of disease free zones.

Recipient

Bulgaria Greece Regional Europe Turkey, Republic of

Donor: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (100 %)

27 Aug 2003: 01 Dec 2003 - 30 Sep 2005

EUFMD: Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia (Syria in the pipeline)

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

26

OSRO/RAF/511/SAF Surveillance and Control of Epidemic Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) in Southern Africa Objective: The goal is to enhance livestock as a tradable commodity through assured animal health in order to improve overall food security and rural livelihoods.

The specific objectives: Are to progressively control and strengthen regional preparedness against the spread of TADs of regional strategic importance through or by ensuring: •Access to improved detection, identification; •Monitoring and surveillance of TADs in the target countries; •Capacity building by training of key stakeholders in disease control techniques; and • Public awareness campaigns.

Angola, Republic of Malawi Mozambique Namibia, Republic of Regional Africa Tanzania, United Republic of Zambia Zimbabwe

Recipient

South Africa, Republic of (100 %)

Budget: 2,986,911

FAO-TCP-RAF/2916: WEST AFRICA

FAO-TCP-RAF/2916 Objectives: Laboratory network for foot-and-mouth disease diagnosis.

Donor: FAO USD 400 000 (Phase 1)

GTFS/04/INT/ITA Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

GTFS/04/INT/ITA: Objectives: Rinderpest freedom, surveillance for Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Peste des Petits Ruminants. Strengthening detection, laboratory capability, and response.

Donor: Italy USD 2.700.000 (Phase 1)

27

Project OSRO/IRQ/406/UDG: Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (US $10.5 million)

FAO-TCP-RLA /3108: MERCOSUR (US $ 500,000)

SEA FMD Campaign (ASEAN)

28

GCP/PHI/041/AUL Eradication of Foot-and-mouth Disease in the Philippines (Phase II) Objectives: To eradicate FMD in the remaining areas of the Philippines.

To improve on early response to outbreaks in the endemic areas; To institutionalize public awareness programming the respective regional plans on FMD; To further strengthen field surveillance activity in the free areas; To further strengthen quarantine activity at entry points of free areas and exit point of the endemic areas; To maintain the capability of the FMD Diagnostic Laboratory in detecting the FMD virus type and in using the latest diagnostic technique currently available.

•

•

•

•

•

Budget: 1,106,195

FAO-ADB: Control of TADs in the Greater Mekong Area (Phase 1 - USD 1,000,000)

TCP/BOT/6801 (NTE: 1978-06) - Emergency Assistance to ReEstablish Freedom From Foot-And-Mouth Disease

$ 154,000

TCP/EGY/6701 (NTE: 1978-04) - Foot-And-Mouth Disease Vaccine Production

$ 100,000

TCP/IND/2801 (NTE: 2003-06) - Review of India’s National Programme on Foot-and-Mouth and other Transboundary Animal Diseases (Fast Track ATS)

$ 10,407

TCP/IND/2901 (NTE: 2003-06) - Review of India’s National Programme on Foot-and-Mouth and other Transboundary Animal Diseases

$ 2,889

TCP/IRQ/7923 (NTE: 1999-11) - Emergency Assistance for Control of Foot-And-Mouth Disease in Western Iraq

$ 400,000

TCP/IRQ/8923 (NTE: 1999-11) - Emergency Assistance for Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Western Iraq

$ 7,815

TCP/MLW/7822 (NTE: 2000-02) - Containment of Transboundary Spread of Foot-And-Mouth Disease

$ 98,752

TCP/MLW/8822 (NTE: 2000-07) - Containment of Transboundary Spread of Foot-And-Mouth Disease

$ 330,933

29

• • • •

TCP/MOZ/2906 (NTE: 2005-09) - Emergency assistance for control of Foot-and-Mouth disease

$ 346,308

TCP/MOZ/4406 (NTE: 2005-09) - Emergency assistance for control of Foot-and-Mouth disease (recoded from TCP/MOZ/2906)

$ 346,308

TCP/MOZ/6801 (NTE: 1978-09.)

Emergency Assistance to Re-Establish Freedom From Foot-AndMouth Disease

$ 150,000

TCP/PHI/3553 (NTE: 1995-12) - Assistance With Control of Epidemic Foot-And-Mouth Disease

$ 248,000

TCP/RWA/0169 (NTE: 2002-06) - Emergency Assistance to Control Foot-and-Mouth Disease

$ 205,571

TCP/UGA/8904 (NTE: 1979-11) - Emergency Assistance for the Control of Foot-And-Mouth Disease

$ 160,000

International Regional National Networks – Geographical – Thematic – Reference Laboratories

• Public / Private Partnerships

30

•

•

Third RCM on the Use of Non-structural Protein of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV) to Differentiate between Vaccinated and Infected Animals (D3 20.20) “The use of non-structural protein of foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) to differentiate between vaccinated and infected animals”

• • • • • • • • •

Research Contract holders A. Braga (Brazil), K. Dyrting, (Honk Kong, China), W. Linchongsubongkoch (Thailand), C. Sanchez (Colombia), A. M. Espinoza (Peru), E. Maradei (Argentina), M.M. Kyin (Myanmar), B.C. Verin (Philippines)

•

Agreement holders H. Unger (Austria), C. Morrissy (Australia), L.S. Christensen (Denmark), S. Parida (UK), J. Lubroth (USA) Companies C. Egli (Bommeli Diagnostic, Intervet), M. Merza, (Svanova, Sweden), C.E. Jacobs (CEDI Diagnostics, NL), A.M. Walfield (United Biomedical Inc, USA).

Acknowledgements and References • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Slingenberg J. 2003. Animal Disease Dynamics on the Eurasian Ruminant Street. FAO. DEFRA. International Animal Health Division. Foot and Mouth Disease Virus type Asia 1 in Central and East Asia. An update and commentary. November 2005.

EMPRES WATCH. FAO. FMD in China. http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/191450/FMD_China_EMPRES.pdf FAO, 2006. Report of the Workshop on FMD virus circulation in Iran and neighbouring countries, held June 2006 in Karaj, Iran. FAO/EUFMD Central Asia FMD Observation project.

Tufan, M. (2004). FMD analysis in Turkey (FAO/EUFMD) FAO/OIE , 2006. Report of the 3rd Roundtable on FMD control in the Middle-East and North Africa, held Damascus, Syria, Novembre 2006.

Knowles et al. 2006. Recent Molecular epidemiology of foot and mouth disease virus Asia 1. EU-FMD Commission.

J. F. Valarcher, N. J. Knowles, N. P. Ferris, D. J. Paton, V. Zakharov, A. Sherbakov, Shang You-jun, Liu Zai-xin, Liu Xiang-tao, A. Sanyal, D. Hemadri, C. Tosh, and T. J. Rasool Recent spread of FMD virus serotype Asia 1. Veterinary Record, July 2005; 157: 30.

Panafosa, PAHO/WHO (COSALFA XXXIV, 2006) OIE Handistatus. www.oie.int OIE-SEAFMD database 2004-2006.

World Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Pirbright. Annual report 2005.

World Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Pirbright. January - March 2006 report.

31

Appendix 3 Report of the FMD FAO World Reference Laboratory David Paton, Nigel Ferris, Geoff Hutchings, Yanmin Li, Bob Statham, Nick Knowles, Don King, Julie Stirling

32

33

34

Appendix 4

Annual OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network Report January – December 2006 FAO World Reference Laboratory and OIE Reference Laboratory for FMD (WRLFMD or WRL), Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK: Nigel Ferris, Don King, Nick Knowles, Yanmin Li, Bob Statham, John Bashiruddin, David Paton Centro Panamericano de Fiebre Aftosa (PANAFTOSA) and OIE Reference Laboratory for FMD, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Ingrid Bergmann, Viviana Malirat, Federal Governmental Institute, Centre for Animal Health (FGI ARRIAH) and OIE Reference Laboratory for FMD: Vladimir, Russia: Valery Zakharov, Vladimir Borisov, Aleksey Scherbakov, Svetlana Kremenchugskaya OIE Regional Reference Laboratory for the Sub-Saharan continent, Gabarone, Botswana: Hervé Coupier, Lindani Mozola, George Matlho

1.

Summary report on FMD outbreaks during period in question from surveillance region covered by reference laboratory

1.1.

Countries that have reported FMD outbreaks in 2006 (January-December) that resulted in an epidemiological change. FMD serotypes related to those outbreaks (where known) are indicted.

The WAHID Interface provides access to all data held within OIE's new World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS): http://www.oie.int/wahidprod/public.php?page=disease&PHPSESSID=97023f8ac08ec351f765834b9fa03148

35

Figure 1. FMD outbreaks causing change in the world epidemiological status

FMD outbreaks reported to OIE in 2006

Russia Asia 1

Turkey A Israel O

China Asia 1

Palestinian Auto. Terr.

O Egypt A Ecuador O

Argentina O

Guinea untyped

Vietnam O & Asia 1 Jordan A D.R. Congo untyped

Brazil O

Botswana SAT 1 & SAT 2 FMD vaccine zones South Africa SAT 3 FMD vaccine zone

1.2.

Overview and discussion of outbreak information

No outbreaks were officially reported in FMD-free countries that did not practice vaccination. FMD remained largely confined to traditionally infected areas between January and December 2006. However, within endemically and sporadically infected parts of the world there have been upsurges of cases, sometimes leading to the submission of samples to reference laboratories and indicating an enhanced risk of collateral spread. Matching tests to check the availability of suitable vaccines to protect against these strains continue to reveal gaps in cover, especially against serotype A, for example the recent outbreaks due to African serotype A viruses in Egypt and Mauritania. Submission of samples from endemic regions has continued to be mainly in response to perceptions of increased outbreak severity, although in some cases there are proactive projects promoting sample submission. The majority of viruses have been isolated from samples submitted from Africa and Asia.

In Africa, FMDV serotype SAT 2 was reported in a formerly FMD-free zone in Botswana in April 2006 leading to cessation of trade with Europe and instigation of vaccination. In June, FMDV SAT 1 was also reported from Northern Botswana from a part of the country where FMDV outbreaks are more common. Cases of FMD caused by SAT3 serotype were reported in Limpopo province, South Africa in August 2006. This outbreak occurred well within the OIE recognized buffer zone (vaccination area) of the FMD control zone of South Africa adjacent to the Kruger National Park and therefore the status of South Africa's FMD free zone without vaccination has not been affected.

There were reports to OIE of outbreaks in Guinea, but the serotype was not established.

Subsequently, WRL received samples from Mauritania that were found to be serotype A of the indigenous west-Africa topotype. Since then there have been FMDV outbreaks in Guinea Siguiri Province in the north-east, close to the border with Mali. African topotypes of serotype O were involved in outbreaks from the Democratic Republic of Congo and from Ethiopia.

In Central Asia, the incidence of FMD due to Asia 1 has apparently declined compared to 2005, although reports of new cases have continued to be received from China throughout 2006.

Vietnam has experienced widespread outbreaks of FMD due mainly to serotype O. Asia-1 virus has also been reported in Vietnam, but the strain has affected cattle rather than pigs and is of a lineage indigenous to Southeast Asia and different from that reported in China. The Cathay pig-adapted

36

topotype of serotype O has been reported in Malaysia and Thailand, the first time that it has been identified in Southeast Asia outside the Philippines, Vietnam and China. The SEAFMD website (http://www.seafmd-rcu.oie.int/index.php) provides maps showing countries in southeast Asia that have experienced outbreaks in each month of 2006.

In the Middle-East, three major incursions of FMDV have been observed. One has involved a sublineage of the O PanAsia strain that was first identified in India in 2001, with subsequent spread eastwards into Malaysia (2003-5) and westwards into Pakistan and Iran (2005-6) and then Turkey and Jordan (2006). The second incursion has involved a strain of serotype A, termed A Iran 05, which was first identified in Iran in 2003, with subsequent spread to Saudi Arabia (2005) and to Pakistan, Turkey, and Jordan (2006). The third incursion has involved another strain of serotype A introduced from the horn of Africa into Egypt.

In South America, areas of southern Brazil and northern Argentina that were formerly FMD-free with vaccination have continued with measures to regain the free status. In Argentina (Corrientes), the outbreak of serotype O (reported in Feb 2006) has been brought under control using a “stamping out” and vaccination (polyvalent O, A, and C vaccine) campaign. Serosurveillance in Mato Grosso do Sul and Parana had left some uncertainty concerning continued low level virus circulation, but further investigations (performed during October 2006) carried out in the municipality of Loanda (Paraná) have indicated that FMDV is not circulating and the zoo-sanitary restrictions applied in the State of Paraná have been lifted. In the State of Mato Grosso do Sul, the survey on FMDV circulation is still in progress. Elsewhere, outbreaks of serotype O were reported in Ecuador in August 2006. Movement restriction measures on susceptible animals located within a 10-km radius of the outbreak have been applied. To date, there is no suspicion of the presence of sick animals within the affected zone or elsewhere in the country.

A selection of the viruses received from around the world were further characterised by partial genomic sequencing and serological matching to vaccine strains. Phylogenetic analyses were performed by using complete VP1 gene sequences. The WRLFMD vaccine recommendations have been changed to take account of the new serotype A viruses that have entered the Middle East; see Annex 4.

2. Clinical samples and FMDV isolates submitted to reference laboratories of the FMD network during the year in question.

2.1. Tabulation of data on clinical samples received and serotyping results.

2.2.

Overview of samples received and serotyping results

During 2006, 637 samples were submitted to the laboratories of the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratories Network for primary or referral diagnosis from 33 countries. The WRLFMD received 578 samples from 25 countries, 421 collected in 2006 and 157 collected 2004-5. The RRLSSA received 24 clinical samples for FMD diagnosis collected in April and June for virus isolation and characterisation. During the same year PANAFTOSA received a total of 35 clinical samples, collected between 2003 and 2006, that were isolated in Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

Nine samples were submitted to ARRIAH. A summary of serotyping and confirmatory molecular detection results for clinical samples and FMD isolates collected by the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratories Network in 2006 is in Table 1. A similar summary of samples collected earlier but received in 2006 is provided in Table 2.

Details of the results obtained by WRLFMD can be found at: http://www.iah.bbsrc.ac.uk/virus/Picornaviridae/Aphthovirus/ Serotyping data from this laboratory can be searched on-line via the FMD BioPortal: http://fmd.ucdavis.edu/bioportal/.

37

Table 1. Serotyping and confirmatory molecular detection results of samples received in 2006

Country

No. of

Virus isolation in cell culture/ELISA

samples

FMD virus serotypes O

A

C

SAT

SAT

1

2

RT-PCR for FMD (or SVD

SAT 3

Asia

NVD

virus

Laboratory

SVD) virus Positive

Negative

1

ARGENTINA

2

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

PANAFTOSA

BOTSWANA

37

-

-

-

9

4

-

-

-

24

22

15

WRL

BOTSWANA

16

-

-

-

4

4

-

-

-

5

-

-

RRLSSA

116

42

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

74

78

38

WRL

5

-

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

-

WRL

44

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

36

14

30

WRL

5

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

-

WRL

64

50

4

-

-

-

-

-

-

10

55

9

WRL

IRELAND

6

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

6

-

6

WRL

ISRAEL

2

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

WRL

JORDAN

7

3

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

6

1

WRL

10

-

1

-

3

-

-

-

-

6

8

2

WRL

KUWAIT

3

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

2

1

WRL

LAOS

5

4

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

-

WRL

MALAYSIA

5

4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

5

-

WRL

MAURITANIA

8

-

7

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

7

1

WRL

MONGOLIA

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

ARRIAH

PAKISTAN

53

21

9

-

-

-

-

-

-

23

50

3

WRL

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

2

-

ARRIAH

D.R.OF CONGO EGYPT ETHIOPIA CHINA (HONGKONG) IRAN

KENYA

RUSSIA

38

RWANDA

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

1

WRL

SENEGAL

9

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

8

-

9

WRL

TANZANIA

1

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

TURKEY

21

14

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

4

19

2

WRL

TURKEY

4

-

4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4

-

ARRIAH

UNITED KINGDOM

9

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

9

-

9

WRL

11

7

-

-

-

-

-

4

-

-

11

-

WRL

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

RRLSSA

33

-

12

4

-

-

205

294

127

VIETNAM ZAMBIA

1

TOTAL

447

163

4

-

RRLSSA

39

Table 2. Serotyping and confirmatory molecular detection results of samples collected earlier but received in 2006 Country

Sample

No. of

year

samples

ELISA/Virus isolation in cell culture

RT-PCR for FMD

FMD virus serotypes O

A

C

SAT 1

SAT 2

SVD SAT 3

Asia 1

NVD

virus

Laboratory

(or SVD) virus Negative

Positive

BENIN

2005

16

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

16

16

-

WRL

CHINA (HONGKONG)

2005

10

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

1

9

WRL

ECUADOR

2005

17

17

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

17

PANAFTOSA

ETHIOPIA

2005

4

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

2

2

WRL

ISRAEL

2004

5

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

WRL

ISRAEL

2005

2

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

WRL

KENYA

2004

25

4

-

-

1

4

-

-

-

16

4

21

WRL

KENYA

2005

31

6

2

-

9

2

-

-

-

12

-

31

WRL

MALAYSIA

2005

1

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

WRL

MYANMAR

2004

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

1

WRL

NIGER

2005

16

3

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

12

10

6

WRL

PERU

2005

7

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

7

-

-

-

PANAFTOSA

RWANDA

2005

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

1

-

WRL

SAUDI ARABIA

2005

2

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

WRL

THAILAND

2005

11

6

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

11

WRL

TURKEY

2005

12

5

7

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

12

WRL

VENEZUELA

2003-

9

-

9

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

9

PANAFTOSA

2005 VIETNAM

2004

7

2

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

7

WRL

VIETNAM

2005

13

6

5

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

13

WRL

190

49

26

-

10

7

-

3

-

62

34

123

TOTAL

40

FMD (or SVD) virus serotype identified following virus isolation in cell culture and antigen VI/ELISA

detection ELISA foot-and-mouth

FMD

disease swine vesicular

SVD

disease no foot-and-mouth disease, swine vesicular disease or vesicular

NVD

stomatitis virus detected

RT-PCR

reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction for FMD (or SVD) viral genome

Table 3. Summary of Antigenic characterisation of FMD field isolates by matching with vaccine strains. r1 values were obtained by VNT or ELISA FMDV Serotype A Strain

A22

A

A May97

A 5925

A Sau95

A Irn 01

Irn 96

A

A

Eri98 /

A22 Iraq

A

A

A

A

Erit

416

Irn9

Irn8

Ken

550

98

4

9

7

35/

ARRI

80

AH

Irn99

A15

A22/

* vnt

elis

vnt

vnt

a A Car

0.29

0.21

116/05 A Car 36/05

elisa

vnt

elisa

vnt

elisa

vnt

vnt

vnt

elisa

elisa

elisa

elisa

elisa

vnt

vnt

0.1 6

0.22

0.30

115/05 A Car

vnt

a

036/05 A Car

elis

0.0 8

0.22

0.30

0.0 8 0.2 5

41

A Egy 01/06

0.23

0.17

0.25

0.2

0.06

0.32

0.42

0.3

0.83

0.60

<0.1

1

0.38

0.23

0.14

0.38

0.45 0.24

0.14

0.16

0.2

<0.0

0

3

0.30

0.50

0.2

A Egy 02/06 A Eth 16/05

0.23

7

A Egy 01/06 A Egy 02/06

0.21

1.00

0.95

0.25

0.41 0.13

0.21

0.2 2

A Eth 16/05

0.2 2

A Irn 04/05

>1.0

0.11

0.4

0 A Irn 05/05

0.17

3

0.71

0.11

0.5

0.15

1 A Irn 05/06

0.48

0.09

0.15

A Irn 05/06 A Irn 07/06

0.09 0.38

0.06

0.09

0.14

A Irn 07/06 A Ken 12/05

0.5

0.2 0.13

0.30

0.5

0.03

0.3 3

A Ken 12/05

0.2 4

A Mau

0.03

0.14

0.13

0.09

0.53

0.03

0.15

0.13

0.06

0.61

01/06 A Mau 03/06 A May 5/05

0.12

0.19

0.5 8

A Pak 01/06

0.43

0.3

>1.0

>1.0

0.22

0.03

42

A Pak 05/06 A Sau

0.29

15/05

>0.8

0.12

8

0.1

0.13

0.08

0.17

0.50

>1.0 0.35

0.09

>1.0

0.14

0.22

>0.8

6

9

A Sau

0.14

15/05 A Sau

0.25

16/05

>0.8

0.12

8

0.1

0.15

0.58

0.39

>1.0

>1.0

7

A Sau

0.14

16/05 A Tur 01/06

0.42

0.21

0.08

0.1

0.4

1

1

0.32

0.21

0.26

0.29

A Tur 01/06

0.15

A Tur 02/06

0.15

A Tur 04/06

0.11

0.35

0.15

0.43

0.16

A Tur 08/06

0.25

0.43

0.53

0.13

0.06

A Tur 09/06

1.0

A Tur 12/06

0.43

0.35

0.86 0.71

0.19

A Tur 14/06

<0.0

>1.0

0.22

0.14

0.31

1.0

0.14

0.21

0.61

0.16

0.07

7 A Tur 16/06

0.09

A Tur 18/06 A Tur 2/06

0.43 0.36

0.29

0.07

0.1

0.4

8

8

A Tur 20/06 A Tur 3/06

A Vit 06/04

0.56

0.09 0.39

0.09

0.11

0.1

0.4

3

8

0.3

0.20

0.50

0.06

0.10

0.30

>1.0

0.3

0.43

0.09

0.11

0.10

0.11

0.15

0.16

1 A Vit 08/05

0.15

0.5

43

1 A Vit 10/04

0.15

0.3

A Vit 18/05

0.20

0.3

0.11

0.15

0.12

0.10

0.20

0.18

1

6

* antiserum raised against vaccine containing two virus strains

44

FMDV Serotype O Strain

O1

O Manisa

Campos vnt O Corrientes/Arg/06

O

O 3039

O 4174

O Tai 189/87

elisa

elisa

elisa

Lausanne vnt

vnt

70.00

0

97.00

0

60 days post vaccine*.

O Corrientes/Arg/06 22 days post revacc*.

O Irn 13/2006

>1.0

0.75

0.34

>1.0

O Irn 14/2006

>1.0

0.61

0.25

>1.0

O Irn 16/2006

>0.86

0.61

0.38

>1.0

O Irn 20/2006

>0.86

0.53

0.25

>1.0

O Irn 26/2006

1.0

nd

0.27

>1.0

O Isr 01/05

0.07

O Isr 11/04

>1.0

O Kuw 02/06

>0.80

0.69

O Kuw 03/06

0.74

0.57

O May 04/06

>1.0

O May 06/06

>1.0

O May 4/05

>1.0

O May 6/05

>1.0

O Vit 01/06

0.33

O Vit 07/04

>1.0

O Vit 12/05

0.19

* Antigenic match of O/Corrientes/Arg/06 to vaccine strain O1 Campos studied by Expectancy of Protection (EPP) assay as provided by National Reference Laboratory (SENASA, Argentina).

45

FMDV Serotype C Strain

C Ober

C Ken 267/67

C Noville

C Phi 7/84

vnt

elisa

elisa

elisa

elisa

C Eth 6/05

0.44

0.19

0.75

0.56

0.14

C Eth 7/05

0.39

0.13

0.59

0.30

0.10

FMDV Serotype Asia 1 As Ind 8/79

Strain

Asia1 Vit 15/2005 Asia1 Amursky/2005

As Shamir 3/89

vnt

vnt

0.25

0.36

a

0.18-0.25

Asia1 Mongolia/2005a

a

elisa

0.25

0.25

Results from ARRIAH

FMDV Serotype SAT 1 Strain

SAT 1 BOT/06/06*

Sat 105

Sat 109

vnt

vnt

0.82

0.71

* RRLSSA isolates and results FMDV Serotype SAT 2 Strain

Sat 2 Eritrea

Sat 251

Sat 287

0.74

0.79

vnt Sat2 Bot 01/05

0.51

Sat2 Bot 02/05

0.48

Sat2 Ken 13/04

0.93

Sat2 Ken 17/04

0.65

Sat2 Ken 22/04

0.63

Sat2 Ken 07/05

0.45

Sat2 Ken 08/05

0.74

Sat 2 Bot 04/06

Interpretation of r1 values In the case of VNT: r1 = > 0.3 suggests that there is a close relationship between field isolate and vaccine strain. A potent vaccine containing the vaccine strain is likely to confer protection. r1 = < 0.3 suggests that the field isolate is so different from the vaccine strain that the vaccine is unlikely to protect.

In the case of ELISA: r1 = 0.4-1.0 suggests that there is a close relationship between field isolate and vaccine strain. A potent vaccine containing the vaccine strain is likely to confer protection.

46

r1 = 0.2-0.39 suggests that the field isolate is antigenically related to the vaccine strain. The vaccine strain might be suitable for use if no closer match can be found provided that a potent vaccine is used and animals are preferably immunised more than once. r1 = <0.2 suggests that the field isolate is so different from the vaccine strain that the vaccine is unlikely to protect

3.2. Overview and discussion of typing results 3.2.1. FMDV serotype O 3.2.1.2. Africa From West Africa, indigenous viruses of the West-Africa topotype were recognized from Senegal and Niger, fairly similar to viruses isolated in previous years from Mali (2005) and Togo (2004-5) (see Annex 2, Figure 5).

From Central and East Africa, indigenous viruses of different East Africa (EA) topotypes (EA-2, EA-3 and EA-4) were recognised. Ethiopian viruses from 2005 and 2006 were very diverse comprising several sublineages within the EA-3 topotype (2005 and 2006) as well as a new EA-4 topotype (2005) (see Annex 2, Figure 4); viruses isolated from Uganda in 1998 were also found to belong to this new topotype (data not shown). Kenyan and Sudanese viruses from 2005 represented sublineages of EA-2 and EA-3 topotypes, respectively (see Annex 2, Figure 3). Forty-two viruses from the Democratic Republic of Congo were similar to one another and belonged to the EA-2 topotype (Annex 2, Figure 3); they were related to viruses received earlier from Uganda (2004) and Kenya (2002). Nineteen viruses isolated from samples taken in the Cameroon in 2005 were all closely related (<2.5% different) and were most closely related to recent isolates from Togo and Mali (~11% nt differences) (data not shown).

3.2.1.3. Asia From the Middle East and South Asia, four sublineages of the PanAsia strain (ME-SA topotype) have been recorded since the beginning of 2005, of which two have been represented by isolations from samples collected in 2006 (Annex 2, Figure 8).

•

One sublineage included viruses from Israel and Turkey (2005) with slightly less closely related viruses recorded from Iran and Israel the previous year.

•

A second sublineage comprised isolates from Kuwait (2006) and Saudi Arabia (2005).

•

A third sublineage was exclusively from Pakistan (2005).

•

A fourth sublineage has been actively spreading since 2001 when it was first recorded in India, with subsequent recognition in Nepal (2003), Bhutan (2003-4) and Malaysia (2003-5). In 2005 and 2006, the virus has been recognized in Pakistan and Iran and in 2006, for the first time in Turkey and Jordan (Annex 2, Figure 8).

From Southeast Asia, as for previous years, porcine virus isolates from Hong Kong belonged to the CATHAY topotypes and were all closely related to each other (Annex 2, Figure 6).

Nine VP1 sequences were received from the OIE FMD Regional Reference Laboratory (RRL) in Thailand.

Three were from viruses isolated from cattle and belonged to the Southeast Asia (SEA) topotype (Annex 2, Figure 6). The remaining six sequences were from isolates from pigs and belonged to the CATHAY topotype (Annex 2, Figure 6). This is the first known occurrence of this topotype in Thailand. In December 2005, the CATHAY topotype was also found in Malaysia for the first time (Annex 2, Figure 7).

Fourteen isolates of serotype O collected from Vietnam (2004-2006) were characterized. These represented three separate serotype O topotypes (SEA, ME-SA and CATHAY) (Annex 2, Figure 7).

Interestingly, two separate lineages of the CATHAY topotype were represented indicating at least two separate introductions of these viruses into Vietnam. Incomplete zoo-sanitary measures and shortage of vaccine have led to widespread outbreaks of FMD affecting cattle and pigs. Four samples from Laos fell within two distinct lineages of the PanAsia strain (ME-SA topotype), as was previously found for samples collected in 2003 (Annex 2, Figure 6). FMDV O was identified in six samples received from Malaysia (one of which was collected in 2005); four fell with the PanAsia strain and one belonged to the SEA topotype (Mya98 strain) (no virus was isolated from the sixth sample) (Annex 2, Figure 7).

47

3.2.1.3. South America From Argentina, the virus responsible for the outbreaks recorded in the FMD-free with vaccination area in Corrientes, belonged to the EURO-SA topotype, being indigenous to the continent, and with homology values between 90-93% to the strains that have sporadically re-appeared in the Southern Cone of the continent in the years 2000, 2002 and 2003 (Annex 2, Figure 16).

From Ecuador, where FMD is still endemic, further EURO-SA topotype viruses were from a different lineage than that causing the emergence in the Southern Cone (Annex 2, Figure 16).

3.2.2. FMDV serotype A 3.2.2.1. Africa From North East Africa, viruses from Egypt were all closely related to each other and most closely related to viruses from East Africa, especially a recent isolate from Kenya (2005) (Annex 2, Figure 9).

These viruses are not closely related to the new type A Iran 05 strain circulating in the Middle East.

From West Africa, an indigenous virus type was recognized from Mauritania (Annex 2, Figure 9). It is of a lineage not detected since 1998 in Gambia and somewhat distinct from more recently isolated type A viruses from the region (Mali 2004, Togo 2005). No samples were received from outbreaks reported to OIE in 2006 by the neighbouring state of Guinea. Three virus isolates collected in the Cameroon in 2005 were closely related to each other (<1.5% different) and most closely related to viruses isolated in Eritrea in 1997-98 and the Cameroon in 2000 (8.3-10.3% nt differences) (data not shown).

3.2.2.2. Asia From the Middle East, no viruses of the A Iran 96 or A Iran 99 topotypes were recognised in 2006.

Rather the new “A Iran 05” strain was widespread (Annex 2, Figure 10). Having been first recognised in Iran in 2003, it became a serious problem there in 2005, and was recognised at the end of the same year in Saudi Arabia. Partial VP1 sequences sent from the SAP Institute, Turkey (later confirmed by complete VP1 sequencing performed in the WRLFMD), indicate that this strain was found in various parts of Turkey during 2005 (Annex 2; Figure 10) and extensive outbreaks ensued with spread into Turkish Thrace close to the borders of Greece and Bulgaria in early 2006. Samples sequenced at ARRIAH showed similar genetic characteristics from complete VP1 sequences (Annex 2, Figure 18). In 2006, the strain was also recognised in Pakistan and Jordan (Annex 2; Figure 10).

From Southeast Asia, viruses from Vietnam were related to sequences of viruses from Thailand, Malaysia and Laos from 2003 and 2004 (Annex 2, Figure 11). Sequencing of samples collected in Thailand and Malaysia during 2005 indicates that serotype A viruses in these two countries have high similarity (Annex 2, Figure 11) 3.2.2.2. South America From Venezuela, where FMD is still endemic, isolates were placed within the indigenous EURO-SA topotype (Annex 2, Figure 17).

3.2.3. FMDV serotype Asia 1 3.2.3.1. Asia Complete VP1 sequences of isolates from Amursky and Chita in Eastern Russia were obtained by ARRIAH (Annex 2, Figure 19). VP1 sequences received by WRL from ARRIAH (from Amursky, Khabarovsk and Chita) were found to be closely related to previous outbreak viruses in the region (Annex 2, Figure 12). The sequences of Vietnamese isolates received from the Thailand RRL were closely related to each other and next most closely related to viruses from Thailand (1998) and Myanmar (2005) (Annex 2, Figure 12). This lineage only occurs in Southeast Asia and is distinct from Asia 1 viruses circulating in other Asian countries.

3.2.4. FMDV serotype SAT 1 3.2.4.1. Africa SAT 1 isolates from Kenya (2004-6) divide into three sublineages (according to location) within the North West Zimbabwe topotype (Annex 2, Figure 13).

SAT 1 was isolated from samples from Zambia, Tanzania and from an outbreak from the buffalo zone in Botswana by RRLSSA, Botswana. SAT 1 FMDV isolated at WRL from samples derived from cattle and buffalo that were received from RRLSSA, Botswana in 2006 were closely related to each other within the West Zimbabwe topotype (Annex 2, Figure 13).

48

3.2.5. FMDV serotype SAT 2 3.2.5.1. Africa Fifty-two Cameroon isolates from 2005 were found to be closely related to each other (<2% different) and most closely related to SAT2/LIB/1/2003 (7.42% nt difference), SAT2/NGR/15/2005 (8.02% nt difference) and SAT2/SAU/6/2000 (8.50% nt difference) (data not shown).

SAT 2 was isolated from an outbreak in the FMD free without vaccination zone (Zone 7, see Annex 1, Figure 2) by RRLSSA, Botswana. Three samples received by WRL from Botswana were sequenced and shown to be closely related to viruses from previous outbreaks in Zimbabwe (2001-02) and Botswana (2002) (Annex 2, Figure 14). They were distinct from viruses causing an outbreak in Botswana in 2005 (see Annex 2, Figure 14). An isolate from African buffalo collected was not closely related to the cattle outbreak viruses (see Annex 2, Figure 14). Kenyan SAT 2 viruses from 2004 were similar to others derived from contemporary cases in Tanzania and Malawi (Annex 2, Figure 14).

A SAT 2 virus from Niger (2005) was closely related to the virus responsible for the 2003 outbreak in Libya (where SAT 2 does not normally occur) providing evidence of the risk posed to the southern Mediterranean from outbreaks in sub-Saharan states (see Annex 2, Figure 15).

3.2.6. FMDV serotype C 3.2.6.1. Africa The complete VP1 sequences of two type C isolates from Ethiopia were determined. Both were said to originate from 1983. Both were essentially identical to each other and to a virus (vaccine strain?) received from Ethiopia in 1971 (C/ETH/1/71) (data not shown). These viruses were distinct from other FMDV C viruses which have occurred in East Africa (Kenya and Uganda).

4.

Antigenic Typing

4.1 Overview of Typing Results The results of all antigenic characterizations of FMD field isolates by matching with vaccine strains are given in Table 3.

4.1.2. Serotype O FMDV serotype O isolates collected in Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Vietnam or Africa (Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya) between 2005 and 2006 were further characterized by VNT and/or ELISA. This confirmed the utility of O1 Manisa to all serotype O isolates tested except for an isolate from Israel (O ISR/1/2005) that was closely related to viruses circulating in the area (Turkey/Lebanon/Israel) and an isolate from Vietnam (O VIT 12/2005) which is classified by VP1 sequencing as a member of the Cathay topotype.

The type O isolate responsible for the outbreaks recorded in the FMD-free with vaccination area in Corrientes, Argentina was subtyped as O1 (National Reference Laboratory, SENASA, Argentina).

Vaccine matching gave satisfactory results by Expectancy of Protection (EPP, by VNT), with vaccines containing strain O1 Campos (National Reference Laboratory, SENASA, Argentina).

4.1.3. Serotype A The best match, by VNT, for the type A virus from the 2006 outbreak in Egypt was afforded by vaccine containing A Eritrea 98. Additional African serotype A viruses (from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya and Togo) were also tested for cross-reaction with the A Eritrea vaccine strain. All showed a rather poor match with this vaccine strain. A potency test conducted for The European Commission for Control of FMD at the Friedrich Loeffler Institute in Germany in August, found that a high potency A22 Iraq vaccine could protect against A Egypt 2006 despite a poor predicted serological match. The only vaccine that provided a match to the Mauritanian viruses was A Ken 35/80.

A22 Iraq vaccine was recommended by WRL to provide protection against the "A Iran 05" strain of FMDV. This is based on serological tests which have and continue to indicate a moderate match despite the lack of a close genetic relationship (isolates tested from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey).

This recommendation has been supported by subsequent reports that the A22 vaccine has proved to be effective against the "A Iran 05" strain in Turkey, in the field.

A May 97 vaccine showed an acceptable match to serotype A viruses isolated from Malaysia (2005) and Vietnam (2004-5).

4.1.3. Serotype Asia 1 Two isolates of Asia 1 from Vietnam had an acceptable match with vaccine strain Asia 1 Shamir.

49

4.1.4. Serotype SAT 1 and 2 The SAT1 isolates tested from Botswana all matched SAT 1 105 and 109 reference vaccine strains and BVI vaccine was effective in controlling the outbreak.

A selection of African SAT 2 isolates matched with the SAT 2 Eritrea vaccine strain.

A new recommendation on vaccine strains has been provided by the FMD FAO World Reference Laboratory to the Executive Committee of the European Commission for the Control of FMD (Annex 4). A22 Iraq has been moved from medium to high priority and A Eritrea 98 from low to medium priority.

5.

Overall Conclusions

FMDV is still active in many parts of the world and continues to threaten FMD-free regions.

Efforts to control FMD in affected regions are extremely variable. Substantial initiatives appear to be taking place to increase vaccination in India and China, two of the largest animal producing regions affected by FMD. In South America, the outbreaks of disease in southern Brazil and northern Argentina have led to concern that virus still circulates in areas that are supposedly “FMD-free with vaccination”.

Despite the efforts of the Commission for the Control of FMD in South East Asia, the situation in the region has not improved in the last year, with major outbreaks in Vietnam, incursions into Malaysia and westward spread of the pig-adapted Cathay topotype. In some parts of the world, particularly parts of Africa, there is little in the way of effective control.

Knowledge concerning the types of FMD virus circulating is related to disease control efforts in the country or region involved. In countries where the disease does not occur or occurs only sporadically, there is a good likelihood that outbreaks will lead to samples being collected and submitted to laboratories for detailed analysis. In contrast, viruses in primary endemic countries which are the main reservoir of infection are much less likely to be studied in a systematic way leading to gaps in our knowledge. Cumulative results over many years have led to a fairly good understanding of the different virus topotypes to be found in different regions, but new strains, for example of serotype A, continue to emerge from incompletely understood sources. Surveillance can be improved by continuing efforts to solicit sample submissions; however, proper epidemiological studies are also needed to complement laboratory-based virus characterisation.

The vaccines held in reserves by different FMD-free regions do not appear to give optimal protection against the full range of FMD viruses from endemic regions and therefore there is a continuing need to review risk and prioritise which vaccine strains should be available. Continuation of vaccination against serotype C remains questionable since there is little evidence for continued circulation of this serotype and use of improperly inactivated vaccine carries a risk of its reintroduction.

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Annex 4. Recommendations from the WRL on FMD virus strains to be included in FMDV antigen banks – 2006 (not in order of importance)

High Priority O Manisa (covers PanAsia strain) O BFS or Campos A24 Cruzeiro Asia 1 Shamir A Iran ’96 A22 Iraq SAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent)

Medium Priority A Eritrea SAT 2 Zimbabwe AIran 87 or A Saudi Arabia 23/86 (or equivalent) SAT 1 South Africa A Malaysia 97 (or Thai equivalent such as A/NPT/TAI/86) A Argentina 2001 O Taiwan 97 (pig-adapted strain or Philippine equivalent) A Iran ’99

Low Priority A15 Bangkok related strain A87 Argentina related strain C Noville SAT 2 Kenya SAT 1 Kenya SAT 3 Zimbabwe A Kenya

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Appendix 5

Epidemic events and lessons learnt in the European neighbourhood – 2005-present Keith Sumption Summary The last two years (2005-present) have seen a dramatic worsening of the epidemic situation in the region, with two major epidemics in Turkey and Iran as a result of incursions of a type A and type O (PanAsia II), threatening FMD free regions of Europe and the Caucasus/Russia. In addition an epidemic of an African type A in Egypt in 2006 threatened Israel, a member country, and heightened risk for the region as a whole. As a consequence, the focus of activities has been on containment of the threats, reducing the resources to undertake other categories of preventive and capacity building activity foreseen in the 4 year Strategic Plan agreed at the 36th Session in 2005.

The incursions into Thrace region in 2006 and 2007 have been contained with emergency actions, but result from a number of failures to contain epidemics of exotic strains of FMDV in Iran and in eastern Turkey in the late autumn/winter of each year, with subsequent animal population as a result of mass animal movements pre and post festivals, that occurred under favourable conditions for transmission.

The recent type O epidemic if of concern as the epidemic has breached biosecurity and well organised vaccination programmes in each country affected, mimicking the spread 10 years ago of the original PanAsia type O virus. The epidemic in Egypt provided that FMD viruses can circulate in Africa for many years (e.g. 8 years in this example) without knowledge of the reference laboratories, potentially leading to lack of suitable vaccines in European contingency plans.

The failure of early warnings has only been partly corrected, and early detection and response are constrained by lack of reporting and capacity to mount serious containment effort around new foci.

Reducing the risk of further events will need a consistent and sustained effort to strengthen FMD control at the two most critical borders of Eurasia, specifically the eastern borders of Turkey, and the eastern borders of Iran.

Greater effort to monitor virus circulation and risk in other regions is also essential if Europe is to have sufficient early warning to ensure that suitable vaccines are stocked to counter new and emerging FMDV, particularly in west Asia and Africa.

Report 1. FMD has not been reported in EUFMD member countries, except for Turkey and Israel, since 2001. However, FMD outbreaks occurred in Turkey within 20 km of the border with Greece and Bulgaria on four occasions in past year (Feb 06 and Jan and Feb 07) 2. Freedom in European Union countries has been maintained, but was severely threatened from the neighbouring regions by type A and type O regional epidemics in west Asia, with incursions of type A Iran 05 and type O (PanAsia II ) into Iran and Turkey in 2005-6, each resulting in severe, widespread epidemics and which resulted in multiple introductions in Thrace region in 2006 (type A) and 2007 (type A, type O) 3. European reserves of vaccine have been mobilised in 2006 and 2007 in response to the above threat, to re-inforce the buffer zone in European parts of Turkey (Thrakia –Thrace) that is maintained by Turkey, a.

for emergency vaccination i. Thrace -Feb 2006, 2.5 million doses A, O, Asia-1 (EU vaccine Bank) ii. Emergency reserve provided of 1 million doses , EC funded, via EUFMD, from vaccine bank of The Netherlands, for cover in period 11/06 to 3/07, including use in Thrace in 2007

b.

To support the epidemic control in 2006 i. 1.66 million doses of A/O vaccine, from EU vaccine bank, September 06, ii. 1.5 million doses provided February 07 to support spring vaccination in Thrace and Marmara, 2007.

4. In addition an emergency reserve was created for the Caucasus countries to counter the risk of A Iran 05 (reserve at FGI-ARRIAH, Russia), in addition the maintenance of the Vaccination Buffer Zone that separates the epidemic situation in Turkey and Iran, from that in the south Caucasus. Despite the epidemic situation in Turkey and Iran, no FMD outbreaks were reported in the South Caucasus.

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5. The attention to emergency events, plus lack of funding for active collection of FMD strains circulating in risk areas, has hindered progress on risk assessment and early warning in more distant risk regions to Europe.

6. The frequency and severity of these epidemic events is a major reverse of the favourable epidemiologic situation in 2003-4; 7. In addition type A incursion into Egypt presented a high risk situation in early 2006, since Europe was not prepared: a. the EU vaccine bank was not known to contain a suitable vaccine against this type A, b. experiments (funded by EC) to identify a suitable vaccine involved a 4 month delay to obtain results 8. The origin of the type A Iran 05 epidemic appears to be the circulating pool of type A viruses in the ecosystem of west Asia (Pakistan/Iran/Afghanistan), with countries to the west (Turkey, Caucasus, middle-east being at risk of overspill, and devastating epidemics.

9. The origin of the type O (PanAsia II lineage) appears to be South Asia ( Indian subcontinent), on basis of first detection and later detection in neighbouring countries 10. The time period between the international epidemic (pandemic) waves of PanAsia I and II is circa 10 years. In contrast to events leading up to the European PanAsia epidemic sin 2001, there is so far no evidence of the PanAsia II lineage involving east Asia (China and neighbours) , but this also occurred late in the epidemic spread in the PanAsia I pandemic and more information on the type O strains circulating in China is needed.

11. In the past 10 years, Europe and the immediate neighbouring regions have been affected by FMD incursions from 5 different FMD ecosystems in Asia and Africa; a. Indian subcontinent (type A in Balkans, 1996) b. East Asia, possibly via intermediate countries (pandemic type O PanAsia I, to north-west Europe in 2001) c. West Asia (type O and Asia-1, type A (A Iran 96, A Iran 99 and A Iran 05 types) d. East Africa (type A in Egypt, 2006) e. The pastoralist belt of the sahel region below the sahara i. SAT2 into Libya in 2003 ii. Type O from West Africa into Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, 1999 12. The region is therefore at risk from at least three major sources of FMD viruses, and at least 7 vaccine antigens are required for the incursions in the past 10 years, and thus the region is one of the most complex in the world for organisation of vaccine banks and preventive vaccination.

13. Early warning in source regions of antigenic shifts is therefore essential for vaccine bank management and for early response.

14. In 2005 and again in 2006, with type A and O respectively, the summer/autumn epidemics in Iran were followed by incursions into Turkey, and as a result of the pre and post festival movements of animals, widely disseminated outbreaks occurred, reaching Thrace region in January 06. The type O and A strains have also been detected in Jordan, and type O in Israel in late 2006, a situation last seen with the panAsia epidemic wave in the late 1990s.

15. Epidemics immediately preceding the main festival period, especially if it occurs in cool winter conditions, carry a high risk of disseminating an outbreak. The festival period again falls in mid winter in 2007, therefore heightened surveillance is needed in SeptemberNovember.

16. There was no early warning of the type A epidemic in 2005, which contributed to the scale of the problem in Turkey in 2006, with OIE/EC/FAO only being notified when FMD had reached Thrace region, 17. As a result of the EUFMD /IVO collaboration, the type O epidemic in 2006 was detected, characterised and early warning was provided of the virus strain and of illegal animal trade risk across the eastern borders of Turkey in December 06. Nevertheless, the type O was detected in January 07, and retrospective analysis suggest multiple possible entry points, with the genotype detected close to borders of Iraq and Syria.

18. The subsequent spread of the type O genotype across Turkey in 2007 indicates a failure a. detect and contain new incursions b. in the herd immunity achieved by the vaccination policy (bi-annual cattle vaccination in Anatolia, no systematic vaccination of sheep) c. to regionalise infection, within Anatolia, and across the bosphorous 19. The above incursions into Turkey and other countries in 2006-7 events indicate that Eurasian borders have increased in permeability in past 2 years, of importance not only for FMD but for other TADs. Conclusions 1. The European region is at risk from at three different and complex regions whose ecosystems of FMD viruses have high antigenic diversity.

2. The situation in the past two years has been highly unstable compared to previous biennium.

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3. Epidemics continue to sweep through partially vaccinated populations in Turkey and Iran, highlighting the need for commitment to animal movement control and biosecurity at all levels.

4. The EU vaccine bank and the EC/FAO agreement on the support to EUFMD has been extremely important in mounting effective and rapid response to FMD emergencies in Turkey.

5. The purchase of vaccine from a national bank operated by a member states has been important in enabling a response when the EU vaccine bank stocks was not sufficient.

Recommendations 1. The close functional relationship between the EUFMD Secretariat, DG-SANCO and the World Reference Laboratory, and FAO structures has proven to be effective in enabling rapid response to crisis situation including delivery and monitoring of emergency vaccination programs.

However the crisis situation have taken resources from preventive actions, and therefore further strengthening of the information and response systems, including communication with member countries is recommended.

2. In response to the increasing movements of infection from Africa to the region, the EUFMD Commission should continue to support the collection and typing of viruses, and in 2007-8 the priorities should include West African and north-east African regions where there is lack of virus information, and in doing so work through the Regional Animal Health Centres (RAHCs) established by FAO: OIE with the African Union (AU-IBAR) in Bamako and Nairobi, 3. In order to improve the information base for risk assessment, the Commission should also support information gathering on FMD epidemiology in source regions, with priority to areas where suitable vaccines are unknown or unavailable , working through the RAHCs, and through the established Global Early Warning System (GLEWS) operated by FAO/OIE/WHO. 4. The Commission should specifically promote and monitor risk reduction measures which will assist to reduce the FMD risks of trans-border movements of animals and products across the eastern boundaries of Europe, and through improved efficiency of vaccination programs, measures to reduce or mitigate illegal animal movements, early warning and response capacity in the border regions.

5. To these ends the FAO EUFMD Commission, in consultation with OIE and EC, and with the countries involved, invite participation in regular “Multi-partite” meetings for FMD control at the Eurasian interface (Turkish boundaries), and provide technical assistance to the improve the monitoring and impact of vaccination and other control measures.

6. As a component of a Global Region reduction under GF-TADS, the Commission should assist development of a long term plan (“Roadmap”) for FMD control in the region where Europe and Asia meet (Europe: West Asia).

7. The position of Iran is of great importance for disease control and therefore the EUFMD Commission should continue to support the Iranian authorities in their efforts to establish an effective early detection and early warning system for FMD incursions, and to promote effective control.

8. The boundaries of Iran with its eastern neighbours constitute a important potential barrier to westward movement of infections, and therefore FAO, in consultation with OIE and EC, and the Economic Co-operation organisation (ECO), and with the countries involved should also consider establishing regular multipartite forum on FMD risk reduction across the Central and West Asian borders, to which EUFMD is invited to participate.

9. The feasibility of the long term plan for FMD control in Turkey should be re-evaluated in light of the recent epidemiology, and the possible reasons for failure recognised and addressed early in the planning and implementation process.

10. Given the apparent failure of FMD control against the epidemic type O virus, using an apparently suitable vaccine, the feasibility of achieving the much higher level of herd immunity to effectively drive FMD type O outbreaks to extinction should be re-evalauted. As part of this, other options, including greater emphasis on regionalisation and effective local containment of epidemics, should be considered.

11. Greater emphasis and support to epidemiology and predictive modelling is needed over the next 3 years, for the most affected countries.

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Time-line of major epidemic events, 2005-7

July 2005

Iran Start of A Iran 05 epidemic

November 05

First type A outbreak for 6 months. Recognised as A Iran 05 in December 05 Widely distributed cases of FMD type A outbreaks.

Entry into Thrace (index case)

January 06

February 06

Continued type A epidemic –widespread (140 outbreaks) Type A outbreaks reported in Thrace.

Emergency missions – EUFMD/EC 2.5 million doses vaccine donated by EU-VB. Continued type A epidemic -widespread Mass vaccination campaign in Thrace.

No more reported cases in Thrace

March 06

April 06 June-July

Regional meeting organised by EUFMD to identify vaccine for control of A Iran 05.

September 06

Upsurge in outbreaks –type O. (Start of epidemic with new variant)

October 06

Spread of type O, severe nature of cases Warning issued about virulence of type O and epidemic situation Warning to Turkey issued on risk of cross border movement of type O

November 06

Turkey

Resurgence of type A epidemic in Anatolia Thrace: overspill from Anatolian epidemic- 2 isolated ob.

Decline in type A in Turkey Early re-vaccination in Thrace.

1.66 million doses vaccine donated by EU for autumn control.

Index case of new panAsia type O in Turkey

1 million doses vaccine donated EC via EUFMD for emergency reserve for winter risk

Egypt

other

First outbreaks of type A (African origin), wide spread Reported to OIE, samples typed at WRL. Severe, widespread outbreaks.

EUFMD missions for diagnostic support, epidemic control.

Homologous vaccine produced in Egypt.

Dramatic decline in cases after April, before type A vaccination program starts

Type A Iran 05 incursion in Jordan

FAO/OIE Roundtable on FMD control in middle-east – Damascus, discussed regional risk.

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December 06 (?)

Increase in type O cases

January 07

Massive type O epidemic (122 outbreaks) Isolated Type A outbreak Thrace (Edirne)

February 07

Meeting of Iranian and Turkish veterinarians to discuss improved FMD control

.

Type O outbreaks start to decline EU donate 1.5 million doses vaccine for Thrace New outbreak in Thrace (Kirklareli) –type O

Type O outbreak in Thrace (Cannakale, Evrese)

March 07

April

FMD type O outbreaks in Israel (previously 12/2005) Northern Iraq: FMD cases observed by FAO consultants, severe mortality in young animals FMD in West Bank (type O), A very high mortality among lambs and kids aged less than two years was observed.

FMD type O in wildlife (gazelle, wild boar) in northern Israel, possible transfrontier movements.

Outbreaks in domestic animals Outbreaks continue in Israel

FMD outbreaks in Turkey 2005-2007(March) 180 160 120 100

TYPE O

80

TYPE A

60 40 20 S EP JU TE LY M BE N O R VE M JA BE N R U A R Y -0 7 M A R C H

M A Y

S EP JU TE LY M BE N O R VE M JA BE N R U A R Y -0 6 M A R C H

M A Y

0 JA N U A R Y -0 5 M A R C H

Number

140

Month

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Appendix 6 GF-TADS - Global risk reduction and the technical support via the regional animal health centres Joseph Domenech

ch

57

58

59

60

OIE/FAO network of FMD Reference Laboratories - David Paton

Appendix 7

61

62

Global FMD Research Alliance – Martyn Jeggo

Appendix 8

63

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Appendix 9 The launch of the Global Roadmap for Improving the Tools to Control Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Endemic Settings FAO Headquarters, Rome, 17th April 2007 Brian Perry International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya On the 17th April 2007 at FAO, the Global Roadmap for Improving the Tools to Control Foot-andMouth Disease in Endemic Settings was launched, through presentation of the Roadmap report1 to a meeting of international stakeholders from the endemically affected regions, international organizations, animal health regulators and funding bodies and from the scientific community. The process of developing the Roadmap brought together an international network of scientists involved in developing and refining the tools that are tailored to the needs of controlling FMD in countries and regions in which the disease is endemic. The Roadmap process was initiated at a workshop held in Agra, India from 29th November to 1st December 2006. It was the inaugural activity of Programme Two of the Global Foot and Mouth Research Alliance (GFRA).

The GFRA was launched in 2003 as an international consortium of five institutions, Pirbright Laboratory (UK), Plum Island Laboratory (USA), National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (Canada), the Australian Animal Health Laboratory and the International Livestock Research Institute, with a five-year research programme for developing a new generation of vaccines and other technologies for the control of FMD. Funded principally by the Wellcome Trust and the European Union, with additional financial support from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the US Department for Agriculture, Pfizer, Intervet and Novartis, the workshop was attended by 55 invited participants who were mostly acknowledged experts in various aspects of FMD research and included virologists immunologists, geneticists, vaccine design specialists, epidemiologists and agricultural economists. In addition, representatives of relevant international and regional organisations (FAO, FAO/IAEA, OIE, AU-IBAR, PANAFTOSA, PANVAC), pharmaceutical companies and institutions which make FMD vaccines, senior representatives of Indian veterinary institutions who have responsibility for the control of FMD, and key donors also participated.

The workshop had the following key stated objectives:

•

• •

•

•

•

To provide crucial momentum to a global initiative on improving the capacity of countries in which FMD is endemic to control the disease through the use of improved vaccines and other associated technologies.

To present and discuss the market demands for current and new FMD vaccines, and the longterm sustainability of such markets.

To review and critique draft research ideas on the development of a new generation of FMD vaccines and diagnostics and epidemiological tools and to evaluate their success, targeted at the needs of developing countries.

To identify and engage with key research and development partners interested in participating in a Global Roadmap for Improving Tools to Control Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Endemic Settings, including appropriate research institutes, universities, pharmaceutical industries and biotech enterprises, including those located in the developing world.

To produce a portfolio of concept notes for subsequent development as full research proposals for submission to the Wellcome Trust and other relevant sponsors within four months of the workshop.

To provide a structured report of the workshop describing outputs, roadmap structure and proposed research plan.

The self-appointed mandate of the Roadmap was defined as ‘developing, testing and making available packages of tools for the control of FMD in endemic settings’. It was agreed that the use of those tools, for example in FMD control campaigns, fell beyond the mandate of the Roadmap: the group assembled in Agra were mostly highly experienced ‘tool makers’, with the tools including vaccines, diagnostics and epidemiological and economic tools. It was recognised that the mandate for the control of FMD belonged to national authorities and, at an international level, regional and international organisations such as AU-IBAR, FAO and OIE.

1

Perry, B.D. and Sones, K.R. (Editors), 2007. Global Roadmap for improving the tools to control foot-and-mouth disease in endemic settings. Report of a workshop held at Agra, India, 29 November–1 December 2006, and subsequent Roadmap outputs. ILRI (International Livestock Research Institute), Nairobi, Kenya. pp. 88 and a CD

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The workshop participants developed vision and mission statements, and two strategic goals.

Vision: A world in which livestock-based livelihoods, enterprises and trade can flourish unimpeded by foot-and-mouth disease Mission: To establish and sustain global partnerships involving institutions in foot-and-mouth disease endemic and free areas to develop, test and promote packages of tools needed for the successful control and eventual elimination of the disease in endemic settings The roadmap’s strategic goals are: 1. Between 2008 and 2012, to have developed, validated and promoted a set of FMD control packages, based on the application and adaptation of existing vaccines, diagnostics and epidemiological and economics tools, that are fit for purpose and tailored to the demands of different endemic FMD settings 2. By 2015, through coordinated priority research initiated in 2007, to have demonstrated proof-ofconcept for new, improved demand-responsive vaccines and diagnostics that will facilitate control and eventual eradication of FMD in endemic settings Prior to the Agra workshop, an undertaking was made to the principal funder, the Wellcome Trust, that concept notes for priority research identified during the workshop would be submitted to the Trust and other potential funders by the beginning of April 2007. Building on the outputs of the Agra workshop, lead writers subsequently facilitated the development of concept notes in the following key areas: • Rational design of improved FMD vaccines • Defining viral determinants of protection in order to develop improved and more stable vaccines for the progressive control of FMD in endemic settings • Understanding host responses to FMD virus infection and vaccination • Understanding the challenges to achieving FMD-free zones in Asia • Institutional strategies and economic impacts of alternative FMD prevention and control strategies in southern Africa • Epidemiological-economic support tools to control FMD in South American endemic settings The concept notes are included in this Roadmap report.

Attached to this report is a CD which contains the full report in digital format. In addition it contains the Scene Setting papers presented on day one of the workshop, and copies of the presentations made.

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Appendix 10

Report of the 3rd Roundtable meeting on FMD control in the Middle-East and North Africa Damascus, Syria, November 6-7th 2006 [ N B : The appendices to this report are not included ]

Introduction A 3rd FMD Roundtable meeting on FMD Control in Middle-East and North Africa was held in Damascus, Syria, November 6-7th November 2006. The meeting was opened by H.E. Dr Adel Safar, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and hosted by Dr Khoury, President of the GF-TADS Regional Steering Committee for the Middle-East.

Several countries and international organizations have participated in the meeting including Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, FAO (Rome), OIE (Central Bureau and Regional), WRL (Pirbright, UK), USDA APHIS IS Cairo Area Office, the Russian FGI-ARRIAH and French Ministry of Agriculture. The vaccine production private sector was represented.

The Session considered the current risk situation and recent events in FMD epidemiology in the region, the selection of FMD vaccines to counter the risk, and the improvement of performance and standardisation of FMD laboratory diagnosis.

Summary From the results of the questionnaire survey, and from the reports to the meeting, it is clear that FMD remains a significant drain on the budgets of the national veterinary services of MENA countries and on the livelihoods of livestock owners across the MENA area. Almost all countries operate vaccination programs in large ruminants, some in all ruminant species. These vaccination programs utilise vaccines from a wide variety of sources, including producers based within the region and international suppliers from Europe and India; the lack of standardisation may be a factor affecting control. In 2005-6, the ME has been very hard hit by rapid invasion and impact of two distinct serotype A viruses, one which emerged in Iran (A Iran 05) in 2005-6, and an incursion of an African type A virus into Egypt causing widespread outbreaks in January-July 2006. In Turkey and Iran, the type A vaccines in routine use did not prevent the new strain from spreading. The A Iran 05 strain continues to circulate in Turkey and I.R of Iran, and which has been detected in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 2006. Type O remains endemic, but the risk of Asia-1 appears diminished with the last reported occurrence in Iran in August 2005. SAT viruses have not been reported in the region since 2003 (SAT-1 in Libya), but serological evidence of SAT infection in Sudan was presented.

The dynamic situation requires continuous monitoring, not least because first detection of new strains in the centre of countries rather than at the borders, and because of rapid animal trade movements, and also because other antigenic variants of serotype A were observed in 2005 and may continue to persist in the region and give rise to later re-emergence. Further, the proximity and importance of trade with countries in the Horn of Africa, and in west and central Asia, has the potential to introduce exotic FMD viruses from these regions.

The meeting also reviewed the risk situation, including possible introduction of exotic FMDV, and how selection of vaccines against FMDV could be improved across the region. It also considered if antigen banks could play a role to avoid shortage of vaccine in emergency situations, and on improvement and standardisation of diagnostic laboratory performance.

Item1 - Evaluation of FMD status in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) Dr Yehia, OIE Regional Representative for the Middle East, summarised the responses to the questionnaire sent to member countries before the meeting, together with information provided annually to the OIE. The aim of the survey was to provide additional information on vaccination, diagnostic laboratory usage, and on state of contingency plans. The report is given in Appendix 3.

Country Presentations Short presentations were made by on recent FMD experience and current control measures, by representatives of the veterinary services or the national vaccine producers, from Egypt (given by Dr elBendary, Appendix 4), Sudan (given by Dr Aziz , Appendix 5), Yemen (given by Dr al-Eriani, Appendix 6), Syria (given by Dr Georgos Maksoud, Appendix 7), Jordan (Appendix 8), Turkey (given by Fuat Özyörük, Appendix 9), Pakistan (given by Dr Usmani, Appendix 10), and Iran (report of the Razi Institute, given by Dr Mahravani; Appendix 11). The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) gave a verbal report.

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The presentations provided much valuable information and indicated that FMD has occurred the last years as new serotypes of FMDV emerged unpredictably in some regional countries and caused serious damages. Their uncontrolled spread represents a high risk of transmission to neighbouring countries FMD Type A was diagnosed in 2006 in 8-9 governorates in Egypt this year. Genetically, this new serotype A differs considerably from the Middle Eastern viruses and was closely related to FMD viruses from East Africa.

During 2005 a new FMDV A lineage spread throughout Iran and moved westwards into Saudi Arabia and Turkey (including Thrace). In 2006 it was also detected in Pakistan.

Turkey has reported an outbreak of FMD virus serotype (A) in 2006. The outbreak in Thrace was first detected on 21 January 2006 and confirmed at the beginning of February 2006. The source of infection is reported to be the introduction of new animals or animal products from Anatolian to European part of the country.

Item 2 - Risk situation: Risk of FMD evolving from endemic to epidemic Global situation and risk of exotic viruses entering the MENA region On behalf of the FAO World Reference Laboratory (WRL) for FMD, Dr Ferris presented a global overview (Appendix 12) of the major events in FMD epidemiology, as detected from the samples submitted to the WRL and to the other laboratories in the OIE/FAO FMD Laboratory Network. Of importance to note is that epidemiology in South America has been relatively stable compared to that in the middle east and in east Asia (China and South-East Asia). In Africa, the epidemiological information is scarce and insufficient samples are received each year to determine major trends, although types A, O and SAT 1, 2 and 3 have been detected from outbreaks in the current year. In Asia, the circulation of several genetic types of FMDV serotype Asia-1 is a concern, highlighting the fact that at any time multiple virus strains are simultaneously circulating, and which may be a risk to the Middle East where vaccine against Asia-1 is not used in all countries.

Risk situation: early warning system in Iran for detection of risk from west and central Asia The activities of the project supported by FAO, EC and the Iranian Veterinary Organisation (IVO) to improve the early warning of FMD viruses in west and central Asia, which should benefit the middle east by providing early information that will assist vaccine selection in countries to the west (Turkey, Iraq, Syria) was presented by Dr Geiger (FAO) and Dr Otorod (IVO). The former provided an overview of the FAO project (Appendix 13), and the latter illustrated how a knowledge of the animal populations and FMD incidence was being used to target FMDV surveillance, in particular aimed at collection of FMDV from animal mixing/marketing points that could provide an efficient means to determine if the FMDV types circulating presented a risk to break through the vaccines used in the region. Through this approach, a new and virulent type O strain had been detected which is currently spreading in Iran (Appendix 14).

Item 3 - Vaccination: selection and use in the region The Item was chaired by Dr Khoury Keith Sumption (FAO) presented an overview of key issues in vaccine selection, highlighting recent problems with FMD control in the region which should provide lessons for selection by veterinary services (Appendix 15). He highlighted the need to predict which FMDV will provide the threat of outbreaks in the next 6-12 months, rather than using historic information. The ME region is much more complex than other regions, given the threats are from east (Asia-1) as well as south (sub-Saharan Africa), and possibly in future from South America, as well as the regular type O and A strains within the region. In this uncertain situation, high potency vaccines are particularly important, as they generally confer a broader protection that low potency vaccines, albeit at higher price; this had probably been a major factor in the effective control of FMD in Thrace region of Turkey in 2006. The purity of FMD vaccines is important if countries are interested to develop export zones or FMD free zones where surveillance to demonstrate freedom from virus circulation is needed. The risk of virus escape, from non-OIE standard vaccines, or vaccine plants operating without adequate biosecurity, was mentioned; the latter should concern CVOs of countries with production facilities since the handling of exotic virus types could potentially lead to outbreaks of exotic virus strains to which the region has no immunity.

An overview of FMD vaccine selection in the MENA region, based on the responses to the questionnaire, was given by Dr Mustafa Hassan (Appendix 16). In general, FMD Serotype A is endemic in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey while sporadic outbreaks occur in the southern Middle Eastern countries.

[Vaccine matching tests revealed that the type A virus responsible for the 2005-6 epidemic is antigenically different to A Iran 96 and closer to A22; this new strain has been designated as A Iran 05.

In contrast the type A strain responsible for outbreaks in Egypt in 2006 is closely antigenically matched to A Eritrea 98, and not to other type A vaccines used frequently in the MENA region such as A Iran 96 or A22.]

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Five countries in region are known to produce FMD vaccine. They are Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iran and Morocco. Others are mostly importing their needs from external sources known to be recognized international vaccine manufacturers. From Africa, countries like: South Africa, Botswana, and Kenya (in early days) are the main sources of FMD vaccine. The vaccine imported is mainly trivalent (A, O, SAT1 serotypes) and quadrivalent (A, O, SAT1 and SAT2 serotypes) and rarely monovalent (A or O serotype).

With few exceptions, vaccination strategy is either poorly planned or entirely lacking in most of countries. Thus a scientifically backed up vaccination strategy is needed for the countries of the region.

The diagnostic facilities for FMD are not well developed. This justifies why most of the vaccine serotypes imported by the countries are not matching with the local serotypes. FMD contingency plans are not well developed in most countries of the region.

A Q&A session on the issues followed, including the questions: Should purchasers check the suppliers’ claims before or after purchase? What level of vaccine purity is needed in the region? Is it safe to produce vaccine using viruses from outside of the region?

Priority antigens for use in vaccination programs in the MENA region Dr Sumption introduced this paper. In Europe, a system is in place to guide decision makers, usually the CVO, on the choice of FMD antigen to hold in the emergency reserves. He suggested that the system could be adapted to provide guidance to the decision makers in the MENA countries on the priority antigens to be considered for their programs. The system in Europe involves the WRL producing a list every 6 months with a full review every 2 years; the review involves discussion with stakeholders and vaccine producers, since the strains listed should have a number of advantageous properties including extent of cross-protection to be expected.

The draft WRL list for priorities for the MENA region was presented by Dr Ferris (Appendix 17).

He recommended that each country does it own risk assessment, but in doing so considers the high priority antigens on the list since they represent, according to the viruses detected internationally in 2005-6, the most appropriate antigens against the most prevalent viruses.

Where countries are affected by outbreaks, then specific advice from the WRL should be sought.

In discussion, the need to review the list by experts from the region was highlighted. In particular, Dr Otorod (IVO) questioned why A ran 87 was not listed as a priority. Dr Sumption thanked him for this comment since it highlighted the very high importance of the Reference laboratories such as the WRL receiving A Iran 87 isolates from recent outbreaks to test whether the priority type A vaccine strains provide sufficient protection. If they do not, this could justify raising A Iran 87 to high priority in the programs for the region.

Item 4 - Preparing for emergency situations: the potential role of national FMDV vaccine or antigen banks Dr Sumption opened this Item, and brought attention to the problems in the MENA region in the past year where commercial suppliers did not have stocks for immediate delivery to countries affected by the type A epidemics, but the EC was able to deliver 2.5 million doses of A/O/Asia-1 vaccine for emergency vaccination in Turkey from its antigen bank for immediate use. This highlighted the role of banks to provide an immediate response; these banks were little different from normal tenders, being a contract between a veterinary service and vaccine producer, that would ensure delivery of specific vaccine within days of demand from the CVO. Dr van Aarle, (Intervet), presented a paper on this item (Appendix 18). He highlighted the fact that heptavalent (7 antigen) vaccines are used by some countries in the region; through using a antigen bank, several valencies could be potentially removed from the regular programs; in emergencies a monovalent vaccine could be rapidly made (5-10 days) for use in an emergency program. For most of the MENA countries, antigens banks could be a way to ensure they have access to vaccines for emergencies (exotic strains), when the antigen is not needed for the routine prevention (endemic strains). In addition, the formulation could be made specific to the problem, for example to make a high potency to counter a more antigenically divergent virus. He also illustrated the regulatory situation for FMD vaccines in Europe which was the most stringent in the world; together with the high purity this leads to a higher price, but also a more guaranteed result.

Item 5 - Diagnostic laboratory performance and standardisation This Item was Chaired by Dr al-Kuzaei (Bahrain). Dr Ferris, WRL presented two talks (Appendix 19 and Appendix 20) on the subject of harmonising the performance of FMD diagnostic laboratories. Since the OIE prescribed tests for international trade, harmonisation of serology had been important for many years since otherwise disputes between countries arose through lack of recognition of laboratory results.

69

Therefore FAO had supported the WRL to organise harmonisation studies (FAO Phase XIX, etc) , which involved sending panels of serum to participant laboratories to enable them to assess their own performance. This had become important in recent years for labs to reach or retain their accreditation (external quality assurance).

In the past year, FAO and the WRL had agreed to extend the harmonisation to virus diagnosis, in particular because many labs now wished to use RT-PCR methods and potentially there may be high variation between labs in their ability to detect FMD. This was a proven problem in the MENA region in 2005-6 since the new type A strains had lead to low reactions in the ELISA tests, therefore diagnostic methods also need to be tuned.

The result obtained in 2006 will be further discussed between FAO and the WRL; the possibility to extend the panel to assist countries wishing to harmonise tests for post-vaccination monitoring will be considered.

Overall, the results clearly show that labs vary in their methods and in their results for the same samples; this could lead to serious problems. Commercially available test kits tend to be well standardised, but for FMD these are few, and for NSP ELISA the kits vary significantly in their performance.

Discussion followed, which highlighted: - the interest of the CVOs in the region to have an inspection of their laboratories by an expert, to develop a action plan that would assist to progress towards international standards; - the issue of biosecurity, since very few national laboratories in the region are built to required OIE standards for FMD, and there is no separate category or derogation for laboratories in endemic countries to work under lower levels of biocontainment; - the possibility that the new diagnostic methods, which do not require live virus, have advantages by not requiring expensive biocontainment; - the interest of labs to participate, and the question of whether the CVO should be sent the results before or after the laboratory has had a chance to comment on their own performance.

Conclusions: 1- One of the major challenges facing vaccination against FMD is the prevalence of seven serotypes and more than 60 subtypes of FMDV which are quite distinct not enjoying common cross reactivity. Furthermore, frequent mutation adds to the complexity of vaccine selection in endemic regions.

2- It is essential to invest in research effort to develop vaccines which will provide wide protection against FMDV serotypes and subtypes and thereby reduce complexity and cost of regional FMD control through vaccination.

3- FMD vaccination is an essential tool in the control and eradication of FMD in the MENA region.

4- FMD vaccine producing countries in the region are few.

5- Joint efforts by the local, regional and international communities are needed to strengthen the existing vaccine production facilities to meet the demand of the region for quality vaccine meeting international standards.

6- Monitoring the circulating strains of FMDV (through reference labs) plays an essential role in the control of the disease through vaccination, and collected data should be analyzed in a regional reference centre, to improve of early warning and early control of the disease.

7- The recognition of the most prevalent serotypes in the region is very essential. Thus national epidemio-surveillance campaigns, financially and technically supported by the international community, are needed in all countries.

8- Since the information available on FMD is limited in some areas of the region, training of personnel involved in disease investigation and control should be strengthened.

9- A science based vaccination strategy is needed for the countries of the region.

10- Countries, supported by regional and international communities, need to develop and regularly update their national FMD contingency plans based on their FMD status.

11- Vaccine quality assurance is badly needed in the region, and establishment of a centre for undertaking independent trials on vaccines should be considered.

Recommendations: Considering that: 1. FMD remains a constant drain on the budget of veterinary services across the region, and that periodic devastating epidemics occur that spread rapidly across national and regional borders.

2. Live animal movement, through regulated trade or by illegal movement, from regions not free of FMD is a feature of livestock trading patterns in the region, and contributes to the risk of FMD entry, and can be expected to continue in the future.

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3. West Asia, and East Africa remain potential threats for countries in the eastern and central parts of the MENA region, and that virus submission to Reference Laboratories from these regions remains inadequate.

4. Lack of information exchange between countries and to the international organisations has contributed to the scale of the type A epidemics experienced in the region in 2005-6.

5. The lack of immediate vaccines against the A Iran 05 and A Egypt 06 viruses contributed to the scale of the outbreaks.

6. The new serotype A virus (A Iran 2005) has continued to spread in 2006, circulating in Turkey and I.R. of Iran, and which has been detected in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 2006.

7. That further spread of the A Iran 2005 and possibly A Egypt 2006 viruses to countries in the Near-East is likely to occur unless effective preventive measures are taken.

8. The location and risk from other exotic viruses, should be kept under review by each country, including the continuous circulation of Asia-1 in south and east Asia; 9. The Type O remains endemic in the Near-East.

10. The dynamic disease situation requires continuous monitoring, not least because of first detection of new strains in the centre of countries rather than at the borders, and because of rapid animal trade movements.

11. That FMD vaccines can rarely contain all the required antigens to protect against the diversity of viruses expected in the region, and that priorities for each species are needed to reduce cost.

12. That antigen banks are an option for countries to hold sufficient stocks of antigen for immediate formulation in emergency situations, and which can reduce the need to vaccinate against some virus types.

13. That no country in the region currently maintains an antigen bank, and that only a few countries in the region have developed and formalised their contingency planning against FMD; 14. That there have been serious delays in diagnosis of the new type A viruses because diagnostic tests were not optimised for the type A infections; 15. That there is a need to build confidence in laboratory capacity in the region for early detection of new strains, and for monitoring of vaccination programs and sero-surveillance; 16. That most MENA countries have a national reference laboratory for FMD, but that there is significant variation in capacity, in bio-safety, and in standardisation of FMD tests, leading to lack of confidence in laboratory results, which affects trade prospects; 17. Progress has been made in the validation of NSP (non-structural protein) antibody tests for the major species, but that many countries lack the experience in design of surveillance in potential export or FMD free zones, or following FMD outbreaks.

Recommends that: Relating to control of FMD in MENA region: 1. The whole of the Middle East and North Africa areas should be considered as one FMD epidemiological region, but with possible subregions reflecting different ecosystems for circulation of FMDV strains, requiring a set of co-coordinated prevention, control and eradication programs to be elaborated covering the entire region at risk; 2. Transparency in notification of FMD outbreaks should be strongly implemented within the region to assist an effective response and control of FMD; 3. FMD suspected samples to be sent to the international reference laboratories should be accompanied a comprehensive epidemiological report, including the geo-reference, to assist early warning and tracing the likely pattern of disease spread, 4. Coordinated action across borders and sanitary measures should be strengthened by imposing appropriate quarantine measures on animal movements whenever the disease is reported; 5. systematic vaccination campaigns of ruminants should be encouraged in all areas at risk, especially in border areas, that are designed to reach a population immunity that will effectively prevent FMD spread, using appropriate vaccines that meet international standards; Procurement of vaccines should consider the recent FMDV antigenic subtypes in the countries of the region as well as the antigenic relationships to the virus isolates circulating in neighboring countries; 6. A strategy to achieve international recognized disease free zones or FMD free country status must be developed in the region, within the framework of the progressive control of transboundary animal disease program (GF-TADs); 7. in support of the above, each country is encouraged to “map” their ruminant livestock population in the country, and consideration should be given to developing a standard format for livestock population mapping that is applicable across the region, and which will assist each country in planning disease control measures; 8. The countries of the region establish an FMDV network, co-coordinated by the Regional Animal Health Center (RAHC), to facilitate exchange of information and to respond rapidly to a emergence of any new serotype in the region; 9. Member Countries of the Middle East region are urged to develop, test and keep a regularly updated a national foot and mouth disease preparedness plan that will assist them to ensure a rapid and effective response to new epidemic events;.

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Relating to early warning of FMD risk in the MENA region: 1. The information flow to MENA countries on the change in FMD risk should be improved, with regular summaries of the situation and alerts with follow ups when major events occur that threaten parts of the region; 2. each country ensures that epidemiologically significant events are detected, acted upon and reported without delay; early recognition of these events can be helped by using DEFINITIONS of abnormal field and laboratory findings, such as increased incidence of FMD, the detection of a new subtype, or possible breakthrough of FMD in well vaccinated herds; 3. when threatening events of regional significance are identified, emergency meetings be rapidly convened by the RSC to assess the risk and necessary international response; 4. the Regional Steering Committee of GF-TADS organise regular roundtable meetings on FMD prevention and control, at least at yearly basis; 5. each country re-assesses the risk of entry of the prevalent epidemic viruses in the region, including the A Iran 05 virus type, and takes appropriate actions, including vaccination, to reduce risk of introduction and spread; 6. increased effort to collect and submit samples for virus typing is made by countries which have an epidemiological importance in the region, particularly Iran (as indicator for west Asia), Yemen (as an indicator for the Horn of Africa), and Sudan . For the Maghreb countries (North Africa), increased effort is mainly needed in the West African countries to the south of this region.

International support from the FAO and/or OIE should be requested to reduce the cost of submission of samples that are of regional importance.

Relating to improved control of epidemic FMD: 7. That each country develops and formalises a contingency plan for FMD that addresses the particular problem of entry of an exotic type of FMD virus to which the regular vaccination programs do not protect (see no. 11 above); 8. that each importing country that imports live animals from countries not free of FMD has in place a contingency plan to address the risk of virus entry from that region, that will assist to build confidence in animal trade with such countries and reduce restrictions, in full compliance with the OIE Animal Health Code; 9. that each country considers establishing a national antigen bank to ensure rapid availability of potent FMD vaccines for use in emergencies.

Relating to priorities for inclusion in vaccination programs and in antigen banks: 10. each country re-examines its selection of FMD vaccines to ensure that the purchased vaccines meet or exceed OIE standards and the antigens are appropriate to the international risk situation; 11. that the WRL, through the OIE and FAO, is requested to produce a list of priority antigens for inclusion in vaccination schedules in the MENA countries on a regular basis; the list should be reviewed by the RSC or a task force nominated by this group, before being made publicly available; 12. that the recommendations of the WRL to the 3rd Roundtable are noted by MENA countries, who should be aware of the elevated importance of A22 Iraq antigen (to protect against A Iran 05), and A Eritrea 98 (to protect against the A Egypt 06); 13. that efforts be made to address gaps in knowledge of vaccines to be used against the circulating virus types in parts of sub-Saharan Africa which provide a source of exotic FMD viruses to the MENA countries; the international organisations should provide support if the countries themselves are unable to do so; 14. that the RSC or a nominated task force develops guidance on the subjects a. harmonisation of vaccination in the MENA region to ensure coverage against the most prevalent (priority) viruses; b. vaccination of small ruminants; Relating to improving laboratory capacity and harmonisation of FMD laboratory test performance in the region: 15. that member countries ensure that their national laboratories re-assess their methods and reagents to ensure that diagnostic tests are appropriate for detection of the current A (including A Iran 05, A Egypt 06), O, Asia-1 and SAT types expected in the MENA region; 16. that NRLs in the MENA region be encouraged by their national authorities to participate in the international FMD laboratory standardisation exercises organised by FAO through the WRL at Pirbright; 17. that participants in the Roundtable encourage or organise assessment missions to their NRLs for evaluation, and which will guide the potential establishment of a regional reference laboratory (RRL); 18. the RSC develop guidelines for biosecurity of laboratories that will assist compliance with OIE and are feasible throughout the region;

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Relating to epidemiological support for planning of FMD preventive and control measures: 19. that the RSC establish an epidemiology advisory group to assist in response to request from countries for technical support, for example a. in the design of surveillance programs for establishment of export zones in the MENA region b. in the design of sero-monitoring programs post-vaccination 20. that the RSC consider nominating one or more centres of expertise in the region to promote the application of modern epidemiological tools and methods to improve planning of FMD control measures; one such centre could be in Iran, making use of epidemiological capacity of the Iranian Veterinary Organisation and the support received from the FAO/EC and another one elsewhere in the MENA region, with the help of the international organisations.

Location and date of next meeting: An offer was received from Jordan to host the next meeting; in approximately one year (November 2007).

Item 6 - Endorsement of the Draft Report The draft report was read and endorsed by the participants and their comments noted by the rapporteurs. It was agreed that the comments would be incorporated and draft circulated within 10 days of the close of the meeting.

Closure of the Meeting Dr Khoury presided over the closure of the meeting, and Dr Yehia and Dr Sumption made short statements in closure. Dr Yehia thanked all the participants for their inputs which had lead to a successful meeting, and the sponsors of the lunches and evening events. He thanked the support staff of the OIE regional representation and of the FAO Headquarters for assistance.

A special vote of thanks was made to Dr Khoury and to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian reform for the wonderful hospitality and excellent local arrangements.

Following the closure, Dr Zakharov (FGI-ARRIAH) made a presentation on their work on FMD vaccine production and recent results on vaccine potency (Appendix 21).

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Appendix 11

Current situation of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in the Middle East Perspectives and risks linked to animal movement Prepared by: OIE Regional representation for the Middle East – 28 march 2007

Summary FMD is endemic and widely spread among various animal species in the Middle East, but periodic devastating epidemics occur that spread rapidly across national and regional borders. In 2005 and 2006, the region has been severely affected by two separate type A epidemics: one which emerged in Iran, moved westwards into Turkey (including the European part of Thrace) and which has been detected in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and an incursion of an African type A virus into Egypt causing widespread outbreaks in 2006.

Livestock products contribute significantly to the diets of both the rural and fast-growing urban populations of the Middle East. However, these relatively high levels of consumption are supported by import of animals and their meat from abroad. Of particular note here is the substantial import of small ruminants for the major Muslim festivals (Hajj, Ramadan and Eids).

Livestock trade in the region is driven by demand from the Gulf States, which collectively imported near 80 % of the recorded 13.2 million live sheep, goats and cattle imported in 2005 in the region.

On various occasions over the past decade, diseases, such like FMD, have spread from the Greater Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and from there into the Mediterranean Basin. And, since the early sixties, whenever there was an outbreak of FMD in the Middle East, high concern was always expressed that the disease might invade Europe.

The proximity and importance of trade with countries in the Horn of Africa and in west and central Asia, has the potential to introduce exotic FMD viruses from these regions.

Much of the Middle East region is arid or semi arid, which drastically limits the potential availability of natural pasture. A wide range of traditional management systems have evolved to optimise the use of the grazing that is available. Many rely on movement – either nomadic pastoralism or seasonal transhumance – to winter and summer pastures, or less regular movements to reach the unpredictable patches of grazing characteristic of very low rainfall areas.

Such fluidity has significant consequences for the spread of animal diseases, notably FMD. This situation is all the more worrying as most countries have not the capacities to implement a coherent and reasoned strategy of prevention and anticipation face to such disease.

Indeed, regarding absence in most countries of biosecurity measures, involving strict border control, early detection program for new strains, confidence in analyses realised by the national labs, epidemiological survey, vaccination monitoring, contingency plans are as many factors promoting the spread of the disease, notably the epidemic form.

Unfortunately, due to the importing capacity of the Middle East, the region was left behind the major international animal health programs that were elaborated for the control of major transboundary animal diseases including FMD. Countries of the Middle East were individually involved in different programs of other regions which led to more mistreatment of the region as a unique and integrated epidemiological block.

Thus, to control FMD worldwide, the situation of this disease in Middle Eastern countries should be treated as a priority.

So, the implementation of a regional project to control FMD in the Middle East is essential.

This was highlighted during the 3rd Roundtable Meeting on FMD control in the Middle East and North Africa, Damascus, Syria, November 6-7th 2006, where one of the major recommendation made is to implement such project within the OIE/FAO global framework of the progressive control of transboundary animal disease program (GF-TADs) and co-coordinated by the Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) established to provide expertise and assistance especially in major emergency cases in the region.

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REPORT The Middle East region is acting as a mixing vessel to animals from different sources in the world. As an important importing region, the Middle East receives animals and animal products from different parts of the world and mostly from regions where FMD is endemic. The ineffective infrastructure of the veterinary quarantine bodies and the lack of appropriate diagnostic capabilities always lead to the absence of any early warning system. The number of under-trained veterinary personnel compared with the professional veterinarians in-charge of disease surveillance and monitoring of animal diseases especially FMD makes it difficult to achieve proper control of the disease.

The lack of information exchange among countries of the regions and the uncontrolled importation of veterinary biologicals and vaccines as well as the absence of proper quality control add to the risk factors of more introduction of the disease to the region and more threat to the neighboring ones.

As an air-borne disease, the potential of the spread of the disease to adjacent regions is increasingly considered considering the geographical location of the Middle East and the increasing traffic and transportation of people and goods to and from the region. The ports of the Middle East and escalating volume of shipments and transit sector are other indirect and unforeseen threats.

Unfortunately, due to the importing capacity of the Middle East, the region was left behind the major international animal health programs that were elaborated for the control of major transboundary animal diseases including FMD. Countries of the Middle East were individually involved in different programs of other regions which led to more mistreatment of the region as a unique and integrated epidemiological block.

The last epidemics of FMD in Europe suggest that the disease may take a sudden and a strong comeback in any region. The effective control or eradication of the disease cannot be achieved with isolated country efforts, especially in those having common borders with several countries and in which veterinary practices differ. Concreted efforts of countries in the region are, therefore, required to curb such an important disease. This stems from the fact that the spread of this disease in the region negatively affects the Inter-Arab agricultural trade because of the stringent measures enforced by several countries. The situation becomes more critical after the recent establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the necessity of implementation of the guidelines and standards of the OIE. 1. Summary of the Foot and Mouth Disease in the Middle East 1.1 Current situation FMD remains a significant drain on the budgets of the national veterinary services of the Middle East countries and on the livelihoods of livestock owners across the region. As from a national point of view, where control measures are rigorously applied, the disease involves heavy expenditure on diagnostic services, campaign of vaccination, stamping out policy, quarantine and carcass disposal measures.

The disease is endemic, but periodic devastating epidemics occur that spread rapidly across national and regional borders.

FMD continues to limit the development of dairy industry in most of the Middle East countries, causing economic losses through decrease of milk and beef cattle production, and high mortality in young ruminants.

Although not quantified, the incidence and importance of FMD in small ruminants in the region is on the rise. Indirectly, FMD may be a predisposing factor to other microbial and/or nutritional diseases that lead to economic losses in these species.

In 2005 and 2006, the Middle East has been severely affected by two separate type A epidemics, one which emerged in Iran (A Iran 05) in 2005- 2006, and an incursion of an African type A virus into Egypt causing widespread outbreaks in January-July 2006 (map n°1).

The new serotype A virus (A Iran 2005) was first observed in Iran and moved westwards into Turkey (including the European part of Thrace). It has continued to spread in 2006, circulating in Turkey and Iran, and which has been detected in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

In Turkey and Iran, the type A vaccines in routine use did not prevent the new strain from spreading.

Phlylogenetic analyses revealed that the strain A Iran 2005 isolates from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia formed a single genetic lineage distinct from previous virus strains present in the region, including A-Iran-96 and A-Iran-99. Vaccine matching tests revealed this new lineage to be antigenically more like A22.

The type A which affected Egypt, was diagnosed in 8 governorates in this country. Genetically, this new serotype A differs considerably from the Middle Eastern viruses and was closely related to FMD viruses

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from East Africa. Antigenically, a vaccine incorporating A-Eritrea-98 would be expected to afford protection.

The lack of immediate vaccines against the A Iran 05 and A Egypt 06 viruses contributed to the large scale of the outbreaks.

In both of these events, the virus behaved essentially as if it were entering a naïve population with no immunity, and in both Turkey and Egypt, within 2 or 3 months of the index case, had spread almost of the extent of the cattle distribution.

In both case, the majority of geographical spread within the countries had occurred before notification of the index case to the OIE. Type O remains endemic, but the risk of Asia-1 appears diminished with the last reported occurrence in Iran in August 2005. SAT viruses have not been reported in the region since 2003 (SAT-1 in Libya), but serological evidence of SAT infection in Sudan was presented.

Almost all countries operate vaccination programs in large ruminants, some in all ruminant species.

These vaccination programs utilise vaccines from a wide variety of sources, including producers based within the region and international suppliers from Europe and India. The lack of standardisation may be a factor affecting control.

Map n°1: recent spread of Iran 05 and A serotypes to the region

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The table below summarize the FMD situation in the Middle Eastern countries, according to countries reports presented at the 3rd Roundtable Meeting on FMD control in the Middle East and North Africa, Damascus, Syria, November 6-7th 2006.

Country

Bahreïn

Cyprus

Djibouti

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

Statut

+

1964

2001

+

+

+

1999

Type

O

-

-

A

A, O, Asia 1

A, O

-

Country

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Oman

Palestinian Territories

Qatar

Saoudi Arabia

Statut

+

+

2003

+

+

+

+

Type

O

O

-

O

O

O

A, O

Country

Sudan

Syria

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

Yemen

Statut

2005 (?)

2002

+

+

+

Type

-

-

A, O, Asia 1

O

O

+ : presence;

- : not detected;

1994 : last outbreak occurrence.

1.2 FMD hazards identified in the Region The major routes of the FMD infection in the region are:

•

From outside the Middle East Region:

The Middle East is surrounded by some other FMD infected areas such as Caucasian countries, Eastern and Western Africa and South Asia. The region is an important livestock import market without effective pre-import and quarantine measures. The second reason is the uncontrolled movement of animals across borders.

The spread of FMD strains exotic to the Middle East Region has been identified:

•

East Africa.

Asian strains.

South America due to imports.

Other regions due to means of transportation and trade routes passing through the Middle east due to its geographic location at the cross-roads of the old world.

From inside the Middle East Region:

Movement of animals within the Region is mainly governed by the characteristics of the animal population. The Middle East Region is characterized by the quasi-absence of pigs and the importance of small ruminants (443 million vs. 137 million cattle and buffaloes). The agro-pastoral system is predominant, which implies much livestock movement due to transhumance, drought or attraction of markets. Religious festivals and Islamic charity are also favoring livestock movement.

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2. Livestock population in the Middle Eastern countries Many countries in the Middle East have huge ruminant livestock resources, providing livelihood and employment to a high proportion of their populations and earn valuable foreign exchanger to the nation.

The Middle Eastern countries have considerable animal populations. The livestock sector, in particular sheep and goats, plays an important role in the national economy of the Region countries. The percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) generated from agriculture in the high-income countries of the Region varies from 1 to 4 percent and in the low-income countries varies from 23 to 55 percent2.

The table below reports the animal population in the Middle Eastern countries sensible to FMD, in 2006, according to countries reports presented at the 3rd Roundtable Meeting on FMD control in the Middle East and North Africa.

Country

Cattles

Sheeps

Goats

Camels

Buffaloes

Bahrain

16 450

27 800

17 500

2 200

/

Djibouti

55 000

400 000

550 000

30 000

/

Egypt

2 531 200

2 602 650

1 329 500

149 500

2 234 000

Jordan

59 750

1 933 400

461 400

19 000

/

300 000

1 300 000

6 300 000

800 000

/

Kuwait

14 000

1 000 000

100 000

100 000

/

Lebanon

85 000

350 000

450 000

/

/

230 640

233 000

882 600

104 700

/

Palestinian Authorities

11 200

540 000

248 500

/

/

Qatar

14 800

214 530

178 500

50 800

/

Sudan

33 103 000

39 835 000

36 087 000

2 936 000

/

Syria

930 000

13 800 000

1 100 000

8 800

1 300

68 900

450 000

120 000

200 000

/

1 400 500

5 029 000

4 452 500

198 500

/

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Oman

United Arab Emirates Yemen

The study of country declaration on their national livestock population3 shows stability from the last 5 years, and this tendency could be extrapolated for the next 5 years.

3. Livestock movement in the Middle Eastern countries Most countries do not have an appropriate system to collect, analyse and notify statistical data on livestock and agricultural in general. Information on livestock available resources is often not complete or reliable.

3.1 Import and export 2

FAO (2003) Livestock Dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula. A Regional Review of National Livestock Resources and International Livestock Trade. David Bourn, Environmental Research Group Oxford, United Kingdom, consultant, January 2003, Rome. http://ergodd.zoo.ox.ac.uk/download/index.htm 3

OIE, World Animal Health situation in 2000 – 2001 – 2002, OIE publications : Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan; Syria

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Livestock products contribute significantly to the diets of both the rural and fast-growing urban populations. However, these relatively high levels of consumption are supported by import of animals and their meat from abroad. Of particular note here is the substantial import of small ruminants for the major Muslim festivals (Hajj, Ramadan and Eids).

Many millions of live ruminants are imported into the Middle Eastern countries each year from around the world, including especially greater Horn of Africa countries, East Asia, Iran, Turkey, Europe, South America, Australia, and New Zealand (Map n° 2). On various occasions over the past decade, diseases, such like FMD, have spread from the Greater Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and from there into the Mediterranean Basin.

Livestock trade in the region is driven by demand from the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE), which collectively imported near 80 % of the recorded 13.2 million live sheep, goats and cattle imported in 2005 in the region.

The table below reports the livestock imports (cattle, sheep, and goats) in 2005 in the Middle Eastern countries4.

Country

Cattles

Sheeps

Goats

Bahrain

748

98 258

6 510

Djibouti

No data

No data

450

Egypt

18 571

2 294

No data

Jordan

20 886

571 551

100 760

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

26 998

6 042 607

502 038

4 908

1 898 399

32 455

203 531

64 428

3 182

Libya

2 013

10 592

25

Oman

39

395 638

160 180

9 411

No data

No data

Qatar

829

559 546

45 334

Sudan

2

No data

No data

Syria

8 230

34 907

No data

United Arab Emirates

3 518

522 540

516 714

Yemen

172 354

7 467

1 164 117

Total

472 038

10 208 227

2 531 765

Kuwait Lebanon

Palestinian Authorities

For all countries and species, imports far exceed exports, except for sheep exports from Syria (2 821 145 in 2005) and Sudan (1 147 028 in 2005), and there is, therefore, a major net inflow of livestock into the region.

In 2005, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was by far the largest importer of live animals, with 6.04 million sheep and 500 000 goats. Kuwait was the next largest sheep importer, followed by Jordan, Oman, UAE, Qatar and Bahrain.

Sudan (122 000) and Oman (103 385) were the main exporter of live goats with 855,000 recorded exports in 2005.

4

source FAOSTAT : http://faostat.fao.org

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More and more the supply from free FMD countries, notably for the Arabic Peninsula countries needs, is difficult linked to the cost of animals and transport (Australia, South America) and to the incapacity to those countries to respond to such a demand.

Thus, the importation flow involve the African Horn countries (Somalia, Sudan), where FMD is uncontrolled but where the production is sufficient with a competitive cost. Turkey and Iran represent also a significant source of sheep and goats for Middle Eastern countries.

Omniscient of the risk of such trade, the Arabic Peninsula countries, wish to collaborate with the African Horn countries to implement the security of such trade, notably with the building of Pre Export Quarantine Station and upon sanitary certification elaborated in the respect of the OIE’s recommendations.

Map n° 2: International trade in animals and animal products with the Middle East

3.2 Livestock movement involved by specific production systems The Middle East has long been a focus of attention for animal health professionals because it supports very large numbers of ruminant livestock – especially sheep. Much of the region is arid or semi arid, which drastically limits the potential availability of natural pasture. Much of the area cannot support grazing for large parts of the year – because it is too dry, too cold, or is covered in deep snow.

In an area that has been settled for longer than most other parts of the world, it is to be expected that a wide range of traditional management systems have evolved to optimise the use of the grazing that is available. Many rely on movement – either nomadic pastoralism or seasonal transhumance – to winter and summer pastures, or less regular movements to reach the unpredictable patches of grazing characteristic of very low rainfall areas. Though these are slowly giving way to more intensive husbandry techniques that rely on supplementary or stall feeding, opportunism is still a widely practiced strategy.

The Middle East thus supports an unusually mobile livestock population (map n° 3), in areas with particularly variable grazing distribution patterns. Add to this the fact that there is a very large volume of international trading, driven to a great extent by the demand for small ruminant meat from the Gulf States, and from the pilgrims to the annual religious season in Mecca. This draws animals from all the Middle Eastern states, many getting there by foot rather than mechanised transport.

Such fluidity has significant consequences for the spread of animal diseases, both infectious and vector borne. Though rather poorly understood, at least in quantitative terms, it is widely assumed

80

that such pronounced mobility magnifies the risk of an outbreak spreading extensively over large areas.

The fact that the animal populations are densely concentrated in rather limited areas, and often to smaller areas of suitable grazing for parts of the year, or kept in stalls and feedlots for considerable periods, is likely to exacerbate the potential for disease transmission. There is thus a real possibility of, for example, Foot and Mouth Disease originating in Pakistan reaching the Gulf and Turkey in a relatively short period. The potential threat to the highly developed European agricultural industries should not be ignored5.

This is highlighted by geographical studies on livestock movement in the region, which establish links between Europe and South Asia threw the “Eurasian Ruminant Street” involving Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, and where Iran take up a central position6.

Indirect movement Intercountries movement Map n° 3: inter-country movement of animals especially small ruminants

5

FAO (2003) Ruminants, seasons and grazing in the Middle East. William Wint, Environmental Research Group Oxford, United Kingdom, consultant, mars 2003, Rome. http://ergodd.zoo.ox.ac.uk/download/index.htm 6 Jan Slingenbergh, 2003, Clarifying diseases spread in the Eurasian Ruminant Street, Report of the 35th Session of EUFMD, Rome, App.10

81

4. Actual surveillance and control of FMD disease in the Middle Eastern countries These critical points have been highlighted during the 3rd Roundtable Meeting on FMD control in the Middle East and North Africa: • • •

• • • •

• •

• •

• •

most countries have limited capacities in the early detection of new strains; the lack of information exchange between countries and to the international organisations has contributed to the scale of the type A epidemics experienced in the region in 2005-6; the monitoring of the circulating strains of FMDV, through reference labs, is inefficient. In 20052006, the lack of sample submission to reference labs had contributed to lack of early warning and contingency planning for virus type to which type A vaccination programmes were not adapted; only a few countries in the region have developed and formalised their contingency planning against FMD; with few exceptions, vaccination strategy is either poorly planned or entirely lacking in most of countries; most of the vaccine serotypes used in the region are not matching with the local serotypes; live animals and animal products are largely imported from regions and countries that have been practicing vaccination against the disease, within the entire country or parts of it or FMD free with vaccination with no previous assessment of the vaccination programs in the exporting countries and/or their national surveillance plans; no country in the region currently maintains an antigen bank; the diagnosis facilities for FMD are not well developed, thus, in 2005-2006, there have been serious delays in diagnosis of the new type A viruses because diagnostic tests were not optimised for the type A infections; there is a need to build confidence in laboratory capacity in the region for early detection of new strains, and for monitoring of vaccination programs and sero-surveillance; most Middle Eastern countries have a national reference laboratory for FMD, but that there is significant variation in capacity, in bio-safety, and in standardisation of FMD tests, leading to lack of confidence in laboratory results, which affects trade prospects; many countries lack the experience in design of surveillance in potential export or FMD free zones, or following FMD outbreaks; some countries, which are not meat exporter, don’t identify FMD control as a priority for their own country or don’t have sufficient and effective resources to be involved in such control.

5. Short term perspectives and risk transmission to neighbouring regions The new serotype A virus (A Iran 2005) has continued to spread in 2006, circulating in Turkey and Iran.

The Egyptian new serotype A still affects this country, representing a threat for the neighbouring countries.

The detection of the A-Iran-05 in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 2006 produces the proof.

Further spread of the A- Iran- 2005 and possibly A- Egypt- 2006 viruses to countries in the Near-East is likely to occur unless effective preventive measures are taken and so their uncontrolled spread represents a high risk of transmission to neighbouring countries.

The presence of the A-Iran-2005 in Thrace, at the borders from Greece and Bulgaria, is also an important threat of virus introduction into the European Union countries.

In the past, exotic strains of FMD virus were involved in panzootics, covering large areas in the region, extending as far as the frontiers of Europe. Such panzootics included outbreaks of FMDV types Asia 1 (1957-1964, 2000), SAT 1 (1962-1964), and A22 (1964-1965, 1996). The recurrence of such situations is not a remote possibility, due mainly to the continuous influx of live sheep for slaughter, principally into the Arabian Peninsula. Animals from Africa and Asia can readily introduce strains of FMDV which then spread among the local ruminants, particularly nomadic sheep and goats. These animals may then further disseminate the virus into large-scale, commercial dairy farms.

Serotype SAT 2 was introduced into Saudi Arabia as recently as 2000, later appearing in Kuwait (2001) and Libya (2003). It appears that the recent spread tracks are similar to those described in the past; namely, that FMDV was probably introduced into the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa, and then spread from the Gulf States in a north-westerly direction.

Then, the Middle East region is much more complex than other regions, regarding its geographical location, at the crossing of three continents, and due to the specificity on animal trade.

The Middle East has also become the largest importer of food and animal feed in the developing world, due to a rapidly growing population. Imports, principally of live sheep (an annual figure of more than 10

82

million, almost 64 % of the global trade in live sheep) and animal products, now account for more than 25 % of the total import bill for the region.

Special events or occasions, such as the Hajj season, may involve the ritual slaughter of millions of animals. The meat of all those animals slaughtered during the day of Hajj is also distributed charity wise to 52 Muslim countries worldwide. This could be also an important source of contagion, considering that the conditions of slaughter and meat conservation are not often offering all the guarantees regarding FMD virus.

The proximity and importance of trade with countries in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan notably), and in west and central Asia, has the potential to introduce exotic FMD viruses from these regions.

In Africa, the epidemiological information is scarce and insufficient samples are received each year to determine major trends, although types A, O and SAT 1, 2 and 3 have been detected from outbreaks in 2006. In Asia, the circulation of several genetic types of FMDV serotype Asia-1 is a concern, highlighting the fact that at any time multiple virus strains are simultaneously circulating, and which may be a risk to the Middle East where vaccine against Asia-1 is not used in all countries.

As a large part of the trade is realised in illegal ways or without the relevant sanitary certification, the control of the virus spread at a national or regional level is excessively problematic.

This situation is all the more worrying as most countries have not the capacities to implement a coherent and reasoned strategy of prevention and anticipation face to such disease.

Indeed, regarding absence in most countries of biosecurity measures, including strict border control, early detection program for new strains, confidence in analyses realised by the national labs, epidemiological survey, vaccination monitoring, contingency plans….are as many factors promoting the spread of the disease, notably the epidemic form.

6. Conclusion FMD is an endemic and widely spread among various animal species in the region. It is, therefore, very difficult to control the disease at a single country level.

The increase of animal movement between neighboring countries in the region, where FMD is uncontrolled, makes the disease control even more difficult.

The presence of different strains and variants of the FMD virus in different countries makes the correct diagnosis and development of specific vaccines a crucial task.

FMD in the Region is perceived differently according to the type of farming system. In the intensified livestock sector (modern dairy cattle farms), the economic consequences are important. Farmers who are interested in extending their market face sanitary barriers either under informal intra-regional trade restriction or under the WTO and SPS Agreement. For the farmers from the traditional sector, FMD infection is often mild with a low mortality rate and consequences are perceived only when a new strain is involved. This the actual trend on handling the disease issue in the region.

As a consequence, the control of external and internal sources of FMD is not systematically addressed in the Region. At the national and regional levels, systems for early detection of the disease or of the emergence of new strains are needed. Furthermore, implementation of adapted control strategies has to be strengthened.

Since the early sixties, whenever there was an outbreak of FMD in the Middle East, high concern was always expressed that the disease might invade Europe.

Thus, to control FMD worldwide, the situation of this disease in Middle Eastern countries should be treated as a priority.

So, the implementation of a regional project to control FMD in the Middle East is essential. It is also political wise to increase the scientific and technical cooperation with the region during this very important political transition which will have a very positive impact relevant to the historical and long term relationships with the people of these significantly important countries.

83

This was highlighted during the 3rd Roundtable Meeting on FMD control in the Middle East and North Africa, Damascus, Syria, November 6-7th 2006, where one of the major recommendation made is to implement such project within the OIE/FAO global framework of the progressive control of transboundary animal disease program (GF-TADs) and co-coordinated by the Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) established to provide expertise and assistance especially in major emergency cases in the region.

84

Appendix 12

COUNTRY REPORT OF TURKEY FOR FMD A. Naci BULUT, VMD

1. OUTBREAK SITUATION 1.1. FMD situation between 2005-2007 in Turkey The disease is endemic in Anatolia Region, Two serotypes; O1 Manisa and A type have been circulating in Anatolia Region. Outbreaks due to type Asia 1 has not been reported since April 2002 in Turkey.

In 2005 majority of outbreaks were occurred with type O1 Manisa until a new A type was introduced to country on November; a total of 122 FMD outbreaks have been detected, 102 due to type O and 20 due to type A (Figure.1) Type A outbreaks have not been detected in Turkey between June 2005 and November 2005. Following the determination of one outbreak due to type A in the Eastern province of Elazıg in November and occurred 13 further outbreaks in December. According to epidemiological study results, index case was detected in Igdır province, located on Turkey and Iran border, one month earlier than Elazıg outbreak. Laboratory analysis of these viruses showed that this type A viruses were genetically quite distant from both A Iran 96 and A Iran 99 virus topotypes, both of which have been circulating in Turkey recently. The sequence data which was obtained in Ankara Sap Institute was sent to WRL Pirbright Laboratory and these viruses were closely matched with viruses isolated in Iran in 2005.

TYPE O

DECEMBER

NOVEMBER

OCTOBER

SEPTEMBER

AUGUST

JULY

JUNE

MAY

APRIL

MARCH

FEBRUARY

TYPE A

JANUARY

18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Fig.1. Distribution of the 2005 outbreaks in Turkey

The viruses which were isolated from Iran were antigenically matched with A 22 Iraq vaccine strain. The antigenic relationship of these viruses with A Iran 96 and A Iran 99 vaccine strains were very weak.

These findings of Pirbright Laboratory were confirmed in Sap Institute as well and A 22 Mahmatlı vaccine strain was determined as the best vaccine strain against these new viruses.

After the introducing of type A05 Iran strain to Turkey, the disease was spread all the regions and showed its effects enormously on livestock. Since vaccine unavailability and animal movements occurred during the Kurban Festival, numbers of outbreaks were reached on pick on February 2006.

Fortunately, new vaccine was delivered and implemented starting on February which was resulted the disease was taken slightly under control. However given seasonal effects, melting snow and animal movements to grazing area, the second big pick was observed during the spring time. Since the outbreaks were taken under control by effective control measures including increased field immunity level, numbers of outbreaks were decreased starting to summer and finally end of the year a few outbreak was recorded with type A 05 Iran.

However, a new type O strain, O pan-Asia, was introduced to Turkey on October while number of type A outbreaks were seen declining (more detailed information below on 1.2. subtitle) The disease has not been seen in Thrace Region between on June 2001-February 2006. Beginning of February, the disease occurred in this region. The isolated viruses from Thrace region were also sequenced and found to be same as new viruses isolated from Anatolia recently. Consequently, total of 16 type A05 Iran outbreaks were occurred in Thrace region in 2006. Last FMD outbreak in 2006 was occurred in Silivri district of Istanbul province, Thrace Region on 03.07.2006.

In 2006, a total of 827 FMD outbreaks have been reported, 48 due to type O; 769 due to type A (fig.2).

85

DISRIBUTION OF 2006 OUTBREAKS

161

150

140 TYPE A (769)

110

20 2

14 3

24 10 December

1

September

2

July

June

1

May

3

April

February

March

5

October

33

27

7

November

54

50

50 0

TYPE O (48)

79

71

August

100

January

NUMBER OF OUTBREAK

200

MONTHS

Figu re.2. Distribution of FMD outbreaks in 2006 1.2. CURRENT FMD OUTBREAK SITUATION Turkey has been under the high risk with circulating a severe virulent new O subtype, O Pan-Asia strain because of occurrence uncontrolled animal movements from outside and within the country.

Epidemiological investigation and molecular epidemiologic studies were indicated that O Pan-Asia substrain has been introduced to Turkey up to October 2006, beside existed domestic strains O Manisa/ O Alfa 05 topotype, which were caused a few outbreaks before the October 2006. It has been recently recorded outbreaks mostly with type O, a total of 366 outbreaks were detected, 203 of by type O, 23 of by type and 140 of untyped respectively in 2007 (up to Macrh) (Table.1and fig.3).

OUTBREAKS Month Type O

A

UNTYPED

TOTAL

SUSCEPTIBLE

CASES

DEATH

October 06

2

20

November 06

3

14

December 06

24

10

122

17

37

176

156989

4563

1383

February 07

63

6

44

113

80945

2036

453

March 07

18

0

59

77

66056

2169

752

232

67

140

439

303990

8768

2502

January 07

Total

Table 1. Distribution of recent FMD outbreaks

86

CURRENT FMD OUTBREAK SITUATION (OCTOBER 2006-MARCH 2007

140

122

100 80 60

63

40

44

37

O

A

59

6 March

November

October

17 February

14 3

2

0

24 10 January

20

20

December

NUMBER OF OUTBREAKS

120

MONTH

18 0

UNTYPED

Fig.3. Recent outbreaks situation Although it was recorded 48 outbreaks with type O in 2006 and those isolates were dropped in O Alfa 05 lineage genetically, the numbers of type O outbreaks were increased at beginning of October 2006.

Because of the effects of animals movements during the Kurban Festival (end of the year), viruses were spread all over the country and numbers of outbreaks were reached on pick on January 2007. According to genetic analysis of isolates, a new type O pan-Asia sub strain was detected first time at Selvioglu village in Uşak on 8th October 2006. The sequence data which was obtained in Ankara Sap Institute showed that this virus was closely matched with viruses isolated in Iran in 2006. It is uncertain that whether this was index case or not for the new sub strain Since Uşak province is located west of Turkey, in Aegean Region, it was probable that it might be occurred another case in East Region of Anatolia, close to Iran border. . It is probable that the disease with type O Panasia sub strain was occurred in another place where is near to border after the entrance into the country. However it is clear that this was available first evidence indicated genetic changing of circulating viruses. Many further sequence data which was made in Ankara Sap Institute on between October 2006 and March 2007 also supported that O pan-Asia strain was circulated all over the country. Those studies were indicated that the isolates were not only closed to Iran isolates but also they were closed to isolates of Middle East Region, particularly of Jordan. The recent data made on March showed that isolates collected from Şırnak Province in South East Region of Turkey, near to Iraq/Syria border were closed to these lineages.

(Table.2 and Dendograms as annex).

PROT.NO PROVINCE

YEAR

MONTH

TYPE

GENOTYPE

TOPOTYPE

6

Edirne

2007

January

A

A05

ASIA

5

Erzincan

2007

January

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

13

Muğla

2007

January

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

15

Tokat

2007

January

A

A05

ASIA

83

Konya

2007

January

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

120

Konya

2007

January

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

207

Kastamonu

2007

January

A

A05

ASIA

285

Şırnak

2007

February

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

324

Bolu

2007

February

A

A05

ASIA

357

Kırklareli

2007

February

O

PANASIA

ME-SA

370

Isparta

2007

February

A

A05

ASIA

Table.2. Results of nucleotide sequence analysis

In addition to those situations, some other sequence results indicated that O Alfa 05 sub strain has been also still circulated in Anatolia which was similar to isolates caused outbreaks in 2005.

Although it was detected genetically differences of O virus as Panasia and affected severe clinically on animals, recent available antigenic studies, R Value ELISA, show that there has been no changing antigenically, which O1 Manisa vaccine strain has been covered both sub strains. The data for type A 05 Iran outbreaks which detected as limited number in 2007 show that it has been closed to their genetic lineages and given high protection well antigenically ( table 2 and Dendogram.2.)

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As a conclusion, it has been already type O Pan-Asia sub strain was introduced to Turkey from two different origins and caused many outbreaks all over the country which is genetically quite distant from old isolates and no differences antigenically, which is protected with O Manisa vaccine strain.

1.3. 2007 Outbreaks in Thrace In 2007, three outbreaks has been detected in Trace Region, because of uncontrolled animal movements after the Kurban Festival. The detail for those are as follow:

a. Oğulpaşa, Havsa Edirne Outbreak was occurred with type A05 Iran in two premises in 3rd January. Disease was caused by returning unsold cattle from Istanbul Bayrampaşa impermanent market. As a total 11 animals were affected by disease in two holdings and they were slaughtered after laboratory confirmation. Disease was limited within the holdings, no spread to around, by taken efficient measures including ring vaccination within and around the villages b. Armağan, Kırklareli Disease was noticed by owner in 22th February in one dairy cattle, but it was reported to state veterinary centre with delaying four day. In a result of clinical diagnosis, 9 animals were detected as FMD. This result was also confirmed by Laboratory as type O After the confirmation, all animals were slaughtered. Although it was carried out outbreak investigation, the origin of transmission was unclear.

It was carried out epidemiological investigation and taken efficient measures including ring vaccination.

The NSP survey in village was indicated that there was no spread the disease around the diseased farm. c. Evreşe, Gelibolu, Çanakkale Disease was occurred in same farm where outbreak detected previously on June 2006 and also the cause was similar with it. Officially unregistered (in that place) farmer transferred animals from Sakarya province in Anatolia to his farm in Evreşe. Unless movement certificate to Evreşe, (for another place in Anatolia), he transferred the animals his land in Evreşe. Since the animals were contacted with the virus before (according to investigation evidence), they were catch the disease by arriving Evreşe village on 30th March. At the beginning the outbreak, 8 animals were affected in this farm, but later on virus was spread to another two neighboring farms; as a total 15 animals were affected at three farms. According to epidemiological assessment (Since location of those 3 farms was apart from main village area), in addition those affected cattle, 61 animals (35 cattle and 26 buffalo; in total 76) were slaughtered and ring vaccination was implemented in the village 1.4. Evaluation of the FMD Outbreaks in Turkey When it is overviewed disease events of last seven years, it is clear that Turkey has been experienced with FMD outbreaks different epidemiological features year to year in him disease history. In a year it

88

has been occurrence an upsurge of outbreaks caused by one new type, which was invaded all over the country and those were taken the under control by efficient measures; in the next year it has been welcomed again a new upsurge of outbreaks caused another FMD type, such as Asia-1 outbreaks in between 1999 and 2001, A 05Iran in 2005/2006 and now current type O Panasia.

It is clearly appeared that FMD outbreaks were very frequent in villages and probably in fattening herds, in population which can contact with movement animals and given the age of young primo vaccinated or unvaccinated animals , but occurred only occasionally in specialised cattle dairy herds. This observation suggests that the former herds constitute a reservoir of FMDV and that they might be a source of outbreaks for dairy herds, which have better biosecurity measures. However, it is difficult to explain this pattern of outbreaks by taking in account that all types of epidemiological units are intensely and equally vaccinated against FMD, in absence of serosurveillance data to estimate the herd immunity level. The data of vaccination coverage for Autumn 2006 clearly show that some area, in which particularly has high risk for FMD, like East and South east Region, has very poor coverage which is also allow the maintains of circulating live virus. And also it was observed that variability of vaccination coverage in unit (village) can be resulted same risk. Some owners refuse to have their cattle vaccinated, because they are scared/suppose that the vaccination might induce abortion, decrease of milk production, and for others the vaccinators bring FMD on their farm and also for others have no highly awareness of the disease etc. In addition, animals that are not 3 months of age at the moment of the vaccine phase might remain unvaccinated until the following phase and thus until the age of around 7 months. In these conditions, the existence of non- or not properly vaccinated animals reveals the presence of FMDV in the environment brought by other animals, humans, vehicles, etc.

In all this circumstances, animal movements should be taken strongly consideration on risk to help by the spread the existed circulating virus.

During the outbreaks, although it was conducted control measures to stop the spread of the disease and achieved it partly resulted by decreasing number of outbreaks, it should be considered that it can not be fully eradicated the disease in the country and around the country. This consideration has been raised the questions on our epidemiological situation and tools that it has been used for combating the disease.

In this respect, it is clear that the strategy already used for combating the disease should be revised and defined an effective policy. To achieve this objective, some points which can be considered are as follow: -Conduct a well structured network within country and particularly as regional to maintains sharing information, informing emerging events ect - Recent disease experiences clearly learnt that risk on entrance of disease from outside the country is very high. For this reason, Can be constituted coordination with neighboring country by leadership an International Organization (ex: EUFMD/OIE) to stop: º Animals movement º the spread of the disease by the others way -Recent experiences have been learnt that animal movement is the main element the spread of the disease. For this reason, it should be revised current policy on it and find a well structured measure for it. For instance: ºdialer should be taken under the registration system and it should be trained them. For this it needs a new legislation º It shoul be find practical solution for movements during the Kurban Festival and relating to this returning unsold animals and design of Kurban market -Encourage owner for early notification of disease -Improvement epidemiological investigation to detect the disease earlier and to stop further the spread of the disease. For this purpose, it can be constitute a epidemiological team only responsible for disease investigation; for example at FMD Institute -Remind and to train animal owners and their staffs in biosecurity control measures concerning: importance of the disease, movements: animals, vehicles, humans and Disinfection -This recent situation demonstrates once again that the vaccination is only not sufficient tool to control FMD and needs to be associated with strong sanitary measures.

- It should be established a regional vaccine/sub strain bank to be preparedness for entrance a new strain General Measures taken in the out break areas: In order to prevent entrance of new virus types into Turkey, a surveillance program has been introduced in the East and the South Eastern border regions.

Also the restriction of animal and animal products movements, quarantine, intensive vaccination programs and active monitoring and surveillance programs have been introduced.

89

In case of outbreaks, ring vaccination program is applied in the focus. Due to the insufficiency in the vaccine production and unwillingness of the farmers, vaccination of the sheep can not be carried out under a nationwide program.

Diagnosis, research and vaccine production services are carried out by Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, located in Ankara.

2. Vaccination programme in 2006 Mass vaccination policy was the main element of the control programme against FMD. Vaccination Programme which has been implemented in 2006 is as follows; Vaccination policy • o Spring vaccination campaign using trivalent vaccine in March and April o Autumn vaccination campaign using trivalent and bivalent vaccine in September and October o Thrace and Marmara Region; Vaccination of all ruminants o In the other regions in Turkey; Vaccination of all large ruminants • Vaccination o Large Ruminant: • Application of routine mass vaccination twice a year all large ruminants in the country, Application of strategic vaccination to large ruminants in the selected region at the • Black Sea Region o Small Ruminant: • Application of routine mass vaccination once a year all ruminants in the Thrace and Marmara regions.

Trivalent (2 501 500 doses) and bivalent FMD vaccine (1 660 000 doses) donated by EUFMD/EC is being used in Thrace Region and selected region in Anatolia and also FMD Institute vaccines being used in Anatolia.

90

Distribution of trivalent and bivalent FMD vaccine donated by EUFMD/EC in 2006

Trivalent Vaccine

Povince

Spring

Autumn

Vaccine dose

Vaccine dose

Total

EDIRNE

225.000

135.000

360.000

TEKIRDAG

114.000

104.000

218.000

KIRKLARELI

104.500

90.000

194.500

75.000

60.000

135.000

CANAKKALE

237.000

99.000

336.000

BALIKESIR

462.000

240.000

702.000

BURSA

89.000

108.000

197.000

BILECIK

40.000

27.000

67.000

YALOVA

10.000

9.000

19.000

KOCAELI

55.000

45.000

100.000

SAKARYA

80.000

63.000

143.000

0

30.000

33.000

1.491.500

1.010.000

2.501.500

ISTANBUL

DÜZCE Total

Bivalent Vaccine for Autumn Province ANKARA KONYA

Vaccine dose 99.000 198.000

KARAMAN

15.000

KIRIKKALE

15.000

YOZGAT

99.000

KIRSEHIR

30.000

AKSARAY

30.000

NEVSEHIR

25.000

KAYSERI

99.000

SIVAS

171.000

CORUM

81.000

AMASYA

81.000

TOKAT

171.000

ESKISEHIR

81.000

DENIZLI

72.000

BURDUR

72.000

USAK

60.000

AFYON KUTAHYA Total

171.000 90.000 1.660.000

91

New trivalent FMD vaccine donated by EUFMD/EC on November 2006 As a total 1000.000 doses trivalent FMD vaccine have been delivered to Sap Institute on

November 2006

Those vaccines were used for emergency vaccination during the Kurban Festival and 2007 Spring Vaccination Campaign for Thrace.

2.1. Spring vaccination campaign in 2006 Spring vaccination campaign was carried out between March and April 2006. Trivalent vaccine donated

by EUFMD/EC was used in Thrace Region. Trivalent vaccine produced by FMD Institute was used in Anatolia Region.

In the framework of the vaccination campaign 92 % of large ruminants and 82 % of small ruminants in Thrace Region and 72 % of programmed large ruminants and 98 % of small ruminants in Anatolia Region were vaccinated respectively. Spring vaccination figures are given in Table 3 and 4 as follows: Table.3. Vaccination figures for Spring 2006 campaign in Turkey Region

Large Ruminants

Small Ruminants

Programme

Vaccinated.

%

Programme

Vaccinated.

%

Anatolia

9.611.857

6.943.394

72

1.757.934

1.721.279

98

Thrace

527.153

484.630

92

900.180

737.123

82

Total

10.139.010

7.428.024

73

2.658.114

2.458.402

92

Table.4. Vaccination figures for Spring 2006 campaign in Thrace Province

Vaccination programme Vaccination

of animals Large rum.

Small rum.

Large rum.

%

Small rum.

%

CANAKKALE

115257

29979

90383

78

214461

64

EDIRNE

142236

14071

134357

94

178093

76

ISTANBUL

61460

4151

62826

102

53257

96

KIRKLARELI

86004

20262

87184

101

167288

120

122196

5922

109880

90

124024

94

527153

74385

484630

92

737123

82

TEKIRDAG Total

2.2 Autumn vaccination campaign in 2006 Autumn vaccination campaign was carried out between September and October 2006. Trivalent and bivalent vaccines donated by EUFMD/EC were used in Thrace Region and selected Anatolia region.

Trivalent vaccine produced by FMD Institute was used in Anatolia Region.

Although 88 % of large ruminants were vaccinated in Thrace Region, 72 % of programmed large ruminants were vaccinated nationwide. Autumn vaccination figures are given in Table 5 and 6 as follows;fig.1 and table 1: Table 5. Vaccination figures for Autumn 2006 campaign in Turkey Programme Anatolia Thrace Total

Vaccinated.

%

9.140.818

6.526.858 71

527.097

462.685 88

9.667.915

7.009.030 72

92

Table 6. Vaccination figures for Autumn 2006 campaign in Thrace Province

Vaccination programme of animals Large rum.

Small rum.

Large rum.

%

CANAKKALE

115.261

81.700

71

EDIRNE

142.236

128.238

90

ISTANBUL

61.460

59.934

98

KIRKLARELI

86.004

78.407

91

122.136

114.406

94

527.097

462.685

88

TEKIRDAG Total

93

3. VACCINE PRODUCTION AND AVAILABILITY AT ŞAP INSTITUTE FOR SPRING VACCINATION CAMPAIGN During the six months period for renovation some part of vaccine department, Antigen Concentration, Inactivation, Vaccine Formulation and Vaccine Bottling Units at Şap Institute were reconstructed according to GMP rules and has been ready for production and finally vaccine production was started on January 2007.

5 million doses trivalent vaccines have been already produced and delivered to use and some amount of antigen, which is equal to 4 million trivalent vaccines, is waited to be bottling which means that preparation of vaccine to be need for spring vaccination campaign has been already achieved successfully. According to the vaccination program, vaccine production will be continued to be used for the next campaign.

Vaccine strains produced at Şap Institute are as follow: -O1 Manisa Matches with new variants of Pan Asia type O -A22 Iraq 24/67 Matches with a Iran 05 -Asia-1 Shammir Spring vaccination campaign has been started on beginning of March and will be completed in end of April. Since the campaign has not been finalised, data for coverage of vaccination will be presented after the campaign.

94

Annex.1. FMDV Type A phylogram for regional strains circulating in 1998 to present A10Holl/NET/1942 A/EGY/1/2006 A/EGY/2/2006 A15/T/1960|AY593755.1|VP1

A/Ind/170/88 A/India/253/98 A/Ind/236/99 A/India/302/88 A/Ind/160/90 A/India/61/88

0.1

A/IRN/22/99 A/Igdir/TUR/382/06/99 A/Kayseri/TUR/1263/11/00 A/Erzurum/TUR/222/06/03 A/Elazig/TUR/453/11/03 A/Afyon/TUR/214/06/03 A/Sakarya/TUR/75/03/04 A99/Konya/TUR/311/05 A/Kirsehir/TUR/124/05/04 A99/Konya/TUR/160/04 A/Afyon/TUR/245/06/03 A/TUR/5/2003 A99/Kayseri/TUR/238/04 A/Afyon/TUR/246/06/03 A/Afyon/TUR/244/06/03 A99/Kayseri/TUR/237/04 A/IRN/2/87 A/India/395/88 A22/Ind/17/77 A22/Iraq/1964 A22/Mahmatli/1965 A22/USSR/65 A22-550 A/IND/256/98 A/GUA/24/91 A/TUR/2/2003 A/TUR/Hmn A/TUR/4/2003 A/IRN/17/2005 A/IRQ/108/2002 A/IRN/5/2003 A/IRN/33/2004 A/Burdur/TUR/205/06/04 A/IRN/98 A/Aydin/TUR/148/03/98 A/Burdur/185/03/98 A/Burdur/TUR/186/03/98 A/Balikesir/TUR/28/01/98 A/Aydin/TUR/51/01/98 A/Ankara/TUR/89/02/98 A/Kutahya/TUR/45/01/98 A/IRN/32/2001 A/IRN/34/2001 A/IRN/2/2002 A/IRN/6/2002 A/IRN/7/2003 A/IRN/7/2004 A/IRN/41/2003 A/IRN/26/2003 A/PAK/5/2006 A/IRN/53/2005 A/Aydin/1451/2006 A/IRN/22/2005 A/IRN/5/2006 A/PAK/1/2006 A/PAK/3/2006 A/Hakkari/1240/2006 A/Bolu/324/2007 A/Van/1269/2006 A/Hakkari/1266/2006 A/Van/1416/2006 A/Diyarbakir/553/2005 A/IRN/4/2005 A/IRN/1/2005 A/Denizli/1068/2006 A/IRN/29/2005 A/IRN/10/2005 A/IRN/16/2005 A/IRN/13/2005 A/Eskisehir/1115/2006 A/Samsun/738/2006 A/Bursa/1250/2006 A/Aydin/1400/2006 A/Kastamonu/208/2007 A/Amasya/1433/2006 A/Afyon/1374/06 A/Usak/1401/2006 A/Ardahan/347/2006 A/Erzurum/203/2006 A/Balikesir/330/2006 A/Nevsehir/331/2006 A/Canakkale/1012/2006 A/Kars/957/2006 A/Igdir/979/2006 A/Konya/700/2006 A/Edirne/6/2007 A/Tokat/48/2007 A/Adana/1048/2006 A/Tunceli/1091/2006 A/Ankara/29/2006 A/Ankara/969/2006 A/Kayseri/1024/2006 A/Ankara/546/2005 A/Diyarbakir/1088/2006 A/Bingöl/571/2006 A/Bingol/1096/2006 A/Elazig/542/2005 A/Elazig/548/2005 A/Kastamonu/337/2006 A/Igdir/1050/2006 A/Bolu/658/2006 A/Konya/1372/2006 A/Isparta/370/2007 A/Afyon/583/2006 A/Konya/562/2005 A/Tekirdag/194/2006 A/Bolu/552/2005 A/Bolu/565/2005 A/Kirklareli/175/2006 A/Tekirdag/270/2006 A/Kirklareli/161/2006 A/Mersin/560/2005 A/Gaziantep/569/2005 A/Samsun/739/2006 A/Samsun/1025/2006 A/Kastamonu/1104/2006 A/IRN/7/2006 A/Konya/1029/2006 A/Bilecik/564/2005 A/Kutahya/570/2005 A/Diyarbakir/664/2006 A/Kars/726/2006 A/Erzincan/1084/2006 A/Kars/764/2006 A/Mus/1443/2006

95

Annex.2.

FMDV

Type

O

phylogram

for

regional

strains

O/XJ 1

Đran 2001

O/alfa/

Malesia 2003

circulating

1998

to

present

O1/FRG/Kaufbeuren6 6 O/HKN/1/200 O/HKN/6/200 6 O/HKN/10/200 4 4

O/PAK/17/200 O/PAK/16/200 3 O1/Manisa/Turkey/6 3 9 O/Igdir/472/199 O/IRN/15/9 O/TUR/1/9 O/Sivas/61/200 6 O/TUR/5/200 1 O/TUR/2/200 2 O/GRE/27/9 0 O/PAK/1/200 6 O/PAK/53/200 3 3O/PAK/15/200O/IRN/15/200 4 O/IRN/61/200 2O/IRN/4/200 1 O/IRN/20/200 3 O/IRN/6/200 O/IRN/8/200 3 O/IRN/15/200 3 3 O/Mersin/35/200 O/Mersin/13/200 4 O/Ankara/250/200 4 O/KMaras//100/200 1 O/Erzincan/211/200 3 O/TUR/7/200 3 O/LEB/1/200 3 O/ISR/7/200 3 O/ISR/2/200 4 O/ISR/8/200 O/ISR/11/200 O/IRN/6/200 4 O/Denizli/87/200 4 O/Denizili/73/200 3 O/Denizli/152/200 3O/Eskisehir/384/200 3 O/Denizli/441/200 3 O/Nigde/353/200 3 O/KMaras/1127/200 3O/Burdur/109/0 6 O/Burdur/110/200 6 O/Aydin/125/0 6 6 O/Afyon/260/200 O/ISR/1/200 O/ISR/2/200 6 O/ISR/1/200 6 O/Snir/0 5 O/Ardahan/353/200 5 O/Konya/395/200 5 5 O/Sakarya/194/200 5 O/Adiyaman/224/200 5O/Kayseri/386/200 O/Ardahan/474/200 5 O/Erzurum/213/200 O/Erzurum/423/200 5 O/Mus/465/200 O/Erzurum/248/200 5 O/Igdir/513/200 5 O/Rize/412/200 5 O/Ardahan/340/200 5 O/Konya/426/200 5 O/Bayburt/226/200 5 O/Sivas/510/200 5 O/Osmaniye/193/200 5 O/Elazig/282/200 5 O/Kayseri/163/200 5 O/Rize/435/200 5 O/Nigde/460/200 O/Kars/522/200 O/Kars/250/200 5 O/Kars/249/200 5 O/Ardahan/326/200 5 O/Elazig/338/200 5 5 O/Nevsehir/242/200 O/Nevsehir/478/200 O/Nevsehir/398/200 5 O/Nevsehir/502/200 5 5 O/Kayseri/506/200 O/Nigde/479/200 5 O/Nigde/507/200 5 O/Kirsehir/485/200 5O/Konya/438/0 5 O/MAY/6/200 5 O/NEP/4/200 3 O/BHU/41/200 3 O/NEP/5/200 3 O/BHU/47/200 3 O/NEP/6/200 3 O/BHU/15/200 O/BHU/33/200 O/BHU/40/200 4 O/BHU/30/200 4 O/BHU/28/200 4 O/BHU/26/200 4 O/PAK/14/200 4 O/PAK/4/200 6 O/Karabuk/1472/200 6 O/Erzincan/5/200 6 O/Diyarbakir/1481/200 7 O/Mugla/13/200 6 7 O/Sirnak/285/2007 O/IRN/10/200 O/IRN/8/200 6 O/IRN/9/200 O/Usak/1423/200 6 O/Kirklareli/357/2007 6

O/Konya/83/2007

UK 2001

in

O/Mersin/385/200 6

O/Konya/120/2007 O/PAK/22/200 O/IRN/67/200 5 O/PAK/19/200 1 O/PAK/3/200 5O/PAK/25/200 5 O/IRN/2/200 5O/IRN/16/200 3 O/IRN/58/200 O/IRN/41/200 1 O/IRN/8/200 1 O/BAR/6/9 4 O/IRQ/30/200 9 O/IRN/1/200 0 O/TUR/8/200 0 O/TUR/5/200 0 O/MOG/200 0O/IRN/16/200 0 O/PAK/45/200 1 O/AFG/16/200 3 O/IRN/24/9 3 O/IRN/9/9 O/Konya/512/199 O/1734/RUS/200 9 O/Tibet/CHA/9 0 O/JPN/200 9 O/SAR/200 0 O/UKG/35/200 0 1 O/IRL/134/200 O/Ankara/643/199 1 O/TUR/1/200 9 O/Kirsehir/586/200 3 O/TUR/2/200 1 O/Diyarbakir/363/200 1 O/Bursa/173/200 O/Duzce/207/200 5O/Bingol/330/200 O/Bingol/332/200 5 O/Diyarbakir/319/200 O/KMaras/366/2005 5 O/Amasya/100/200 3 O/Afyon/171/200 4 O/Kutahya/134/200 4 O/Afyon/107/200 4 O/SYR/3/200 4 O/Ankara/377/200 2 O/TUR/12/200 2O/Erzincan/351/200 2 O/TUR/3/200 2 O/TUR/3/200 2 O/Ankara/406/200 3 2 O/Sivas/43/200 2

PanAsia II I

O/beta/05

0.

1

96

Appendix 13 Report of the EUFMD/EC project on FMD surveillance in Iran–I Francis Geiger

EUFMD General session – 18/20 April 2007

FMD surveillance in Iran A key to understand the regional situation Dr F. Geiger FMD Surveillance Centre International Coordinator AGAH – EUFMD - MTF/INT/003/EEC

A. Animal population

80 M Sheep and goat

A. Animals population

8 M Cattle

2 M Pure Dairy cattle

2 M Crossed breed

1. Iran

B. Animal husbandry C. Animal movment

4 M Others < 2 M Horses

D. Vaccinal status

200.000 Camels

Sheep and Goat density

97

Cattle density

Source: Dr Otarod, GISVET system

B. Animal husbandry dairy farm

3-50

500-5000

dairy and beef farm

10 + 100

dairy and sheep farm

10 + 200

sheep farm

10-400

fattening beef farm

10-100

fattening sheep farm

100-1000

fattening beef and sheep farm

10 + 200

village

200-2000

pasture

500-5000

water pump

100-200

village

beef farm dairy and sheep farm

dairy farm sheep farm

sheep farm dairy and sheep farm pasture

dairy farm

beef farm dairy and beef farm city fattening sheep farm village

beef and sheep farm water pump

98

C. Animal movements

Border movements - In

Fattening areas

Breeders areas

Breeders areas

Breeders areas

In country movements

Nomadic movements

99

Border movements - Out

D. Vaccine status

Intensive Dairy cattle units Villages in high risk areas vaccination every 4 months

Intensive Fattening units In vaccination program

Nomadic herds yearly program in high risk areas

Foot and Mouth Disease Surveillance Project MTF/INT/003/EEC

2. FMD Surveillance results A. Data analysis B. Alert system C. Proposed Actions in Iran D. Project Program 2007

100

A. Data analysis

Evolution of FMD during the past 4 years

Evolution of FMD in 2006-2007

Source of FMD outbreaks

Farm investigations

Sampling results

=> Conclusions

Foot and Mouth Disease Surveillance Project

MTF/INT/003/EEC

Evolution of FMD during the past 4 years monthly FMD outbreaks in cattle 1382-1385 april 2003 - march 2007 250

200

150

100

50

Az ar 85 Ba hm an 85

Me hr 84 Az ar 84 Ba hm an 84 Fa rv a rdin 85 Kh ord ad 85 Mo rd a d8 5 Me hr 85

Me hr 83 Az ar 83 Ba hm an 83 Fa rv a rdin 84 Kh ord ad 84 Mo rd a d8 4

Az ar 82 Ba hm an 82 Fa rv a rdin 83 Kh ord ad 83 Mo rd a d8 3

Fa

rv a rdin 82 Kh ord ad 82 Mo rd a d8 2 Me hr 82

0

101

FMD OUTBREAKS EVOLUTION - April 2003/March 2007 250

200

150

100

50

Ju ne Au gu st O ct ob er D ec em be Fe r br ua ry -0 7

Ju ne Au gu st O ct ob er D ec em be r Fe br ua ry Ap ri l -0 6

Ju ne Au gu st O ct ob er D ec em be r Fe br ua ry Ap ri l -0 5

Au gu st ct ob er D ec em be r Fe br ua ry Ap ri l -0 4 O

Evolution of FMD in 2006-2007 Provinces

April

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

total

Provinces

West azarbaijan East Azarbaijan Ardebil Kordestan Kermanshah Ilam Zanjan Hamedan Lorestan Khuzestan

10 2 1 2 1 4 0 0 3 3

5 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0

6 3 2 6 1 0 0 4 1 1

4 2 6 2 0 0 1 5 0 0

5 1 20 2 2 0 1 7 2 0

15 8 7 7 2 0 4 18 1 0

19 5 3 11 1 1 4 22 1 1

8 5 4 2 2 4 3 7 1 0

35 2 7 7 2 6 5 7 1 3

32 5 3 1 1 7 4 6 0 3

11 3 0 0 0 3 5 1 0 0

2 2 0 2 1 6 1 2 0 0

152 38 53 44 13 31 29 80 10 11

West Azerbaijan East Azerbaijan Ardebil Kordestan Kermanshah Ilam Zanjan Hamedan Lorestan Khouzestan

461

Qazvin Markazi Qom Tehran Semnan Esfahan Chaharmahar Kohkilouyeh Fars Yazd

4 5 8 2 1 5 0 0 1

3 13 22 0 0 1 0 0 1

3 17 13 0 0 2 0 0 1

1 13 7 3 0 5 0 0 4

8 15 10 3 0 3 0 0 0 1

8 10 32 6 2 15 0 0 5 3

5 7 16 4 3 4 0 0 1 0

3 15 14 1 2 5 0 0 15 1

3 18 17 11 3 18 0 0 48 5

3 14 22 7 3 10 0 0 14 1

1 14 19 6 2 12 4 0 2 3

0 6 9 5 0 0 1 0 0 2

42 147 189 48 16 80 5 0 92 16

Qazvin Markazi Qom Tehran Semnan Esfahan Chaharmahar Kohkilouyeh Fars Yazd

635

Gilan Mazandaran Golestan North Khorasan Central khorasan South Khorasan Kerman Sistan Hormozgan Bushehr

1 0 1 0

1 1 0 0

0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 2 6 0 0

2 0 0 1 0

2 0 1 0 1

2 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 1 0

12 3 8 3 0 0 2 0 0 0

1 3 6 1 2 0 2 0 0 0

2 9 2 5 1 0 1 3 1 0

4 11 1 7 18 1 4 0 0 1

4 6 2 3 9 4 3 18 1 0

2 6 4 4 2 2 0 3 0 0

30 41 24 25 36 13 15 31 4 2

Gilan Mazandaran Golestan North Khorasan Central khorasan South Khorasan Kerman Sistan Hormozgan Bushehr

221

Total

62

54

65

55

82

153

136

107

222

183

136

62

1317 1317

nunmber of cases

03 Ap ri l -

Ju ne

0

250

TOTAL CASES CATTLE

200 150 100 50 0 Month : April 2006 - March 2007

Sources of FMD Outbreaks

FMD outbreaks analysis in 9 provinces: East and West Azerbaijan, Ardabil - Qom, Markazy, Qazvin – Tehran, Isfahan, Fars – North, Central and South Khorassan, (* Dr Otarod, GISVET system)

1. Focal prevalence of FMD in Iran 2. Focal prevalence of FMD in Cattle 3. Focal prevalence of FMD in Sheep and Goat

102

1. Focal prevalence of FMD in Iran cattle 40.00 35.00 30.00

Beef Farm

25.00

Dairy and beef farm

20.00

Dairy and sheep farm

15.00

Dairy Farm Villages

10.00 5.00 0.00 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

sheep and goat 14 12 10

pasture 8

villages

6

sheep farm dairy and sheep farm

4 2 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

2. Focal prevalence of FMD in Cattle

6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Villages

Dairy Farm

East Azar

Dairy and Dairy and beef sheep Farm Farm West Azar

Beef Farm

Ardabil

103

2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Villages

Dairy Farm

Dairy and sheep Farm

Tehran

Esfahan

Dairy and beef Farm Fars

2. Focal prevalence of FMD in Sheep and Goat

1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 dairy and sheep farm

sheep farm East Azerb

villages West Azerb

pasture

Ardabil

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 dairy and sheep farm

sheep farm Markazy

villages Qom

pasture

Qazvin

104

FMDV results

15% 42%

14%

29%

16% 32%

Provinces

POS

NEG

No result

BAD

Total

West-Azarbaijan East-Azarbailan Ardabil Kordestan Kermanshah Ilam Zanjan Hamedan Lorestan Khuzestan

49 13 22 17 3 0 11 12 6 13

146

36 14 27 17 2 1 5 11 11 9

9 5 4 1 2 4 2

10 6 18 2 2 9 3 5 10 1

104 38 71 37 9 14 21 28 27 41

390

Qazvin Markazi Qom Tehran Semnan Esfahan Chaharmahal Kohkyloyeh Fars Yazd

31 36 34 26 7 26 11 0 54 12

237

21 23 15 9 1 18 2 2 37 4

7 15 2 3 1 5

67 80 56 38 9 55 17 2 122 23

469

Gilan Mazandaran Golestan North Khorasan Central Khorasan South Khorasan Kerman Sistan Hormozgan Bushehr

11 13 10 7 15 0 10 4 1 1

223

Total

455

52%

72

18 8 6 5

6 4 11 6

20 1

14 4 7 5 7 3 3 1 3

9 7 1 8 39 3 1

3 7 8 1 7 1 4

1

2 2

37 31 26 21 68 7 18 5 7 3

312

160

155

1082

Farm investigations conducted in November, December 2006 and January 2007

Villages FMD is under-reported FMD virus circulates all over the year Vaccination coverage is insufficient and

heterogeneously conducted

105

Industrial Farms Affected animals = young animals not

vaccinated or vaccinated with only 1 injection

No respect of biosecurity measures

Fattening Units Permanent animal movement = permanent

source of various viruses Vaccination after entering without quarantine

period not useful

Conclusion 1. FMD is highly endemic in Iran and villages and beef herds are FMD reservoir 2. High infectious pressure on non or not well vaccinated animals 3. Lack of Biosecurity

Endemicity + Existence of reservoirs + Existence of animal improperly vaccinated + No biosecurity = >Increase of the number of outbreak that could be caused by any FMD virus

106

B. Alert system Field Event definition

The occurrence of very severe FMD outbreaks in vaccinated animals which have a high level of immunity

The occurrence of FMD in vaccinated epidemiological unit in the face of a strong immunity, e.g. 1 or 2 months after vaccination

The emergence of important outbreaks (more than expected level) in vaccinated area,

The occurrence of FMD outbreaks in area with no background of FMD outbreaks (no animal movement, e.g. in dairy cattle farms)

…/...

Laboratory Event definition

Detection of a new subtype apart from already existing in the country

Increasing number of samples received over a short period Increasing number of samples received over a short period Having unexpected test results Having more negative results rather than positive in virus detection tests …/….

FIELD & LABORATORY EVENT EVENT LOCALISATION DATE (S)

High virulence Type O 10 provinces July-August-September-October

EVENT: - Continuous increasing of prevalence of type O from July, 15th, even in vaccinated herds - Severe clinical signs in affected herds (calves mortality and tongue lesions in young cattle) - samples collected send to Pirbright for further investigation

LOCALISATION (S): - West province of Azerbaijan (2), Ardebil and Hamadan - Central provinces of Qom, Markazy, Qazvin and Tehran - South East provinces of Fars and Sistan

=>

COMMENTS: Changing of virulence of type O?

107

C. Proposed Actions in Iran

1. To focus on cluster analysis 2. To set up a Serosurveillance program

To focus on cluster analysis *Dr Otarod, GISVET system

=>Accumulation points

108

To set up a Serosurveillance program To Monitor herd immunity against FMD and the prevalence/incidence of FMD in vaccinated herds => preliminary experiments

• Induction of NSP antibodies by vaccines produced

by Razi and Merial

• Induction of SP antibodies following the use of vaccines produced by Razi and Merial and according to the protocol used in Iran => pilot study to determine parameters

C. Program 2007 Project Program activities 2007

Information

Booklets for Farmers, Animal Dealers and Private Vet. Information day

Training-Seminar

Workshop on Outbreak Investigation and Follow up Seminar on FMDV circulating in the region

Surveillance

Sero-monitoring preliminary experiments Improving of GISVET Information system (contract) Epidemiological data analysis (equipment equipment) Improving of CVL capacity (training training + equipment) equipment

3. Perspectives

Iran experience Neighbouring countries Regional approach

demonstrate value of FMD surveillance implemented in Iran extend the project to the neighbouring countries use Tehran as a regional coordination point

109

Phase 1 ongoing in Iran 2007

Phase 2 (2008-2009) to be prepared and agreement signed between FAO and concerned countries in linked with the GFTS/INT/907/ITA project

110

Combating Foot-and-mouth Disease through enhanced and co-ordinated surveillance activities; the Central Asia FMD Surveillance Centre initiative” is an FAO Project, supported by the European Commission and conducted by the EUFMD Secretary via a French International Co-ordinator based in the Veterinary Services of Iran (IVO) – Tehran (see annex)

1. Objectives, outputs and capacity building Objectives of the project The main objectives of the project are: Phase 1: • strengthened national and local capacities for active surveillance of FMD, with effective and timely management of FMD risk in Iran Phase 2: • establish a regional network for FMD surveillance in the region, based on the Iranian experience, with National Focal Points and Regional Co-ordination Centre in Tehran. provide through this regional network an effective and timely information about patterns of • FMDV circulating in the region • Outputs of the project The specific outputs of Phase 1 are: 1. To train specific staff skilled in FMD surveillance, outbreak investigation, control measures planning and spatial mapping analysis 2. To strengthen FMD surveillance system in high risk zones, especially in border regions of Iran 3. To strengthen capacity for quarantine activities and develop animal movement mapping 4. To strengthen capacity for identifying risk of FMD spread in and from Iran 5. To strengthen Central Veterinary Laboratory capacities, including rapid characterization of the virus, virus identification and sero-monitoring 6. To train CVL in FMD vaccine quality control 7. To revise National Surveillance Programmes and contingency plans including updated surveillance methodologies.

1.3

Capacity building

Technical capability to rapidly identify the emergent FMD virus strain and to identify the most important causes and origins of FMD outbreaks and the routes by which they spread will be enhanced through training in outbreaks investigation, in active surveillance methods and in the development of laboratory skills.

Development of laboratory skills, focused on identification and typing of FMD virus field strains, virus genotyping, sero-diagnosis methods and vaccine quality control.

Establishment of sero-diagnostic capacity to monitor the vaccination performance in the field and to identify the possible reasons for vaccine success or failure.

Training of the IVO’ personnel in planning an implementing FMD surveillance and in long term progressive control of TAD. Continuous interaction among the national staff at all levels to promote the concepts of priority of FMD and other exotic disease control and of early reaction in case of outbreaks.

The international co-ordinator is expected to work with the senior government veterinary staff to guide the development of national surveillance plans and the revision of national contingency plans

111

2. Project activities and results The project officially started in January 2006, when the EU support funding was notified to Iran Veterinary Organisation through FAO-REP in Iran.

2.1 Project activities According to the work Plan adopted during the last General Session, the following activities were achieved.

Training in Europe T1 - Short Term external training T1.1 - Training on FMD serological and virological tests Serology methods Participant: 2 persons from CVL (Central Veterinary Laboratory) and Regional Laboratory Duration: 2 weeks - May 2006 Duty station: Pirbright WRL T1.3 - Training on vaccine quality control (Inocuity, Potency and Safety) Potency Test Participant: 1 person from Razi Institute (FMD vaccine producer) Duration: 2 weeks - August 2006 Duty station: Pirbright WRL T2 - Long Term external training Training on FMD genetic typing and advanced molecular epidemiology Sequencing method Participants: 1 specialist of FMD Diagnosis Unit of CVL (Central Veterinary Laboratory) Duration: 6 months attachment - November 2006/April 2007 Duty station: Pirbright WRL Workshops in Iran WT1 - Workshop on Active Surveillance and FMD Outbreak Investigation Training in Outbreak investigation Participants: official and private veterinarian involved in FMD surveillance in the 7 pilot provinces (15 persons) Duration: 2 weeks (10 working days) - January 2006 Duty station: Tehran and Qazvin Province WT2 - Workshop on FMDV circulating in the region (workshop organised due to the regional situation) Exchange of information about FMV circulating in the region Participants: Iraq, Turkey and Syria representatives Duration: 3 days - June 2006 Duty station: Tehran Central Veterinary Laboratory

112

Regional meting RM1 - Turkey-Iran bilateral meeting (visit tour organised to reinforce bilateral ties between the 2 countries) Regional cooperation on FMD field Participants: IC + representatives of IVO, FMD Task Force and Razi Institute (7 persons) Duration: 3 days - February 2007 Duty station: Ankara (Turkey) RM2 - GTFS/INT/907/ITA regional meeting Regional situation of FMD in beneficiary and observer countries – links between the 2 projects Participants: CVOs (or representatives) and Epidemiologist of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, beneficiary countries and Iran and Kyrgyzstan (observer countries) Duration: 3 days - March 2007 Duty station: Dushanbe (Tajikistan) International meting IM1 - EUFMD Research group Experience and lessons learned about AO5 virus type in Iran Participants: IC + representatives of FMD Task Force and Razi Institute (2 persons) Duration: 3 days - October 2006 Duty station: Paphos (Cyprus) IM2 - OIE/FAO Round table on FMD control in the Middle East Regional situation of FMD and Iran experience in FMD surveillance Participants: IC +representatives of FMD Task Force and Razi Institute (2 persons) Duration: 2 days - November 2006 Duty station: Damascus (Syria) IM3 – EUFMD Executive Committee Situation of FMD and risk assessment for Europe Participants: members of the EUFMD Executive Committee + observers Duration: 2 days - January 2007 Duty station: Roma (Italia)

Project results The main results of the project during this first year of phase 1 (2006) were: 1. Set up a specific staff (F FMD Task Force) skilled in FMD surveillance and outbreak investigation - An FMD Task Force has been set up in March 2006. This team, managed by an FMD Task Force manager, is working in the 7 pilot areas in the 3 high risk zones - 7 Provincial FMD Task Force Managers and an HQ-team trained during the first workshop on FMD surveillance organised by the project in January 2006 are working for the project.

2. To strengthen FMD surveillance system in high risk zones - The 7 pilot areas have been chosen according to the FMD risk analysis and the number of outbreaks declared during the last 4 years.

- The 7 provincial FMD Task Force Managers conducts a reinforced FMD surveillance in their provinces.

- Monthly reports of FMD situation in the country is send to EUFMD secretary

113

3. To strengthen capacity for quarantine activities and develop animal movement mapping This item has not yet be assessed 4. To strengthen capacity for identifying risk of FMD spread in and from Iran - FMD results analysis is conducted by the project every month.

- A “Field and Laboratory Event Alert System” have been set up after the first seminar on FMDV circulating in the region organised in June 2006.

5. To strengthen Central Veterinary Laboratory capacities - 2 persons received a 2 weeks training course on FMDV serology diagnostic in Pirbright WRL in May 2006.

- 1 person has been trained on FMDV sequencing during 6 months in Pirbright WRL from October 2006 to April 2007.

6. To train CVL in FMD vaccine quality control - 1 person received a 2 weeks training course on FMD Vaccine potency testing in Pirbright WRL in August 2006.

7. To revise FMD National Surveillance Plan From July 2007, I am member of the National FMD Committee, with regular meeting every 2 Mondays.

3. Project perspectives Based on the Iran experience, a regional approach for FMD surveillance can be set up in the region step by step, using Tehran as a regional coordination point for: - Training: FMD surveillance and outbreak investigation and follow up FMDV diagnostic - Regional meeting and Seminar: FMD situation in beneficiary and observers countries FMDV circulating in the region FMD surveillance, control and vaccine

Phase 2 of the project (2008-2009) must be rewritten and proposes to the neighbouring countries of Iran, in link with the phase 2 of the FAO regional project GTFS/INT/907/ITA “Controlling Transboundary Animal Diseases in the Central Asian Countries”.

114

Annex

WEST AZERBAIJAN EAST AZERBAIJAN ARDEBIL KORDESTAN KERMANSHAH ILAM ZANJAN HAMEDAN LORESTAN KHOUZESTAN

11 7 0 2 2 15 1 2 0 0

QAZVIN MARKAZY QOM TEHRAN SEMNAN ESFAHAN CHAHARMAHAR KOHKILOUYEH FARS YAZD

0 12 15 5 1 1 1 0 0 2

GILAN MAZANDARAN GOLESTAN KHORASAN NORTH KHORASAN RAZAVI (Central) KHORASAN SOUTH KERMAN SISTAN BALOUSHISTAN HORMOZGAN BOUSHER

2 8 5 6 2 2 0 7 0 0

Combating Foot-and-mouth Disease through enhanced and co-coordinated surveillance activities Central Asia FMD Surveillance Centre Project

FMD OUTBREAKS REPORT: MARCH 2007

115

provinces

West Azerbaijan

East Azerbaijan

Kermanshah

Kordestan

Ilam

Zanjan

Hamedan

Qazvin

Markazi

index

cattle

sheep and goat

Total

succeptible

6188

30070

36258

affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks

10 2 0

1592 72 0

1602 74 0

2 2166 62 2 0

9 11500 415 62 6

2 1 1 0 0

succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of

BV

SR

11 13666 477 64 6

3%

19%

5 700 12 2 0

7 701 13 2 0

3%

11%

1 250 3 1 0

1 0 0 0 0

2 250 3 1 0

2%

2%

2 1053 118 39 1

0 10005 341 195 0

2 11058 459 234 1

3%

0%

6 220 2 1 0

9 0 0 0 0

15 220 2 1 0

10%

19%

1 25 23 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

1 25 23 0 0

2%

0%

2

0

2

3%

0%

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 393 108 16 3 6

0 1375 146 20 3 6

0 1768 254 36 6 12

0%

0%

10%

13%

116

Qom

Tehran

Semnan

Esfahan

Chaharmahal

Yazd

Gilan

Mazandaran

Golestan

North Khorasan

outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths

317 214 25 4

3467 989 148 0

3784 1203 173 4

9 766 64 0

6 0 0 0

15 766 64 0

15%

13%

5 0 0 0 0

0 1100 40 30 0

5 1100 40 30 0

8%

0%

0 0 0 0 0

1 430 147 132 17

1 430 147 132 17

0%

2%

0 100 3 0 0

1 0 0 0 0

1 100 3 0 0

0%

2%

1 971 10 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

1 971 10 0 0

2%

0%

2

0

2

3%

0%

20 5 0 0

0 0 0 0

20 5 0 0

2 251 230 29 2

0 710 185 48 0

2 961 415 77 2

3%

0%

6 2333 15 0 0

2 3100 115 20 0

8 5433 130 20 0

10%

4%

4 1268 14 0

1 2425 7 1

5 3693 21 1

6%

2%

117

Central Khorasan

South Khorasan

Sistan

Total

slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks succeptible affected deaths slaughtered No.of outbreaks

0

0

0

4 132 3 1 0

2 0 0 0 0

6 132 3 1 0

6%

4%

2 99 3 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

2 99 3 0 0

3%

0%

2 321 14 0 0

0 1081 223 19 0

2 1402 237 19 0

3%

0%

3 16874 902 116 10

4 65963 4212 749 26

7 82837 5114 865 36

5%

9%

62

47

109

100%

100%

pilot areas

118

Provinces East-Azarbaijan West-Azarbaijan Ardabil Esfahan Ilam Bushehr Tehran Chaharmahal South Khorasan Central Khorasan north Khorasan Khuzestan Zanjan Semnan Sistan Fars Qazvin Qom Kordestan Kerman Kermanshah Golestan Gilan Lorestan Mazandaran Markazi Hormozgan Hamedan Yazd Total

A PB

1

A,O

CVL

RAZI

1

1

A05

RAZI

2

RAZI 3 7 2 7

Cattle FMD samples for the 11 month of year 1385 (Updated) 21/03/2006 - 21/02/2007 A05,O A87 A87,A05 Asia1,O bad Neg RAZI

RAZI

1 1

1 3

RAZI 1 3

CVL

RAZI

4 4 2

1

1 1

1

1 3

2

1 1

2 4 1 3 5 5 2 4 2

2

CVL

1

1

1 3 1 1

1 3

1 1

1

2

6

3

1

70

1

CVL 2 16 13 4

RAZI 10 19 8 10

8

1 1

3 3

2

2 1

1 1 2 4 1

1 1 2 4 8 3

PB

3

1 2

2

2 6 1

1 1 1 1

1

RAZI 6 5 9 3 1 1

4 1 1 1 2 11

1

4 1 4 2 3

1 17

12

7

1

1 44

9 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 5 2 2 4 65

10 14 7 3 1 2 2 4 1

4

No result

11 1 7 3 115

CVL 4 4 2 2

3 5 5 4 1

12 2 5

15 7 7 14 3 1 3 9 2 3 8 1 4 1 145

4 8 2

O

RAZI

PB

3 1 3

2 2 16 1 5 2

5 1 3

CVL 3 16 4 3

RAZI 6 17 5 10

2 2

19 3

3 6

1 1 2 1 2 1 20 9 9 2 5

8

3

1 3 3 1

2 1 3 4 5

7 2 4 1 1 2 1

1 47

RAZI

5 5 2 13 9 11 9 1

1

1 1

1 5

2 6

1 3 45

2 3 115

1 4 61

O,A87

1 5 2 3 10 1 3 5 140

2

Total 35 100 57 51 1 3 38 14 6 53 16 28 21 8 4 92 67 55 37 15 8 19 26 17 25 63 6 27 21 913

119

FIELD & LABORATORY EVENT EVENT

High virulence Type O

LOCALISATION DATE (S)

5 provinces July-August-September 2006

EVENT: - Continuous increasing of prevalence of type O from July, 15th, even in vaccinated herds - Severe clinical signs in affected herds (calves mortality and tongue lesions in young cattle)

LOCALISATION (S): - Central provinces of Qom and Markazy - Province of Isfahan - West province of Kurdistan and Hamadan

COMMENTS: Changing of virulence of O type or new subtype ?

120

FIELD & LABORATORY EVENT EVENT

High virulence Type O

LOCALISATION DATE (S)

10 provinces July-August-September-October 2006

EVENT: - Continuous increasing of prevalence of type O from July, 15th, even in vaccinated herds - Severe clinical signs in affected herds (calves mortality and tongue lesions in young cattle) - samples collected send to Pirbright for further investigation

LOCALISATION (S): - West province of Azerbaijan (2), Ardebil and Hamadan - Central provinces of Qom, Markazy, Qazvin and Tehran - South East provinces of Fars and Sistan

COMMENTS: Changing of virulence of type O?

121

Annex

Combating Foot-and-Mouth through Enhanced and Co-Ordinated Surveillance Activities: The Central Asia FMD Surveillance Centre Initiative

1.

Background and Justification

1.1

Regional point of view

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) types O and A have long been endemic in the Central Asia area with a continuing deleterious effect on the livestock sector. FMD is currently causing serious direct and indirect economic losses in both countries. In many cases, the control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease is directly linked to food security, such as with nomadic people and other groups whose nutrition is based on milk. A major consequence of the disease is a drop in milk production, which has a direct impact on their food security. FMD also causes losses in newborn animals that can contribute to the deficit in animal protein production and livestock capital in the infected areas. Aside from detriment in production, another major economic consequence affecting rural incomes is the loss of revenue from livestock trade, which is severely constrained by the presence of FMD. In this area, the disease is perpetuated by FMD viruses moving into and between the countries through farming communities that span national borders and through trade-based livestock movements. The risk of the disease expansion is at present particularly high, given the severe political and FMD problems being experienced in some countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

That is the reason why collaboration between the Central Asia countries to strengthen the control of animal diseases - including FMD - in the region, by means of such fundamentally important measures as the control of illegal transboundary animal movement.

1.2

European point of view

During the last years and very recently in Turkey and Iraq, this region has seen regular appearance of new strains of FMD virus, which spread widely and necessitated the development of new vaccines for their control. The emergence within a short period of time of two new variant strains of type A FMD virus was recognised retrospectively to have occurred in Iran in 1996, 1999 and 2005. At this time the virus became widely disseminated throughout Iran after its initial recognition in 1996, spread rapidly through Turkey during 1998, entered Georgia and Armenia and extended to the point at which it threatened to cross the Bosphorus into European Turkey and onward into mainland Europe. The occurrence in 1999 in Iran of type Asia 1 makes the situation more complicated, and it is essential that appropriate measures be taken urgently. Development of new vaccines for FMD is a lengthy procedure.

The newly emergent strains of virus have revealed deficits in coping with FMD emergency situations, both in terms of surveillance and virological monitoring and in technological capability with respect to the virus characterisation necessary to support effective vaccine production.

Taking in account those two points of view, the project is expected to strengthen the control of FMD in the region and to give updated and appropriate information to European countries regarding FMD situation in this area. It would also complement and assist ongoing FAO EMPRES activities in the region which promote the progressive control of transboundary animal diseases in accordance with the World Food Summit Plan of Action.

1.3

Iranian point of view

FMD is currently causing serious direct and indirect economic losses in Iran and, regarding the geographical situation of the country, the Iranian authorities thinks this initiative may contribute to solve the difficulties that they have to control the disease at the national level.

The Iranian authorities emphasize on the need of regional approach regarding the control of FMD in the next future and not only for the surveillance aspects.

122

They consider the following key-success for this project: Regional surveillance Centre to coordinate National surveillance Centres diagnostic laboratories well equipped adapted training period and permanent technical support for all human resources involved in the project efficient vaccine adapted regulation regarding FMD surveillance and control in all the countries concerned harmonised epidemiological data collection permanent viral strain surveillance In this context, Iranian veterinary Organisation will contribute actively to the project through human and logistic resources given to the project.

2.

Objectives of the project

2.1

to improve FMD surveillance system in the region to get early warning and updated information through a FMD surveillance centre able to centralise and disseminate FMD information in Central Asia

2.2

to strengthen the technical capability for FMD diagnosis including new variant identification in the region through a technological transfer between WRL, SAP Institute and Central veterinary laboratory of Karaj

2.3

to get a rapid alert system in case of risk of spread of the disease from the region through a regional FMD surveillance centre able to analyse collected data immediately.

3.

PROJECT STRATEGY

3.1

to start with capacity building in I.R. Iran and focus initial activities in high-risk areas through implementation of a national dedicated FMD surveillance Centre set up progressively in 3 pilot areas, then in all the country, managing active and passive surveillance according to risk and typing of virus isolated

3.2

to demonstrate to neighbouring countries ability of this pilot scheme implemented in I.R. Iran for FMD surveillance in the region through technical visits related to the pilot scheme FMD surveillance system implemented in I.R. Iran

3.3

to extend to neighbouring countries (Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) this pilot scheme and to establish in Tehran the regional centre for FMD surveillance in the region through workshops for harmonisation of data collection and virus diagnosis and establishment of national FMD surveillance point in each involved country

4.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (INCEPTION REPORT PROPOSALS) The project will be implemented during 4 years, within 2 phases:

4.1.

4.1.1

Phase 1 – focalised in Iran (2 years)

establish regional epidemiological group in high risk areas, with specifically trained staff in surveillance

strengthen regional diagnostic capacity and Central veterinary laboratory

Phase 1-A (1 year)

strengthen provincial surveillance for FMD in 3 pilot areas ( 7 provinces)

improve guidelines and forms for FMD investigation with field evaluation, adaptation and review

set up an FMD Task Force team

123

4.1.2

4.2.

5.

5.1.

5.2.

5.3.

5.4.

5.5.

Phase 1-B (1 year)

extend provincial surveillance to other major areas of risk

assess the Iran National Centre for FMD surveillance

Phase 2 – extended in the region (2 years)

demonstrate value of FMD surveillance system implemented in Iran for animal production and trade systems common in the region

extend the project to neighbouring countries

use Tehran as regional co-ordination point for the project

PROJECT OUTPUTS (RESULTS) The specific outputs are expected to be: to strengthen field surveillance activity in high-risk areas of the region and improved reporting systems to analyse the animals’ movement within and between the countries with adapted and updated technology, so G.I.S system (Geographical Information System) to improve capability for laboratory diagnosis including serological testing, sero monitoring and characterisation of the virus to enhance interregional communication and collaboration for transboundary movement control to pave the way of a regional FM

124

Appendix 14 Report of the EUFMD/EC project on FMD surveillance in Iran – Use of GIS in analysis of FMD outbreaks and vaccination coverage V. Otarod

125

126

127

128

129

Appendix 15 FMD prevention and control in South Caucasus Carsten Pötzsch

130

131

132

133

Appendix 16 FMD Control in Israel Hagai Yadin Ap

134

135

136

137

Appendix 17A Report of the Executive Committee Progress in the Implementation of the EUFMD Strategic Plan for 2005-8 Reporting Period 2005-6 Summary The 37th General Session in April 2007 falls at the midpoint of the four year Strategic Plan that was agreed at the 36th Session in 2005. This Plan covers a 4 year period between the agreement of the plan at the 36th Session and the 38th Session in 2009.

A review of progress is due at the 37th Session. This report is based on the paper presented and reviewed at the 74th Session of the Executive Committee in January 2007, and incorporates recommendations from that Session (Appendix 23 of the 74th Session).

The Strategic Plan sets out a strategic vision and purpose, which are higher level achievements by the member states, and which should be assisted by the strategic actions of the Commission. Five categories of action were agreed at the 36th Session, with the balance between emergency responses and preventive and other actions being continually adjusted according to the risk situation, and human and financial resources.

Progress towards the vision and purpose of the Strategic Plan–a summary 1. Regarding the Strategic vision (goal) In 2005 this was defined as: “- A Europe free of FMD – the FMD disease-free state achieved and maintained in all Europe”.

Progress: FMD freedom in European countries has been maintained in period 2005-7, with exception of Turkey and Israel.

2. Regarding the Purpose (higher level objectives) In the 2005-8 plan, it envisaged the member countries, with support from the EUFMD Commission and other partners, working towards the following: 1. No occurrence of FMD in officially free countries of Europe in the period to 2008.

Progress: on track – at 2/07. In addition the Republics of Belarus, Serbia and Montenegro, with Kosovo; status of FMD free without vaccination recognised by OIE in 2006.

2. Effective management of risk of entry through improved access to information of FMDV circulation in source countries and of epidemiologically significant events.

Progress: severe decline in reporting in 2005 and 2006, impacted early warning. Counter measures taken - regional meetings (with OIE, AU-IBAR); more effort in rumour tracking, to promote sample collection, and typing at WRL Pirbright 3. No occurrence of Asia-1 infection in Turkey over the 4 year period.

Progress: on track – to 2/07 4. Reduction in incidence of other exotic FMD types entering Turkey over this period.

Progress: not achieved, rate of entry and impact increased in period 5. FMD surveillance targets and reporting in Caucasus countries and in Iran (and Iraq, Syria) that meet the requirements of at risk countries for early warning.

Progress: .surveillance intensity increased in Iran; assistance provided to the Caucasus countries and Syria (on track– to 2/07) 6. Incidence of FMD in Thrace region of Turkey reduced to zero in period; targets for surveillance, disease investigation and reporting in Thrace region meet need for early and effective control of incursions.

Progress: not achieved. FMD outbreaks in Thrace in 2006, in 2007.

7. Reduction in distribution of type A and type O FMD in Anatolia – defined by increase in the Provinces/area, and in period /time when virus infection is shown not to be present.

Progress: not achieved, reverse.

Conclusion 1. the European freedom from FMD has been maintained, but was severely threatened from the neighbouring regions by type A and type O regional epidemics in west Asia, with incursions of type A Iran 05 and type O (PanAsia variant) into Iran and Turkey in 2005-6, each resulting

138

2.

3.

4.

5.

in severe, widespread epidemics and which resulted in multiple introductions in Thrace region in 2006 (type A) and 2007 (type A, type O) The frequency and severity of these events is a major reverse of the favourable epidemiologic situation in 2003-4; in addition type A incursion into Egypt presented a risk situation in early 2006.

European reserves of vaccine have been mobilised in 2006 and 2007 in response to the above threat, for emergency vaccination (Thrace 2006) or strategic application in prevention (Marmara and western Anatolia 2006, Thrace and Marmara, western Anatolia 2007).

The three south Caucasus countries have been assisted with the maintenance of the Buffer Zone: despite the epidemic situation in Turkey and Iran, no FMD outbreaks were reported in the South Caucasus. An emergency reserve as maintained at ARRIAH, Russia, under the EUFMD/EC funding agreement, for mobilisation in case of emergency.

The attention to emergency events, plus lack of funding for active collection of FMD strains circulating in risk areas, has hindered progress on risk assessment and early warning in more distant risk regions to Europe.

6. Regarding the Strategy to implement actions at EUFMD level: The strategy focussed on actions to be taken to achieve outcomes useful to member states to help them achieve and maintain FMD freedom. It was agreed the Commission should focus on delivery in four key categories of action in the period 2005-8, plus emergency response actions if required.

Progress is summarised below: Category of action (approved: 36th Session) 1.

Improved system for monitoring FMD virus strain circulation operational

2.

Technical constraints to preferred European FMD control policies reduced

Progress

Comments

Limited, but opportunities improving

Improvements at level of OIE/FAO lab network, and more networking on FMD in some regions. But still no systematic priority system to guide efforts on monitor.

Opportunity for FAO/OIE Regional Animal Health Centres to address FMD submission issues. West and East Africa, and west Asia are principle surveillance gaps. Financial resource needed. Epidemiology expert group needed.

Good opportunities to collaborate within Europe. Expertise outside Europe not effectively used. Epidemiology expert group needed. Subgroup on on epidemic modelling required.

More human resources (and facilitation, Use of communication tools) needed to progress working groups /support Chairman Plan developed (presented to 72nd Executive) but only module 1 (FMD investigation) module development initiated in 2/07 (Online training resources)

Some progress on vaccination to live/ NSP

3.

System for professional development in FMD management/expertise developed

Plan, not implemented, but development of Online training modules started

4.

FMD risk surveillance and management programmes operating in target countries

Progress in Iran, also with the Caucasus countries

5.

FMD incursions/emergencies rapidly controlled, where supported by specific Commission decisions

Good in 2006 (Thrace).

Targets 2005-8 were in Turkish neighbourhood: Projects or progress in place: Caucasus, Iran, Turkey (EC project 2007-) Gaps: Syria, Iraq ““New”” gaps: Egypt, Ethiopia, sahel, central Asia Type A Iran 05 epidemic, incursion 2006 in Thrace: effective control with EC support.

Risk management , vaccine supply to Turkey autumn 2006.

Incursion in Thrace 2007: ongoing.

No confirmed FMD incursion in EU countries to date (05-1/07).

139

Background information: The EUFMD Strategic Plan for 2005-8, as approved by the 36th Session in 2005 Set out a strategic vision – goal Consistent with the EUFMD constitution, the strategy is to undertake a programme of actions that will assist member countries, and the EC, to progress towards the goal, or vision, of: - A Europe free of FMD – the FMD disease-free state achieved and maintained in all Europe.

Set out the Purpose (higher level objectives) : Envisages the member countries, with support from the EUFMD Commission and other partners, working towards the following: 1. No occurrence of FMD in officially free countries of Europe in the period to 2008.

2. Effective management of risk of entry through improved access to information of FMDV circulation in source countries and of epidemiologically significant events.

3. No occurrence of Asia-1 infection in Turkey over the 4 year period.

4. Reduction in incidence of other exotic FMD types entering Turkey over this period.

5. FMD surveillance targets and reporting in Caucasus countries and in Iran (and Iraq, Syria) that meet the requirements of at risk countries for early warning.

6. Incidence of FMD in Thrace region of Turkey reduced to zero in period; targets for surveillance, disease investigation and reporting in Thrace region meet need for early and effective control of incursions.

7. Reduction in distribution of type A and type O FMD in Anatolia – defined by increase in the Provinces/area, and in period /time when virus infection is shown not to be present.

Recommended a Strategy for action The strategy focussed on actions to be taken to achieve outcomes which are useful to member states to help them achieve and maintain FMD freedom.

It was agreed the Commission should focus on delivery in four key categories of action in the period 2005-8: o o o o

Support to FMD control in “traditional risk areas”- threatening south-eastern Europe and Turkey.

Global FMD observation – virus circulation and risk.

Coordination of technical studies to address constraints to policy implementation.

Capacity building across Europe – raising and retaining expertise and competence in the scientific basis of FMD control and in best practises in epidemic management.

The Commission should therefore in the 4 year period develop projects, gain funding and implement projects to enable it to develop useful outputs and outcomes which are applied in member countries and beneficiaries: 1. Improved system for monitoring FMD virus strain circulation operational 2. Technical constraints to preferred European FMD control policies reduced 3. System for professional development in FMD management/expertise developed 4. FMD risk surveillance and management programmes operating in target countries 5. FMD incursions/emergencies rapidly controlled, where supported by specific Commission decisions The Secretariat/FAO should take steps to find funding for the following: •

•

1: Implementation of an FMDV observation action, supporting European vaccine management through better identification of risk trends and events, including: a. support to developing country veterinary services to collect and submit samples; b. support to information exchange and networking of FMD Reference Laboratories.

2: Supported actions to address technical constraints identified by the EUFMD Standing Technical Committee, working with the FAO/EC/OIE Co-ordination structure for FMD and CSF laboratories.

140

• • • • • •

3: Implementation of innovative, capacity building action to raise technical competence of key levels of the European epizootic control management.

4: Field programme support: support the implementation of comprehensive actions for the surveillance and effective response to FMD in the southern Balkans region (Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria); implementation of a project for early warning of FMD regional risk events, through supported actions with the Islamic Republic of Iran; implementation of a project for the surveillance and effective response to FMD risk in countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan); identification and formulation of project actions to control risk in other countries neighbouring to Turkey, and in other FMD risk situations, as required by the emerging situation.

141

Summary of Action -2006

Towards goal of official FMD free status

-

Moldova: technical support to assist Moldova towards official FMD free status should be provided under EC-FAO Food Security Programme (EC-FAO FSP), 2006-8 with FAO implementing and AGAH as lead technical unit.

Activity status - under the 5 Strategic Plan categories

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

Implementation

Annual contract with

Priorities for supported

Limited:

WRL finisihed 2005.

submission:

of Activity 1

Improved system for monitoring FMD virus strain

All European

circulation operational

countries, but global

-

value

-

west Africa,

funding of shipments to WRL

Sudan/horn of

-

Africa

project proposals developed (5 high risk countries)

2

Technical constraints to

All European

EUFMD-Research Group

EC country participation.

Good collaboration with research

preferred European FMD

countries

meeting 2006.

Meetings of task groups to

group, and allied European

progress Workplan of

projects.

EUFMD-RG

.

control policies reduced

Specific commissioned studies: Use of A22 vaccine against A Egypt 2006 (by FLI, Insel Riems) 3

System for professional

All European

Secretariat inputs to

To be decided.

development in FMD

countries, potential

training initiative.

Training initiative prepared:

management/expertise

global

None. Deferred to 2007

year 1 request circa US$

142

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

Implementation

of Activity developed 4

330,000

FMD risk surveillance

Trans-Caucasus-

Secretariat technical

Trans-Caucasus:

Good.

and management

regional (Armenia,

and admin support

Buffer zone Spring and

Buffer Zone maintained in 2006.

programmes operating

Azerbaijan,

time.

autumn vaccination 2006

Emergency reserves of vaccine

in target countries

Georgia)

Vehicle provision –

funded/implemented..

established (at ARRIAH) to counter A Iran 05 epidemic in

EUFMD TF To be decided:

Iran/Turkey.

Proposal formulated for

Epidemiologts recruited to project

2006-8, 2006 costs

(June -06)

of.EURO 636k.

Surveillance and lab support provided

FMD management in target

Iran

countries

Secretariat technical

Iran:

On track.

and admin support time

FAO Technical co-

Regional meeting on virus

Secretariat technical

ordinator in place

circulation held in Teheran June

support time

provided by France.

06.

Phase 1 programme

Molecular epidemiology study

implemented [US$

program established.

761,000, of which

7 Pilot study areas for

2006: US$381k.].

surveillance/epidemiology established.

Sero-surveillance program designed

FMD management in target countries

Turkey

Secretariat technical

Turkey:

Emergency responses: Good.

support time

Emergency missions

Sero-surveillance: excellent

143

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

Implementation

Sero-surveillance support -

implementation by SAP Insitute.

Thrace

One million dose vaccine reserve

Emergency Vaccine

funded/established in Ankara -

purchase (1 million doses,

cover for kurban/bayram risk

11/06)

period

of Activity

Syria

Mission -Secretary

Kit for FMD diagnosis supplied to Damascus

FMD management in target

Iraq

countries

Secretariat technical

Limited to correspondence

support time

Middle-east and

Secretariat technical

Good – regional meeting in Syria

north Africa

support to FMD

organised November 2006 with

roundtable meeting

OIE Office (Beirut)

2006 (5 days) 5

FMD incursions/emergencies

EU & EUFMD.

As required; Secretariat

See Turkey

technical support time

Major incursion of FMD into

rapidly controlled, where

Thrace controlled by

supported by specific EC

Turkey, with EC supplied

decisions

vaccine (2.5 million doses)

Immediate

Two further vaccine deliveries (1.66 and 1 million doses)

144

Appendix 17B

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES of the EUFMD COMMISSION IN 2005 AND 2006 Key Points 1.

The activities have followed the recommendations of the 36th Session, and focussed on five categories of action, as set out in 2005-8 Strategic Plan agreed at the 36th Session. A separate Report is provided summarising the Progress in the Implementation of the EUFMD Strategic Plan for 2005-8, Reporting Period 2007-8 (Item 1 Appendix 1).

2. As agreed at the 36th Session, the major outputs or outcomes for the four year period should be: an improved system for monitoring FMD virus strain circulation, operational technical constraints to preferred European FMD control policies reduced system for professional development in FMD management developed FMD risk surveillance and management programmes operating in target countries FMD incursions/emergencies rapidly controlled, where supported by specific Commission decisions.

3. A new funding agreement was been signed with the EC (DG-SANCO), in September 2005, for 4.5 million €, and revised to 8 million € in 2006, after the 72nd Executive Session and following review of the likely program and emergency support costs in 2006-8.

4. The Secretariat (Secretary and Clerk), funded by members contributions, have acted to implement decisions of the 36th Session and subsequent Executive Committees. In the period 2005-2006 the Commission has been greatly assisted by an additional Associate Professional Officer (supported by Ireland). Since staff costs are met by the Commission, almost 100% of the external funding (EC, and FAO) goes to cover the additional costs of the actions - for example in supply of vaccines, diagnostic kits, workshop costs.

5. Under the Implementing Agreement with the EC for activities of the EUFMD Commission, the staff of the EUFMD Secretariat provided the project management and technical backstopping, and have been greatly assisted by the Chairman of the Research Group and the other elected technical experts from member countries who provide technical advice, and assist in missions usually without charge, and through contract services with the specialist institutions such as the FAO World Reference Laboratory in the UK. 6. The co-ordination and co-operation between the EUFMD Secretariat and the counterpart at EC , with the focal point at the FAO/OIE/EC Reference Laboratory for FMD at Pirbright, and the Chairman of the Technical Committee has been excellent (CRL), and strongly contributed to effective decision making in crisis situations 7. The position of the Commission in relation to the FAO Animal Health Service ensures that activities are co-ordinated and informed by FAO involvement in the wider region, and complement and contribute to goals and outputs of the FAO Regular Programme.

8. The funding from SANCO has enabled several major actions to be continued or implemented, aimed at reducing the risk of exotic FMD transmission across the Eurasian borders: a. The continuation of a bi-annual vaccination in the buffer zone (BZ) in the TransCaucasus on the side of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, through 2005 to the spring campaign of 2007 (limit of agreement at time of report). In 2006 this support program was significantly strengthened by recruitment of a full time regional epidemiologist and national consultants. b. The funding, from November 2005 of a project to support the I.R of Iran in surveillance and epidemiology (US$761,000 over 3 years), assisted by a full time consultant seconded by France to FAO and based in Tehran (Francis Geiger).

9. The balance in EUFMD activities in the period has been towards operational support to disease surveillance and emergency control in South-East Europe, because of the severe, sweeping regional FMD epidemics with types A Iran 05 (2005-7), the risk of the A Egypt 2006 epidemic, and a regional epidemic caused by incursion of a new variant of O PanAsia (late 2006 to current).

10. The EUFMD effort has been co-ordinated with the EC and OIE, and several international meetings have been held to assist countries to combat the type A and type O regional epidemics (Paris, Teheran, Tbilisi, Damascus, Ankara) , in addition to the routine six-monthly Sessions of the Executive to review the risk situation and the balance of actions.

11. Therefore maintaining a balanced program, between actions to improve prevention and capacity for containment (outcomes 1-3 in the Plan) and effort to implement field actions/projects including emergency measures (Outputs 4 and 5) has been affected by the high demands of the emergency situation.

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12. The recommendations to strengthen EARLY WARNING of new virus threats through promoting and supporting sample collection in key risk countries has been implemented only to a limited extent. However the need to move the balance towards prevention is illustrated by the 2005-6 epidemic situation, in which FMD epidemics in the countries in West Asia and the eastern Mediterranean emerged very rapidly and crossed borders before the identity and threat of the emergent viruses was recognised internationally (=an early warning failure).

13. Since the regional epidemics in 2005-6 were came from two sources, from the east, (west Asia and south Asia), and from sub-Saharan Africa (into Egypt in 2006), several small projects have been formulated to improve sample collection in “distant neighbours”, as far as possible using the operating structures of the joint FAO and OIE Regional Animal Health Centres (RAHCs).

14. Over half (29) of the 45 recommendations in the 36th Session report have been implemented through activities/actions, 13 can be considered only partially implemented, 2 were for member countries, and one recommendation (#14, on engagement with North Africa on FMD surveillance) was not implemented.

15. In line with recommendations at the 36th Session, the activities have been co-ordinated with partner organisations (OIE, EC, EFSA) to avoid overlap and make the best use of specialist technical experience in the Secretariat and Standing Technical Committee (Research Group): a. Co-ordination of international actions to improve risk assessment for antigen and vaccine banks, working with FAO-WRL and the OIE (ad hoc group on antigen and vaccine banks, 6/2005 and 2/2007). b. Partnership in research co-ordination, with WRL/EC/OIE in the Co-ordination Action for FMD and CSF laboratories (CA-FMD CSF, implemented in 2005). c. Specialised technical support to EFSA in the panel on FMD risk to Europe – assessment and management options (finalised in 2006).

Actions to prevent entry of infection 16. The situation of risk to EUFMD member countries was kept under continual review through the mechanism of Tripartite group meetings, and at the 3 meetings of the Executive Committee, resulting in decisions to continue or implement support actions in Thrace region and south Caucasus in the period: a. With EC, support an emergency vaccination programme in Thrace region of Turkey in Feb-March 2006, b. With EC, support the strategic deployment of follow up vaccination programmes in central, western Anatolia and Thrace in autumn 2006 to counter the type A epidemic, c. With EC , tender and supply 1 million doses of vaccine to act as emergency reserve in case of flare up of the epidemics in January-march 2007, d. With EC, support the strategic deployment of EU-VB donation of 1.5 million does of FMD vaccine in February 2007, and tender for further supplies, to counter the type O epidemic, e. With EC, support sero-surveillance actions following the 2006 epidemics, and support to Turkey on outbreak investigation (through an FAO national team, ongoing). f. With EC, maintain a buffer zone if vaccination (circa 1.1 million cattle doses per campaign) in the South Caucasus, with continual modification of he vaccine content to counter the changing risk in Iran and Turkey, in addition maintain a strategic reserve ARRIAH, in case of breakthrough of the BZ. 17. The EUFMD actions, under the FAO/EC/OIE Tripartite, have assisted to stabilise the FMD situation at these border regions for Europe, despite what has been the worst epidemic situation for at least 15 years. The effective use of FMD vaccine in small and large ruminants in Thrace region of Turkey in this period undoubtedly contributed to rapid control of introduced infection.

18. The epidemic situation has affected the eastern Mediterranean in two ways, extensions from west Asia and from sub-Saharan Africa, and the movement of viruses into this area is highly relevant and of concern.

19. The Commission also sent missions to Egypt (3 mission in 2006) because of the severe epidemic with an African type A virus, where there was a major risk of onward spread into the ME and possibly Europe. These missions were aimed to assist Egypt in combating FMD, with the objective to reduce risk of further spread.

20. The Commission also organised several regional Meetings, with OIE and other partners: a. Tripartite meeting son FMD control in the Southern Balkans, Feb 06, November 06 b. Regional meeting on virus circulation in Iran and neighbouring countries, Teheran 2006 (organised by EUFMD) c. 3rd Roundtable on FMD in the middle-east and north Africa (organised with OIE , under GF-TADS, Damascus -11-06)

146

21. The situation of FMD virus circulation in other risk areas was kept under continual review through the mechanism of the Executive Committee and the Standing Technical Committee meetings. FMDV surveillance information for much of the endemic areas of the world remains in critically short supply.

22. The global focus on avian influenza has contributed to switch in attention from FMD, at times contributing to the scale of FMD epidemics. Given the human resources devoted to AI, FAO and the Secretariat have received many requests for advice and assistance to combat epidemics.

Given the spread of FMD from Africa to the Mediterranean, the Secretary assisted with organisation of a Regional meeting on emergency control of FMD in the Horn/East Africa in Nairobi, August 2006.

Actions supporting risk assessment and risk management 23. Activities to note in the period 2005-6 have been: a. The Commission has continued to support sample shipment to the WRL to assist virus identification and typing in epidemiologic regions considered to pose a significant risk, and thereby to determine the suitability of antigens held in the European vaccine banks holding exists; b. Missions to Niger and Mali were conducted by EUFMD consultants, during which FMD samples were collected and support projects formulated, c. Continued reporting to the Executive on changes in patterns of FMD circulation and risk to EUFMD member countries; d. Continue support to the FAO WRL, financially and operationally, from the EUFMD Trust Fund.

24. However, given the examples of Egypt (2006) and Libya (2003), and north Africa (1999), the importance of sub Saharan Africa as source – the introductions were from east, central and west Africa , it is clear that the need to address the deficiencies in epidemic data as well as strain characterisation (O, A and SATs were involved). The Commission has therefore promoted formulation of small projects to establish active sampling in sentinel locations.

25. Promotion of regional networks, as part of the process of accelerating FMD virus typing, this approach is central to the small projects formulated on active sampling, using the newly established FAO/OIE/African regional centres in co-ordination.

Actions to address technical constraints to implementing FMD control policy 26. In line with recommendations of the 36th Session, activities to address technical issues have been: a. Supporting the implementation of a Research Group work plan developed in 2005; b. Supporting resolution of vaccination to live issues, specifically i. working group on surveillance after emergency vaccination in FMD free countries ii. support to simulation exercises on post-outbreak surveillance iii. organisation of a workshop on capacity and logistics of emergency vaccination against FMD c. Co-ordination of the efforts to increase efficiency of transfer of technical progress into practise, including revision of standards, through: i. The DG-Research Coordination Action project (with WRL and OIE) to begin in 2005; ii. technical advisory inputs of the Secretary and Chairman of the RG to OIE ad hoc groups, 27. The Standing Technical Committee (Research group) met on two occasions and continued its position as the pre-eminent, international forum for review of progress in FMD diagnostics and vaccination issues, with a record attendance of observers at the Open Section of the Session in 2006 in Paphos, Cyprus.

Actions aimed at improving capacity to respond to FMD emergencies 28. Activities to support capacity in European countries to control FMD emergencies: a. Updating and continual professional development through wide participation (a record level) of European countries, and from Mediterranean basin, and the first time, a large contingent from China and the far-east in the Open Session of the Standing Technical Committee, 2006. b. Training: workshops in the Caucasus, Iran, and Turkey (the last one attended by Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria) c. Online training modules for FMD: (pilot) program to develop training resources started 2/07

147

Member countries 29. The number of member countries increased by one, to 34, of which 25 are EU members. The Slovak Republic joined the Commission in 2006.

Specific Activities 1. The Executive Committee held three ordinary Sessions, the 72nd in The Hague, The Netherlands, December 2005, the 73rd in Istanbul, Turkey, June 2006, and the 74th in Rome, January 2007. The Reports of the 72nd and 73rd Sessions, in English and French, were sent to all member countries and are available on the EUFMD website, and the 74th is planned for circulation by the end of March 2007.

2. The Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee of the Commission held two Sessions during the biennium; one with restricted participation, held at The Friedrich Loeffler Institute, Insel Riems, Germany (20-23 September 2005), attended by 23 technical experts, and a Session with an Open Section for observers in 2006 in Paphos, Cyprus, 16-20 October 2006, attended by over 140 FMD specialists. The latter is a record attendance at Research Group Session, from almost all of the National FMD laboratories in Europe including the ARRIAH OIE Regional Reference Laboratory, and in addition representatives from FMD reference Laboratories in the Americas, in Africa, and from national reference laboratories in the Middle East and north Africa, Iran, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from India, and Australasia, and for the first time, a significant delegation from the China. This again highlights the importance of these meetings for stimulating technical improvements and capacity building in EUFMD member states and in neighbouring (mainly infected) countries in the region. The reports of the two sessions were sent to all European FMD Research Institutes and laboratories and were posted on the EUFMD website. The Chairman of the Research Group was also actively involved in the activities of the Commission, representing the Research Group at internal and external meetings.

3. Workshops were held in the 2005-2006 biennium: • Tbilisi: Regional and national workshops on contingency planning and regional simulation exercise for testing FMD contingency plans (June 2005 to December 2005).

• National workshops on FMD surveillance in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in period Sept 06-Jan 2007, and in Iran in February 2006, also sub national follow workshops under the EC/EUFMD project. .

• Workshop on FMD outbreak investigation principles and procedures: held in Ankara, March 16-20th 2007, with participants from Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Azerbaijan.

• International Workshop on implementation of emergency vaccination programs: held 2-4th April, Rome (part funded by the DG-Research Co-ordination Action for FMD & CSF).

4. The EUFMD/EC/OIE Tripartite Group for FMD control in the Balkan region: The Group met on 25th November 2005 in Alexandropoulos, Greece, with an emergency meeting held in February 2006 following the type A incursion, and subsequently in November 2006 in Ankara.

The 2005 meeting was important for re-confirming • the importance of maintaining a the high population immunity in Thrace region in large and small ruminants (the importance of this was demonstrated less than 2 months later with the incursion of type A Iran 05); • that a high risk period of the kurban/bayram festival was approaching and would occur in winter conditions, favouring transmission, and thereby additional preventive measures should be taken • that Thrace region of Turkey should continue to be considered a special region for disease investigation and reporting; cases of former List A diseases occurring in this region, and other diseases where occurring for the first time, should be notified without delay to the neighbouring countries, and also to OIE, EC and FAO. that the policy of prevention of PPR through mass vaccination and eradication of PPR • infection if detected in Thrace region, and to establish the necessary control on animal movements so to prevent the further entry of infection.

The emergency meeting in February 2006 took place in Paris (OIE), following on from the Regional meeting on avian influenza, and was important to • review the epidemic situation, the findings of the EUFMD mission, • provide a briefing to the near neighbours (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Russian Federation): • review the risk of continued epidemic development • consider additional support measures The follow up to the meeting involved two further EUFMD missions, providing logistical advice to the emergency vaccination program, and on monitoring and surveillance.

Further meetings occurred in the context of the EUFMD Executive Session held in June in Istanbul, and thereafter the Tripartite meeting, held 17th November 2006 in Ankara.

148

The question of continuation of the Tripartite was raised at this meeting, given the accession of Bulgaria to the EU, the two European neighbours are in the EU and there are regular Standing Committee meetings. The representatives of Greece and Bulgaria strongly supported a continuation of the Tripartite, at which technical and specific issues are discussed, with presence of the regulatory agencies and international organisations.

The meeting recommended: • that the Government of Turkey review in depth the factors that led to the scale of the 2005-6 epidemic of A Iran 05 virus, and in particular the organisation and impact of FMD control measures applied in Thrace region in 2006; • to review the extent of national vaccination coverage in the autumn campaign, to identify areas that may present a major risk in FMD transmission to western Turkey and Thrace region, and for national spread in the winter of 2006/7. that the additional million doses of FMD vaccine provided by EC in 11/06 (via • EUFMD/FAO) should be kept in reserve to provide a strategic vaccine bank; • that additional measures be considered to reduce the risk of infection in Provinces or Districts with low immunity levels following the autumn campaign. that increased measures are taken to reduce the risk from potential entry of exotic FMD • strains across the eastern borders during the high risk period for animal movement before and after the kurban/bayram festivals.

• that the FMD outbreak reporting system should be reviewed to improve the speed of detection of unusual events, to trigger further laboratory and epidemiologic investigations; In addition the PPR and bluetongue control measures were reviewed, and Bulgaria reported on the detection of sero-positive animals to BT in its surveillance in sentinel animals along the borders with Turkish Thrace.

FAO was again encouraged to develop a project to assist countries in risk assessment and early warning of exotic disease risks including BT, PPR, LSD, EHD and FMD in the eastern Mediterranean region, with active involvement experts from Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.

5. The OIE/EUFMD-FAO/EC Tripartite Group for FMD control in the Trans-Caucasus countries The group met on the following occasions: 1st November 2005, in Tbilisi, Georgia to review the technical reports of the sero-monitoring of the spring 2005 campaign, and to agree on the main principles of the continuation of the vaccination buffer zone and allied technical inputs required to strengthen capacity for FMD control.

Another meeting between the CVOs and EUFMD took place on 19 – 22 June 2006 in Tbilisi, Georgia to review the achievements of the TCP/RER/3001 (A) and to plan for and agree on the main principles of the 3 year project (2006-2009) “Co-ordination of FMD surveillance and control in the Tran Caucasian countries and strengthening of emergency management capacity” as part of MTF/INT/003/EEC. Technical co-ordination of the FMD input has been assisted by appointing a regional co-coordinator (Carsten Potzsch) in June 2006, stationed in Tbilisi, who had previously acted as EUFMD consultant on the Caucasus buffer zone, in two missions in 2004/2005.

The project includes continuation of the vaccination buffer zone and the following expected outputs to strengthen capacity for FMD control: Component 1:  Regional cooperation framework developed  National FMD risk management strategies formulated and implemented Component 2:  National FMD surveillance and control policies improved and implemented  National disease information systems upgraded, including geographical data/GIS and diagnostic data and information  National Emergency management plans revised and tested Component 3 – Laboratory  National reference laboratories capable to safely confirm infection by antigen detection ELISA  National capacity for FMD serology; serology for SPs for vaccination coverage and epidemiologic investigation and NSP ELISA for virus circulation  upgraded to reach performance indicators for response time and integration with Department of Veterinary Services.

For detailed project activities, reference is made to the 6 monthly reports to the EUFMD Executive Committee, and papers from the EUFMD Secretariat (Inception Report, Six-monthly Project Report 2006 and Consultancy Report (Assessment of FMD Diagnostic Laboratories in Armenia and Azerbaijan).

6. Activities relating to FMD control in Iran and Central Asia The exceptional importance of this region as a source of FMDV antigenic variants for Turkey and neighbouring region is well recognised. For example, Asia-1 swept through Iran in 1999 into Turkey

149

and travelled as far as Greece in 2000, type A Iran 05 spread through Iran, Turkey and as far as Thrace between mid-2005 and January 2006, and type O PanAsia repeated this in mid 2006, with severe consequences, spreading though host of Turkey and reaching Thrace in February 2007.

In 2003 the EUFMD Commission, following the 35th Session recommendations, made a request for financial support (761,000 US$ in Phase 1) from the EC for a programme of actions aimed at strengthening surveillance in Iran, especially in areas of most concern for early detection of FMDV threats to Turkey. The agreement with EC was finally received in November 2005, with EUFMD funds, and France support a veterinary technical officer (Dr Francis Geiger), to be based in Teheran and to work under EUFMD Commission for 3 years, from March 2005. The main actions of the EC funded project began in 2006, with seven pilot areas for improving surveillance initiated, in West, Central and Eastern Iran, at locations of high incidence of outbreaks and involving congregation points where exotic strains are likely to be first detected. An FMD Task Force team has been implemented in 2006, who monthly reports detailed FMD situation to EUFMD Commission. The collaboration is now working very well, with the new type O strain being reported as an alert by the project, enabling warning of Turkey. Iranian surveillance specialists of the Iran Veterinary Organisation routinely participate in EUFMD technical meetings (for example Paphos, 2006, Damascus 2006). This project is to be extended to neighbouring countries, in link with the GFTS/INT/907/ITA, to extend the surveillance to the Central Asia area.

7. Activities relating to FMD control in the Middle-East and North Africa As a result of the exceptional situation with spread of FMD type A Iran 05 and A Egypt 2006, the Regional GF-TADS Steering Committee for the Middle-East and North Africa in April 06 recommended organising regional meetings on FMD prevention and control. FAO and OIE therefore organised a joint meeting in November 2006 in Damascus, attended by numerous countries, which discussed the international risk, priorities for vaccination, and formulated recommendations to co-ordinate vaccination and other measures.

The importance of the event was shown by the continued spread of A Iran 05 into Jordan, and type O new variant into Jordan, the west bank, and Israel in autumn/winter of 2006, Given the dynamic situation, a yearly FMD co-ordination meeting was recommended, with EUFMD requested to provide technical support.

8. Collaboration with the Office International des Épizooties (OIE): The Commission has worked closely with the OIE: • in FMD control through the two Tripartite groups; • in co-organisation of the FMD roundtable for the Middle-east and North Africa Through the participation of the Secretary, and two members of the Research Group in • the OIE ad hoc group vaccine and antigen banks, • The OIE has been invited as observer to all EUFMD Sessions, including Closed Sessions of the RG; • In the discussions on the development of a Global Initiative on FMD control under the joint FAO: OIE GF-TADS. Given the extensive involvement of FAO and OIE in committee work, the question of joint Committees (GF-TADS expert groups on selected issues of common interest, and which that report to both organisations) should now be raised.

9. Collaboration with the WRL and other national laboratories: The FAO World Reference Laboratory for FMD continues to play a very important role in the Commission’s activities, with the WRL represented at each of the EUFMD Sessions and providing services through a contract with EUFMD and with the FAO regular programme and experts for workshops.

EUFMD/FAO is also a partner in the DG-Research funded Co-ordination Action for FMD and CSF laboratories, co-ordinated by David Paton at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright (WRL); the working groups in this initiative on FMD have been organised to avoid overlap and as far as possible contribute to EUFMD actions.

The Secretariat has worked closely with WRL to implement support to NRLs in African and other countries to support delivery of samples for virus typing. The requirements of each situation are different and the process of supporting countries demanding in effort, and the close co-operation of WRL and EUFMD has been important to overcoming obstacles and building trust with the countries concerned.

The Commission also financed the FAO-WRL Phase XIX project (reports: in the Session of the EUFMD research group), which continued to provide external quality assurance (proficiency test panels) to laboratories of member countries, and continued development of international reference sera - and can be considered to be the pre-eminent international initiative in FMDV diagnostic standardisation.

10. Publications Official Session reports and Workshop Proceedings are given in the Annex to the final report.

11. Missions Details of mission travel in 2005 and 2006 are given in the Annex to the final report.

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Appendix 18 Status of EUFMD actions - Outline activity plan 2007 - 8

Activity status - under the 5 Strategic Plan categories

•

• • •

o •

In summary: Most of the actions described are subject to funding from EC (SANCO) via the 2005 agreement (8 million €), or in the case of pilot studies, the EUFMD Trust Fund (ie subject to the Executive Ctte) Emergency response actions will be taken as required and determined by the EC and EUFMD Executive, Funding agreements will be sought to implement surveillance support activities in 2008-9 (Category 1: Global FMD observation – virus circulation and risk.)

Continuation of the in country collaborative actions for early warning and prevention of transmission across Eurasian international boundaries in the middle-east should continue (Caucasus, Iran) , where possible initiated (Syria, ?Iraq) These include the Buffer Zones (BZ) in the Caucasus/Iran/Syria/Buffer Zone program in the Caucasus, continuation and possible extension of collaborative program with I.R of Iran Increased technical engagement with the European FMD expertise in the research group, and greater use of external epidemiology expertise in planning and evaluation EUFMD actions The FMD Training Initiative, reviewed following the pilot phase and evaluation (2007), extension and conversion to other languages (Turkish, Russian) – subject to funding.

151

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

Activity 1

actions Improved system for monitoring FMD virus

Annual contract All European

To be decided by EC..

Some regional

with WRL finished th

OIE WAHIS

System

development

established in high risk

strain circulation

countries, but global

2005; . 74

Small support projects (in

support e.g: 1.

operational

value

Session

total value c 160,000 USD)

Italian funded

FAO-EMPRES-I

countries

recommended

received from Ethiopia,

Central Asia TADS;

information

should

new contract at

Kenya, Mali, Niger, to

2. Asian Bank

system

continue -

60,000US$ , to

address priorities for

Mekong subregional

development

subject to

include WRL

supported submission:

project

review at

west Africa,

3. Norwegian

Avian flu projects

each

not covered by

Sudan/horn of

funding ; Somalia

on surveillance

Executive.

CRL , and in

Africa

functions that are

-

and lab capacity –

support to

indirect benefits

international

Exploratory:

surveillance, lab

FAO/OIE and Co-

QA/QC, support

ordination Action

for OIE/FAO

discussion on

network of labs.

surveillance networking.

Epidemiology

SADC region

expert group

(southern Africa) ;

meetings

EC funding 13 million € , 200710.

2

Technical constraints

All European

EUFMD-Research

Costs of EC experts to RG

DG-Res funded CA

Yes, as online

to preferred European

countries

Group meeting

meetings

FMD&CSF (2005-

community of

2007.

Request to EC for funding

).

experts

if it is a priority of the

DG-Res funded

supporting

FMD control policies reduced

152

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

Activity

actions Support contract

Executive and EC

EPIZONE (2006-)

EUFMD.

;45,000 USD, for

Funded

Simulation

actions

exercises

depend on EC

(Slovenia and

and Executive

Lithuania), QA/QC

priorities

workshop.

3

System for

All European

Training:

To be decided.

HPAI training of

Decision after

professional

countries, potential

- Training in FMD

Training initiative

trainers

evaluation of

development in FMD

global

investigation

prepared: year 1 request

approaches

Pilot Phase

management/expertise

(Turkey, 3/07) to

circa US$ 330,000 but not

relevant ?

(EUFMD

developed

respond to

formally submitted to EC in

complementarity

online) -

request from

2006.

in approaches?

web-based

Bulgaria and

EPIZONE training

training

Cyprus)

workpackage

resources.

To 2009

- develop on line training modules (pilot phase)(from 2/07-).

4

FMD risk

Trans-Caucasus-

Secretariat

surveillance and

regional

Trans-Caucasus:

Trans-Caucasus:

Office:

technical and

Buffer zone Spring

FAO funded:

Provided by Govt

management

admin support

/autumn vaccination 2007

TCP/RER/3001,

of Georgia

programmes

time.

–funding approaval from

project extended

EC needed.

into 2007. No

operating in target

overlap with EC-FAO

countries Revised proposal to be submitted (Jan 07) to EC

153

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of Activity

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

actions to fund 2007-8-9.

FMD management in

Georgia

target countries

BZ Spring vaccination

EC-FSP support

2007 planned.

finished 2006.

2007 priorities

Some EC support

identified with Govt::

to reform of

Technical support to

veterinary service.

establish TADinfo/National Surveillance system

US-DETRA

(NADSS).

project. Important

Baseline national FMD

capacity in FMD

survey.

diagnosis will be

Prevention planning:

in place.

Progress Contingency Plans

FMD management in target countries

Armenia

BZ Spring vaccination

EC-FSP in country

2007 planned

technical

2007 priorities,

assistance to

identified with Govt

implement

funds not yet agreed :

NADSS.

Implement TADinfo/NADSS with active

FAO/Italian

follow up of FMD sero-

Government

surveillance findings.

support to

Laboratory support:

brucellosis control

-training in Brescia and in

(started 2006) –

154

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of Activity

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

actions Yerevan, establish

some synergy in

serology to support

planned baseline

national surveys.

national survey.

Imprtove capacity for outbreak investigation /virus confirmation Progress NCPs FMD management in target countries

Azerbaijan

BZ Spring vaccination

EC-FSP,

2007 planned

French bilateral.

2007

US-DETRA project

priorities,identified with

should begin

Govt , funds not yet

2007. Important

agreed :

capacity in FMD

Address 2006 problems

diagnosis will be in place - ?2008

National baseline FMD sero-survey.

FAO/UNDP

Progress NCPs

support to

Surveillance system:

privatised delivery

Implement TADinfo

of vet. services,

installation, training,

focus on

NADSS with active follow

brucellosis

up of FMD sero-

surveillance and

surveillance findings.

control.

Laboratory support: -external quality assurance

155

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

Activity

actions and training to establish sero-monitoring.

- outbreak /virus confirmation FMD management in

Iran

target countries

Secretariat

Iran:

technical and

FAO Technical co-

admin support

ordinator in place

time Secretariat

provided by France.

technical support

Phase 1 programme

time

approved, [US$ 761,000, of which 2006: US$381k.].

Continue surveillance in 7 pilot study areas.

Extend disease investigation training and reporting to whole country.

Implement serosurveillance for assessment of vaccination coverage

FMD management in target countries

Turkey

Secretariat

Turkey:

FAO animal health

EC enlargement

Operational:

technical support

Emergency response -if

officer to be posted

support to FMD

Depends on

time

required

to Ankara (for

eradication

need and

Strengthen outbreak

Central Asian

(project fiche

progress of

investigation (55k USD) in

countries) .

prep) -support

EC/Turkey

Organise

156

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

Activity

actions international

3 regional investigation

Increased capacity

expected to begin

FMD program.

meeting -

centres (to April 07).

for local

mid- 2007

“Tripartite”” on

Other inputs to be decided

FMD/PPR/pox/BT

Organisation

FMD control in the

1/2007, depends on start

technical support

of co-

Turkish

of EC/Turkey funded

ordination

neighbourhood “”.

vaccination project.

meetings :

Actions in 2007-8 to

Regional

protect eastern borders

disease

and prepare for national

control

eradication.

Thrace region: Diagnostic support to serosurveillance to be identified 1/2007.

Syria

To be decided

ELISA kit for FMDV

If programme

detection supplied.

established

Mission needed: Support package to ensure FMDV can be detected and typed, for surveillance support, laboratory etc.

FMD management in

Iraq

target countries

Secretariat

Possibly: aia EC/FAO/Iran

Uncertain; via

Unclear and

technical support

project: support FMD

FAO(TCES) - support

uncertain

time

typing in those regions

to rebuilding

(Kurdish areas) on

services.

?

Turkish border.

FMD managemert in

Moldova

Via FAOSEUM

157

Category

Targets/supported

EUFMD funded

EC-FAO Trust Fund

of

Other FAO

Complementary

Continuation

relating to FMD

donor & FAO

in 2008

Activity

actions target countries

(Budapest) Moldova: US$ 314k EC-FAO FSP funded technical support to harmonisation/TADS prevention and control, 2006-8 Middle-east and

Repeat of 2006

Routine co-

north Africa

roundtable on

ordination

FMD ?

meetings with

Secretariat

OIE/FAO

technical support

Regional

to FMD roundtable

Animal Health

meeting

Centre

November 2007 (2

(Beirut)

days) 5

FMD

EU & EUFMD m.c.

As required;

Situation dependent.

EC/Turkey

incursions/emergencies

benefit.

Secretariat

Emergency tender: vaccine

FMD control

rapidly controlled,

technical support

for Turkey 3/07

project to be

where supported by

time

specific EC decisions

As required

initiated in 2007

158

Appendix 19 Relating to formation of a Management Support Group (MSG) for the Commission EUFMD Secretariat

159

Appendix 20

Report of the Chairman of the EUFMD Research Group on the: 1. Sessions of the FAO EUFMD Research Group at (i) Greifswald, Insel-Riems, Germany, 20-23 September 2005 and (ii) Paphos, Cyprus, 17-19 October 2006.

2. FAO EUFMD RG WORKPLAN 2006-2008 Kris De Clercq, Chairman of the EUFMD Research Group

Item 1 - Lessons learnt from the recent events in FMD control and Regional risk situation - Studies on the importance of each of the transmission routes for farm to farm infection in the 2001 epidemic in the UK indicates that efficiency gains in biosecurity could be an effective means to significantly reduce transmission and could strongly contribute to the control of an epidemic.

- There is great potential for full genome sequencing in FMD epidemiology, e.g. to identify the main routes of transmission between farms.

- Significant quantities of animal products are brought by air traffic into European countries every day by passengers from FMD endemic countries.

- Turkey should be encouraged to continue to organise sero-surveillance in Thrace region and to extend active surveillance studies in Eastern Anatolia.

- Sero-monitoring of virus circulation and FMDV vaccination in the Caucasus: The objectives of the serosurvey were to estimate the level and describe the geographical distribution of antibodies to structural (SP) and non-structural proteins (NSP) and to interpret the findings in relation to the effect of vaccination and evidence for circulating infection.

Item 2 - Virus transmission, the art of understanding FMD spread - Modelling airborne spread of FMDV is very complex and valid estimates require combining laboratory findings, good field work, modelling and experience of past outbreaks.

- The inverse age effect of FMD in cattle was reported. This needs to be further evaluated, including looking at susceptibility and differences in infectivity, and a possible association with strain-dependency. The relevance of the findings for contingency planning should be evaluated.

Item 3 - Vaccine development, production and selection - There is an urgent need to test the ability of vaccine strains to protect against heterologous strains and correlate it to the results of in-vitro methods like r-values, sequences and MAb-binding profiles.

- There is insufficient knowledge on the duration of immunity, in particular in respect to heterologous strains.

Item 4 - Vaccine control: Validation, Quality Control and Quality Assurance - It is not possible to discriminate between a vaccine with a PD50 of 3, 6 or 10 based on the outcome of a single potency trial.

- Statistical validation of alternative potency methods is needed to make any further revision of the FMD Ph.Eur. Monograph possible.

- A positive correlation was found between IFN-gamma response in cattle and protection against clinical disease.

160

Item 5 - Vaccine application, contingency planning and simulation exercises - Vaccination reduces virus replication and virus excretion in cattle pigs and sheep, which would potentially reduce transmission during an outbreak.

- Anti-viral agents have been shown to inhibit FMDV replication both in vitro and in vivo and may have potential for use in controlling the spread of infection during an outbreak.

- In order to rapidly apply vaccination in crisis situations, governments should identify areas where FMD emergency vaccination will be necessary if an FMD outbreak occurs.

- Decision support systems (DSS) can be used in planning for epidemics, risk mapping, estimate the required size of vaccine banks and resource allocation as well as exploring different strategies such as stamping out, vaccination and combinations of these. The use of mathematical models during outbreaks to predict spread has proved more controversial.

- A working group on FMD simulation exercises should produce a standard for the core components that national simulation exercises should contain and a standard format for reporting the results and outputs of such exercises.

Item 6 - Diagnostics: Diva tests - Serum panels for evaluating different DIVA tests have been created for several FMD susceptible species (cattle, pigs and small ruminants); - Clinical disease in pigs might be required to generate a good antibody response to NSP. In order to reliably estimate sensitivity and specificity parameters for different DIVA tests in pigs, more data is needed on the occurrence of subclinical infection in vaccinated pigs and on the performance of the tests in these herds.

- Studies to address knowledge gaps in validation data from sheep, goats, water buffalo and pigs should be supported, in particular data should be generated on the specificity of NSPEs in vaccinated animals of those species.

- Probang-sampling followed by RT-PCR is insufficiently sensitive unless three serial samples are tested.

- Serosurveillance can substantiate rather than demonstrate freedom from infection after an outbreak. Different combinations of tests can be used in series to improve the overall diagnostic specificity but sensitivity remains a limiting factor in achieving the required level of confidence within small herds.

- Possible solutions to the “small herd problem” include: (i) not vaccinating them; (ii) vaccinating them but increasing the number of small herds “sampled” to increase the probability of detecting infection or (iii) applying a vaccinate-to-kill policy.

- Preliminary results on the use of a new software tool to optimise herd sensitivity whilst maintaining a minimum herd specificity by altering the numbers of samples taken per herd and the cut point at which a farm would be considered positive shows that the current NSPEs are fit for purpose to substantiate freedom of FMD at a 5% prevalence at herd level and 2% prevalence between herds.

- There needs to be a much better understanding of the interpretation of NSP data and the use of serological profiling and cluster analysis for differentiating true and false positive outbreak clusters.

Workshop on the design and interpretation of post Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD)vaccination serosurveillance by NSP tests, 2007.

Item 7 - Diagnostics: Confidence in results: Quality Control/Quality Assurance - Validation, including investigations of field samples, of novel diagnostic platforms either based on genome or antigen detection should be conducted with high priority.

- Guidelines for use of field-based tests should be established as part of contingency plans.

- The proficiency tests concentrated on a wide distribution of a live virus proficiency panel along with the distribution of a serology and antigen detection ELISA panel based on inactivated materials.

- The serology proficiency panel was applicable to both non-structural and structural protein antibody tests and the priority serotypes were O, A, Asia 1 and SAT 2.

161

- Inter-laboratory testing exercises provide a valuable opportunity to compare tests. It is important that participants are given individual feedback concerning their performance and consideration needs to be given to follow-up in relation to discrepancies identified.

In this respect there is a need for a clear procedure to be followed taking into account the relationship with the CVO. - Future studies should aim to harmonise serology used for monitoring the efficacy of vaccination.

- A simple method can be established within each laboratory for correlating confidence in a given qualitative test result to the quantitative read-out of the test itself.

Item 8 - Laboratory bio-security - Under special conditions it will be of advantage to allow laboratories not meeting the security standards for FMD laboratories adopted in 1993 to carry out the laboratory diagnosis of FMD with methods, which do not require the propagation of virus. However, these exceptions should not compromise the efforts to exclude the escape of FMDV from laboratories in FMD – free countries.

Item 9 - Virus inactivation studies - A scenario tree for the analysis of a risk assessment on the risk of FMDV in pork from vaccinated animals was established and it was concluded that the risk of FMDV in pork from vaccinated pigs was low, however, the uncertainties inherent in the assessment is significant.

Item 10 – Wildlife - In all recent European outbreaks wildlife were not implicated in the spread of FMD and the outbreaks could be controlled without any specific action devoted to wild species, native or exotic.

- Although a high proportion of gazelle have been seropositive after being involved in FMD outbreaks in Israel, the prevalence of antibodies dropped indicating that the virus did not circulate on its own within the gazelle population.

162

Item 11 - FAO EUFMD RG WORKPLAN 2006-2008

Theme

Task (blue italic = associated task)

Who

Draft/freque

Completion

ncy 1. Global

1.1

Global surveillance maps/models

Surveillance

Liaison person DP to

Yearly progress Ongoing

actions between CA,

report

FAO and OIE 1.2

Establish regular risk reporting – virus types circulating in Iran,

FG, KS, DP (link)

3 monthly

Ongoing

Yearly report

Ongoing

Pakistan, Afghan...

1.3

Improving delivery of viruses from risk areas

Secretariat, WRL

on gaps/progress 1.4

Priority antigens for the European Ag banks

WRL

6 months

Ongoing

Every 2 years 1.5

Minimum size of vaccine stocks in EU vaccine banks – position

AD, (Paul Barnett),

Outline

2007 (pre-

paper

KS, AEF

Progress report General Session) 2006

1.6

1.7.

Type C vaccination/eradication position paper

KS, DP, KDC, SoA

Progress report Closed Session -

Expert consultation in 2007

(+FAO colleagues)

Gen Ses 2007

Procedure for naming of FMD strains/subtypes

DP (Nick Knowles)

2007

Closed Session 2007

2.

Strategy for prevention of FMD entry into Europe – group should

Prevention

review risks and interventions

3. Sero-

Design sero-monitoring in vaccination zones –Thrace and Trans-

KS, FM/MB, AEF

KDC, MB, DS, NB,

Progress report Closed Session Gen Ses 2007

2007

by Feb- 2007.

Ongoing

163

monitoring

4. EQA FMD

Caucasus

4.1.

Diagnostics

-

refine, re-design

-

support future official status (Thrace)

KM, CP

Results – Closed Session

Establish EQA support for 2007– virus detection and serology

DP, KDC, BH, EB, KS,

Meet to co-

Closed Session -

(Phase XX)

AEF

ordinate with

2007

CRL. 4.2.

Harmonisation of the serology used for monitoring the efficacy of

DP, EB, AD, KDC

vaccination 5. PVS

5.1.

5.2.

5.3.

6. DSS

7. Biosecurity

Progress report Closed Session Gen Ses 2007

2007

Test/optimise guidelines on the use of NSP tests through simulation

KDC, DP, AD, EB, DS,

Progress report Closed Session -

at workshop (using selected scenarios)

AEF

Gen Ses 2007

Complete analysis on sheep and pigs, buffalo

KDC, DS, GG

Progress report Closed Session -

2007

Gen Ses 2007

2007 Gen Ses 2007

Substantiate freedom from infection: position paper

KS, AEF, DP, BH, PW

Nov 2006

Decision support systems – develop position paper on validity,

Secretariat (links

Progress report Closed Session -

applicability, gaps

also with CA)

Gen Ses 2007

2007

Biosecurity guidelines – follow up required:

BH, SoA, HY, AEF

Jan 2007

Gen Ses 2007

-

table with gaps between standards of FAO and OIE

8. Virus

Inactivation studies

SoA, AD, PW, (IAH-

Progress report Closed Session -

inactivation

- Milk and milk products: combination with Pakistan study?

Don King),

Gen Ses 2007

2007

- Meat and meat products: follow-up needed 9. Pen-side

Pen-side tests position paper

DS, Scott Reid, HY

Gen Ses 2007

Laboratory Contingency Plans: to be placed on the website

Secretariat

Gen Ses 2007

test 10. LCP

(link to CA) Scaling up diagnostic capacity: Workshop on upscaling serology –

Check timetable-

164

only interesting for eastern European countries, particularly that are

Secretariat, GG,

CA will send

not candidate countries

CA

around as

end 2007

Manual 11. Potency test

Potency test evaluation (Turkey) Link person KDC

-

FMD_ImproCon

-

Position paper on potency tests in pigs - do we require

AD, AEF, DP-Zidong*,

Progress report Closed Session -

vaccines to be tested in pigs, and are there new

BH

Gen Ses 2007

alternatives?

SoA(epidemiology)

2007

*link to China 12. Sample

Sample transport guidelines – to be sent around

BH (Nigel Ferris)

Gen Ses 2007

Closed meeting (October 2007)

Secretariat

Progress report

(Egypt / the Netherlands)

KDC

Gen Ses 2007

Open meeting Italy (Sardinia, Sicily)

EB

transport 13. Meeting

SoA: Soren Alexanderson; EB: Emiliana Brocchi; MB: Mark Bronsvoort; NB: Naci Bulut; KDC: Kris De Clercq; AD: Aldo Dekker; AEF: Alf-Eckbert Füssel; FG: Francis Geiger; GG: Georgi Georgev; BH: Bernd Haas; KM: Koen Mintiens; FM: François Moutou; DP: David Paton; CP: Carsten Pötzsch; DS: Donal Sammin; KS: Keith Sumption; PW: Preben Willeberg; HY: Hagai Yadin.

CA = Co-ordination Action – FMD and CSF laboratories (DG-Res); CRL: European Community Reference Laboratory; WRL: World Reference Laboratory

165

166

Appendix 21 Summary of presentations to the Session ofo the EUFMD Research Grouop in Paphos, Cyprus, October 2006 Nesya Goris

167

168

169

Appendix 22 Report of a simulation exercise on surveillance after emergency vaccination of cattle in normally FMD free northern European country Kris de Clercq

170

171

172

173

174

Appendix 23 On application of methods for improving confidence in the outcome of surveillance for disease freedom Tom Murray

175

176

177

The Stochastic Scenario Tree Approach to Combining Multiple Sources of Evidence to Demonstrate Freedom from FMD (Information Paper) Tom Murray, Associate Professional Officer, FAO-EUFMD Commission The following paper is principally based on workshops attended by the Author in February 2006 and February 2007 on the use of complex sources of evidence to demonstrate freedom from disease.

Introduction The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code provides guidelines for demonstration of disease freedom. Specific measures for Foot-and-Mouth Disease are described in Chapter 2.2.10 and surveillance guidelines in appendix 3.8.7. Appendix 3.8.1.5 provides for the use of multiple sources of evidence to demonstrate disease freedom. Paragraph 4 states that “The methodology used to combine the evidence from multiple data sources should be scientifically valid, and fully documented including references to published material”7 “Traditionally, national disease status has been determined using structured crosssectional surveys, which are generally difficult and expensive to implement. On-going surveillance may also be assessed by expert panels, but there are no accepted methods for quantifying either confidence in the surveillance process, or the probability of national disease freedom demonstrated thereby”.8 Demonstration of disease freedom presents extra difficulties in regions with inadequate technology or resources to apply conventional surveillance systems and in vaccinated populations where design prevalence would be quite low, clinical signs may be less evident and serological tests must be able to distinguish between the vaccinated and exposed animal. Further, the confidence in the disease freedom will depend on the likelihood that incursions of infection occur without detection by the surveillance system, for example when the area has land borders or is in close proximity to an endemic area.

Provision is made in EU Council Directive 2003/85/EC for the use of vaccination in the face of any future outbreaks of FMD in European countries. Non Structural Protein (NSP) tests have been developed to distinguish the vaccinated animal from the exposed animal and desktop simulation exercises/workshops are currently being conducted to consider the implications associated with the use of these tests to demonstrate FMD freedom after eradication of FMD, when vaccination has been used as a control measure. An important topic discussed at the first of these exercises was the question of how to deal with small numbers of test positive animals. It was concluded at this workshop that these positives should be dealt with in the context of the overall surveillance system, including epidemiological, clinical and serological examinations.

The scenario tree approach is a means of combining various sources of evidence in a quantitative manner and could prove useful when dealing with small numbers of antibody test positive animals. This concept was originally developed in relation to regions where limitations in technology or communications may inhibit the use of conventional surveillance systems and where multiple sources of data which are already available would provide more compelling evidence of disease freedom.

Outline of how quantitative methods are used to combine surveillance system components into one overall surveillance system and its evaluation The aim of the system is to combine the various surveillance system components, including passive/routine surveillance and active surveys; for example random

7

8

OIE. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 2006. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/A_summry.htm

Cameron A, et al . Demonstrating freedom from disease using multiple complex data sources. A

proposed standardised methodology and case study. Open Session of the EUFMD Standing Technical Committee. Bern. 16-19 September 2003.

178

serosurveillance, non comprehensive serosurveillance9 compulsory notification, veterinary farm visits, abattoir inspections and other data sources (Figure 1), to produce a quantitative value for our confidence in disease freedom given that none of the surveillance system components detected disease. This can also be described as the negative predictive value of the overall system. The probability of a new incursion of disease, within a given time period, is also incorporated into the model and variations in relative risks between different regions and animal groups are accounted for.

Figure 1: Combining Surveillance System Components (SSC) into a Surveillance System Surveillance System

SSC1 Random Serosurveillance

SSC2 Veterinary inspections

SSC3 Compulsory Notification

SSC 4 .................

SSC5 ..................

Bayesian inference is used to combine the prior probability of disease/circulation and survey results to calculate the posterior probability of disease/circulation. The original prior probability may be based on risk assessments, expert opinion any other relevant data. To combine surveillance system components, where there is a lack of independence between surveillance system components, the posterior probability of disease calculated from the first surveillance system component is used as the prior probability for the next surveillance system component and so on. Where there is complete independence between surveillance system components then the original prior is used. Further calculations are required for dealing with varying levels of independence. For the following surveillance programme the prior probability can be estimated using the posterior probability from the previous survey and the likelihood of a new incursion over the relevant time period. Many of the inputs and outputs of these models are in the form of distributions (stochastic) rather than point data, as this more accurately reflects the variability and uncertainty associated with most biological data. A more detailed guide to the development of a scenario tree for an individual surveillance system component, the combination of surveillance system components and how the probability of disease incursion is accounted for are available at the Ausvet website: http://www.ausvet.com.au/freedom Situations where this work can be relevant to the work of the EUFMD Commission Substantiation of FMD freedom in vaccinated populations and how to deal with small numbers of positive results to serosurveillance surveys are currently major topics of discussion within Europe. The quantitative use of other sources of evidence combined with serosurveillance could assist in finding a solution to this problem which is repeatable and which allows comparison between different surveillance systems used in different regions.

This work can be used to support disease surveillance in countries bordering Europe.

Countries which are vaccinating to control disease will eventually want to declare freedom with vaccination, followed by a declaration of disease freedom without vaccination one year after vaccination programmes cease. The use of the scenario tree approach can identify other sources of data which would, if combined with serosurveillance, improve our overall confidence in disease freedom. The increased risk associated with the movement of animals during festivals such as the Kurban festival can be factored into the work. The Thrace region of Western Turkey is an area of particular importance to the EUFMD Commission, as it acts as a buffer zone between non vaccinating countries in South-East Europe and Eastern Turkey (Anatolia). In 2007 there have been sporadic outbreaks of FMD Serotype A and Serotype O in Thrace. Efforts are been made through vaccination and biosecurity measures to once again eradicate disease in this area. When eradication is achieved it will then be important that best use is made of all available sources of data used in demonstration of disease freedom and that the overall surveillance system would ensure early detection should a new outbreak occur.

9

Non comprehensive serosurveillance refers to any serosurveillance which is not random and therefore not fully representative of the population

179

Proposed technique for EUFMD Secretariat to implement the scenario tree approach to demonstrate disease freedom and to early detection of circulating virus The process should be an iterative and progressive activity where uncertainty associated with data is reduced with each survey (Figure 2). A workshop would be organised where the scenario tree would be constructed. A situation of major interest would be the Thrace region of Turkey, or possibly adjoining areas of Greece and Bulgaria. The participants would comprise of individuals with experience of the epidemiology of FMD in the specific region, knowledge of other sources of evidence which could be used to demonstrate freedom from FMD circulation and knowledge of the use of the scenario tree approach to demonstrate disease freedom. These individuals would include (for example) official veterinarians from Turkey, consultants hired by the EUFMD Commission in Thrace in recent years and members of the EUFMD research group.

Figure 2: Iterative process for development of surveillance programme based on the stochastic scenario tree approach

Evaluation of Results

Evaluation of Surveillance System in Place

Implementation

Identification of other data sources and strategies to reduce uncertainty

of Surveillance Programme

Design of Surveillance Programme

Modeling and Evaluation of other data sources in Scenario Tree

180

The aim of the process is to produce a structured and coordinated design for a most effective surveillance system for demonstration of disease freedom that incorporates the experience of recent surveys, technologies available and the experience of experts in the region.

1. Workshop a. The Negative Predictive Value (NPV) of the current surveillance systems in place should be evaluated b. Other sources of data available to include in the surveillance system are identified and ranked. Ideally these sources of data are already in place and the objective here is to quantify their value within an overall surveillance system. c. Rough trials are carried out of the other sources of evidence using the scenario tree approach. Risk assessments, literature and expert opinion can be used to estimate values of parameters inserted into the scenario tree. The inputs and outputs are often in the form of distributions (stochastic) rather than point values, as this is more reflective of the uncertainty and variability associated with biological processes. d. The other sources of data are re-ranked based on the sensitivity of the overall outputs to the various inputs and the degree of uncertainty associated with each input. Including data sources with the minimum uncertainty associated with them and reducing the uncertainty of the most significant data sources, helps to improve the overall model. e. Decisions made on what sources of evidence should be included in the overall model and proposals for reducing uncertainty associated with these inputs.

2. Carry out surveillance for the time period in question using surveillance system components decided on during the workshop.

3. When all results are in and given negative results, calculate the negative predictive value of the overall surveillance system and the probability of disease given the negative surveillance results 4. The overall surveillance system should be analysed to identify how the next survey can be improved and how uncertainty associated with various inputs can be reduced.

5. The posterior probability of disease is combined with the probability of re-entry of disease into the region to produce an estimate of the prior probability of disease for the next survey Conclusion The scenario tree approach can be used to gather all available sources of evidence in a coordinated approach to demonstrate disease freedom. This quantitative approach provides for a repeatability and comparability between different surveillance systems used for different regions and in different time periods. It can use expert opinion, risk assessments, current and historic data. The aim is to make best use of all sources of evidence already available and helps to provide a framework to bring together the knowledge and experience of experts in a coordinated and logical fashion. The time period of surveillance, the likelihood of new incursions of disease and the relative risks of disease between different strata (regions or animal groups) are all factored into this approach.

References: OIE. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 2006. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/A_summry.htm Cameron A. Barford K. Martin T. Greiner M. Sergeant E. and other members of the International EpiLab research team on Disease Freedom. Demonstrating freedom from disease using multiple complex data sources. A proposed standardised methodology and case study. Open Session of the EUFMD Standing Technical Committee. Bern. 16-19 September 2003.

EPIZONE, EUFMD (FAO) & EU Coordination Action FMD-CSF. Workshop on the design and interpretation of post Foot-and-Mouth Disease vaccination serosurveillance by NSP tests Part I (dense cattle-pig countries). January 23-25, 2007

181

Willeberg P. (2003) Note on Animal Health Surveillance. Impressions from an OIE Technical Consultation in Ft Collins, Colorado 17-21 March 2003. Appendix14. pp 148-151.

Thirty-fifth General Session of the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease http://www.ausvet.com.au/freedom/ COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease.

Acknowledgements The methodology for the analysis of complex surveillance systems using stochastic scenario tree modelling was developed principally by Angus Cameron, Tony Martin, Jenny Hutchison, Evan Sergeant and Nigel Perkins.

Dr Keith Sumption, EUFMD Commission.

182

Appendix 24

Minimum size of antigen stocks in the EU vaccine bank Position paper A. Dekker10, Laboatory for Vesicular Diseases, CIDC-Lelystad, and P. Barnett , Institute for Animal health, Pirbright, UK

Introduction Forman and Garland [1] describe the history and value of vaccine banks. According to them the big advantages of antigen banks over the storage pre-formulated vaccines are: • flexibility in the formulation of monovalent or polyvalent vaccines, • flexibility in the level of antigen incorporation (doses, Payload?), • flexibility in the type of adjuvant (ALSA or DOE) and • Extended shelf life (at least 15 years) as compared to 12 to 18 months for FMD vaccines.

The EU antigen bank was established by Council Decision 91/666/EEC based on Article 13 of Directive 85/511/EEC. Antigens were at that time procured with the intention to slaughter vaccinated animals or even kill them and little attention was paid to aspects such as marketing authorisation. Instead these antigens were deposited in strategic places depending on the prevailing risks.

Council Decision 91/666/EEC initially required to keep 5 million doses of each subtype of antigen. This figure was later adjusted by Decision 2001/181/EC which requires at least 2 million doses of each antigen.

The working Groups assisting the Commission in preparing Directive 2003/85/EC recommended to keep 5 million doses of 12 antigens.

In order to exercise their right of initiative in accordance with Article 13 (3) last paragraph, and Article 14 (1) of Directive 85/511/EEC, several EU Member States (UK, The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and probably others) are maintaining their own reserves.

Those provisions are now included in Article 50(5) and in Section 14 of Directive 2003/85/EC. The need for national reserves in several countries like The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany may also be partially explained by the extremely high density of susceptible animals and the need to have emergency vaccines available without delay.

Due to marketing authorisation constraints the EU antigen reserve has been limited to one bank held at Merial in two locations. Currently there are at least 1 million doses available for all strains, but for some strains the availability is higher.

Even though the risk for introduction of strains occurring close to the borders of the EU is higher, there is no evidence that these strains specifically would spread more readily and that higher amounts of antigen should be stored. Therefore it is reasonable to state that for all antigens the same minimum amount should be stored.

However, with the view to assisting third countries to control FMD on their territory, the likelihood to donate vaccines into areas adjacent to the EU, it is useful to store a higher number of doses of vaccines that cover the strains circulating in adjacent areas.

Two points that will not be discussed in this paper is the merits of having more strains and lower amounts versus fewer strains in larger amount if the funding is limited, and secondly whether agreements between the central European vaccine banks and the national European vaccine banks, or other vaccine banks world wide, could modulate the number of doses for a particular strain.

The main question addressed in this paper is; "what is the minimum amount of vaccine doses required in Europe". The answer to this question should be based, as required by

10

Member of the EUFMD Standing Technical Committee

183

legislation, on the estimates made in the framework of contingency planning and notably on the vaccination policy applied. Although some countries only plan to vaccinate cattle, research in the past [2] including that of other diseases like influenza [3] show that vaccination of all susceptible individuals leads to better results, even if some individuals are not very susceptible or not likely to get ill. Therefore it is likely that emergency vaccination only helps if all susceptible species in the vaccination area are vaccinated, and in the discussion about numbers of animals to be vaccinated we base the minimum amount of vaccine, were relevant, on the quantity of all susceptible animals in a vaccination zone.

Table 1: Data on animal livestock in several European countries (2005, FAOSTAT).

Buffaloe Camels Cattle Goats Pigs Sheep s Albania 120 0 655 000 941 000 147 000 1 760 000 Austria 0 0 2 050 55 523 3 125 327 163 991 361 Armenia Azerbaijan, Republic of Belgium

402

573 260

46 655

89 082

601 387

22 932

26 455 73 474

6 332 433 653 343

308 551

201

0

0

Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria

13 000

0

2 007 206 2 694 662 459 790

7 973

0

671 579

718 117

931 402

Croatia

0

0

471 025

120 000

Cyprus

0

0

57 704

329 297

1 205 000 427 919

Czech Republic

0

0

12 623

Denmark

0

0

Estonia France

0 0

0 0

Germany

0

0

Georgia

33 200

Greece

0

0

1 397 308 1 544 296 249 800 19 383 000 13 034 500 1 250 672 600 000

Greenland Hungary

0 0

0 0

15 723 000

Iceland Ireland

0 0

0 0

Italy

205 000

0

550 000

146 000

0 0 0

0 0 0

63 375 6 888 000 6 255 000 8 800 000 371 100 6 000 791 966

0 725

0 0

185 235 248 185

2 203 0

435 700 3 000 1 073 348 90 147 155 753

0 0

0 0

17 900 331 000

5 400 119 000

73 000 398 000

Iran Islamic Rep of Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia,The Fmr Yug Rp Malta Moldova, Republic

556 597 6 887 444 155 333 902 731 1 692 507 796 480 268 874

2 876 834 13 466 283 340 100 15 020 198 26 857 800

140 197

115 700

483 854

689 200

5 400 000 0 74 000

1 000 000 0 4 059 000 41 152 1 681 100 9 200 000

9 000 000 19 000 1 397 000 451 559 4 556 700 7 954 000 54 000 000 38 600 2 900 22 149

0 2 900 1 212 590 170 000

433 7 700 945 000 26 500 000 14 700 280 26 904

160 745 38 800 9 185 475 2 642 400

10 277 1 244 000 14 900 823 000

total 3 503 120 5 559 038 1 265 594 9 827 721 9 208 883 2 102 338 4 021 578 2 592 505 1 083 794 4 426 962 15 171 324 631 600 44 801 263 42 704 700

16 000 000 19 015 6 253 000 556 519 13 133 500 24 559 000 54 000 000 860 100 12 180 1 914 367 287 862 1 648 663 111 200 1 671

184

of Netherlands

0

0

Norway

0

0

Poland

0

0

Portugal

0

0

Romania

0

0

Slovakia

0

Slovenia

3 799 000 920 300

282 000

141 475

0

5 483 290 1 443 000 2 808 000 527 889

0

0

451 136

22 000

Spain

0

0

Sweden

0

0

2 904 690 0

Switzerland

0

0

103 900

865

0

0

6 463 530 1 619 000 1 544 547 10 069 346 10 378 000

Turkey United Kingdom

64 500

547 000 661 000 39 566

73 970 6 609 037 92 000

11 312 000 515 400 18 112 380 2 348 000 6 495 000 1 108 265 533 998 24 884 022 1 823 474 1 609 497 4 399 00 4 851 000

000 16 756 000 3 917 200 24 053 108 9 838 000 17 389 000 1 996 207 1 101 134 57 001 725 3 921 874 3 674 364 41 988 702 50 574 048

1 363 000 2 417 000 315 963 5 500 000 7 425 000 320 487 94 000 22 749 483 479 400 446 350 25 201 155 35 253 048

Data analysis There are several ways to address the question, in every way there are limitations to the knowledge we have of the events that may or may not take place in the future. In this paragraph we will use data from three different sources; FAO information on animal livestock in Europe, the relation between animal density and the risk of infection (as a proxy for the size of an outbreak), and the UK strategic reserve paper on optimal antigen stock requirements?).

Total numbers of animals Based on the data in Table 1, the highest number of susceptible animals per country is in Spain, over 54 million animals. In the 2001 UK outbreak over 4 million animals were slaughtered, which is approximately 8.3% of the livestock population. The Netherlands were lucky with only just over 270 thousand animals killed, which was only 1.6% of the total susceptible population.

If in a vaccination programme the number of animals vaccinated would have been similar to the number of animals culled during the previous outbreaks, between 1.6% (one million) and 8.3% (4.7 million) of 57 million animals would have to be vaccinated within the largest population in Spain.

It should be noted that it is most likely that the EU would also supply vaccines in the case of outbreaks occurring in its direct or even distant neighbours we therefore also took into consideration the livestock population in adjacent countries.

Density of farms A recent study in the Netherlands related the risk of a large outbreak (reproduction ratio above 1) to farm density (Boender et al. 2006). Using the infection kernel (probability of a farm getting infected in relation to the distance to an infected premise), they produced a risk map of the Netherlands to identify the areas in which the average number of new infections per infectious farm would be more than 1 using the standard EU measures (culling the infected farm, standstill in the protection and surveillance zone). Only a few parts of the Netherlands were at risk for a large outbreak. The major part was in the same area where the 2001 outbreak occurred (Figure 1). This study indicates that in most cases emergency vaccination is not necessary (The Netherlands has the highest overall density of cloven hoofed animals in Europe, over 400 animals per square kilometre). Although the number of vaccine doses needed to stop transmission in such a densely populated livestock area would be high, the number of areas in Europe where vaccination in case of

185

an outbreak is needed would likely be limited. In the Netherlands during the 2001 outbreak a little less than 190 000 doses was used. So if outbreaks occurred in 5 of these areas, one million doses would be sufficient in Europe. One should however remember that the mount of vaccine needed heavily depends on how soon an introduction is detected and how many areas already have been infected at the moment control measures are implemented.

Figure 1:

Comparison of the area with the highest farm density (on the left) where the reproduction ratio is estimated to be above 1 (red) or between 0.75 and 1 (orange) with the area where the 21 of the 23 outbreaks occurred in 2001 (outbreaks with the same colour have the same VP1 sequence).

UK strategic reserve In the UK a paper tabled at the UK FMD EXPERT GROUP was prepared in December 2005 for a "Recommendation of the amount of vaccine doses that should be available for each strain stored in the UK strategic reserve". In this paper several issues were addressed, specifically: "Expected number and size of emergency vaccination zone", "Population of the primary target, cattle therein", "Rate of vaccine administration", "Number of doses required", "Wastage of vaccine", and "Delay period on supplementary manufactured stocks". Based on their assessment they recommended a minimum of 1.2 million doses for the UK if one vaccination is sufficient and double the amount if a booster vaccination was necessary. Additional information was obtained by a letter from Risk Solutions who simulated FMD outbreaks in the UK. The 95% percentile of the simulations with the highest number of vaccinated cattle indicated that 1.1 million cattle would be vaccinated. However in their scenario they did not include sheep and pigs, where cattle, based on the data above, is only 1/5 of the susceptible population. So the numbers of doses needed will be higher because all species should be vaccinated, and some wastage of vaccine should be taken into account.

Conclusions •

•

The number of doses needed in Europe during an FMD emergency would most likely never exceed 5 million doses, based on the total number of animals likely to require vaccination, and the upper limit of the large outbreak scenario model in the UK, if all species (5 x as much as cattle) are vaccinated.

It is likely that both assumptions mentioned at the first bullet are too extreme. The first assumption that a similar fraction of animals would have to be vaccinated as was culled in the UK 2001 outbreak is unlikely, since a sound emergency vaccination should reduce the number of outbreaks. The second assumption that the numbers in the UK would be 5 times higher if all species were vaccinated

186

• •

•

would only be true if all species were randomly spread throughout the country, but there are areas with high cattle densities and areas with high pig densities, which are not overlapping. Therefore 2 – 2.5 million doses would probably be sufficient, if vaccine producers can restock the reserves within a few months.

The latter indicates that Europe would be better off with more than one producer for FMD vaccine, so restocking within a few months is more likely.

Precise prediction and advice on upcoming virus topotypes together with immediate vaccine matches, through the assistance of manufacturers, on new virus isolates would reduce the risk of unnecessary vaccine antigen procurements.

Vaccine reserves should be used to help neighbouring countries, and therefore at least double the amount should be present for vaccines that can cover strains circulating in neighbouring countries.

Recommendation • •

The EU should have at least 2.5 million doses available for each antigen strain held in the EU reserve bank.

For vaccine strains covering strains circulating in neighbouring countries at least 5 million doses should be available

References 1

Forman, A.J. & Garland, A.J.M. Foot and mouth disease: the future of vaccine banks. Revue scientifique et technique de l' office international des epizooties 2002, 21(3), 601-612.

2 van Bekkum, J., Bool, P.H. & Vermeulen, C.J. Experience with the vaccination of pigs for the control of foot-and-mouth disease in the Netherlands. Tijdschr. diergeneeskd. 1967, 92(Suppl.), 87-97.

3 Thomas, R.E., Jefferson, T., Demicheli, V. & Rivetti, D. Influenza vaccination for healthcare workers who work with the elderly. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2006, 3, CD005187.

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Appendix 25 Survey of the vaccine bank holdings in Europe among the EUFMD member states EUFMD Secretariat

188

Appendix 26 Summary of the EYFMD/Co-ordination Action Workshop on improving capacity to undertake emergency vaccination programmes Tom Murray

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Appendix 27 Enhancing confidence in epidemiological models of Foot-and-Mouth Disease David Schley Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, Surrey. Gu24 0NF UK

Executive Summary In the context of a growing need for reliable decision support systems, a survey of current Foot-and-Mouth Disease modelling work was undertaken to assess confidence in current models and identify priorities for future development and data research. There are a number of groups separately developing models, most of which are very similar, focussing closely on vaccination and outbreak control together with logistic and economic implications.

These models are too complex for individual analysis and comparisons between them will assist in improved implementation. This will not, however, validate underlying, often shared, assumptions, so that attempts to replicate known sequences of events remain important even though at present there are insufficient sets of outbreak data for models to be either fully vindicated or invalidated.

Procedures are necessary for the data used in models to be validated and managed, so that it is clear to decision makers what inputs models are based on, and that different models are based on the same agreed data. Integral to this is the ownership of parameters, especially with regard to logistics and available resources. The high levels of uncertainty in many parameters mean that sensitivity analysis, as far as computationally feasible, remains a prerequisite for confidence in output. A gap analysis to consider what experimental results are required for future improvements would be of value.

Greater knowledge of a model by experts is necessary for their assumptions to be assessed and validated. Given the improvements in program accessibility and simulation output, both the potential role of models and their limitations need to continue to be fully appreciated; their scope and purpose, and the involvement of end users, should be clear at inception.

1.

Introduction

The modelling of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a continually growing area of research whose importance in the understanding of the epidemiology and control of the disease has been widely acknowledged (Follett, 2002), if sometimes with reservations (Taylor, 2005).

The 2001 outbreak in Europe instigated a significant amount of new research, both by reiterating the socio-economic importance of the disease and, no doubt, because of the significant data set recorded in the UK. Such comprehensive data is a prerequisite for many of the models currently in use, and it is utilised widely by researchers (not only in Europe) for the validation and fitting of models. Developments in computing capacity have also allowed such vast data sets to be fully exploited.

The acknowledged preference for the use of emergency vaccination in any control strategy (Anderson, 2002, Follett, 2002) and its inclusion in contingency planning (EUFMD, 2001) has also exacerbated the need for reliable decision support systems. The lack of experimental results for the use of vaccines in a major outbreak, and of equivalent data sets to the 2001 UK outbreak, means that their deployment will rely heavily on theoretical predictions. Following detailed critiques (e.g. Kitching et al., 2005, Taylor, 2005) there now exists a clear understanding of, and a good level of agreement about, the key factors any model of FMD should include.

A study of current work was undertaken to consider strategies for improving confidence in FMD modelling. By considering the similarities and differences between models and the questions they attempt to answer we have sought to identify common criticisms in the systems currently available and potential areas for development.

Although overviews, reviews and critiques of existing models appear regularly in the literature (Morris et al., 2001, Green and Medley, 2002, Kao, 2002, Moutou and Durand, 2002, Kostova, 2004, Perez et al., 2004, Bronsvoort, 2005, Keeling, 2005, Taylor, 2005, Murray, 2006), albeit often with a strong focus on the 2001 UK outbreak, there appears to be a significant amount of on-going work which has not yet been published: for example, the development of an FMD model (Backer, 2007) based on a model for classical swine fever using a within-pen, within-herd and between-herd structure (Backer et al., 2007).

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Thus, while this survey has included all the publicly active models, the author accepts that the list of research groups mentioned may not be comprehensive.

2.

Methods

A literature survey of published FMD models was undertaken, together with an internet search for on-going research and groups active in this area. Clarification was sought directly from corresponding authors and project leaders via email where necessary. Only epidemiological models currently being applied or developed are discussed here: many more exist (see for example Kostova, 2004, Taylor, 2005, Keeling, 2005 and references therein). Systems which would form only part of an epidemiological model – such as advanced atmospheric dispersion models (e.g. Carruthers et al., 1996, Galmarini et al., 2004, Thykier-Nielsen et al., 2004) – and which are not specifically focused on FMD, or have not been integrated into a model, are also not included.

3.

Results

A number of separate models of FMD epidemiology were identified: a summary of those considered is given in Table 1.

Most current models are stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-based statetransition micro-simulations based on the SIR paradigm. The Imperial model stands alone in being deterministic and not spatially explicit.

Recent models have been primarily focused on the use of vaccination in the event of an outbreak, in conjunction with other methods of control including movement restrictions, security zones, slaughter of dangerous contacts and contiguous and pre-emptive culling.

Most now also include response logistics, allowing the cost-benefit associated with different strategies to be assessed.

All current FMD models are highly complex, resulting in a lack of transparency: published papers provide, at best, a basic description of the system but rarely enough for it to be reproduced by others. The replication of such work is, in practice, impractical anyway, but public access to comprehensive details of all aspects of models is necessary if confidence in their structure, at least, if not their execution, is to be established.

Micro-simulations such as AusSpread, Exodis and InterSpread Plus provide detailed models of different mechanism to include all known or suspected forms of transmission, including fomites and airborne spread, but therefore need to estimate a significant number of unknown parameters for which they rely heavily on “expert opinion”. Thus, even where details of the simulation protocol and the parameter values used are available, it is not possible to make an objective assessment of their accuracy. Because of this lack of reliable data other models, such as the Imperial and Keeling models, use crude descriptions of transmission based on distance kernels fitted to outbreak data. Such a process inevitably results in the model becoming dependent on a particular scenario and casts doubt on its accuracy under different circumstances (although this criticism can equally be applied to expert opinion in more complex models which may also be based on specific situations). At present no model combines spatial spread with adequate intra-herd dynamics modelling, probably due to exiguous experimental data.

There is a clear need to include and/or improve the modelling of within-farm dynamics (Keeling, 2005) but this requires new data on transmission: otherwise a more complex model may simply introduce artifacts not there in current farm-based models. How withinherd spread is modelled significantly influences the macroscopic dynamics of the system: a comparison project of models found that increasing infectivity results in significantly fewer infections than a constant infectivity with the same average (Dubé et al., 2006, Dubé et al., 2007), but at present the models of these processes remain hypothetical.

Each of the spatial models is capable of using detailed input data concerning farm locations and size, but weaknesses in the farm data provided constrain the reliability of results. It is reasonable to require the accuracy of inputs such as herd sizes and locations or contact histories to be of an order of magnitude greater than the desired outputs. Developments mean future models are likely to consider even more transmission factors including biosecurity, topography and complex airborne spread.

The inclusion of these will, however, be questionable at best if adequate data cannot be provided to support their explicit modelling. At present significant effort has been focused on providing adequate logistics modelling, to incorporate resource constraints into simulated control scenarios, which again requires accurate and up to date regional or national data.

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In all cases “it remains an open question whether the local-scale inaccuracies present in the models are sufficient to invalidate any of the national-scale predictions” (Keeling, 2005).

Models produced for or by specific end-users are being developed to be user-friendly, with easily accessible interfaces and graphical outputs. While this greatly facilitates their use by resource managers and economists as well as epidemiologists, there exists the potential for misuse and misinterpretation of self-generated simplistic quantitative results. Thus whether a model is fit for purpose is now becoming a question of implementation as well as construction.

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Table 1: Status summary of known FMD models currently being applied or under development.

Model

Owners/Developers

Summary

Automota

Texas A&M University

A two-species geographical-automata (Ward et al., 2007)

Simulation of hypothetical FMD spread within

(no official

College of Veterinary

developed from a cellular automata (Doran and Laffan,

feral pig, deer and cattle in southern Texas,

name

Medicine & Biomedical

2005) with probabilistic inter-herd-distance dependent

USA, based on 2004 Department of Agricultural

established)

Sciences, USA & University

transmission. This model is particularly suited to FMD in

National Agricultural Statistics Service data,

of New South Wales,

wild animals or situations where flocks or herds are widely

Department of Agricultural Natural Resources

`Australia.

dispersed, focusing as it does on spatial herd location and

Conservation Service Ecological Site (Range)

allowing for implicit herd movement, and may be extend

Descriptions and land-use data and ecological

to multiple species in the future (Laffan, 2007).

site carrying capacity from expert opinion.

Department of Agriculture,

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Designed to be user-friendly.

Fisheries and Forestry,

based state-transition micro-simulation accommodates

Simulation of hypothetical FMD outbreak in

Australia.

real farm boundaries or point location data, developed for

Southern Queensland (Garner and Beckett,

the Australian setting (Garner and Beckett, 2005).

2005).

DAFF is in the process of entering into a collaborative

Part of a comparison project run by the

arrangement with the Commonwealth Scientific and

Quadrilateral countries in 2005 together with

Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), to develop and

InterSpread Plus and NAADSM (Dubé et al.,

validate a whole-of-country model for FMD, based on a

2006, Dubé et al., 2007).

AusSpread

Application

National Livestock Movement Model (NLMM) due to be completed May 2008.

Plans include the incorporation of logistics and additional spatial layers such as roads, waterways and wildlife.

193

Model

Owners/Developers

UCDavis

University of California,

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Simulation of a hypothetical FMD epidemic in

(no official

USA.

based state-transition micro-simulation model (Bates et

California, USA to predict disease spread (Bates

al., 2003b).

et al., 2003c) and cost-benefit of vaccination

name

Summary

Application

(Bates et al., 2003a) using estimates based on

established)

1997 USDA Agriculture Census data.

A stochastic intra-herd disease spread model (Carpenter

Simulation of spread of FMD within a

et al., 2004) based on the Reed–Frost equation.

hypothetical 1,000-cow dairy herd in California.

Currently no published work combines the above two

Modelling research within the group is ongoing,

models for intra- and inter-herd dynamics.

looking at FMD in the US and globally, as part of a wider surveillance and prediction programme (Carpenter, 2007).

Exodis

Risk Solutions for

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Designed to be user-friendly and to be

Department of the

based state-transition micro-simulation model with

implemented as Defra’s in-house model during

Environment, Farming and

distance-dependent transmission and some intra-farm

2007.

Rural Affairs, UK.

disease dynamics, consisting of an epidemiological model

The currently planned training of users aims to

(Risk-Solutions, 2005c) together with an economic

impart expert knowledge of the program to build

component (Risk-Solutions, 2005b), which has been used

confidence and aid improvement and

for cost-benefit analysis (Risk-Solutions, 2005a) and more

development.

recently to study the impact of electronic identification of sheep on control (Risk-Solutions, 2006).

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Model

Owners/Developers

Summary

Application

Imperial

Imperial College, UK.

A deterministic differential model (Ferguson et al., 2001a,

Used for prediction of temporal dynamics of

(no official

Ferguson et al., 2001b) with a strong focus on the

2001 UK outbreak, with parameterisation based

name

distribution of temporal delays between infection,

on a spatially explicit statistical model applied

established)

reporting and slaughtering of herds rather than detailed

regionally using contact-tracing and 2001 census

mechanisms designed for robust and rapid

data (Ferguson et al., 2001a, Ferguson et al.,

parameterisation. Differentiates between long and short

2001b).

range transmissions but is not spatially explicit, making the modelling of dangerous contact and contiguous culling difficult.

Substantially refined since 2001 (Keeling, 2005).

InterSpread

EpiCentre, Massey

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Used for prediction of dynamics of 2001 UK

Plus

University, New Zealand.

based state-transition micro-simulation model

outbreak using contact-tracing and 2001 census

incorporating a variety of distance-dependent and

data (Morris et al., 2001).

logistics transmission mechanism, InterSpread Plus

Simulation to replicate 2002 outbreak in Korea

(Stevenson et al., 2006) is a development of the original

and explore alternative strategies (Yoon et al.,

InterSpread model (Sanson, 1993, Sanson et al., 1994,

2006).

Morris et al., 2001).

Simulation of hypothetical scenarios in

Widely used as it is not disease specific and capable of

Switzerland to examine the effectiveness of the

including logistic modules, but requires a large amount of

current Swiss FMD control measures (Bachmann

disease-management data and parameters based on

et al., 2005).

expert opinion.

Part of a comparison project run by the

Simulation framework software (but not FMD specific

Quadrilateral countries in 2005 together with

modelling and parameterisation) is free available

AusSpread and NAADSM (Dubé et al., 2006,

(Epicenter-team, 2007).

Dubé et al., 2007).

195

Model

Owners/Developers

Summary

Application

Keeling

Warwick University,

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Used for prediction of dynamics of 2001 UK

Also referred

Edinburgh University &

based state-transition simulation model with distance-

outbreak using contact-tracing and 2001 census

to as the

Cambridge University, UK

based transmission based purely on farm susceptibility

data (Keeling et al., 2001).

Edinburgh/

and infectiousness (compounded by herd size)

Developed to consider vaccination in the UK

Cambridge

parameterised from contact tracing data (Keeling et al.,

(Keeling et al., 2003) and then extended to

model or

2001, Keeling, 2005).

model different vaccination strategies (Tildesley

Warwick

Focussing on spatial structure the model has fewer

et al., 2006).

model

parameters than those with more complex transmission

Adapted by others to consider if vaccinated

(no official

descriptions (on the grounds of insufficient reliable data)

farms have carriers(Arnold et al., 2007)

name

allowing for relatively fast simulation. No explicit

Currently model being developed for and applied

established)

modelling of logistics.

to Denmark and USA (Keeling, 2007).

Model results are highly stochastic suggesting epidemics are highly variable and making local scale predictions difficult (Keeling, 2007).

MESA

Lawrence Livermore

Multiscale Epidemiological/Economic Simulation and

Details are currently not publicly available but

National Laboratory for

Analysis is a large-scale (US scale) decision support

the group claims significant progress in its

Department of Homeland

system to evaluate the consequences of Foot-and-Mouth

development (Kostova, 2007).

Security, USA.

disease introduction to USA. Resulting in part from a gap-analysis (Kostova, 2004), it is likely to be a microsimulation model employing large scale computing similar to and potentially based on the UCDavis model.

196

Model

Owners/Developers

Summary

Application

NAADSM

Canadian Food Inspection

A stochastic Monte-Carlo species-specific spatial farm-

Freely available software designed to be user-

Agency, Canada, United

based state-transition micro-simulation model with

friendly.

States Department of

distinct transmission mechanisms, the North American

Part of a comparison project run by the

Agriculture, USA, Ontario

Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM-project-team,

Quadrilateral countries in 2005 together with

Ministry of Agriculture and

2006, Harvey et al., 2006), an enhanced version of the

InterSpread Plus and AusSpread (Dubé et al.,

Food, Canada, Colorado

SpreadModel (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003) which was

2006, Dubé et al., 2007).

State University, USA, &

motivated by an Australia model (Garner and Lack, 1995).

Being used to develop a bank of FMD outbreak

University of Guelph,

A project to combine this with a wind-dispersion model

scenarios and also for vaccination simulation

Canada.

and a logistics module, the Foreign Animal Disease

exercises of USA and Ontario, Canada (Dubé,

Emergency Response System (FADERS) is due for

2004, Dubé, 2007).

completion in 2010 (Dubé and Roy, 2005, Dubé, 2007).

Used by others groups to consider, for example, a hypothetical outbreak in Kansas (Pendell, 2006).

197

4.

Discussion & conclusions

The complexity of most currently used models make it unfeasible for the methodology to be replicated by other groups (Keeling, 2005), and also makes the robustness of conclusions difficult to assess.

One approach recently used by the Quadrilateral countries (QUADs: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and USA) was a comparison project considering various different scenarios using InterSpread Plus, AusSpread and NAADSM. This was the first such exercise of its kind and helped highlight modelling assumptions and programming protocols, resulting in improvements in all of the participating models (Dubé et al., 2006). Results were not found to be significantly different at the level of policy (Dubé et al., 2007), which was also felt to give credence to the models used.

It must be noted, however, that all these models are very similar with fundamentally the same structure: thus, while such comparisons may improve and help develop “best practice” amongst such models – which is, of course, valuable in itself - it does not help prove that they are “good enough”. Reviews of the three main models used during the 2001 UK outbreak (the Imperial model, the Keeling model and InterSpread) also found that, despite the more significant technical differences between them, their predictions of the required control methods were similar (Keeling, 2005). Yet strong criticisms have been levied at the accuracy of these results despite their consistency (see for example Haywood and Haywood, 2002, Taylor, 2005, Kitching et al., 2006).

A similar project has been carried out by EpiLab in Denmark (Milne and Ersbøll, 2004), comparing InterSpread, the UCDavis model and the Keeling model, with results in progress (Dubé, 2007).

The pragmatic approach in model comparisons is to use the lowest common denominator for all models, that is, to only attempt to consider those situations and inputs which all models can handle. This is useful in verifying the models but has the disadvantage that individual models are prevented from performing at their best, and prevents certain modelling assumptions from being validated. While such a process is a useful and necessary step, part of any complete comparison programme should be consideration of difficult and/or realistic scenarios and data sets without an a priori assessment of what each models can handle and how they do so. This would further highlight differences between models, although without necessarily indicating which is better.

Underlying flaws in input data may result in consistent but erroneous advice: for example, the contact tracing data produced for the 2001 has been heavily criticised for producing overestimates of infectivity in the models used (Kitching et al., 2006), since direct contacts which are omitted require models to explain infections through other – usually proximity based - means of transmission. The critical evaluation of data supplied to modellers is integral to the evaluation of output: it may be helpful on a national level to consolidate data (concerning current levels of resources, logistical constraints, disease characteristics etc.) and to develop protocols for its regular reviewing and updating. Access to such information could then be provided to modellers, ensuring that all advice received is based on known and agreed data.

Validation of models may be sought by attempting to reproduce real life events: such an exercise will be undertaken at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, in June 2007, where the meteorological dispersion models of a number of different nations will be used to consider airborne spread of FMD (Gloster, 2007). While replication can be valuable, confidence may be misplaced in potentially deceptively realistic outputs. Firstly, most models are initialised and parameterised by using known information from an outbreak, and so the desired output is used as input.

Transmission kernels, for example, have been fitted using the known spread of FMD in the UK in 2001, with model predictions then only compared to that outbreak. Confidence in these models should require the replication of one outbreak having been parameterised with data from another.

Although the 2001 UK data set contains a number of distinct regional outbreaks, these have not been used to cross-fit simulations and are sometimes analysed separately because of their significant differences (e.g. Kao, 2001, Savill et al., 2006).

Unfortunately no comparable data sets are freely available, and it is therefore difficult to tell how suitable the 2001 UK outbreak really is: it could, for example, have followed a particularly unlikely course which an accurate model would predict as possible but improbable. Certain model results appear highly stochastic (Keeling, 2007), suggesting that epidemics will also be highly variable.

Data from the 2001 Uruguay outbreak, during which vaccination was used for control, is currently being used to validate the NAADSM model (Dubé, 2007): the data is apparently of good quality but is not publicly available for use by other groups. Similarly there is also potentially good but tightly controlled data from other South American countries, such as that from Argentina now being studied using InterSpread.

198

Finally, the current focus on vaccination strategies means that all models are attempting to make predictions about situations of which we have very little experience; while this is the very power of mathematical modelling which is desired, the further hypothetical scenarios venture from what is known historically (in terms of logistics, vaccination, serotype etc.) the harder it is to validate results. Explicit modelling of spread in endemic countries has not been carried out, although spatial distribution of the disease in Pakistan was recently estimated using statistical analyses (Perez et al., 2006), and at present it is unclear what the study of vaccination in such different settings would reveal.

Confidence in the underlying model structure and parameters used can only be achieved through a detailed understanding of the system. Defra is currently implementing a training programme so that experts within the department can use the Exodis program with a thorough knowledge of its structure and assumptions. This appears a pragmatic form of peer review, with specialists in different spheres assessing different aspects of the model, not just the output.

Integrated with this is the responsibility for parameter validation, which still depends considerably on “expert opinion” for these large systems. It remains clear that continued research into transmission and vaccination (including immunity response, challenge response prior to full immunity, response to heterologous challenge and the carrier potential of vaccinated animals), as well as systematic collection and organisation of data (concerning resource etc), remains a priority.

All models have undergone some level of sensitivity analysis, whereby parameters whose value is not certain are varied and the effect on results examined. Such a process is only mathematically rigorous, however, if all parameters are allowed to take on any of their possible/reasonable values simultaneously: this is usually computationally unfeasible, and in practice only small subsets of parameters are tested together. This is sufficient to help promote confidence in results, but only if it is done systematically and openly.

Finally, the reliability of modelling advice now depends, more than ever, on the end user. The development of a number of user-friendly systems allows for the simulation of results with little knowledge of the underlying model.

The strength of this is that experts in one field, such as resource planners, can investigate potential scenarios without a detailed knowledge of epidemiology, for example. There is a danger, however, that convincing output – including automatically generated and easily interpretable geographical plots and summary charts - may be generated from quite unrealistic input. Thus it is strongly encouraged that sufficient training be given to all operators of such systems: at present Defra aims for all expert users to be knowledgeable in all aspects of the model to a reasonably high level.

Despite the inclusion of detailed individual farm level data, all models remain of only strategic value.

Detailed modelling of local scale events is provided to give the most accurate representation possible of the overall situation, but cannot provide advice to the same extent.

Most models, for which ever country they have been designed, attempted to provide regional guidance, but never at the tactical level. This has been emphasised by all model developers: NAADSM for example states it is not intended for outbreak predictions; AusSpread is advocated as a training and investigation tool with only limited scale-dependent forecasting. As well as continuing to question modellers’ assertions, it is also important to heed their reservations, since the theoretical step from peacetime policy formulation to outbreak planning and decision making is significant, even if it appears technically simple.

The scope and purpose of any future developments or new models should be clear at the outset, so that end-users are involved at inception. Availability and quality of data will continue to remain an integral factor, since these will affect - as much as the validity and implementation of any theoretical construct – the potential use of models.

199

5.

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202

6.

Glossary Automaton:

(pl: -a) a self-operating machine or mechanism that has been programmed to perform specific actions in a manner imitative of a human or animal.

Deterministic:

a system in which randomness is excluded from the process so that identical inputs will always produce a unique output.

Differential:

based upon differential equations, where relationships involving the rates of change of continuously varying quantities are described through mathematical functions

Micro-simulation:

a computer-generated system to represent the dynamic responses and behaviour of a real-life system, in which individual behaviour is modelled to infer group dynamics.

Monte-Carlo:

a probabilistic technique in which simulations are repeated with statistical sampling applied to undetermined parameters.

State-transition:

a system in which entities can only exist in a discrete number of states, and modelling focuses on how they change between these.

SIR:

paradigm model of epidemiology where individuals in a population can be in one of three states: susceptible (S), infectious (I) and recovered (R); derivative models including additional classes e.g. immunised, carriers.

Stochastic: Strategic:

involving chance or probability. part of a long term particular

Tactical:

plan of action designed to achieve a

goal.

using whatever means are available to achieve ends (often a temporary and/or limited advantage) that are at a smaller level and of less long-term significance than strategic goals.

203

Recommendations for Enhancing confidence in epidemiological models of Foot-and-Mouth Disease David Schley Detailed models too complex for exhaustive analysis should be compared with each other.

• This does not validate the underlying modelling assumptions but is a necessary step in model verification, improving implementation and helping develop best practice amongst similar systems.

• This should be part of a wider communication process between groups to disseminate ideas and develop mutual understanding of models.

• The role of smaller scale sub-models, easier to validate and useful for examining specific issues, should be acknowledged.

Model simulations should be compared to known events for comparison.

• Lack of good data from outbreaks in non-vaccinating FMD-free countries means that models are being parameterised using the same data that they are trying to replicate.

• Given the stochastic nature of outbreaks, individual events may be quite unlikely and thus predicted as improbably by an accurate model: without sufficient distinct sets models cannot be invalidated by their failure to replicate historic events alone.

Greater access should be provided to available epidemiological and control data.

• Access to outbreak data in endemic countries is often tightly controlled, so that most groups cannot utilise it in the development of their models.

• Provision of a clear protocol for the dissemination of data to researchers both in peace-time and during an outbreak would be useful.

Knowledge of a model and its assumptions should be cultivated amongst experts and end users.

• Pragmatic peer review of model assumptions and structure is necessary in order to assess their validity.

• The development of easily accessible models producing more sophisticated outputs means it is important that the role of models, their limitations and the quality of the data they use continues to be fully appreciated • Integral to this is the ownership of parameters (especially with regard to logistics and available resources) by the relevant departments.

Procedures for the data used in models to be validated and managed should be implemented.

• It must be clear to decision makers what information has been used in a model.

• Different models should be based on the same (inter)nationally agreed best available data.

A gap analysis of model input data requirements should be carried out.

• This should include explicit details by all national bodies of the farm, resource etc. data available, together with an evaluation of its quality.

• National and regional differences in farming practice and structure should be detailed in order for models to be suitably modified.

A gap analysis of experimental data requirements should be carried out.

• Successful modelling of complex scenarios will require accurate parameterisation of, and therefore the acquisition of experimental data on, virus transmission and vaccination (including immune response, heterologous challenge and serotype specific dynamics).

• This information will allow for the development of accurate local models which may be incorporated as sub-systems into larger national-scale decision support tools.

Modellers should provide detailed sensitivity analysis of results.

• It must be clear, especially at the advice level, what changes can be produced by reasonable variations in parameters (whose precise values are not known).

The potential for developing a template model-validation process, involving modellers, veterinarians and policy makers should be considered. A combination of the current Defra exercise for implementing its in-house model Exodis and the Quadrilateral countries’ recent comparison workshop is a candidate for this.

204

Appendix 28 Paper on Epidemic modelling Review by the Secretariat

Conclusion 1. The lack of new datasets on big FMD epidemics in free countries presents a major constraint to validate epidemic models on FMD epidemics that are independent from those based on the 2001 UK epidemic. This constraint is likely to be a long term feature as no major FMD epidemics have occurred in FMD free countries that do not use vaccination since 2001.

2. Most epidemics are currently in non-FMD free countries, that use vaccination, and therefore present the best opportunity to validate models until the next major epidemic in free countries occurs.

3. There is need of a clear guidance and process to assist decisions makers, and the expert groups that advise them, to select models that are fit for the purpose intended.

4. User friendly epidemic models are increasing, leading to potential problems if used by persons who are unfamiliar with the basic assumptions and parameters.

5. It is important that users of the models understand the assumptions and have a sense of ownership of the parameters used, confidence can be built by agreeing on what goes into the model, and the critical parameters (sensitivity analysis).

Recommendations 1. Potential models for use by an expert group should be subjected to a pragmatic peer review process, whereby the potential users become familiar with the structure and parameters, and understand the critical parameters.

2. An ad hoc working group should be formed to select the models of most interest, and undertake a pragmatic peer review process, to guide the Executive and member states on the models of most potential use and on how such peer reviews could be organised at national expert group level.

3. The ad hoc group should also consider if a European animal disease spread should be developed, and the key activities and animal movement information needed to achieve this, using models developed for national epidemic forecasting.

4. In order to improve models, and ensure their relevance to disease control in countries such as Turkey, the opportunity to gain systematic animal disease data from the endemic countries in the regions should be taken, and the ad hoc group should consider the relevance and feasibility of using the opportunity to work with infected countries in the region.

205

Appendix 29

206

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

STATEMENT 1 MTF/INT/011/MUL - TF number 904200 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE Financial Report as at 31 December 2005 (Final)

US$

Balance as at 1 January 2005

Eur

Eur

168,822

Interest received Contributions from member countries and instititute

US$

4,459

414,910

135,733

3,585 419,369

333,588

337,173

(As per statement 2)

Expenditure

Commission Secretary

173,997

139,894

Consultant

35,244

28,336

Admin. Support Personnel

89,627

72,060

Contracts

80,061

64,369

Duty Travel

74,223

59,675

General Operating Expenses

18,552

14,916

14,444

11,613

Expendable Equipment

Total Expenditure

Balance as at 31 December 2005 (Final)

486,147

390,862

102,044

82,043

Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2005

86,737

The Financial statements of the commission are maintained in US Dollars in accordance with the accounting policies and dministrative systems of FAO. The amounts stated in Euros, including opening balance, have been converted from US Dollars at the average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rates for 2005.

The closing balance is restated at the UN Operational Exchange rate on the date of the report. The average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rate applicable for the period to 31 December is US$ 1:Eur 0.804. The UN Operational Exchange rate at 31 December is US$ 1:Eur 0.850

207

Statement 2

TRUST FUND No. 9042.00 - MTF/INT/011/MUL Inter-Regional - Euopean Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Status of Contributions as at 31 December 2005 (expressed in US$) ORACLE CODE:

TF-AGADD-TFAA970089122

Member Governments

Outstanding 31/12/2004

ALBANIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE HUNGARY ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG MACEDONIA MALTA NETHERLANDS NORWAY POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SERBIA and MONTENEGRO SLOVENIA SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TURKEY UNITED KINGDOM YUGOSLAVIA a/ INSTITUTE OF ANIMAL HEALTH, UK

TOTALS

13.00

Contribution due for 2005

3,000.00

Received up to Outstanding 31/12/2005 30/12/2005

2,992.16

20.84

16.31

9,200.00

9,216.31

0.00

12.99

15,300.00

15,277.65

35.34 13.23

8.22

9,200.00

9,194.99

3,000.00

3,000.00

6,000.00

0.00

2,609.00

3,000.00

3,000.00

2,609.00

0.00

9,200.00

9,186.97

13.03

8.37

15,300.00

15,286.74

21.63

8.50

9,200.00

9,200.00

8.50

16.82

30,500.00

30,500.00

16.82

8.45

30,500.00

30,503.45

5.00

10.00

9,200.00

9,188.31

21.69 -9,200.00

-9,200.00

9,200.00

9,200.00

403.00

3,000.00

3,403.00

0.00

20.00

9,200.00

9,200.00

20.00

15.35

3,000.00

3,008.04

7.31

1,695.78

30,500.00

37,304.55

-5,108.77

5.00

3,000.00

3,000.53

4.47

0.00

3,000.00

2,984.86

15.14

5,633.26

3,000.00

3,001.03

5,632.23

13.51

3,000.00

2,991.99

21.52

8.29

15,300.00

15,295.18

13.11

0.00

9,200.00

9,187.17

12.83

0.00

15,300.00

15,305.44

-5.44

8,690.15

9,200.00

0.00

17,890.15

13.29

15,300.00

15,300.00

13.29

9,210.00

9,200.00

0.00

18,410.00

42.32

3,000.00

3,042.32

0.00

20.87

15,300.00

15,282.00

38.87

15,325.00

15,300.00

30,595.00

30.00

8.56

15,300.00

15,308.56

0.00

0.00

15,300.00

15,286.98

13.02 5.00

0.00

30,500.00

30,495.00

81,511.30

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

26,171.84

0.00

119,127.34

381,700.00

414,910.07

30,577.81

a/ The arrears of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are abolished in accordance with the the resolution of the 71st Executive Committee.

208

te

STATEMENT

3

MTF/INT/004/MUL - TF number 909700 FOOT AND MOUTH DESEASE - EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME Financial Report as at 31 December 2005 (Final) US$

US$

Balance as at 1 January 2005 Interest received Expenditure Consultancy Duty travel Expendable Procurement Support Costs Total expenditure

Eur

Eur

41,232

33,151

1,006

809

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

Balance as at 31 December 2005 (Final)

0

0

42,238

33,959 35,902

Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2005

STATEMENT

4

MTF/INT/003/EEC - TF number 911100 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE Financial Report as at 31 December 2005 (Final) US$

US$

Eur

55,284

Balance as at 1 January 2005 Interest received Contribution received

Eur

6,475 2,379,200

44,448 5,206 1,912,877

2,385,675

1,918,083

Expenditure Salaries Professional

0

0

Consultancy

5,842

4,697

Contracts

13,047

10,490

Duty Travel

44,950

36,140

0

0

24,549

19,737

744,733

598,765

0

0

20,180

16,225

4,369

3,513

Training General Operating Expenses Expendable Equipment Non-Expendable Equipment General Overhead Expenses Support Costs 6% (on all items except expendable equipment) Less: Total Expenditure Balance at 31 December 2005 (Final)

821,914

660,819

1,619,045

1,301,712

Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2005

1,376,188

The financial statements of the Commission are maintained in US Dollars in accordance with the accounting policies and administrative systems of FAO. The amounts stated in Euros, including opening balance, have been converted from US Dollars at the average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rates for 2005. The closing balance is restated at the UN Operational Exchange rate on the date of the report. The average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rate applicable for the period to 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.804. The UN Operational Exchange rate at 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.850

209

STATEMENT 1

MTF/INT/011/MUL - TF number 904200 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE Financial Report as at 31 December 2006 (Final)

US$

Balance as at 1 January 2006

Eur

Eur

102,044

Interest received Contributions from member countries and instititute

US$

8,749

518,829

81,737

7,008 527,578

415,582

422,590

(As per statement 2)

Expenditure

Commission Secretary

195,126

156,296

6,784

5,434

Admin. Support Personnel

46,802

37,488

Contracts

39,890

31,952

Duty Travel

60,396

48,377

General Operating Expenses

44,995

36,041

Expendable Equipment

2,664

2,134

Consultant

Total Expenditure

Balance as at 31 December 2006 (Final) Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2006

396,657

317,722

232,965

186,605 177,053

The financial statements of the Commission are maintained in US Dollars in accordance with the accounting policies and administrative systems of FAO. The amounts stated in Euros, including opening balance, have been converted from US Dollars at the average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rates for 2006. The closing balance is restated at the UN Operational Exchange rate on the date of the report. The average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rate applicable for the period to 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.801. The UN Operational Exchange rate at 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.760

210

STATEMENT 2 TRUST FUND No. 9042.00 - MTF/INT/011/MUL Inter-Regional - Euopean Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Status of Contributions as at 31 December 2006 (expressed in US$) ORACLE CODE:

TF-AGADD-TFAA970089122

Member Governments

Outstanding 31/12/2005

ALBANIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE HUNGARY ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG MACEDONIA MALTA NETHERLANDS NORWAY POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SERBIA and MONTENEGRO SLOVENIA SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TURKEY UNITED KINGDOM YUGOSLAVIA a/

TOTALS

Contribution due for 2006

Received up to 31/12/2006

Outstanding 31/12/2006

20.84

3,900.00

3,879.71

41.13

0.00

11,960.00

11,948.04

11.96

35.34

19,890.00

19,880.00

45.34

13.23

11,960.00

11,947.11

26.12

0.00

3,900.00

900.00

3,000.00

2,609.00

3,900.00

3,900.00

2,609.00

13.03

11,960.00

11,947.34

25.69

21.63

19,890.00

19,890.00

21.63

8.50

11,960.00

11,960.00

8.50

16.82

39,650.00

39,650.00

16.82

5.00

39,650.00

39,650.00

5.00

21.69

11,960.00

11,936.84

44.85

-9,200.00

11,960.00

0.00

2,760.00

0.00

3,900.00

0.00

3,900.00

20.00

11,960.00

11,938.06

41.94

7.31

3,900.00

3,892.31

15.00

-5,108.77

39,650.00

38,805.15

-4,263.92

4.47

3,900.00

3,883.77

20.70

15.14

3,900.00

3,883.86

31.28

5,632.23

3,900.00

5,592.27

3,939.96 28.65

21.52

3,900.00

3,892.87

13.11

19,890.00

19,882.00

21.11

12.83

11,960.00

0.00

11,972.83

-5.44

19,890.00

19,890.00

-5.44

17,890.15

11,960.00

50,996.31

-21,146.16 13.29

13.29

19,890.00

19,890.00

18,410.00

11,960.00

30,347.00

23.00

0.00

3,900.00

3,882.46

17.54

38.87

19,890.00

19,880.00

48.87

30.00

19,890.00

19,860.00

60.00

0.00

19,890.00

15,283.56

4,606.44 13.02

13.02

19,890.00

19,890.00

5.00

39,650.00

39,650.00

5.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

30,577.81

496,210.00

518,828.66

7,959.15

a/ The arrears of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were abolished in 2005 in accordance with the resolution of the 71st Executive Committee.

211

STATEMENT

3

MTF/INT/004/MUL - TF number 909700 FOOT AND MOUTH DESEASE - EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME Financial Report as at 31 December 2006 (Final) US$

US$

Balance as at 1 January 2006 Interest received Expenditure Consultancy Duty travel Expendable Procurement Support Costs Total expenditure

Eur

Eur

42,238

33,833

1,651

1,322

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

Balance as at 31 December 2006 (Final)

0

0

43,889

35,155 33,356

Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2006

STATEMENT

4

MTF/INT/003/EEC - TF number 911100 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE Financial Report as at 31 December 2006 (Final) US$

US$

Eur

1,619,045

Balance as at 1 January 2006 Interest received Contribution received

Eur

57,865 0

1,296,855 46,350 0

57,865

46,350

Expenditure Salaries Professional

54,901

43,976

Consultancy

5,842

4,679

111,207

89,077

Duty Travel

92,714

74,264

Training

12,096

9,689

General Operating Expenses

18,979

15,202

1,304,483

1,044,891

Non-Expendable Equipment

0

0

General Overhead Expenses

27

22

17,746

14,215

Contracts

Expendable Equipment

Support Costs 6% (on all items except expendable equipment) Less: Total Expenditure Balance at 31 December 2006 (Final)

1,617,995

1,296,014

58,915

47,191

Balance restated at UN Exchange rate of 31 December 2006

44,775

The financial statements of the Commission are maintained in US Dollars in accordance with the accounting policies and administrative systems of FAO. The amounts stated in Euros, including opening balance, have been converted from US Dollars at the average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rates for 2006. The closing balance is restated at the UN Operational Exchange rate on the date of the report. The average monthly UN Operational Exchange Rate applicable for the period to 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.801. The UN Operational Exchange rate at 31 December is US$ 1: Eur 0.760

212

Appendix 30 PROPOSAL FOR REVISED BUDGET FOR TRUST FUND No. 904200 - MTF/INT/011/MUL FOR BIENNIUM 2008-2009

1. Under the Constitution of the EUFMD Commission, the Commission member countries support the work of the Commission through contributions to a Trust Fund administered by FAO from which the Secretariat is supported, together with other operating costs for key actions agreed at the General Session or by subsequent Executive Committees.

2. The 36th General Session in April 2005: Agreed the annual budget for MTF/INT/011/MUL be US$ 496,210 for the biennium 2006-7.

Recommended that the Commission should, as far as possible under the procedures of the FAO, express the budget contributions in Euro, and to provide the financial statements in Euro, or Euro equivalent to the currency (US $) in use in the administrative system of the Organization.

3. The budget of the Commission for the forthcoming biennium is prepared by the outgoing Executive Committee. It was therefore the responsibility of the 74th Session of the Executive Committee, meeting in January 2007, to review the financial position and agree the budget to be proposed for approval by the 37th Session.

4. The 74th Session, in reviewing the financial position, took into consideration: financial statements of the Commission, a paper on the financial position including expected change in expenditure in period 20072009, including a proposed budget for 2008-9 (Annexed below) a paper relating to the level of contribution of the Slovak Republic, a new member country a proposal for use of the Trust Fund to support workshops on surveillance after emergency vaccination; the continuation of a contract with the WRL, Pirbright , for services to the Commission .

The discussion on this item in included in the Report of the 74th Session (Annex 1).

5. 5. The Conclusions and Recommendations of the 74th Session were as follows: Conclusions The budget proposal of US$528,890 for 2008 and 2009 was endorsed; The level of support per annum for the WRL should be set at a maximum of 60,000 US$ per annum, and the Secretariat should proceed with contract negotiations; The financial management should aim to maintain an end of year reserve (balance) of US$100,000; a decision on this level, and any balance in excess of this reserve, to be reviewed annually by the Executive.

Recommendations (numbering refers to 74th Session report) Relating to the Administrative budget of the Commission: 39. the Slovak republic be considered in category 3 for contributions to the Commission, based on the country classification in effect at the time of the Session, and that the membership contribution for quarters 2 and 3 of 2006 be waived; 40. the proposal for a contract to the VAR, Belgium , to support the organisation of three workshops should be supported, with funds drawn from MTF/INT/011/EEC; 41. the budget proposal for 2008-9, for an annual budget of circa US$ 528,000 per annum in 2008-9, be proposed to the 37th General Session; 42. the contract with the World reference Laboratory be set at US$ 60,000 in 2007, and included in the annual budget of the Commission proposed for ratification by the 37th Session.

6. Proposed Budget for 2008-9, and scale of contributions These are given in Annex 2, being those endorsed by the 74th Session of the Executive Committee.

TABLE 1 gives the 2008 and 2009 budgets for approval by the 37th Session TABLE 2. Proposed revision in relation to historic levels of contribution, expressed in US$ (top) and euro (below), using exchange rate of 1/1/03, 11/1/05 and 1/1/07 TABLE 3. Proposed annual contributions in 2008-9 of member countries to the administrative budget of the EUFMD Commission (MTF INT/011/MTF) 7. Note regarding Country contributions The categorisation of countries (into 4 levels) for contributions was made at the 32nd Session, and is based on ruminant and pig livestock population, and the Member State contribution to FAO.

213

-

-

No change to the categorisation of countries has been proposed by the Executive or by Member countries. The increase to contributions below has therefore been made on a pro rata basis when change to the total administrative budget have been agreed by a Session.

The Slovak Republic is a new member, and the proposed to the 74th Session as a Category 3 country, on the basis of the assessment made for the 32nd Session.

214

Annex 1 Extract of the Report of the 74th Session of the Executive Committee Administrative budget of the Commission a. Contribution to be paid by Slovak Republic in 2006 The paper (Appendix 24) prepared by the Secretariat was reviewed, and it was agreed that: • the 1997 assessment applied, and Slovak Republic was therefore to be considered in category 3 of the scale of contributions; for 2006, the membership fees should only be required for the quarter in which membership • was communicated to the country, thereby the Committee agreed that the contributions for the two previous quarters from date of deposition should be waived. b. Contracts for support services and workshops The paper (Appendix 25) relating to financial support towards organisation of three workshops as part of the work program of the research group was discussed, and the Committee endorsed the proposal, with funds to be drawn from MTF/INT/011/MUL, as a partial use of the balance of funds from 2006. c. Administrative Budget of the Commission in biennium 2008-2009, to be proposed to 37th General Session The Financial Statements (Appendices 26 and 27) for 2005 (final) and 2006 (provisional) were reviewed, together with the proposal (Appendix 28). for the Administrative Budget for the biennium following the 37th Session (i.e. calendar years 2008 and 2009).

The paper set out the reasons for the proposed budget. In 2005, expenditure was only slightly exceeded by income, but in 2006 savings had occurred because of a favourable exchange rate, lately reversed, a change in staff, with temporary replacement at lower cost, and reduction in the level of contracts awarded. Higher costs are expected in 2007, with reversion to normal pattern of expenditure and exchange rate. The budget proposal applied the normal FAO inflation figure for budget forecasting of 4% per annum, and an overall budget of US$528,890. As a result of the new membership of the Slovak Republic, the proposed budget could be met with contributions that would equate to 2% per annum rise, less than inflation.

The Committee discussed the proposal, and the level of support to be made available for contracts, with the following conclusions: • The budget proposal of US$528,890 for 2008 and 2009 was endorsed; The level of support per annum for the WRL should be set at a maximum of 60,000 US$ per • annum, and the Secretariat should proceed with contract negotiations; • The financial management should aim to maintain an end of year reserve (balance) of US$100,000; a decision on this level, and any balance in excess of this reserve, to be reviewed annually by the Executive.

Relating to the Administrative budget of the Commission: 21. the Slovak republic be considered in category 3 for contributions to the Commission, based on the country classification in effect at the time of the Session, and that the membership contribution for quarters 2 and 3 of 2006 be waived; 22. the proposal for a contract to the VAR, Belgium , to support the organisation three workshops should be supported, with funds drawn from MTF/INT/011/EEC; 23. the budget proposal for 2008-9, for an annual budget of circa US$ 528,000 per annum in 2008-9, be proposed to the 37th General Session; 24. the contract with the World reference Laboratory be set at US$ 60,000 in 2007, and included in the annual budget of the Commission proposed for ratification by the 37th Session.

215

Annex 2 Summary of the financial position of the EUFMD Commission Paper submitted to the 74th Session (Appendix 27 of the Report of the 74th Session) 1. The budget statements for MTF/INT/011/MUL are provided by the Administration and Finance Department of FAO (AFFC Section), for 2005 (Final) and 2006 (Provisional, as the accounts for 2006 have not been closed).

2. At the 36th Session, April 2005, the members agreed to contribute a budget of US $496,210 for each year of the biennium, 2006-7.

3. The expenditure in 2005 was US$ 486, 148, against the budget allocation agreed by the 36th Session of US$496, 210.

4. The expenditure in 2006 (Provisional) is reported as US$368, 196. The reduction in expenditure is the result of: a. Reduction in the euro-related costs (salary costs are adjusted in line with exchange fluctuations); b. Saving of some 42, 000 USD on the Administrative assistant, since Ms Fragiotta took special leave without pay from end of June 2006, and had been replaced by temporary assistance at a lower rate to the end of December 2006. c. Under spend in the contracts budget line of some 43, 000 USD, and travel budget line of some 10,000 USD. 5. For the above reasons the current balance at end of 2006 is some 245, 315 USD, a rise from 102, 044 USD in December 2005.

6. The predicted expenditure in 2007 is USD 498, 304, rising compared to 2006 for the following reasons: a. Administrative assistance (G5 level Clerk) will return to normal, because of secondment of a G5 clerk to fill the post until return or resignation of Ms Fragiotta; b. Temporary assistance costs will rise, associated with the costs of the General Session, c. The budget required for workshops, diagnostic contract (WRL) and other contracts should return to that agreed in the 36th Session, of circa 90,000 USD. 7. The estimates for the euro-related costs (salaries) are uncertain because of the impact of the exchange rate fluctuations; in 2005-6 the Commission benefited from a rise in the dollar rate for most of the period, however it has now returned to a similar level (<1% difference) at the time of the same financial exercise of the Commission in 2005, and analysts predict a further fall in the dollar.

8. For the purposes of budgeting, it has been assumed there will be no further fall, and if this occurs, the salary related costs will rise proportionately, and require to be absorbed by the current balance in the Trust Fund.

Budget for 2008-9.

9. A budget proposal for 2008 and 2009 is made below, based on the following; 10. in line with FAO budgetary planning procedures, a 4% figure has been applied for the annual growth in salaries and non-staff costs. Based on the staff in post, staff related costs, and associated Secretariat costs (travel, office, assistance at Sessions) for 2007-9 were estimated (Table 1) 11. The budget required for contracts (including WRL contract) in 2008-9 was set at 96,000 USD/year.

This is a moderate increase (from 88,000 USD) agreed in 2005.

12. The allocation in the contracts budget line allows the Executive to take decisions to support actions for which other funds are not available.

13. The priorities for the funds allocated to the Contracts budget line, for workshops, actions requiring consultancies, diagnostic or scientific service contracts, should be decided by the Executive and/or the General Session, whichever comes first.

14. Funding of additional staff is not proposed under the 2008-9 budget. The staff costs associated with a professional post would require circa 150,000 to be found from the non-staff fundings in the budget (ie, requiring funds currently allocated to contracts and travel lines).

15. Based on the above an annual budget in USD of 528,890 is proposed; this equates to circa 2% per annum, rather than the inflationary figure of 4%, for existing member states, since growth in costs is met in part by the additional contribution from the new member state (Slovak Republic). The latter has been provisionally identified as a Category 3 country for contributions, and the contribution of countries in this category is each circa 2.4% of the total budget.

16. On the basis of an annual budget of USD 528,890, and on a proportionate rise in contributions by the member nations, the proposed scale of contributions for 2008-9 is shown in Table 3.

216

Budget considerations and options.

1. Given the balance in the Trust Fund at the end of 2006, consideration should be given to setting an planned minimum reserve in the Fund, for example a year-end balance of 100,000 USD, acting as a reserve against late payment of contributions by the member nations in the following year.

2. if such a balance is agreed, then an expenditure plan can be developed on the use of the reserve funds.

Note regarding Country contributions These are shown in Table 2 and 3.

1. The categorisation of countries used for contributions has been that agreed by the 32nd Session, based on ruminant and pig livestock population, and the Member State contribution to FAO. 2. No change to the categorisation of countries has been proposed by Members. The increase to contributions below has therefore been made pro rata.

3. The Slovak Republic is a new member, and the proposed to the 74th Session as a Category 3 country.

217

EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE (EUFMD)

TABLE 1.

TRUST FUND 904200 MTF/INT/011/MUL 2008 and 2009 budgets for approval by 74th Executive and by 37th Session

Budget for 2006 is from the (provisional) report of expenditure, for 2007 is predicted expenditure.

2005

2006

Agreed

2006

Real

Agreed

th

Real

36

$US

$US

2007

36

Predicted

th

2008

2009

For

For

approval

approval

$US

173997

217,589

195126

226,292

35244

15,600

6784

16,224

assist.

89627

86,920

44633

Contracts

80061

85,405

Duty Travel

74223

GOE

Secret.

2007

202931

211048

219490

21000

30000

33000

90,396

90396

94100

97900

41890

88,821

88821

96000

96000

66,967

56104

69,646

69646

70000

70000

18552

2,791

21010

7,000

20000

16000

17000

14444

3,375

2649

3,510

3510

3600

3600

2,000

0

2,000

2000

480,647

368196

503,890

520748

536990

Temp.

Assist.

Admin

Expend equip.

Non-exp.

Equipment 486148

498304

218

TABLE 2.

Proposed revision in relation to historic levels of contribution, expressed in US$ (top) and euro (below), using exchange rate of 1/1/03, 11/1/05 and 1/1/07

Contribution

$ Annual

Annual

Annual

Proposed revision

Category

Contribut

Contributions

Contribution 2006-

2008-9

ions,

2004-2005

7

30500

39,650

41,260

2002 & 2003 1

US$ 26000

2

13000

15300

19,890

20,700

3

7800

9200

11,960

12,450

4

2600

3000

3,900

4060

496,210

528,890

euro at 1/1/05

Euro at 1/1/07

TOTAL (US$)

euro

EURO equivalenc

(official e.r.1/07)

at 1/1/03

e 1

TOTAL

euro

29,437

30,290

31,358

2

14,767

15,195

15,732

3

8,879

9,137

9,462

4

2,895

2,979

3,086

368,401

379,076

401,956

(euro)

219

TABLE 3.

Proposed annual contributions (in US$) of member countries to the administrative budget of the EUFMD Commission (MTF INT/011/MTF), for the biennium 2008-9

MEMBER

LEVEL

COUNTRY

ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS

PROPOSED

2006-2007

CONTRIBUTIONS 20089

ALBANIA

4

3,900

4060

AUSTRIA

3

11,960

12450

BELGIUM

2

19,890

20700

BULGARIA

3

11,960

12450

CYPRUS

4

3,900

4060

CROATIA

4

3,900

4060

CZECH REPUBLIC

3

11,960

12450

DENMARK

2

19,890

20700

FINLAND

3

11,960

12450

FRANCE

1

39,650

41260

GERMANY

1

39,650

41260

GREECE

3

11,960

12450

HUNGARY

3

11,960

12450

ICELAND

4

3,900

4060

IRELAND

3

11,960

12450

ISRAEL

4

3,900

4060

ITALY

1

39,650

41260

LITHUANIA

4

3,900

4060

LUXEMBOURG

4

3,900

4060

FYROM

4

3,900

4060

MALTA

4

3,900

4060

NETHERLANDS

2

19,890

20700

NORWAY

3

11,960

12450

POLAND

2

19,890

20700

PORTUGAL

3

11,960

12450

ROMANIA

2

19,890

20700

SERBIA AND

3

11,960

MONTENEGRO

12450

SLOVAK R.

3

11,96011

12450

SLOVENIA

4

3,900

4060

SPAIN

2

19,890

20700

SWEDEN

2

19,890

20700

11

New member: approved at the 74th Session

220

SWITZERLAND

2

19,890

20700

TURKEY

2

19,890

20700

UNITED KINGDOM

1

39,650

41260

496,210.00

528,890

TOTAL

221

Appendix 31

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS / LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS DELEGATIONS Albania / Albanie

Cyprus / Chypre

Jemin GJANA Minister of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection Tirana

George POULIDES Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to FAO

Vera CARA First Secretary Via Asmara, 5 00199 Rome Tel: +39 06 8622411 Fax: +39 06 86224120 Austria / Autriche Ulrich HERZOG Chief Veterinary Officer Austria, Mag. Ministry of Health, Family and Youth 1031 Vienna, Radetzkystr. 2 Tel: +43 1 71100 4824 Fax: +43 1 7104151 Mobile: +43664 611 29 96 e-mail: ulrich.herzog@bmgfj.gv.at; CVO-Austria@bmgfj.gv.at Belgium / Belgique Luc LENGELE Conseiller Général CVO Federal Public Service for Public Health Eurostation II - Place Victor Horta 40 bte 10 1060 Bruxelles Tel: +32 2 524 73 00 Fax: +32 2 524 73 49 Mobile: +32 496 59 97 42 e-mail: luc.lengele@health.fgov.be Philippe HOUDART Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC) - WTCIII Simon Bolivarlaan 30 B-1000 Brussel Tel: +32 2 2084870 Fax: +32 2 2084932 Mobile: +32 478 500172 e-mail: philippe.houdart@favv.be Bulgaria / Bulgarie Georgi Kirilov GEORGIEV Head of Exotic and Emerging Diseases Laboratory of the National Diagnostic and Research Veterinary Medicine Institute 1606 Sofia Tel: +359 2 345402 e-mail: georgivet@yahoo.com

Gabriel ODYSSEOS Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to FAO Czech Republic / République tchèque Milan MALENA Director General (CVO) State Veterinary Administration of the CR Slezská 7 120 56 Prague 2, CR Tel: +420 227 010 142 Fax: +420 227 010 191 e-mail: m.malena@svscr.cz; red@svscr.cz Josef VITÁSEK Head of the Department of Animal Health and Welfare State Veterinary Administration of the CR Slezská 7 120 56 Prague 2, CR Tel: +420 227 010 144 Fax: +420 227 010 195 Mobile: +420 602 433 375 e-mail: j.vitasek@svscr.cz; epiz@svscr.cz Denmark / Danemark Preben WILLEBERG Chief Veterinary Officer Danish Veterinary and Food Administration Tel: +45 3395 6115 Fax: +45 3967 5248 e-mail: pw@fvst.dk Birgit HENDRIKSEN Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Danish Veterinary and Food Administration Tel: +45 3395 6036 e-mail: bh@fvst.dk Tina MØRK Veterinary Officer Danish Veterinary and Food Administration Tel: +45 3395 6042 e-mail: tm@fvst.dk

222

Finland / Finlande Taina AALTONEN Senior Veterinary Officer Department of Food and Health Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry PO Box 30 FI-00023 Government - Helsinki Tel: +358 9 16053437 Fax: +358 9 16054777 e-mail: taina.aaltonen@mmm.fi Ulla RIKULA Veterinarian Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira Mustialankatu 3 FI-00790 - Helsinki Tel: +358 20774585 Fax: +358 20774363 e-mail: ulla.rikula@evira.fi

Helen D. HONDROKOUKI Director of FMD & ED Institute 9 Notou str, Ag. Paraskevi Athens 153 42 Tel: +30 210 6394300 Mobile: +30 6936 394300 e-mail: fmdi@otenet.gr Hungary / Hongrie Lajos BOGNÁR Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Kossuth L. sqr. 11 Budapest 1055 Tel: +36 14606300/108 Mobile: +36 307423248 e-mail: bognarl@elelmbizt.oai.hu Iceland / Islande

France Monique ELOIT Directrice générale adjointe C.V.O Direction Générale de l’Alilmentation Ministère de l'agriculture et de la pêche 251 rue de Vaugirard 75732 Paris Cedex 15 Tel: +33 (0) 149558174 Fax: +33 (0) 149555591 Mobile: +33 0608967057 e-mail: monique.eloit@agriculture.gouv.fr

Halldór RUNÓLFSSON Chief Veterinary Officer Agricultural Authority of Iceland Austurvegur 64 800 Selfoss Tel: +354 530 4800 Fax: +354 530 4801 Mobile: +354 895 6265 e-mail: halldor.runolfsson@lbs.is Ireland / Irlande

Yves LEFORBAN Inspecteur général de santé publique vétérinaire Conseil Général de l’Agriculture de l’Alimentation et des Esoaces Ruraux Ministère de l'agriculture et de la pêche 251 rue de Vaugirard 75732 Paris Cedex 15 Tel: +33 (0) 149558129 Fax: +33 (0) 149558169 e-mail: yves.leforban@agriculture.gouv.fr

Michael SHERIDAN Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Department of Agriculture Agriculture House 5 East, Kildare St Dublin 2 Tel: +353 1 6072645 Fax: +353 1 6762989 e-mail: michael.sheridan@agriculture.gov.ie

Germany / Allemagne

Giuseppe COPPOLA Direttore Generale per la Qualitá dei Prodotti Agroalimentari e Produzioni Animali Ministero delle Politiche Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali

Dietrich RASSOW Head of Division Nationales Krisenzentrum-Tierseuchen Tierseuchenangelegenheiten beim Handel Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection e-mail: Dietrich.Rassow@bmelv.bund.de Greece / Grèce

Italy / Italie

Piergiuseppe FACELLI Direttore dell’Ufficio III Rapporti Internazionali del Dipartimento della Sanitá Pubblica Veterinaria, la Nutrizione e la Sicurezza degli Alimenti Ministero della Salute

Spiros DOUDOUNAKIS Head of Unit of Animal Diseases e-mail: vetserv@ath.forthnet.gr

223

Lithuania / Lituanie Antanas BAUZA Head of Service Klaipeda County State Food and Veterinary Service Kretingos-62 Klaipeda LT-92325 Tel: +370 635 0242 Fax: +370 635 0550 Mobile: +370 873 1811 e-mail: antanas.bauza@vet.lt Luxembourg Arthur BESCH Chief Veterinary Officer Administration des Services Vétérinaires 211, rte d'Esch L - 1014 Luxembourg BP1403 Tel: +352 478 25 39 Mobile: +352 621 156432 e-mail: arthur.besch@asv.etat.lu (The) Netherlands / Pays Pas Peter DE LEEUW Chief Veterinary Officer Department of Food Quality and Animal Health Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality The Hague e-mail: p.leeuw2@chello.nl Wim PELGRIM Senior Policy Advisor Food Quality and Animal Health Department Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality Bezuidenhoutseweg 73 PO Box 20401 2500 EK The Hague Tel: +31-70-3784243 e-mail: w.pelgrim@minlnv.nl Norway / Norvège Keren BAR-YAACOV Chief Veterinary Officer Department of Health and Hygiene PO Box 383 N-2381 Brumunddal Tel: +47 2321 6800 Fax: +47 2321 6801 Mobile: +47 9130 0351 e-mail: kebay@mattilsynet.no

98-220 Zduńska Wola, ul. Wodna 7 Tel: +48 43 8265134 Fax: +48 43 8235275 e-mail: andrzejke@piwzp.invar.net.pl Portugal Carlos AGRELA PINHEIRO Director General of Veterinary Services Largo Academia Nacional de Belas Artes, nº 2 1249-105 Lisboa Tel: +351 21 323 9655 Fax: +351 21 346 3518 Mobile: +351 966 901 943 e-mail: dirgeral@dgv.min-agricultura.pt Romania / Romanie Eugen Lucian OLARU 63 Dr. Staicovici Street Sect V, Bucarest Tel: +40 21 410 0945 Fax: +40 214113397 e-mail: olaru.eugen@idah.ro Claudiu DIACONU Head of High Containment Unit Institute for Diagnostic and Animal Health Bucarest e-mail: diaconu.claudiu@idah.ro Serbia / Serbie Dejan KRNJAIC Chief Veterinary Officer Veterinary Directorate 1 Omladinskih brigada St New Belgrade Tel / Fax: +381 11 2602 320 Mobile: +381 64 8680 000 e-mail: dejank@minpolj.sr.gov.yu Slovakia / Slovaquie Jozef BIRES Chief Veterinary Officer of the Slovak Republic State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic Botanicka 17, Bratislava e-mail: bires@svssr.sk Spain / Espagne

Poland / Pologne

Luis-José ROMERO GONZÁLEZ Chief Epidemiology Unit Subdirectorate General For Animal Health Alfonso XII, 62; 1ª Planta Tel: +34 91 3478351 e-mail: ljromero@mapya.es

Andrzej KESY Head of the Department of Foot-and-Mouth Disease National Veterinary Research Institute

Ernesto RÍOS LÓPEZ Consejero Adjunto Permanent Representation of Spain to FAO Rome

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Angel OROZCO GÓMEZ Agregado Permanent Representation of Spain to FAO Rome

Tel: +90 312 2873600 Fax: +90 312 2873606 Mobile: +90 533 3571484 e-mail: nacib@sap.gov.tr

Carmen GARRIDO Técnico Permanent Representation of Spain to FAO Rome

United Kingdom / Royaume Uni

Sweden / Suède Leif DENNEBERG Chief Veterinary Officer Swedish Board of Agriculture SE-551 82 Jönköping Tel: +46 36 155000 Fax: + 46 36 308182 e-mail: leif.denneberg@sjv.se Marianne ELVANDER State epizootiologist National Veterinary Institute SE-751 89 Uppsala Tel: +46 18 674000 Fax: +46 18 674445 e-mail: marianne.elvander@sva.se Agneta NORGREN Senior Administrative Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 103 33 Stockholm Tel: +46 8 4051000 Fax: +46 8 4054970 e-mail: agneta.norgren@agriculture.ministry.se

Debby REYNOLDS Chief Veterinary Officer Room 303 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1A Page Street London SW1P 4PQ Tel: +44 20 79046139 Fax: +44 20 79046242 e-mail: debby.reynolds@defra.gsi.gov.uk Nick COULSON Head, International Animal Health Division Room 403C Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1A Page Street London SW1P 4PQ Tel: +44 20 79046169 Fax: +44 20 79046364 e-mail: nick.coulson@defra.gsi.gov.uk Patrick BURKE Veterinary Adviser Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1A Page Street London SW1P 4PQ Tel: +44 20 7904 6177 e-mail: patrick.j.burke@defra.gsi.gov.uk

Switzerland / Suisse Observers / Observateurs Josef SCHMIDT Office vétérinaire fédéral (OVF) Comité de direction Secteur Soutien à l’application de la législation Schwarzenburgstrasse 155 CH-3003 Berne Tel: +41 31 3238499 e-mail: josef.schmidt@bvet.admin.ch Turkey / Turquie Nihat PAKDIL Deputy Undersecretary Acting General Director of General Directorate of Protection and Control Tel: +90 312 4257789 Fax: +90 312 4186318 e-mail: nihatp@kkgm.gov.tr; vet_service@kkgm.gov.tr A. Naci BULUT FMD Expert Head of the Diagnosis Department FMD Institute Ankara

E. COUACY-HYMANN e- mail: e.couacy-hymann@lanada.ci Australia / Australie Martyn JEGGO Director Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) CSIRO Livestock Industries PMB 24, Geelong Vic 3220 Tel: +61 3 5227 5160 Fax: +61 3 5227 5250 e-mail: Martyn.Jeggo@Csiro.Au Brazil Ligia Maria SCHERER Minister Counsellor Permanent Representation of the Federative Republic of Brazil to FAO Via di Santa Maria dell'Anima 32 00186 Rome Tel: +39 06 68307576 Fax: +39 06 68398802 e-mail: rebrafao@brafao.it

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Canada Caroline DUBÉ Epidemiologist Animal Health and Production Division Disease Control Section Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) 59 Camelot Ottawa, Ontario K1AOY9 Tel: +1 506 3846697 e-mail: dubecm@inspection.gc.ca Emery LÉGER Veterinary Program Specialist Animal Health and Production Program Network - Altantic Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) Moncton, New Brunswick China / Chine Jianhong GUO Assistant Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute,CAAS National Foot and Mouth Disease Reference Laboratory 1# Xujiaping Yanchangbu Lanzhou, Gansu 730046 Tel: +86-931-8342585 Fax: +86-931-8340977 e-mail: gregjh@126.com

Tel: +32 2 2950870 Fax: +32 2 2953144 e-mail: Alf-Eckbert.Fuessel@ec.europa.eu Intervet International Paul VAN AARLE Director Institutional Sales PO Box 31 5830 AA Boxmeer The Netherlands Tel: +31 485585228 Fax: +31 485587491 e-mail: paul.vanaarle@intervet.com Iran Abbas GANJI Iran Veterinary Organization 23, Seyed Asad Abadi St. PO Box 14155-6349 Tehran Vahid OTAROD Iran Veterinary Organization 23, Seyed Asad Abadi St. PO Box 14155-6349 Tehran Tel: +98 982188806407 Fax: +98 982188902712 e-mail: votarod@hotmail.com Kenya

Hong YIN Researcher Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute,CAAS National Foot and Mouth Disease Reference Laboratory 1# Xujiaping Yanchangbu Lanzhou, Gansu 730046 Tel: +86-931-8342515 Fax: +86-931-8340977 e-mail: yinhong@public.lz.gs.cn

Abraham K. SANGULA Foot-and-Mouth Disease Laboratory Embakasi PO Box 18021 00500 Enterprise Road Nairobi Tel / Fax: +254 20 553633 Mobile: +254 722 302444 e-mail: abrahamsangu@yahoo.com Morocco / Maroc

Egypt / Égypte Yasser Mohamed GADO General Authority for Veterinary Services

Abderrahman EL ABRAK Chef de la Division de la Santé Animale Direction de l’Elevage e-mail: a.abrak@menara.ma

Hassan AIDAROS Professor of Hygiene and Preventive Medicine 5 , Mossadak St. 12311 Dokki-Cairo Tel: +202 2185166 / Fax: +202 7607055 e-mail: haidaros@netscape.net

Mehdi EL HARRAK Chef du Départment de virologie à Biopharma e-mail: elharrak_m@hotmail.com

European Commission / Commission européenne (EC) Alf-Eckbert FÜSSEL DG SANCO/E2 Animal Health Welfare and Zootechnics Rue Froissart, 101, 3/64 B-1049 Brussels Belgium

OIE - World Organisation for Animal Health / Organisation mondiale de la santé animale Gideon BRÜCKNER 12, rue de Prony Paris France e-mail: g.bruckner@oie.int

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Panaftosa – PAHO-WHO Victor SARAIVA Head Vesicular Diseases Unit Rio de Janeiro Brazil Tel: +55 21 3661 9022 e-mail: vsaraiva@paho.org SADC/EU Andrea MASSARELLI SADC FMD Project SADC FANR – Millenium Park Gaborone Botswana Tel: +267 74111812 e-mail: massarelli_net@hotmail.com; amassarelli@sadc.int South Africa / Afrique du Sud Wilna VOSLOO Team Leader - Exotic Animal Health Exotic Diseases Division Private Bag X05 Onderstepoort - 0110 Tel: +27 12 5299592 Fax: +27 12 5299595 Mobile: 0823391879 e-mail: VoslooW@arc.agric.za Ukraine Oksana DRAMARETSKA Alternate Permanent Representative of Ukraine to FAO Via G.d’Arezzo, 9 Tel: +39 068412630 / Fax: +39 068547539 e-mail: emb_it@mfa.gov.ua Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) Ahmed SRIKAH Chef de Division Direction de la Sécurité Alimentaire Rabat Morocco

EUFMD Research Group / Groupe de Recherche de l’EUFMD Kris DE CLERCQ (Chairman, Research Group, EUFMD) Department of Virology Section Epizootic Diseases CODA-CERVA-VAR Groeselenberg 99 B-1180 Ukkel Belgium Tel: +32 2 3790592 / +32 2 3790400 Fax: +32 2 379666 Mobile: +32 4 73730592 e-mail: kris.de.clercq@var.fgov.be Aldo DEKKER Senior Scientist Laboratory Vesicular Diseases Central Institute for Animal Disease Control PO Box 2004 Lelystad 8203 AA The Netherlands Tel: +31 320 238603 Fax: +31 320 238668 Mobile: +31 651 311371 e-mail: aldo.dekker@wur.nl Yadin HAGAI Head of Virology Division and FMD Laboratory Kimron Veterinary Institute c/o Ministry of Agriculture PO Box 12, Beit-Dagan 50250 Israel Tel: +972 3 9681619 Fax: +972 3 9681788 Mobile: +972-50-6241382 e-mail: hagaiy@moag.gov.il David PATON Pirbright Laboratory Institute for Animal Health Ash Road Pirbright, Surrey GU24 0NF UK Tel: +44 1483 231012 Fax: +44 1483 232621 e-mail: david.paton@bbsrc.ac.uk

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FAO

EUFMD Secretariat / Secrétariat EUFMD

Samuel C. JUTZI Director Animal Production and Health Division (AGA)

European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EUFMD) / Commission européenne de lutte contre la fièvre aphteuse (EUFMD)

Joseph DOMENECH Chief Animal Health Service (AGAH)

Rapporteurs Nesya GORIS Department of Virology Section Epizootic Diseases CODA-CERVA-VAR Groeselenberg 99 B-1180 Ukkel Belgium Tel: +32 2 3790-514 Fax: +32 2 3790 666 e-mail: negor@var.fgov.be Tom MURRAY Associate Professional Officer EUFMD, AGAH FAO Via delle Terme di Caracalla 00100 Rome Italy Tel: +39 06570 55124 Fax: +39 06570 55749 e-mail: tom.murray@fao.org

Animal Health Service FAO HQ Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 00100 Rome, Italy Fax: +39-06570-55749 Keith J. SUMPTION Secretary Tel: +39-06570-55528 e-mail: keith.sumption@fao.org Tom MURRAY Associate Professional Officer Tel: +39-06570-55124 e-mail: tom.murray@fao.org Nadia Rumich EUFMD Secretariat Tel: +39-06570-55811 e-mail: nadia.rumich@fao.org Laura Contaldi EUFMD Secretariat Tel: +39-06570-52183 e-mail: laura.contaldi@fao.org Georgia Carsten PÖTZSCH FMD Surveillance and Control in the Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) Tbilisi Tel: +995 99 626546 e-mail: carsten.potzsch@fao.org Iran Francis GEIGER c/o FAO Office Tehran Tel: +98 21 88806408 Fax: +98 21 88902712 Mobile: +98 9122360424 e-mail: francis-geiger@fao.org.ir

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