Dr Klaus Olshausen, Meckenheim

by Dr Klaus Olshausen, Lt.Gen. (ret.), President, Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg

In early May this year the international media were buzzing with reports of the violent condemnation by Russian Defence Chief General Nicolai Makarov, pronounced during a conference in Moscow, of NATO’s plan to achieve an interim missile defence (MD) capability by its Chicago summit. Makarov even suggested pre-emptive attacks against missile installations in allied countries as a potential Russian response. Only days later did some of the media take note of remarks made at the same conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow explaining in great detail why NATO’s MD project, aimed at providing comprehensive protection of allied territories and populations against present and future threats, was a responsible step forward. Those statements highlight the fact that the combination of NATO, Russia and missile defence brings with it opportunities but also the risk of severe friction or even failure.

A historical snapshot The development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the 9/11 terror attacks prompting a focus on the wider Middle East were critical factors in the Bush administration’s decision to denounce the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty dating back to the early 1970s. The requirement for a limited defence capability against future long-range ballistic missiles from those countries/regions made this step unavoidable, according to the US rationale. Moreover, notwithstanding all the criticism on the part of the international community and Russia, the then Russian President Putin coolly claimed that Russian offensive capabilities would in any case easily be able to overwhelm those defences.

Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Three years following the controversy over the decision to launch the Kosovo air campaign, the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted increased interest on the part of both Russia and NATO in seeking ways of coming closer with a view to combating transnational terrorism. At that time NATO had also embarked on the final stages of its decision-making process on the accession of seven new members, including the three Baltic States. The creation of the NRC was therefore also perceived as a means of mitigating the repercussions for Russia of former USSR member states joining NATO. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Rome Declaration of 28 May 2002, besides general military-to-military

Dr Klaus Olshausen Dr Klaus Olshausen was born in Eisenberg on April 25, 1945. On graduation from high school he joined the Bun deswehr. 1967-1972 studies of history and political sciences and PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University, Freiburg. 1978 completion of general staff officer training. 1979–1985 G2 12th (GE) Armoured Division; attendee of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA and Foreign and security policy directorate at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn and Commander of Engineer Battalion 2. 1985: Planning Staff of MoD. 1987 Military Attaché in Washington, DC, USA. 1990 Commander (GE) Infantry Brigade 31. 1994 as a Brigadier General Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Army Support Command. 1996 Deputy Commanding General EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. 1998 Deputy Commander HQ IV. Corps (Deputy Commander GE KFOR (KOSOVO). 2000–2006 German Military Representative to the MC/NATO, WEU and EU on 1 October 2000 with the rank of Lieutenant General.

cooperation, already included Theatre Missile Defence as one of the nine areas in which cooperative efforts were to be taken forward.

Missile defence as a NATO project But before delving deeper into the topic of missile defence it is helpful to establish the perspective and intentions on both sides that led to the creation of the NRC. While NATO nations were eager to engage with Russia, at least to a certain extent, but without (Russian-imposed) constraints, Russia was seeking to create a forum of equal partners in order to take decisions on significant European security issues. “Both sides want to lead but not be led”. From SDI to the Rumsfeld report of 1998, from the Bush administration’s National Missile Defense Project (including cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic) to the “phased approach” of the Obama administration, missile defence was and remains a critical US project. It was only with Obama’s adaptation of the programme and his readiness to enlarge its scope to cover the whole of NATO Europe that the Allies rallied behind the programme, with the additional prospect of broad transparency vis-à-vis Russia and deliberate coordination or even the broadest possible cooperation with it. Although the then President Medvejev agreed at the 2010 Lisbon summit to such cooperation in general, Russia had

already placed its own emergency brake on the New START Treaty in the spring of that year.

NATO’s cooperation path In an attempt to accommodate Russian concerns the Alliance suggested several areas of cooperation: • Firstly, an effort to draw up a common threat assessment. This assessment was agreed in principle at the NRC CHODs meeting in April 2012; • Secondly, the creation of two “NATO-Russia missile defence centres” with mixed teams working together around the clock. The first was planned to be a Missile Defence Data Fusion Centre in order to create – using data from all sensors – a common operational picture of possible third country missile launches. The second was to be a Missile Defence Planning & Operations Centre which would concentrate on operating concepts, rules of engagement and preplanned responses to be implemented in the event of an actual attack by a third country.

Russia’s perceptions and requirements An article written by Sergey Koshelev in May 2012 describes the Russian perception of NATO’s MD project as a potential threat against Russia’s own nuclear arsenal that would negate its capacity for retaliation. Clearly the presumption underlying that perception is that of a US and/or NATO attack requiring an overwhelming nuclear response from Russia. Or else Russia is thinking of contingencies involving a conventional attack against NATO territory, but where a nuclear retaliatory capability would be required in order to deter a nuclear response from NATO. Both scenarios look far-fetched but are triggering unrealistic demands on the part of Moscow. Instead of making the most of the offers of cooperation to enhance its own situational awareness and influence, Russia is insisting on two far-reaching and – for NATO – impossible demands. Ultimately, what Moscow wants is a missile defence in and for Europe for which the strategic deployment decisions are taken by the NRC and not by the NAC or even SACEUR alone. As long as this is not achievable Moscow is insisting on a legally binding guarantee that MD will not be used against Russia. The first demand is unacceptable to the Alliance since the use of missile defence, as a matter of collective defence falling under Article 5, cannot be placed in the hands of a third country. And the second would constitute a self-imposed longterm and legally binding limitation of the Alliance’s scope for action that neither the US nor any other NATO member nation would be willing to accept.

The way forward Since the Chicago summit there have been no recognisable activities between NATO and Russia in the field of missile defence. Against the current backdrop of Russian disapproval or downright rejection and the first interim MD capability having been established at the time of the Chicago summit, the following points should guide NATO’s approach: • The MD project is designed for the protection of territories,

populations and deployed forces against a limited number of ballistic missile attacks. • Risks, dangers and threats arising from the proliferation of ballistic missiles already exist and are likely to increase in terms of the types of threat, their number and their geographic extension. • In a spirit of solidarity, common reponsibility and burden

sharing the participation of many if not all member nations is required, not least of all to master this technologically, financially and politically challenging endeavour. • NATO’s limited MD is not directed against Russia and will never develop the technical or operational magnitude that would allow it to undermine Russia’s retaliatory capabilities. • All offers of cooperation with Russia regarding threat analysis, early warning and operational planning remain valid and will be further pursued with the Russian authorities. Unjustified Russian objections which are possibly no more than an attempt to hide the fact that Russia does not want NATO/US installations on the territory of “new” Alliance members in central and south-eastern Europe and to drive a wedge between Alliance members cannot and must not be allowed to stand in the way of the useful and affordable contribution that MD can make to the comprehensive collective defence of the Alliance. But even if all these points are followed through, the technological challenges – such as intelligence & reconnaissance, target recognition & identification and improved weapons effectiveness – will require a long-lasting effort in order to create operationally effective systems. This might also give rise to critical questions on the part of the nations concerned. The time must also be used in order to work out acceptable solutions for the political issues as well – and not only with Russia.

On 13-14 November 2012, a simulated computer-based exercise to test the NATO-Russia Council’s Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) Information Exchange System (IES) took place over three CAI geographical areas of operational interest: Bodø/Murmansk, Warsaw/ Kaliningrad and Ankara/Rostov-on-Don. The purpose of CAI is to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination against terrorist attacks using civilian aircraft. The exercise, called “Vigilant Skies 2012” builds on the achievements of previous CAI exercises and workshops and will help to build towards a possible live exercise in 2013 over the Black Sea area.