Aging in Russia and Ukraine: a Comparative Analysis of Current State and Future Trends

2009–2010

ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research Ensuring Income Security and Welfare in Old Age

Aging in Russia and Ukraine: a Comparative Analysis of Current State and Future Trends Gaiane L. Safarova

Report

Aging in Russia and Ukraine: a comparative analysis of current state and future trends Gaiane Safarova Saint-Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences Tchaikovsky str. 1, 191187 Saint-Petersburg, Russia Tel: (7 812) 272 20 45, Tel/Fax: (7 812) 273 79 53 e-mail: safarova@emi.nw.ru Introduction It is recognized that while the XXth century was the one of population growth, the XXIst century might come out as the one of population ageing (Golini 2006). All developed countries face serious problems connected with consequences of reproduction type change and age structure transformations. Besides, for Eastern Europe and the CIS countries the last decades of the XXth century were marked by radical changes in all spheres of social life. For transition states the demographic component of their development is highly sensitive to social, political and economic transformations. Undergoing similar reforms Russia and Ukraine, besides, have more similarities in economic, cultural, linguistic and other aspects than other former Soviet republics. Moreover, migrational exchange between Russia and Ukraine is a significant part of migration streams in these countries. Thus, it presents both theoretical and practical interest to make a comparative analysis of current state and future dynamics of ageing process in Russia and Ukraine since the year 1989 (when the last Soviet census was conducted).

In the paper it is supposed to focus on the following topics. As population ageing is one of the consequences of demographic transition (the manifestation of age structure changes in the course of demographic transition) special attention will be paid to age structure changes, i.e. changes in proportions of the aggregated age groups (children, working age population and the elderly) for Russia and Ukraine. Then, to characterize the situation with population ageing in Ukraine and Russia a number of ageing characteristics of different types (proportions, age-related indicators) for both countries will be considered including proportions of the elderly (e.g. 60+, 65+, 80+) in the total population, ageing index, dependency ratios, life expectancies at older ages, median age. To understand better ageing development in Russia and Ukraine corresponding ageing characteristics will be compared with those for several developed countries representing different regions of Europe. At present demographic forecasts are an integral part of socio-economic planning at different levels serving in particular for quantitative assessment of expected effects of different economic and social programmes which are launched for achieving certain results. In the

2 paper future trends of population ageing in Russia and Ukraine up to the year 2050 will be studied based on probabilistic projections. Finally national concepts of demographic development for Russia and Ukraine will be examined and compared from the point of view of meeting needs of the elderly.

The study is based on censuses and vital statistics (given by Federal State Statistics Service, Rosstat, and State Committee on Statistics of Ukraine); materials of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat and data from Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Plank Institute for Demographic Research (Germany) have been used.

Driving forces of ageing and changes in population age composition in Russia and Ukraine, 1989 - 2008 It is acknowledged that population reproduction is determined in general by fertility, mortality and migration, the contribution of age structure being significant as well (see for example Pirozhkov and Safarova 1999, 2003). The mentioned main demographic processes are driving forces of population ageing, but their effects on ageing process for different countries may be different.

In the UN publication (United Nations 2005) presenting an overview of trends in population ageing in the world it was shown that international migration’s effect on population age structure for the more developed regions is fairly small (though not always negligible). It was shown in (United Nations 2001) that to offset ageing in countries with below-replacement fertility enormous implausible migration flows are required; this question for Russia was discussed in (Pirozhkov and Safarova 1999). Thus, here it is not supposed to dwell upon migration.

It is known that mortality contributes to ageing if more people survive till older ages (so called rectangularisation of survival curve) and if life expectancy of the elderly increases. Both conditions are not satisfied in Russia and Ukraine, this was shown in numerous studies focused on the mortality crisis in Russia and Ukraine, see for example (DaVanzo J., G. Farnsworth, 1996; Demograficheskaya modernizatsiya Rossii 2005; a series of annual demographic reports Naselenie Rossii 1993; Naselenie Rossii 1994,‌, Naselenie Rossii 2006; Mortality in countries of the former USSR, 2006). Fig. 1, 18 showing dynamics of life expectancy at birth and at the age of 60 are illustrations of the last statement. So, the main driving force of population ageing in Russia and Ukraine has been fertility decline (shown on Fig. 2). Thus, over 1959 – 2007 the total fertility rate (TFR) declined almost twice: from 2.6 in 1959 to 1.4 in 2008 for Russia and from 2.2 to 1.25 for Ukraine, while the percentage of the elderly (60+) almost doubled (see Fig. 10).

3 Figure 1. Dynamics of life expectancy at birth, Russia and Ukraine, 1970 – 2007

Figure 2. Dynamics of the total fertility rate (TFR), Russia and Ukraine, 1989 – 2008

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995, …, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008.

4 Figures 1, 2 demonstrate as well that general trends of natural population movement for Russia and Ukraine have been similar. This results in the similarity of their age compositions (as it is shown below).

It should be mentioned that while demographic transition started in Western Europe at the end of the XVIIIth century, in Russia and Ukraine it began much later – in the 1920s; changes in main demographic processes during demographic transition in Russia and Ukraine were studied in detail in (Demograficheskaya modernizatsiya Rossii 2005, Vosproizvodstvo naseleniya SSSR 1983). This results particularly in lower values of ageing indicators for Russia and Ukraine as compared with those for developed countries (at greater length see a special part below). Some demographic aspects of population ageing in Russia and Ukraine were considered for example in (Safarova G., Pirozhkov S., 2000; Safarova, 2005).

As it has been pointed out above ageing should be considered not isolatedly but in the context of age structure transformation. Changes in proportions of the aggregated age groups (children, working age population and the elderly) are going to be examined here. For the most part, the period after the year 1989 when the last Soviet census was conducted and reforms started, is considered but for better understanding dynamics of ageing in Russia and Ukraine values of indicators for 1959, 1970 and 1979 censuses are often given as well.

A comparison between population pyramids of Russia in 1897 (the year of the first Russian census) and at present (in 2008) shows dramatic changes in the country’s age composition: the proportion of children (under age 15) decreased from 37.7% in 1897 to 14.7% in 2008 while that of the elderly (population aged 60+) increased from 7.3% to 17.2% (see Figure 3).

The analogous figure for Ukraine looks absolutely similar due to already mentioned parallels in dynamics of main demographic processes in Russia and Ukraine.

The pyramid for the year 1897 is typical for a population before the beginning of demographic transition – it has a broad base and a narrow vertex.

5 Figure 3. Population pyramids (%), Russia, 1897 and 2008

Source: Vosproizvodstvo naseleniya SSSR 1983, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2008.

Source: Vosproizvodstvo naseleniya SSSR 1983, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2008.

Figure 4 (prepared by P. Shevchuk) shows population pyramids for Russia and Ukraine in 1959 (the year of the first post-war census); these pyramids may be called twins. They mirror crisis events in the history of Russia and Ukraine. Thus, “1” marks war losses, “2” – mortality increase during the famine of 1932-1933, “3” – some fertility increase before the WWII, “4” – fertility decline during the WWII. Demographic waves of these events can be traced on countries’ age structures in 1989 (the last Soviet census; see Fig. 5). Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 (population pyramids for Russia and Ukraine in 2005) demonstrate resemblance of Russian and Ukrainian age structures.

Besides, if we compare them with age structures of Northern, Southern and Western Europe in the same year 2005 (see Fig. 7 - 9) using some metric indicator, it can be seen that for Ukraine corresponding differences are lower than those for Russia, that both for Russia and Ukraine the discrepancies between their age compositions and age compositions of regions of Europe have their

6 minimal values for Western Europe, and the difference between age compositions of Russia and Ukraine is more than twice smaller than that between Ukraine and Western Europe.

Figure 4. Population pyramids (%), Russia and Ukraine, 1959

It should be mentioned that in general in modern Russia and Ukraine age structures are characterized by deformations (i.e. sharp disproportions between sizes of adjacent age groups) as can be seen from Fig. 6 representing Russian and Ukrainian population pyramids.

7 Figure 5,6. Population pyramids for Russia and Ukraine (%): 5. 1989 (upper); 6. 2005 (lower)

8 Figure 7. Population pyramids for Russia (upper)/Ukraine (lower) and Northern Europe, (%), 2005

9 Figure 8. Population pyramids for Russia (upper)/Ukraine (lower) and Southern Europe, (%), 2005

10 Figure 9. Population pyramids for Russia (upper)/Ukraine (lower) and Western Europe, (%), 2005

11 Figures 10 a, b, 11 a, b show dynamics of percentage of major age groups in 1959 – 2008 (2007 for Ukraine). In the period 1959 – 2008 (2007 for Ukraine) the proportion of children has decreased to almost 50 % (relative to its value in 1959), that of working age population (15 – 59 years old) has reached 110 % for Russia and 104% for Ukraine (relative to its value in 1959), the percentage of the elderly has almost doubled (increased to 193% for Russia and 196% for Ukraine relative to its value in 1959). Thus in present (in 2008/2007) the proportion of children (14.7% for Russia and 13.4% for Ukraine) is lower than that of the elderly (17.2% for Russia and 20.5% for Ukraine), the percentage of working age population being 68.1% for Russia and 66.1% for Ukraine.

During almost two decades after the last Soviet census (held in 1989) the proportion of children decreased by 8.4% for Russia and 8.2% for Ukraine while that of the elderly increased by about 2% for Russia and 2.5% for Ukraine. So, population ageing in Russia and Ukraine is progressing and dynamics of proportions of major age groups for Russia and Ukraine has been similar.

It should be mentioned that till now the proportion of working age population has not decreased (see Fig. 10, 11), thus total relative size of children and the old people to the working age population has not increased (dependency rates will be discussed below). This fact is favorable from economic point of view.

The internal age structure of the group of the elderly to some extent determines the need for care and support in daily living. It does not remain constant, and its changes should be taken into account when formulating social policies. The population of the elderly is itself ageing: over the period 1989 – 2008 the share of “young old” (aged 60 – 69) in the population aged 60+ decreased while the proportions of the age group 70 – 79 and the oldest-old (80+) increased. Among those aged 60 years or over, the oldest-old population is the fastest growing group. By 2050 the share of oldest-old in the population aged 60+ in Russia may reach 18.9%, in Ukraine – 19.5% (according to computations based on the medium variant of World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision), while in 1989 it was 11.7% for Russia and 12.4% for Ukraine.

Steady increase in median age from 25 years for Russia and 27.6 years for Ukraine in 1950 to correspondingly 37.3 and 38.9 years in 2005 (World Population Ageing 2007) reflects the development of population ageing as well. Median age is such an age, where half the people in a population are younger than the median age and half are older, changes in median age can demonstrate how a population is ageing. Dynamics of median age is considered below in the paragraph on comparative analysis, and it is given on Figure 17.

12 Figure 10. Population age structure by major age groups (%), Russia (a) and Ukraine (b) 1959 – 2008

Source: own elaboration based on The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995,…, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008

13 Figure 11. Population age structure by major age groups, Russia (a) and Ukraine (b) 1959 – 2008 (relative to 1959)

Source: own elaboration based on The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995,…, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008

14 Development of population ageing in Russia and Ukraine, 1989 – 2008 To characterize the situation with population ageing in Russia and Ukraine a number of ageing characteristics of different types (proportions, age-related indicators) have been computed, including proportions of the elderly (e.g. 60+) in the total population, ageing index, dependency ratios, parent support ratio, life expectancies at older ages, median age.

Changes in the percentage of population aged 60 or over have been discussed above. Figure 12 shows dynamics of dependency ratios (young age, old age and total dependency ratios).

Dependency ratios are indicators of the level of support of children or/and the elderly (aged 60+ or 65+; here we consider 60+), they are expressed in term of the relative size of children or/and the old age population to the working age population (aged 15 – 59 or 15 – 64; in this section we consider 15 - 59).

Certainly, among dependency ratios only old-age dependency ratio is a characteristic of ageing process. Unfortunately in Russia and Ukraine population ageing is often considered by some economists and the Pension Fund officials as something very dangerous for national economies due to “crushing burden” to the working age population. But dependants are not only old people, thus to form a clear picture of the “burden”, young age and total dependency ratios are given as well. As can be seen from Figure 12, changes in old-age dependency ratio were rather small, i.e. from 24.8 and 29.8 in 1989 (for Russia and Ukraine correspondingly) to 25.3 in 2008 for Russia and 31.1 in 2007 for Ukraine (the maximal value over the period being for Russia 29.1 in 2001 and 34.4 in 2002 for Ukraine). Dynamics of old-age dependency ratio is determined by behavior of two age groups (60+ and 15 - 59) shown on Fig. 10. While in 1992 – 2007 the percentage of working age population (15 - 59) monotonously increased by about 12% for Russia and 9.5% for Ukraine relative to values in 1989 (from 60.9% in 2002 till 68.2% in 2007 for Russia and from 60.4 to 66.1 for Ukraine), dynamics of 60+ proportion was more complicated due to effects of numerous crisis historical events (e.g. World War II) on population age composition. Thus, almost monotonous increase in this proportion in 1989 – 2002 (interrupted only in 1994 - 1995 in Russia and 1993 – 1995 in Ukraine) was followed by a small decrease till 2007/2006. As a result the trajectories of 60+ proportion and old-age dependency ratio in 1989 – 2002 had been similar. Then in 2001(2002) – 2007/2006 both indicators decreased, old-age dependency ratio decrease being more rapid due to increase in the ratio’s denominator.

15

Source: own elaboration based on The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995,…, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008

16 Figure 12 shows that in spite of old-age dependency increase by 2% for Russia and 4.4% for Ukraine (relative to values in 1989), the total age dependency ratio decreased by about 25% for Russia and 22% for Ukraine (relative to values in 1989) over the considered period. Thus at present the situation with dependants in Russia is not so tragical as it is sometimes described by numerous bureaucrats and mass media.

Figure 13. Dynamics of ageing index, Russia and Ukraine, 1959 – 2008/2007

Source: own elaboration based on The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995,…, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008

Figure 13 shows dynamics of ageing index, aging index being the ratio of people aged 60+ to children younger 15. This indicator reflects changes in family structure, i.e. ageing index increase means that now children have more grandparents than in the past. Besides, in the developed countries families become more multigenerational due to life expectancy increase. Over the period 1989 – 2008/2007 ageing index increased by about 80% for Russia and 84% for Ukraine (from 66 to 118 for Russia and from 83 to 154 for Ukraine). This rapid increase was caused by both decrease in the proportion of children and increase in the percentage of the elderly.

17 Figure 14. Dynamics of parent support ratio, Russia and Ukraine 1959 – 2008/2007

Source: own elaboration based on The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1995,…, 2008; Population of Ukraine 1992, …, 2008

Figure 14 shows dynamics of parent support ratio. Parent support ratio shows the number of persons aged 85+ in relation to those aged 50 – 64 years, this indicator reflects the need to care for very old and sometimes frail relatives. In 1989 – 2008/2007 parent support ratio increased from 3.6 to 4.2 for Russia and from 4.0 till 5.0 for Ukraine, its trajectory being far from linear. Dynamics of this ratio depends on the sizes of the groups 85+ and 50 – 64 which did not change monotonously as countries’ age compositions were affected by numerous crisis historical events. Maximal value of this indicator (equal to 5.6 for Russia and 5.8 for Ukraine) was observed in 1999. Parent support ratio represents the number of oldest-old (85+) per 100 potential caregivers (i.e. persons aged 50 64). Thus, showing a potential need for informal care this indicator is of great importance for Russia and Ukraine where systems of institutions and services for the elderly are underdeveloped.

As can be clearly seen from Figure 6 modern Russian and Ukrainian age structures are characterised by significant male/female imbalance.

In (Safarova, Pirozhkov 2002) it was demonstrated that demographic development of Russia and Ukraine is characterized by very high mortality difference by sex and by significant disparity

18 between males and females in the population structure. Moreover, the older is the age the greater is imbalance. Thus, mentioned disparities affect the countries’ population ageing. Besides, it was shown that for Russia and Ukraine the number of males per 1000 females is lower than that for developed European countries, and the gap (between Russia/Ukraine and these countries) is widening with age. Thus, gender imbalance in Russia and Ukraine has been more marked than in developed European countries.

Results of computations have shown that in Russia the percentage of the elderly (60+) in the female population varied within the range 19.8% (in 1989) – 22.9% (in 2002), for Ukraine - within the range 22.4% – 25.4% (minimal and maximal values having been observed in the same years as for Russia). For the male population the proportion of the elderly changed between 10.0% (in 1989) and 13.9% (in 2002) for Russia, and between 12.8% and 16.7% (minimal and maximal values having been observed in the same years as for Russia). So, female/male ratio for Russia varied between 1.64 (in 2002) and 1.97 in 1989, and that for Ukraine – between 1.53 (in 2001 an 2002) and 1.75 (in 1989).

Summarizing, it may be stated that over the period 1989 – 2008/2007 all considered ageing characteristics increased though their trajectories and the pace of increase were different. Due to irregularities of Russia’s and Ukraine’s population pyramids ageing indicators changed unevenly.

Ageing index demonstrates the highest and monotonous increase, while increase in old-age dependency ratio was rather small. Values of the considered indicators have been greater for Ukraine. In both countries ageing process is characterized by significant gender imbalance. Ageing in Russia and Ukraine is progressing, moreover, it may be shown that the pace of population ageing in both countries is more rapid than in developed countries. Thus Russia and Ukraine have less time to adjust to the consequences of this process.

Population ageing in Russia and Ukraine as compared with European countries To understand better ageing development and to successfully face its challenges in Russia and Ukraine, corresponding ageing characteristics have been compared with those for several countries representing different regions of Europe (i.e. Western, Southern, Eastern and Northern Europe). At the same time they belong to transition (e.g. Poland) and non-transition countries (e.g. France and Spain). In turn, considered transition countries represent both post-Soviet states (e.g. Belarus and Latvia) and Eastern European transition countries (e.g. Hungary and Romania). At first indicators characterizing structural aspect of ageing are considered, then we’ll dwell upon life expectancy at older ages.

19 Table 1 shows ageing in Russia and Ukraine within the European context. It can be seen that the enumerated ageing characteristics for Russia and considered European countries have been converging, for Russia being lower than for countries of Western, Southern and Northern Europe.

Table 1 Ageing indicators for Russia, Ukraine and selected European countries, 1950, 1970, 1990, 2005 Country France Germany Year

Italy

Spain Sweden

United

Poland Russia Ukraine

Kingdom 60+, %

1950

16.2

14.6

12.2

10.9

14.9

15.5

8.2

9.2

10.9

1970

18.1

19.9

16.1

14.2

19.6

18.7

12.8

12.0

14.0

1990

19.1

20.4

21.1

19.0

22.8

20.8

14.9

15.9

18.4

2005

20.8

25.1

25.3

21.7

23.4

21.2

17.2

17.1

20.6

Ageing index: 60+/(0 - 14), % 1950

71.5

63.0

46.5

40.4

63.7

69.5

28.0

31.8

40.2

1970

73.0

85.4

65.7

50.9

94.2

77.3

47.4

45.1

56.1

1990

94.4

127

133

95.5

127.0

109.5

59.0

69.0

86.0

2005

113.2

174.5

181.2 150.3

134.3

118.3

105.2

113.3

140.3

Old age dependency ratio: 60+/(15 - 59), % 1950

26.5

23.5

19.9

17.6

24.2

25.0

13.1

14.9

17.6

1970

31.7

35.0

27.1

24.5

32.9

32.7

21.3

19.5

23.0

1990

31.5

32.1

33.5

31.0

38.4

34.6

24.8

26.0

30.6

2005

34.2

41.4

41.8

33.9

39.5

35.0

25.8

25.3

31.8

Source: own elaboration based on World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision In general Russia and Ukraine are not very “old” countries. According to (World Population Ageing 2007) in 2007 Russia was the 44th in the percentage of the elderly (Ukraine – the 22nd), the 34th in median age (Ukraine – the 20th) and 30th in ageing index (Ukraine – 11th) among 192 countries. Figures 15 - 17 give an idea of the place of Russia and Ukraine in the European ageing

20 process showing some ageing indicators, i.e. proportion of the elderly, parent support ratio and median age.

Figure 15. Proportion of population aged 60+ (%), Russia, Ukraine and selected European countries, 1990, 2005

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision The percentage of the elderly (60+) in Russia, being equal to 17.1% in 2005, was the lowest one among the considered countries; for Ukraine it coincided the European level (20.6%). Values for the considered Northern, Southern and Western European countries varied within 19.3% (for The Netherlands) - 25.3% (for Italy).

In 2005 among the considered countries Russia had the next to lowest value of parent support ratio equal to 4.3 (the lowest one equal to 3.8 was observed in Romania), corresponding value for Ukraine was 4.7. Values of parent support ratio for the considered Northern, Southern and Western European countries varied from 7.9 (for Finland) to 12.3 (for Sweden), being equal to 7.7 for the whole Europe.

21 Figure 16. Parent support ratio, Russia, Ukraine and selected European countries, 1990, 2005

Source: own elaboration based on World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Fig. 17. Median age, Russia, Ukraine, Northern, Southern and Western Europe, 1950 – 2005

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision

22 Figure 17 represents dynamics of median age for Russia, Ukraine, Northern, Southern and Western Europe since 1950. It can be seen that values of this indicator for Russia, Ukraine and the regions of Europe are converging, for Russia being lower. The value for Ukraine in 2005 coincided with the European level (38.9 years) being lower than that for Southern and Western Europe. In 2005 median age for Russia was 37.5 years, for Northern Europe – 38.8 years, Southern Europe – 39.8 years and for Western Europe –40.5 years.

Figures 15-17 show that in comparison with the considered European countries Russia is characterized by the lowest or next to lowest levels of the considered ageing indicators while their values for Ukraine were higher than those for Russia and closer to European levels. These relatively low values may be considered as an advantage giving Russia more opportunities to take steps to cope with consequences of ageing Consider now life expectancy at older ages. It is known that main driving forces of population ageing are fertility decline and life expectancy increase. But in Russia and Ukraine population ageing is developing due to low fertility only. Mortality has effect on population ageing when more people survive till older ages and when life expectancy at older ages increases. In Russia and Ukraine the situation with mortality is quite different – life expectancy at age 60 is one of the lowest in Europe.

Fig. 18. Dynamics of life expectancy at the age of 60 (LE 60), Russia and Ukraine, 1959 – 2006

23 Figure 18 represents dynamics of life expectancy at the age of 60 (LE 60) for male and female populations of Russia and Ukraine since the first post-WWII census (1959). Trends of this indicator for Russia and Ukraine have been similar. For male populations LE 60 for Ukraine have been higher than that for Russia, while for female populations for some years LE 60 was higher for Russia. In the last years some increase in life expectancies at older ages both in Russia and Ukraine was observed. Nevertheless life expectancies in older ages for Russia and Ukraine are still much lower than in developed European countries. Thus, in 2006 LE65 for males in the EU was 15.5 years while in Russia – 11.4 years, in Ukraine – 11.7 years; LE 65 for females in the EU was 19.4 years while for Russia – 15.6 years, for Ukraine –15.5 years (see Fig.19 based on (European Demographic Datasheet 2008). Therefore Western socio-economic policies which are connected with high and increasing life expectancy can’t be applied to Russian and Ukrainian situations without serious adaptation.

Figure 19. Life expectancy at 65, Russia, Ukraine and selected European countries, 2006

24 It is acknowledged that life expectancy increase is one of driving forces of population ageing.

In its turn, progressing population ageing attracted researchers’ attention to the concept of age.

Thus, the concept of prospective age appeared (Sanderson W. and Scherbov S., 2005, 2008). It was pointed out that conventional ageing measures based on chronological age should be supplemented by measures that take account of remaining years of life. One of such measures is population average remaining years of life (PARYL); it is calculated by weighting the remaining life expectancy of all ages with the proportion of people at those ages in the considered population (European Demographic Datasheet 2008).

In fact PARYL is a kind of life potential of a population – it may be interpreted as an average individual life potential. This notion dates back to the notion of life potential developed in works of L. Hersch (see for example (Filrose E., 1975; Pirozhkov S., 1992), the concept of life potential was widely used in Russia and Ukraine in studying labor potential. Such interpretation of PARYL makes it very useful in studying a wide range of population issues, e.g. ones connected with labor market.

Figure 20. Dynamics of population average remaining years of life (PARYL) for Russia and Ukraine, 1959 – 2006

Source: own elaboration based on Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Plank Institute for Demographic Research (Germany)

25 Figure 20 shows dynamics of PARYL for Russia and Ukraine since the 1959 census. During post-Soviet period this indicator decreased from 40.1 years for Russia (39.2 years for Ukraine) in 1989 to 34.5 years for Russia (34.1 years for Ukraine) in 2006. According to (European Demographic Datasheet 2008) in 2007 values of this indicator for Russia and Ukraine were the lowest ones among given European countries, reflecting mortality crisis in both countries.

Future trends of population ageing in Russia and Ukraine up to the year 2050 Since the 50s the UN Population Division has regularly made world population projections.

A great advantage of the UN projections is that they have been made on the basis of the same methodology. They are well comparable, providing the standard and consistent set of population figures. The UN projection up to 2050 embracing the population of the world, of different regions and countries is composed of four variants, i.e. high-, medium-, low- and constant-variants. A feature peculiar to the UN projections is that the high and low variants differ from the mediumvariant only on hypotheses about fertility dynamics.

Unlike traditional approach probabilistic population forecasts specify future total fertility rates, life expectancies, and net migration as distributions and not as points (Lutz W., Sanderson

W., Scherbov S., 1997). Unlike a conventional approach giving a fixed number of variants (usually medium, low and high), a probabilistic one gives a “bunch� of trajectories, each of them can be realized with a certain probability. A probabilistic approach to population projection is described for example in (Lutz W., Sanderson W., Scherbov S., 1997, 1998, 2001).

Here future trends of population ageing up to the year 2050 for Russia and Ukraine will be considered based on the probabilistic approach (Pirozhkov, Safarova and Scherbov 2007).

Table 2 shows the initial and forecasted values of the total fertility rates (TFR), life expectancies (LE), and net migration for the initial (2005), intermediate (2025) and the final (2050) years for Russia and Ukraine.

For the initial year 2005 the TFR for Russia (1.29) is higher than that for Ukraine (1.22).

Median and prediction intervals for Russia and Ukraine coincide: in 2050 the TFR is 1.53 (median) both for Russia and Ukraine, and there is a 95% probability that it will range between 1.02 and 2.09.

Unlike fertility, in the initial year life expectancies for Russia are lower than those for Ukraine (for males, for females, for males and females). Thus, in 2005 LE for males and females was 65.4 for Russia and 67.4 for Ukraine. But prediction intervals for Russia and Ukraine don’t differ much.

26 Table 2 shows significant differences in assumptions about migration. Unlike fertility and mortality, the ranges for net migration are very wide: in 2050 for Russia a 95% prediction interval is 60.1 – 299.9 thousand and –151.8 – 199.8 thousand for Ukraine.

Table 2. Scenarios for the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), Life Expectancy at Birth (LE) and net migration, Russia and Ukraine, years 2005, 2025 and 2050.

2005 RUSSIA

2025

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

2050

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

TFR 60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval MEDIAN

1.29

1.22

1.24 – 1.54

1.33 – 1.78

1.04 – 1.73 1.38

1.02 – 2.09 1.53

2025

2050

2005 RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

64.8 – 67.7

64.8 – 67.6

68.6 – 73.4

68.9 – 73.2

62.8 – 69.6

63.0 – 69.5

65.7 – 76.4

65.6 – 76.4

75.8- 77.0

75.8 - 77.6

77.43- 80.6

77.63- 80.5

74.6 - 78.9

74.7 - 78.8

75.4 - 82.6

75.4 - 82.6

70.2 - 72.5

70.2 - 72.5

72.9 - 76.9

73.2 - 76.8

LE MALES 60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval FEMALES 60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval

58.9

61.6

73.6

72.3

MALES AND FEMALES 60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval MEDIAN males females males and females

65.4

67.4

68.6 - 74.2

68.7 - 74.0

70.4 - 79.

70.40 - 79.4

58.9 72.30 65.44

61.65 73.55 67.45

66.25 76.76 71.38

66.28 76.76 71.39

70.96 78.97 74.87

71.06 79.03 74.95

2005

Net migration

RUSSIA

2025

UKRAINE

2050

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

99.5 – 206.0

- 42.0 – 76.0

136.0 – 230.4

-51.4 – 100.1

29.7 – 279.7

- 112.0 – 157.0 21.0

60.1 – 299.9

-151.8 – 198.8 25.3

(thousand) 60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval MEDIAN

120

4.6

155.4

182.8

27

The mentioned differences in assumptions about changes in main demographic processes will certainly affect dynamics of the total size and population age structure of Russia and Ukraine.

Forecasted population sizes, median age, ageing characteristics (proportions of population aged 65 or over, 80 or over, old-age dependency ratio) are given in Table 3 and Figures 21-28. For both countries a monotonic total population size decrease is expected. By the year 2050 median total size may decrease (as compared with the initial year) by 23.5% for Russia and even more for Ukraine – by 30.5%.

28

29

In both countries population ageing is expected to continue. For both countries the share of population 65+ will increase: in Russia in the whole population this proportion will increase from 3.7 in 2005 to 20.6% (median) in 2050, i.e. 90% increase as compared with the initial year is expected; for Ukraine the corresponding increase is expected to be about 65% (from 15.9% in 2005 to 26.3% (median) in 2050). It should be mentioned that changes in the proportion of 65+ in Russia and Ukraine have similar dynamics (both for males and for females): in 2007 – 2011 (for Russia)/2013 (for Ukraine) some decrease is expected followed by monotonic increase (see Fig. 22, 23).

Increase in the proportion of 80+ is expected to be more significant than that of 65+: median proportion of 80+ in 2050 will be 3.1 times higher than that in 2005 (6.2% as compared with 2.0) for Russia, and 2.5 times higher for Ukraine (6.2% as compared with 2.5%). Dynamics of the share of 80+ is more complicated than that of 65+ (both for Russia and Ukraine), and for Russia and Ukraine it is similar (see Fig.24, 25).

Old-age dependency ratio (both for Russia and Ukraine) behaves similar to the share of 65+ (see Fig. 22, 23, 25, 26). Corresponding graphs have similar shapes. For Russia in 2050 median oldage dependency ratio is expected to increase by 120% (from 19.3% to 42.5%) as compared with that in 2005, for Ukraine – by 87% (from 23.0% to 43.0%).

On the background of total population size decrease ageing process in Russia and Ukraine will develop. While values of the considered ageing characteristics and median age for Ukraine are expected to be higher than those for Russia, differences between them have been shown to decrease.

Moreover, dynamics of the considered indicators for Russia and Ukraine is expected to be similar.

Thus, positive experience of Russia /Ukraine in elaborating ageing well policies may be fruitfully used in both countries.

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

Table 3. Forecasted population sizes, ageing indicators and median age for Russia and Ukraine, years 2005, 2025 and 2050.

2005

POPULATION SIZE (mln)

RUSSIA

2025

UKRAINE

60% prediction interval 95% prediction interval

143.47

RUSSIA

MALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

128.43- 132.80

39.45- 41.79

104.0- 115.30

29.7835.87

125.58-135.75

37.82- 43.45

94.37- 122.84

130.69

40.63

109.69

26.3339.84 32.75

2005 RUSSIA

UKRAINE

47.10

MEDIAN

PROPORTION of (65+), %

2050

2025

2050

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

9.5

11.7

12.8-13.6 12.2-14.2

12.8-13.8 12.2-14.4

19.7-23.1 17.4-25.6

19.5-23.4 17.5-26.6

17.4

19.6

21.0-21.8 20.4-22.4

21.7-23.0 21.0-23.9

28.5-31.6 26.5-33.8

28.7-32.7 26.3-36.5

FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval MALES AND FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

13.7

15.9

17.2-18.1

17.7-18.8

24.4-27.7

24.4-28.4

16.6-18.6

17.0-19.5

22.4-30.0

22.4-31.7

21.4 30.0 26.0

21.5 30.4 26.3

MEDIAN males females males and females

9.5 17.4 13.7

11.7 19.6 15.9

13.3 21.4 17.7

13.2 22.4 18.2

2005

PROPORTION OF 80+, %

RUSSIA

2025

UKRAINE

MALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

0.8

1.2

3.0

3.7

2050

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

1.6-1.8

1.8-2.1

3.7-4.8

3.3-4.5

1.5-1.9

1.7-2.2

3.0-5.8

2.8-5.7

3.8-4.2

4.9-5.4

7.1-8.6

7.3-9.1

3.6-4.4

4.6-5.7

6-2-9.8

6.4-10.8

2.8-3.1

3.5-3.9

5.5-6.8

5.5-7.0

2.7-3.2

3.3-4.1

4.7-7.9

4.8-8.3

1.7 4.0

2.0 5.1

4.2 7.8

3.9 8.1

FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval MALES AND FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

2.0

2.5

MEDIAN males females

0.8 3.0

1.2 3.7

38 males and females

2.0

2.5

2.9

2005

OLD AGE DEPENDENCY RATIO

3.7

6.2

2025

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

19.3

23.0

6.2

2050

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

25.2-26.4

25.8-27.6

39.6-45.5

39.5-47.2

24.4-27.2

24.8-28.7

36.2-50.2

35.6-54.3

25.8

26.7

42.5

43.0

60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval MEDIAN 2005

MEDIAN AGE

RUSSIA

2025

UKRAINE

2050

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

39.6-40.4

39.7-40.7

42.9-46.8

43.2-47.7

39.0-41.0

39.1-41.3

40.2-49.4

40.5-51.4

44.6-45-4

45.3-46.4

49.8-53.8

50.7-55.0

44.0-45.9

44.6-47.3

46.8-55.9

47.6-58.1

42.0-42.8

42.4-43.5

46.2-50.4

46.8-51.7

41.5-43.4

41.8-44.2

43.4-52.8

44.1-55.1

40.0 45.0 42.4

40.2 45.9 43.0

44.9 51.9 48.3

45.5 52.8 49.2

MALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

34.2

35.3

FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

40.3

41.6

MALES AND FEMALES 60%-prediction interval 95%-prediction interval

37.3

38.7

MEDIAN males females males and females

34.2 40.3 37.3

35.3 41.6 38.7

Policy responses to the progressing population ageing These remarkable and unprecedented changes in age composition mean that Russian and Ukrainian pension system, help and support for the elderly need to be reformed in order to avoid risks related to population ageing.

Though population ageing has major consequences and implications for all facets of country’s life, in Russia ageing issues are still insufficiently focused. Thus, in the previous Concept of demographic development of the RF for the period up to 2015, approved by the resolution of the government of the Russian Federation of 24.09.2001 N 1270-p (where the aspects of demographic development were traditionally represented in three blocks: fertility/family, health/mortality and

39 migration) challenges of ageing weren’t even allocated in a separate section. This led to limited opportunities to elaborate adequate economic, social and medical measures.

Very often in Russia old people are considered as dependants, the burden for the state and a threat to the pension system, while it is acknowledged that if old people remain in good health they are a resource for the society. Thus it is highly important to form in the Russian society a benevolent and respectful attitude to the old people. Besides, it should be pointed out that the general approach to elaborating policies related to population ageing and the elderly in Russia is wrong as usually such policies address to both the elderly and disabled persons, though these groups may have quite different interests, needs and problems.

In Russia demographic policies are mainly focused on fertility increase and support for families with children. Fortunately, the Concept of demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 approved by the Order of the President of the Russian Federation N 1351 of 09.10.2007 includes “adoption of special programmes for health maintenance and expanding the healthy period of life for the elderly, development of gerontological service”. On the basis of this concept priority measures to adapt economy and social infrastructure of the Russian Federation to the ageing society could be elaborated.

Unlike Russia, in the Strategy of Demographic Development for the period up to the year 2015 approved by the resolution of the Ministry of Ukraine N 879 of June 24, 2006, ageing issues are better presented. Among six principal tasks of the Strategy there is one directly devoted to population ageing – overcoming negative consequences of ageing. For adaptation of Ukrainian society to ageing and harmonization of intergenerational relations 19 main directions have been suggested including economical, medical and social ones. It seems elaborate and fruitful that the suggested measures start with informing the society about inevitability of population ageing and inspiring children and young people with respect to old people and their contribution to the development of the country.

Taking account that ageing trajectories in Russia and Ukraine have been similar, Ukrainian experience in formulating ageing policies may be applicable and useful for Russia.

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