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TAX COURT, continued

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Vasko owns the subject property a residential home in Lester Prairie, Minnesota 2 Prior to the challenged assessment date January 2, 2019 the subject property was classified as a residential homestead 3 and thus received the associated tax benefit. Ms. Vasko purchased the subject property in 2004, 4 and the County does not dispute that she and her son lived at the property at some point before the year at issue. 5 On or around July 16, 2018, the McLeod County Assessor’s Office removed the homestead designation starting as of the January 2, 2019 assessment date 6 For taxes payable 2020 the subject property was valued at $110,100. 7 Ms. Vasko is also part-owner of another residential property in Biscay, Minnesota. 8

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The City of Lester Prairie maintains monthly billing records for several utilities, including water, sewer, and garbage services. 9 For all of 2019, Ms. Vasko’s City utility bills were timely paid and thus her water, sewer, and garbage services were operational throughout 2019. 10 Despite having running water, there was no appreciable water usage at the subject property for all of 2019; indeed, the water meter at the subject property has not detected any water usage since 2016 11

III. MS. VASKO’S CHALLENGES TO THE ASSESSMENT

A. Burden of Proof

“[A]n appeal to the Tax Court may be taken from any matter over which the [tax] court is granted jurisdiction ….” Minn. Stat. § 271.06, subd. 1 (2022). However, “the order of … the appropriate unit of government in every case shall be prima facie valid.” Minn. Stat. § 271.06, subd. 6(a) (2022). Minnesota Statutes section 272.06, which governs the property tax assessment at issue here, further provides that “[a]ll such assessments … shall be presumed to be legal until the contrary is affirmatively shown[.]” Minn. Stat. § 272.06 (2022). “[A] prima facie case simply means one that prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating it.” S. Minn. Beet Sugar Coop v. Cnty. of Renville (SMBSC), 737 N.W.2d 545, 558 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Tousignant v. St. Louis Cnty , 615 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000)). A petitioner has the burden of overcoming prima facie validity. Id ; Schmieg v. Cnty of Chisago, 740 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2007)

2 Pet.; Tr. 18, 86 (Ms. Vasko purchased the subject property in 2004).

3 Ex. E, at 8, Ex. F; Tr. 140.

4 Tr. 86.

5 Tr. 62.

6 Ex. E, at 8, Ex. F; Tr. 140.

7 Pet.

8 Tr. 70. Biscay, Minnesota is north of Glencoe, in McLeod County.

9 Tr. 96; Ex. B (The end of the “receipt” row shows the amount paid. Tr. 107.).

10 Tr. 114; Ex. B, at 15-18.

11 Tr. 107-113; Ex. B, at 15-18. The City of Lester Prairie water metering system measures, and thus bills, for each 1,000 gallons of water used. Ex. B, at 15-18. In other words, the water metering system cannot detect 999 gallons or less of water used. The water usage at the subject property prior to 2016 was minimal. Tr. 119-22.

The Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes “a presumption of validity for the county’s assessment.” Ct Park Co. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 907 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn. 2018) (quoting SMBSC, 737 N.W.2d at 557. “[T]o defeat the prima facie validity of the assessment, the taxpayer must offer evidence to invalidate the assessment.” SMBSC, 737 N.W.2d at 558; see also Conga Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 41, 53 (Minn. 2015) (“When a taxpayer presents substantial evidence that the [government’s] assessment order is invalid or incorrect, the presumption of validity is overcome ….”); Guardian Energy, LLC v. Cnty. of Waseca, 868 N.W.2d 253, 258 n.6 (Minn. 2015) (“A county’s presumptively valid tax assessment … may be successfully challenged with credible evidence that the assessor’s estimated market value is incorrect .”).

Generally, a property owner’s testimony as to the valuation is admissible at trial. See Beck v. Cnty. of Todd, 824 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2013) (holding that, generally, the testimony of a property owner is admissible). An owner is not required to offer a written appraisal and the tax court must consider the owner’s testimony. Id at 639-41. As always, however, the court “determines ‘the weight and credibility’ ” of such testimony. Id at 639 (quoting Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 353, 176 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1970)).

“When a taxpayer [succeeds in presenting] substantial evidence that [an] assessment order is invalid or incorrect, the presumption of validity is overcome, and the case is decided by the trier of fact the same as if the presumption had never existed.” Conga, 868 N.W.2d at 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The tax court must then determine the taxpayer’s claims based on a preponderance of the evidence, Minn. Energy Res. Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 909 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 2018), bearing in mind that “the taxpayer retains the burden of proof throughout the proceeding.” Harmon v. Comm’r of Revenue, 894 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Minn. 2017). Here, if the presumption is overcome, it is Ms. Vasko’s responsibility to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she homesteaded the subject property, and what its market value is.

B. Classification

To determine whether Ms. Vasko’s property may be classified as residential homestead, the court must look to the plain language of the statute authorizing such a classification. “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). We determine the intention of the legislature “primarily from the language of the statute itself.” Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 516, 8 N.W.2d 808, 816 (1943)).

Looking to the plain language of the residential homestead statute, Minn. Stat. § 273.124, subd. 1(a) (2022), “[r]esidential real estate that is occupied and used for the purposes of a homestead by its owner, who must be a Minnesota resident, is a residential homestead.” Put another way:

[t]he Homestead Provision establishes a four-part test to determine homestead classification: 1) the taxpayer must be the owner; 2) the Subject Property must be residential real estate; 3) the Subject Property must be occupied and used by the owner for the purposes of a homestead; and 4) the owner of the Subject Property must be a Minnesota resident.

Aanenson v. Cnty. of Murray, No. C9-01-63, 2002 WL 1988199, at *2 (Minn. T.C. Aug. 22, 2002) (citing DeWester v. Cnty of Cook, No. C7-98-45, 1998 WL 930584 (Minn. T.C. Dec. 28, 1998) (discussing Minn. Stat. § 273.124, subd. 1(a)). “It is the use, not the number of days present that matters.” Sayles v. Cnty. of Cottonwood, No. 17-CV-08-282, 2009 WL 4035666, at *5 (Minn. T.C. Nov. 20, 2009) (granting homestead classification when the taxpayer was at the property for only about four weeks throughout the year); c.f. Neville v. Cnty. of Ramsey, No. C3-90-14682, 1991 WL 169079, at *2 (Minn. T.C. Aug. 22, 1991) (finding 120 days present in one year was not enough to establish occupancy). Finally, we are mindful that the homestead law is to be liberally construed. Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 217-18, 126 N.W.2d 440, 444 (1964).

The court first finds that Ms. Vasko overcame the prima facie validity of the County’s non-homestead classification with her testimony that she and her son lived at the subject property in 2019 12 See SMBSC, 737 N.W.2d at 558. Having overcome the presumption, Ms. Vasko next bears the responsibility to show the court she meets the elements of homestead classification by a preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Energy Res. Corp., 909 N.W.2d at 573.

Here, there is no disagreement that Ms. Vasko meets the ownership requirement, the property is “residential real estate,” and Ms. Vasko is a Minnesota resident. 13 The parties’ dispute

12 Tr. 46.

13 Pet.; Ex. 27 (The County notes that Exhibit 27, which is a copy of Ms. Vasko’s driver’s license, “is not a REAL ID per Minn. Stat. § 171.07, Subd. 1(f) as it is marked ‘not for federal thus turns on whether Ms. Vasko “occupied and used” the subject property “for the purposes of a homestead.” Minn. Stat. § 273.124, subd. 1(a).

We find, after reviewing all the evidence presented at trial, Ms. Vasko did not prove she occupied or used the subject property in any appreciable manner during 2019. There is no dispute that Ms. Vasko worked as a traveling nurse, 14 and therefore could not have been at the subject property year-round. To show that she was there, at least for some time, Ms. Vasko stated she lived there when she was not traveling for work. 15 Possibly in anticipation of the County’s case, Ms. Vasko stated that water service had been shut off at the subject property due to non-payment of garbage fees, that at other times the water was restricted due to low pressure, and that there was an obstruction in the line that prevented them from getting water service at the property. 16 Since there was no water, Ms. Vasko alleged, she and her son brought in water in order to live in the house. 17 garbage services were operational throughout 2019. 18 Despite having running water, there was no appreciable water usage at the subject property for all of 2019; indeed, the water meter at the subject property did not detect any water usage since 2016. 19 By comparison, as testified to by Ms. Lundin, Financial Director/City Clerk for the City of Lester Prairie, the average single adult in Lester Prairie uses about 2,000 gallons of water per month. 20 Although Ms. Vasko and her son need not show they each used 2,000 gallons of water per month, especially since Ms. Vasko testified they were not at the subject property year-round, the court would anticipate at least some measurable water usage during the subject year

We do not find credible Ms. Vasko’s assertion that she and her son occasionally lived at the subject property, without water, by bringing it in. Her testimony is directly undercut by the fact that for all of 2019, Ms. Vasko’s utility bills were timely paid, meaning her water, sewer, and identification.’ ” Resp’t’s Post-Trial Br. 4 (filed Sept. 16, 2022). The court does not construe this as a challenge to the assertion that Ms. Vasko is a Minnesota resident.).

14 Tr. 59.

15 Although not stated directly, Ms. Vasko constructively stated she lived at the subject property when not traveling for work. See, e.g., Tr. 36-37, 46-48, 88-90.

16 Tr. 46-48. Ms. Vasko also introduced a series of handwritten memoranda to the County from 2019 and 2020, asking for her bills to be sent to her house or to have water service at the subject property turned back on. Id. at 34-36; Exs. 31-34. Evidence presented by the County, Ex. B, however, shows the bills were always timely paid and the water was always on.

17 Tr. 46-48. Ms. Vasko said they got around the lack of water by using laundromats, showering elsewhere, sponge bathing, and pouring water in the toilet tank prior to flushing. Id. at 46-48, 65.

In further support of the argument that Ms. Vasko occupied and used the property, she introduced several envelopes addressed to the subject property and/or the property’s corresponding post office box, implying that she must have been living at the property to receive this mail 21 During trial, however, Ms. Vasko conceded that her mail was necessarily picked up at the local post office (as opposed to personal delivery to the subject property), as the postal service did not personally deliver mail to Ms. Vasko’s neighborhood. 22 The fact that Ms. Vasko picked up her mail at the post office does not establish occupancy at or use of the subject property.

18 Tr. 114; Ex. B, at 15-18.

19 Tr. 105-113; Ex. B, at 6-18. The City of Lester Prairie water metering system measures, and thus bills, for each 1,000 gallons of water used. Tr. 102 In other words, the water metering system cannot detect 999 gallons or less of water used. The water usage at the subject property prior to 2016 was minimal. Id. at 119-22; Ex. B, at 1-5.

20 Tr. 106.

21 Tr. 22-26; Exs. 1-25.

22 Tr. 68.

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