Jeremy Zullow
ASPEN COURSEBOOK SERIES
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Jeremy Zullow
ASPEN COURSEBOOK SERIES
GRANT
RACHELLE
HERMAN F. GREENE, MISSY LAHREN Editors
MATT ZEPELIN Managing Editor
We have thrown the planet we inhabit violently out of balance. Humanity’s disregard for Nature’s laws glares through razed forests, vanished species, acidified oceans, polluted rivers, and cascading climate catastrophes. The annihilatory trajectory of industrial civilization threatens to trigger Earth’s sixth mass extinction the kind that has not occurred since the death of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. Should the assaults persist even for a few more years, future humanity and other species for untold generations will face a hellish struggle to survive while pummeled by floods, hurricanes, heat waves, fires, disease, crop losses, food shortages, drought, and sea-level rise. In The Bridge at the Edge of the World, Gus Speth puts it simply: “[W]e’re headed toward a ruined planet.”2 Time is not on our side to reverse course. With greenhouse gases flooding the planet’s atmosphere, we face an urgency to act before crossing over climate tripwires poised to send the planet into a state of runaway heating.3
In the United States, the president holds power never contemplated by the Founders the power to push the United States, other countries, and a vast part of the natural creation over the climate cliff. In this time of extreme climate danger when the president of the International Court of Justice says that climate change is “an existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet”4 President Trump uses his agencies’ statutory authority under environmental laws to promote massive domestic fossil
1. Authored by Mary Christina Wood, Philip H. Knight Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law, and author of Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law For a New Ecological Age (2013). Footnote citations herein are minimal, referring to the work or case as a whole and not to referenced page numbers.
2. James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability x (2008).
3. See António Guterres, UN Secretary-General’s Special Address on Climate Action: “A Moment of Truth,” United Nations (June 4, 2024), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2024-06-05/secretary-generals -special-address-climate-action-moment-of-truth-delivered, discussing carbon “budget,” stating: The truth is . . . we are burning through the budget at reckless speed spewing out around 40 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year. We can all do the math. At this rate, the entire carbon budget will be busted before 2030. . . . The truth is . . . the battle for 1.5 degrees will be won or lost in the 2020s under the watch of leaders today. All depends on the decisions those leaders take or fail to take especially in the next eighteen months.
See also Timothy Cama, UN Report Predicts Catastrophic Consequences if Greenhouse Gas Emissions Not Reduced by 2030, The Hill (Oct. 7, 2018); Juliana v. United States, Opinion and Order, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231191 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023) (stating “climate crisis threatens our ability to survive on planet Earth,” and “[t]his catastrophe is the great emergency of our time and compels urgent action.”).
4. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Jul. 23, 2025), https://enb.iisd.org/international-court-justice-advisory -opinion-climate-change-23Jul2025.
fuel development, consumption, and exportation.5 The United States has expanded oil and gas production four times faster than any other nation and now leads the world in both.6
So, here we are. We are the granules of sand falling through a minute glass between two worlds our past world in which Nature supported life in infinite ways, and a potential hellish world ahead filled with global chaos and devastation leading to humanity’s own self-destruction. One may reasonably ask: Where is environmental law in this apocalyptic picture?
Under the second Trump administration, as in prior administrations, environmental law affirmatively legalizes these perilous actions. In fact, environmental law helped deliver this ecological emergency to our planet’s doorstep.
In the United States, statutes passed more than five decades ago were supposed to reverse the arc of destruction that was obvious even then. The U.S. Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and a multitude of other laws to prohibit environmental harm. This legal model was considered so promising that countries throughout the world emulated it in their legal systems. A burgeoning set of bureaucracies gained authority and funding to carry out the laws. Yet, as agencies became captured by politically powerful interests, the system as a whole degenerated into a monumental failure. The dysfunction now operates on a dangerous, systemic, global level.
Statutes characteristically vest agencies with breathtaking authority and discretion to issue permits allowing the very harms that the laws were designed to prevent. If the agencies were intent on protecting ecosystems and the public in carrying out the laws, they would use their authority to prevent damage. Instead, with few exceptions, agencies operate in alliance with politically powerful corporations and profiteers, using the permit system to legalize massive destruction in the form of oil and gas drilling, coal mining, toxic water pollution, forest clearcutting, habitat eradication, and other injuries too numerous to inventory. Today, rather than organizing an emergency response to an existential climate threat, environmental agencies push the destruction even more, bringing the world to the edge of the climate precipice. Elizabeth Kolbert says, “It may seem impossible to imagine that a technologically advanced society could choose, in essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we are now in the process of doing.”7 Environmental law now serves as the cane on which humanity leans as it walks the plank toward its own destruction.
Law mediates the struggle between power unjustly wielded and moral truth. It is a system that defines reasonable outcomes. The searing reality of our moment will cause judges around the world to redefine their roles. As they do, one thing is clear: Legal reform cannot tinker around the edges of the failed regime of statutory environmental law and practice. That regime lacks
5. See A. Martinez & H. J. Mai, Trump Wants to “Drill, Baby, Drill.” What Does That Mean for Climate Concerns? NPR (Nov. 15, 2024).
6. The United States surpassed Russia in 2011 to become the world’s largest producer of natural gas and surpassed Saudi Arabia in 2018 to become the world’s largest producer of petroleum. U.S. Energy Information Administration, The U.S. Leads Global Petroleum and Natural Gas Production with Record Growth in 2018 (August 20, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40973.
7. Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change 189 (2006).
ideas truly calibrated to the magnitude of the problem and the roaring pace of change. At this late date, tweaking the law becomes a fool’s errand by throwing out a rescue rope that is too short. Even if there were time to accomplish massive regulatory reform, the system as a whole is dysfunctional. The entire paradigm of ecological responsibility must change, and the power of governance must recalibrate before environmental tyranny takes permanent hold. Courts remain singularly positioned, through their constitutionally vested authority, to rein in government actors and redirect them to protect fundamental rights.
A new legal paradigm must be articulated, examined, rigorously critiqued, and proposed in a variety of forums. Then, positioned at the edges of the old destructive regime, it must impart the inspiration needed to animate key moments of transformation, drawing law into the epochal task of restoring vital ecology.
Earth Law: Emerging Ecocentric Law A Guide for Practitioners (Earth Law), now in its second edition, pulls together promising jurisprudential and legal approaches world-wide aimed at harmonizing human existence with the natural world. It is a must-read for judges, lawyers, and students who not only want to understand, but also respond meaningfully to the central challenge of their fleeting moment in history. As is often said, we are the first generation to understand the impending cataclysmic consequences of our course of destruction, and we are the last generation that will be able to do anything about it. Lawyers, through their advocacy, skill, and position in society, hold unparalleled potential to build new governance structures and operating rules. New ideas remain paramount to this epic endeavor. We need, as Gus Speth says, a “fresh conceptualization and a new way of thinking. . . .”8 Ecological paradigms will present a vision of co-responsibility among nations, societies, corporations, landowners, and citizens; reciprocity with Nature; and robust and practical legal footholds by which citizens can hold government officials and members of society accountable. New values will power a global assertion of rights and duties in defense of humanity, fellow species, and all future generations of life on Earth.
This book gathers, distills, and analyzes pioneering approaches in law for the Earth and for our time. It is an assemblage of approaches, not a system. Earth Law takes the reader around the world, from the Colombia Supreme Court, which recognized biocultural constitutional rights of Atrato Basin communities in their battle against toxic mining; to India’s Supreme Court, which announced a right of glaciers to exist; to the Federal District Court of Oregon (presiding over Juliana v. United States) where Judge Ann Aiken declared for the first time in U.S. history an environmental constitutional right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life”; and to the Washington Court of Appeals in the United States where a panel of judges found that Ken Ward had a constitutional right to assert the “necessity defense” to justify his peaceful climate civil disobedience when he illegally entered a Kinder Morgan pipeline facility and stopped tar sands oil from entering the United States. Compiling a multitude of other cases as well as recent statutes, Earth Law anchors these innovative approaches in the shared human experience and transcendental ecological reality of our times. This is a textbook about ideas and what is possible; it cannot help but inspire and guide present and future practitioners.
If there is hope that law will respond to the environmental crisis, it is a hope lodged in a diversity of ideas, realizing that one singular solution does not hold all the answers. All over the world, judges, legislators, lawyers, and citizens are pioneering new concepts and tools adapted to vastly different bioregions, cultures, and societies. The widely varying approaches presented in this book suggest five unifying themes that provide common ground for a truly global legal revolution.
8. Speth, supra note 2, at xiv.
To begin with, we have no choice now but to connect the law with our stark reality. If we fail at that, the law will be irrelevant. That overriding reality is defined by Nature, not us, and we must view Nature’s requirements as laws that define our legal strategies and goals.
All of the approaches in Earth Law recognize the need for recalibrating industrialized laws to the laws of Nature. Indigenous leaders have taught since time immemorial that Nature’s own laws rank supreme over human laws. Oren Lyons puts it this way: “The thing you have to understand about nature and natural law is, there’s no mercy. . . . There’s only law.”9 The most basic task of environmental law is to bring society into compliance with these laws of Nature. But industrialized environmental law legalizes the rampant violation of these supreme laws not only at the level of individual species and ecosystems, but also at the level of atmospheric function, ocean health, and biodiversity a truly planetary level. As Thomas Berry wrote,
Only a self-destructive arrogance would enable a society to assume the rights to devastate what nature could bring into being but which no power in heaven or on Earth, not even nature herself, could remedy once destruction had taken place. . . . . . . We need legal structures and political establishments that will know that our way into the future is not through relentless industrial development but through the living forces that brought us into being and are the only forces that can sustain us in the coming centuries.10
Earth law, as it continues to develop, will redefine and reorient environmental law as a realm of fundamental rights. These include human rights, civil rights, rights of dignity, biocultural rights of communities, rights to assert the necessity defense in climate civil disobedience cases, Rights of Nature (such as those increasingly accorded to rivers and wildlife), animal and nonhuman rights, and perhaps the most globally applicable the rights of present and future generations under the enduring public trust principle to force government protection of the crucial resources supporting all life on Earth.11 Underlying these approaches is a basic reframing of environmental law to pull it out of the narrow confinements of current statutory provisions and connect it to a deeper and more legally forceful set of rights engrained (implicitly or explicitly) in constitutional frameworks. As some commentators have observed, the vanguard of environmental law has taken a definitive “rights turn.”12
This turn necessarily involves reformulation of legal assumptions that drive the law above all, those concerning property concepts. An entire body of western law has developed around the assumption that Nature belongs to humans who are entitled to exploit, subjugate, and destroy its gifts and vitality. As Thomas Berry wrote, “This mechanistic world controlled by humans, for human advantage, saw the surrounding world as a vast assembly of natural resources put there for human use, not as manifestation of the sacred and sublime to be experienced in the wonder of its mountains and oceans, in the beauty of its meadows and birds and woodland creatures, in its healing of the loneliness of the human soul and the ills
9. Wood, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Oren Lyons).
10. Thomas Berry, Foreword to Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law, A Manifesto for Earth Justice, at 19 & 21 (2d ed., 2011).
11. For discussion of the public trust principle as an inherent right applicable to all democracies, see Mary Christina Wood, Securing Ecology “Capable of Sustaining Human Life”: Invoking the Inherent and Inalienable Public Trust Rights of the People, 26 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1212, section IV (2024).
12. See Mary Christina Wood, The Children’s Lawsuits: Building a Global Movement in Law and Society, 82 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Section A (2025). xxxviii Foreword
of the human body.”13 Earth Law brings to the forefront leading cases, such as the Colombia Supreme Court’s Atrato River decision, which recognizes and invokes, after centuries of suppression, Indigenous conceptions and instructions regarding Nature. Earth Law also reports on “ecocide,” which reverses the notion that Nature is here for human use, even to the point of destruction, by criminalizing the eradication of Nature.
Not all environmental problems are created equal. Some threaten individual watersheds, species, or forests. Others imperil entire life systems. Our climate crisis is sui generis having no equal in terms of urgency, scope, and magnitude.14 Throughout the world, political branches continue to promote, legalize, and subsidize dangerous fossil fuel energy systems to benefit powerful corporate interests. The situation was described by President Obama’s science advisor in 2009 as akin to being “in a car with bad brakes driving towards a cliff in the fog.”15 Now, over 15 years closer to climate tipping points, President Trump shows frenzied intent to floor the accelerator with the world’s children, future generations, and other species on Earth trapped in the back seat. The climate revolutionary Greta Thunberg implored, “Pull the emergency brake.”16
Courts have authority to do just that through their powers of injunctive and declaratory relief. As the third constitutional branch of government, the core duty of the judiciary is to protect fundamental rights. Invoking their power to enforce such rights, courts have singular power to not only enjoin executive actions, but also to overturn legislative enactments. Over the last 15 years, drawing on the fundamental public trust principle as well as express constitutional provisions, youth and citizens in nations worldwide have pursued judicial relief from their governments’ fossil fuel policies that endanger lives across the globe. Known as atmospheric trust litigation (ATL), this global legal movement is the subject of Chapter 13, “The Public Trust Doctrine and Atmospheric Trust Litigation,” and has produced landmark legal opinions from a multitude of countries and subjurisdictions.17 Unprecedented in the history of law, nearly identical actions were filed in the United States simultaneously on the state and federal level, and suits in other countries followed suit all deploying climate science and demanding emissions reduction.18
13. Berry, supra note 10, at 17.
14. Juliana v. United States, Opinion and Order, Civ. No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023), slip op. at 6. (describing sui generis character of climate crisis and stating, “[A] legal approach must ‘rise to the emergency rather than repeat a failed past paradigm.’”) (citing Mary Christina Wood, “On the Eve of Destruction”: Courts Confronting the Climate Emergency, 97 Ind. L.J. 239, 249 (2022)).
15. Obama to Look at Climate Engineering, The Wall Street Journal (Apr. 8, 2009), https://www.wsj.com /articles/SB123920773503201665.
16. Greta Thunberg’s Speech to the World, Geneva Business News (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.gbnews.ch /greta-thunbergs-speech-to-the-world/ (providing transcript of Thunberg’s address to the UN COP24 climate talks in Poland in 2018). See also UN Secretary General’s Special Address, supra note 3 (“We are playing Russian roulette with our planet. We need an exit ramp off the highway to climate hell. And the truth is . . . we have control of the wheel. The 1.5 degree limit is still just about possible.”).
17. For additional cases and materials on ATL, see Michael C. Blumm, Mary Christina Wood & John Dernbach, The Public Trust Doctrine in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, Fourth Edition, Chapter 11 (Atmospheric Trust Litigation) (2025).
18. See Wood, Nature’s Trust, supra note 1, at 3-122 (providing an in-depth discussion of the atmospheric trust litigation strategy and its theoretical foundations); see also Law Library, Our Child. Tr., https://perma.cc/L53VN5W9 (last visited Mar. 27, 2025) (collecting pleadings, briefs, and other legal documents related to the atmospheric trust litigation). Our Children’s Trust is the nonprofit organization that launched ATL and continues to litigate ATL cases.
Foreword
In a landmark case that came to be called the “Biggest Case on the Planet,”19 21 American youth plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States challenged the entire federal fossil fuel policy as violating the constitutional public trust principle and Due Process Clause.20 They sought a court-supervised federal remedial plan to address carbon emissions. The youth won a landmark victory in the District Court of Oregon in 2016 when Judge Ann Aiken announced a constitutional right under the public trust principle and Due Process Clause to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life” a right heard around the world that inspired other climate cases.21 But the Juliana case was appealed and dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in a staggering opinion that seemingly marked the Dark Ages of environmental law. Judges Hurwitz and Murguia (the majority of a three-judge panel) frankly acknowledged the world is approaching the “eve of destruction,” furthered by U.S. fossil fuel policy, but decided that the courts have no conceivable role in stopping the federal government from hastening an “environmental apocalypse” one capable of burying cities, unleashing life-threatening disasters, and jeopardizing crucial food and water sources.22 They said that climate policy is a matter for the legislative and executive branches the same branches that created this climate cataclysm. After years of protracted litigation in the case, the U.S. Supreme Court in March 2025 declined to intervene, ending one of the highest-profile climate rights battles in U.S. history.23
In the past, individual environmental cases were judged by clear wins or losses. Today, as emphasized in Chapter 23, “Earth Law Movement Lawyering: Past, Present, and Future,” litigation’s role breaks beyond clear outcomes to movement-building that surges through society. In that aspect, Juliana played a catalytic role in awakening the world to the climate crisis by galvanizing a powerful global youth climate movement that voiced the public trust obligation of government.24 Moreover, by amassing an unrivaled body of science and economic evidence available to the public,25 the record in the Juliana case set a foundation for many other climate cases worldwide. Perhaps most important, though, the litigation resulted in published opinions that declared the dreadful prospect of irrevocable climate disruption and called forth judges worldwide to step up to their constitutional role. As Judge Aiken wrote in a 2023 opinion in
19. Juliana v. United States, 2023 WL 9023339 at 7 (Dec. 29, 2023); see also Laura Parker, “Biggest Case on the Planet” Pits Kids v. Climate Change, Nat’l Geo. (Nov. 9, 2018).
20. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com /static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5824e85e6a49638292ddd1c9/1478813795912/Order+MTD.Aiken.pdf, reversed 947F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). For court filings and orders in the case, see Our Children’s Trust, https://www .ourchildrenstrust.org/court-orders-and-pleadings. Under the public trust principle, the sovereign holds in trust the natural resources of its jurisdiction for the benefit of present and future generations.
21. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257, 1260-61 (announcing constitutional right and holding that the public trust doctrine imposes a sovereign duty on the government to protect essential natural resources for future generations).
22. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164. 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing climate change as approaching the “‘Eve of Destruction’”) (“A substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has long promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it can cause catastrophic climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an environmental apocalypse.”) (“The problem is approaching ‘the point of no return.’ Absent some action, the destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life-threatening natural disasters, and jeopardize critical food and water supplies.”).
23. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Climate Change Case That “Ignited a Movement” Ends with Supreme Court’s Cert Denial, Aba J. (Mar. 25, 2025).
24. See Wood, The Children’s Lawsuits, supra note 12.
25. See id. (“[T]he Juliana case provided the lower courts with thousands of pages of declarations by scientists, economists, and others showing the perils of continuing a fossil fuel energy system and the possible pathways to decarbonization.”). All this information is compiled in the climate case chart maintained by the Sabin Center and accessible to the public. U.S. Climate Change Litigation, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L., https://perma.cc /PZ77-7CDW (last visited Apr. 16, 2025).
Juliana, “The judiciary is capable and duty-bound to provide redress for the irreparable harm government fossil fuel promotion has caused.”26 Judge Staton, the dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit panel that dismissed the Juliana suit, wrote haunting words that reverberated in judicial circles around the world:
It is as if an asteroid were barreling toward Earth and the government decided to shut down our only defenses. [T]he government bluntly insists that it has the absolute and unreviewable power to destroy the Nation. My colleagues throw up their hands, concluding that this case presents nothing fit for the Judiciary. . . .
When the seas envelop our coastal cities, fires and droughts haunt our interiors, and storms ravage everything between, those remaining will ask: Why did so many do so little? 27
The Juliana saga juxtaposes two judicial approaches, forcing judges to choose their side in history.28 One approach is what Professor Douglas Kysar and James Weaver call judicial “nihilism”: Rejecting their extensive power, these courts “cower before catastrophe.”29 This judicial timorousness has been the pattern over the past few decades as judges have repeatedly analyzed ecological harms through the narrow lens of statutory claims, reflexively deferring to the agencies on the grounds that agencies alone hold the expertise necessary to carry out the public interest. As obeisance to the political branches grew, the courts, which had sometimes courageously acted in areas of civil rights, abdicated their constitutional role as the guardian of fundamental rights with respect to the environment despite acknowledging clear and present danger of a climate apocalypse. But the other approach summons judicial courage to innovate remedies that will protect the life-sustaining climate system.30
As a movement, ATL continues to generate more filed cases and more victories. In March 2020, 16 youth plaintiffs in Montana gained a ruling, affirmed by the state’s Supreme Court, that a law prohibiting climate change analysis in state environmental impact assessments violated Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, which guarantees the right to a clean and healthy environment.31 In Hawai‘i, an ATL case filed by youth resulted in a landmark settlement that
26. Juliana v. United States, Opinion and Order, Civ. No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023), slip op. at 6, reversed, Juliana v. United States, Case: 24-684 (9th Cir. May 1, 2024), https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content /uploads/case-documents/2024/20240501_docket-24-684_order.pdf. See also In Re Hawai‘i Electric Light Co., Inc. 526 P.3d 329 (Haw. 2023) (J. Wilson concurring) (“Given the current level of atmospheric carbon concentrations, humanity faces an imminent global emergency. The decade of the 2020s is pivotal. . . . The stark failure of the federal judiciary to grant redress to present and future generations alleging knowing destruction of a life-sustaining climate system relegates implementation of the climate rule of law to state judiciaries. . . . Unlike the Juliana majority, the Hawai’i State Supreme Court does not choose to “throw up [our] hands.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1174 (Staton, J., dissenting)). The majority opinion in the Hawai‘i case found the right to “a life-sustaining climate system.” 526 P.3d at 336.
27. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1191 (9th Cir. 2020) (J. Staton dissenting).
28. See UN Secretary General’s Special Address, supra note 3 (“[T]o young people, to civil society, to cities, regions, businesses and others who have been leading the charge towards a safer, cleaner world, I say: Thank you. You are on the right side of history. . . . It is we the Peoples versus the polluters and the profiteers. Together, we can win. But it’s time for leaders to decide whose side they’re on. Tomorrow it will be too late. Now is the time to mobilize, now is the time to act, now is the time to deliver. This is our moment of truth.”).
29. R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 295 (2017), http://ndlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/7.-Weaver-Kysar.pdf.
30. In Juliana v. United States, Judge Aiken emphasized the judicial authority to innovate remedies in climate cases. See Juliana v. United States, Opinion and Order, Civ. No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023), section II.A.2 (“The Court’s Power to Provide Redress”) (drawing on “[f]amiliar instances of large-scale institutional litigation in modern American history.”). In Colombia, the court created a system of guardianship, supported by advisory commissions and expert panels, to protect the Atrato River. Center for Social Justice Studies v. Presidency of the Republic, et al. (The Atrato River Case, Constitutional Court of Colombia Judgment T-622/16 (2016). Innovative enforcement models are discussed in Blumm, Wood & Dernbach, supra note 17, at Chapter 13.D. See also supra note 26.
31. Held v. Montana, DA 23-0575 ¶8, (Mont. Dec. 18, 2024) (enforcing M.T. Const. Art. II, §3). Foreword
forces decarbonization of the state’s transportation system and provides a compelling model for settling other cases under continuing judicial supervision.32 Abroad, cases have yielded dramatic victories. In 2019, the Netherlands Supreme Court ordered its government to reduce CO2 emissions by 25 percent as compared with 1990 levels by the end of 2020.33 In Pakistan, the High Court of Lahore created a climate commission to address climate harm that had been ignored by agencies.34 In Germany, the federal Constitutional Court in 2021 held that the nation’s climate protection law was incompatible with the human rights and intergenerational justice principles enshrined in the German constitution. It required the government to set revised CO2 emissions reduction goals that would not impose an undue burden on future generations.35 In South Korea, youth plaintiffs gained a landmark victory in 2024 when the nation’s Constitutional Court ordered the National Assembly to amend its legally binding targets for greenhouse gas reduction in accordance with the nation’s global share of emissions reduction and principles of intergenerational equity.36 Other advances for ATL have emerged from a multitude of other countries.37 This worldwide litigation movement, coalescing around a grave planetary threat, portends both a new paradigm of global ecological responsibility and a more ambitious role for courts both of which pose unavoidable challenges for Earth law as the field develops from the pages of this book.
Earth Law illuminates ways of revamping governance. Clearly, judicial authority is needed to check the legislative and executive power exercised through statutory laws that drives ecological devastation and harm to communities. When courts fail to create meaningful remedies to protect fundamental rights, their passivity implicates them by omission in violations of rights they could prevent. As Douglas Kysar and Jim Weaver emphasize, “inaction can inflict a symmetric violence.”38
At the same time, true environmental democracy cannot rest on judicial orders alone. If one thing is clear, it is that citizens must engage every branch of government, and at every level local, state (or equivalent), and federal. Earth Law provides examples of constructive action across a myriad of jurisdictional contexts and in chapter 20 proposes ideas and principles of ecocentric governance that are transferrable across the branches and levels of government. Its pages also remind us that law is carried out across a multitude of playing fields, and that citizens often need only “win” on one field to arrest a damaging project. Attempts to
32. Navahine F. v. Haw. Dep’t of Transp., No. 1CCV-22-0000631 (Haw. Cir. June 20, 2024) (joint stipulation and order regarding settlement), https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/1cc-Navahine-495-JointStip-Order-re-Settlement_-Exb-A-1.pdf. See also Dharna Noor & Lois Beckett, Youth Activists Win “Unprecedented” Settlement in Hawai‘i, The Guardian (June 20, 2024).
33. Isabella Kaminski, Dutch Supreme Court Upholds Landmark Ruling Demanding Climate Action , The Guardian (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/20/dutch-supreme-court -upholds-landmark-ruling-demanding-climate-action.
34. Leghari v. State (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *1–2, *4 (Pak.).
35. See Neubauer, et al. v. Germany, BVerfGE, 1 BvR 2656/18 (Mar. 24, 2021), http://climatecasechart.com /climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/neubauer-et-al-v-germany/. Federal lawmakers responded by passing legislation requiring reduction of, at minimum, 65 percent in greenhouse gases from 1990 levels by 2030. Id.
36. See summary at Sabin Center Climate Case Chart, Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/kim-yujin-et-al-v-south-korea/; Raphael Rashid, South Korea’s Climate Law Violates Rights of Future Generations, Court Rules, The Guardian (Aug. 29, 2024).
37. See Blumm, Wood, & Dernbach, supra note 17, Chapter 11 (summarizing developments in ATL cases in France, Ireland, India, Belgium, Australia, Brazil, and Colombia).
38. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 29, at 301.
Foreword xliii
stop a huge oil pipeline, for example, might meet with defeat in a lawsuit challenging a water pollution permit but could gain a win on the local level where a crucial land use permit is denied. Some of the most destructive industry actions require more than a dozen permits, and an industry proponent must gain them all to move forward. Earth lawyers must take strategic aim across the multiple playing fields of law.
As Earth law develops as a field, attorneys should also focus on the nonprohibitory side of law the often untapped, transactional capacity of law and government to organize and solve vexing ecological problems. Particularly when society turns its attention to ecological recovery rather than merely the arrest of destruction, the prohibitory mandates of law might do little good, for the task of recovery often requires an intensely interdisciplinary effort of partnering with landowners, agencies, groups, and funders reaching across jurisdictional lines and property boundaries to achieve common goals. Forming a vision, creating a plan for implementation, and securing protections or commitments for the long term all squarely call forth the skill set of lawyers. This organizing side of law will be crucial, for example, in tackling epic challenges such as biodiversity recovery and sky cleanup that draws down and sequesters legacy atmospheric carbon on farmlands, forestlands, and tidelands.39 Such crucial endeavors require complex coordination initiated and led by Earth lawyers of the future.
In these ambitious pursuits, Earth lawyers will have to find ways of aligning goals of ecological abundance with true economic stability on the community level. In the past, environmental law has casually ignored the economic fallout of its mandates, causing a massive political revolt against the whole system an insurgency that has pulled the rug out from under statutory protections, particularly in the Trump era. The extreme fluxes of environmental law and politics belie any true stability in the system. But it is not a foregone conclusion that economic equilibrium and ecological health are incompatible in fact the opposite should be true. Earth lawyers should attend to those possibilities, working with communities to advance dual goals of economic stability and ecological recovery, for failing to do so will continue to undermine the collective purpose of protecting the planet for both humans and species.
Earth Law positions the law in the broader context of society, philosophy, and history, which it must do to provide any deep reform. Law is a powerful force in human society, for better or worse. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote: “The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.”40 When the law feels untrue to our deepest sense of justice, it stings our collective soul and presses us toward reform. Indeed, in the five years since the first edition of this book, Earth-centered laws have continued to rapidly advance around the world, reflecting a deep and widely shared moral urge to harmonize human existence with Nature.
As sentinels of the legal system, lawyers, judges, and lawmakers must take care to not quash this righteous sense of the citizens, but instead continually inspire and empower them to pursue justice. If these sentinels fail to attend to that spark of justice, they imperil democracy by dispensing despair, defeatism, and disempowerment the breeding grounds of oppression and tyranny. The judicial system in the United States teeters precariously close to that point, as reflected in the Juliana Ninth Circuit majority’s opinion in which the two majority judges
39. See Mary Christina Wood, Sky Carbon Cleanup and Biodiversity Restoration: Devising Regional Frameworks , 25 Vermont J. Envt’l L. 209 (2024) (proposing and describing regional frameworks to guide drawdown of sky carbon).
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. (1897), reprinted in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 992 (1997).
Earth Law comes to the world not a moment too soon. xliv Foreword
found there was no conceivable judicial remedy in face of an apocalyptic future propelled by the young plaintiffs’ own government. As the dissenting Judge Staton wrote, “Where is the hope in today’s decision? Plaintiffs’ claims are based on science, specifically, an impending point of no return. If plaintiffs’ fears, backed by the government’s own studies prove true, history will not judge us kindly.”41 By presenting cases in which courageous judges worldwide are developing jurisprudence to steer the world to safety and justice, Earth Law kindles the democratic impulse needed to bring new paradigms to fruition.
Earth Law, throughout its pages, invites practitioners and students as future practitioners to co-create this field using the resources it offers. It calls out to those resolute judges, lawyers, lawmakers, students, and citizens across the planet who refuse to relinquish or squander their collective moment in time. This book will guide us all as Earth’s citizens in claiming this moment to stop the onslaught on Mother Earth and work to preserve a habitable planet for present and future generations of all species.
41. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1191 (9th Cir. 2020) (J. Staton dissenting).
Surely, we care about our own offspring. For many this care will include posterity of family members, children, friends, and even future generations of people we don’t know. As we have human rights today, so will they when they will live.
But do future generations have a right to a livable planet? Rights that we can invoke (for them) today? If so, what are the legal obligations of current generations to safeguard that right and how can those obligations be enforced? These questions are no longer just theory, as lawsuits that reference the rights of future generations are being won, and even some international declarations have been based on the existence of such rights. Amid accelerating climate destabilization and extreme weather, biodiversity collapse, and resource depletion, the need to recognize, respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of future generations has become a critical challenge for law and governance.
Legal systems traditionally emphasize the rights and interests of identifiable, present individuals. Future generations, by contrast, are anonymous, unborn, and unable to represent themselves in existing legal structures. Nonetheless, their interests are increasingly acknowledged in international declarations, constitutional texts, and judicial rulings. This emerging legal recognition aligns with evolving moral, ecological, and democratic imperatives.
Two recent landmark instruments have significantly reshaped this field: the 2024 United Nations Declaration on Future Generations,2 adopted as part of the Pact for the Future, and the Maastricht Principles on the Rights of Future Generations (2023). 3 Both instruments assert that duties to future generations flow from principles of intergenerational equity, ecological sustainability, and fundamental human dignity. They establish that foreseeable and avoidable harm to future persons gives rise to obligations under existing human rights and environmental law frameworks.
1. Authored by Jan van de Venis, Owner of JustLaw, Deputy Chair of the Network of Institutions for Future Generations, and acting Ombudsperson for Future Generations in The Netherlands. This chapter was based on, and only in part replaced, the work done in the original chapter (in the previous edition) by Stacy Jane Schaefer.
2. UN Declaration on Future Generations (2024), United Nations General Assembly, https://www.un.org/sites /un2.un.org/files/co-facilitators_zero_draft_of_the_declaration_on_future_generations_26_march_2024_final_.pdf.
3. Maastricht Principles on the Rights of Future Generations (2023), Maastricht University, https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/futuregenerations.
Jurisprudence is also evolving. Courts in The Netherlands, 4 Germany,5 Colombia,6 and the European Court of Human Rights (in KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, 2024) 7 have issued landmark rulings that frame government inaction on climate change as a violation of rights that extend into future generations. In the United States, in Held v. Montana, the state’s Supreme Court held that Montana’s constitutional right to a “clean and healthful environment” also encompasses the rights of future generations to a stable climate system. 8 These rulings emphasize that protecting future persons is not merely a political or ethical imperative but a legal duty grounded in enforceable principles.
This chapter begins with definitional challenges: What is a “generation” or “future generation” in legal terms, and how might future generations be considered legal subjects? It then explores international soft law and emerging treaty norms, constitutional innovations, and judicial recognition through climate litigation. Finally, it addresses the question of legal standing how the voiceless unborn can be represented in legal systems designed for the living.
To delve into the question of whether future generations hold legally cognizable rights and whether any enforceable duties are owed to them, a sensible start is the legal framework in which the meaning of “future generation” has been considered. While sociologists define a generation as a social group sharing a historical or cultural experience over a period of roughly 20 to 30 years, legal definitions must grapple with temporality, identity, and enforceability. In law, the question is not just who future generations are but how they can be represented and protected despite their non-existence in the present.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a generation as “a body of living beings constituting a single step in the line of descent from an ancestor; a group of individuals born and living contemporaneously.”9 An identified current generation is necessarily tied to identifiable past generations as well as future generations. That is, it encompasses the time continuum from the birth of one generation to the birth of that generation’s offspring and so on. Social science research also constructs a timeline in which each successive generation has an identified position, as shown below.10
The Silent Generation Baby Boomers Gen X Millennials Gen Y Gen Z Gen AA Gen BB Born 1928–1945 1946–1964 1965–1980 1981–1996 1997–2015 2015–2039 2039–2059
4. Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands, Supreme Court, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007.
5. Neubauer et al. v. Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2656/18 (2021).
6. Supreme Court of Colombia 5 April 2018, no. STC4360-2018, p. 13 (Future Generations/Ministry of the Environment).
7. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 53600/20 (2024).
8. Held v. Montana, No. CDV-2020-307 (1st Dist. Ct. Mont., Aug. 14, 2023).
9. Generation, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generation (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
10. Information found in the table with generation names and dates is from Michael Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, Pew Research Center (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/, and Kasasa , Boomers, Gen X, Gen Y, and Gen Z Explained (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.kasasa.com/articles/generations/gen-x-gen-y-gen-z.
Identifying future generations by estimating the average number of years on a time continuum has legal precedence as well as precedence in other disciplines. While there may be other approaches, this demonstrates that there are practical methods of defining what constitutes “future generations.” Even so, international law has not yet defined or recognized an authoritative definition of “future generation.” Some commentators hold that young, alreadyborn children should be part of the definition, for example, because their future as adults will be more complex if we don’t respect their rights today. From the group of people already alive today, young children will indeed carry the heaviest burden of negative impact of climate change and biodiversity loss, yet it’s also true that they are here and have human rights and children’s rights to protect them. We have begun to see cases that bridge the divide between the young and future generations. For example, in Neubauer et al. v. Germany (2021), youth climate change plaintiffs sued the German government for not adequately addressing the threat of climate change. Germany’s Constitutional Court determined that current legislation must not unduly shift burdens onto future generations, grounding its reasoning in Article 20a of the Basic Law, which mandates protection of the environment “also in responsibility for future generations.”11
The 2024 UN Declaration on Future Generations defines future generations as “members of the human family not yet born, whose rights and dignity must be safeguarded through present decisions.”12 This reflects a shift from viewing the future as an abstraction to a legally cognizable population with moral and legal standing. The 2023 Maastricht Principles on the Rights of Future Generations used this same principle in asserting that legal obligations to future persons arise from foreseeability, causality, and proximity of impact.13 They emphasize that the nonidentity of future individuals does not invalidate their entitlement to protection under principles of dignity, equity, and sustainability. The Maastricht Principles also broaden the scope, by defining future generations (in Principle 1) to include persons, groups, and peoples.
What of justice between generations? Philosopher Edith Brown Weiss articulated three principles foundational to intergenerational justice: conservation of options, conservation of quality, and conservation of access.14 These principles have been cited by courts and international declarations to justify environmental limits and affirmative duties. The core idea is that future generations are entitled not to identical conditions but to a comparable range of choices and life opportunities as those currently living. While future persons cannot bring claims directly, legal systems are beginning to acknowledge that they can be represented by proxies and protected by statutes, constitutional clauses, and fiduciary doctrines that incorporate a temporal dimension of justice.
The concept of a duty to protect the Earth for the benefit of future generations is neither new nor restricted to any one culture or nation. This section provides a brief survey of customary, international, and domestic government edicts that speak to protecting the Earth for future generations.
11. Neubauer et al. v. Germany, 1 BvR 2656/18 (Ger. Fed. Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2021), English translation available at https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/neubauer-et-al-v-germany/.
12. Declaration on Future Generations, annex to Pact for the Future, G.A. Res. 79/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/79/1 (Sept. 22-23, 2024), https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/declaration-on-future-generations.
13. Maastricht Principles, supra note 3.
14. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (1989).
A worldview that extends human care to larger communities of life necessitates consideration of future generations, as is done by many Indigenous Peoples.
A current expression of protecting the Earth for future generations appears as the Seventh Generation Principle that current decision-making should result in a sustainable world seven generations later set out in the Bemidji Statement, which combines the wisdom of the Native American Haudenosaunee Tribe with the precautionary principle:
The first mandate . . . is to ensure that our decision-making is guided by consideration of the welfare and well-being of the seventh generation to come. . . . Indigenous Peoples have learned over thousands of years to live in harmony with the land and the waters. It is our intent to survive and thrive on this planet for this and many generations to come.15
Other Indigenous leaders speak of future generations from an ecocentric perspective. The Indigenous rights magazine Cultural Survival wrote about this perspective in 2009: “When women like Pauline Whitesinger, an elder at Big Mountain, and Carrie Dann, a Western Shoshone land rights activist, speak of preserving the land for future generations, they are not just talking about future generations of humans. They are talking about future generations of plants, animals, water, and all living things.”16
Another example of a legal obligation owed to future generations is found in the customar y legal system of the Indigenous Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand. The Māori’s tikanga recognizes both a physical and spiritual connection of the people to the Whanganui River ecosystem in which they have lived for centuries. “Ko au te awa. Ko te awa ko au.” (“I am the river. The river is me.”) This deeply held belief is reflected in the 1840 Te Awa Tupua Treaty.17 As the Waitangi Tribunal explained in its report on the Whanganui River treaty claim, the Māori consider the Whanganui River “the central bloodline of their one heart.”18 The Māori tikanga asserts that humans are connected to the world and that interconnectedness carries the responsibilities and rights as one would attribute to fellow family members.
In 1969, a U.S. Senate Report on the National Environmental Policy Act stated that “[t]he Nation has in many areas overdrawn its bank account in life-sustaining natural elements.”19 From this recognition, Congress enacted numerous federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act to realign the American government’s commitment to protecting the environment. In 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency was created.
The 1970 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the closest U.S. environmental law has come to explicitly representing the interests of future generations. NEPA, called America’s “basic national charter for the protection of the environment,” 20 was enacted with broad bipartisan support in both the executive and legislative branches.21 The text of NEPA
15. The Bemidji Statement on Seventh Generation Guardianship , 14th Protecting Mother Earth Conference, July 6-9, 2006, http://www.precaution.org/lib/06/prn_bemidji.060627.htm.
16. Wilma Mankiller, Being Indigenous in the 21st Century, Cultural Survival (Mar. 2009).
17. The Te Awa Tupua Act emerged from treaty settlement negotiations resolving historical Treaty of Waitangi claims of the Whanganui Iwi (Tribe) in relation to the Whanganui River. The settlement agreement, Tūtohu Whakatupua, was signed August 30, 2012. Whanganui Iwi & The Crown, Tūtohu Whakatupua (2012).
18. Waitangi Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report, 379 (1999).
19. S. Rep. No. 91-296 at 16 (1969).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1969).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a).
begins by “recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment.”22 It “declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”23 President Richard Nixon hailed NEPA as providing the “direction” for the country to “regain a productive harmony between man and nature,” 24 and he declared, “I think that 1970 will be known as the year of the beginning, in which we really began to move on the problems of clean air and clean water and open spaces for the future generations of America.”25
The initial strength of this movement and the potential it had to create “a productive harmony between man and nature” for the benefit of current and future generations has proved to be short-lived. To date, no federal court has found a statutory right of future generations to an inhabitable Earth. In Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980), the Supreme Court established that while NEPA sets out “significant substantive goals for the Nation,” it only “imposes upon agencies duties that are essentially procedural.”26 According to the Supreme Court, “once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’” 27 Based on this understanding, U.S. courts have foreclosed substantive review of agency actions, even if such actions are significantly detrimental to Nature and to present and future generations of Americans. In the 2023 Raimondo case, the conservative Supreme Court majority overturned the Chevron doctrine of deferring to agency interpretations of Congressional laws, opening the door to less stringent enforcement of existing environmental laws and regulations.
In 2016, after decades of being ignored under NEPA and other environmental laws, future generations came knocking on the courtroom doors. In Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260-1261 (D. Or. 2016), “Future Generations” of humans were among the petitioners, along with 21 young persons and the nonprofit organization Earth Guardians, suing the U.S. government for allowing atmospheric CO2 concentrations to rise to dangerous levels.28 The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their right to a stable climate system, which is retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment and essential to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that the government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.29 The plaintiffs also alleged that these actions violate the public trust doctrine.30 James Hansen, the former NASA scientist who has warned about climate change since the 1980s, served as the appointed legal guardian (or “representative”) of future generations.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Richard M. Nixon, Statement About the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 Pub. Papers 2 (Jan. 1, 1970).
25. EPA, 40th Anniversary of the Clean Air Act, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/40th-anniversaryclean-air-act (emphasis added).
26. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (internal citation omitted).
27. Id. at 227-228 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
28. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief , Juliana v. United States of America, Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. 2015).
29. Id.
30. Id.
In January 2020, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to dismiss the lawsuit, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue because the plaintiffs’ injuries were not redressable by the exercise of judicial power. Rather, the court concluded, “the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political branches of government.” 31 By confining the grounds for the decision to the issue of redressability, the court did not decide whether the future generations were rights-bearing legal entities who, through a legal guardian, may yet be afforded constitutional protections.
In the dissent, Judge Josephine Staton highlighted what might persuade another court and perhaps a future-generation Supreme Court that the Constitution requires the exercise of judicial power to redress the injury of climate change. Expressing a belief that the U.S. government has some duty to consider the needs of future generations, Judge Staton also discusses the roots of the U.S. Constitution and notes:
When the Articles of the Confederation proved ill-fitting to the task of safeguarding the Union, the framers formed the Constitutional Convention with “the great object” of “preserv[ing] and perpetuat[ing]” the Union, for they believed that “the prosperity of America depended on its Union.” The Federalist No. 2, at 19 (John Jay) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787). [Citation omitted.] . . . In light of this animating principle, it is fitting that the Preamble declares that the Constitution is intended to secure “the Blessings of Liberty” not just for one generation, but for all future generations our “Posterity.”32
Over the past four years, the case experienced significant legal developments. In June 2023, U.S. District Court Judge Ann Aiken permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, allowing the case to proceed toward trial. However, in May 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the federal government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to dismiss the case for lack of Article III standing, asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were not redressable by the courts. The plaintiffs sought to challenge this dismissal by petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On March 24, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the petition, effectively concluding the nearly decade-long legal battle without a trial.33
Despite the case’s dismissal, Juliana v. United States has had a profound impact on climate litigation. It inspired a global movement advocating for the recognition of climate rights, particularly for youth and future generations. The case underscored the challenges of addressing climate change through the judiciary and highlighted the need for legislative and executive action to protect the rights of younger and future populations. The case significantly contributed to the discourse on environmental rights and intergenerational equity, emphasizing the moral and legal imperatives of addressing climate change for the benefit of current and future generations.
In the contemporary international legal system, there are declarations, conventions, and resolutions that speak to the protection of the environment for future generations. Some of these legal instruments are summarized in the following chart.
The international laws, declarations, and statements referenced below are functionally “soft laws” because they allow an organization to declare its intentions without being directly
31. Opinion, Juliana v. United States of America, Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. 2020).
32. Id. at 38-39.
33. Sahara Valentine, Juliana v. United States Comes to a Close, Prism Reports (Mar. 27, 2025), https:// prismreports.org/2025/03/27/juliana-v-united-states-sahara-valetine/.
Legal Instrument
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
Article 4 of the UNESCO Declaration of the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations
Rights of Future Generations Text
“[Humanity] bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”34
“Preservation of life on Earth. The present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity. Each generation inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use natural resources reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the ecosystems and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm life on Earth.”35
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Article 3 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992)
The 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Preamble, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Preamble, paragraph 2, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532
“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”36
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind.”37
“Water resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”38
“CONVINCED of the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for the wellbeing of present and future generations.”
“Aware of the health concerns, especially in developing countries, resulting from local exposure to persistent organic pollutants, in particular impacts upon women and, through them, upon future generations.”
34. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
35. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations, arts. 4-5, Records of the General Conference, Paris, Oct. 21-Nov. 12, 1997.
36. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, princ. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
37. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II) Add. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 851.
38. The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Art. 2(5)(c), Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
Maastricht Principles on the Rights of Future Generations (2023)
Pact for the Future and UN Declaration on Future Generations (2024)
Foreseeability of harm creates enforceable obligations; that environmental degradation violating future persons’ rights may trigger extraterritorial responsibilities; and that future generations are entitled to the same protections of life, health, and dignity as current populations. Future generations have the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, and current generations owe them enforceable duties under international law. Calls for institutional mechanisms, such as future generations commissioners, long-term impact assessments, and crosssectoral policy frameworks that integrate intergenerational justice into decision-making.
enforceable in a court of law. Despite its nonbinding nature, soft law helps to generate shared norms and can lead to binding hard law in the future, as it has with human rights. Soft law can communicate “future intentions to enact hard law, allowing people to adjust their behavior in advance of binding statutes and in some cases avoiding constitutional requirements that apply to hard law. . . . [I]f people adjust their behavior in anticipation of hard law, hard law enactment might not be necessary.”39
Future generations are strongly considered in global sustainability efforts.40 The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, released in 1987, defines the principle of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 41 This has become the mantra of the international community’s sustainability work. In some limited contexts, the principle of sustainable development may have reached the level of customary international law. 42 Although sustainable development discourse lacks the element of “rights,” it does establish that current generations have a “responsibility” to future generations a trend that may be further enforced as concepts such as “harmony with nature” gain traction at the United Nations and beyond.
In sum, the use of soft law in the international arena is an important element of the legal framework for protecting the rights of future generations. As commentators have noted, “Despite their lack of formal legal status, international soft laws can ultimately have real effect by working their way into customary international law or by providing the framework for informal interstate cooperation.”43 Together, these instruments reflect an evolving consensus: Sustainable governance must account for the long-term consequences of today’s decisions, and future generations are not merely aspirational subjects of policy but emerging
39. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, 586 (2008).
40. See generally Environment & Society Portal, UN World Commission on Environment and Development, www.environmentandsociety.org/mml/un-world-commission-environment-and-development-ed-report-world -commission-environment-and (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
41. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future , ch. 2 para. 1 (World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. ed., 1987), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content /documents/5987our-common-future.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Varamon Ramangkura, Thai Shrimp, Sea Turtles, Mangrove Forests and the WTO: Innovative Environmental Protection under the International Trade Regime, 15 Geo. Int’l Env’t L. Rev. 677, 682 (2003).
43. Gersen & Posner, supra note 39, at 575.
rights-holders within the framework of international law. Certainly, international law instruments will continue to play a major role in the development of rights of future generations.
(1) What types of impacts have past generations made on the current generation with respect to the environment and Nature? Do you think they have violated your rights? What duty(ies) did they have when they violated the right(s)? When did the violation(s) occur, and when were you injured? When was your generation injured? If rights of future generations are established as a matter of law and impose duties on governments to protect the rights of future generations, what duties may governments impose on people and corporations whose conduct violates those rights?
(2) Fifty years after NEPA was enacted, in Juliana v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “the political branches of government have to date been largely deaf to the pleas of the plaintiffs” to, in the words of NEPA, “maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” Nonetheless, the court held the case could not proceed based on constitutional limitations of federal judicial powers:
Not every problem posing a threat even a clear and present danger to the American Experiment can be solved by federal judges. As Judge Cardozo once aptly warned, a judicial commission does not confer the power of “a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness;” rather, we are bound “to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921).
(3) What factors might lead another federal court to find that judicial action to remedy the failure of the political branches of government to adhere to the stated purposes of NEPA is constitutionally permissible?
(4) How could an attorney in the United States representing the rights of future generations make use of international soft laws?
At the national level, Bolivia, Norway, and South Africa constitutionally recognize the rights of future generations to a healthy environment. The Constitution of Bolivia states: “Every person has the following fundamental rights . . . to enjoy a healthy environment, ecologically balanced and adequate for his wellbeing, safeguarding the rights of future generations.” The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway states: “Every person has a right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources should be managed on the basis of comprehensive longterm considerations whereby this right will be safeguarded for future generations as well.” The Republic of South Africa’s Bill of Rights, found in Chapter 2 of its Constitution, provides that “Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations. . . .”
While the development of Earth law based on national constitutional recognition of rights of future generations may be more well-grounded than other approaches, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Congress will soon pass such an amendment. Nevertheless, there is ample opportunity to develop the rights of future generations in the state context.
Currently, six state constitutions provide in some way for protection of the environment for current and future generations those of Hawai‘i, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court interpreted its Commonwealth’s constitutional guarantee in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017). The court found that the state has a constitutional obligation to manage state parks and forests, including the oil and gas they contain, as a trustee, with present and future generations as the named beneficiaries of the trust. As part of the reasoning for its decision, the court described the history and purpose of Section 27 as follows:
That Pennsylvania deliberately chose a course different from virtually all of its sister states speaks to the Commonwealth’s experience of having the benefit of vast natural resources whose virtually unrestrained exploitation, while initially a boon to investors, industry, and citizens, led to destructive and lasting consequences not only for the environment but also for the citizens’ quality of life. Later generations paid and continue to pay a tribute to early uncontrolled and unsustainable development financially, in health and quality of life consequences, and with the relegation to history books of valuable natural and esthetic aspects of our environmental inheritance. The drafters and the citizens of the Commonwealth who ratified the Environmental Rights Amendment, aware of this history, articulated the people’s rights and the government’s duties to the people in broad and flexible terms that would permit not only reactive but also anticipatory protection of the environment for the benefit of current and future generations.44
During the case, a question arose as to whether Section 27 is self-executing, meaning whether the judiciary can enforce the provision without the aid of a legislative enactment. An amicus curiae in the case, the Republican caucus, argued that the rights enumerated in Section 27 are not self-executing and therefore needed implementing legislation to become effective for the benefit of current and future generations. However, the court disagreed:
There can be no question that the Amendment itself declares and creates a public trust of public natural resources for the benefit of all the people (including future generations as yet unborn) and that the Commonwealth is made the trustee of said resources, commanded to conserve and maintain them. No implementing legislation is needed to enunciate these broad purposes and establish these relationships; the [A]mendment does so by its own ipse dixit.45
This case set a precedent for applying the public trust doctrine to protect the rights of future generations at the state level in the United States. Another case concerning the rights of future generations under a state constitutional right to a healthy environment is the Montana court’s decision in Held v. Montana. Held exemplifies a shift in standing arguments in climate change litigation, drawing on Montana’s constitutional right to a healthy environment.
Unlike the constitutions of some other countries, the U.S. Constitution does not articulate a fundamental right for future generations to a habitable Earth. Nor has the Supreme Court yet found such a right arising from the Constitution. However, scholars and litigators alike have argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause require the federal government to uphold the right to a healthy environment, including a stable climate system, for both present and future generations.
44. Pa. Environmental Defense Fdn. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 918 (Pa. 2017).
45. Id. at 937.
As noted above, “Future Generations,” as represented by guardian James Hansen, asserted their constitutional right to a stable climate in Juliana v. United States. However, the U.S. district court dismissed the case for lack of standing before ruling on whether future generations were capable of holding this right.46
As the constitutional embodiment of rights of future generations continues to progress, more courts will examine the concept. The most deeply developed common law recognizing the rights of future generations is the Philippines Supreme Court’s decision in Minors Oposa v. Sec. of the Dept. of Env. & Natural Resource. This opinion provides an expansive and comprehensive interpretation of the rights of future generations to a healthy environment in the absence of any constitutional authority. In this case, the Philippines Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the Philippines Constitution confers a right to a “balanced and healthful ecology” not just for the current generation of its people but also for future generations. The 2018 Companion to Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism: Selected Cases and Materials, Selected Edited Judicial Opinions from Around the Globe provides a comprehensive edited version of Minors Oposa, which is excerpted below.
The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1993)
The court recognized the principle of intergenerational justice and granted standing to petitioners, who represented their generation and generations of unborn Filipinos in a petition opposing timber license agreements.
This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-generational justice.” Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of Philippine rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”
. . .
This case . . . has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. . . .
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
46. Juliana, No. 6:15-cv-01517.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, we do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge’s challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. . . .
We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. . . . The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country’s forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) is a body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by its states parties. The Committee has increasingly emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of future generations, particularly in the context of environmental degradation and climate change. This focus is evident in both its general comments (authoritative interpretations of a treaty provision issued by a treaty body) and jurisprudence.
In General Comment No. 36, the UNHRC interprets Article 6 of the ICCPR to encompass environmental dimensions, recognizing that environmental degradation, climate change, and unsustainable development pose serious threats to the right to life for present and future generations. The UNHRC asserts that states have obligations to take positive measures to protect individuals against life-threatening environmental conditions. This includes considering the rights of future generations, as the effects of environmental harm often extend beyond the present population.
47. CCPR/C/GC/36, https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life.
2. Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay (2020)48
In this landmark case, the UNHRC found that Paraguay violated the rights to life and privacy under the ICCPR by failing to prevent environmental contamination from agrochemical use, which resulted in the death of a farmer and harm to others. The UNHRC highlighted the state’s duty to regulate environmental risks and protect individuals from foreseeable threats, setting a precedent for recognizing environmental harm as a human rights violation.
3. Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand (2020)49
Although the UNHRC did not find a violation in this case, it acknowledged that environmental degradation and climate change could pose serious threats to the right to life of present and future generations. The case involved a Kiribati national seeking asylum in Aotearoa New Zealand due to the impacts of climate change in his home country. The UNHRC recognized that states have obligations to protect individuals from foreseeable environmental threats, including those affecting future generations.
4. Billy et al. v. Australia (2023)50
In this case, the UNHRC found that Australia’s failure to adequately protect Torres Strait Islanders from the impacts of climate change violated their rights under the ICCPR. The UNHRC emphasized that states have positive obligations to protect individuals from foreseeable environmental threats that can impair the enjoyment of their rights, underscoring the importance of considering the long-term effects of environmental harm on both current and future generations.
By integrating environmental considerations into the human rights framework, the UNHRC’s evolving interpretative guidance and jurisprudence underscore a growing recognition of the need to protect long-term interest in general and, more specifically, the rights of future generations.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the body of experts that monitors the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The CRC has consistently confirmed the significance of safeguarding the rights of future generations through its interpretive practice, particularly evident within its General Comments. These authoritative interpretations reflect an evolving awareness of intergenerational equity, explicitly linking present obligations to the rights and interests of future children.
Notably, General Comment No. 16 (2013), addressing the impact of business on children’s rights, emphasizes sustainable development and intergenerational justice. It highlights states’ obligations to regulate corporate activities to prevent adverse effects on children’s rights and underscores the need to ensure environmental sustainability for present and future generations of children.51
48. Portillo Cáceres and Others v. Paraguay, Communication No. 2751/2016, UN Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Doc. CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016 (Views adopted Jul. 25, 2019).
49. Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Communication No. 2728/2016, UN Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Doc. CCPR/ C/127/D/2728/2016 (Views adopted Oct. 24, 2019).
50. Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, UN Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Doc. CCPR/ C/135/D/3624/2019 (Views adopted Jul. 21, 2022).
51. CRC, General Comment No. 16 (2013), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16, para. 19.
Furthermore, General Comment No. 15 (2013) reinforces the significance of sustainable environmental conditions, underscoring states’ duties to secure children’s health and development, recognizing explicitly that today’s environmental actions shape future living conditions.52
General Comment No. 26 (2023), which focuses on children’s rights and the environment with a special emphasis on climate change, directly acknowledges intergenerational equity. It stipulates that states must take effective measures to mitigate climate change impacts, preserve biodiversity, and ensure environmental sustainability explicitly to protect the rights of current and future generations of children.53 It also emphasizes that present failures in environmental protection amount to violations of children’s rights, projecting harm well into the future, and thus calling for proactive and preventive measures aligning with principles of intergenerational justice.54
Through these general comments, CRC shows that it is not just a guardian for children alive today but also for future generations. Its interpretative guidance has helped develop and clarify the legal obligations of states to respect, protect, and fulfill children’s rights within an intergenerational framework, emphasizing sustainable development and a future focus as a central principle for children’s rights implementation and enforcement.
In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the world’s highest court on international law, issued a historic advisory opinion on states’ legal obligations under international law, including customary law and human rights law, to protect the climate system from anthropogenic resource emissions. The ICJ was asked to do so by the General Assembly of the United Nations after youth from the Pacific Islands, youth worldwide, and the State of Vanuatu started a legal campaign to bring the world’s biggest problem to the world’s highest court.
Through this advisory opinion, the court set leading-edge standards for the protection of the climate system and the environment, directly linking the adverse effects of climate change to human rights, including the rights to life, health, water, food, housing, and the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment for present and future generations.
It has addressed and, in paragraph 377, adopted the aforementioned General Comment 36 on the right to life by the UNCHR. Further, it stated in paragraph 373 that the environment is the basis on which the health and well-being of both present and future generations depend. In paragraph 273, it stated that the goal of preventing significant damage to the environment also applies to the climate system, which is an integral and important part of the environment and must be protected for present and future generations. In paragraphs 156 and 157 on intergenerational equity, it stated that intergenerational equity is an expression of the idea that present generations are trustees of humanity, tasked with protecting valuable life experiences and passing them on to future generations. In the court’s view, intergenerational equity is a manifestation of general concern and therefore shares its legal significance as a guide to the interpretation of additional rules.55
Expounding on the principle of intergenerational equity, the court wrote, “Due regard for the interests of future generations and the long-term implications of conduct are equitable
52. CRC, General Comment No. 15 (2013), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/15, para. 50.
53. CRC, General Comment No. 26 (2023), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/26, paras. 11, 20.
54. Id., para. 40.
55. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, General List No. 187, ¶¶377, 373, 273, 156, 157 (July 23, 2025).
considerations that need to be taken into account where States contemplate, decide on and implement policies and measures in fulfilment of their obligations under the relevant treaties and customary international law.”56
So, even though the ICJ did not explicitly reinforce that future generations have rights under current human rights treaties, it has now clarified the responsibilities states have under customary laws and human rights law toward future generations.
Regional human rights courts, through their advisory opinions, guidance, and jurisprudence, have increasingly acknowledged the rights and interests of future generations, particularly in the context of environmental protection and climate change. The following cases and advisory opinions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) illustrate this emerging jurisprudence.
The ECHR has been building a clear and ever more strict line in environmental cases over the last two decades, limiting states’ margin of appreciation, designing clear positive obligations, and putting more proof (“onus”) on the states. Some cases even mention future generations or the right to live in a healthy and clean environment, a right that is not yet codified in the European Convention on Human Rights.57
In the landmark KlimaSeniorinnen case,58 the ECHR held that Switzerland violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to implement sufficient measures to combat climate change. The court emphasized that inadequate state action on climate change can infringe on individuals’ rights to private and family life, implicitly recognizing the implications for future generations.
In the specific context of climate change, the ECHR observed that intergenerational burden-sharing is of particular importance, both concerning the different generations of those currently living and future generations.59 Although the legal obligations arising for states under the Convention extend to individuals presently living, it is evident that future generations are likely to bear an increasingly heavy burden from the consequences of current failures and omissions to combat climate change. Simultaneously, they lack the opportunity to participate in relevant current decision-making processes.
In Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 (IACHR, 2017), 60 the IACHR clarified that the right to a healthy environment, as enshrined in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human
56. Id. ¶157.
57. Cases to be mentioned here are Tatar v. Roemenia, nr. 67021/01 (27 Jan. 2009); Di Sarno v. Italy, nr. 30765/08 (10 Jan. 2012); Jugheli and others v. Georgia, nr. 38342/05 (13 Jul. 2017); Cuenca Zarszoso v. Spain , nr. 23383/12 (16 Jan. 2018); Yevgeniy Dmitreiyev v. Russia, nr. 17840/06 (1 Mar. 2021), and Cannavacciuolo and others v. Italy, nr. 51567/14 (30 Jan. 2025).
58. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, App. No. 53600/20, Grand Chamber, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 9, 2024), [2024] ECHR 304, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233206.
59. Id. at para. 420.
60. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 15 November 2017. For more on this judment see also Chapter 15, “Human Rights and Rights of Nature.”
Rights, encompasses both present and future generations. The court stated that environmental degradation can have transgenerational effects, thereby imposing obligations on states to prevent environmental harm that could affect future generations.
In the case of Lhaka Honhat Association v. Argentina (IACHR, 2020), 61 the IACHR found that Argentina violated the rights of Indigenous communities by failing to protect their environment and natural resources. The court recognized the interdependence between environmental protection and the rights of Indigenous Peoples, highlighting the necessity to safeguard these rights for the benefit of future generations.
62
The ACHPR issued an advisory opinion emphasizing that the right to a satisfactory environment, as outlined in Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, includes the protection of the environment for future generations. The court underscored that states have obligations to mitigate climate change impacts to preserve the rights of both current and future populations.
As explained in Chapter 4, “Rights of Nature in the United States,” standing is a constitutional doctrine that determines whether an aggrieved person is allowed to bring a claim (i.e., “stand”) before the court. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution delineates only the substantive limits of “[t]he Judicial Power” of the federal court system as the adjudication of “Cases” and “Controversies” concerning “the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” From this basic limitation, the Supreme Court has developed the requisite elements of standing over time through its case law. By way of review, standing has three elements: injury, causation, and redressability. This section explores the challenges and potentials that an Earth law practitioner representing future generations faces with respect to each of these elements.
The injury to a future generation plaintiff is the damage and destruction of the Earth’s life- s ustaining biosphere. As we explored earlier, that injury might rest on claims that the government body or bodies breached their fiduciary duties to protect natural resources under the public trust doctrine. The injury might likewise be asserted as a violation of constitutional rights. Either way, it is imperative for an attorney to plead a cognizable injury in fact to future generations for purposes of Article III standing. Challenges to meeting this first element of the standing test include establishing the environmental harm or imminent threat to an ecosystem as an “injury in fact” and proving the injury within the plaintiff’s lifetime.
Attorneys for future generation plaintiffs can learn from the difficulties that members of the present generation have had establishing an injury in fact in the context of Article III standing. For example, establishing that an injury is sufficiently “imminent” to constitute an injury in the Article III context requires a plaintiff to establish that it will occur within their lifetime. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Court ruled that the plaintiffs had not shown how extinction of endangered animals would produce any imminent injury to the plaintiff since
61. Lhaka Honhat Association v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 6 Feb. 2020.
62. Advisory Opinion No. 001/2025, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2 May 2025.
Nature wills that there is no end to life.2
Aotearoa New Zealand (inclusive of both the Māori and the English names) has a long history of recognizing the intrinsic worth of Nature. Since 2014, it has also been a world leader in granting legal personhood and protections to specific natural features. The unicameral New Zealand Parliament has acted thrice by unanimity or consensus to provide environmental personhood and co-management with local Māori iwi (tribes) and representatives of the Crown: first to an ancestral forest (2014), then to a spiritually important river (2017), and most recently to a revered mountain system (2025).
Aotearoa New Zealand is a relatively young and sparsely populated state. It was the last habitable landmass on Earth to be settled by humans when East Polynesians arrived by canoe between 1200 and 1300 AD. Various iwi later known as the Māori people ruled for more than 500 years until European colonization in the 1830s. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the English Queen and the Indigenous Māori provided the terms of English settlement and government. Subsequent land wars from 1845 to 1872 with the European settlers weakened the Māori. In 2020, as a result of mostly European settlement over the last 200 years, Māori make up approximately 15 percent of the population of about 5 million.3 Those 5 million people are spread over a land area approximately the size of Colorado.
Aotearoa New Zealand is a common law, democratic country without a written constitution. Even though there is no single written Aotearoa New Zealand constitution, there are constitutional documents, including a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the foundational Treaty of Waitangi, signed by representatives of the British Crown and more than 500 Māori chiefs in 1840. However, Aotearoa New Zealand also has a system of parliamentary sovereignty, similar to those in the United Kingdom and in Israel. Therefore, court decisions are important, as in any common law system, but courts do not have power to invalidate procedurally valid laws passed by Parliament, whereas Parliament can pass a law to override a court
1. Authored by Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand; and Duff Wilson, retired from the Seattle Times, New York Times, and Reuters, Adjunct Professor of Journalism, Columbia University.
2. The first sentence of Te Kawa o Te Urewera, the management plan for Te Urewera, https://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera; discussed in § 23.4B, infra
3. See, e.g., Statistics New Zealand on population numbers and ethnicity: http://www.stats.govt.nz.
Section II Nature’s Rights and Personhood
decision. Although the separation of powers is taken extremely seriously, and Aotearoa New Zealand is repeatedly ranked as one of the least corrupt nations in the world,4 the makeup of Parliament and thus the system for appointing parliamentarians determines the content of most of Aotearoa New Zealand’s laws.
Aotearoa New Zealand is a party to most international environmental agreements and prides itself on being a strong protector of the environment.5 It has a range of domestic environmental laws dealing with different subjects; the largest and most comprehensive statute creating an integrated management regime for most uses of land, air, and water is the Resource Management Act 1991. Separate legislation governs national parks, protected species, animal welfare, and most resource extraction. Likewise, separate legislation governs some of the innovative environmental co-management and co-governance arrangements between the government and the Māori.
Aotearoa New Zealand is also a party to most international human rights agreements and similarly prides itself on being a strong defender of human rights. Key domestic human rights laws include the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act; both are ordinary statutes, and the Bill of Rights contains solely civil and political rights; none contains environmental rights. It is through Aotearoa New Zealand’s human rights framework that many of the more ecocentric legal mechanisms have been made part of the law. Most significantly, this has taken place as a result of the systems Aotearoa New Zealand has adopted for resolving Indigenous grievances to breaches of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.
This chapter outlines two aspects of Aotearoa New Zealand legislation that contribute to the body of Earth law: references to the intrinsic value of Nature and adoption of legal personality for Nature.
Several significant pieces of Aotearoa New Zealand’s environmental legislation contain recognition of the “intrinsic worth” or “intrinsic value” of Nature. The key examples are the Reserves Act 1977, the National Parks Act 1980, the Conservation Act 1987, the Resource Management Act 1991, the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, and the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. In addition, several other statutes specific to particular natural areas refer to intrinsic values of Nature.6
References to the intrinsic worth or intrinsic value of Nature occur most often as part of the general purpose of the statute or the principles by which decisions under the statute should be made. Interestingly, only some statutes define these terms; those without definitions
4. See, e.g. , Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 , https://www.transparency.org .nz/corruption-perceptions-index (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (ranking New Zealand first equal with Denmark).
5. That pride may not reflect its domestic results in practice to date. For example, New Zealand has been ranked 18 of 179 in the world for its proportional environmental impact, where 1 is the greatest environmental impact proportional to total resource availability i.e., New Zealand is one of the worst 20 countries of the world in this regard. It remains to be seen whether the growing Rights of Nature movement in the country can make substantive improvements to such results. C.J.A Bradshaw, X. Giam & N.S. Sodhi, Evaluating the Relative Environmental Impact of Countries, 5(5) Plos One e10440 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010440.
6. See, e.g., Water Conservation Orders in respect to the Kawerau and Rangitata Rivers, the three statutes conferring legal personality to natural features referred to later in this chapter, some forest and heritage area legislation, and the Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994.
thus leave the terms to their plain meaning and definition by decision-makers and courts. For example:
• The Reserves Act 1977 provides for a range of types of reserves, including recreation, historic, scenic, Nature, and scientific. Only the provision defining scenic reserves refers to their intrinsic worth:
(1) It is hereby declared that the appropriate provisions of this Act shall have effect, in relation to reserves classified as scenic reserves
(a) for the purpose of protecting and preserving in perpetuity for their intrinsic worth and for the benefit, enjoyment, and use of the public, suitable areas possessing such qualities of scenic interest, beauty, or natural features or landscape that their protection and preservation are desirable in the public interest.
The term intrinsic worth is not further defined in the statute, so it is left to take its ordinary (anthropocentric) meaning.7 Nature’s intrinsic worth, although ecocentric in abstraction, is still rooted in human enjoyment of Nature. For example, the courts have determined that the view from a scenic reserve is part of its intrinsic worth;8 this justified the Minister of Conservation granting a lease to enable construction of a gazebo on a scenic reserve to take advantage of the view. In determining when and where “protection and preservation are desirable,” the decision-making is based on what is “desirable in the [human] public interest.” Thus, the measure of intrinsic worth is established anthropocentrically.
• The National Parks Act 1980 has a similar purpose and reference to intrinsic worth:
4. Parks to be Maintained in Natural State, and Public to Have Right of Entry (1) It is hereby declared that the provisions of this Act shall have effect for the purpose of preserving in perpetuity as national parks, for their intrinsic worth and for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of the public, areas of New Zealand that contain scenery of such distinctive quality, ecological systems, or natural features so beautiful, unique, or scientifically important that their preservation is in the national interest.
This Act goes on to say that national parks, native plants and animals, and sites and objects of archaeological and historical interest shall be preserved “as far as possible” while also giving public access to enjoy the parks. As with the Reserves Act, the term intrinsic worth is not further defined in the statute, so it is left to take its ordinary meaning. To date, courts have not considered the National Parks Act 1980 in any manner to define “intrinsic worth.”
• The Conservation Act 1987 refers to intrinsic values three times when defining “conservation,” “nature conservation,” and “preservation”: conservation means the preservation and protection of natural and historic resources for the purpose of maintaining their intrinsic values, providing for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public, and safeguarding the options of future generations
7. The ordinary meaning of the text is interpreted in light of the purpose of the legislation: Interpretation Act 1999, § 5(1).
8. Summit Road Society (Inc.) v. Minister of Conservation, 14 NZTPA 216 (1990) (N.Z.).
Section II Nature’s Rights and Personhood
nature conservation means the preservation and protection of the natural resources of New Zealand, having regard to their intrinsic values and having special regard to indigenous flora and fauna, natural ecosystems, and landscape preservation, in relation to a resource, means the maintenance, so far as is practicable, of its intrinsic values
The Aotearoa New Zealand Supreme Court has held that the definition of “conservation” and its inclusion in the purpose of the Act means that the existence of “intrinsic conservation values” are key to the existence and protection of conservation land; only where such values no longer exist can the protected status of conservation land be revoked. 9 Thus, intrinsic values, as vaguely defined and as anthropocentrically discerned as they may be, have enabled the strong protection sought by the Conservation Act.
• The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, also in the purpose of the Act: recognises, through the protection of public rights of access, navigation, and fishing, the importance of the common Marine and coastal area
(i) for its intrinsic worth; and
(ii) for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of the public of New Zealand.
The meaning of “intrinsic worth” is not provided in the legislation, nor is it addressed in commentaries on the legislation, nor has it been considered by courts in the context of the Takutai Moana Act.
• The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) refers to “intrinsic values of ecosystems” in one of the sections containing the decision-making principles. Helpfully, the term is defined in the statute:
intrinsic values, in relation to ecosystems, means those aspects of ecosystems and their constituent parts which have value in their own right, including (a) their biological and genetic diversity; and (b) the essential characteristics that determine an ecosystem’s integrity, form, functioning, and resilience.
The RMA contains a hierarchy within its overall scheme to aid in its interpretation. The purpose of the Act, it says, “is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources” meaning management to enable “social, economic and cultural well-being” of people while sustaining the natural resources (excluding minerals) to meet the needs of future generations. A high level of protection goes to “matters of national importance” where the law at section 6 says decision-makers “shall recognize and provide for” the protection of the coastal areas, wetlands, lakes, rivers, outstanding natural features, and historic heritage specifically, protection “from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development.” A lower level of protection, in section 7(d), says decision-makers “shall have particular regard to . . . intrinsic values of ecosystems” as well as certain other goals of the Act. Thus, intrinsic values are not as fundamental to the definition of what is to be protected under the RMA as they are in the context of the Conservation Act.
9. Hawke’s Bay Regional Investment Co Ltd v. Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc (2017) 1 NZLR 1041 (N.Z.). In this judicial review, the conservation status of land was unable to be revoked for a dam, as it still had inherent conservation value. The minister’s (highly politically charged) decision to revoke that conservation status was quashed.
Several court cases have ruled on the application of “intrinsic values of ecosystems” in RMA section 7(d); they have generally found offsetting benefits to approve projects. In a coalmine dispute, the Environment Court of Aotearoa New Zealand found that “there is clearly an adverse effect on the proposal on significant habitats of indigenous fauna”10 but agreed to the applicant’s suggested mitigations and granted the mining consents. In litigation involving a plan to poison invasive pests in a wildlife sanctuary, the High Court said the plan “satisfies the RMA promotion of protection of natural resources and ecosystems with intrinsic value” because its ultimate aim was to protect the sanctuary. In a case concerning a solid waste landfill, the Environment Court ruled that 400 hectares of revegetation meant “that the intrinsic values of the ecosystems would at least be maintained and, in all probability, significantly enhanced as a result of the restoration project and conservation management area.”11 In a controversy involving a dam on the Waitaki River, the Environment Court agreed that “there will be a general adverse effect on the mauri” of the river,12 including the spiritual value of the river to the Māori, but concluded that the dam would provide a net benefit to the community for renewable energy generation.13
• The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) has a similar provision to the RMA where “the intrinsic value of ecosystems” is one of a list of six matters that decision-makers must “take into account.”14 This Act also contains the definition of “intrinsic values” adopted in the RMA.
Professional legal practice guides to this legislation suggest that interpretations of the equivalent “RMA provisions are likely to provide some guidance in interpreting these provisions of the HSNO Act.”15 In other words, the academic legal community expects the meaning of Nature’s intrinsic value will come to be understood as transcending specific laws.
• The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 is the final example of environmental legislation recognizing the intrinsic worth or value of Nature. The purpose of the Act states that it:
recognises, through the protection of public rights of access, navigation, and fishing, the importance of the common Marine and coastal area
i. for its intrinsic worth; and
ii. for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of the public of New Zealand.
The meaning of “intrinsic worth” again is not provided in the legislation, nor is it addressed in commentaries on the legislation. It has not been considered by courts in the context of the Takutai Moana Act.
10. West Coast Environmental Network Inc. v. West Coast Regional Council and Buller District Council (2013) NZEnvC 47 at 319, 324 (N.Z.).
11. Transwaste Canterbury Ltd v. Canterbury Regional Council, NZEnvC, Decision C29/2004 (22 Mar. 2004) at 266, 284 (N.Z.).
12. Lower Waitaki River Management Society Inc v. Canterbury Regional Council & Meridian Energy Ltd , NZEnvC, Decision C80/2009 (24 Sept. 2009) at 231 (N.Z.).
13. Id. at 558. It is noted that this judgment runs to 241 pages, with an additional 40 pages of Annexures. There are 560 paragraphs and more than 800 footnotes. The environmental issues are discussed in detail.
14. Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, § 6(b).
15. D. Randal, Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, Environmental and Resource Management Law Online, Lexisnexis, at 11.5 (Nov. 2019).
As with other settled countries around the world with surviving Indigenous Peoples, Māori have made legal and political claims to lands and resources that they have lost through settlement. Aotearoa New Zealand is widely regarded as being at the forefront of initiatives to recognize Indigenous rights and resolve such claims, including the co-management and co-governance of Aotearoa New Zealand’s land and resources with Māori.
Aotearoa New Zealand does not recognize any human right to a healthy environment, nor have existing human rights been extended to enable any remedies for violations through degraded environments. However, the recognition of Indigenous rights and the resolution of claims based on the land taken by the British from the Māori has led to the recognition of Indigenous environmental rights and responsibilities. Through the protection of Indigenous worldviews and Indigenous environmental management, this particular combination has entailed the adoption of measures for environmental protection that go beyond simple claims to rights to also implement complex notions of responsibility and guardianship on the part of individuals, communities, and the state. It is through this recognition and system for resolving the Indigenous Peoples’ grievances that the legislature has adopted the innovative use of legal personhood for natural features.
In Māori culture, natural and geographical features are viewed as ancestors.16 It is the responsibility of Māori today to act as guardians and care for their environmental ancestors, which will in turn protect and look after the people. The environment is believed to be inhabited by spirits, such that each environmental feature has its own spirit and life force; human actions must maintain this life force. Part of being ancestrally connected to Nature means that humans are not considered separate from or above it, and they cannot own it. What is important for the interplay between human rights and the environment is that they are intertwined: Human well-being exists in tandem with that of the nonhuman natural world, and each cares for the other.
Over the last 40 years, the ability of Māori to manage natural resources17 in a way that is consistent with their worldview has gradually been incorporated in Aotearoa New Zealand law through Treaty of Waitangi grievance settlements, judicial decisions, and domestic legislation, as well as through local, regional, and national policy.18 It is noteworthy that this approach covers publicly owned lands and resources, not just those currently owned by Māori, and that these developments have occurred within a western legal system. In particular, Māori cosmology, including the spiritual relationship with the environment, has become a required consideration in most environmental decision-making and has even been given “primacy” as a matter of national importance when balancing competing factors. 19 Decision-makers under the RMA are also required to pay particular regard to traditional Māori
16. For more detail, see Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Māori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the Cosmology That Protects the Environment, 21(2) Widener L. Rev. 273-327 (2015).
17. As with other chapters, “natural resources” is used here to describe the elements of Nature commonly used by humankind, although the editors of this book acknowledge the need to begin describing Nature beyond its economic utility to humans as a resource.
18. Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today 34 (1999).
19. Environmental Defence Society, Inc. v. Mangonui County Council (1989) 3 NZLR 257 (CA) (N.Z.).
kaitiakitanga (guardianship) or stewardship of natural resources.20 This started with court decisions upholding the importance of the Treaty and is now enshrined in the RMA.21
Māori relationships with the natural world have also been recognized and protected through grievance settlement agreements between the Aotearoa New Zealand government and Māori, and these are enshrined in legislation. Over the last 30 years, the government and claimants have devised a wide range of options to recognize and restore Māori Tribal spiritual, cultural, and traditional associations with the natural environment, as well as to recognize and restore Māori cultural authority. 22 They have included joint management of lands and resources between the government and Māori and Tribal ownership of natural sites of great cultural significance to the tribes, including the beds of rivers and lakes.23 The most significant of these measures has been the recent creation of separate legal personality for natural beings, with joint Tribal/government representation and guardianship of that being’s interests.24
Accordingly, legal personhood or personality to natural beings such as a river system, a mountain, and even broad areas of territory comprising ecosystems is increasingly used as a tool to accord rights to Nature and better implement human responsibility for it.25 Aotearoa New Zealand has legislatively accorded personhood to a 2,127-square-kilometer (821-square-mile) densely forested national park (Te Urewara); a 7,609-square-kilometer (2,938-square-mile) river catchment area (Te Awa Tupua); and a 342-square-kilometer (132-square-mile) national park featuring volcanic cones (Taranaki Mounga). The legislation does not explicitly recognize Rights of Nature in the sense rights are generally recognized in legal systems. It was not designed primarily to prevent or remedy environmental degradation. Rather, the legislation was designed to implement a Māori vision of human responsibility for and relationship with our natural environment and was done to better uphold Indigenous Peoples’ rights. While the legislation recognizes the intrinsic value of the environment i.e., in its own right it also recognizes that people are part of the environment and is intended to promote coexistence between people and all natural environments.
(1) Do references to intrinsic worth or intrinsic value represent the inclusion of a deep ecology approach, which treats human life as just one of many interrelated components, all essential in their own separate and collective ways, of a larger global ecosystem? Can it have any effect if it operates within and must be balanced against other more mainstream values? How would you explain intrinsic value to a court? How would it be different in a general sense than in the case of a particular client, for example, a river? How does the
20. Resource Management Act 1991, § 7.
21. Resource Management Act 1991, §§ 6-8.
22. See, e.g., Dean Cowie, The Treaty Settlement Process, in Treaty of Waitangi Settlements 48, 61 (J. Hayward & N. Wheen eds., 2012). However, the current conservative government that came into power in November 2023 has been accused of rolling back long-admired policy recognizing Māori rights and cultural identity, as well as addressing historical injustices. See, e.g., Yan Zhuang, New Zealand Veers Sharply Right, Leaving Jacinda Ardern’s Era Behind, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/18/world/asia/new-zealand-conservative-maori-protest. html.
23. See, e.g., The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998; Office of Treaty Settlements (2015), at 90-94 n.66.
24. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 and Te Urewera Act 2014. See also Iorns Magallanes, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., S. Ravi Rajan, Catherine Iorns Magallanes & Kirsten Davies, Identifying Human Rights and the Environment, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights and the Environment, 183, at nn.12-19 (James R. May & Erin Daly eds., 2019).
Resource Management Act 1991 delineate the range of matters that must be balanced by a decision-maker?
(2) How might the persuasive value of an argument based on intrinsic worth or intrinsic value be enhanced or diminished by the fact that they are mentioned as an overriding purpose and not elsewhere in the statute? How might a court instruct a jury on the weight to be given to intrinsic worth or intrinsic value? How might it be distinguished from extrinsic value?
(3) Does using Indigenous language terms import their different understanding of humans’ relationships with Nature more in line with Earth law or are they only as good as the judges interpreting the terms? The use of “kaitiakitanga” in the Resource Management Act will be considered and interpreted by decision-makers who are not Indigenous and might have little understanding of Indigenous cosmology. How might this be met? How would you avert a non-Indigenous interpretation based on the statutory wording that it is only needed to be paid regard to, rather than recognized and provided for by a decision-maker?
(4) How might the Aotearoa New Zealand example of upholding human rights Indigenous rights provide persuasive authority for the development of Earth law in a jurisdiction you are familiar with? What are the elements of the development of the Aotearoa New Zealand laws that might have comparable elements in your jurisdiction? How might a focus on human responsibility over rights be achieved in a jurisdiction in which you may practice?
Te Urewera National Park was created in the 1950s out of ancestral forest land confiscated from the Māori Tūhoe people.27 This occurrence was the subject of a grievance against the government, the settlement of which culminated in the Te Urewera Act 2014. 28 Key to this settlement was Tūhoe regaining control of the Te Urewera National Park and the ability to exercise its kaitiakitanga (guardianship) over Te Urewera, along with explicit acknowledgment of the metaphysical relationship of Tūhoe with their ancestral land.29 This was achieved through the creation of legal personhood for the park, whereby Te Urewera would obtain its own separate identity, along with the establishment of a legal guardian. What was a national park can now be governed independently, with significant Tūhoe input and in accordance with Tūhoe protocol and custom.
Under this agreement, Te Urewera is no longer a national park. It is its own legal entity, with “all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”30 This legal status permits Te Urewera to hold title to land (i.e., title to itself), which is managed by its guardian, the Te Urewera Board, that acts “on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera.”
26. This description of Te Urewera is adapted from Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Human Rights, Responsibility and Legal Personality for the Environment in Aotearoa New Zealand, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights and the Environment, 550, 554-555 (James R. May & Erin Daly eds., 2019).
27. Department of Conservation, Te Urewera National Park Management Plan 1 (2003). See also Ngai Tuhoe, Te Urewera (2015), http://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-urewera.
28. Tangata Whenua (2012), Historic Treaty Settlement for Tuhoe, Sept. 11, 2012, http://news.tangatawhenua .com/2012/09/historic-treaty-settlement-for-tuhoe/.
29. Te Urewera Act 2014, § 9(36).
30. Id. at § 11(1).
Board membership is a mix of Tūhoe trustees and government appointees. The Act grants the Board extensive powers and obligations, including the power to make by-laws and to grant activity permits within Te Urewera. Tūhoe spirituality is directly provided for in board decision-making. The principles governing the implementation of the Act focus primarily on aspects of environmental protection but are also protective of Indigenous relationships with the park and of public access for the benefit of all Aotearoa New Zealanders.
The board released its management plan for Te Urewera, Te Kawa o Te Urewera, in 2017 (“Te Kawa”). 31 This plan embodies a new vision of the rights and responsibilities between humans and the environment. The overriding purpose of Te Kawa is to delineate dignity and command respect for Nature, as well as to reaffirm the subordinate place of humans within it.32 It emphasizes duty and “responsibility . . . not power or rights” throughout the document. It expressly states: “[T]he Board through Te Kawa is disrupting the notion of our false superiority over the natural world . . . we are returning to our place in nature, as her child.”33
Subpart 1 Background, Purpose, and Principles
3. Background to this Act
Te Urewera
(1) Te Urewera is ancient and enduring, a fortress of nature, alive with history; its scenery is abundant with mystery, adventure, and remote beauty.
(2) Te Urewera is a place of spiritual value, with its own mana and mauri.
(3) Te Urewera has an identity in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.
Te Urewera and Tūhoe
(4) For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is Te Manawa o te Ika a Māui; it is the heart of the great fish of Māui, its name being derived from Murakareke, the son of the ancestor Tūhoe.
(5) For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is their ewe whenua, their place of origin and return, their homeland.
(6) Te Urewera expresses and gives meaning to Tūhoe culture, language, customs, and identity. There Tūhoe hold mana by ahikāroa; they are tangata whenua and kaitiaki of Te Urewera.
Te Urewera and all New Zealanders
(7) Te Urewera is prized by other iwi and hapū [subtribes] who have acknowledged special associations with, and customary interests in, parts of Te Urewera.
(8) Te Urewera is also prized by all New Zealanders as a place of outstanding national value and intrinsic worth; it is treasured by all for the distinctive natural values of its vast and rugged primeval forest, and for the integrity of those values; for its indigenous ecological systems and biodiversity, its historical and cultural heritage, its scientific importance, and as a place for outdoor recreation and spiritual reflection.
31. Te Kawa o Te Urewera: The Te Urewera Management Plan (2017), http://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz /Te-Kawa-o-Te-Urewera.
32. Id. at 15. 33. Id
Tūhoe and the Crown: Shared views and intentions
(9) Tūhoe and the Crown share the view that Te Urewera should have legal recognition in its own right, with the responsibilities for its care and conservation set out in the law of New Zealand. To this end, Tūhoe and the Crown have together taken a unique approach, as set out in this Act, to protecting Te Urewera in a way that reflects New Zealand’s culture and values.
(10) The Crown and Tūhoe intend this Act to contribute to resolving the grief of Tūhoe and to strengthening and maintaining the connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera.
4. Purpose of this Act
The purpose of Parts 5 to 7 is to establish and preserve in perpetuity a legal identity and protected status for Te Urewera for its intrinsic worth, its distinctive natural and cultural values, the integrity of those values, and for its national importance, and in particular to
(a) strengthen and maintain the connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera; and
(b) preserve as far as possible the natural features and beauty of Te Urewera, the integrity of its indigenous ecological systems and biodiversity, and its historical and cultural heritage; and
(c) provide for Te Urewera as a place for public use and enjoyment, for recreation, learning, and spiritual reflection, and as an inspiration for all.
Subpart 3: Legal Identity of Te Urewera and Vesting of Te Urewera Land
Legal entity
11. Te Urewera Declared to be Legal Entity
(1) Te Urewera is a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.
(2) However,
(a) the rights, powers, and duties of Te Urewera must be exercised and performed on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera
(i) by Te Urewera Board; and
(ii) in the manner provided for in this Act; and
(b) the liabilities are the responsibility of Te Urewera Board, except as provided for in section 96. . . .
Subpart 1 Te Urewera Board
Purposes, functions, and powers of Board
17. Purposes of Board
The purposes of the Board are
(a) to act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera; and (b) to provide governance for Te Urewera in accordance with this Act.
18. Functions of Board
(1) The functions of the Board are
(a) to prepare and approve Te Urewera management plan; and
(b) to advise the persons managing Te Urewera on the implementation of the management plan, including by means such as
(i) issuing an annual statement of priorities for implementing the management plan:
(ii) undertaking any specified functions in relation to the annual operational plan for Te Urewera:
(iii) monitoring the implementation of the annual operational plan; and (c) to initiate proposals and make recommendations for (i) adding land to, or removing land from, Te Urewera; and (ii) acquiring interests in land; and
(iii) establishing specially protected areas, wilderness areas, and amenity areas within Te Urewera; and
(d) to make bylaws for Te Urewera; and
(e) to authorise activities that must not otherwise be undertaken in Te Urewera without an authorisation under Part 2; and
(f) to prepare or commission reports, advice, or recommendations on matters relevant to the purposes of the Board; and
(g) to promote or advocate for the interests of Te Urewera in any statutory process or at any public forum; and
(h) to liaise with, advise, or seek advice from any agency, local authority, or other entity on matters relevant to the purposes of the Board; and
(i) to perform any other function of the Board specified in this Act or in any other enactment; and
(j) to take any other action that the Board considers to be relevant and appropriate in achieving its purposes.
(2) In performing its functions, the Board may consider and give expression to (a) Tūhoetanga: [cultural characteristics specific to the Tūhoe] (b) Tūhoe concepts of management such as (i) rāhui:
(ii) tapu me noa:
(iii) mana me mauri: (iv) tohu.
(3) In this section, in accordance with the understanding of Tūhoe, mana me mauri conveys a sense of the sensitive perception of a living and spiritual force in a place rāhui conveys the sense of the prohibition or limitation of a use for an appropriate reason
tapu means a state or condition that requires certain respectful human conduct, including raising awareness or knowledge of the spiritual qualities requiring respect tapu me noa conveys, in tapu, the concept of sanctity, a state that requires respectful human behaviour in a place; and in noa, the sense that when the tapu is lifted from the place, the place returns to a normal state tohu connotes the metaphysical or symbolic depiction of things. . . .
(1) The Board must consider and provide appropriately for the relationship of iwi and hapū and their culture and traditions with Te Urewera when making decisions, including (a) the approval of Te Urewera management plan; and
(b) the adoption of the Board’s annual statement of priorities; and
(c) the acceptance of the annual operational plan; and
(d) the making of a recommendation to add land to Te Urewera or remove land from Te Urewera; and
(e) the making of a recommendation to establish a specially protected area, a wilderness area, or an amenity area; and
(f) the grant of an activity permit or a concession in Te Urewera; and (g) the imposition of controls on access to parts of Te Urewera; and (h) the making of bylaws.
(2) The purpose of subsection (1) is to recognise and reflect
(a) Tūhoetanga; and
(b) the Crown’s responsibility under the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). . . .
[Subpart 2 orders the creation of a Te Urewera Management Plan, including its preparation, approval, purpose, and scope. See below for excerpts and discussion of the plan that was created.]
. . .
Subpart 4 Authorisation of Certain Activities in Te Urewera Activity permits
58. Activities Requiring Activity Permit
The following activities must not be undertaken in Te Urewera unless they are authorised by an activity permit issued by the Board:
(a) taking, cutting, or destroying any plant, whether indigenous or exotic:
(b) disturbing, trapping, taking, hunting, or killing any animal, whether indigenous or exotic (other than sports fish):
(c) possessing dead protected wildlife for any cultural or other purpose:
(d) entering specially protected areas:
(e) making a road or altering an existing road:
(f) establishing accommodation:
(g) farming:
(h) recreational hunting:
(i) any activity that would otherwise be an offence under this Act.
In relation to liabilities, section 96 of the Act provides that Te Urewera is not liable for local government land taxes, nor for levies to fund any rural fire district authorities, nor for contamination of any Te Urewera land if the contamination occurred before it became a legal person.
The first words that greet you in (the English version of) Te Kawa o Te Urewera (Te Kawa) are “Nature wills that there is no end to life,” in bold 72-point font. As such a beginning indicates, Te Kawa is like no other management plan. It was deliberately written to establish the principles to guide the decisions of the board and the setting of operational management plans under the legislation. As board Chairman Tamati Kruger said at the time:
34. Te Kawa o Te Urewera (English version), https://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera.
Te Kawa does not work the same way as other management plans, which focus on setting rules and stock-taking. . . . That traditional approach can frame nature as a set of discrete resources to be managed and used. Te Kawa is different. It asks us to stop and reflect on Te Urewera and what that means as a living system. A living system we depend on for survival, culture, recreation, and inspiration. Te Urewera has its own identity that is legal, but also physical, environmental, cultural and spiritual. . . .
Te Kawa sets out a vision for bringing all New Zealanders, including Tūhoe, into a closer relationship with Te Urewera, rather than setting out to manage the land itself. . . . Te Kawa o Te Urewera is not about short term thinking. Te Urewera does not work to annual plans, but over seasons and centuries.35
We now turn to the text of the management plan itself. As you read, consider how it differs from the types of management plans that you might typically expect from your own local, regional, or national jurisdictions.
Te Kawa is about the management of people for the benefit of the land it is not about land management.
It raises hope for a renewed collective responsibility for our [people’s] impact on the land and foresees our disciplined response to those impacts.
Together, we invite an inter-generational outlook to introduce new practice for principled based responsibility and management to meet our admiration and respect for Te Urewera. . . .
Te Kawa is not intended to operate in the same way as a usual management plan which focuses on rules. Rather, Te Kawa records principles as law, and traditions and beliefs as the sense of a better future. As in life, virtues shape our responsibilities and choices guiding Te Urewera Board decisions on appropriate and responsible activities in Te Urewera. The application of these will also develop over time in the form of operational plans, activities and use terms, and other wide-ranging areas. . . .
People need nature, land and waters for life, purpose and humanity. Nature enjoys people for their aspiration, endeavour and friendship. Te Kawa then describes the interrelationship between people and Te Urewera for a just life. An interplay that acknowledges our place and describes our renewed respect and intuition for the health and vitality of Te Urewera.
We know and we understand that nature is timeless, regenerative and operates by mauri and mana. Life’s purpose is realised when we understand that life flow, for it brings us order, shows us how to dispense justice and know fairness, letting us see how to serve as worthy people deserving of benefit and entitlement. Without nature’s principles alive in our relationships we too often suffer discord from irrelevant habits and cannot apply justice to achieve a natural balance. But, if we can share in these Te Urewera traditions and beliefs guiding our way to a responsible life, our ability as people to live with nature can be restored. And so that what we see in the world is that which we want to see in ourselves.
As tanata whenua [people of the land i.e. Tūhoe guardians] and manuhiri [visitors], we know that Te Urewera-Papatūānuku36 predates us and that we are of her creation living with
35. Te Kawa o Te Urewera Draft Released, Scoop, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK1705/S00487/te-kawa-ote-urewera-draft-released.htm.
36. Papatūānuku refers to “Mother Earth.”
and amongst all of her kin. As her children we are born with responsibility, we are not born with power and rights. The most difficult of virtues yet most important to accomplish is our sense of belonging, to know our place and contribution to creation.
In reaffirming this natural order the Board through Te Kawa is disrupting the notion of our false superiority over the natural world. In all decisiveness, we are returning to our place in nature, as her child.
• Papatūānuku: Landscape
Balance: Nothing in the natural world is equal; nature itself operates on the basis of diversity. A human view of devastation can be for Te Urewera a process of recycling and regeneration. Nothing in nature is wasted; everything happens for a reason. Te Urewera has a scale beyond our perception in which to balance and order life.
• Mauri: Life
Mauri: A life force requiring generosity each to the other. This generosity opens the soul to want connection and collective benefit. To see the relationship between past and future, species and race, birth and death, individual and community, dreaming and science and through managing self-interest, see the common threads of all creations to realise true purpose through which to bring prosperity to life.
• Tapu: Wai
Resilience: Wai [water] is comprehensively hard and soft, serene and insurgent[;] she nourishes all that have needs for life. Fairness brings the discipline necessary for collective progress, sharing life, easing the pressure on those that might otherwise struggle, foreseeing and adapting for future life needs and standards as easily as creating new water courses.
• Ahua: Character
Nakau iti: Futures grow from selflessness and sacrifice today. Nature thus humanizes interest and inspirit each other not through biological makeup but through values, personality and vibe. Our care for each other inspires us to live together for purpose. All things are bound together, everything is connected, so the need for strict discipline and high regard for reciprocity.
• Tatai: Heritage
Time: Our sense of time creates our past and future. Our memory for unity, hope and generosity urges our will to live together. This memory spurs us into the future, unlearning, relearning, learning anew so that we are always current adapting to be necessary and relevant to each time span we are granted.
• Whānau: Manuhiri and Tanata Whenua
Discipline: No creature should believe they belong only to themselves. Our values and virtues help guard against inherent human impulses to dominate one another; to balance ego and self-interest. When strong, our habits defend against these pressures and the wellbeing of the collective outweighs the good of individual.
When our laws and rules depart from Te Urewera principles and from our practice of that alive in our traditions and beliefs, they lose moral integrity and authority. They make no sense; they cannot be said to be fair or just.
The role of Te Urewera Board is to act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera. In doing so the Board must engage with and embrace the Te Urewera identity.
Te Urewera Act recognises that Te Urewera has its own identity, in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care. Through this identity, the Act makes evident the presence and distinct personality that is Te Urewera as well her creations of the natural world. The Act does not establish the Te Urewera identity rather it liberates it from human speculation in order that nature and the natural world return to its primal role, revered and served by those of her children to whom she has given life.
The use of property rights by the western legal system has hidden from view the concept of nature; rendered her parts as natural resources now capable of rival priorities competing with other household choices. These human granted rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku with ownership now serving individual advantage. These motives suppress the vision of Te Urewera as distinct life. Yet, property rights do not give life nor do they encourage the connectedness of all living things for life. In this altered relationship people struggle to unify to perceive the whole which is nature collectively. Needlessly our fracturing of nature has sponsored our own fragmentation. The use of property rights to regulate human disputes arising from human society is no longer permissible in and of Te Urewera. Te Urewera may never again be owned by people.
The National Parks Act was sympathetic to the voice of Te Urewera but also created a further dislocation between Te Urewera, its identity, and Tūhoe. By ignoring the presence and personality of Te Urewera, treating her as lands for the enjoyment of others, these mechanisms served to disorder the Te Urewera connection distorting the relationship between people, nature and identity.
The recognition of Te Urewera as a legal entity in Te Urewera Act redresses the Te Urewera identity. Te Urewera has primacy under the law, with the role of institutions, laws and people being to embrace, respect, and act in the interests of Te Urewera.
Now, Te Kawa seeks to start the journey of understanding and articulating the Te Urewera identity. That requires an understanding of traditions and beliefs, the role and place of people in Te Urewera, the concepts of tanata whenua and manuhiri, and the relationship between Tūhoe and Te Urewera. . . .
We recognise that Te Urewera, which includes the well-being and the experiences of the people that make her their home or a place to visit, is also influenced by activities that happen outside of her borders. Global warming, pest infestation, water and air quality, attitudes and aspirations of people all have the potential to adversely impact Te Urewera’s living system. These problems are our problems; we have a stake in resolving them. Leaving such neglect and abuse for the next generation will not reflect honourably on any of us. Our investment in these issues today will count; they are relevant factors for our impact accounting.
If we believe that the permanency of the land is a precondition for our life, then as we invite the return of nature into our homes and relationships we will relearn her needs and
through that our limits. Reciprocity and mutual respect are key elements of Te Kawa the more selfless the interaction with Te Urewera, be they transient or generational, the richer the engagement and our security for enduring life.
The aspiration is that in 20 years’ time Te Urewera, Tūhoe and her Manuhiri who choose a relationship connection with Te Urewera will be supporting a local, national and global effort of living with the land, admiring the living system of nature and making us whole. . . . . . .
The potential of responsible innovation to improve the efficacy of operations and experiences within Te Urewera is embraced. New ideas are encouraged, approaches and technologies consistent with Te Urewera values welcomed, forever mindful of the potential risks and unintended consequences associated with unchecked innovations. . . .
Connection to and opportunity within this considers ideas such as:
• The potential for innovations and technologies around all aspects of delivering on Te Urewera priorities e.g. pest control, smart/sensing living systems.
• Manuhiri relationship and experience systems to inform planning decisions more efficiently to bring targeted development and manage and deliver better experiences for people.
• Openness to exploring new and better ways of doing things. Te Urewera has potential to benchmark the safe, responsible and robust testing of new ideas, technologies and other innovations consistent with Te Kawa principles.
For appropriate commercial-type activities and large scale activities, more formal relationship will be required. The Board may grant a concession now referred to as a Friendship Agreement in the form of a lease, license, permit or easement, but only where the activity is not inconsistent with Te Kawa.
Friendship Agreements replace the previous concessions regime applied by the Department of Conservation. Associated processes for approving, monitoring and adapting these will have similarities to the previous concessions regime, but will be designed to achieve new and broader standards of integrity for our impact uses on the living system of Te Urewera.
A Te Urewera Friendship Agreement admits that opportunities are afforded only where we can demonstrate loyal affection to Te Urewera values and her need to continue her complex balancing act amongst her living system. The collaboration needed by holders of Friendship Agreements will enact and instill robust examples of the principles required of all interactions with Te Urewera. Their design will ensure the mauri of Te Urewera is not diminished through external pressures, considerations or expectations.
Introducing a Friendship Agreement brings opportunity for those seeking a livelihood within Te Urewera, or to undertake an activity of scale or with a non-trivial impact. The Board in applying the terms of [section] 62 and schedule 3 of Te Urewera Act will only do so in a way that is consistent with Te Kawa;
(a) Explicitly considers how such an activity contributes to achieving the (i) purpose of Te Urewera Act; (ii) Te Urewera principles which are Te Kawa principles; (iii) Te Urewera Responsibilities and Prioritised Actions
(b) Clearly explains how the activity effects the living system of Te Urewera;
(c) Clearly provides adequate or reasonable methods of remedying, avoiding or mitigating the adverse effects on the living system of Te Urewera;
(d) Shares the benefits/risk on a sustainable basis between the parties, reflecting their respective contributions.
(e) Is enabling of Tūhoe participation, where they are or have the potential in the future to be best placed to own/manage an activity.
(f) Has positive obligations on parties granted an agreement to “use it, or lose it.”
The Board will apply a monitoring oversight at the whole of living system level, at an individual activity operator level and at the manuhiri or partner satisfaction level. Key elements of the monitoring will include establishing a “dashboard” to highlight how the living system of Te Urewera is adapting, what real impact particular activities or factors are having, and where the priorities are for future action.
• The resilience of the living system of Te Urewera;
• Productivity and use in Te Urewera;
• Economic opportunities and innovation within Te Urewera;
• Tūhoe leadership and infrastructure.
Providing for all who wish to have a deeper relationship with Te Urewera the opportunity to do so, through the facilitation of dialog and opportunity which will consider:
• Information provision on Te Urewera and Tūhoe practices, cultures, expectations etc. so that willing manuhiri [visitors] can educate themselves;
• Opportunities for manuhiri [visitors] to announce themselves either prior or at the time of their arrival to Tūhoe who can listen to their goals and help them plan and get the most out of their visit. This is expected to be an important channel for identifying parties who wish to have a positive exchange with Tūhoe and Te Urewera and services as a first step in building the networks and dialogs for this to happen;
• Specific initiatives Invitations for Tūhoe and manuhiri to participate in workshops and development programmes, e.g., a contribution to trapping pests, planting trees, restoring tracks;
• Information capture manuhiri provided with a range of mechanisms to provide a contribution to the caretaking of Te Urewera;
• Partnerships (and sponsorships) which through introducing and mobilising new and complementary capabilities that can in combination create new potential and opportunities.
Our need for new standard[s] and responsibility needs new guidance. Natural tensions exist from old and new practices, between the individual and the collective, between use and preservation, science and culture and science and people, these things are in desperate need of sound reconciliation effort. The use of new whanau [extended family], hapū [sub-tribe], tribal, stakeholder and community leadership supported by new instinct and technology needs time to be developed. Raising our compliance standards will also need disciplined innovation which the Board accepts as an important current priority.
In summary, the Te Urewera legislation elevates the legal status of a national park to a legal entity with all of the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person. It envisages a new
Section II Nature’s Rights and Personhood
relationship between humans and the environment based on a framework of rights and responsibilities. However, it is Te Kawa o Te Urewera the management plan made under it that redefines that relationship and creates a truly new beginning, where that relationship is in harmony with Earth law principles.
The vast Whanganui River catchment area has also been accorded legal personality by legislation and has been provided with legal guardians to represent and uphold its interests. The Whanganui River is the ancestral river of a number of Whanganui Iwi (Tribal groups). It is Aotearoa New Zealand’s longest navigable waterway at 290 kilometers (180 miles) in length running from Mount Tongariro to the Tasman Sea. From the 1800s, the government assumed ownership of the river and undertook riverbed works, gravel extraction, and water diversions for a hydroelectric power scheme, despite persistent opposition from Whanganui Iwi. Grievances over the river were the subject of petitions to Parliament, Royal Commission reports, Waitangi Tribunal claims, and numerous court cases between 1938 until 2010. An agreement in resolution of these grievances was enacted in the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017.
This Act recognizes the indivisible connection between the Whanganui Iwi and the Whanganui River, as well as the river’s metaphysical status as a living being:
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements.
In an effort to implement the Māori understanding of the river as a living whole, connected to the Whanganui Iwi but incapable of being “owned” in an absolute sense, the Act grants the Whanganui River independent legal personhood: “Te Awa Tupua is a legal person and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”
The river is defined broadly to include all of its tributaries, streams, and other natural watercourses within a catchment area of 761,100 hectares (almost 3 million acres). The river catchment area includes substantial private property and two urban areas. Part 1.7 to the Act (“Interpretation”) focuses on all natural water bodies within the catchment area:
Whanganui River and River, other than in relation to the matters provided for in subpart 5 of Part 2 and Schedule 5, mean
(a) the body of water known as the Whanganui River that flows continuously or intermittently from its headwaters to the mouth of the Whanganui River on the Tasman Sea and is located within the Whanganui River catchment; and
(b) all tributaries, streams, and other natural watercourses that flow continuously or intermittently into the body of water described in paragraph (a) and are located within the Whanganui River catchment; and
(c) all lakes and wetlands connected continuously or intermittently with the bodies of water referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) and all tributaries, streams, and other natural watercourses flowing into those lakes and wetlands; and
(d) the beds of the bodies of water described in paragraphs (a) to (c)
Title to the riverbeds of what was the Whanganui River and its tributaries is vested in the name of Te Awa Tupua. The riverbed is defined: bed, in relation to the Whanganui River,
37. This section is adapted from Iorns Magallanes, supra note 26, at 555-556.
(a) means the space of land that the waters of the Whanganui River cover at its fullest flow without overtopping its banks; and
(b) includes the subsoil, the plants attached to the bed, the space occupied by the water, and the airspace above the water.38
An omission worth noting is that the waters of the river catchment have been excluded from this legislation’s coverage. Whereas the Whanganui River itself is defined in the law to include its water, the title being vested in Te Awa Tupua only includes the riverbed. The river’s water is thus not part of the legal person nor its property. This is due to a government position that no one owns fresh water in Aotearoa New Zealand, and that the government manages it for the good of all under the RMA. The government refused to recognize potentially disruptive new ownership of water rights in the legislation, even by the natural entity itself. Despite this omission, the arrangements enacted in respect of Te Awa Tupua created a new beginning. The riverbed was historically vested in the Crown; now it is controlled by Te Awa Tupua. This principle among others created a new relationship between local and national government, the area’s residents, the river, and its guardians based on a new set of rights and responsibilities that are in line with Earth law principles.
The Act anticipates the development of Te Heke Ngahuru, a “Whole of River Strategy,” that addresses and advances the health and well-being of the Whanganui River. It also establishes Te Korotete o Te Awa Tupua, a “River Fund” of NZD $30 million that is designed to support the health and well-being of the river. Unlike Te Urewera, the Whanganui River was not a national park prior to being granted legal status. The environmental protection afforded to it under the Te Awa Tupua Act is thus greater than had previously been the case. Yet what is most important for the Whanganui Iwi is their understanding and belief that their health and well-being is dependent on the health and well-being of the river. It is expressed in their proverb, “Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au” (I am the river and the river is me).39
Importantly, the Act provides that guardians shall be appointed on behalf of the Whanganui River: two persons “of high standing,” one appointed by the Crown and one appointed collectively by all tribes with interests in the river. This office of guardianship, called Te Pou Tupua, must “promote and protect the health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua,” “act and speak on behalf of Te Awa Tupua,” and act “in its interests and consistently with Tupua te Kawa [intrinsic values of the river].” The office of Te Pou Tupua, acting as the human face of the river, embodies a co-governance arrangement, with both Māori and non-Māori members, and its powers enable stronger legal respect for the environment in line with Māori cosmology. 40 Other institutions were created under the guardianship to further protect the river, including an Advisory Council (Te Karewao) currently with three members and a collaborative mechanism called Te Heke Ngahuru ōpuka) of no more than 17 members.41
One of the first major tests of the collaborative approach within the Advisory Council (Te Karewao) proved its practical value. Through months of discourse, public hearings, and
38. Id. at § 2. 39. Id. at § 69(3).
40. Hannah Reynecke, The Braided River of Legal Personality: Power, Property and Sovereignty, 20 N.Z. J. Pub. & Int’l L. 191 (2022), https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/public-law/publications/nz-journal-of-public-and-international-law /previous-issues/volume-20-issue-1-2022/05-reynecke-pdf.
41. Te Kōpuka nā Te Awa Tupua, Ngā Tāngata Tiaki o Whanganui, https://www.ngatangatatiaki.co.nz/ourstory/ruruku-whakatupua/te-kopuka-na-te-awa-tupua/ (last visited June 18, 2025).
meetings, they were able to largely agree with local governments, landowners, and private business interests on plans to revitalize the port near the mouth of the Whanganui River.42
A study based on 30 interviews found the “collaboration and pluralism” in the advisory group was essential to a “paradigm shift” on the project. “Council officials interviewed by us expressed that they were excited about this new way of working, which they saw as very different to that of the RMA. The continuous consensus-seeking required adjustments from their business as usual. Broad and meaningful engagement adds time and costs to the initial phase a view echoed by the owner of the boatbuilding company but this mitigated the potential for conflict, cost and delay at later phases. One council official mentioned that it was the first major development consent in the region that had not been contested or appealed via judicial processes.”43
The study concluded: “The Whanganui model has the potential to be transformational, enabling a paradigm shift away from the RMA’s management model towards something that is both old and new. Furthermore, it is an Indigenous sharing model by virtue of the fact that through relationality, abundance, working together, putting the river first, and bringing a whole community in conversation with the river, the Whanganui model benefits us all.”44
The most recent example of Aotearoa New Zealand recognizing legal personhood for a major natural feature was enacted in 2025 and was modeled partly on the 2014 Te Urewera Act. Both affected national parks with preexisting protections as well as decades of controversy.
A unanimous agreement of Parliament and the Taranaki Māori permanently retired the colonial name Mount Egmont in favor of the Māori name Taranaki Mounga, renamed that national park Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki, and recognized the dormant volcano and surrounding peaks as an ancestral being named Te Kahui Tupua with co-governance by the Crown and Māori.
“Te Kāhui Tupua is a legal person and has all the rights, powers, duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of a legal person,” according to Subsection 18 of the Te Ture Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua 2025/Taranaki Mounga Collective Redress Act 2025.45 It was a nearly identical phrase as in earlier laws assigning personhood to Te Urewera forest and the Te Awa Tupua river basin, but adds the word “responsibilities,” a nod to specific responsibilities detailed in the transition period for Taranaki Mounga.
An eight-person board called Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi equally from Māori and the Conservation Ministry comprises “the human face and voice of Te Kāhui Tupua.”46 The Ministry retains certain powers and responsibilities; for example, it retains authority to approve the use of organisms to control plant or animal pests. However, under subsection 106 of the 2025 Act, it must consult Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and “have regard to its views.” (Identical language appears in the pest-control subsection 63 of the 2014 Te Urewera Act.) Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi has the specific responsibility to prepare a draft He Kawa Ora, or national park management plan.
Debbie Ngarewa-Packer, co-leader of Te Pāti Māori (the Māori party), noted in Parliament that the Act “doesn’t return ownership” but praised the outcome of negotiations. “Today we
42. M. Cribb, E. Macpherson & A. Borchgrevink, Beyond Legal Personhood for the Whanganui River: Collaboration and Pluralism in Implementing the Te Awa Tupua Act, Int’l J. of Human Rights 1-24 (2024), https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13642987.2024.2314532.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Natural and Built Environment Act 2025, § 5 (N.Z.), https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2025/0001/latest/whole.html#LMS899476.
46. Id., § 28.
affirm what we have always known our [mountain] is, and never was, a crown asset it is our [ancestor], the living, breathing embodiment of our identity . . . as Taranaki.”47
“The mountain has long been an honoured ancestor, a source of physical, cultural, and spiritual sustenance and a final resting place,” government negotiator Paul Goldsmith said upon final passage. He described the Act as redress for “immeasurable harm over many decades” since the Crown confiscated 1.2 million acres of Taranaki land in 1865. “Traditional Māori practices associated with the mountains were banned, while tourism was promoted.” At the same time, Goldsmith emphasized that access to the mountain would not change.48
Chief negotiator for Taranaki Mounga, Jamie Tuuta, said, “When we think about the concept of personhood, what we are doing is putting in place a very Māori Indigenous concept into western law. . . . When we view them as being ancestors . . . what we ultimately look to do is to see behaviour change.”49
How it plays out remains to be seen. Recreation clubs with lodge concessions, for instance, were concerned they could lose some of their access, but were assured by the Māori Affairs Committee that under subsection 103 of the Act, referencing Schedule 4, “Decisions on applications relating to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki” would be renewed by the Minister of Conservation as long as they were consistent with He Kawa Ora. “Renewal applications that were not consistent with He Kawa Ora would be subject to the joint decision-making process involving the Minister and Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi. They would be considered as an application for a new concession or authorisation.”50
The committee wrote, “We are encouraged by the interactions we saw between clubs and iwi leaders on the day of our hearings in New Plymouth. We were pleased that iwi representatives expressed willingness to develop relationships with the local clubs. We would encourage clubs to reach out to Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi (once it is established) to build their relationship.”51
Aotearoa New Zealand is a modern, western democracy with values and culture familiar to other English-speaking western democracies. In that sense, the adoption of statements of intrinsic value and personhood for Nature were subject to the political and policy considerations that might arise in other such countries. It is thus instructive to consider the choices made in their legislative incorporation, as well as in their ongoing application by courts, and to consider opportunities to rely on Aotearoa New Zealand lawmaking to develop Earth law in other countries.
Aotearoa New Zealand’s recognition of Indigenous environmental rights and responsibilities has been more extensive and effective than in other countries that share the English language and western culture. Consider, for example, the efforts in the United States promoted by CELDF, as discussed in Chapter 4, “Rights of Nature in the United States.” The protection of Indigenous worldviews and Indigenous environmental management through statute notably the adoption of responsibility, guardianship, and legal personhood is
47. Eva Corlett, Taranaki Mounga: New Zealand Mountain Granted Same Legal Rights as a Person, The Guardian (Jan. 30, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/30/taranaki-mounga-new-zealands-second -highest-mountain-granted-same-legal-rights-as-a-person.
48. Parliament speeches, Te Pire Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Bill T hird Reading, Jan. 30, 2025, https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/ HansDeb_20250130_20250130_36.
49. Corlett, supra note 47.
50. Māori Affairs Committee commentary, Status and involvement of recreational clubs, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2023/0293/latest/whole.html.
51. Id.
innovative. The Aotearoa New Zealand experience in drafting legislation will provide both perspective and persuasive authority for practitioners of Earth law in other countries.
As with all legislation, the value of the Aotearoa New Zealand laws will depend on the statutory wording and the legislative history, which provide the parameters for what judicial and administrative decision-makers can do. Courts will determine the breadth of such parameters as they consider and construe their meanings. In considering the study questions below, focus on these parameters as you identify and argue their interpretation and application. The experience under statutes such as the RMA show that interpretations of the provisions implementing Māori culture and values are argued as thoroughly in courts as any other statutory provisions that are challenged on the basis of the meaning and application of the words. The specific wording must be the subject of careful attention.
Te Kawa is not itself legislation. It was adopted pursuant to the powers and guidelines within the statutory framework. It illustrates a new vision of the rights and responsibilities between humans and the environment, in line with Earth laws. The overriding dignity and respect for Nature, along with the place of humans within it, and its emphasis on duty and responsibility rather than power or rights, provides an innovative opportunity for land management. Te Kawa illustrates what can be done to challenge “the notion of our false superiority over the natural world” and return us “to our place in nature, as her child.”52
The study of Earth law in its many emergent forms enables us to explicitly identify and draft ecocentric legislation, to recognize whether it is being used as intended and effectively, and to take action to uphold and extend its application. These examples from Aotearoa New Zealand expand our conception of what is possible.
(1) In the context of legal personality discussed in section 2.1 of the Te Kawa extracts, how do property rights encourage fragmentation and discourage connectedness of Nature and living things in it? What might dispute resolution within human society look like if it did not use property rights to resolve disputes?
(2) When natural beings like parks and rivers are legal entities and have “all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person,” what are the strengths and weaknesses of arguments based separately on (1) rights, (2) powers, (3) duties, and (4) liabilities? Why do you think the Aotearoa New Zealand legislation identifies all four?
(3) Identify three key features of Aotearoa New Zealand’s history and its legal framework that have enabled this nation to make the substantial progress seen in legal personhood and protections in three separate situations: for a national park in 2014, a river in 2017, and another park and mountain range in 2025. What is different about Aotearoa New Zealand compared with other countries that have attempted to award such legal personhood to protect Nature? How are the key features you have identified transferable to other nations, and how are they not?
(4) What benefit can the A otearoa New Zealand legislation that accords personality to Nature provide by way of a precedent for Earth laws in other countries? Consider this commentary on the laws examined in this chapter:
52. Te Kawa, supra note 31, at 15.
These examples provide an excellent illustration of the interconnection between environment and human rights. Upholding Māori Indigenous rights to land, resources and culture has resulted in a new way to not only protect the environment but to reconceive our relationship with the environment, upholding human rights better in the process, as a virtuous circle. In respect of the legal personhood model in particular, the granting of legal personhood to a geographical feature represents a momentous shift from an external ownership model, which prioritises the uses that humans derive from a resource, to an Indigenous self-ownership model, which requires no human justification for environmental protection. While intimately connected with human rights, this is a very different vision of legal subjects and objects, and of rights and duties, from that which human rights law traditionally upholds. The notion of responsibility in these examples is used in contrast to the notion of rights, and these examples adopt a communal focus, rejecting individualistic notions of rights.53
53. Iorns Magallanes, supra note 26, at 556-557.
In response to a long history of pollution, particularly of its water bodies, the Peruvian legal system has begun to entertain an ecocentric approach, including application of the Rights of Nature. This section explores Peru’s seminal case concerning the rights of the Marañón River.
In September 2021, a federation of Indigenous women filed a lawsuit against several government entities and Peru’s state oil company, Petroperú, concerning the multidecade record of oil spills into the Marañón River and its tributaries. The plaintiff organization expressly requested as a remedy that the court recognize the Marañón River as a legal subject of rights.
In March 2024, the Mixed Court of Nauta declared that the Marañón River is a rightsholder with enumerated rights. The court ordered government parties to establish a management institution that gives Indigenous institutions a participatory role and declared that several national and regional government entities, in addition to Indigenous organizations, have the responsibility to serve as guardians, defenders, and representatives of the Marañón River and its tributaries. On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice of Loreto largely upheld the Mixed Court’s rulings.
This section also examines the larger context in which the Marañón River judgment emerged, portraying the rapid development of normative support for Rights of Nature in Peru. That context includes local ordinances recognizing the rights of water bodies, legislative initiatives, and a subsequent case that recognized the rights of an individual fox. The Marañón River decision also illustrates a cross-border legal dialogue that shaped Peruvian advocates, legislators, and ultimately, the courts’ constitutional interpretative approach to recognize Nature’s rights.
In Peru’s judiciary, the Supreme Court of Justice is the highest court, and it hears appeals from the Superior Court and, in select instances, cases of first impression directly.77 There is a Superior Court in each of Peru’s 25 judicial districts that hears criminal cases and appeals from decisions of the specialized courts (specializing in one area of law) and mixed courts (typically found in areas with less litigation, handling a broad range of legal matters). Peru has a separate court system for constitutional matters. The Constitutional Court is authorized to review constitutional questions on appeal and to issue writs declaring a law, regulation, or public institution’s conduct unconstitutional. In addition to reviewing constitutional questions on appeal, the Constitutional Tribunal may issue writs declaring a law or regulation unconstitutional or affirming that a public institution’s conduct exceeds its constitutional mandate.
Peru is a civil law country in which the lower courts have first-instance jurisdiction over constitutional matters but must apply the constitutional interpretations of the Constitutional Tribunal78 as binding precedent. 79 The 1993 Constitution established a unicameral legislature,80 with 25 regions that are subordinated to the central government.81 Peru will, however,
77. Peru, Judiciaries Worldwide, https://judiciariesworldwide.fjc.gov/country-profile/peru (last visited June 9, 2025).
78. The court may be referred to as either the Constitutional Tribunal or the Constitutional Court; this chapter refers to it as the Constitutional Tribunal.
79. Ley No. 31307, Nuevo Código Procesal Constitucional, El Peruano 23 Jul. 2021, Preliminary Title, art. 7 (Peru).
80. Constitución Política de Perú 1993, art. 90.
81. Juan-Andrés Fuentes, Peruvian Legal Research, Harvard Law School Library, https://guides.library.harvard.edu/law/peru (last updated May 28, 2025).
return to a bicameral system in the 2026 national elections following the legislature’s passage of a constitutional reform in 2024, despite overwhelming public opposition in a 2018 referendum.82 Peru’s political territory is divided into regions, departments, provinces, and districts.83 Provincial and district municipalities retain political, economic, and administrative autonomy in circumscribed areas.84
The Constitution, and international human rights treaties to which Peru is a party, rank above all other sources of law in Peru’s hierarchy of laws. 85 Like Colombia, Peru ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Under Article 68(1) of the American Convention, Peru is obligated to comply with the Court’s judgments. Peru’s Constitution establishes the amparo action as a tool of recourse to challenge violations of constitutional rights.86 The amparo is a judicial mechanism of last resort to prevent or remedy infringements on legal rights, which functions similarly to the Colombian legal mechanism for protecting fundamental rights, the tutela. Human rights treaties shape the content of constitutional rights. Peru’s New Constitutional Procedural Code, which regulates amparo lawsuits, provided at the time of the Marañón River judgment that “[t]he content and scope of the constitutional rights protected by [amparo] processes must be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights treaties, as well as with the decisions adopted by international human rights courts constituted according to treaties to which Peru is a party.”87
Before the Marañón River case, there were several initiatives to advance legal recognition of the Rights of Nature, yielding mixed results:
• Two lawsuits one challenging the Chadín 2 Hydroelectric Power Project (2018), in which the Rights of Nature claim did not succeed,88 and a youth climate lawsuit, Álvarez et al. v. Peru (2019), which is still pending89;
82. Perú Retorna al Sistema Bicameral Después de Tres Décadas, Deutsche Welle (Mar. 21, 2024), https://www. dw.com/es/per%C3%BA-retorna-al-sistema-bicameral-despu%C3%A9s-de-tres-d%C3%A9cadas/a-68628561.
83. Constitución Política de Perú 1993, art. 189.
84. Id., art. 194.
85. Peruvian Legal Research
86. Constitución Política de Perú 1993, art. 200.2.
87. Nuevo Código Procesal Constitucional, art. 8. (translated). This component of the Nuevo Código Procesal Constitucional (New Constitutional Procedural Code) was revised in November 2024, after the Marañón River judgment. Ley No. 32153, Ley que Modifica la Ley 31307, Nuevo Código Procesal Constitucional, con la Finalidad de Fortalecer los Fines de Los Procesos Constitucionales, El Peruano 5 Nov. 2024.
88. The Instituto de Defensa Legal and Earth Rights International filed a constitutional amparo action on behalf of local environmental defenders, in the Mixed Court of Celendín Cajamarca region. Chadín 2 Hydroelectric Power Project, Earthrights International, https://earthrights.org/case/chadin-2-hydroelectric-power-plant/. As part of their request for remedies, the plaintiffs sought recognition of the rights of the Marañón River but that claim was not a core focus of the litigation. Communication from Rosa Luz Arista Zerga, June 27, 2025. The Mixed Court of Celendín deemed this claim to be inadmissible, expressing that it is the legislative and executive branches that have the power to create new rights, that courts cannot recognize new rights in amparo actions, and, implicitly, that Rights of Nature did not presently exist in Peru’s legal system. Corte Superior de Justicia Cajamarca, Juzgado Mixto de Celendín [Mixed Court], junio 23, 2023, J. Javier Chavéz Ramírez, Sentencia Resolución No. 24 (Peru).
89. Seven Peruvian youth filed an amparo environmental protection claim in the Superior Court of Lima, challenging the adequacy of the Peruvian government’s climate change policies and requesting that the court order Peruvian government entities to set policies for net-zero deforestation by 2025. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Álvarez et al. v. Peru, Climate Change Litigation Databases (last visited July 15, 2025), https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/alvarez-etal-v-peru/. In April 2025, the Superior Court of Lima determined that the case could proceed to a full merits analysis. Id. The case is noteworthy here because the plaintiffs asked the court to “[recognize] the Peruvian Amazon[] . . . as an entity subject to the rights of protection, conservation, maintenance[,] and restoration.” Compl. ¶I.5.d.
Chapter 8 Nature’s Rights in Colombia and Peru: An Emerging Jurisprudence 203
• Three municipal ordinances, passed in 2019 in Peru’s southern Puno Region, 90 established as legal subjects either all water bodies, or individually named water bodies, within their political boundaries: in the Provincial Municipality of Melgar,91 the District Municipality of Ocuviri (Lampa Province),92 and the District Municipality of Orurillo (Melgar Province)93;
• Six congressional legislative initiatives that have not been passed into law. The first legislative proposal, 6957/2020-CR, was the fruit of a decade-long campaign by Indigenous women for the recognition of Rights of Nature, and two latter initiatives, 2226/2021 and 6638/2023, reintroduced 6957/2020-CR with largely minor revisions. Two legislative proposals, 8097/2020-CR and 3803/2022-CR, sought constitutional reforms. The former proposed a constitutional amendment to recognize the Amazon rivers as subjects of law and as rightsholders. The latter sought a constitutional referendum for multiple policy objectives, including to develop an ecocentric constitution that recognizes the Rights of Nature. Finally, a civil society coalition, in collaboration with Indigenous stakeholders, secured Congressional consideration of Ley No. 04994/2022-CR, which would establish an ecocentric legal framework governing the protection of stingless bees.94
A diverse array of political and civil society groups, including Indigenous women, were at the vanguard of the movement for Rights of Nature in Peru, and advocates found receptive legislative champions in various political parties and congressional coalitions. Each set of initiatives is part of a broader dialogue and movement for legal reform: The Melgar and Orurillo municipal ordinances informed successive ordinances and provided normative support for legislative proposals; political parties and coalitions have platformed Rights of Nature within their legislative and constitutional reform agendas; and the lawsuits advance a consistent legal
90. Ordinances are the primary law-making policy tool available to regional and local governments. OECD, Regulatory Policy in Peru: Assembling the Framework for Regulatory Quality, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform , OECD 151 (Report, July 29, 2016, Paris), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264260054-en. The Puno Region is comprised almost entirely of Quechua and Aymara peoples (57.0 percent and 33.7 percent, respectively, with 5.5 percent more identifying as mixed heritage). Ordenanza Municipal No. 006-2019-MDO/A de la Municipalidad Distrital de Orurillo, Ordenanza que Aprueba el Reconocimiento de La Madre Agua - La Yaku–Unu Mama como un Ser Viviente Sujeto de Derechos, Dentro de la Juridicción [Sic] de la Municipalidad Distrital de Orurillo, 26 Dec. 2019 (Peru), https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Peru_Orurillo_Municipal-Ordinance-recognizingWater-as-a-subject-of-rights_379.pdf (citation omitted) [hereinafter Ordenanza Municipal No. 006-2019-MDO/A].
91. The Melgar Provincial Municipality recognized the Llallimayo River Basin as a subject of law. Ordenanza Provincial No. 118-2019-CM-MPM/A de la Municipalidad Provincial de Melgar, Ordenanza que Reconoce a la Cuenca del Rio Llallimayo como Sujeto de Derecho, con el Fin de Institucionalizar y Generar los Mecanismos y Estrategias Municipales que Garanticen la Conservación y Gestión Sostenible en Beneficio de la Población y de los Ecosistemas, 23 Sept. 2019 (Peru), https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Peru_Melgar_ Municipal-Ordinance-recognizing-the-Llallimayo-River-basin-as-a-subject-of-rights_380.pdf.
92. The District Municipality of Ocuviri recognized Mother Water Yaku-Unu Mama and, by extension, all water bodies in the municipality as living entities and a subjects of rights. Ordenanza Municipal No. 05-2021-MDO/A de la Municipalidad Distrital de Ocuviri, Ordenanza que Aprueba el Reconocimiento de La Madre Agua–La Yaku–Unu Mama como un Ser Viviente Sujeto de Derechos, Dentro de la Juridicción [Sic] de la Municipalidad Distrital de Ocuviri, 31 Aug. 2019 (Peru), https://pratec.org/pra/blog/2021/09/06/ puno-municipalidad-de-ocuviri-declara-las-aguas-del-distrito-como-sujetos-de-derecho/.
93. The District Municipality of Orurillo also recognized Yaku-Unu Mama as a living entity and subject of rights. Ordenanza Municipal No. 006-2019-MDO/A de la Municipalidad Distrital de Orurillo, 26 Dec. 2019 (Peru), http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload1066.pdf.
94. The initiative aims to protect stingless bees through a legislative declaration “that stingless bees and their ecosystems have an inherent right to exist.” Reforming Peru’s Bee Law, Amazon Research Internacional, https://www. amazonresearch.org/bee-law (last updated Nov. 2024). In March 2025, Peru’s Congress recognized all native stingless bees as national assets warranting protection, Ley No. 32235, Ley que Modifica la Ley 26305, Ley que Declara de Interés Nacional la Apicultura y la Actividad Agro-Industrial de los Productos Apícolas, El Peruano 9 Jan. 2025, but civil society continues to push for the passage of an ecocentric law for the protection of native bees.
Section II Nature’s Rights and Personhood
framework for achieving Rights of Nature through the judiciary, reflecting the influence of the Peruvian NGO Instituto de Defensa Legal (Legal Defense Institute) as legal counsel in Chadín 2, Alvarez v. Peru, and the Marañón River cases.
The Peruvian initiatives also reflect the influence of Colombia’s jurisprudence. In the Atrato case, the Constitutional Court explained that Nature’s rights confer on it the enjoyment of rights to “protection, conservation, maintenance,” and in that individual case “restoration.”95 Peruvian initiatives largely adopted the Colombian framework of Nature’s rights, with some Peruvian initiatives diverging only in the inclusion of “regeneration” in place of or in addition to “restoration.” Other legal and normative developments also exerted a strong influence on Peruvian initiatives, with Peruvian initiatives often referring expressly to the following legal and normative support:
• Article 2, clause 22 of Peru’s Constitution, which guarantees the right to a healthy environment.
• The right to a healthy environment established in Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), which Peru ratified in 1999.96
• The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence the 2017 Advisory Opinion 23/17 on the Environment and Human Rights (Advisory Opinion 23/17)97 and the 2020 Case of Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina98 which identify Rights of Nature as an implicit component of the human right to a healthy environment.99
• Domestic constitutional100 and international human rights treaty guarantees101 of Indigenous cultural rights. Biocultural rights an idea accorded meaningful weight in the Atrato decision connect Indigenous rights governing their resources and culture, either by permitting or compelling government entities to give legal effect to Indigenous understandings of the relationship between the human and nonhuman world, and require Indigenous participation in corresponding governance mechanisms.
• The normative force of nearly a dozen foreign legal precedents, including Colombia’s jurisprudence, Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, and Bolivia’s 2010 legal reform, Law No. 071.
95. See the excerpts from the Atrato River judgment in Section I.C.1 of this chapter.
96. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), Nov. 17, 1988, OAS Treaty Series, No. 69.
97. The Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017).
98. Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400 (Feb. 6, 2020).
99. In a case brought against Peru concerning pollution from mining activities, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that Peru failed to adequately monitor mining activities, resulting in severe pollution and heavy metal poisoning in the La Oroya communities. Case of the Inhabitants of La Oroya v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 511 (Nov. 27, 2023). The La Oroya case did not concern Rights of Nature, but the Court reiterated its pronouncements from Advisory Opinion 23/17 and Our Land v. Argentina that the right to a healthy environment “protects the components of the environment[] . . . as legal interests in themselves.” Id., ¶118. The Court also discussed the interconnectedness of the rights of water bodies and the right to water, under the framework of the right to a healthy environment. Id., ¶124.
100. Specifically, initiatives cite Constitución Política de Perú 1993, art. 2.19, which guarantees the right to ethnic and cultural diversity.
101. Initiatives identify support in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO 169), and the general UN human rights framework.
Chapter 8 Nature’s Rights in Colombia and Peru: An Emerging Jurisprudence 205
Before the Marañón River judgment, the municipal ordinances were the sole legal achievements to recognize Rights of Nature. The legislative proposals, although numerous, all failed or stalled,102 and litigation had either stalled or failed to adequately address the question. The ordinances had a clear normative impact, but their legal impact appears, by their nature, to be limited, due to the joint powers that Congress has over the management and preservation of water bodies.103 There is an apparent lack of analysis or evidence connecting the ordinances to substantive policies implementing the rights of the enumerated water bodies.
Since the Mixed Court of Nauta published its judgment in the Marañón River case, new initiatives have emerged in Peru. Two legislative proposals were introduced: 08472/2023-CR (a bill to recognize Peru’s water bodies as legal subjects) and 10576/2024-CR (a bill to recognize Lake Titicaca as a legal subject).104 A third legislative initiative, 08744/2024-CR, a bill for the protection, recuperation, and conservation of Lake Moronacocha, is not expressly a Rights of Nature bill, but the legislative proposal adopts similar concepts and concludes that the Marañón River judgment compels the Congress to “approve laws to safeguard the elemental liquid in order to protect the subsistence of human life and health.”105
In April 2025, the Regional Council of Puno passed a regional ordinance recognizing Lake Titicaca as a subject of law.106 Lake Titicaca is of great importance to Indigenous Peoples and it has been subjected to significant long-term pollution. 107 The Lake Titicaca ordinance represents a substantive evolution from earlier ordinances. The ordinance declares Lake Titicaca and its tributaries a legal subject with the rights to be free from pollution and other detrimental activities, to existence and maintenance, regeneration, representation, and, critically, restoration.108 In an unprecedented step, the ordinance incorporated an express requirement that ecocentric approaches to protecting Lake Titicaca must be consistent with the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence.109
Finally, a second Rights of Nature case was decided shortly after the Marañón River case. The Third Constitutional Court of the Lima Superior Court of Justice extended legal rights to the Andean fox known as “Zorro Run Run.”110 “Run Run” was held in captivity as a pet
102. 6 957/2020-CR and its successors were approved by the Commission of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples, Environment and Ecology, but they never received a vote in Congress. 8097/2020-CR and 3803/2022-CR appear not to have made it out of commission.
103. See generally Regulatory Policy in Peru: Assembling the Framework for Regulatory Quality, Oecd Reviews of Regulatory Reform (discussing the powers of Peru’s various levels of government).
104. Proyecto de Ley No. 08472/2023-CR, Ley que Reconoce como Sujeto de Derecho a los Ríos, Lagos, Lagunas, Glaciares y el Mar del Perú, Garantizando su Existencia, Regeneración, y Evolución Natural, 24 July 2024 (Peru), available on Vlex (translated); Proyecto de Ley No. 10576/2024-CR, Ley que Reconoce al Lago Titicaca como Sujeto de Derecho para su Protección y Conservación, 19 Mar. 2025 (Peru), available on Vlex (translated).
105. Proyecto de Ley No. 08744/2024-CR, Ley de Protección, Recuperación y Conservación del Lago de Moronacocha del Distrito de Iquitos, Provincia de Maynas del Departamento de Loreto, 29 Aug. 2024 (Peru), available on Vlex (translated).
106. Ordenanza Regional No. 020-2025-GR.Puno/CRP/-BMU-AUVE del Gobierno Regional de Puno, Ordenanza que Declara al Lago Titicaca como Sujeto de Derecho, 14 Apr. 2025 (Peru), https://ecojurisprudence.org/ wp-content/uploads/2025/07/PunoPeru_RegionalOrdinanceforLakeTiticaca.pdf. The ordinance is pending publication, and the national government has contested the ordinance’s lawfulness by asserting that the intended policy invokes national, rather than regional, regulatory power.
107. Yvette Sierra Praeli, Gobierno Regional de Puno Declara al Lago Titicaca Sujeto de Derecho pero el Gobierno Central de Perú se Opone, Mongabay (May 20, 2025), https://es.mongabay.com/2025/05/puno-declaralago-titicaca-sujeto-de-derecho-peru/.
108. Ordenanza Regional No. 020-2025-GR.Puno/CRP/-BMU-AUVE, art. 2.
109. Id. art. 4.
110. Corte Superior de Justicia Lima, Tercer Juzgado Especializado en lo Constitucional [Lima Third Constitutional Court], junio 28, 2024, J. Javier Paredes Salas, Sentencia Resolución No. 11 (Peru) [hereinafter Run Run].
and later relocated to a zoo, which failed to reintroduce the fox into the wild. In an amparo action claiming the fox’s confinement violated constitutional protections for animal welfare, the Third Constitutional Court determined that the fox was a legal subject of rights and that the fox’s indefinite captivity violated its rights. In its judgment, the Lima Third Constitutional Court did not dialogue with, or even mention, the Marañón River case. The National Forest and Wildlife Service appealed the judgment, and the Superior Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration.111 The Superior Court based its reversal on narrow grounds: that the court of first instance grounded its decision in theory without “harmonizing” its decision with Peruvian law, and the court did not “evaluate the implications that this decision may generate in the legal system.”112 With regard to the Rights of Nature component of the decision, the Superior Court found that the lower court did not support its conclusion that individual animals “can be considered as subjects of law, since it is not enough to refer to a judgment issued by a constitutional court in the international context and simply declare that the law must move toward new ways of looking at animals.”113 The Superior Court, treating seriously the emergence of ecocentric legal approaches, declined to opine on whether a court can recognize rights for nonhuman living beings.114
In April 2024, the Mixed Court of Nauta recognized the Marañón River as a subject of rights.115 That constituted the first jurisprudential recognition of Nature’s rights in Peru, and followed the three Puno municipal ordinances in recognizing a river as a rightsholder. The Marañón River was accorded a broad and detailed list of rights, inclusive of the rights to protection, preservation, conservation, restoration, regeneration, and more.
Peru’s diverse ecosystems support thousands of species of flora and fauna and nine major rivers, two of which (Ucayali and Huallaga) are wholly within Peru’s borders.116 Peru contains a significant share of the Amazon River basin, second only to Brazil.117 Despite the vital role Peru’s waterways play in sustaining regional biodiversity, they are increasingly threatened by oil spills, infrastructure development, and illegal mining, reflecting a broader water pollution crisis.118 About 87.5 percent of Peru’s water bodies have concentrations of contaminants above legal limits, including the Marañón River basin and Lake Titicaca.119
The Marañón River stretches roughly 1,000 miles across Peru and forms a principal tributary of the Amazon River. The river supports a diverse array of species, including the endangered pink river dolphin and giant river otter, and is a fundamental cultural and natural
111. Corte Superior de Justicia Lima, Sala Superior [Superior Court of Justice], enero 9, 2025, J. Sandro O. Aguilar Gaitan, Expediente No. 04921-2021-0-1801-JR-DC-03 (Peru).
112. Id. at 15 (translated).
113. Id. at 12 (translated).
114. Id. at 12-13, 16.
115. Corte Superior de Justicia Loreto, Juzgado Mixto de Nauta [Mixed Court], marzo 8, 2024, A. Chapiama Corely, Sentencia Resolución No. 14 (Peru) [hereinafter Nauta Judgment].
116. Peru Country Profile, Convention on Biological Diversity (last visited June 8, 2025), https://www. cbd.int/countries/profile?country=pe.
117. The Amazon Basin: A Comprehensive Overview, Latin America & Caribbean Geographic (Aug. 14, 2024), https://lacgeo.com/amazon-basin.
118. Pedro Arrojo Agudo (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation), Visit to Peru: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, U.N. Doc A/HRC/54/32/Add.2 ¶¶7, 15 (July 26, 2023), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/54/32/Add.2.
119. Proyecto de Ley No. 08472/2023-CR, Ley que Reconoce como Sujeto de Derecho a los Ríos, Lagos, Lagunas, Glaciares y el Mar del Perú, Garantizando su Existencia, Regeneración, y Evolución Natural 3, 24 July 2024 (Peru), available on Vlex (translated).
Chapter 8 Nature’s Rights in Colombia and Peru: An Emerging Jurisprudence 207
resource of Indigenous communities along its shores, who depend on the river for commerce, food, and fresh water. In the rural Loreto Region, the Marañón River is a major source of drinking water.120
For decades, however, nearby mining projects and the Petroperú owned and operated Northern Peruvian Oil Pipeline, which encroaches on a significant portion of land surrounding the Marañón River, have contributed to dangerous levels of water pollution.121 Since the 1970s, when Peru began leasing oil concessions in the area and constructed the Northern Peruvian Oil Pipeline to move oil to the coast, the Marañón Basin has been plagued by oil spills; the Peruvian government has neglected to remediate many of those spills, compounding the crisis by leaving water bodies in a hazardous condition.122
In the past 50 years, Indigenous communities who live along the Marañón River and its tributaries have confronted a spike in health issues that they believe are the result of long-term, large-scale, and untreated pollution from oil activities.123 In one 22-year period, for example, the Peruvian government recorded more than 60 oil spills along the pipeline.124 Regarding the impact of contamination on river communities, studies found that residents had dangerously high concentrations of lead, mercury, arsenic, and cadmium, which are believed to be linked to the elevated rates of illness in those communities.125
The Kukama are an Indigenous People of the Peruvian Amazon who rely on the Marañón River as their sole source of drinking water and a critical resource for food, transportation, and recreation. The river also holds deep cultural significance. In Kukama cosmology, the Marañón River is a spiritually powerful entity believed to carry the spirits of lost or drowned relatives.126 The pollution crisis poses an existential threat to Kukama communities. Kukama women founded Federación Mujeres Huaynakana Kamatahuara Kana (HKK), an advocacy federation, including women in 29 Kukama communities, that empowers Kukama women to defend personal, collective, and territorial rights, and has led legal efforts to defend the Marañón River.127 The centrality of water to Peru’s Indigenous cultures and the urgent nature of the pollution crisis provide vital context to understand why Rights of Nature is flourishing as a legal strategy to protect Peru’s water ecosystems.
In 2021, following historic decisions that granted legal personhood to rivers in Colombia and Aotearoa New Zealand, Mari Luz Canaquiri Murayari, the president of HKK, filed an amparo action in the Loreto Superior Court of Justice. 128 The amparo action asserted that systematic oil spills affecting the Marañón River violated the fundamental constitutional and human rights of the surrounding communities and the river. The lawsuit named as defendants the state-run oil company, Petroperú, and national and subnational government bodies
120. Agudo, supra note 118, at ¶43.
121. For more information about the state of environmental degradation in the Marañón River, its tributaries, and the communities that depend on it and the responsibility of Petroperú see Directorial Resolution No. 8442015-OEFA/DFSAI, Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental (3 Nov. 2015), https://sinia.minam .gob.pe/sites/default/files/sinia/archivos/public/docs/res_044y084-oefa.pdf.
122. Carla Ruas, Indigenous Efforts to Save Peru’s Marañón River Could Spell Trouble for Big Oil, Mongabay (Apr. 17, 2024), https://news.mongabay.com/2024/04/indigenous-efforts-to-save-perus-maranon-river-could-spelltrouble-for-big-oil/.
123. Id.
124. Id. 125. Id. 126. Id.
127. The name is Kukama for “women who work.”
128. The Earth Law Center, International Rivers, and GARN (Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature) filed an amicus curiae brief concerning the rights of the Marañón River. Sentencia Judicial Confirma la Inviabilidad del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Chadín II: Un avance en la protección del río Marañón y sus comunidades.
responsible for management of water, mineral resources, and Indigenous policy. For remedies, the HKK sought recognition of the Marañón River and its tributaries as a rightsholder; the creation of environmental management structures for the river, with mechanisms for Indigenous communities’ participation; guardianship mechanisms for the Marañón River; and Petroperú’s adequate maintenance of the the Norperuvian Pipeline.
In March 2024, the Mixed Court of Nauta, as the court of first instance, granted the plaintiff all remedies except their final request, that Petroperú update its environmental management instrument for the Norperuvian Pipeline. A key component of the decision is the codification of a broad and detailed catalog of Nature’s rights: The Mixed Court recognized the Marañón River as a rightsholder, with the rights to flow and flow free from contamination, ensure and provide a healthy ecosystem, feed and be fed by its tributaries, biodiversity, restoration, the regeneration of its natural cycles, the conservation of its structure and ecological functions, protection, preservation, and recovery.129 While recognizing that the Marañón River enjoys substantive rights, the Mixed Court distinguished that the Marañón River is not a “subject of law,”130 which would imply that the river also has legal duties. In addition, the court ordered the creation of a Marañón River Basin Council with Indigenous participation. The Mixed Court recognized and appointed Indigenous organizations and national and regional government bodies as guardians, defenders, and representatives of the Marañón River and its tributaries.131
The Mixed Court largely followed the legal arguments that the plaintiff presented. The Mixed Court drew a connection between the human right to a healthy environment and Rights of Nature, finding the latter to be implicit in the former, and placing weight on Peru’s international human rights obligations and the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 132 The court considered that Peru’s human rights treaty obligations particularly the American Convention on Human Rights and the Protocol of San Salvador, and ILO 169 informed its analysis of the constitutional questions at hand, applying the control of conventionality doctrine and the principles for an amparo action established in the New Constitutional Procedural Code.133 Regarding ILO 169, the Mixed Court affirmed the principle that recognizing Nature’s rights, and establishing mechanisms for Indigenous Peoples to make decisions on behalf of Nature, vindicates the political and cultural rights of Indigenous Peoples.134 Further, the Mixed Court grounded its decision in constitutional jurisprudence. The Mixed Court agreed with the plaintiff’s interpretation of the Constitutional Tribunal decision in Case No. 03383-2021-PA/TC, finding that the Tribunal established, “[T]he Ecological Constitution of Peru also protects Nature, in accordance with the criteria of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the intrinsic value of Nature and the rights of Nature.”135
The defendants appealed the Mixed Court’s decision on various grounds. On October 18, 2024, the Civil Court of Loreto affirmed the Mixed Court’s judgment in full and additionally ordered Petroperú to provide “effective, immediate, and comprehensive” maintenance for the Norperuano Oil Pipeline.136
129. Nauta Judgment, Decision 3.1.
130. Id., Section Eleven.
131. Id., Decision 3.3.
132. Nauta Judgment, Sections Eight and Eleven. Compare with Complaint, Section IV.D.
133. Nauta Judgment, Sections Eight and Eleven.
134. Nauta Judgment, Section Twelve.
135. Id., Section Eight (translated).
136. Corte Superior de Justicia Loreto, sala civil agosto 29, 2024, Sentencia Resolución No. 14 (Peru).
Kamatahuara
v. Petroperú SA et al.
Mixed Court of Nauta – Loreto Superior Court of Justice Resolution (Judgment) Number 14
Nauta March 8, 2024 OPINION OF THE COURT137
Chapiama Corely, J.
[The judgment discusses the parties and their claims or defenses, the procedural posture, and the amicus curiae submissions.]
[The judgment then analyzes and decides the defenses that each defendant asserted, explains the process and purpose of an amparo action, reviews the sources of national and international law the plaintiff submitted, the defendants’ arguments, and then proceeds to analyze each of the plaintiff’s claims.]
1. Recognition of the Marañón River and its tributaries as subjects of rights by the court;
In view of all that the defendants have pointed out, that human beings are the central point and that nature cannot be the subject of rights; and to all that was manifested in the hearing by the lawyers and the Kukama women, that they are at risk and their subsistence threatened, by the constant oil spills, because they are consuming the waters of the Marañón River, they are found with heavy metals in their blood, they are currently sick and the authorities do nothing to solve the contamination of their water, which places their livelihood at constant risk.
Although Peru’s Political Constitution, and in general the Peruvian legal framework, has not adopted the legal paradigm of the Rights of Nature, nor has it explicitly recognized rivers as a subject of rights, there are various international instruments ratified by the State, as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court that allow complementing the traditional content of the right to a balanced environment, with the recognition of an Ecocentric dimension, and therefore, to consider the intrinsic value of natural entities in decision-making in an autonomous and fully justiciable manner.
The Constitutional Court has issued a substantive pronouncement in accordance with the interpretation that Nature deserves, carrying out a review of reasonableness on the scope of the constitutional precepts in force. In paragraphs 40 to 41 of the judgment in Case No. 03383-2021-PA/TC, the Constitutional Court recognizes that our ecological Constitution is not limited to protecting Nature and its elements only for human interests or needs, but that its biocentric and ecocentric scope must be considered, where the human being must coexist in balance and harmony with nature and recognize the importance of its elements. . . .
Conventionality control allows us to review decisions of the Inter-American Court that delve into the Ecocentric perspective since “the constitutional judiciary should focus itself not only on exercising only constitutionality control; but they find their obligation to exercise
137. This opinion was translated using an online AI translating service and reviewed by several editors; as of the time of this writing, there is no publicly available English translation. Citations and cross-references to other sections not reproduced here have been removed.
conventionality control, that is to say, the jurisdictional power of local judges and the supranational jurisdiction, which in our case is constituted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court), to resolve controversies arising from norms, acts and behaviors contrary to the American Convention on Human Rights, regional human rights treaties ratified by Peru, jus cogens and the jurisprudence of the IACHR Court.”
Thus, the right to a healthy environment has been recognized by the Inter-American Human Rights System through the joint interpretation of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights in relation to Article 11 of the Protocol of San Salvador. Both international instruments have been ratified and adopted by the Republic of Peru and are an integral part of the national legislation in force.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been clear in understanding that considering the intrinsic value of Nature is a dimension that must be considered in the interpretation and application of the right to a healthy environment, a right that has been recognized in the Political Constitution of the Republic of Peru in article 2 numeral 22.
The advisory opinion begins by reaffirming “the existence of an undeniable relationship between the protection of the environment and the realization of other human rights, insofar as environmental degradation and the adverse effects of climate change affect the effective enjoyment of human rights” . . . considering the fact that “a minimum environmental quality” is a “necessary” precondition for their exercise.
In addition, the Court is clear to point out:
“This Court considers it important to emphasize that the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right , unlike other rights, protects the components of the environment, such as forests, rivers, seas and others, as legal interests, even in the absence of certainty or evidence of risk to individual persons. It is a matter of protecting nature and the environment not only because of their connection with a utility for human beings or because of the effects that their degradation could cause on other rights of individuals, such as health, life or personal integrity, but also because of their importance for other living organisms with whom the planet is shared, also deserving of protection in themselves. In this sense, the Court notes a tendency to recognize legal personality and, therefore, rights to nature not only in court rulings but even in constitutional orders.”
[The court discusses the Convention on Biological Diversity’s recent Kunming Global Biodiversity Framework, which promotes “the integration of Nature’s values” and articulates the rights of Mother Earth.] These international frameworks call for reforming existing legal frameworks and interpretations of our regulations and advancing a paradigm shift.
An indispensable part of the implementation of the right to a balanced environment is the adoption of a precautionary orientation in the interpretation and decision-making in environmental matters. . . .
The General Environmental Law (Law No. 28611), in Article VII, recognizes the precautionary principle[.] . . . [The opinion continues by explaining how the precautionary principle is formulated and applied in Peru.]
Since the right to a healthy environment is an operative norm of public order and interest in our country, it is important to emphasize that there is no conflict between rights. The recognition of the intrinsic value of the right to a healthy environment has as its objective the health and harmonious coexistence of all natural elements and society.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights understands that the right to a healthy environment, in particular; and economic, social and cultural rights, in general; enjoy direct justiciability, stating that “the Court reiterates the interdependence and indivisibility existing between civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, since they must be understood
integrally and consolidated as human rights, without hierarchy among themselves and enforceable in all cases before those authorities that are competent to do so.”
Being in the fourth Final and Transitory Provision of the Political Constitution of Peru, it is established that the norms related to the rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution are interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the international treaties and agreements on the same matters ratified by Peru. Along the same lines, Article V of the Preliminary Title of the Constitutional Procedural Code states that the content and scope of the constitutional rights protected by the processes regulated in this Code must be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the treaties on human rights, as well as the decisions adopted by the international tribunals on human rights constituted according to treaties to which Peru is a party.
[Discussing the doctrine of conventionality control.] The constitutionalization of international human rights law is also enforceable by virtue of the “Conventionality Control” recognized in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in the case Almonacid Arellano v. Chile . . . . With regard to indigenous peoples, it is essential that the States grant effective protection that takes into account their own particularities, their economic and social characteristics, as well as their situation of special vulnerability, their customary law, values, uses, customs, and culture, which maintain a strong spiritual relationship with the ancestral territory that they have traditionally used and occupied. The rivers mean a source of subsistence for them; it is also a necessary source for the continuity of life and cultural identity of its Kukama members.
[The court continues its discussion of the cultural and life-giving importance of the Marañón River to the Kukama people.] The Marañón River and the environment that surrounds it provides the necessary environment for the human life of the indigenous peoples and mestizo [mixed heritage] population, being their subsistence . . . [and] for which, the natural resources [provide for the needs of the Peruvian population], but they must also guarantee the well-being of future generations; we are borrowing today what belongs to the youth and children and to the future generations that will be born in Peru, who must also have what is necessary for their well-being and subsistence. . . .
. . . It corresponds to this office to protect the right of the Marañón River and its tributaries as a holder of rights, and that the State must legally protect, for being an important part of the fundamental rights of every human being and our future generations to life, health represents one of our basic needs, being that, every human being that surrounds it, is protected to live in a healthy environment and human dignity is linked and determined significantly by the environment and the ecosystem intrinsically. Therefore, this claim must be declared founded, although the Marañón River cannot be determined as a subject of law, but it is up to this Jurisdictional body that the state recognizes the intrinsic value of the Marañón River and adopts a precautionary orientation in the protection, prevention and conservation of the Marañón River and its tributaries, as it is a primordial element for the functioning of the associated ecosystems and for the subsistence of the native communities and of all that surround it, as well as of our future generations[.] . . .
Twelfth: Second and Third Claims
2. Require the National Water Authority to establish the Marañón River Interregional Basin Council with the participation of Loreto’s indigenous organizations with decision-making capacity and the creation of sub-basin or micro-basin committees for each tributary river of the lower Marañón in the Loreto region.
3. Recognition and appointment of the State and indigenous organizations as guardians, defenders and representatives of the Marañón River and its tributaries.
. . . [I]t is incumbent upon this office to order the Regional Government of Loreto to take the necessary steps to establish the guidelines for the creation of the Water Resources Basin Councils in the Marañón River and its tributaries, to promote the commitment and participation of the institutions, including the participation of the indigenous organizations of Loreto, with decision-making capacity[.] . . . Two international instruments are particularly relevant to the recognition of the right to cultural identity of indigenous peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights considers that the right to cultural identity is a fundamental and collective right of indigenous communities, which must be respected in a multicultural and democratic society. This implicates the obligation of States to guarantee that indigenous peoples are duly consulted on matters that affect or may affect their cultural and social life, in accordance with their values, uses, customs and forms of organization. . . .
. . . Therefore, national and international instruments convey to this office the recognition and appointment of the State and indigenous organizations as guardians, defenders and representatives of the Marañón River and its tributaries. . . .
In view of the previously discussed considerations, in accordance with Article 2, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure, and taking into account the purposes of the Constitutional Process, the powers conferred by Articles 138 and 139, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Political Constitution of Peru and Article 1 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, administering justice on behalf of the Nation; Order:
3. Declare founded in part the amparo action claim filed by Ms. Mariluz Canaquiri Murayari, member of the Kukama indigenous people, of the native community of Shapajilla and President of the Huaynakana Kamatahuara Kana Federation, against the Regional Government of Loreto and its competent bodies, Petroperú, the Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Agrarian Development and Irrigation and the National Authority of Water [ANA, in Spanish]; consequently:
3.1. Declare the Marañón River and its Tributaries as Rights Holder; it has the right to flow, to secure a healthy ecosystem[;] the right to provide a healthy ecosystem[;] the right to flow free from any contamination; the right to feed and be fed by its tributaries[;] the right to biodiversity; the right to be restored[;] the right to the regeneration of its natural cycles; the right to the conservation of its structure and ecological functions; the right to protection, preservation and recovery; the rights to have representation and that the State must legally protect it, for being an important part of the fundamental rights of every human being and of our future generations for being life, health, and represents one of our basic needs, for our subsistence. Therefore, it must be represented.
3.2. Ordered that the Regional Government of Loreto[] take the necessary steps before the National Water Authority , in order to request the guidelines for the creation of the Water Resource Basin Councils for the Marañón River and its tributaries, under its jurisdiction, and promote the commitment and participation of the institutions, including the participation of the indigenous organizations of Loreto, with decision-making capacity.
3.3. Ordering the Recognition and Appointment of the State (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agrarian Development and Irrigation and the National Water Authority), Regional Government of Loreto and indigenous organizations as guardians, defenders and representatives of the Marañón River and its tributaries.
The parallels between the Colombian and Peruvian cases are considerable, starting with recognition of Nature’s rights as applied to a specific ecosystem and coming from the courts in response to alleged violations to environmental rights. They diverge in the level of the courts issuing the decisions, as well as in which rights they judged to have been violated. The material reality of the Atrato River Basin and the Colombian Amazon remains largely the same as before the rulings were issued, and implementation has fallen short of judicial aspiration. In the case of the Marañón River, too little time has passed since the ruling’s issuance, and measuring implementation status is not possible at this stage. After time, ongoing compliance with the rulings can be measured against their stated aims.
In both cases, however, political will might be measured against allocation of funding extractive activities continue to receive the lion’s share of state funding as compared to environmental protections that could, ostensibly, be allocated to upholding the rights of the named ecosystems.
One distinction is that in Peru, unlike in Colombia, the jurisprudence is still in its infancy. Colombia’s Constitutional Court decided the seminal Atrato River case, providing an authoritative pronouncement and laying the groundwork for future courts to follow. Peru’s highest courts have not yet been presented with such a case. The Marañón River case, having been resolved by the lower courts, is not assured of the same jurisprudential influence or even staying power in Peru. The milestone Run Run judgment was reversed, but in a manner that simply renewed the question of implementing Rights of Nature in Peru’s legal system. Finally, and although the Chadín 2 decision might not merit substantive consideration,138 the court did address and decide the Marañón River rights claim in the negative. Consequently, a Rights of Nature case before Peru’s Constitutional Court will be a critical next step: A favorable decision would provide valuable jurisprudential certainty, elevate the normative weight of Peru’s jurisprudence on the international plane, and it can, as in Colombia, shape and inspire the proliferation of litigation.
Another recent development could affect the trajectory of Peru’s jurisprudence. Peru’s legislature revised parts of its Constitutional Procedural Code in late 2024, including Article VIII, which governs courts’ consideration of international human rights law in determining the substance of a constitutional right.139 The impact could be significant: Courts are now restricted to considering only the “sentences,” or contentious cases, to which Peru was a party, rather than all “judgments” of international human rights courts, thereby excluding from consideration advisory opinions and non-Peruvian contentious cases. 140 The Marañón River decision relied heavily on the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence and explicitly cited Article VIII of the Constitutional Procedural Code141 to emphasize that Peru’s international treaty obligations inform and expand Peru’s constitutional right to a healthy environment. The changes to Article VIII will, presumably, reduce or negate the weight that Peruvian courts give to the Inter-American Court in Rights of Nature cases. The Inter-American Court’s foundational judgments Advisory Opinion 23/17 and the Lhaka Honhat case, the former a “judgment” and the latter not involving Peru as a party are now removed from
138. The rights of the Marañón River was a secondary claim in the Chadín 2 case, which the Mixed Court of Celendín ultimately did not need to decide, and the court decided the question in a cursory manner, so its weak analysis is unlikely to serve as persuasive analysis or otherwise influence future courts’ decision-making.
139. Ley Nº 32153, Nuevo Código Procesal Constitucional, El Peruano 5 Nov. 2024 (Peru).
140. Compare id. with Ley No. 31307, supra note 79.
141. The Mixed Court of Nauta discusses the substance of Constitutional Procedural Code’s Article VIII, but erroneously cites Article V. Nauta Judgment, Section Eleven, 27.
application toward interpreting the content and scope of rights in Peru.142 On the other hand, the Inter-American Court’s La Oroya v. Peru sentence, which glancingly discusses the Court’s ecocentric Rights of Nature turn within its analysis of the right to a healthy environment, may provide a mechanism for Peruvian courts to give weight to some of the Inter-American Court’s Rights of Nature jurisprudence.
In both Colombia and Peru, following the issuance of these rulings came a wave of activity to recognize Nature’s rights at various levels. Like the flurry of activity outlined following the issuance of the precedent-setting Colombian cases, Peru’s Marañón River case set a valuable normative precedent. The Marañón River case has had a tremendous impact on sociolegal discourse in and outside of Peru, and is inspiring further initiatives. What, exactly, this means for the implementation of rights frameworks and the material protection of rightsholder ecosystems remains to be seen.
The cases discussed in this chapter, along with others advancing the development of Earth law, have fostered a broader discussion in Colombia, Peru, and beyond. Supporters of Nature’s rights point to the evolving understandings of legal rights and personhood throughout history. At one time, children, women, and many other groups were not considered legal persons under the law. Today, in an increasing number of jurisdictions and judicial and legislative bodies are recognizing ecosystems, river basins, and individual animals as the subjects of rights.
Some supporters of this emerging jurisprudence argue recent judgments shed light on the inefficiency of the Colombian government, institutional gaps at the local and national levels, and the insufficient protection of Nature and ecosystems. 143 Supporters claim that the judicial recognition of Nature’s rights allows communities and other stakeholders to enforce the protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration of ecosystems, despite legislative inaction.144 Furthermore, supporters argue, Nature’s rights frameworks provide an opportunity for civil society actors to engage in the implementation of judicial decisions by participating in monitoring mechanisms. Through Nature’s rights jurisprudence, the courts have affirmatively recognized Nature’s legal rights and further developed a more ecocentric paradigm.145
There are also tensions between the Rights of Nature and the fundamental rights of vulnerable populations. Challenges between the Rights of Nature and those of vulnerable populations have begun to emerge in the implementation of some of the recent case decisions in Colombia. For example, in the case of the Atrato River, various residents thought to be associated with the protection of the river have been targeted for assassination and threatened with violence.146 The threats and violence against environmental defenders are not a new phenomenon, but the judicial order could increase this risk. At this time, there does not appear to be any governmentally recognized system to protect residents from these ongoing threats
142. The Inter-American Court’s recent climate advisory opinion, which explicitly recognizes Nature as a subject of rights, Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos, Serie A, No. OC-32/25 ¶¶279-286, (29 Mayo 2025), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., would likewise be precluded from consideration.
143. Villavicencio, supra note 28, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Threats of violence against environmental defenders and rights activists are endemic in Colombia. In recent years, Colombia has ranked among the five most dangerous countries worldwide for environmental defenders and rights activists. Colombia: “Terrible Trend” of Rights Defenders Killed, Harassed; UN Calls for “Significant Effort” to Tackle Impunity, UN News (May 10, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038281.
of violence.147 An analysis of these tensions does not imply a flaw in the judgments per se but is indicative that the actors responsible for the implementation process are encountering foreseeable challenges in carrying out the courts’ decisions. At this time, it is too early to critically analyze the Peruvian case much beyond its theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. There is not yet much data on the implementation efforts associated with the Peruvian case. If reference to implementation in Colombia offers any insight, it has become clear that these decisions face implementation challenges.148 Despite the judgments’ tendency to give emphasis to the enforcement of Nature’s rights, the challenges of effectuating these rights are complicated in the context of co-occurring inequality, extractive economic models, and ongoing violence. For example, after Colombia’s 2016 Peace Agreement with a former guerilla group, the country finds itself in a social transition after more than five decades of an internal armed conflict.
Although there are challenges to implementing judgments recognizing Nature’s rights, the Colombian cases and their subsequent emergence in Peru represent an extraordinary advancement in the field of Earth law and chart a promising future for both litigation and legislation. In both Colombia and Peru, legislative efforts have emerged to cement Nature’s standing as a rightsholder beyond the judicial realm. Furthermore, these decisions are spurring meaningful legal debate, pushing institutions to respond, and inspiring activists to imagine new ways to leverage the law for social and environmental change.
(1) Th ere are clear and intentional par allels between the development of Rights of Nature jurisprudence in Colombia and Peru. Peruvian advocates quickly learned from and adapted Colombian strategies, drawing heavily on Colombian jurisprudence in their own litigation. The Atrato decision has shaped and provided foundational normative support for Peruvian legislative initiatives. The Nauta court adopted arguments and language that appear grounded in Colombia’s jurisprudence. Colombia’s jurisprudential influence on Peru provides a compelling example of transnational judicial dialogue, whereby state legal systems internalize international environmental and human rights law and also contribute to its development by shaping the content of international law norms. Does Colombia’s jurisprudence offer a Rights of Nature framework that is generally adaptable across legal systems?
(2) T he Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion on climate change, recognizing Nature’s rights. In what ways are Colombian and Peruvian jurisprudence building regional norms that advocates in other countries in the Americas can build on, and that their respective domestic courts will follow? Additionally, recall that the Marañón River and Run Run cases did not reach Peru’s highest courts. Will this diminish the normative impact of Peru’s jurisprudence? Should it diminish Peru’s normative contribution? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its 2025 climate change advisory opinion, included the Run Run case but not the Marañón River case in its list of examples of Rights of Nature’s normative development in the region.
147. R edacción Colombia 2020, ¿ Nos Van a Matar a Todos por Defender el Río Atrato?”: Líder Social del Chocó , El Espectador (Feb. 26, 2019 2:22 p.m. ), https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/ nos-van-matar-todos-por-defender-el-rio-atrato-lider-social-del-choco-articulo-857687.
148. For a discussion of the implementation phase of the Amazon decision, see Camila Bustos, Implementing Climate Remedies, Vanderbilt L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026).
(3) The plaintiff in the Marañón River case asked the Mixed Court to recognize Rights of Nature either as a novel, autonomous right, or as a corollary of the human right to a healthy environment. The court chose the latter approach. Is Rights of Nature becoming an automatic corollary of the right to a healthy environment in practice? Absent legislation, as in Bolivia, or constitutional reform, as in Ecuador, might judicial recognition of Nature’s rights be inextricable from the right to a healthy environment in the Inter-American system? More than 160 states recognize the right to a healthy environment at some level within their domestic legal system. What are some pros and cons to recognizing Nature’s rights but tethering those rights to an anthropocentric human right?
Indigenous Earth Law begins not with statutes, but with stories. It arises not from the state, but from the land and water. Rooted in place-based legal orders, Indigenous Earth Law affirms that humans are not the only lawful beings in the world. Rivers, trees, fish, whales, and the Ocean itself are kin not commodities. They possess not only ecological functions but legal entitlements and spiritual agency. These beings are subjects of law, governed by and participating in justice systems that Indigenous Peoples have stewarded since time immemorial. This chapter introduces the field of Indigenous Earth Law 2 as both an ancient and emergent legal framework, grounded in sacred relationships, ancestral responsibilities, and “inherent relationships jurisprudence.”3
As we confront intensifying climate disruptions, biodiversity collapse, and the deepening disenfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Earth Law offers a paradigm shift. Rather than treating land and water as property or natural resources, this legal tradition recognizes them as living relatives subjects of law imbued with rights and deserving of protection. The result is both a legal reorientation and an ontological one. Asserting that the Klamath River has the right to flourish, that Manoomin (wild rice) has standing in court, or that a 300-yearold beech tree possesses the right to persist are legal innovations grounded in Indigenous law.
Across Turtle Island and Oceania, Indigenous Nations are reaffirming authority to protect water, trees, fish, and Ocean territories. These acts are not efforts to “catch up” to western environmental law but rather manifestations of legal orders that have persisted despite colonial displacement. From the Yurok Tribe’s 2024 codification of the Rights of the Klamath River to the White Earth Nation’s declaration of the Rights of Manoomin, and from the Shinnecock Nation’s recognition of a beech tree’s inherent rights to the Mashpee Wampanoag’s affirmation of herring personhood, Indigenous Earth Law is being inscribed in Indigenous constitutions, ordinances, resolutions, declarations, and courtroom advocacy. These actions assert Indigenous Nations’ status as lawmaking polities, capable of recognizing, enforcing, and defending the rights of more-than-human kin.
1. Authored by Dr. Kelsey Leonard, JD, PhD, Assistant Professor and Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Waters, Climate and Sustainability in the School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability at the University of Waterloo in Canada and a Senior Fellow with the Earth Law Center. She is an enrolled citizen of the Shinnecock Indian Nation and an internationally recognized scholar in Indigenous water governance, climate justice, and ecojurisprudence.
2. This chapter capitalizes Indigenous Earth Law to reflect the unique self-determination framing of Indigenousled Earth law movements explored by the author.
3. This term refers to jurisprudence based on the inherent relationships between Indigenous Peoples and their connected lands and waters, as well as other non-rights-based inherent responsibility pathways found in customary law and
What distinguishes Indigenous Earth Law from the broader Earth law movements is its grounding in relationships. Earth law, in its Indigenous articulation, goes beyond attributing rights to Nature using the tools of settler jurisprudence. It is about restoring and protecting legal relationships among beings human and more-than-human. This relationality is not symbolic. It is jurisdictional. It is epistemological. It is sovereign.
In settler-colonial law, environmental statutes like the Clean Water Act4 or the Endangered Species Act5 often treat harm as a technocratic matter of thresholds, permits, and enforcement discretion. But in Indigenous Earth Law, harm is a breach of responsibility and a rupture in relationships with kin. The consequence is not only environmental degradation but a violation of intergenerational duty.6 Thus, the enforcement mechanisms in Indigenous Earth Law may include Tribal court standing for a river, data sovereignty for a watershed, or restitution for a damaged sacred site. (This chapter largely focuses on North America and Oceania; for a chapter on Indigenous legalities in Latin America, see Chapter 22, “Indigenous Legalities and Biocultural Rights: Latin America and Beyond.”)
This chapter is structured around five interrelated domains of Indigenous Earth Law. The chapter begins with the story of the Yurok Tribe’s recognition of the Klamath River as a legal person in 2019 with corresponding enforceable rights in 2024. The Yurok example, and others like it, illustrate how Indigenous Nations are asserting jurisdictional authority over river systems by aligning Tribal legal codes with ancient responsibilities and inherent rights. Under Yurok law, the Klamath River holds rights to flourish, regenerate, and evolve rights that go beyond aspiration and into enforceability. Similar developments across the Great Lakes and the Menominee River show the proliferation of river personhood rooted in Indigenous legal traditions.
Next, the White Earth Band of Ojibwe’s 2018 campaign for rights of Manoomin through Tribal law and litigation is described. As the first known case in a Tribal court to enforce a Rights of Nature ordinance, Manoomin v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources challenges settler assumptions about jurisdiction, standing, and the identity of legal persons. Drawing from sacred law and treaty rights, the case exemplifies Anishinaabe law (which exists across what is currently known as the United States and Canada), part of what Anishinaabe legal scholar John Borrows calls “Canada’s Indigenous Constitution” a law that flows from creation teachings rather than constitutional enactment.7 The same principles guide the White Earth Band of Ojibwe, which has a government-to-government relationship with the United States.
In Indigenous Earth Law, trees have been frequent protagonists in ceremony and ancient storylines of guardianship. The third section highlights two illustrative examples from 2016 and 2024: the Indigenous women across Northeastern forests’ Voices from Maple Nation
Traditional Indigenous Knowledge. Earth Law Center, Inherent Relationships Jurisprudence: An Indigenous Environmental Network and Earth Law Center Collaboration (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.earthlawcenter.org/blog-entries/2024/10/ inherent-relationships-jurisprudence-an-indigenous-environmental-network-and-earth-law-center-collaboration.
4. Heather Tanana, Jason Combs & April Hoss, Water Is Life: Law, Systemic Racism, and Water Security in Indian Country , 19 Health Security S-78 (Supp. 1 2021); Sibyl Diver, Native Water Protection Flows Through Self-Determination: Understanding Tribal Water Quality Standards and “Treatment as a State,” 163 J. Contemp. Water Res. & Educ. 6 (2018).
5. Clayton T. Lamb et al., Braiding Indigenous Rights and Endangered Species Law, 380 Science 694 (2023).
6. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 225, 228 (1997).
7. John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (2010), https://utppublishing.com/doi/book/ 10.3138/9781442610385.
Declaration, and the Shinnecock Indian Nation’s recognition of the rights of an ancient beech tree. These legal initiatives center Indigenous women’s responsibilities, intergenerational guardianship, and the reforestation of justice. In doing so, they advance a law of care that surpasses Christopher Stone’s foundational call for trees to have legal standing by embedding standing within kinship.
The Ocean is also at the forefront of Indigenous Earth Law as an ancestor, a territory, and a source of law. The fourth section turns to Indigenous Ocean governance, 8 focusing on Indigenous Marine Stewardship Areas, the rights of whales, and the assertion of marine jurisdiction through cases such as Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle. This section examines the intersection of international law9 (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, etc.) and Indigenous legal frameworks, illustrating how Ocean law must move beyond state-centric frameworks to honor relational responsibilities to the Ocean and the beings that call it home.10
The chapter concludes by situating Indigenous Earth Law within the context of Hawaiian sovereignty. From the 2011 petition filed on behalf of Mo‘oinanea, a Nature spirit guardian of Lake Waiau, to the 2024 Hawai‘i Watersheds Bill, Kānaka Maoli advocacy demonstrates the possibilities and perils of engaging settler-state law. Questions of jurisdiction, recognition, and legal pluralism come to the fore as Hawai‘i contemplates codifying Earth law while the Hawaiian Kingdom remains under unresolved occupation.
Throughout these case studies, several throughlines emerge. First, Indigenous Earth Law is jurisdictional it goes beyond a claim of values to the actual exercise of legal authority. Second, it is relational rights are grounded in responsibilities and arise from kinship, not conquest. Third, it is generative it challenges colonial doctrines like aqua nullius, terra nullius, Montana v. United States, and the narrow definition of legal standing, proposing instead a more expansive, inclusive, and just jurisprudence.
This chapter does not ask readers to replace one legal system with another. Rather, it calls on legal scholars, practitioners, and students to acknowledge and respect the plural legal orders that exist and have always existed within global society. Indigenous Earth Law is not an alternative to law; it is law. And in a time of ecological unraveling, its recognition and resurgence offer pathways toward environmental protection and, more broadly, legal transformation.
Across Turtle Island, Indigenous Nations are asserting what has always been true in their own legal orders: rivers are living relatives, not property. The emerging global movement for the rights of rivers is rooted in this fundamental truth. Yet in settler-colonial legal systems, rivers
8. Natalie Ban, Eric Wilson & Douglas Neasloss, Strong Historical and Ongoing Indigenous Marine Governance in the Northeast Pacific Ocean: A Case Study of the Kitasoo/Xai’xais First Nation , 24 Ecology & Soc’y (2019); Shankar Aswani, Indigenous Polycentric and Nested Customary Sea-Tenure (CST) Institutions: A Solomon Islands Case Study in Governing Renewable Natural Resources 129 (Fikret Berkes & Douglas Armitage eds., 2019).
9. The international law covered in this section will include the U.N. Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1833 U.N.T.S 397 and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295.
10. Michelle Bender, Rachel Bustamante & Kelsey Leonard, Living in Relationship with the Ocean to Transform Governance in the UN Ocean Decade, 20 Plos Biology e3001828 (2022).
(1) How do existing environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act or international water agreements fall short in protecting the full lifeways and ecological integrity of rivers? What are the legal implications of recognizing the rights of rivers for other manifestations of water lakes, aquifers, rainfall, glaciers, and O cean and ho w might a shift toward relational water governance reshape the legal status of water across these diverse forms? How does recognizing river personhood support or fall short of achieving Indigenous water justice? How can legal systems ensure Indigenous data sovereignty and governance aligns with river rights? What mechanisms uphold a river’s interest in how its data is collected, shared, or interpreted?
(2) What might Earth law learn from the Anishinaabe philosophy of sovereignty embedded in relationships? How might legal systems better reflect obligations to more-than-human kin?
(3) The recognition of trees as rights-bearing entities invites critical reflection on the foundations of legal personhood, property, and guardianship. Across legal systems from local civic traditions to Indigenous sovereign law trees have been variously symbolized, protected, and spoken for. What legal responsibilities arise when trees are recognized as rights-bearing beings, and how does the concept of guardianship shape the role of human communities in upholding those rights? The tree that owns itself. A white oak in Athens, Georgia, is widely known for an early nineteenth-century deed said to have transferred ownership of the tree and the surrounding eight feet of land to the tree itself.45 Although no deed has been located in official records, the story has persisted through civic tradition and public education as a symbol of environmental value and autonomy. 46 In contrast, the Shinnecock Indian Nation’s recognition of the rights of a more than 300-year-old beech tree in 2024 represents an exercise of sovereign Indigenous legal authority. How does the contrast between the Athens, Georgia, white oak and the Shinnecock Indian Nation’s beech tree illustrate differing legal philosophies and legal implications regarding the Rights of Nature?
(4) Rooted in Indigenous worldviews, the 2010 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth established that humans are part of an interdependent community of life, not separate from it. The Voices from Maple Nation Declaration echoes this philosophy by affirming Indigenous women’s responsibilities to the Maple Nation and recognizing the suffering of the land, waters, and beings as shared, speaking from a place of relational care, protection, and reciprocity. How does invoking Mother Earth in the Maple Nation Declaration help reframe legal and moral duties within climate governance?
The Ocean is a legal and living relative for many Indigenous Peoples an ancestor, a teacher, and a site of law. Indigenous Ocean governance is not a new concept. It is embedded in legal orders that predate colonial encroachment and extend across the planet. These legal orders recognize the Ocean as kin imbued with spirit, agency, and memory. Accordingly, rights of
45. E.M. Coulter, The Story of the Tree That Owned Itself, 46 Ga. Hist. Q 237, 238-39 (1962).
46. Id. at 242-46; M.P. Mueller, K.K. Pattillo, D.B. Mitchell & R.A. Luther, Lessons from the Tree That Owns Itself: Implications for Education, 6 Int’l J. Env’t & Sci. Educ 293, 295-96 (2011).
the Ocean are inseparable from responsibilities to care for Ocean beings, maintain balance in ecosystems, and uphold the reciprocal obligations passed down through law, ceremony, and intergenerational governance.
Despite the persistence of Indigenous marine governance, settler-colonial legal systems have long sought to displace Indigenous law from the Ocean. The doctrines of terra nullius and aqua nullius asser ting that land and sea territories were legally unoccupied prior to colonization have long served to justify the dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their ancestral territories. Through these doctrines, the drawing of maritime boundaries, colonial law of the sea, and the establishment of marine protected areas without Indigenous consent, colonial legal systems have obscured Indigenous rights and responsibilities in “sea country” (a term originating from First Nations’ legal activism in Australia). Rooted in the doctrine of discovery, 47 these legal fictions denied the existence of Indigenous law, governance, and sovereign territorial authority.
Courts in the United States, Australia, and Canada, among others, have rejected the premise of “nobody’s land.” In Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23, the Australian High Court rejected terra nullius, recognizing the continuity of Aboriginal land law and establishing the legal foundation for native title. Similarly, in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Tribal Nations retained sovereign rights over their lands. The Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia , 2014 SCC 44, held that the doctrine of terra nullius “never applied in Canada,” recognizing that Indigenous Peoples had preexisting systems of law and occupation prior to European assertions of sovereignty.48 Yet, much of Ocean governance continues to operate under aqua nullius, erasing Indigenous marine jurisdictions. Scholars such as Dr. Virginia Marshall and Steven Newcomb have critiqued these doctrines as colonial tools that undermine Indigenous law and relational governance with land, water, and sea.49 In this context, the Ocean is often treated as a mere resource to be managed rather than a relation to be cared for.
International human rights law p articularly the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) provides further support for Indigenous marine governance by recognizing the rights of Indigenous Peoples to own, use, develop, and control marine territories. Articles 25, 26, and 29 of UNDRIP declare the right to maintain spiritual relationships with waters and coastal seas, and the duty of states to uphold environmental protection consistent with Indigenous values. This global recognition is coupled with a growing Earth law movement that acknowledges the Ocean as a rights-bearing entity in its own right (see Chapter 19, “Ocean Governance and Earth Law in the Twenty-First Century”).
These rights, however, are not granted by states they are inherent. Indigenous Ocean rights arise from the laws of Indigenous Nations and from the relationships Indigenous Peoples maintain with Ocean kin. Inherent relationships, responsibilities, and rights include the authority to protect marine ecosystems, assert governance over fisheries, protect cultural practices tied to marine species, and uphold sacred obligations to the Ocean. They also include the right to say no, including to deep sea mining, offshore drilling, or state-led conservation efforts that erase Indigenous governance structures.50
47. Assembly of First Nations, Dismantling the Doctrine of Discovery (Jan. 2018), https://www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/18-01-22-Dismantling-the-Doctrine-of-Discovery-EN.pdf.
48. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, ¶69.
49. See generally Virginia Marshall, Overturning Aqua Nullius: Securing Aboriginal Water Rights (2017); Steven T. Newcomb, Pagans in the Promised Land: Decoding the Doctrine of Christian Discovery (2008).
50. Rosanna Carver, Erika R. Gavenus & J.J. Manson, Stealing the Seabed: The Canadian State and the Question of Rights and Title over Submerged Lands, 156 Geoforum 104-08 (2024).
Across the globe, Indigenous Peoples are asserting these Ocean rights and responsibilities through legal innovations, treaties, declarations of Indigenous Marine Stewardship Areas (IMSAs), and litigation. To illustrate the contours of Indigenous Ocean relationships, responsibilities, and rights and their interaction with settler legal systems, we now turn to a series of case examples.
Across coastal territories a global resurgence of Indigenous marine stewardship is reshaping Ocean protection. This resurgence centers the Ocean as kin as a relative with whom Indigenous Peoples maintain reciprocal relations of care, obligation, and governance. In 2023, the Yurok and Tolowa Dee-ni’ people asserted inherent jurisdiction over ancestral Ocean territories through the formal designation of the Yurok-Tolowa Dee-ni’ IMSA.51 This protected area was formalized under Tribal law by the Pulikla Tribe of Yurok People (formerly Resighini Rancheria; designation declared, June 14, 2023), the Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the Trinidad Rancheria (designation declared July 13, 2023), and the Tolowa Dee-ni’ Nation (designation declared August 10, 2023).52 These were further affirmed in November 2024 through a treaty agreement between the interested Tribal Nations.
This legal pluralism is supported by international law. UNDRIP recognizes that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”53 The IMSA framework, for example, asserts Indigenous jurisdiction through declarations of Ocean stewardship that do not rely on permission from settler governments, but instead invite collaborative co-management while retaining full Indigenous legal authority.54 These efforts are not isolated. They are part of a broader global movement of Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas (IPCAs), including sea country governance initiatives in Australia, where coastal Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander First Nations manage marine territories under Indigenous law.55
Further south along the California coast, the Chumash people have led the designation of the Chumash Heritage National Marine Sanctuary, formally established in 2024 the first U.S. federally recognized marine sanctuary on the West Coast to be Indigenous-led. 56 This marks a significant milestone in federal Ocean governance, but the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA) has historically presented limitations for Tribal Nations, marginalizing Indigenous legal authority and offering minimal pathways for co-governance or recognition of Indigenous rights within sanctuary designations. 57 Although the Chumash initiative signals a welcome shift, it remains bound by the statutory frameworks of the
51. Tolowa Dee-ni’ Nation, Yurok-Tolowa Dee-ni’ Indigenous Marine Stewardship Area, https://www.tolowa. gov/341/Yurok-Tolowa-Dee-ni-Indigenous-Marine-St (last visited Aug. 8, 2025).
52. Id.
53. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 25-29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
54. Yurok-Tolowa Dee-ni’ Indigenous Marine Stewardship Area Resolution, Resighini Rancheria, Resolution No. 2023-17 (June 14, 2023); Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the Trinidad Rancheria Resolution, No. TC-23-23 (July 13, 2023).
55. Phil Rist et al., Indigenous Protected Areas in Sea Country: Indigenous-Driven Collaborative Marine Conservation in Australia, 29 Aquatic Conservation: Marine & Freshwater Ecosystems 138 (2019).
56. NOAA Office of National Marine Sanctuaries, Chumash Heritage National Marine Sanctuary, https://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/chumash-heritage/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2025).
57. See Nat’l Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445c-1.
NMSA, which continue to reflect state-centric and anthropocentric, rather than relational, legal paradigms.
Conventional marine protected areas (MPAs) continue to be critiqued for exclusionary top-down governance. IMSAs and IPCAs demonstrate the potential for more just and ecologically effective alternatives.58 In 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment attested that Indigenous governance of marine ecosystems is essential to realizing the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, particularly for communities historically marginalized in Ocean law and policy.59 Although UNDRIP recognizes the international right of Indigenous Peoples to protect their relationships with coastal seas, this right is not always recognized within domestic jurisdictions, and so Indigenous Nations must remain steadfast in their pursuit of Ocean justice.
Notably, global leadership for the recognition of Indigenous Ocean rights, marine jurisdiction, and right to protect sea country emerged from the leadership of First Nations rising up against the settler-colonialism of Australia, as seen in Commonwealth v. Yarmirr.60 In this landmark decision, the High Court reversed the lower court’s decision by finding that Native title could exist in the territorial sea. The court relied on the landmark decision of Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), a 1992 case that recognized the existence of Native title in Australia. However, it stopped short of recognizing exclusive possession, reflecting a colonial legal discomfort with Indigenous authority over water.
Conclusion: The common law as re-expressed in Mabo [No. 2] and incorporated in the Act, and as informed by norms of international law and supported by the analogy to exclusive fisheries, is able to recognise certain exclusive rights in relation to the sea . . . . They [] forbid extinguishment of title on the basis of rules which discriminate against people on racial grounds. This is the point that Mabo [No. 2] teaches. It is applicable to the claimants’ sea country here as it was to land country in Mabo [No 2] and in Wik.
Problems with the finding: The first problem with the findings of the primary judge was an underlying assumption, evident in his reasons, that, without fulfilling conventional definitions of occupation and possession, which he saw as unachievable in relation to the sea, the claimants could have no exclusive proprietary rights to the sea. He said:
The very nature of the sea renders it inappropriate to attempt to strictly apply concepts such as possession and occupation which are readily capable of being understood in relation to
58. Anupa Asokan, Marine Protected Areas as a Tool for Environmental Justice , 11 Frontiers in Marine Sci 1478023 (2024); see also Cassidy Warrior et al., Indigenous Peoples and Marine Protected Area Governance: A Mi’kmaq and Atlantic Canada Case Study, 7 Facets 944 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1139/facets-2021-0128 (noting limitations on Indigenous participation in MPA governance under federal statutes).
59. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, The Ocean and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/ HRC/58/59 (2024).
60. See also Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), [1992] HCA 23 (Aus.) (recognizing for the first time under Australian common law that Indigenous land rights, or “native title,” preexisted colonization and continued to exist, thereby rejecting the doctrine of terra nullius and establishing a foundation for the recognition of native title over both land and, subsequently, sea country).
land. There is a clear distinction between possession and occupation on the one hand and use and enjoyment on the other. The claimed right of senior clan members to grant permission is limited to allowing non-members to use and enjoy the country, not to possess or occupy it.
I agree that concepts of “occupation” and “possession” are, in some ways, ill-suited to a description of a relationship between persons and the sea. However, the claimants’ argument that their traditional laws and customs do recognise a form of “occupation” and “possession” of the waters has obvious factual merit. The latter is demonstrated by their consistent reference to the determination area as “my country” or “Mandilarri-Ildugij country.” When questioned about ownership, Mary Yarmirr responded: “It’s always the yuwurrumu, yuwurrumu clan that owns that particular estate.” Unlike the primary judge and the majority in the Full Court, I would not regard such views of possession and ownership, although expressed from within a different legal culture from our own, as irrelevant. Such concepts, accepted by traditional law and custom, are an integral part of the “socially constituted fact” that the majority of this Court in Yanner upheld as an indication of native title rights and interests. Indeed, such concepts appear far more relevant than physical possession of the area which, of its nature, was not capable of being “occupied,” as non-indigenous perspectives understand that term. Remote areas, such as mountain regions or deserts, may be equally “empty” or “uninhabited” according to common European thought . . . . In giving flesh to these concepts in this context, a more useful focus is on the rights that the native title claimants assert based on their own understandings of occupation, possession, use and enjoyment of their sea country. This is the approach envisaged by Mabo [No. 2]. It is not completely alien to notions known to the common law. The very claims to sovereignty in the Crown, made respectively by Captains Cook and Phillip, over the land mass of a huge continent, had a similar metaphorical quality, excluding all other claims to sovereignty. But they had undoubted legal consequences which our courts uphold. . . .
Thirdly, native title accords recognition to rights and interests based on the claimants’ connection with land and waters, as recognised by their traditional laws and customs. Such connection must have survived the acquisition of sovereignty. It is the traditional connection arising from the acknowledgment of laws and customs by the indigenous community, and not recognition or acceptance by others of the connection, which is the source of native title. .
The conclusion that I favour: . . . [Aboriginal Australians] observe their traditional laws and customs as their forebears have done for untold centuries before Australia’s modern legal system arrived. They have a “sea country” and claim to possess it exclusively for the group. They rely on, and extract, resources from the sea and accord particular areas spiritual respect. The sea is essential to their survival as a group. In earlier times, they could not fight off the “white man” with his superior arms; but now the “white man’s” laws have changed to give them, under certain conditions, the superior arms of legal protection. They yield their rights in their “sea country” to rights to navigation, in and through the area, allowed under international and Australian law, and to licensed fishing, allowed under statute. But, otherwise, they assert a present right under their own laws and customs, now protected by the “white man’s” law, to insist on effective consultation and a power of veto over other fishing, tourism, resource exploration and like activities within their sea country because it is theirs and is now protected by Australian law. . . . The situation of this group of indigenous Australians appears to be precisely that for which Mabo [No. 2] was decided and the Act enacted. The opinion to the contrary is unduly narrow. It should be reversed. . . .
Other cases in Australia have also ruled on First Nations’ rights in relation to the Ocean. In Blue Mud Bay, the Court recognized Aboriginal ownership of the intertidal zone, strengthening sea rights. Later, in Akiba v. Commonwealth , the High Court confirmed that Native title could include commercial fishing rights, marking a significant step in asserting economic self-determination in sea country.
Parallel developments have occurred in Canada.61 The Haida Nation designated the SGáan Kinghlas-Bowie (SK-B) Seamount Marine Protected Area in 1997, later co-managed with Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans. More recent declarations, including the Gwaxdlala/Nalaxdlala IPCA by the Mamalilikulla First Nation in 2021 and the Gitdisdzy Luugyeks (Kitasu Bay) MPA by the Kitasoo Xai’xais in 2022, reflect growing Indigenous legal authority in marine governance. (See Chapter 19 for more on the Haida Nation and Ocean stewardship.)
Indigenous Nations have long exercised marine jurisdiction through their own legal orders, recognizing reciprocal responsibilities to Ocean kin and asserting governance over fishing territories and responsibility for nonhuman relations. This jurisdiction extends beyond the recognition of Indigenous fishing rights in treaties or statutes it encompasses the stewardship of entire marine ecosystems, including the beings that dwell within them. Indigenous law affirms that fish hold cultural and subsistence value and, in some cases, even have legal standing as relations with embodied responsibilities and rights. Indigenous Nations are asserting marine jurisdiction by weaving together treaty rights, customary law, and emerging legal frameworks like Earth law to recognize and protect both fishing rights and the inherent rights of fish themselves. Indigenous fishing rights across Turtle Island are grounded in multiple legal foundations: inherent or aboriginal rights, treaty-reserved rights, usufruct rights, statutory rights, and judicial recognition through case law. Many of these rights are nonabrogated, meaning they have not been lawfully extinguished. In the United States, a landmark ruling came in 1974 with the Boldt Decision (United States v. Washington), which held that treaty Tribes in Washington State retained the right to harvest up to 50 percent of the harvestable fish at their “usual and accustomed” fishing places.62 This decision followed decades of state suppression, culminating in the Fish Wars, during which Indigenous fishers were arrested for asserting their rights through acts of occupation, fishing, and protest.63 Judge Boldt’s ruling recognized Tribal sovereignty, co-management authority, and treaty fishing as both a legal entitlement and a cultural imperative.
384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. 1974)
10. [ . . . ] A Treaty Tribe occupies the status of a party to one or more of the Stevens’ treaties and therefore holds for the benefit of its members a reserved right to harvest anadromous fish at all usual and accustomed places outside reservation boundaries, in common with others.
61. See Chapter 19 for a case study on Gwaii Haanas marine governance.
62. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
63. See Charles Wilkinson, Treaty Justice: The Northwest Tribes, the Boldt Decision, and the Recognition of Fishing Rights (2024).
11. The right of a Treaty Tribe to harvest anadromous fish outside reservation boundaries arises from a provision which appears in each of the Stevens’ treaties and which, with immaterial variations, states:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory.
12. It is the responsibility of all citizens to see that the terms of the Stevens’ treaties are carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal representatives at the councils, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.
13. From the earliest known times, up to and beyond the time of the Stevens’ treaties, the Indians comprising each of the treating tribes and bands were primarily a fishing, hunting and gathering people dependent almost entirely upon the natural animal and vegetative resources of the region for their subsistence and culture. They were heavily dependent upon anadromous fish for their subsistence and for trade with other tribes and later with the settlers. . . .
14. The taking of anadromous fish from usual and accustomed places, the right to which was secured to the Treaty Tribes in the Stevens’ treaties, constituted both the means of economic livelihood and the foundation of native culture. Reservation of the right to gather food in this fashion protected the Indians’ right to maintain essential elements of their way of life . . . .
15. The treaty-secured rights to resort to the usual and accustomed places to fish were a part of larger rights possessed by the treating Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to their existence than the atmosphere they breathed. The treaty was not a grant of rights to the treating Indians, but a grant of rights from them, and a reservation of those not granted. . . .
16. The Stevens’ treaties do not reserve to the Treaty Tribes any specific manner, method or purpose of taking fish; nor do the treaties prohibit any specific manner, method or purpose. Just as non-Indians may continue to take advantage of improvements in fishing techniques, the Treaty Tribes may, in exercising their rights to take anadromous fish, utilize improvements in traditional fishing methods, such for example as nylon nets and steel hooks.
17. The exercise of a Treaty Tribe’s right to take anadromous fish outside of reservation boundaries is limited only by geographical extent of the usual and accustomed places, the limits of the harvestable stock and the number of fish which non-treaty fishermen shall have an opportunity to catch, as provided in the Decision of the Court.
18. Because the right of each Treaty Tribe to take anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the United States, that right is preserved and protected under the supreme law of the land, does not depend on State law, is distinct from rights or privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any action of the State. . . .
The legacy of United States v. Washington continues to influence both U.S. and Canadian law. In Canada, the Supreme Court upheld the Musqueam Nation’s aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes in R. v. Sparrow, 64 and later recognized Mi’kmaq treaty rights to fish for a “moderate livelihood” in R. v. Marshall 65 These cases underscore the enduring transboundary nature of Indigenous advocacy for marine jurisdiction and relational responsibilities to fish.
64. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.).
65. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (Can.).
The criminalization of Indigenous fishing rights did not end with the Fish Wars and Boldt decision of the 1970s; it continues today. Tribal fishers of the Shinnecock Nation, in Silva v. Farrish (E.D.N.Y.), currently face litigation as they defend unceded aboriginal fishing rights against state criminalization and harassment.66 The Mashpee Wampanoag notably fought similar persecution in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Michael J. Maxim and David S. Greene, where Tribal members were criminally charged for harvesting shellfish. In 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unanimously affirmed Mashpee usufruct fishing rights, reversing convictions and underscoring the persistent struggle against Indigenous criminalization. 67 The court found no credible conservation justification for the restrictions, noting that commercial fishers were permitted to use certain harmful methods while prohibiting the Tribe’s low-impact, “rake and hand” subsistence method, and reversed the criminal conviction as being inconsistent with treaty rights.
Settler-colonial conservation laws, often wielded by police and criminalize Indigenous fishing, have largely failed to protect fish themselves. While Indigenous harvest was attempted to be restricted in the name of preservation, state and federal regimes permitted dams, pollutants, and warming waters to devastate fish habitats. These contradictions have fueled a growing movement, not only to protect the rights of Indigenous fishers but to recognize the inherent rights of fish. In 2023, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe passed a Tribal Resolution recognizing the rights of herring, affirming the fish’s right to migrate, procreate, and thrive.68 The resolution declared a state of emergency, citing a 95 percent decline in herring populations, and called for Tribal guardianship over river restoration. This intergenerational movement has been propelled by Mashpee youth and the Native Environmental Ambassadors, who advocate for ecosystem repair, sovereign lawmaking, and the defense of fish as relatives.
More than a half-century after the Boldt decision in Washington, the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe is advocating for a complementary vision for salmon justice. In 2021, the Tribe sued the City of Seattle for operating hydroelectric dams on the Skagit River, asserting not only violations of treaty rights but also the inherent rights of Tsuladxw (salmon) to exist, regenerate, and access ancestral waters.69
This is an action for declaratory relief by which Plaintiffs Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, in its capacity as a tribal nation and as the Sahkuméhu for and on behalf of Tsuladxw ǝ ti Stulǝkw seeking declaratory relief to:
a. Declare Tsuladxw within the territory of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe is protected and possesses inherent rights to exist, flourish, regenerate, and evolve, as well as inherent rights
66. Silva v. Farrish, No. 2:18-cv-03648 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 22, 2018); Exercising Shinnecock Nation Fishing Rights in Long Island Waters, Native Am.-Rts. Fund (July 17, 2025), https://narf.org/shinnecock-fishing-rights/.
67. Commonwealth v. Maxim , 708 N.E.2d 636 (Mass. 1999); Mashpee Wampanoag Fishing Rights , U. Mass. Amherst (Peter P. d’Errico), available at http://people.umass.edu/derrico/wampanoag/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2025).
68. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council Resolution on the Rights of Herring, No. 2023-RES-041 (Apr. 26, 2023).
69. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle, Civil Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. Jan. 6, 2022).
70. Id.
to restoration, recovery, and preservation. These rights include, but are not limited to, the right to pure water and freshwater habitat; the right to a healthy climate system and a natural environment free from human-caused global warming impacts and emissions and the right of access to their ancestral waters. . . .
Plaintiff’s complaint is based upon the Natural Laws of the Lushootseed people. Native tribes are rich in unwritten traditional law and tribal Elders are cornerstones of traditional wealth. Unwritten law, sometimes called “natural law” or the “Creator’s law,” is found in values, beliefs, practices, customs, traditions, and in the ways problems are solved. It is passed on through language, stories, songs, dances, ceremonies, speech making, leadership, and decisions. It is shown through the behavior of those who carry on tribal traditions. It is taught by the guidance of tribal Elders, tribal leaders, and through the families. Traditional unwritten tribal law is centered upon relationships among families and persons within the tribe, relationships between tribes, problem solving, and on the interconnection of all creation and human relationships with nature. As set forth below, Plaintiff’s conduct is contrary to the Natural Laws of the Sahkuméhu. . . .
The Sauk-Suiattle Tribe invoked natural law and UNDRIP, and the Tribe declared its role as Sahkuméhu, caretakers on behalf of salmon and river ecosystems.71 The actions of the Mashpee and Sauk-Suiattle Tribes show how Earth law is being used to respond to real threats facing fish populations and the ecosystems they depend on. By recognizing rights for herring and salmon, these Tribes are using their own laws to protect species that state and federal systems have failed to fully safeguard.
Indigenous leaders are applying Indigenous legal frameworks and advancing rights (or personhood) for whales and other cetaceans. This includes the decades-long fight by Lummi Nation citizens and their allies to return their relative Sk’aliCh’elh-tenaut (also known as Tokitae or Lolita), a southern resident orca violently captured from Penn Cove in 1970, to her home waters in the Salish Sea.72 Southern Resident Orcas are called qwe’lhol’mechen by the Lummi, meaning “our relations under the waves.”
Lummi elders presented various legal arguments, highlighting that Sk’aliCh’elh-tenaut was a family member “taken” much like many Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families. 73 They also argued that she was a living “object” of cultural patrimony whose return was required under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 74 providing an ecocentric law interpretation of this statute that traditionally applied to nonliving objects. Although NAGPRA permits claims by lineal descendants, federally recognized Indian Tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations, the statute does not grant standing to individuals acting independently. Nonetheless, these citizens advanced claims consistent with Lummi traditional kinship, challenging whether captivity at a federally
71. Id. at 2-4.
72. Juliana Kim, Lolita, Oldest Orca Held in Captivity, Dies Before Chance to Return to the Ocean, NPR (Aug. 19, 2023), https://www.npr.org/2023/08/19/1194867016/lolita-orca-toki-miami-seaquarium-dies.
73. See generally Sacred Sea, https://sacredsea.org/.
74. Ear th Law Center, Earth Law Center Joins the Fight to Free Orca from 50 Year Captivity and Bring Her Home (June 10, 2020), https://www.earthlawcenter.org/elc-in-the-news/2020/6/earth-law-center-joins-the-fight-tofree-orca-from-50-year-captivity-and-bring-her-home.
funded aquarium operating akin to a museum triggered legal duties to repatriate. Their approach illuminated both the possibilities and constraints of NAGPRA when applied to living beings and cultural kin outside dominant legal categories that infer all “objects” held by museums or similar institutions are “non-living.”
In practice, the Lummi elders never fully pursued this pathway; a negotiated agreement to return Sk’aliCh’elh-tenaut to her home waters was reached before further legal action became necessary. Tragically, Sk’aliCh’elh-tenaut died in 2024 before she could be returned home. Lummi advocates and their allies are now seeking legal rights for Southern Resident Orcas, or qwe’lhol’mechen, building a broader advocacy movement. Relatedly, in 2024, Indigenous leaders across the Pacific signed He Whakaputanga Moana, a treaty recognizing the legal personhood of whales and dolphins. Similar to the Lummi Nation, many Indigenous Peoples of Polynesia consider whales to be relatives. He Whakaputanga Moana is indicative of a larger trend of Indigenous Earth Law being applied to protect cetaceans. These topics are covered in greater length in Chapter 19 on the Ocean.
Earth law challenges the anthropocentric foundations of settler-colonial legal systems by recognizing the inherent rights of the natural world, including the Ocean, as subjects of law. Within this evolving legal field, Indigenous legal traditions have provided foundational insights, particularly in relation to Ocean governance.
A growing body of legal scholarship situates Earth law and Indigenous Ocean rights within overlapping spheres. As noted by Asokan in her article on marine protected areas and environmental justice,
Hawaii’s Hā’ena CBSFA [Community-Based Subsistence Fishing Area] is an example of a community-led stewardship effort to restore traditional systems of resource management. Local families with intergenerational ecological knowledge pre-dating colonization were key to this MPA’s designation, offering an opportunity to continue traditional cultural practices and engage the community in enforcement and monitoring of the area, which has shown an increase in biodiversity since establishment.75
In this way, Indigenous marine governance offers a corrective to state-centric MPAs by centering responsibilities to Ocean kin, rather than dominion over maritime territory. This perspective reframes marine law not as a tool of control but as an expression of intergenerational care and accountability. In a landmark Ocean rights analysis, Earth Law Center and partners assert:
Fulfilling the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment must encompass the Ocean, an essential component of our planet’s ecosystem. This includes recognizing the Ocean’s own rights and centering Indigenous Peoples as original Ocean stewards whose legal traditions have governed marine territories since time immemorial.76
Earth law thus adopts legal pluralism by aligning state and international recognition with Indigenous legal orders that already regard the Ocean as a living being. In doing so, Earth law opens new legal pathways for Indigenous-led Ocean conservation, co-governance, marine restoration, and the affirmation of Ocean justice grounded in inherent relationships and ancestral law.
75. Asokan, supra, note 58.
76. Earth Law Center, Final Comment to the OHCHR: Right to a Healthy Environment and the Ocean (June 18, 2024).
• When could it reasonably be argued to occur? An ecological tipping point, or another time?
• How does ecocide relate to the “right to development”?22
• Assuming ecocide has occurred, when multiple parties are involved in the illicit activity in the above case, governments, land clearers, farmers, sources of financial investment, multinational corporations who buy products, and consumers with which party or parties does criminal liability reside?
• Does the crime of ecocide require criminal intent, or is it a strict liability offense?
• Who can prosecute ecocide?
• What international tribunal or tribunals can adjudicate an ecocide case?
• What is the punishment for an ecocide violation?
• What remedies are available for restoring a damaged ecosystem?
These questions are explored in the remainder of this chapter and probed in more detail via two segments of study questions.
During the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Army, with major help from U.S. chemical companies, effectively launched an immense herbicidal warfare program to defoliate the forests so that guerilla fighters could not live or hide there. During the operation, known as Operation Ranch Hand, 20 million gallons of Agent Orange and other chemicals were sprayed over an area the size of the state of Massachusetts.23 Although the declaration of herbicidal war was implicit, the chemical warfare itself was explicit and a clear example of “war against nature.”24
The anger toward the U.S. strategy triggered a response from scientists, many of whom were biologists and botanists. They used the term “ecocide” to denounce the environmental disaster caused by the Pentagon’s Operation Ranch Hand. 25 A plant biologist, Arthur W. Galston, was the originator of the term. He defined it as “willful and permanent destruction of the environment in which a people can live in a manner of their own choosing.” 26 The ecocide movement thus first emerged in the 1970s in response to the horrors of environmental destruction during wartime, with notable commentators, including Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme and American legal scholar Richard Falk, further developing it.
Since the introduction of the term, there has been an ongoing debate about the criminalization of acts involving the extensive destruction of Nature.
22. Under the United Nations Declaration of the Right to Development: (1) The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. (2) The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. G.A. Res, 41/128, Declaration of the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986).
23. Clyde Haberman, Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2014), https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-for-vietnam-and-veterans.html.
24. David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientist Who Changed the Way We Think About the Environment 95 (2011).
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 19.
At the international level, there is still no crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly called “ecocide.” However, the Rome Statute does regulate ecocide as a crime in wartime, albeit without using that name.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means: . . .
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: . . .
[iv] Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. . . .27
In addition, the earlier Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which entered into force on October 5, 1978,28 also regulates ecocide in wartime in Article I without specific reference to that term: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.29
The “Understandings” relating to the treaty define the terms “widespread,” “long-term,” and “severe damage”:
Understanding relating to Article I
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of this Convention, the terms “widespread”, “long-lasting” and “severe” shall be interpreted as follows:
(a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers;
(b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.30
Article II defines environmental modification techniques as “any technique for changing through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes the dynamics, composition or
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. As of December 15, 2019, there were 123 parties. The United States signed the Rome Statute but is not a party. Rome Statute, U.N.T.C., Chap. XVIII, No. 10, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en#12 (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
28. As of December 15, 2019, there were 78 parties to ENMOD, including the United States. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, U.N.T.C., Chap. XXIV, No. 1, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ no=XXVI-1&chapter=26&clang=_en (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
29. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, art. I, 1108 U.N.T.S. 153. (Emphasis added.)
30. International Committee of the Red Cross, text of Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Understandings, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl. nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2AC88FF62DB2CDD6C12563CD002D6EC1 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”31 In sum, international law already recognizes wartime ecocide without reference to that term.
Environmental damage has long been an inevitable consequence of armed conflict, yet severe devastation has often been justified on the grounds of military necessity in ways that could not so readily be done if the casualties were human. Today, military ecocide is prohibited widely under customary and treaty international law, including within the Rome Statute. However, even examples where the environment and environmentally risky infrastructure have been targeted deliberately with a single act are not easy to prosecute. (Consider, for example, the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine in June 2023.) Due to stringent thresholds of intent that the perpetrator intended to cause the level of environmental damage, while also knowing that such an action was disproportionate to the military or economic benefit anticipated Article 8(2)(b)(iv) has never successfully been used.
An ongoing frustration in multiple jurisdictions with impunity for severe environmental harms has reignited the ecocide movement in recent years. The movement has also gained momentum under the leadership of global civil society organization Stop Ecocide International,32 cofounded in 2017 by late Scottish barrister Polly Higgins and current CEO Jojo Mehta. Stop Ecocide International is credited with playing a significant role in the development of ecocide law with their broad work in advising and supporting governments, institutions, and the public on the topic.
Environmental crime plays a dynamic and underappreciated role in the ecological and climate crises. Broadly defined, environmental crime refers to acts that violate environmental laws and are subject to criminal sanctions under the legal system. These crimes include the illicit trade of animals, fish, and plants, as well as unlawful extraction of minerals, illegal waste dumping, industrial pollution, and related corporate misconduct33 often involving organized crime networks. Although not all environmental harm is criminalized, and many environmental laws rely on administrative or civil penalties, the subset of violations that qualify as crimes represents a significant global challenge. With a combination of high profits, low incidence of detection, and weak legal deterrents, environmental crime is now considered by Eurojust to be the fourth largest criminal sector in the world.34 Yet it remains widely perceived as victimless and low priority, leading to chronically underresourced enforcement. This gap has serious implications, not only for ecosystems but also for human rights particularly those of environmental defenders and frontline communities.35
Many different legal and economic theories attempt to explain the need for criminal enforcement of environmental law. These include the failure of civil/administrative law to adequately deter violations;36 the significance to the international community, in terms of
31. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, art II. 1108 U.N.T.S. 153.
32. See the work of UK-based NGO Stop Ecocide International, https://www.stopecocide.earth.
33. Europol, Environmental Crime (online), https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/ crime-areas/environmental-crime.
34. Eurojust, Report on Eurojust’s Casework on Environmental Crime 7 (2021), https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/assets/report_environmental_crime.pdf.
35. See Chapter 15, “Human Rights and Rights of Nature.”
36. Timothy Schofield, The Environment as an Ideological Weapon: A Proposal to Criminalize Environmental Terrorism, 26 Boston Coll. Env’t Aff. L. Rev. 642 (1999).
moral outrage, that comes with describing a course of conduct as a crime; and economic analysis of crime, in the sense that an effectively enforced criminal statute raises the cost of certain types of conduct and therefore encourages compliance with laws and regulations.37 In sum, criminal law offers a strong deterrent against eco-criminals. The International Criminal Court has acknowledged in 2016 and 2024 the necessity to consider the environmental implications of the Rome Statute crimes.38
It has been argued that environmental crime’s detection and enforcement difficulties can be partially attributed to the fact that there is no universal definition of the practice.39 Unlike the field of human rights which is grounded in international treaties and declarations affirming core protections there is no written framework in international law that recognizes the criminality of severe environmental harm in and of itself, separate from acts in war. For example, there is no international recognition of the Rights of Nature, nor binding international conventions addressing violations of those rights. This legal vacuum is significant, as civil sanctions often fail to provide adequate deterrence (particularly if the profit incurred by environmental destruction outweighs an anticipated fine), and there is often no moral stigma attached to such violations. Conversely, a principal function of criminal law is that of social stigma, and the symbolic nature of declaring an action criminal particularly at the international level is significant.
International criminal law (ICL) identifies prohibitions that are the most serious and established violations of international legal norms,40 addressable to individuals, and definable with the clarity required for criminal law. ICL is still innovative: Its novelty is that it elevates prohibitions from civil state responsibility (or from domestic crime) to punishable individual crimes of the highest order.41 As the ultimate sanction, an international crime can and should have only a restricted field of application, facilitating coordination around collective social values deemed essential to the international community as a whole.
While the Rome Statute and ENMOD in effect regulate ecocide in wartime, there is no international agreement on peacetime ecocide. However, previous and current definitions of ecocide law, including proposals and codifications of the crime at national and regional levels, can provide some guidance.
Under the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is limited to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as whole,”42 specifically:
1. Crime of Genocide
2. Crimes Against Humanity
37. Byung-Sun Cho, Emergence of an International Environmental Criminal Law? 13 (2000); R. Pereira, The Internationalisation of Environmental Criminal Law 97 (2015).
38. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (Int’l Crim. Ct. Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf; Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Draft Policy on Environmental Crimes under the Rome Statute (Dec. 18, 2024), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-12/2024-12-18-OTP-Policy-Environmental-Crime.pdf.
39. Anna Maddrick, No Climate Justice Without Enforceable Law: Criminalising Ecocide , Int’l Rev. of Contemp. L. (2024), https://iadllaw.org/2024/11/no-climate-justice-without-enforceable-law-criminalising- ecocideanne-maddrick/.
40. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part 2, UN Doc. A/46/10, 85.
41. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, with Commentaries, ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part 2, 1994, 38-41; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l, 43-56.
42. Rome Statute, supra note 27, at art. V, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
3. War Crimes
4. Crime of Aggression.43
The late Polly Higgins, a Scottish barrister, activist and author, devoted her life to exposing and eradicating ecocide. She led an effort to establish ecocide as the fifth crime under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In 2010, she submitted a draft model ecocide law to the United Nations. Higgins’s definition, and others proposed by lawyers and academics, are laid out in Table 1, below. These definitions all would apply, at least in part, to nonmilitary activities of humans:
Table 18.1
Author Definition
Richard Falk
Benjamin Whitaker
Polly Higgins
Lynn Berat
Mark Gray
“To disrupt or destroy, in whole or in part, a human ecosystem.”44
“Adverse alterations, often irreparable, to the environment—for example through nuclear explosions, chemical weapons, serious pollution and acid rain, or destruction of the rain forest—which threaten the existence of entire populations, whether deliberately or with criminal negligence.”45
“The extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or will be severely diminished.”46
“Intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of any portion of the global ecosystem, via killing members of a species; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the species; inflicting on the species conditions of life that bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part: and imposing measures that prevent births within the group or lead to birth defects.”47
“Serious, extensive, or long-lasting ecological damage, that has an international dimension and is wasteful.”48
43. Id.
44. Richard Falk offers a “Proposed International Convention on the Crime of Ecocide,” which would define ecocide as any of a list of acts done “with intent to disrupt or destroy, in whole or in part, a human ecosystem.” Richard A. Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide Facts, Appraisal and Proposals, 4 Bull. of Peace Proposals 80, 95-96 (1973).
45. Benjamin Whitaker, Special Rapporteur on the Economic and Social Council, Revised and Updated Rep. on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ECOSOC, P33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1985/6.
46. Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide 63 (2d ed. 2015).
47. Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geocide In International Law, B.U. Int’l L.J. (1993).
48. Bronwyn Lay, Laurent Neyret, Damien Short, Michael Urs Baumgartner & Antonia A. Oposa, Jr., Timely and Necessary: Ecocide Law as Urgent and Emerging, 28 J. Juris 431, 434 (2015).
Table 18.1 (continued)
Author Definition
Laurent Neyret
Franz Broswimmer
“Any . . . intentional acts when they threaten the security of the planet and are committed as part of a widespread or systematic action.”49
“Acts that intend to disrupt or destroy species development and an entire ecosystem.”50
An important difference among these proposals is that some require criminal intent (mens rea) and others are based on strict liability (i.e., they do not require intent). Higgins argued that ecocide should be a strict liability crime like many other environmental offenses because (1) it is the consequence that is in question, not the conduct; (2) the gravity of the damage justifies conviction without proof of criminal intent; (3) enforcement would otherwise be largely ineffective; and (4) strict liability rightly places the focus on prevention of the crime and not the blame of the accused.51
The various attempts to define ecocide reflect a challenging reality: Although the concept can be easily understood, its legal elaboration is far more complex. Reconciling the flexibility required under international environmental law with the rigid standards of international criminal law raises complex legal considerations, not least because international environmental law has typically neglected Earth law principles, instead proposing regulatory schemes that largely see Nature as ancillary to economic activity.
We now turn to the panel of legal experts who addressed these legal challenges in depth to create a consensus definition of ecocide that would serve as the foundation of a global campaign.
Many of ecocide law’s substantial developments in recent years can be attributed to a proposed definition of the crime under the Rome Statute. This definition, agreed on by the international Independent Expert Panel (IEP) convened by the Stop Ecocide Foundation, was the consensus result of a six-month drafting project by the panel, published in 2021. This definition rapidly gained political and legal attention and is now widely associated with the concept of ecocide. It has catalyzed significant legislative developments since its publication and framed definitions of ecocide law in, for example, the EU and in Belgium.
The IEP defines the crime of ecocide as follows: “Unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or longterm damage to the environment being caused by those acts.” Within this definition are hundreds of hours of thought assessing each key word and phrase. We now explore some of the terms of art and boundaries of the IEP definition.
Environment: To ensure all aspects of the environment, including interconnections, are included, the IEP text defines environment on the basis of earth-system science identifying the five main zones of Earth’s environment (biosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, as well as outer space).
Acts: The qualitative nature of this definition ensures that it will include any actions, whether committed intentionally or through reckless disregard for consequences, of a kind that
49. Id.
50. Franz Broswimmer, Ecocide: A Short History of the Mass Extinction of Species 75, 109 (2002). 51. Higgins, supra note 46, at 68.
directly or indirectly expose the environment in its various components to an immediate risk of substantial degeneration, or endangering the safety of the planet, or the survival of humankind. The crime of ecocide is therefore committed by reaching a threshold of environmental destruction, rather than by a particular act.
Widespread, long-term and severe: The crime of ecocide requires some impact threshold to distinguish lesser environmental offenses, in addition to the constraining requirements on a given case for ICC suitability, such as the gravity assessment,52 the complementarity principle,53 and the interests of justice.54 Rooted in existing international law, the threshold of “widespread, long-term and severe” seems a normatively and legally appropriate trigger point to distinguish from lesser environmental offenses. This three-part criterion unveils a multipart test that combines “and” and “or” elements: the former ensuring only the most serious environmental degradation meets the legal threshold, thus maintaining the stigma and gravity that warrants international criminalization, with the latter ensuring a wider capturing of conduct within the crime’s scope.
Mens rea (intent): Regarding the mens rea of ecocide, it can be noted that a strict intention to commit ecocide, such as that found in the definition of the crime of genocide, would not be appropriate because people very rarely intend to destroy the environment; more likely, destruction is a means to an end or a byproduct of other military or commercial activity. On the other hand, simple negligence would be inappropriate for international criminal law, which is built on strong thresholds to maintain stigma and seriousness. Thus, when it comes to ecocide, “the remaining credible option is knowledge of some stipulated likelihood of harm.”55
Knowledge of substantial likelihood: Such knowledge can be proved where it is evident that the damage is likely to be irreversible and carry long-term effects, or is unable to be redressed in a reasonable period of time.
Unlawful: By also covering “unlawful” acts, this definition can invoke existing laws thus ecocide law can work harmoniously with existing bodies of law regulating the environment.
Wanton acts: In addition to activity that is by definition “unlawful,” the necessary knowledge element in the ecocide 2021 definition hinges on an application of a “wanton” standard to otherwise lawful behavior. In this regard, the drafters noted that it was important to propose a pragmatic definition that states could support, not venturing “beyond the boundaries of legal concepts which states are familiar with in international law.”56 Routine actions taken in good faith by industries critical to human well-being would not meet the legal standard for ecocide. Environmental damage as well as conduct that was lawful yet environmentally destructive in consequence, such as actions committed under an improperly obtained license, is covered by the term “wanton” a term already familiar to ICL and the Rome Statute. Indeed, “wanton” is particularly important in cases where destructive conduct is carried out under a properly obtained permit but with knowledge of the likely long-term harm.
Substantial likelihood (causation): This phrase takes a position on whether ecocide should be defined based on the occurrence of actual harm or whether it may be grounded in the
52. On gravity, see, e.g., M. M. Deguzman, How Serious are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 Col. J. of Transnat’l L. 18 (2012); M. M. Deguzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 5 (2008).
53. Rome Statute, Preamble, paragraph 10 and Article 17(1)(a)-(c).
54. Rome Statute, Article 53(1).
55. D. Robinson, Ecocide Puzzles and Possibilities 330 (2022).
56. C. Voigt, Ecocide as an International Crime: Personal Reflections on Options and Choices (2021).
potential or likelihood of serious harm. The Panel definition adopts the endangerment rationale: The fault is imposed by carrying out conduct in the knowledge that it is likely to cause the requisite harm even if such harm has yet to occur. This avoids the problems of having to await materialization of ecological catastrophe.57 ICL already has defined crimes that do not require materialization of the anticipated harm; for example, genocide (which does not require that destruction of a group be achieved), declaring no quarter, or launching an attack despite disproportionate risk.58
With an agreed-on definition in hand, the movement to criminalize ecocide at the ICC has built significant political support in the years since 2021.
This subsection describes an ecocide proposal at the ICC and the leadership role of a small Pacific Island. For states whose very existence is threatened by climate change, international commitment to sustained environmental remediation and future protection is paramount. This is of particular relevance to small island developing states in light of the threats posed by sea-level rise, climate migration, resulting breakdowns in legal and social structures, and potential risks to their very statehood.
With increasing geopolitical attention to the concept of the bioeconomy and with diverse financial and political interests at stake59 it is arguably imperative to set legal parameters to curtail the worst forms of environmental damage, especially regarding ecosystems that are immediately vulnerable and vital to climate-regulating and biodiversitysustaining biomes. Ecocide law may be well suited to this essential function, defining a crime that can cover severe and widespread or long-term environmental damage.
Vanuatu, a small island developing state located in the South Pacific, highly vulnerable to rising seas and climate change, is spearheading efforts at the United Nations to strengthen international law protecting the environment. Vanuatu not only led the process toward a consensus General Assembly resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the responsibilities of states for the climate change crisis it was also the first state to publicly call for adding ecocide to the Rome Statute as an independent crime.60 In December 2019, His Excellency John H. Licht, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the Kingdom of Belgium and the European Union, asserted:
The unprecedented challenges posed by climate change require unprecedented international cooperation. International law has a key role to play in this regard; however, this role has remained marginal in practice. . . . We believe that the city of The Hague, as the world’s capital of international law, has a special role to play in this regard. This august body the Assembly of States Party is supremely well-positioned to help realise this potential. Most notably, an amendment of the Rome Statute could criminalise acts that amount to Ecocide. We believe this radical idea merits serious discussion in the face of recent scientific evidence showing that climate change poses an existential threat to civilisations.61
57. Robinson, supra note 55, at 332.
58. Arts 6, 8(2)(b)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xii), 8(2)(e)(x) ICCSt.; see also Arts 8(2)(a)(ii)-3, 8(2)(e)(xi)-1, 8(2)(e)(xi)-2, Elements of Crimes, requiring only that health be “endangered.”
59. See, e.g., European Commission, Assessing Environmental Impacts, Knowledge Centre for Bioeconomy, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/bioeconomy/topic/assessing-environmental-impacts_en.
60. Republic of Vanuatu, Statement to the 18th Session of the Assembly of States Parties (Dec. 2, 2019), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sites/asp/files/asp_docs/ASP18/GD.VAN.2.12.pdf.
61. Id. at 3-4.
Five years later, in 2024, the Government of Vanuatu took the formal step of proposing an independent crime of ecocide to the ICC.62 This proposal, initially supported by the Pacific Island governments of Fiji and Samoa, and later the Democratic Republic of Congo,63 uses the Independent Expert Panel definition, noting:
[t]his definition, building upon established law with similar remits to ecocide law, has rapidly gained political and legal traction and is now widely associated with the concept of ecocide, having catalysed significant legislative developments since its publication.
The proposal urges the inclusion of ecocide as an independent crime under Articles 5 and 8 of the Statute, noting:
the requirement of human harm as a condition for bringing consideration of environmental aspects of crimes significantly restricts their effectiveness, both in protecting the environment and protecting humans. This is not least because very significant harms may be perpetrated upon elements of the environment without immediate harm to humans but with horrific longterm effects that will be very harmful to local, regional, or even global populations of multiple species including humans, constituting thereby crimes of most serious concern to the international community as a whole.
Whether or not ecocide will become a crime depends on the states parties to the ICC. A total of 125 states have ratified the Rome Statute, and although consensus is not required for amendment to the Statute, the goal of international criminal law is to reach consensus on a value presumed universal. At the same time, ICL has an even narrower remit than domestic criminal law covering only a tiny fraction of the conduct prohibited by states seeking consensus to ensure crimes warrant international concern and extraterritorial prosecution.
Common features of ICL crimes are that they (1) have great gravity, (2) generate impacts that cross boundaries, or (3) “shock the conscience” of humanity. In considering ecocide’s suitability for ICL, we may say that there is an increasing recognition that serious transnational environmental offenses affect the peace and security of mankind and violate customary rules and universal values. Hence these crimes could satisfy the first three criteria. Significantly, in 2007 the UN Security Council recognized that climate change poses a threat to peace and security of mankind.
Based on the leadership of Vanuatu and other nations, including some who face existential threats from climate change and other environmental pressures, ecocide law will likely continue to be considered within the ICC in the coming years as states parties seek the elusive consensus.
62. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Vanuatu to the United Nations, Proposal Independent Crime of Ecocide (Nov. 2024), https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Vanuatu-Proposal-Rome-Statute.pdf.
63. République Démocratique du Congo, Déclaration à la 23e session de l’Assemblée des États Parties (Dec. 3, 2024), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/asp_docs/ASP23-GD-DRC-3-12-FRA.pdf.
Ecocide is closely linked with cultural genocide. In one example, Indigenous Peoples, historically connected with natural habitats, say they are especially vulnerable to the side effects of expanding patterns of transnational production and consumption.64
Scholars Martin Crook and Damien Short have written about “ecologically induced genocide.” 65 This may occur when “‘ecologically destructive interventions’ for example, killing or destroying animals, fish, or crops . . . ‘undermine the life, existence and resistance of Indigenous populations’ and can be identified as an example of ‘textbook counterinsurgency “starvation” tactics’ that may form ‘part of a larger extermination strategy.’” 66 In The Genocide-Ecocide Nexus (2022), Crook and Short examine the intertwined nature of ecocide and genocide through detailed case studies from Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, and Brazil. 67
There is also growing attention to the genocide-ecocide nexus in international fora. For example, in 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, whose remit includes genocide, stated that it would prioritize crimes involving land grabbing and environmental harm, writing: “The Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute Crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land.”68 In 2024, the Office of the Prosecutor issued a new Draft Environmental Policy,69 which sets out “how the Office will use its mandate and powers to investigate and prosecute environmental crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction that are committed by means of or that result in environmental damage, what the Policy collectively refers to as ‘environmental crimes.’”70
In parallel with international efforts to define and recognize ecocide as a crime under the Rome Statute, a growing number of countries have enacted laws addressing ecocide or equivalent environmental crimes. Vietnam was the first to explicitly include the term “ecocide” in its criminal code in 1990, in the wake of the devastating impacts of Agent Orange. As of 2024, at least 15 countries had passed laws criminalizing large-scale environmental destruction, with varying definitions and degrees of enforcement
Table 2, below, lists the countries, their dates of adoption, titles of the statutes, and description of the crime.
64. Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and Ecocide 35, 36 (2016); Deniz Tekayak, Protecting Earth Rights and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards an International Crime of Ecocide, 14 Fourth World J. 2, 9 (2016).
65. Martin Crook & Damien Short, Marx, Lemkin and the Genocide-Ecocide Nexus, 18 Int’l J. of Hum. Rts 298, 299 (2014).
66. Martin Crook, Damien Short & Nigel South, Ecocide, Genocide, Capitalism and Colonialism: Consequences for Indigenous Peoples and Global Ecosystems Environments, 22 Theoretical Criminology 298, 299 (2018) (quoting A. Dunlap, The “Solution” Is Now the “Problem”: Wind Energy, Colonization and the “Geocide Ecocide Nexus” in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Oaxaca, 22 Int’l J. of Hum. Rts. 550, 557 (2018)).
67. Damien Short & Martin Crook, The Genocide-Ecocide Nexus (2022).
68. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, ¶41 (Sept. 15, 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3.
Table 2
Country and Date of Adoption
Title of Statute
Armenia (2003) Crimes Against Peace and Human Security
Belarus (1999) Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind and War Crimes
Description of Crime
“Mass destruction of flora or fauna, poisoning the environment, the soils or water resources, as well as implementation of other actions causing an ecological catastrophe.” (Art. 394)
“Mass destruction of flora and fauna, or air or water poisoning or any other intentional acts that may cause an ecological catastrophe.”
(Art. 131)
Belgium (2024) Belgian Criminal Code
France (2021) Climate & Resilience Act
Georgia (1999) Offense Against Humankind
Kazakhstan (1997) Crimes Against Peace and Human Security
“Deliberately committing, by act or omission, an illegal act causing serious, widespread and long-term damage to the environment.” (Art. 94)
“Offences which cause serious and lasting damage to health, flora, fauna or the quality of the air, soil or water.”71 (Art. 231-233)
“Ecocide i.e. contamination of the atmosphere, soil, water resources, mass destruction of fauna or flora, or any other act that could have led to an ecological disaster.” (Art. 1999)
“Mass destruction of vegetable or animal world, poisoning of the atmosphere, land and water resources, as well as commission of other actions, caused or could cause ecological disaster or environmental emergency.”
(Art. 169)
71. In France, ecocide now exists in two contexts. The first is as a “délit” under national law (Article 231-3), providing for up to ten years’ imprisonment for those committing offenses, and the second as a reporting requirement (Article 296). The approval was passed 44-10 in France’s Assemblée Nationale (lower house of Parliament). “In the most serious cases of environmental damage at national level . . . the government is obliged to report back to parliament within one year on its action in favour of the recognition of ecocide as a crime which can be tried by international criminal courts” (Art. 296).
Table 2
Table 2
Country and Date of Adoption
Title of Statute
Kyrgyzstan (1997) Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
Republic of Moldova (2002)
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Humanity, War Crimes
Description of Crime
“Massive destruction of the animal or plant kingdoms, contamination of the atmosphere or water resources, and also commission of other actions capable of causing an ecological catastrophe.”
(Art. 374)
“Deliberate mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning the atmosphere or water resources, and the commission of other acts that may cause or caused an ecological disaster.”
(Art. 136)
Russian Federation (1996)
Crimes Against the Peace and Security Mankind
Scotland (pending as of 2025)
Ecocide Prevention (Scotland) Bill
“Massive destruction of the animal or plant kingdoms, contamination of the atmosphere or water resources, and also commission of other actions capable of causing an ecological catastrophe.”
(Art. 358)
“Unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long term damage to the Scottish environment being caused by those acts.” (Art. No. Pending)
Tajikistan (1998) Crime Against the Peace and Safety of Mankind
Ukraine (2001) Criminal Offenses Against Peace, Security of Mankind and International Legal Order
“Mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning the atmosphere or water resources, as well as commitment of other actions which may cause ecological disasters.” (Art. 400)
“Mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning of air or water resources, and also any other actions that may cause an environmental disaster.”
(Art. 441)
Table 2
Table 2 (continued)
Country and Date of Adoption
Uzbekistan (1994)72
Vietnam (1990)
Title of Statute
Crimes Related to Environment Protection and Conservancy
Crimes of Undermining Peace, Against Humanity and War Crimes
Description of Crime
“Pollution or damage of land, water, or atmospheric air, resulted in mass disease incidence of people, death of animals, birds, or fish, or other grave consequences.” (Art. 196) (Removed in 2023)
“Those who, in peace time or war time, commit acts of . . . as well as other acts of genocide or acts of ecocide or destroying the natural environment.” (Art. 342)
In addition to state actors, in 2024 the European Union passed an Environmental Crime Directive that requires EU member states to adopt laws criminalizing “Conduct ‘comparable to ecocide’ where the conduct causes destruction or widespread and substantial irreversible or long-lasting damage to an ecosystem of considerable size or environmental value or a habitat within a protected site, or to the quality of air, soil or water.”73 (Art. 3(2).) Such laws are supposed to be adopted by member states within two years.
Although there has been one successful prosecution of a corporation under a national ecocide law a 2016 case in Guatemala against an international palm oil corporation, which saw the murder of one environmental activist on the court steps and harassment of others, and had little effect on the polluting operations of the corporation74 the authors are aware of no other successful convictions, of a person or corporation, of criminal violation of an ecocide law in any jurisdiction. Arguably, the reason for this is the culture surrounding environmental harms and offenses, which are traditionally viewed as less serious than other crimes, therefore not meriting as serious a legal response. Moreover, the piecemeal nature of much environmental regulation which is typically contained in multiple different statutes and regulations can make understanding and enforcement of environmental law difficult for judges to adequately define and deploy. It remains to be seen whether national-level ecocide statutes can be brought to bear in a more effective manner or if it will fall to international bodies to adjudicate such cases.
72. Uzbekistan’s 1994 Criminal Code was replaced in 2023 and any mention of ecocide was removed. See Ecojurisprudence Monitor, https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/1994-criminal-code-of-uzbekistan/?utm_ source=chatgpt.com. The exact reasons for this legislative change are not detailed in the available sources. On May 31, 2023, the President of Uzbekistan issued Decree No. UP-81, which addressed environmental crimes under a different framework entitled “On Measures for Transformation of the Sphere of Ecology and Environmental Protection and the Organization of Activities of Authorized State Body.” This decree outlined comprehensive measures to enhance environmental protection and introduced stricter penalties for environmental offenses.
73. In the EU’s latest revision of the Environmental Crimes Directive “qualified offences” comparable to ecocide could be punished with prison terms of eight years, those causing the death of a person with ten years, and the other offenses with up to five years. See Article 3(2) of the Directive for the full list of prohibited acts: https://www. europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0093_EN.html.
74. Cindy Woods, The Guatemala Ecocide Case: What It Means for the Business and Human Rights Movement , Due Process of Law Foundation (Mar. 10, 2016), https://dplfblog.com/2016/03/10/ the-guatemala-ecocide-case-what-it-means-for-the-business-and-human-rights-movement/.
Ecocentric law is an emergent movement in South Asia, with notable recent developments in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Rights of Nature are increasingly seen as the backbone of a new generation of environmental laws. However, successful implementation and practical enforcement remain a challenge.
In India, there have been at least two attempts by courts to recognize the Rights of Nature, with mixed results. In one decision, the first of its kind in India, the Uttarakhand High Court recognized the legal rights of personhood for the Ganges (or “Ganga”) and Yamuna (or “Jumna”) rivers and related natural systems. The ruling has been stayed by the Indian Supreme Court, which has not indicated when it will resume proceedings. The second decision, also by the Uttarakhand High Court, declared that the members of the animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic creatures, are legal entities and therefore have the same rights, duties, and liabilities as other juristic persons.
This chapter examines these cases to show the possibilities and difficulties posed by the “first generation” of Rights of Nature laws in India. It then explores a landmark Rights of Nature case for rivers in Bangladesh, which similarly demonstrates both the promise of legal innovation and the reality of setbacks. The chapter concludes with a summary of other Earth law innovations emerging across South Asia.
India is a federal union with 28 states and eight union territories. The Indian legal system is a hybrid of civil, common, and customary law, coupled with elements of Hindu and Islamic ethical and religious law, all molded into a framework heavily influenced by the country’s colonial past. India has a parliamentary system of government with three branches: the executive, legislative, and judiciary. The operations of these three branches are dictated by the Constitution of India, which was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in November 1949 and came into effect in January 1950.
1. Authored by Earth Law Center staff, Abhayraj Naik, Shanzay Asif, and volunteers. Special thanks to Jacquelyn Corday, Odaria Finemore, Jyoti Chaudhari, and Nikita Tanwar for their assistance.
The judiciary in India follows a common law, hierarchical structure, similar to that of the United States. The Supreme Court sits at the apex and is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the Indian Constitution. It is the final appellate court for all matters. At the next level are the high courts, which oversee judicial administration in India’s states and union territories. Various other bodies have a right to appeal to the high courts, including lower courts in the states and territories, the district courts, and Lok Adalats (agencies that resolve disputes through conciliation) at the village and panchayat (village council) level.2 Part III of the Indian Constitution provides that both the Supreme Court and high courts have the special constitutional responsibility of enforcing the “fundamental rights” of citizens.
The environmental regulatory system in India is largely comprised of central and state-level pollution control boards, the central and state-level environmental ministries, and specialized central and state-level regulators for coastal zones, biodiversity, groundwater, wildlife, animal welfare, genetic engineering, and so on. The legal and policy regime relating to climate and the environment in India is beset by a number of problems, the most serious of which include the high levels of fragmentation and scatteredness of legal sources and decision-making power, as well as the chronic inadequacies and lack of effective implementation of existing laws across all levels of governance.
The Rights of Nature movement in India took a significant step in 2016 when the High Court of Uttarakhand (“High Court”) gave legal status to the Ganga and Yamuna Rivers along with their tributaries, glaciers, and catchments. The case commenced as a citizen-suit when local resident Mohammed Salim sued the State of Uttarakhand to remove illegal construction and encroachments along the banks of the Yamuna River. Originating in the Himalayan foothills, the Yamuna is the second-largest tributary of the Ganges River. Salim also alleged that the state governments of Uttarakhand and neighboring Uttar Pradesh were failing to cooperate with the government of India (the central government) to create a Ganga Management Board, which was mandated under the Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Act (2000).3
In December 2016, the High Court ruled that the illegal encroachments and construction on government land be removed, that the governments of Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh join the Ganga Management Board and Upper Yamuna River Board within three months, and that all mining in the riverbed of the Ganga and its floodplains cease immediately.4 Much of the decision focused on issues of federalism, such as the respective roles of state and federal government in water management.
However, the central government, as well the governments of Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh, failed to comply with the direction of the High Court. In a further order issued in March 2017, the High Court judges expressed the court’s “serious displeasure” at the two state governments.5 Whereas the earlier order had focused on issues of federalism, the court’s second order decided that protecting the Ganga and Yamuna Rivers required the ambitious and unprecedented step of recognizing their “legal personhood,” in part based on their spiritual significance to the Hindu people.
The following are excerpts from the court’s order, written by Justice Rajiv Sharma.
2. National Informatics Centre, Indian Judiciary, Indian Courts, http://indiancourts.nic.in/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
3. Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, W.P.(C.) 126 of 2014, H.C. Uttarakhand, reserved judgment, ¶19 (Dec. 5, 2016).
4. Id. at ¶25.
5. Id. at ¶9.
Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand and Others
Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 (Mar. 20, 2017)
10. The extraordinary situation has arisen since Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are loosing [sic] their very existence. This situation requires extraordinary measures to be taken to preserve and conserve Rivers Ganga and Yamuna.
11. Rivers Ganges and Yamuna are worshipped by Hindus. These rivers are very sacred and revered. The Hindus have a deep spiritual connection with Rivers Ganges & Yamuna. . . .
12. In 1969 (1) SCC 555 their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commission of Income-Tax, Calcutta have held that a Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed through its Shebaits [ministers and custodians of the idol] who are entrusted with the possession and management of its property. In paragraph no. 6, their Lordships have held as under:
6. That the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juridical person has been expressly laid down in Manohar Ganesh’s case, I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247. . . . Such ascription of legal personality to an idol must however be incomplete unless it be linked [to human guardians]. . . . The Judicial Committee observed thus: ‘It is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an idol and the possession and management must in the nature of things be entrusted with some person as shebait or manager.6
[The High Court’s ruling continued by examining precedents recognizing other nonhumans, such as Hindu idols and deities, as “juristic persons” in Indian religious law. This provided legal support for the notion that the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers, both sacred rivers, could also be juristic persons under the law. Eds.]
14. In AIR 2000 SC 1421, their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Shri Som Nath Dass & others have held that the concept “Juristic Person” arose out of necessities in the human development. Recognition of an entity as juristic person is for subserving the needs and faith of society. In paragraph nos. 11, 13 and 14, their Lordships held as under:
11. The very words “Juristic Person” connote recognition of an entity to be in law a person which otherwise it is not. In other words, it is not an individual natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognised to be in law as such. When a person is ordinarily understood to be a natural person, it only means a human person. Essentially, every human person is a person. If we trace the history of a “Person” in the various countries we find surprisingly it has projected differently at different times. In some countries even human beings were not treated as persons in law. Under the Roman Law a “Slave” was not a person. He had no right to a family. He was treated like an animal or chattel. In French Colonies also, before slavery was abolished, the slaves were not treated to be legal persons. They were later given recognition as legal persons only through a statute. Similarly, in the U.S. the African-Americans had no legal rights though they were not treated as chattel. 13. With the development of society, where an individual’s interaction fell short, to upsurge social development, co-operation of a larger circle of individuals was necessitated. Thus, institutions like corporations and companies were created, to help the society in achieving the desired result. The very Constitution of State, municipal corporation, company etc. are all creations of the law and these “Juristic Persons” arose out of necessities in the human development. In other words, they were dressed in a cloak to be recognised in law to be a legal unit. . . . We may, therefore, define a person for the purpose of jurisprudence as any entity (not necessarily a human being) to which rights or duties may be attributed.
6. Id. at ¶¶10-12.
14. Thus, it is well settled and confirmed by the authorities on jurisprudence and Courts of various countries that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific development evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic person became inevitable. This may be any entity, living inanimate, objects or things. . . . This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith of the society. . . .
16. With the development of the society where the interaction of individuals fell short to upsurge the social development, the concept of juristic person was devised and created by human laws for the purposes of the society. A juristic person, like any other natural person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law. In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but only through a designated person, as their Lordships have held in the judgments cited hereinabove, that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific development, evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic person becomes inevitable. This may be any entity, living inanimate, objects or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the Courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith of the society. . . . Thus, to protect the recognition and the faith of society, Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are required to be declared as the legal persons/living persons.
17. All the Hindus have deep Astha [care, interest, faith] in rivers Ganga and Yamuna and they collectively connect with these rivers. Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are central to the existence of half of [the] Indian population and their health and well being. The rivers have provided both physical and spiritual sustenance to all of us from time immemorial. Rivers Ganga and Yamuna have spiritual and physical sustenance. They support and assist both the life and natural resources and health and well-being of the entire community. Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are breathing, living and sustaining the communities from mountains to sea.
18. The constitution of Ganga Management Board is necessary for the purpose of irrigation, rural and urban water supply, hydro power generation, navigation, industries. There is utmost expediency to give legal status as a living person/legal entity to Rivers Ganga and Yamuna r/w Articles 48-A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India.
19. Accordingly, while exercising the parens patrie [sic] jurisdiction, the Rivers Ganga and Yamuna, all their tributaries, streams, every natural water flowing with flow continuously or intermittently of these rivers, are declared as juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status of a legal person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person in order to preserve and conserve river Ganga and Yamuna. The Director NAMAMI Gange, the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttarakhand and the Advocate General of the State of Uttarakhand are hereby declared persons in loco parentis as the human face to protect, conserve and preserve Rivers Ganga and Yamuna and their tributaries. These Officers are bound to uphold the status of Rivers Ganges and Yamuna and also to promote the health and well being of these rivers.
The High Court made important connections between Articles 48A and 51A(g) of the Indian Constitution and the Rights of Nature. These two articles provide as follows:
• Article 48A: “The State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.”
• Article 51A(g): “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forest, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures.”
As applied to Rights of Nature, the High Court reasoned that achieving the environmental mandate of Articles 48A and 51A(g) for the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers required recognizing the two rivers as juristic persons. In other words, the current approach to environmental governance was not sufficient. “Today, the State and the citizens are under a fundamental obligation to protect and improve the environment, including forests, lakes, rivers, wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures,” the High Court concluded.7
Following the Uttarakhand High Court’s declaration that the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers are “juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status of a legal person,” that same court in Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand and Others extended the ambit of juristic persons to a wide range of natural entities that feed into these rivers, such as other rivers, glaciers, waterfalls, streams, lakes, rivulets, jungles, meadows, grasslands, dales, air, and forest wetlands. 8 Two natural entities were picked out for special attention: glaciers and forests. Emphasizing the existential threat faced by the Gangotri and Yamnotri Glaciers, the High Court wrote as follows.
W.P.(C.), No. 140 of 2015, H.C. Uttarakhand (Mar. 30, 2017)
It is the fundamental duty of all the citizens to preserve and conserve the nature in its pristine glory. There is a grave threat to the very existence of Glaciers, Air, Rivers, rivulets, streams, Water Bodies including Meadows and Dales. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that few cities are not livable due to higher level of pollutants in the atmosphere. The Courts are duty bound to protect the environmental ecology under the “New Environment Justice Jurisprudence” and also under the principles of parens patriae.
With the development of society where the interaction of individuals fell short to upsurge the social development, the concept of juristic person was devised and created by human laws for the purposes of the society. A juristic person, like any other natural person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law. In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but only through a designated person. For a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific development, evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic person becomes inevitable. This may be any entity, living inanimate, objects or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the Courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith of the society. All the persons have a constitutional and moral responsibility to endeavour to avoid damage or injury to nature ( in damno vitando).
Any person causing any injury and harm, intentionally or unintentionally to the Himalyas, Glaciers, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles and forests is liable to be proceeded against under the common law, penal laws, environmental laws and other statutory enactments governing the field.
The Union of India filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging this order. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of India ordered a stay of operation on the judgment and order passed by the Uttarakhand High Court. The Supreme Court also tagged this case with the Special Leave Petition challenging the Uttarakhand High Court’s judgment
7. K.M. Chinnappa, T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 10 SCC 606.
8. Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand and Others , W.P.(C.), No. 140 of 2015, H.C. Uttarakhand (Mar. 30, 2017).
in Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, where the operation of the High Court’s earlier order had also been stayed. Both these cases are still pending in the Supreme Court, with no significant pronouncements on the key issue of legal personhood and rights of rivers and other natural entities.
(1) One noteworthy aspect of the Uttarakhand High Court’s judgment was its invocation of the principle of parens patriae. Black’s Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as:
a. The State regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.
b A doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit. The State ordinarily has no standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be served by the suit.9
To this end, the High Court eventually appointed six government officials in loco parentis with a duty to protect, conserve, and preserve the two rivers and their tributaries in cooperation with seven local representatives. Having read the guardianship chapter and now learning about the case of Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, what challenges might impair the effectiveness of a guardianship body comprised of government officials in implementing the Rights of Nature? Based on the Court’s reliance on the juristic status of Hindu idols, what role might be served by a religious or spiritual element in a guardianship body that represents the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers? What benefits might result from the religion-rooted perspective? What drawbacks might be encountered?
(2) The government of Uttarakhand argued that recognizing the personhood of a river could lead to immense legal complications, posing the example of whether humans should be able to sue a river if it floods. Can an entity have rights without duties? What might the duties be? What benefits to society, if any, might be achieved if rivers had legal duties?
(3) Do you agree with the Uttarakhand High Court’s approach that legal personality is a useful alternative for river management? How would the legal personality approach change river management in the United States? How would the rights of rivers as legal personalities be balanced with human rights and interests? What is the proper balance? If you do balance, how do you avoid “balancing away” all of the important river protections, and at what point do Rights of Nature become no different than the current approach to protecting rivers?
In 2013 and 2014, Justice K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and the Supreme Court of India delivered five radically transformative judgments that established an ecocentric basis for
9. Shama Sinha, Doctrine of Parens Patriae, High Court and Supreme Court Judgments (Aug. 6, 2016), http://latestsupremecourtjudgments.blogspot.com/2016/08/doctrine-of-parens-patriae.html.
Chapter 9 South Asia: Rights of Nature in India and Bangladesh 223
Indian law. First, in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (the Asiatic Wild Buffalo judgment of 2012), Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and Chandramauli Kumar Prasad issued a series of directions to the Chhattisgarh government to protect the endangered Asiatic wild buffalo.10
Second, in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (the Red Sanders judgment of 2012), the same two judges issued a series of directions to the central government and to state governments for the conservation and regulation of the sandalwood plant.11
Third, in Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India (the Gir Lion judgment of 2013), once again the same two judges declared that endangered Asiatic lions, found only in Gujarat’s Gir forests, be provided a second natural habitat at Madhya Pradesh’s Kuno wildlife sanctuary.12 The judgment on the Asiatic lion draws attention to a “species best-interest standard” focusing on what is considered in the best interest of Asiatic lions, rather than human interests13 and links this to the intrinsic value of wildlife, the notion of endangered animal species having “equal rights to exist on this earth,” and other ecocentric law concepts.14 The judgment also interprets Article 21 of the Constitution of India upholding the right to life and draws out from this an “obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a species becoming extinct, conservation and protection of environment” as an “inseparable part of right to life.”15
Fourth, in Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment & Forest (the Niyamgiri judgment of 2013), Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan, Aftab Alam, and Ranjan Gogoi ruled that a proposed bauxite mining project in Orissa’s forests could not proceed without endorsement from local Tribal village assemblies. 16 This is considered a landmark judgment in Indian law because the Supreme Court effectively empowered the local Tribal village assemblies (Gram Sabhas) to decide on whether Vedanta’s bauxite mining project should be permitted in their forest territories. Importantly, all 12 Tribal Gram Sabhas in the affected area objected to the idea of the project in their territory, which, in line with the Supreme Court judgment, led to the requisite official environmental and forest “clearance” being denied. Although the judgment does not explicitly use ecocentric terminology or Rights of Nature approaches, it recognized and affirmed Tribal sovereignty and authority over forest lands. It also explicitly acknowledged the vital role of Tribal communities in environmental management and protection “because of their knowledge and traditional practices.” The Court further recognized that the Tribal communities viewed the proposed mining site as sacred, belonging to and directly embodying their Tribal deity, and that these religious, spiritual, and cultural beliefs must be central to deciding whether mining should be allowed in the forest.
Finally, in Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (the first Jallikattu judgement, delivered in 2014), Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose declared that jallikattu, a traditional bull-taming event in Tamil Nadu, as well as traditional bullock cart races in Maharashtra, were illegal under India’s Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. 17
10. T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 277.
11. Id. at 4 SCC 362.
12. Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India (2013) 8 SCC 234.
13. The court drew from the prevalence of this approach and language under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Convention (CITES).
14. Id
15. Id
16. Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment & Forest (2013) 6 SCC 476.
17. Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014) 7 SCC 547.
The Justices, citing ecocentric principles, stated: “When we look at the rights of animals from the national and international perspective, what emerges is that every species has an inherent right to live and shall be protected by law, subject to the exception provided out of necessity. [An] animal has also honour and dignity [of] which [it] cannot be arbitrarily deprived . . . and its rights and privacy have to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks from Indian and international law.”18 The judgment also connects India’s animal cruelty laws to the Constitution of India, particularly the Fundamental Duties to have compassion for living creatures (Article 51A(g)), to develop humanism (Article 51A(h)), and the Fundamental Right to life (Article 21). In and through these five judgments, the foundations for Rights of Nature in India were established.
Building on this ecocentric precedent, in July 2018, the High Court of Uttarakhand held in Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India and Others that all members of the animal kingdom are legal persons.19 The decision came in response to a petition filed for the protection and welfare of animals. The petitioner had sought to restrict the movement of horse carts (known as “tongas”) between Nepal and India through Banbasa in the Champawat district of India due to the suffering experienced by the horses. As a remedy, the petitioner sought vaccinations and medical checkups for the horses to detect suspected infections prior to entry into India from Nepal. By consent of the parties, the court expanded the scope of the petition to promote the protection and welfare of all animals. The High Court wrote as follows.
W.P.(C.), No. 43 of 2014, H.C. Uttarakhand (July 4, 2018)
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the Indian authorities have failed to regulate the entry of horse carts/tonga entering from Nepal to India. The horses are not medically examined. The fare and freight are not regulated. He has referred to the treaty [between India and Nepal] signed in the year 1991, revised in 2009. According to the treaty, the contracting party may impose restrictions for protecting public morals, protecting human, animal and plant life, safeguarding national treasures. He has also argued that there is overloading in the horse carts/tonga going from India to Nepal and vice-versa. The animals are treated with cruelty. The horses are abandoned in the Indian Territory. He then argued that the provisions of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the rules framed thereunder and the provisions of Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contagious Diseases in Animals Act, 2009 have not been enforced. He also argued that the animals are transported in violation of Transport of Animals Rules, 1978. The animals are transported on foot long distances causing immense pain and suffering to them. He also prayed that the entire animal kingdom may be conferred status of [a] legal entity/legal person.20
18. Id. at 51.
19. Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India and Others, W.P.(C.), No. 43 of 2014, H.C. Uttarakhand (July 4, 2018).
20. Id.
The High Court reviewed the relevant legislation, notably the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960, which states that a person commits cruelty to an animal if that person, amongst other actions, beats, kicks, over-rides, over-drives, over-loads, tortures or otherwise treats any animal so as to subject it to unnecessary pain or suffering or causes, or being the owner permits any animal to be so treated; or (employs in any work or labour or for any purpose any animal which, by reason of its age or any disease) infirmity; wound, sore or other cause, is unfit to be so employed or, being the owner, permits any such unfit animal to be employed.21
Additional legislation specifically applies to animals used in transportation, setting maximum loads and numbers of passengers, limiting working hours in hot weather, and imposing other restrictions.22
After examining animal cruelty legislation, the High Court then considered the question of animal suffering. Reviewing previous court decisions, it stated as follows:
75. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court . . . have held that an animal has also honour and dignity which cannot be arbitrarily deprived of and its rights and privacy have to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks. The principle of equality of all species found in Isha Upanishads [Sanskrit texts containing Hindu teachings] is the culture and tradition of the country, particularly the States of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. The PCA Act [Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960] has been enacted with an object to safeguard the welfare of the animals and evidently to cure some mischief and age old practices, so as to bring into effect some type of reform, based on eco-centric principles, recognizing the intrinsic value and worth of animals. So far as animals are concerned, “life” means something more than mere survival or existence or instrumental value for human beings, but to lead a life with some intrinsic worth, honour and dignity.23
Next, the High Court considered works by several authors on the emotions, intelligence, language, self-awareness, and other capabilities of animals. These included David R. Boyd’s book The Rights of Nature, 24 which the High Court quoted as follows:
On the frontiers of legal change, there is a growing global movement to recognize non-human animals as legal persons, a radical change that would endow them with the variety of legal rights. Animal rights advocates are not saying primates, cetaceans, or elephants are people. A “legal person” is not necessarily a human being, but rather an entity to which the law grants specific rights. A corporation is considered a legal person, as are ships, churches and municipalities. The rights and responsibilities of a legal person vary according to the nature of the entity. Corporations and human beings have different sets of legal rights and duties. For example, corporations may assert freedom of expression, but are not protected by the right to life.25
The High Court continued by tying its concept of a juristic person to the animal kingdom in terms similar to those employed in Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand and Others. It also cited religious perspectives on animals, including from Jainism and Buddhism, to support the notion of giving legal rights to animals.
84. Due to damage caused to environment and ecology, the avian and aquatic life is also threatened. There are gaps in laws. New inventions are required to be made in law to protect the
21. Id., quoting Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, No. 59 of 1960, § 11. (Section numbers removed from quotation.)
22. Id., quoting Prevention of Cruelty to Draught and Pack Animals Rules, 1965.
23. Id.
24. David R. Boyd, The Rights of Nature (2017) (footnote added).
25. Narayan Dutt Bhatt, supra note 19.
environment and ecology. The animals including avian and aquatic have a right to life and bodily integrity, honour and dignity. Animals cannot be treated merely as property. . . .
87. It would be pertinent at this stage to make reference of the book, “Sacred Animals of India ”, written by Nanditha Krishna. She has introduced every animal with the myths and legends that establish its religious status, followed by a short note on the ecological or social role of the animal, which made it important in people’s lives. The learned author has also discussed the Ahimsa and Non-violence preached by Lord Mahavira, Lord Gautama Buddha as under:
Ahimsa or Non-Violence
The concept of ahimsa or non-violence is India’s unique contribution to world culture. The Vedas and Upanishads were the first to speak of ahimsa. Although the Aryans were not vegetarians, the concept of non-killing appears in the earliest literature. The Rig Veda (10.87.16), condemns all forms of killing, even for food, preferring vegans to drinkers of milk:
The yatudhana who fills himself with the flesh of man, He who fills himself with the flesh of horses or of other animals, And he who steals the milk of the cow: Lord, cut off their heads with your flame.
The Yajur Veda says that service to animals leads to heaven: “No person should kill animals helpful to all and persons serving them should obtain heaven.” According to the Atharva Veda, the earth was created for the enjoyment of not only human beings but also for bipeds and quadrupeds, birds, animals and all other creatures. The emergence of all life forms from the Supreme Being is expressed in the Mundakopanishad from Him, too, gods are produced manifold, The celestials, men, cattle, birds.
These ideas led to the concept of ahimsa or non-violence. Much later, the Manusmriti says, “He who injuries innocent beings with a desire to give himself pleasure never finds happiness, neither in life nor in death.” The Shrimad Bhagavatam says that a cruel person who kills others for his existence deserves to be killed, and cannot be happy, either in life or in death. The consequences, according to the Yajunavalkya Smriti are that “the wicked person who kills animals which are protected has to live in hellfire for the days equal to the number of hairs on the body of that animal.” . . .
Although Sanatana Dharma did not require its adherents to be vegetarians, vegetarianism was recognized as a higher form of living, a belief that continues in contemporary Hinduism where vegetarianism is considered essential for spiritualism. Around the sixth century BCE, two great religious preachers were born, who took the Upanishadic philosophy of good conduct and non-killing to the people in the common language: Mahavira the Jina (Victor), and Gautama the Budha [sic] (wise). The name traditionally used for Hinduism. Both emphasized that ahimsa or non-violence was essential for a good life. . . .
The High Court concluded:
96. It is the fundamental duty of all the citizens under Article 51-A of the Constitution of India to have compassion for living creatures. It should be the endeavour of the State under Article 48 of the Constitution to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and take steps for preserving and improving the breeds. The State Government is required to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the counter as per Article 48-A of the Constitution of India. . . .
98. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “A. Nagaraja’s” case have held that Article 21 of the Constitution, while safeguarding the rights of humans, protects life and the word “life” has been given an expanded definition and any disturbance from the basic environment which includes all forms of life, including animal life, which are necessary for human life, fall within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. “Life” means something more than mere survival or existence or instrumental value for human beings, but to lead a life with some
intrinsic worth, honour or dignity. All the animals have honour and dignity. Every species has an inherent right to live and are required to be protected by law. The rights and privacy of animals are to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks. Their Lordships have evolved the term “species’ best interest.” The Corporations, Hindu idols, holy scriptures, rivers have been declared legal entities and thus, in order to protect and promote greater welfare of animals including avian and aquatic, animals are required to be conferred with the status of legal entity/ legal person. The animals should be healthy, comfortable, well-nourished, safe, able to express innate behavior without pain, fear and distress. They are entitled to justice.
99. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by issuing the following mandatory directions: A. The entire animal kingdom including avian and aquatic are declared as legal entities having a distinct persona with corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person. All the citizens throughout the State of Uttarakhand are hereby declared persons in loco parentis as the human face for the welfare/protection of animals.
In addition to this first declaration, the court issued more than two dozen directives to the state and municipal governments mandating measures to prevent the mistreatment of any cart-pulling livestock (e.g., horse, buffalo, camels).
The State of Uttarakhand and others filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India challenging the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court in Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India . While the case is still pending in the Supreme Court, the High Court’s declaration recognizing the entire animal kingdom as legal entities with the corresponding rights, duties, and liabilities of a living person, and declaring citizens of the state as persons in loco parentis for the welfare and protection of animals was stayed by the Supreme Court in January 2020.26
The 2014 judgment of the Supreme Court prohibiting jallikattu and bullock-cart races (Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja ) caused an uproar in Tamil Nadu and other states. These states subsequently passed state-level amendments to the prevention of cruelty to animals legislation to recognize these practices as part of their cultural heritage and effectively overturn the prohibitory effects of the Supreme Court judgment. Importantly, prevention of cruelty to animals is a subject on which both the national legislature and the state legislatures in India are competent to pass legislation (by virtue of entry 17 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India). Several states, including Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, also passed detailed rules or notifications for the organization and regulation of jallikattu, bullock-cart races, and similar activities. Eventually, the same issues came back before the Supreme Court on account of legal challenges to the state-level legal amendments. The Supreme Court reconsidered the 2014 judgment in 2023 and significantly diluted the earlier strong statement on constitutional rights for animals under Indian law.27
Apart from some passing observations in the 2023 A. Nagaraja judgment of the Supreme Court, the specific issue of all animals as living legal entities with rights has not been sufficiently elaborated on and is therefore likely to reappear in the legal register in the years ahead. Similarly, many progressive elements from Justice Radhakrishnan’s 2012 to 2014 judgments, discussed earlier, remain untouched by the brief observations on constitutional rights
26. The State of Uttarakhand v. Narayan Dutt Bhatt , Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 43990/2019, 13-01-2020, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42285027.
27. See The Animal Welfare Board of India & Ors v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 23 of 2016 (May 18, 2023) (overruling A. Nagaraja, affirming states’ legislative competence in balancing heritage with cruelty prevention, and permitting Jallikattu, Kambala, and bullock-cart races on grounds of cultural significance and compliance with animal welfare laws).
for animals in the 2023 judgment in A. Nagaraja, and thus are still applicable as persuasive and potentially binding legal authority in India. These include an emphasis on the need to move from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric approach, an acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of animals and all of Nature, and the linkages between the constitutional duty to have compassion for living creatures, the fundamental rights of persons to environment and to life, and the growing international movement recognizing rights and freedoms of animals. It is therefore likely that the rights of animals (and more generally, the Rights of Nature as well as the overall importance of ecocentric law) will continue to feature in legal arguments and in judicial decisions in the years ahead.
The ecocentric law movement in India, including the Rights of Nature, is still at a nascent stage. Despite the constitutional duty to have compassion for living creatures, the remarkable Supreme Court judgments of Justice Radhakrishnan from 2012 to 2014, and the High Court judgments on the rights of the Ganga and Yamuna Rivers and associated ecosystems, animals, and Mother Earth from 2017 to 2022, there is still a long way to go before ecocentric law and Rights of Nature become a well-established and influential part of Indian law. The developments so far have primarily been due to the creativity and foresight of a few individual judges. More concerted efforts to bring Rights of Nature cases to court such as the 2022 litigation in the Kerala High Court arguing for rights for the River Bharathapuzha 28 will undoubtedly help in supporting the development of ecocentric law in the Indian legal system. At the same time, nuanced scholarly analysis and empirically informed commentary on the prospects and challenges of Rights of Nature approaches in India helps bring greater visibility and aids lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and implementing agencies to devise contextually relevant formulations of ecocentric law.29
Notable principles of Indian environmental law such as the polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle, the strict liability principle, the principle of intergenerational equity, and the principle of sustainable development have evolved and become well-established in the Indian system through repeated judicial affirmation and eventual legislative codification. It is therefore promising to note the slow yet steady flow of High Court judgments over the last decade that have recognized the Rights of Nature, some of which have acknowledged the earlier Supreme Court judgments from 2012 to 2013 on the importance of ecocentric law. The Supreme Court judgment (authored by Justice M.M. Sundresh) in the forest-related case of The State of Telangana v. Mohd Abdul Qasim (2024 INSC 310), for example, explicitly endorses a move toward an ecocentric approach and respecting “the rights of rivers, lakes, beaches, estuaries, ridges, trees, mountains, seas and air.” 30 Although not including the words ecocentric law or Rights of Nature, another important judgment was issued in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2024 INSC 997). Justice Mehta’s judgment promotes the protection of sacred groves across India and calls for local communities to play a stronger role in protecting and preserving these groves. These cases provide hope that India will see many
28. See Friends of Bharathapuzha v. The State of Kerala & others, Writ Petition [RIL] No. 15940 of 2022 (May 11, 2022), https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/English-WP-No.-15940-of-2022-HighCourt-Kerala.pdf.
29. Shrishtee Bajpai, Rivers and Rights: Rights of Nature and Systemic Transformations in India, Heinrich-BöllStiftung (Jan. 30, 2025), https://www.boell.de/en/2025/01/30/rivers-and-rights-rights-nature-and-systemic-transformations-india; Stellina Jolly, Rights of Nature, in The Oxford Handbook of Environmental and Natural Resources Law in India (Philippe Cullet, Lovleen Bhullar & Sujith Koonan eds. 2024).
30. Id. at 31.
more judicial and sociolegal developments promoting ecocentric law and Rights of Nature in the coming years.
Known as the “Land of Rivers,” Bangladesh has 700 rivers flowing through its relatively small landmass. These waterways form the foundation of the country’s agriculture, transportation, and cultural identity. The Turag River, stretching 38 kilometers from Kholamora to Teramukh, has become emblematic of a national ecological crisis. 31 Some have referred to this waterway as “a dumping zone called Turag river,” 32 with 15 point sources dumping into the river industrial effluent and municipal sewage.33 Flowing by the Dhaka megacity, this river is also severely polluted from rapid urban expansion and population growth, including illegal developments.34
This section examines how the Turag River became the focal point of a landmark environmental case, detailing the ecological degradation caused by pollution and illegal encroachment, the public outcry sparked by investigative journalism, and the High Court’s unprecedented decision to recognize the Turag as a living entity with legal rights.
The existential threat to rivers in Bangladesh from pollution was further exacerbated by the rampant encroachment on riverbanks and illegal construction activities. Journalist Tawfique Ali’s article “Time to Declare Turag Dead” appeared in The Daily Star in November 2016, documenting the devastating transformation of the once mighty Turag River into what residents described as “a lean flow like a drainage ditch.” The article was quoted in the official court decision and brought national attention to how “ruthless land grabbers” had systematically destroyed one of Dhaka’s vital lifelines. Satellite imagery from 2013 to 2016 provided irrefutable evidence of the river’s gradual strangulation by illegal encroachment, industrial pollution, and unauthorized construction.
Shortly after, the organization Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh filed a writ petition positing that the systematic destruction of the Turag River violated citizens’ constitutional rights to life and a healthy environment and demanding immediate government action to halt further degradation and restore the river’s natural flow.35 A constitutional premise was established for the case through Articles 18A and 31-32 of Bangladesh’s Constitution. Article 18A mandates that “[t]he State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to preserve and safeguard the natural resources, biodiversity, wetlands, forests and wildlife for the present and future citizens.” The High Court connected this environmental mandate with fundamental rights provisions, arguing that environmental destruction violated citizens’ constitutional rights to life and property. The High Court’s decision was driven by the recognition
31. Bipul Kumar & Takeshi Mizunoya, Sustainability Assessment Model of the Buriganga River Restoration Project in Bangladesh: A System Dynamics and Inclusive Wealth Study , 14 Sustainability 873 (2022), https://doi. org/10.3390/su14020873.
32. A Dumping Zone Called Turag River, The Daily Star (Bangladesh) (Nov. 20, 2022), https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/dumping-zone-called-turag-3174146.
33. Id.
34. Alamgir Kabir, Hosney Jahan Sraboni & Md. Mahmudul Hasan, Eco-environmental Assessment of the Turag River in the Megacity of Bangladesh , 6 Env’t Challenges 100423 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j. envc.2021.100423.
35. Writ Petition No. 13989/2016.
that traditional legal approaches had failed catastrophically. Despite existing laws and repeated court orders, encroachment continued unabated. This systemic failure demanded what the court termed “extraordinary measures” for an “extraordinary situation.” The following excerpt from the High Court’s decision encapsulates the depth of legal reasoning and the court’s understanding of the systemic nature of Bangladesh’s river crisis.
Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh v. Government of Bangladesh and Others
Writ Petition No. 13989/2016
High Court Division, Supreme Court of Bangladesh Decided: January 30 and February 3, 2019
Judges: Justice Moyeenul Islam Chowdhury and Justice Md. Ashraful Kamal
Petitioner: Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh (environmental organization)
Respondents: Government of Bangladesh and 23 other respondents including various government ministries, departments (BIWTA, Water Development Board, etc.), and private encroachers
Justice Md. Ashraful Kamal
The other name of water is life.
“. . . and We made every living being out of water. . . .”
Al-Quran (21:30)
That means that both water and life are synonymous. Where there is water, there is life. Where there is no water, there is no life. No animals, plants and human being of this world can survive without water.
Bangladesh and its rivers are inseparably connected. Since time-immemorial, rivers have been the center of formation of societies and states, and have led the way to the progress of mankind. But today, the existence of the rivers of the whole world including Bangladesh is under threat of disappearing
Destroying the rivers is, after all, the same as our collective suicide. Destroying the rivers is like destroying our present and future generations
Due to the illegal encroachment on the Turag River, there has been an adverse impact upon the environment and immense damage to the livelihood and means of living of the neighborhood of the river has been infilled. Illegal encroachment has led to the illegal construction of factories, houses and buildings on the riverside. Such encroachments are illegal and are against the existing laws of the land. If such encroachment process of the Turag riverside is not halted soon, then the Turag River may soon be turned into a dead river. Considering the above-mentioned circumstances, Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh filed this petition pleading for directive to evict the illegal encroachers of [the] river and to halt any construction including earth filling or encroachment in the basin of such river.
According to Article 18A of the Constitution, the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to preserve and safeguard the natural resources, bio-diversity, wetlands, forests and wildlife for the present and future citizens. This means that the Constitution has not given the State ownership of the forests, bio-diversity, wildlife, seas, sea coasts, rivers, canals, channels, ponds and all other water bodies. In relation to the aforementioned resources, the State stands in the position of a legal trustee, whose obligatory duty is to protect and develop these resources on behalf of the people.
The Bangladeshi people are seeing on different print and electronic media how large corporations, commercial institutions and influential people are polluting the Turag and other rivers, lakes, seashores, riverbanks, marshes, wetlands, canals and open waterbodies and illegally encroaching them to build illegal structures, and such pollution, encroachment and illegal construction are still ongoing. Currently, the Turag River has turned more or less into a canal. In the future, it will turn into a drain. Thereafter, due to our inaction, the housing companies will possibly fill up the river and undertake residential plans there. The Turag River will remain in the pages of history, or poetry. Maybe some poets will write, “once there was a toxic Turag river.”
The clean and pristine water of the Turag River, the navigability of its waters, the riverine wind blowing over it, its scenic and incomparable beauty, the unrestricted movement and growth of its fishes, the control of pollution in [the] Turag River and its conservation are all valuable and protected by the Constitution, laws and the Public Trust Doctrine. All rivers including the Turag must be made free of pollution and encroachment and must be made for transportation.
If “special measures” are not undertaken in “specially important circumstances,” there is a possibility of irreparable harm which will be impossible to mitigate. The current matter is so significant, our existence is at the risk of extinction. The pollution and encroachment in the Turag River has reached such terrifying levels that, as the last option of protecting the River, we are declaring it as a legal person.
The “inaction” of the Respondents with regard to the protection of the Turag River from pollution and encroachment have been undertaken without lawful authority thus, it is declared that such “inaction” has no legal authority, and it is directed that the respondents ensure that the illegal structures, encroachment and pollution in the Turag River shall be removed at the expenses of the encroachers, as is their duty.
We, therefore, issue the following orders and directions:
1. The broad explanation, analysis and description of the Public Trust Doctrine made in the present judgment is a part of the law of Bangladesh.
2. Turag River has been declared as a legal person/legal entity/living entity. All rivers flowing within and across Bangladesh shall be granted with the same status.
3 The River Conservation Commission has been declared as the legal guardian (person in loco parentis) with regard to the conservation, protection and development of and removal of pollution and encroachment from Turag and other rivers. The National River Conservation Commission, with the cooperation of concerned organizations, departments and ministries shall be bound to remove all pollution and encroachment from rivers and make it fit for navigation, and protect, conserve and develop the rivers. All the concerned organizations, department and ministries shall be bound to provide all necessary assistance.
4 The “Precautionary Principle” and “Polluter Pay Principle” are declared as parts of our laws. . . .
6. Respondents No. 10 to 23 shall remove their encroachments from the concerned rivers within the next 30 (thirty) days. Otherwise, the National River Conservation Commission, with the assistance of concerned authority, shall evict the respondents at the cost of the Respondents themselves. The encroachers shall pay for the removal of the encroachment and for the return of the river to its earlier condition.
7 Respondent No. 1 shall make necessary amendments to the National River Conservation Commission Act 2013, declaring river encroachment and river pollution criminal
offences, imposing strict penalties for the offences and laying out the procedure for filing, investigating and trying such cases, and shall notify the court regarding the steps it has undertaken in that regard by submitting an affidavit within the next 6 (six) months. . . .
9. Respondent No. 1 shall undertake all necessary measures to make the River Conservation Commission an effective and independent body.
10. All the public and private schools, colleges, schools and colleges, colleges, madrasas, vocational training institutions, public and private institutions of Bangladesh shall, in every two months, conduct a one-hour awareness session on the importance of rivers and their conservation and protection from pollution in every class and shall conduct regular field visits to the rivers in the nearby areas. . . .
16. Secretary, Ministry of Education is directed to include subjects related to river conservation and pollution in the curriculum of schools, colleges and universities with the aim of raising awareness about rivers.
This case incorporates many elements discussed throughout this book: the public trust doctrine, human environmental rights, and, of course, the Rights of Nature. A core point of the decision establishes the state’s constitutional duty as trustee, rather than owner, of the natural world. The High Court interpreted this as creating a fiduciary relationship where the government holds rivers in trust for present and future generations, grounding it in Bangladesh’s specific constitutional text. Meanwhile, the High Court’s expansion of the right to life to include environmental quality mirrors developments in international human rights law.
Before turning to its own ruling on the Rights of Nature, the High Court cited a growing body of global precedent, drawing inspiration from the Whanganui River in Aotearoa New Zealand, the Atrato River in Colombia, and the Ganga River decision in India (among others) to support the recognition of legal personhood for rivers. Legal personhood was thereafter extended to all rivers in Bangladesh, creating one of the world’s most comprehensive Rights of Nature regimes, with a guardianship body established through the existing River Conservation Commission.
Notably, the Bangladesh High Court’s decision also embraced conceptualizations of rivers as gendered entities with spiritual significance. Drawing on the Bengali tradition of distinguishing between nod (male rivers) and nodi (female rivers), it explained that “oriental rivers are not only of feminine gender but also have some counterparts and secondly, some of them belong to their families.” This moves beyond a utilitarian or ecological rationale to recognize rivers as entities with familial relationships, spiritual essence, and intrinsic dignity. The case remains active as a “Continuing Mandamus,” allowing for ongoing judicial supervision of implementation efforts without requiring new litigation.
In February 2020, the Supreme Court’s Appellate Division the highest authority within Bangladesh’s Supreme Court overruled key parts of the High Court’s river personhood ruling, finding that it acted beyond its jurisdiction and without legislative support. For example, it found that the court exceeded its authority in declaring environmental principles like the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle “part of Bangladesh law” without proper legislative authorization, stating, “there is no scope for declaring by the Court to treat the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle as part of the law of this land” without parliamentary backing. The Court also found that due process was violated
Chapter 9 South Asia: Rights of Nature in India and Bangladesh 233
during the investigation and raised doubts about invalidating a land deal without properly reviewing the underlying agreement.
Although the river personhood declaration was not completely overturned, this Supreme Court intervention represents a major setback for the Rights of Nature movement in Bangladesh, effectively limiting judicial innovation alone. This appellate decision helps explain the limited implementation of the original ruling and why the National River Conservation Commission has struggled to exercise the powers envisioned by the High Court Division.
Other countries in South Asia such as Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and the Maldives are also beginning to explore ecocentric legal frameworks. Here we look briefly at the first two in this list.
In Pakistan, the Islamabad High Court made a historic judgment in Islamabad Wildlife Management Board v. Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad (2020), wherein Chief Justice Athar Minallah declared that “like humans, animals also have natural rights which ought to be recognized.”36 The court reasoned that as “life is the premise of the existence of a right,” animals possess legal rights under Pakistan’s constitution, particularly their right “to live in an environment that meets [their] behavioral, social, and physiological needs.”37 Building on this foundation, Pakistan’s Supreme Court advanced ecocentric jurisprudence in the 2021 case D.G. Khan Cement v. Government of Punjab, wherein it “referred extensively to the ‘Rights of Nature’” and ruled against industrial development that would harm groundwater, affirming that “the environment needs to be protected in its own right” rather than merely as a resource for human benefit.38
In Nepal, civil society organizations have been actively promoting ecocentric law and the Rights of Nature for several years. A huge success occurred in 2022, when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioners who opposed construction of the proposed massive Nijgadh International Airport based on a fabricated Environmental Impact Statement, while also acknowledging a Rights of Nature approach.39 The judgment refers to Rights of Nature developments from other countries including Aotearoa New Zealand, Colombia, Ecuador, and India.40 In another case, Nepal’s Supreme Court also dismissed a major extraction project in the environmentally critical Chure range because it would be tantamount to “ecocide” and violate norms of environmental justice and intergenerational equity.41
36. Islamabad Wildlife Management Board v. Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad, W.P. No.1155/2019 at 60 (Apr. 25, 2020).
37. Id.
38. See D. G. Khan Cement Co. v. Gov’t of Punjab, 2021 SCMR 834 (Pak.) at 12 (Apr. 15, 2021), https:// climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/d-g-khan-cement-company-v-government-of-punjab.
39. Prakashamani Sharma & others v. Prime Minister’s Office & Others (Writ No. 076-WF0006, 0007). See also the details of the case, Abhaya Raj Joshi, Nepal’s Supreme Court Axes Plans to Build Controversial New Airport, Mongabay (May 26, 2022), https://news.mongabay.com/2022/05/ nepals-supreme-court-axes-plans-to-build-controversial-new-airport/.
40. Chiranjibi Bhattarai, Connecting the Dots to Make a Story Traces of Rights of Nature from Nepal, Presentation at Interconnected for Nature Igniting the Rights of Nature Movement in the Asia-Pacific (Apr. 27–29, 2025, Mount Purro Nature Reserve, Phil.).
41. Shailendra Prasad Ambedkar v. Office of Prime Minister, Writ No. 077-WC-0099 (Nepal Sup. Ct. Const. Bench 2021).
Ecocentric law is gaining traction across South Asia, with courts beginning to recognize the intrinsic Rights of Nature and challenge human-centered legal frameworks. The specific doctrines may vary, but the region is increasingly receptive to recognizing the intrinsic rights of ecosystems. From landmark rulings in India and Bangladesh to emerging developments across the region, these shifts signal a growing commitment to ecological law rooted in local constitutions, cultures, and ecosystems. Although there have been setbacks, including in landmark judgments in both India and Bangladesh, South Asia is emerging as an important geographic region in the global Earth law movement.
(1) In Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India and Others, the High Court examines in detail the concept of ahimsa or nonviolence and explains that in “Jainism, ahimsa is not the mere causing of violence, but rather the ‘severance of any of the vitality in a mobile or immobile being.’” Is there anything in the foundations of U.S. law that reflects these concepts? Compare and contrast this conceptual framework used by the High Court of Uttarakhand with the approach in U.S. law. “Personhood” as applied to Nature attempts to apply personhood rights given to humans to Nature. What is the benefit of this approach? What alternative Earth law strategies exist to granting aspects of Nature legal rights without granting them status as “legal persons”? Discuss and explain the pros and cons of these different approaches.
(2) Each of the cases discussed in the India section of this chapter come from the High Court of Uttarakhand. How does the case law created in one jurisdiction inspire or persuade courts in other jurisdictions?
(3) Bangladesh’s approach to granting legal personhood to rivers presents both parallels and notable distinctions from India’s Uttarakhand High Court decision. Both nations share similar colonial legal heritage and constitutional frameworks emphasizing environmental protection. However, a significant difference lies in their theoretical basis for legal personhood. Where India’s Uttarakhand High Court relied heavily on the juristic status of Hindu idols and deities as precedent for river personhood, Bangladesh’s High Court Division grounded its reasoning in the public trust doctrine and constitutional human rights provisions. How do you think the Rights of Nature movement is affected by local cultural understandings and legal norms? Do you believe that Nature’s rights will inherently reflect the places where it exists, or are they better expressed in more universalist terms?
(4) As with South Asia, Latin America, and other “hot spots” in the movement, do you think that treaties could emerge establishing common principles of the Rights of Nature for transboundary ecosystems? What opportunities and challenges might there be?