Europe's economic freedom
Europe's economic freedom By Gerhard Gebhardt
The new Europe
Publication series of the Society for European Economic Planning and Large -Scale Economics e.V., Berlin
Scripture 3
Publishing house Glückauf GmbH., Essen 1941
The numbers in this book are taken:
Stat. Yearbook for the German Empire Stat. publications of the League of Nations Int. Institute of Agricultural Economics in Rome Special manuals of the Mining Association, Essen Northwest Group of the Ironmaking Industry Economic Group Metallgesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.
Foreword As the author has informed me, the paper "Europe's Economic Freedom" was written on the basis of su ggestions he has received from my lectures and writings over the years. The "Ruhr und Rhein Wirtschaftszeitung", of which the author is a member of the editorial board and in which the essays summarized in this book have been published, deserves the credit for having investigated this area of question and for having put it up for discussion. This little book is of fundamental. importance. For here, for the first time, a successful attempt has been made to grasp, also statistically, the economic and vital forces of Europe in the large -scale European economy. From this arises the necessity to also include in figures the other non -European largescale economies that are in the process of formation, and also to let them appear before our eyes as natural living s pace economies that are able to live first and foremost from their own space and from the own strength of their peoples. The author has thus fulfilled one of the most urgent tasks of our time in the field of economic policy, which has not yet been accompli shed by the large economic-scientific apparatus in Germany and abroad. The reason for this is that the goal and necessity of European economic independence have not yet been recognized at all. No economist will be able to ignore this little book. A young N ational Socialist who absorbed the teachings of the National Socialist revolution in the economic field deserves priority here. A few brief supplementary remarks on this: As I have been arguing for many years, the meaning of the present world revolution, which entered its critical stage in 1914 with the beginning of the World War, is that the world is again dividing itself into biologically bound habitats. Six habitat agglomerations are already politically, economically and culturally distinguishable from e ach other today: 1. the East Asian habitat with a population of about 560 million; 2. the Indian-Malay living space with a population of about 520 million; 3. the European habitat with a population of about 530 million; 4. the African habitat with about 16 0 million; 5. the North American habitat with approx. 185 million and 6. the South American habitat, which is clearly distinguishable from it, with approx. 95 million.
American habitats are only in the process of development. As a result of deliberate immigration restrictions, they will become increasingly distinct and differentiated from one another in the coming generations. These six habitats are now in an interesting relationship to each other in that those to the north - probably as a result of the ir harsher living conditions are developing the stronger political and economic formative forces compared to those to the south. Thus the East Asian habitat as East Asian large -scale economy finds its tropical complement in the first place in the politic ally and economically less active Indo -Malay habitat, the European large -scale economy in the African continent, while the North American and the South American habitats represent two biologically and economically completely separate habitats despite their geographical affiliation. Only in the second place, besides the predominant north -south complementary tendencies of the three large double -spatial groups, are their cross-connections. These offer then the last economic complementary possibilities as the n ew form of the world economy. Between these six living space economies and their more and more consolidating natural relations among each other, the artificial structure of the English world economic system is finally pulverized. Since the families of peoples of the six different habitats cannot leave their eternal spaces of birth and rebirth in the long run without degenerating or degenerating again, in this reorganization of the world lies at the same time the basis of its political and economic pacificat ion. For the idea of living space has a naturally pacifying effect in political, economic and cultural respects, because it is bound by natural law to nationality, race and soil and therefore cannot be handled arbitrarily and imperialistically. Habitat ver sus imperialism is thus the new principle of world order. The English -American world economic system was built on constant interference with the natural Lebensraum economies, whereas the National Socialist doctrine of Lebensraum economy leads to an unconstrained order. If nowadays here and there pure scholarship tries to twist the newly created terms: Großraumwirtschaft and Lebensraumwirtschaft into "economic Großräume" or "economic Lebensräume", this enterprise proves that one has not yet grasped the meani ng of the new world and economic order; for "economic Großraum" and "economic Lebensraum" are nonsense contrary to life. This self-congratulatory attitude has, moreover, its reason in the fact that the development predicted by me for many years has been un animously fought against or disregarded, but now, after it has become reality, one tries to claim it for oneself with other names. But history is incorruptible and will weigh all things according to their natural weights. February 1941.
Werner Daitz
Intra-European economic integration
If one wants to assess the future possibilities of a European large -scale economy, one must first be clear about the structure of the European "domestic economy" so far. As can be seen from any statistical handbook, even today - despite 400 years of neglect of the European domestic economy - the foreign trade figures of the European countries show a stronger interdependence with the continent than with any other continent or metropolitan area. The only excep tion so far has been Great Britain, precisely because it is the European country that has most strongly removed itself from the community of life of the peoples of the mainland and has instead sought to build its own large economic area. From this strong intra-European economic interdependence, one can derive the justification for distinguishing between a European domestic economy and European foreign trade, even in retrospect of the previous state of affairs. Consequently, however, the exchange of goods be tween the individual European countries must also be counted as part of the domestic economy, and the exchange of goods within Europe must be excluded from European foreign trade and world trade, in contrast to the generally accepted statistical approach. Without wishing to anticipate future political developments, the term Europe cannot be defined too narrowly in such a framework. In the following, therefore, Europe will always be understood to mean the entire continent, including the British Isles and the Soviet Union, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Through the German -Russian treaty, Russia has become a member of Europe. In order to ensure the comparability of the figures, the year 1937 has generally been chosen as the basis for comparison. Due to the reorganization of Europe, the conditions of that year have of course become obsolete in many respects, but they are the basis on which the new structure is built. The conclusions for the future are mostly self -evident from the recognition of the mistakes and weaknesses of the past. Natural European Economic Entity If you are not used to looking at Europe as a whole, you will be surprised at first to see how much all European countries depend on the continent itself as the actual basis of their economy. Bef ore the European war, about 53% of the total imports of all European countries came from the countries of the continent itself. Of exports, almost 65% remained in Europe. The difference between the share of imports and exports in total European domestic tr ade clearly shows the previous development. Up to now, Europe had a passive trade balance with the rest of the world, because the continent had increasingly come to live off foreign soil in recent centuries. The picture 6
becomes even clearer when the fore ign trade of the most important European countries is examined in terms of its interdependence with the European area and the rest of the world. The numerical relationship between imports and exports that emerges in overall European domestic trade also app lies on average to the foreign trade of the individual countries with the continent. For example, about 58 percent of German imports in 1937 (including Austria) came from European countries. At the same time, however, almost 71% of German exports went to E uropean countries. For the former Czechoslovakia, the ratio was 61% to 74%; for Poland, 64% to 81%. For France, domestic European trade accounted for about 40% of imports and 54% of exports; although the figures are lower, the ratio is the same. In contras t, only around 35% of British exports and imports were accounted for by European domestic trade. When looking at European domestic trade from this point of view, it is particularly striking that the highly developed industrialized countries of the West conduct a considerably smaller share of their foreign trade in Europe than the European agricultural countries, of whose foreign trade turnover especially in the case of the countries of the Southeast and East - Europe sometimes accounts for 90 percent or m ore. Nevertheless, there is no country in Europe - with the exception of England - that does not have more than half of its sales anchored in Europe. In the case of France, however, it must be pointed out that only about 40 percent of its imports are accou nted for by Europe. This can be explained by the fact that France is the country with the highest sales to Africa. Incidentally, if Africa and the Middle East are included in the European economic area, which goes without saying in view of the economic affiliation of these regions, then Europe's domestic trade accounts for more than 60 percent of imports and about 75 percent of exports. If one draws conclusions from these purely statistical findings, it is clear that the European domestic economy has been a ble to retain a strength that makes the continent a unified economic area all by itself, despite all its orientation toward the world economy.
7
Share of European domestic trade in the countries' foreign trade in %.
1937 German Empire (w. Austria) former Czechoslovakia former Poland-Gdansk Albania Italy Belgium-Luxembourg Bulgaria Denmark Estonia Finland France Greek Great Britain Ireland Iceland
Import 58,30 60,78 63,96 86,67 54,87 57,28 95,71 87,35 80,00 77,83 40,24 79,33 35,03 67,96 93,10
Export 70,60 74,08 81,08 87,50 50,15 70,85 92,16 94,11 94,44 81,96 54,32 74,67 35,69 97,15 87,50
1937 Yugoslavia Latvia Lithuania The Netherlands Norway Portugal Romania Sweden Switzerland Spain Turkey Hungary USSR All of Europe
Import 84,64 81,25 88,76 61,18 73,75 64,23 89,94 67,16 75,37 70,08 76,11 89,40 53,06
Export 90,48 96,05 94,25 73,62 75,64 66,92 90,90 75,18 71,72 86,12 80,67 89,58 76,44
52,94
64,50
England's special position
Another important insight that can be gleaned from the figures is the out of the ordinary position of England. With little more than one -third of its total imports and exports, Britain has been rooted in Europe. This special position weighs all the more heavily because Britain has had more extensive foreign trade than any other European country. More than any other mainland country, England broke away from the European community at an early date, and at the same time she made the ideationally related detachment from her own soil. England has always been the merchant among European countries. If this basic feature of the English economy is taken together with the position which England has occupied in the financial economy of the world in recent centuries, and if at the same time the role of the Jews in English economic lif e is known, then it does not seem surprising that the strongest impetus for the dissolution of the European economic community has emanated from England, and that the island kingdom has tried to the last with all the military, political and economic means at its disposal to nip in the bud any attempt at European unity. Germany's natural leadership position If the importance of European domestic trade for individual economies has been considered so far, the next question to be examined is the weight of the 8
individual economies for European domestic trade. If one compares the shares of the individual countries in the total value of European domestic trade, one is immediately struck by the clear leading position of Greater Germany: In the following compilatio n, the European countries have been grouped into larger groups according to predominantly political criteria, based on the foreign trade statistics of 1937.
Shares of individual country groups in European domestic trade in %.
German Empire North and Northwest European countries Italy Southeast Europe Russia und Baltic States Great Britan Other Western European countries Of which France
Import 21,50 26,24 4,95 7,13 2,81 20,26 16,21 (8,47)
Export 30,00 27,46 3,58 9,05 4,65 11,94 12,97 (6,82)
The Greater German Reich group also includes, with approximate values, the Protectorate and the Generalgouvernement; the North and Northwest European country group also includes Holland and Belgium. The table shows that the Greater German Reich, together with the northern and northwestern European countries, accounts for more than half of total European domestic trade turnover. The same group of countries includes apart from Italy - all the main industrialized countries of the continent, especially if Alsace and Lorraine are also taken into account. It can thus be seen that the countries of the Northeast Sea region are the main focus of trade policy.
Europe feeds England
After Germany, Great Britain had a particularly strong share in European domestic trade. However, it also had a special position in this respect in that it purchased almost twice as much from Europe as it supplied to it. The explanation for this became particularly apparent during the war. For a long time England has abandoned food from its o wn soil in favor of extensive food imports. Whereas Europe used to supply even staple foods, such as grain, 9
during the last century England has increasingly purchased high -value agricultural products from the mainland. About half of continental Europe's food exports have gone to England in recent years. Various European countries, such as Denmark and Holland, had virtually specialized in British requirements. The situation was similar with regard to England's requirements for certain raw materials. Compared to the high share of British imports in European domestic trade, the share of exports - measured in terms of the country's economic strength - was below average. The share of British exports in Europe's domestic trade of 11.94 percent contrasted, for ex ample, with the share of small Belgium of almost 8 percent. The same lopsidedness is evident in the distribution of British trade among the individual countries of the mainland, as a comparison of English exchanges with Scandinavia and roughly the Southeas t proves. -In support of its claim to leadership, England has sought to compensate for its lack of economic ties with the mainland as a whole by a policy of politically oriented borrowing. Germany, on the other hand, compared with England, has hitherto sho wn a much greater balance in its trade with the European countries, a sign of natural ties.
Russia's and Italy's position expandable
The small share of Russia in European domestic trade is also astonishing. The reasons for this were probably mainly political, since Russia in 1913 still accounted for 7.3% of European domestic imports and 9.9% of European exports. The trade agreements concluded since 1939 by the Soviet Union with Germany and various other countries have already considerably increased t he importance of European trade with Russia; they aim at far surpassing the pre war figures of 1913. As a result, the Soviet Union is once again becoming an integral part of the European metropolitan economy. Italy also has a relatively small share. This i s partly due to the abnormally strong trade in goods with Africa, and partly also to the previous political conditions in the Mediterranean region. Here, too, the war has already initiated a reorganization that will be of increased importance in the future .
The exchange of goods within Europe
The commodity structure of European domestic trade also underscores the 10
economic interdependence of the continent. In the years after the world war, almost a quarter of goods exchanged consisted of foodstuffs, ano ther quarter of consumer goods, 10% of means of production and around 45% of raw materials and semi-finished goods. Of the total exports of foodstuffs and beverages, about 90% of unprocessed products and 70% of processed products remained in Europe, coveri ng about a third and a good half of import requirements, respectively. Of the exports of raw materials and semi -finished goods, about 80% were traded domestically, thus covering a good half of the total imports of all European countries. Thus, while in foo dstuffs and raw materials Europe has had considerable import requirements from other areas in addition to its own production, the picture is quite different in the group of finished goods in view of the industrial performance of the continent. Of total exports of manufactured goods, only about half remained in Europe, but they covered more than three -quarters of the import requirements of all countries. In the case of consumer goods, half of total exports were able to satisfy virtually all import requiremen ts. This balance of the exchange of goods, however, allows only very rough conclusions to be drawn about Europe's self-sufficiency possibilities, since the exchange to date has been strongly influenced by political and trade considerations and ties. Above all, however, the goal of European self sufficiency has been missing altogether. The Finished goods Raw materials and semi-finished goods Food reorganization of the world into racially bound living spaces with independent large -scale economies, as first pointed out by Werner Daitz *), will bring us closer to this goal.
The intra-European exchange of goods
*) Se e : W ern e r Dai tz, N eu o rd n u n g E u rop a s au s Ra s se u n d Rau m. N S. - M on at sh e ft e, E p i sod e 12 6/ 19 4 0. Th e s am e : D ie eu ro p äi s ch e Gr oßra u mw ir ts ch a ft. Jou rn al " Th e Fou r - Y ear P lan ", No. 22 , 19 39 . De r s elb e : Da s n eu e E u r op a, s ein e L eb en s ein h e i t u n d R ech t sord n u n g . G er man La w ," i s su e 49, 1 94 0.
11
Strong production -economy linkage At first glance, the high share of raw materials and semifinished products in Europe's domestic sales is very striking, accounting for almost half of all goods. This confirms that there has always been a strong interdependence of production economies and an extensive division of labor in Europe. It is well known, for example, that countries which can undoubtedly meet their domestic needs nevertheless exchange certain raw materials or semi -finished products, such as coal, iron and textiles. The exchange of goods within Europe is therefore by no means limited to the primitive exchange of finished goods for raw materials, but shows a complicated interdependence, such as exists between the individual provinces of a country. This, too, is proof that Europe is by nature a closed economic area and an area of economic concentration, to a far greater extent than any other continent or large area.
New structure In the future, it will be necessary to bu ild on these natural conditions of the continent, which have survived for centuries despite the neglect of the European domestic economy, especially that of Eastern Europe, by the leading political powers. For the European economic interdependence that has existed up to now is not yet a large -scale economy. One need not even think of the times of the German Hanseatic League *) to realize that a steady development can only be achieved by the conclusion of long -term economic agreements among the European stat es. Only then will it be possible to give the European area a unified economic goal again and to extract from it again that maximum of food, raw materials and labor which it is actually capable of offering. The German example in the Four -Year Plan and in t he far-sighted economic policy agreements with the southeastern states, as well as the far -reaching Italian autarky achievements, best answer the question of future prospects. Once the political troublemakers have been eliminated, a division of labor will also be able to take hold in the long run. The world economic "cyclical fluctuations" will then lose their terrors of their own accord, and the right to work will not be an exclusively German prerogative in a new European domestic economy. Speculators and certain international profiteers may lose the appropriate breeding ground in such an order, but the peoples of Europe will only gain.
*) S ee : W er n e r Da it z, We g e zu r vö lki s c h en W irt s ch a ft Gr oßr au mw ir ts ch a ft . M ein h oid - V erl ag, D re sd en A 1 . 19 38 .
12
und
zu r
eu rop ä i sc h en
The previous exchange with overseas
The formation of a European economic community and the reflection of the European peoples on their tasks in their own area will also be of fundamental importance for Europe's relations with the rest of the world. This does not mean, however, that Europe is striving for complete self -sufficiency and wants to close itself off from the rest of the world. The future global economic question for Europe is not self -sufficiency or export, but self-sufficiency and export.*) In his opening speech at the German Eastern Trade Fair in 1940, Reich Economics Minister Funk clearly stated that Germany and Europe are by no means willing to withdraw from world trade. But Europe will first secure its economic freedom and then be able to enforce acceptable conditions for its participation in the world economy. The transition of some large overseas trading houses in Hamburg or Bremen to trade on the mainland, made necessary by the British blockade, will thus be only an interlude. With the end of the war, the German overseas merchants will take up their posts again, but behind them and behind the German branches in North and South America, in East Asia and the East Indies, there will be a new power: the Greater German Reich and the European Greater Economy. Then those overseas raw material countries which have hitherto seen Europe merely as a collection of feuding states and peoples will have to realize that conditions can no longer be imposed on the most important economic powerhouse on earth on the basis of old claims of guilt or out of certain political dislikes, but that trade with Europe can only be conducted on the principle of equality and reciprocity. Then, to the advantage of all European peoples, the trade balance of the co ntinent will also take on a different face.
Europe's passive trade balance
It is a peculiar phenomenon that the most industrially oriented part of the world has had a highly passive foreign trade balance with the rest of the world up to now, although it is precisely European labor that creates and increases value.
*) W ern er Dai tz, A u tar k ie a l s L eb en s - u n d Wi rt s ch a ft sor d n u n g. NS . -M o n at sh e ft e, E p i sod e 12 9/ 19 4 0.
13
A comparison of trade results in 1913, 1929 and 1937 shows that this development has even mad e further progress in the last 25 years. However, the actual reasons for this lie further back in time. Werner Daitz first drew attention to this and gave as a reason that the unfair exchange of services between Europe and overseas, which was initially bas ed on colonial affiliation, is gradually shifting more and more toward a fair exchange of services as the overseas areas grow stronger politically and economically and develop a life of their own.
Europe's trade with the rest of the world after deduction of European domestic trade Year 1918 1929 1937
Import in Bill. RM 21,2 35,7 18,1
Export in Bill. RM 14,3 23,0 10,6
Export as % of Import 67,45 64,43 58,56
After the time of the great discoveries, the new colonial spaces seemed to offer economic opportunities such as had never existed in Europe. However, the exploitation of the riches of the New World was soon no longer limited to precious metals, but, with t he increasing economic expansion, spread to the products of farming, plantations and mining. At first, these imports from overseas areas were relatively cheap and placed little burden on the hanaeis balance of the European colonial states. This changed, ho wever, as the economic development of the colonial areas of the Americas progressed. The relationship with Europe even took on a completely different look when the majority of the large American colonies, following the example of the United States of North America, fought for independence at the beginning of the last century. They had become equal trading partners and now imposed conditions on their part. Since the world war, the relationship of dependence even seemed to have reversed. The repercussions of this development toward an Anglo -Saxon world economy have been a far-reaching neglect of the economic foundations of Europe's own region. The characteristic example here is again England. England has literally renounced the use of its own soil for food. It could not pay for its enormous import from overseas, which represented no less than 46.5 percent of the entire European import from the rest of the world, by its export, but it believed that it could compensate for it indefinitely with its capital gains throughout the world. How unnatural and unsustainable such an attitude is in the long run has already been demonstrated by the developments of recent years: the balance of payments of Great Britain has also become passive. 14
England, the country of the "re ntier economy," was already living off its capital before the European war.
This is how it was before 1939: Of Europe's foreign trade, the following six countries accounted for 90%:
n
In Bill. RM 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Great Britain
Greater Germany
France
Belgium Import
Holland
Italy
Export
The British trade balance, with a liability of RM 6.25 billion in 1937, exceeded any other country in the country in the world many times over. This had a decisive effect on Europe's trade balance with other economic areas. Of Europe's liability balance*) with the rest of the world of RM 7.5 billion, England accounted fo r no less than Incidentally, more than half of the British import surplus (RM 2.56 billion) came from trade with America, primarily from the United States and Canada. *) E u ro p e h e r e an d in t h e fol lo w in g al way s in clu d in g G r eat Br ita in an d t h e So vi et U n ion .
15
In contrast to England with its extensive food imports, the much more "normal" import surplus of the other large industrialized countries of Europe vis-à-vis non-Europe is based mainly on raw material imports from overseas. In the context of the overal l European balance, it must not be overlooked that these countries have assumed the role of "buyers" for the rest of Europe. Of Germany's large imports of non -ferrous metals, textile fibers, raw rubber, mineral oils and colonial foodstuffs, a not inconside rable proportion is exported in processed form to other European countries which do not have corresponding processing industries. As a result of this division of labor, however, the "buyer states" - i.e. the industrialized countries - are burdened with the bulk of the European import surplus.
Declining position in world trade With the growing independence of the overseas economic areas, Europe's position in world trade also declined steadily; for the other continents began to trade with each other to an in creasing extent. Thus, the share of European countries in world imports (according to the Stat. Jahrbuch f. d. Deutsche Reich) fell from 70.3 percent in 1900 to 56.6 percent in 1937, and the share of world exports fell at the same time from 61.0 percent to 47.4 percent. A temporary apparent upswing in the European position during the years of the world economic crisis can be attributed only to the greater crisis resistance of the European domestic economy. A clearer picture is therefore obtained by comparing Europe's position in world trade, deducting European domestic trade.
Europe's share of world trade (excluding European domestic trade) Year
1913 1929 1937
World imports in bill. of RM 51,1 101,0 47,3
Europe's share In Bill. In % RM 21,2 41,5 35,7 35,7 18,1 18,1
World Export in bill. RM 46,4 92,3 43,6
Europe's share In bill. In % RM 14,3 30,9 23,0 24,9 10,6 24,3
Europe's share of world trade has declined perceptibly since before the World War, from 36.5 percent in 1913 to 30.7 percent in 1929 and A comparison of the figures for 1929 and 1937 shows, however, that Europe is the more reliable customer on the world market, since its share declines proportionately during cyclical peaks, but also holds up better in lean years. 16
Backbone of the global economy
With a share of almost one third of world trade turnover, Europe, even without taking into account its extraordinarily strong domestic economy, still has to be addressed as the real backbone of the world economy. Without Europe, there is no world e conomy. This is shown by a comparison with the next strongest trading partner, the United States of America. The USA. has an active trade balance in line with its development from a' colonial supplier country of Europe. Although its share of world trade ha s increased since before the World War, in line with the general trend, its share of 17.4 percent in 1937 is only about half of Europe's share of world trade (excluding European domestic trade). The United States' share of world imports rose from 14.5 to 1 7.9 percent between 1913 and 1929, but fell again to 16.1 percent by 1937, so that its share is more than doubled by Europe. This seems particularly important in relation to the other raw material countries of the world, which the U.S. would so like to lea d. The figures prove that these export -dependent countries cannot do without the receptive European market. The United States is itself an exporting country. Their share of world exports rose from 13:1 percent in 1913 to 23.5 percent in 1929, but fell agai n to 18.8 percent by 1937. Thus, in terms of exports, they are already much closer to Europe's world position. However, the stronger fluctuations in development also prove that the USA, like all the younger world trading countries, has not yet achieved the internal stability that characterizes the European economy.
The structure of European foreign trade
When considering Europe's foreign trade integration, it is expedient not to start from the total foreign trade of the European countries, but from the foreign trade of the continent with the other areas of the world disregarding Europe's internal trade. The real foreign trade of Europe then shows the following breakdown: Europe's Foreign Trade by Continent in % (1937) Africa Asia America Australia
Export 16,8 21,7 50,9 10,6
Import 25,2 25,7 41,0 8,1
Total
100,0
100,0 17
Revenue
North America
Asia
Ibero-America
Africa
Australia
At first glance, such an account reveals America's hitherto dominant position in European foreign trade. It seems appropriate, however, to distinguish from the outset between North America (United States and Canada) and South and Central America because of their very different relations with Europe, based on their natural diversity as independent habitats. The two areas shared equally in the European import from the continent w ith about a quarter each. North America, on the other hand, took a much larger share of European exports (25 percent) than the countries of Central and South America (16 percent). Europe had a highly passive trade balance with both regions; at almost RM 5 billion, the deficit with America was even greater than with all other continents combined and accounted for more than 65% of the total European import surplus from overseas. Central and South America alone accounted for RM 3 billion. It is therefore no em pty phrase to describe Europe as the indispensable market for South America. After all, the European customer relationship with no other continent, apart from Australia, is so one sided. How long Europe can continue to afford the luxury of such a passive trade balance is another matter. The progressive consolidation of large -scale economies as living -space economies and the associated life -law shift of production, exchange and monetary transactions will in the future bring about much greater reciprocity in trade in goods and thus a balancing of the passive balance, insofar as this is not borne by services (e.g. shipping). If one compares the continents in their position in relation to Europe, a remarkable difference between the import and export sides become s apparent. In European exports, North America, Asia and Africa roughly balanced each other out; together, they accounted for more than three quarters of total exports, while South 18
America and Australia accounted for the last quarter. However, Australia , which is deserted, is of very "minor" importance. North America and South America each accounted for a quarter of Europe's imports, while Asia contributed a good fifth, Africa only a sixth and Australia, which traded 80% of its foreign trade with Great B ritain, a tenth. A fully accurate breakdown of European foreign trade by class of goods is very difficult because the usual statistics always include European domestic trade, which is not taken into account here, and the individual statistics of the countries are difficult to compare. Of the imports of all European countries, food and beverages on the one hand and finished goods on the other account for about a quarter each; imports of raw materials and semi -finished goods take up the other half. There is n o doubt that the share of raw materials in imports from overseas is much higher. Europe's import surplus of RM 9.9 billion in raw materials and semi -finished goods came from overseas. A rough estimate therefore leads to the following breakdown of European trade in goods with the rest of the world: 60 percent of imports are raw materials and semi-finished goods, 30 percent are foodstuffs and 10 percent are finished goods, especially means of production. In European exports, finished goods account for 80-85% of the total, with foodstuffs, especially beverages, and raw materials and semi-finished goods making up the remainder. The relatively high share of foodstuffs in European imports to date is largely due to England, which imported more than three times as m uch foodstuff as Germany.
Europe's Position in the Americas
Europe's economic relationship with the American states already led to the question during the World War, but even more so in the current dispute between the continent and England: Who is depend ent on whom? Apart from the previously made and in practice confirmed statement that a world economy without Europe is inconceivable, it seems good to answer also this question by incorruptible figures. If the importance of America for European foreign trade has been explained above, the weight of Europe in American foreign trade should now be examined. The importance of America as a supplier and customer for Europe is certainly not to be underestimated. But the weight of trade values is not the same on the two sides of the ocean. The decisive factor is not even the one -sided supplier relationship of the American states to Europe, but rather the total volume of trade of the individual economic areas. In Europe's extensive foreign trade (here always excluding European domestic trade), for example, 19
exports to the United States represented one -fifth of total exports; in the balance of trade of the U.S., however, it was more than one -fourth of total imports. The United States exported more than 40 percent of i ts exports to Europe in 1937, and yet this was not one -fifth of total European imports. A hundred marks is more in the sales of a colonial goods merchant than in the much larger sales of an industrial enterprise. In this comparison, however, the various American states play the role of the colonial merchant, even though the United States has already moved up to become a major player in the industry. For the other American states, in fact, the ratio is far more impressive. Trade with Canada plays a very mino r role for Europe, but for Canada itself it represents a quarter of imports and almost half of exports. The same applies to trade with South America. All of Central and South America supplied Europe with a quarter of its imports and absorbed about 16 perce nt of its exports. For each of these countries, however, this meant 50 -70% of their total exports and about half of their imports. It can be seen from this that foreign trade figures must always be viewed from two sides: what do they mean for the supplier and how do they count for the customer. The weight of a region in economic exchange is not determined by the size of its area, but solely by the size of its population and the living requirements of that population. Small Europe*), which does not yet cover 9 percent of the earth's surface, has 530 million people, a quarter of the earth's population, and that is the culturally highest part. The whole of America, which covers almost a third of the earth's land surface, has not yet half as many inhabitants as Europe. The secret of Europe's position in the world economy lies precisely in the fact that the continent is the most important center of consumption on earth. Due to the manpower and the high intellectual level of its people, but also due to the natural production conditions, it is at the same time the most outstanding production center in the world.
Best customer of the raw material countries
Statistical figures clearly show that Europe has played a decisive role in the economic life of the entire American continent, both as a supplier and as a customer. Even from the U.S., Europe still accounted for more than 40 percent of exports; for the other countries, however, this share was up to twice as high. The fact that Europe's importance for America ha s diminished since 1913 - as a result of increased industrialization and the strengthening of exchanges *) h er e ex clu d in g A s ian Ru s sia .
20
among the American states and with other areas - has obviously led to an overestimation of Europe's own independence. Even if the United States should be able to transfer its exports to Europe to its own continent and to replace European exports to American countries, it, which has only a quarter of Europe's population, is by no means able to take over Europe's position as a buyer. One need only recall cotton, wheat, meat production, coffee, etc. The volume of foreign trade in America is far too large in relation to the domestic economy. Only the awakening of the productive forces and their organic balancing within the No rth American living space can make it a "closed," i.e., self -sufficient one.
Europe's foreign trade in 1937 (sales) Shares of the most important countries (Greater Germany converted)
Greater Germany 20 %
France 8,7 %
Belgium 6,1 %
Netherlands 4,6 %
Rest of Europe 18,5 %
Great Britain 39,3 %
Italy 4,8 %
Let's take a brief look at the position of the individual European countries in the exchange with America. Great Britain and Germany were far ahead of the rest of Europe. In 1937, more than 42% of Europe's imports from America as a whole came from Great Britain and around 18% from the territory of the present Greater German Reich. Of European exports to America, 31% came from Great Britain and a good 26% from what is now Great er Germany. For England, the emphasis was on North America, but for the Greater German Empire it was on South and Central America. The importance of German trade with South America and its pioneering work in economic policy is best 21
illustrated by the ex ample of Brazilian cotton, for which Germany was the first to open up a real market. For future forms of trade with America, it will also be significant that Germany has succeeded in recent years in achieving a far better balance of trade with America than any other European country.
Exchange with Asia
Europe traded about one quarter of its exports and one quarter of its imports with Asia. Large parts of Asia are colonial territories of European states and thus give the exchange a certain character from t he outset. Nevertheless, it can be said for the entire region, which has always been divided into two biologically different, independent habitats, the East Asian and the Indian, that it represents a far more independent economic area than the two Americas. This also corresponds to its economic -historical development. While the economy of America was developed from the colonial economy, the countries of Asia have always had highly developed and independent economic forms. The countries that are still indepe ndent today were temporarily more dependent on the European economy only during the period of European influence and during their adaptation to Western forms of civilization. In the case of the Asian colonial territories, the development is similar, althou gh more long-lasting and more pronounced. The original cultural forms of the strong and spiritually partly highly developed native peoples have been influenced from Europe to a modest extent only externally. This explains why the ancient trade relations am ong the Asian states and peoples are still very strong today and are becoming even stronger under the influence of Japan. The feeling of independence, which culminated in the political development in the program of an East Asian and an Indian metropolitan area, has also led to corresponding consequences in the economic sphere. This is the picture that also emerges from the statistical figures. Above all, the development of Japan's trade with Europe clearly shows that it tolerated Europe's economic influence only temporarily in order to adapt to the state of the art in industrial technology. Even today, Japan's purchases of goods are determined by these considerations. Before the world war, Japan obtained almost a third of its total imports from Europe; this share has since fallen steadily to a good 13 percent in 1937. Even before the world war, Europe's share of Japanese exports was less than a quarter. It fell further until 1929, but then, under the influence of Japan's financially driven export campaign, rose again to around 12 percent in 1937. It is also significant that Europe's exchanges with Japan account for only about one tenth of Europe's sales to
22
Asia and, in contrast to total exchanges with Asia, have always produced a surplus for Europe. For Ja pan, therefore, Europe is virtually the supplier of special articles, while America, with a far greater turnover, plays the role of raw material supplier. Europe's economic dealings with China have always been politically colored. China was first and forem ost a market for the European powers. Unlike Japan, however, trade with China has always been under pressure from the colonial powers. Nevertheless, after the World War, China's economic independence aspirations also became clearly evident. If, despite thi s, Europe's share of Chinese imports in 1937 was still somewhat higher than in 1913, at almost one-third, this is obviously the result of the Sino -Japanese war with its increased demand for armaments of all kinds. Of Chinese exports, Europe absorbed more t han a third in 1913, but only about a quarter in the postwar years up to the present. Europe's trade balance was also active with China. A comparison of the independent East Asian states with America's position thus shows that the American states were prim arily suppliers to Europe, while the East Asian states were to a greater extent customers. If the total exchange with Asia nevertheless burdened the European trade balance with an import surplus, then this results from the traffic with the Asian colonial territories, which are to be regarded as specialized suppliers of raw materials (rubber, petroleum, metals, luxury foods, spices, etc.). It is all the more astonishing that, for example, British and Dutch India have less foreign trade links with Europe than , say, the independent South American states. This is probably due to the progressive independence of the Indian region and its more intensive cooperation with the strengthening East Asian region. Europe's share of India's foreign trade in %.
British Indies Dutch East Indies
1913 80,3 61,2
Import 1929 62,5 46,4
1937 47,7 43,5
1913 58,6 48,2
Export 1929 47,9 36,5
1937 49,1 33,2
Even before the world war, when Argentina, for example, supplied almost 90 percent of its exports to Europe, and Chile almost three quarters, India's share fluctuated only around 50 percent. This trend of economic disengagement from Europe is even more pronounced in the import of these regions. Before the world war, Europe was almost the sole supplier of industrial goods. In the meantime, however, Japan has entered the scene. Despite the defensive efforts of the British, in recent years Japan has supplied an average of 15 23
percent of British Indian imports, and it has even accounted for more than a quarter of imports from the L ow Countries. These figures only confirm what has been said above about the natural economic interdependence in the East Asian region. In addition, domestic industry is also growing steadily. One need only recall the upward development of British India's d omestic textile industry, whose finished and semi -finished goods already accounted for a substantial share of exports (10.7%) in 1937. Among the European countries, England, as the most important colonial power, had the lead in the exchange with Asia. It a bsorbed 36.9% of total European imports from Asia and contributed 38.5% to total exports. Greater Germany followed in second place (1937 figures converted to the greater German area) with about 21% of European imports and about 28% of exports, although it had no colonial possessions.
Europe's trade turnover with Asia 1937 Shares of the most important countries:
Greater Germany 24 %
Italy 3,2 %
Belgium 4,5%
USSR 3,7 %
Rest of Europe 8,3 %
The Netherlands 7,2 %
France 11,4 %
Great Britain 37,5 %
The Bridge of the Middle East
The geographic area of Asia also includes areas in the Near East that politically and economically belong more to Europe than to Asia. The countries of the Near East have been closely connected with the European area since ancient times, not only because of their partial colonial dependence, but even more because of their political development; they form the natural bridge to the two areas of life: to East Asia and India. The independen t states in this area, 24
such as Iran and Iraq, also conduct most of their foreign trade with Europe today. For the future, the possibilities in this direction can be increased considerably. It should not be forgotten that these formerly prosperous countries have still not been able to overcome the devastating consequences of the Mongol invasion under Tamerlan. Europe, however, would be in the best position to provide the greatest possible assistance in the future. The rich oil deposits of these regions co uld - after the monopolistic ties have been removed - be a suitable supplement for oil -poor Europe. However, the Middle East is also a prime example of England's pernicious political influence. If one compares the breakdown of Iran's imports and exports, the stark imbalance is striking. While Germany accounted for almost 22 percent of Iranian imports in 1937, its share of the country's exports was only 6.5 percent; Russia's shares were equally disparate at 32 percent and 12.5 percent. The reason for this is that about 70% of Iran's exports consist of petroleum products, which are not at the free disposal of the state, but are almost entirely under the control of the British Anglo -Iranian Oil Company. This company, whose shares are practically owned by the Br itish state, holds the oil monopoly for Iran, with the exception of the northern provinces. Thus, England controls about three quarters of the exports of a completely independent state. However, the British have not even seen this as a special obligation to the economy of this country, but have pursued a transparent policy of exploitation. Although the revenues from petroleum exports are far' higher than the country's total imports, the Iranian state has received only a fraction of them for its own purposes . If, therefore, only about a quarter of the cultivable land in Iran is actually worked today, if the necessary irrigation facilities are still lacking and the development of traffic routes is progressing only relatively slowly, the reason for this lies in the lack of financial resources that have so far been siphoned off by England.
Africa, land of the future
Geographically, Africa is already closely linked to Europe. The Mediterranean deserves its name only if Europe and Africa are considered as one. Si nce early antiquity, the history of Africa has been one with that of Europe, and since that time the black continent has been the natural tropical complement of the West. The conditions for a close economic community exist both in terms of Africa's products and production possibilities and in terms of its population. It should not be forgotten that the economic construction of America became possible only with the help of the Negroes. Nevertheless, for centuries Africa
25
did not go beyond the economic tie s with Europe that existed at the time of the Roman Empire. The blame for this was once the strangulation of Africa by Islam, and later the economic diversion of Europe to the newly discovered West. This is the only explanation for the fact that Africa has not played a major role in European foreign trade up to now, because the exchange of goods between Africa and Europe has so far been almost exclusive. The two "independent" African states, Egypt and the Union of South Africa, transact almost 70 percent of their trade with Europe, and 80 -90 percent with colonial Africa. The volume of these exchanges, however, was by no means satisfactory. The total trade of the African tropics*) , for example, shows the following development:
Year 870 1900 1913 1927 1933
Mill. RM 241,35 880,00 1932,9 4108,20 1687,37
in % of world trade 0,5 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,7
The economic potentialities of the continent are clearly evident from the sharp increase in the figures up to 1927; they keep pace with the development in terms of transportation, which is evident from the increase in the number of railroad lines from 3745 km in 1900 to 26 210 km in 1928. However, the decline of the values in 1933 below the level of 1913 shows the whole absurdity of the world economic calculation of the responsible colonial powers.
German and Italian pioneering work The fact that such a decline was only possible because the so -called global economic considerations of the major colonial powers, i.e. monopolistic capitalism, played the decisive role, is shown by the counter -example of the Italian colonial territories in tropical Africa. Their share of total trade in the African tropics, which had remained constant at 1.9 percent in the period before the World War, rose under Fascism to 2.7 percent in 1 927 and 1930 and then continued to develop vigorously, especially during the world economic crisis, to 4.4 percent in 1933, although the Italian territories are by no means particularly rich by nature. On the other hand, the fact that the share of the German colonies in the total trade of the African tropics, compared with the foreign colonial territories, rose most sharply in the period before the world war, only to drop considerably in the postwar period and 26
remain at this level, is equally exemplary for the completely lost colonial economy in Africa after the world war. Since the world war, the African economy has been developed along political rather than economic lines. Just as it was possible, according to the liberalistic principles of the previou s world economy, to buy up inventions, not in order to exploit them, but in order to prevent their exploitation by others, so too in 1918 the young energetic peoples, Germany and Italy, were cheated out of their claims in Africa and this natural supplement ary space of Europe was left to over-saturated or people -poor states that did not have the strength or the will to develop the African colonial economy in a way that would have corresponded to the overall European needs. If one wants to estimate the actual economic future possibilities of the African area, then one must take the Italian development work and the German pre -war achievement for comparison, then one must remember again the fact that "the Germans also succeeded in doing what other colonial power s had tried in vain before. The establishment of a plantation economy on the African continent" (Waibel).
Outline of the Africa trade
Despite the selfish policy of the Western powers in Africa and the resulting obstacles, Germany continued to cultivate its trade with Africa in the postwar period and even increased it substantially in recent years. In 1937, Germany ranked third in total trade with Africa. It is particularly characteristic of the policy of the oversaturated England in Africa that it regard ed its African possessions primarily as a sales market: Africa is the only continent with which Britain has an active trade balance. On the other hand, Germany had a strongly passive trade balance with Africa. In 1937, it imported from there almost twice a s much as it exported there. The reason lies in the politically conditioned cutting off of the African colonies from the so feared economic influence of the "have -nots". - It is characteristic of the increasing importance of the colonies in the context of world economic development that imports from the colonies have accounted for a growing share of the generally shrunken imports of the major colonial powers since 1929. Thus, in the case of Great Britain, the colonies' share of total imports rose from 26.9 to 38 per cent between 1929 and 1937; in the case of France, from 12.4 to 24.4 per cent; in the case of Italy, from 0.5 to 2.5 per cent; and in the case of Belgium, from 3.7 to 6.9 per cent. Nevertheless, Africa is still far from occupying the place in the European foreign economy which it inherently deserves.
27
The reorganization of Europe and the orientation of the European economy toward European goals will not bypass this very issue. Africa will be able to contribute not insignificantly' to the econom ic freedom of the European area, as demanded by Reich Minister of Economics Funk. Despite the enforced colonial inactivity during the last twenty years, Germany has not been asleep in this area either. The prerequisite for this, however, is the breaking of the British capital shackles which have hitherto gagged both the Black Continent and the raw materials economy of the earth in general. Professor H u n k e once rightly said that the result of the Anglo -Saxon world economy up to now has been the rule of p rice and the power of capital. Therefore, when considering the world economic relations and the raw material economy of Europe up to now, one cannot ignore the consequences of this British capital economy.
African trade under the sign of Versailles
Greater Germany
Italy
1937 Greater Germany Great Britain France Italy Belgium-Luxemburg Spain Portugal 28
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Rest of Europe
France
Great Britain
Share of Europe's trade with Africa in %. Import Export 17,00 10,50 29,10 37,16 31,45 22,63 5,30 15,17 7,79 4,88 1,09 0,08 1,23 0,79
Europe and the British commodity cartel
Spanish copper - English capital
In the southwestern province of Spain - Huelva - which forms part of wine -rich Andalusia, on the southern edge of the ore -rich Sierra Morena, lies a small town with a high reputation in international stock market and financial circles: Minas de Rio Tinto. For a long time, Spain was the leading mining country in the world. Already the Phoenicians, Carthaginians and Romans dug for gold and silver, lead and copper on the Pyrenean peninsula and especially in the Sierra Morena. They may also have known about the sulfur gravel deposits of Rio Tinto. These ore deposits, of unusual thickness up to 200 meters and rare purity, are a unique raw material for the extraction of sulfur and sulfuric acid (45-49% sulfur), but they also yield a high -quality iron ore and have such a high copper content that the Rio Tinto mining area has made Spain one of the most important copper producers in Europe. The Rio Tinto mines were owned by the Spanish crown until the late Middle Ages. With Spain's political and economic decline, the concessions passed into foreign hands on a leasehold basis. In the mid -19th century, the ore deposits gained renewed importance as industrialization and Europe's demand for raw materials increased. A new era began when, in 1873, the mines were acquired by an English company that later called itself "Rio Tinto Company Ltd." and was based in London. Rio Tinto had thus become a stock market security with great appeal until recent years: there was also a very practical reason for this, because the rich mines yi elded high dividends, which not infrequently far exceeded 50%. Rio Tinto's ore deposits - once a pearl of Spanish mining - had gone international. In the Rio Tinto area there was a second company, the Tharsis Sulphur and Copper Co., which gave itself the a ppearance of a French company, but in reality maintained close relations with the British company and actually worked with English capital. It was through the British that Spanish copper was first made "world marketable," for the Rio Tinto company also had substantial interests in the large Rhodesian copper deposits in Africa and was a member of the international copper syndicate, which was responsible for directing the sales and prices of copper on the world market. Via this world market, Rio Tinto copper then made its way back to copper -poor Europe, where it was destined for its destination. In the Spanish mines, however, the Spanish workers worked under the same primitive conditions as their forefathers a few hundred years before. The starting point and t he end point had thus remained the same: 29
Spanish workers extracted Spanish copper ore, which was urgently needed in the European industrialized countries. In between, as part of the development of the world economy, a British capital group had inserted itself, which incorporated the Spanish copper into its monopoly system.
The British system
This process also fits into a system in a broader sense, namely into the past system of the political -economic world position of England. It is not always to be condemned that foreign capital is used to develop the raw material deposits of any country, but it is decisive what this capital does beyond the actual task of increasing output. Let us stick first to the increase in output. Indeed, it has not at all been the proper task for British capital. There is ample evidence for such an assertion. At the begi nning of the European war, as is well known, the British company exploiting the zinc and lead deposits of the Trepca mines in Yugoslavia closed the mines because the workers demanded wage increases. Trepca Mines Ltd. belonged to the sphere of interest of t he British Selection Trust, which also had extensive concessions in South Africa and Australia. The economic viability of the Trepca company is shown by the fact that the company, which was founded in 1930, returned its share capital of about 1.7 million p ounds sterling as net profit only a few years later. It would also have been conceivable, for example, that the Rio Tinto mines would have become "unprofitable" for the British owners because the Spanish workers, as a result of their higher living standard s, could no longer compete with the refiners working in the company's Rhodean mines. The consequence would have been the closure of the Spanish mines; in any case, they would not have been sold, because this would have created a competitor to their own monopoly. European copper production would then have been several percent lower in the world statistics. But there were also other reasons that could have prevented an increase in output. They could be of a political nature, as in the case of Romanian oil production, which was sabotaged by the large British and French companies in recent years through planned neglect. They could be economic speculation, as was undoubtedly determinant in the fact that oil production in Iraq has so far reached only 4 instead of 7 mill. tons per year. There were many reasons that could stand in the way of a natural increase in output, but they all fit into England's world economic system, which was focused on two great points of view: profit and world domination. It contradicted t he unconditional striving for profit, from which England's former wealth stemmed, to let the states and peoples in which English capital 30
worked share in the fruits of the raw materials economy and the work of their own country's children; for this ther e were at best politically earmarked loans. On the other hand, it corresponded to the uncompromising striving for world domination that, as far as possible, every reasonably important production was kept under British control. Economic dependence also prev ented any free political movement. The monopoly economy, however, yielded high profits due to largely arbitrary prices, which were the basis of the bond policy and the enormous capital investments abroad. This was a finely thought -out cycle, which worked smoothly as long as there was no rival on the scene.
World economy straitjacket
The Anglo-Saxon world economy was a kind of straitjacket, not only for the industrialized countries competing with England, but also for the raw material areas of the world. I ts goal was to supply the British world power with the necessary raw materials without its own labor at the most favorable conditions possible, to control the raw material purchases of the others - and thus their economic freedom - and finally to record pr oduction and sales to a large extent centrally in order to be able to determine price and profit. Propagandistic slogans such as "open -door policy" and "free trade" were intended to provide the moral justification for this and at the same time facilitate the practical implementation of the goals. This form of global economy - as a means of political pressure, combined with great economic profit opportunities - was successfully used by England not only in colonial territories, but primarily and for a long ti me vis-à-vis the European mainland. The blockade of 1914 and 1940 was in each case only the final consequence. In Europe, England had found its first economic opponents, and the mainland was the only real threat for the future. Spain had fallen victim to B ritish piracy, the Netherlands had been economically destroyed by Cromwell's Navigation Act. Napoleon's Continental Blockade, which threatened England at its most sensitive point, its trade, had been broken by the mainland states themselves. Industrial Europe of the 19th century, imbued with the ideas of English economic doctrines and convinced of the British "economic genius," became the victim of the English world economy. To mate Europe politically, England took three paths. The European raw material cou ntries were penetrated capital-wise and the most important industrial raw materials, such as the non ferrous metals, petroleum, alloy metals, etc., were incorporated into the British monopoly system. The rest of European raw material production, as well as agricultural production, were abandoned to competition with the world market. Finally, England monopolized the raw materials of the colonial territories or deprived whole areas of European influence by its policy of 31
robbery. After all, England's hunger for land was in no way rooted in its own need or urge to operate, but served exclusively to maintain the principle of monopoly. Versailles, which made Africa a British -French domain, but at the same time drew 2000 km of new customs borders in Europe itsel f, is proof of these methods, as is the fable spread by England of Europe's unconditional dependence on raw materials.
The impact of the UK raw materials cartels
For Europe, the consequences of this British policy became visible not only in England's intrigues in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, but even more in the neglect of mineral resources in most European states and in the permanent crisis of the European agricultural countries, not to mention the unfulfilled European task in Africa to t his day. If we note today that many European mineral resources are still waiting to be tapped, or that yields per hectare in the southeastern states are far below normal levels, or that agriculture is totally under -equipped, or that the purchasing power of some European states is too low, or - one could go on endlessly here. The reason for all these phenomena is - although not alone - the world market price. In the past, if the Romanian farmer could not sell at the world market price, that is, in competition with all the wheat farmers in the world, his grain could rot; less valuable metal deposits could not be exploited, despite Europe's great dependence on imports, because the production costs were higher than the prime costs of world production. A good har vest in the world was no longer a blessing, but a misfortune; one burned 'a part to hold the prices. The commodity cartels determined each year how high world production could rise so as not to fall below a certain price. Such "restrictions", however, did not only apply to the colonial supply areas, but also indiscriminately affected the European production areas, even these first, because they inevitably worked "more uneconomically" than large -scale production and its partly colored labor force due to the higher living standards of the European workers and farmers. This, and not production reasons, explains the ups and downs of the statistical production figures; therefore, the Spanish copper ore production amounted to about 45,000 t in 1913, 63,700 t in 19 29 and only 30,000 t of metal content in 1935. It is significant when one finds statements in geography textbooks today, such as the following: "Southern Slavia is rich in mineral resources (iron, copper, lead, chrome ore, bauxite, asphalt), but most depos its are only just beginning to be developed." Rich raw material areas in the heart of Europe, whose industrialized countries are hungry for raw materials, are still at the beginning of development in the 20th century! This is a result of 32
the Anglo-Saxon world economy. England had turned the European law of life upside down: instead of seeing overseas areas as the complement of Europe, it regarded Europe - namely since the World War - as an occasional supplement to its overseas sources of raw materials. This British system was first recognized and consciously broken by Germany and Italy, in the Four -Year Plan and in German foreign trade, and by Italy in its autarky policy and its work in Africa. Germany tapped its own raw material reserves without regard to world economic profitability concerns and dared to grant its trading partners prices that were above the world market price, but which also enabled these trading partners for the first time to set up a fixed production program and to approach a long -term increase in output without regard to possible world market developments. Although Germany and Italy will not indiscriminately take up any production that is "unprofitable" according to earlier views, it is nevertheless of seminal importance that they hav e not allowed themselves to be limited by the world market price in order to achieve economic freedom, i.e. freedom of action in serious cases. Thus the Axis powers had broken the system of the British world economy.
33
The European raw material balance
The fable of European dependence
All this must be kept clearly in mind when one looks at the production and consumption statistics of Europe and wants to draw conclusions from them about the dependence in these or those raw materials. Nevertheless, everyone who has believed in the English propaganda formula of Europe's unconditional dependence on food and raw materials will be surprised to hear that, according to the statistical calculations of the certainly unsuspicious Geneva League, Europe (including the USSR) has already accounted for no less than 45.5% of the total basic production of the world, i.e. the production of unprocessed food and raw materials. Of the calculated value of world production of RM 258 billion in 1937, Europe ac counted for about RM 117 billion.
Europe as a producer of raw materials
SHARE OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE Europe
Rest of the world
20%
80%
34
SHARE OF THE EARTH'S POPULATION Europe
Rest of the world
27%
73%
SHARE IN THE VALUE OF THE WORLD'S BASIC PRODUCTION Europe
Rest of the world
45% 55%
The shares of the other continents pale in comparison with Europe's huge output: North America, with 24.8 percent of world production, only achieves half of the European production value, Asia only 16 percent and Ibero -America only 7.9 percent, Africa and Australia each have a share of 2.9 percent. In general, it is necessary to counter some views which have become widely accepted among the general public, but which are just as wrong as they have 35
often enough been misused by certain political tendencies to weaken the position of Europe. This is particularly true of the role of agriculture in the European economy as a whole. While at first glance it is astonishing that more than three quarters of the world's total production of basic commodities is accounted for by agriculture and not by mining raw materials, it is even more surprising that in Europe agriculture accounts for more than 80% of the production of basic commodities. In 1937, Europe accounted for 47 percent of world production of agricultural pr oducts. European agriculture, which is so often neglected under the impression of industrial production, thus accounted for almost half of world production of basic agricultural products. The next most important continent is North America with only one fif th. Whoever would think that such a result would only be achieved by including the large Soviet Russian area, will be surprised to hear that Europe without Russia is still far in the lead with 35.7 % alone. Even if one assumes that the East Asian region may not be accurately included in the statistics, this impressive ratio remains valid among the major regions participating in world trade. Europe also leads the rest of the world in the production of non -agricultural basic products (especially mining), albe it at 40.7%, only just ahead of North America at 39%. Europe's alleged dependence on imports is strikingly refuted by such figures. Compared to the value of the total European basic production of RM 117 billion, the European import from other continents wi th a total of RM 18.1 billion in 1937, which also consisted for the most part of food and raw materials, is quite modest. The share of imports in Europe's total consumption of basic products is therefore unlikely to have exceeded 10%. In assessing economic freedom, it should also be borne in mind that a large proportion of European and imported raw materials are exported from Europe in the form of finished industrial products.
Large-scale producer and importer
Despite its huge domestic production, Europe is nevertheless the most important importer on the world market. In 1937, it purchased more than half of the goods brought to the world market by the other continents, primarily raw materials and foodstuffs. This position, unique in the world, as a major producer and importer is the best mark of the superior economic power of the continent, which is not even approached by any other major area. This concentration of the world's economic activity in an area which, including the Soviet Union, comprises only on e-fifth of the world's land area and only one fourth of the world's population, is not clarified by the fact alone that the 36
European countries have accounted for more than two -thirds of world exports of manufactured goods in each of the last ten years. Rather, the decisive factors are the cultural level and self -consumption of these 530 million people and, in particular, of their core in Central Europe. There is no yardstick by which the economic power of Europe can be measured in comparison with the rest of the world; but in all expressions of economic and cultural life - whether in trade, industrial production or cultural creations - one encounters this preponderance of Europe. So it is also in consumption. The life requirements of European man are on a verage much higher than those of the rest of mankind, with the exception of North America, both in terms of nutrition and in the consumption of industrial goods and thus of commercial raw materials. North America, however, has only a quarter of the populat ion of Europe. This consumption, except for a relatively small remainder, is met from within its own area. Nevertheless, the importance of this remainder must not be underestimated. Europe's imports from other parts of the world largely consist of goods which are not naturally available in Europe, but which are difficult to do without in the long run for the modern needs of life. Other goods are only insufficiently available in Europe. In the case of some of them, the quantities involved are relatively smal l, but they are nevertheless of decisive importance for the industrial economy. Of the world's production of basic commodities, foodstuffs accounted for two thirds in 1937, and industrial raw materials for the remaining third. It is significant for the eco nomic development of the world and the European raw materials economy that the share of foodstuffs is slowly but clearly declining compared to the advance of industrial raw materials. It should be noted that this is only the share ratio, since the absolute values in both groups are increasing, but faster in the case of raw materials than in the case of foodstuffs.
Economic freedom, not isolation
For the future direction of the European raw materials industry, it will be crucial to adapt the hitherto "wild" growth of European raw materials production to the new political objectives of the continent. The keyword here is "economic freedom". A united Europe, freed from British domination, cannot afford to be hampered in its freedom of action by supply gap s in vital raw materials, either accidental or created according to plan by the Anglo Saxon world economy. This also answers the question of the degree of self sufficiency. At least those raw materials which Europe needs in an emergency for the vital suppl y of its population and for the maintenance of its armaments 37
must be permanently available to it in sufficient quantities either in Europe itself or in the vicinity; what goes beyond this framework, and that is no small matter in view of the high standa rd of living of the European peoples, is a matter of world trade. The margin between complete self -sufficiency and the degree of self sufficiency necessary to maintain economic freedom will not, however, be the same for 'all raw materials. In an emergency, it will be relatively easy to dispense with a considerable part of the luxury foodstuffs; it will also be possible to reduce private motorization requirements - i.e. fuel and rubber to a large extent or to replace them by domestic materials; on the othe r hand, it seems less acceptable that the European population should tighten its belt whenever world trade links are threatened, for there is a wide margin between hunger and normal requirements. It is also out of the question, for example, that Europe must be able to dispose fully of its coal and iron requirements at any time. In assessing the European supply situation to date, which must be the starting point for all future considerations, it is not so much the fact that Europe had overseas imports of RM 18.1 billion in 1937 that is decisive - this may also be more or less the case in the context of future world trade - but rather the composition of imports. However, an examination of the import of goods shows that more than one third of the import value h as so far been accounted for by five raw material groups, namely vegetable oils and fats, metals (except iron), textiles, fuels and rubber. All of these substances are important for commodity freedom, so that even such a look at commodity imports reveals the gaps in necessary self -sufficiency.
Food freedom, but fat gap
Of these gaps, only one occurs in the area of nutrition, namely the so -called fat gap.*) In fact, Europe's freedom of supply, the absolute necessity of which has been underlined by two Euro pean wars, has already been secured up to now, except for a certain shortage in the supply of fat. Food accounts for almost four-fifths of Europe's basic production, so that, in value, small Europe accounts for more than half of the world's basic food prod uction. But the European population also consumes far more than the average. In addition, the composition of production and eating habits play an important *) Se e : Wa lt er Hü b en er , M ög li ch k eit en d er d eu ts ch en u n d eu rop ä i sch e n F et t ve r sor gu n g. In : N ati on al e W i rt sc h a ft so rd n u n g u n d G roß rau m wi rt s ch a ft. M ein h old V e rla g sg e s el l sch a f t, Dr e sd en 19 41 .
38
role. In detail, it can be said that Europe's supply of bread cereals has been secure up to now, except for the supplementary requirements of the British Isles. In wheat, rye, potatoes and sugar beets, the continent leads by far in world production. Although the rice harvests have so far covered only half of the demand, they are also not of considerable importance for the supply. Europe also accounted for no less than h alf of the world's meat production. In the case of butter and eggs, the import surpluses are not significant. However, the high production of animal foodstuffs has hitherto been conditional on quite substantial imports of feedstuffs, namely corn and oilcak e.
In 1937, Europe accounted for half of the world's food production but only about one-fifth of the world's oil resources.
Basic food
Europe
North-America
Ibero-America
Asia
Oceania
Africa
The fat gap is also closely related to this. If European butter production has so far been able to cover most of its own requirements, this is only due to the fact that European countries have increasingly switched to cheaper overseas vegetable fats in recent decades. However, Europe has so far only had a share of a good fifth of the world's oil raw materials. This affected not only the vegetable fat production itself, but also the production of animal fats, because the residues of vegetable oil production (oil cake) are in turn the best concentrated feed.
39
Oil fruits and oil seeds
Europe
Asia
Africa
Ibero-America
North-America
Oceania
Apart from the freedom of food supply, which is secured except for the bottleneck in the supply of fats, it is of no significance that Europe is import dependent in important luxury goods. In the production of wine and hops in the world, Europe is by far the leader with almost four fifths. Europe produces a good quarter of the world's tobacco. In addition, it has spent about RM 1.5 billion annually on imports of overseas tobacco, coffee, tea and cocoa.
The industrial foundation is secured
Europe has sufficient supplies of the raw materials coal and iron, which are crucial in the industrial sector. The fact that Europe accounts for more than half of the world's hard coal production and almost all of the world's lignite production has already been demonstrated to the world in recent years by the example of Germany. Co al is the most versatile energy source and raw material. Without coal, the second four -year plan would have been an empty program. It has not only supplied German industry with power in the form of steam, electricity and gas, but has also provided the dome stic basis for motorization in benzene and coal gasoline, as well as in Buna, and has also helped to replace many other raw materials that are naturally scarce, such as metals, fats, fertilizers, natural dyes, and so on. As a starting material for almost all new materials, it will continue to cause many upheavals in the world's raw materials balance in the future.
40
Self-sufficient in coal and iron Distribution of world production 1937
n Pig iron 104 Million t
Lignite 231 Billion t
Hard coal 1,3 Billion t
0
20
40 Europe
North-America
60
80
100
120
Rest of the world
Nothing needs to be said about the importance of iron for industry and armaments. In iron, too, Europe is Europe is practically self -sufficient. As with coal, the level of iron ore production has hitherto been merely a matter of consumption and market conditions. The European soil's reserves of both raw materials are suf ficient to meet any demand.
The shortage of armor metals
One of the most important gaps in the European supply of raw materials in the industrial sector, on the other hand, is the shortage of steel refining metals and nonferrous metals. Of the alloying metals so important for steel production and processing, Europe has a good 40% of the world's production of chromium and more than half of the world's production of manganese. Nickel,' tungsten, vanadium and molybdenum, on the other hand, have so far only been produced in very small quantities. The situation was not much better for the so -called non-ferrous metals. It is 41
not the import value, which in 1937 amounted to about RM 1.3 billion for alloying and non -ferrous metals together, that is important, b ut the militaryeconomic significance of these metals. The monopolization by the Anglo -Saxon powers already clearly indicates the importance of these metals, and the donation of metals by the German people has introduced the concept of non ferrous metals to every German citizen. Europe consumed - not least because of the high demand for export goods - in each case more than half of the world's production; it produced, on the other hand, within the framework of world production, only 1.7% of tin, 11% of copp er, 20% of lead and a good 29% of zinc. This is not an acute danger. As the European war has shown, this gap can be bridged by precautionary stockpiling and sensible management, but Europe will not be satisfied with this in the future. The development of A frica by the European economy and the intensification of the Soviet Union's economy will not only close the existing gap, but will also ensure the growing demand for the foreseeable future. The situation, on the other hand, is quite different in the case o f light metals, which are already replacing non -ferrous metals to some extent. Europe produced and consumed about 63 percent of the world's aluminum in 1938, but it also accounted for the same proportion of bauxite production. Its position in magnesium pro duction appears even more superior, since the raw materials for this, dolomite, potassium salts and magnesite, are more than abundant in Europe. The fact that the light metals are not substitutes but metals in their own right is shown by their triumphant r un throughout the world. Both metals have made their way from Germany. Aluminum production has more than doubled in less than a decade. World production of around 600,000 tons in 1938 was already almost equal to world production of copper, which it can rep lace above all, because of its much lower specific gravity. A similar development can be seen in magnesium, which in certain alloy forms has an extraordinarily wide range of uses. With the light metals, the Axis powers have already broken the Anglo -Saxon monopoly ring of armaments metals. In the European war, England had to learn that aluminum and magnesium are armaments metals on a par with copper and tin. The victory of the German Luftwaffe is also a victory for the German light metals industry.
42
n 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Bauxite production Europe
Aluminum production North-America
Aluminum consumption
Rest of the world
Textile fibers, wood, fuel and rubber
Even more than in the metal industry, the supply of textile raw materials must be expected to meet the needs of the export industry. As remarkable as it is in itself that in 1937 more than 16 percent of the value of total European imports from overseas was still accounted for by imports of textile fibers, it must not be overlooked that this import of RM three billion served, at least to a large extent, to make Europe's significant exports of finished textile goods possible. Just under a quarter of the world's textile fiber production has been obtained in Europe itself. Consumption, including export requirements, on the other hand, amounted to about half of the world's production, so that Europe's own production has so far been able to meet only about half of its requirements. For a number of years, however, there has been a continuing shift in favor of domestic supply in the textile sector, which today already makes the pre-war figures appear obsolete. In view of the pr evious requirements of the large British export industry, there is of course also a major difference in the degree of self -sufficiency of continental Europe and the pan-European region, including the British Isles and the Soviet Union, which is always take n as a basis here.*)
*) B e sid e s, it sh ou ld b e n ote d th e g ro win g p r od u cti on o f th e S o vi et Un i on an d th e B alk an s of th e b e st c otto n ; ap a r t fro m th e fa ct th a t8 wi th th e in clu s ion o f Af ri c a in th e E u rop e an lar ge - s ca le eco n o my , n o t on ly t h e E gy p ti an cott on i s a va ila b l e, b u t al so q u it e u n exp lo it ed cu lt i vat ion p o s sib il iti e s are op en .
43
Europe is the largest timber producer in the world
WORLD PRODUCTION OF WOOD PRODUCTS 1937 Europe
North-America
Asia
5%
42%
53%
WORLD PRODUCTION OF PULP AND GROUNDWOOD PULP 1937 Europe
North-America
Asia
4%
45%
51%
In contrast, the European supply of wood (apart from the overseas precious woods) and pulp is completely adequate. Pulp, which up to now has been obtained almost exclusively by chemical and mechanical pulping of spruce wood, is an important raw material not only for the production of synthetic fibers, but also for paper production and certain armaments. Howev er, 44
provision has already been made for further increases in demand. It seems particularly important to use especially cheap raw materials for pulp production, such as straw and potato leaves, which have recently passed their test in Germany. In wood -poor Italy, corn straw and reeds have been successfully used for pulp production. Fuel supplies are also relatively favorable. Including Russian and Romanian production, two-thirds of Europe's total demand in 1938 could have been met from within the country, since the total European consumption of about 60 million tons was offset by production of 41.5 million tons. If one were to deduct from this total demand the British import of about 11 mill. If the British import of about 11 million tons were subtracted f rom this total, it would be clear that continental Europe could have met its demand from its own sources and by using synthetic gasoline, benzene and the other domestic fuels that have been in use up to now, except for a residual quantity of 7.5 million to ns. As I said, this would have been possible if there had been a planned management of production and consumption. However, the strings for this have largely been in British hands, and accordingly the actual picture has naturally looked different. With the second raw material, rubber, which is important for motorization, Europe used to be completely dependent on imports from overseas, except for the production of Buna and other artificial rubber. Rubber is another of the many examples of the monopolization of the most important raw materials for armaments by England, which merely broke the Brazilian rubber monopoly at the end of the last century in order to be able to build up its own monopoly economy in the East Indies. For the rubber plantations of the Dut ch Indies were also predominantly in British hands, so that the world rubber cartel, which fixed production quantities and determined prices, was a purely British institution.
An interim balance sheet
Summarizing the results of the supply of raw material s to Europe so far, it is evident that the continent has the advantage over any external threat of assured freedom from food and a supply of the most important industrial raw materials, namely coal and iron, which is not too disruptive. The food supply, apart from minor tensions, shows only a perceptible gap in the supply of fat and fodder. While this gap is not likely to seriously threaten economic freedom, it is at least unpleasant, not least with regard to the need for industrial fats.
45
In the case of industrial raw materials, the level of self -sufficiency necessary to maintain economic freedom has not been reached for nonferrous metals, various steel refining metals and rubber. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the textile fiber supply and the fuel supply are sufficient to meet vital subsistence needs in an emergency. That it would be desirable to have a greater degree of freedom of action in textile fibers and fuels is another matter. - Of course, Europe also lacks tropical agricultural produc ts, which is significant for world trade, but irrelevant for economic freedom.
46
The road to economic freedom
Three demands for the future
The fact that conditions have hitherto been as they are described is, however, in most cases not a natural condition, but corresponds to the earlier economic political disruption and lack of plan in the economy of Europe as a whole, and to the more or less conscious influence of England on the supply and production of raw materials in Europe . It does not require great foresight to say that after the dismantling of the artificial barriers erected in Europe, especially at Versailles, and the realization of a genuine economic community, such as Germany and Italy have to some extent already achie ved, some of the weaknesses which have existed up to now will be reduced of their own accord. But this cannot be enough for the future. Securing economic freedom is a political task and will be realized with political vigor, just as it has already been done in Germany and Italy in the years before the European war. The Axis powers have already taken the path to this end. Three clear demands for the future result from the experience gained so far: 1. strengthening Europe's natural agricultural and industrial raw material production, 2. strengthening of industrial (synthetic) raw material production, 3. generous development of Africa and the areas of the Middle East, i.e. the natural European supplementary areas. The question of the economic viability of such an increase in self -production is already answered by limiting it to the extent necessary to safeguard economic freedom. The exact determination of this level of self -sufficiency is a matter for political and economic policy leaders; of course, it makes a difference whether one is just able to hold out, whether one can get by or whether one is well supplied. Germany and Italy are sufficiently supplied, but to a good extent by a planned stockpiling economy, with which the new Europe cannot be content in the future. The self -production of such raw materials, in any case, which in an emergency will decide on the freedom and life of the European peoples, is - as far as it is possible at all - never too expensive. All other raw materials, however, and the quantit ies which go beyond vital needs, can also be obtained by means of world trade. Where the line is drawn in detail, however, depends not least on the attitude of overseas raw material producers. In the case of synthetic production, it should also be noted th at
47
the costs at the beginning of production are never indicative of the true production costs in the case of full production. The examples of nitrogen and synthetic fibers are worth mentioning.
The tasks of agriculture
Within the framework of the future European raw materials program, agriculture is faced with the task of narrowing the gaps in the production of fats, feedstuffs and textile fibers, in addition to the general increase in output, which is already indicated by the all too strong differ ences in yields in the individual countries. This task is already remarkable and particularly suitable for a joint effort, since all three requirements are closely interrelated in terms of production. Natural textile fibers are wool, cotton and flax. Howev er, as is well known, sheep provide not only wool but also meat and milk; cotton and flax, in turn, provide not only textile fibers but also, in their seeds, high quality oil raw materials and, in the processing residues, oil cake as concentrated feed. Thi s is not to say that the task is already to be regarded as solved. Increased corn and green fodder cultivation and increased soybean and olive production cannot be dispensed with. The economic prerequisite for increasing agricultural output, namely the cre ation of a market and price order, has already been largely realized by the Axis powers beyond their own borders. The technical prerequisites, i.e. agricultural machinery, sufficient fertilizer supply and transport access to the agricultural areas, do not pose any major difficulties for Europe. The successes already achieved under unfavorable political conditions allow us to look to the future with confidence. Europe's production of soybeans, for example, increased - thanks to German pioneering work - in the Southeast from 1,500 t in 1932 to 85,000 t in 1937; at the same time, production of linseed grew from 106,000 t to 256,000 t. In Italy, for example, technical improvements in harvesting methods enabled oil yields to be increased from 16.1 kg per quintal of olives to 17.5 kg in the course of a single year. The cultivation of new oil crops - such as perilla, safflower, etc. - is under serious consideration in the Southeast; German scientific. Findings and the German organizational talent help effectively. S uccess seems all the more promising because the basis for the production of vegetable oils is extraordinarily broad. No plant has yet been able to develop into the world's oil crop; cotton seed, with only 18% of world oil production, has had the largest sh are so far. Nor are the oil plants bound to certain climatic regions or soil conditions. There are a considerable number of plant varieties that are primarily suitable for cultivation in Europe or Africa. In this respect, there is no limit to future development. 48
Textile fiber production had also increased by 80 % in 1937 compared with the average for the years 1925 -1929, thus exceeding the increase in world production by almost double. The war has considerably accelerated this development, which has alre ady been evident for some time in all European countries. Germany is not the only country to have substantially increased flax production and sheep breeding; Denmark also plans to increase the area under flax from 600 to 10,000 hectares. Similar plans exis t in Switzerland and Sweden. Even France more than quadrupled its flax acreage between 1931 and 1938. Plans in southeastern Europe and Russia are particularly promising. Russia has increased its cotton crop twentyfold since 1924; not only can it now meet its needs, but it has recently been able to export cotton. In the southeastern states, cotton production has risen from 20,000 tons to about 90,000 tons since 1930, but it is still in its infancy. Italy also wants to expand its cotton culture in Sicily. She ep wool production has about doubled in the Soviet Union in the last four years and also shows substantial increases in the southeastern states. Organization of the market and firming of prices will be able to greatly accelerate further recovery.
Unearthed mineral resources
The special tasks facing the European mining industry must be seen as incomparably more difficult. The task is to reduce European dependence in the armaments metals. As already mentioned, Europe has so far had only very small quantities of nickel, molybdenum, tungsten and vanadium in the steel alloy metals. Here, it will be important to fully exploit even the small deposits that were previously less considered from a world economic point of view. In the case of nickel, however, the prospects - apart from perhaps the Finnish deposits - are not very great (Canada has the world monopoly), but there is considerable scope for replacing it with chromium and molybdenum. Molybdenum has so far been a monopoly of the United States. However , Europe does not yet have to come to terms with this. So far, Germany has been able to cover about one third of its requirements by means of its yellow -lead deposits. Turkey is also said to have fairly rich molybdenum ore veins, which are, however, only i n the process of being developed. In addition, surprising finds are always possible with ores that occur only in such small quantities (world production in 1939 16 300 t of metal). Up to now, only Portugal has supplied significant quantities of tungsten in Europe. The Spanish deposits, which are not to be underestimated, seem to have been insufficiently mined so far. Finally, Europe will probably have to rely solely on African deposits of vanadium in the future.
49
The outlook for nonferrous metals is bett er. However, Europe will probably remain dependent on tin supplies, since the only really significant deposits are in Great Britain, but they do not account for more than 1 to 2 percent of world production. By contrast, Europe's own supply of copper could be noticeably increased. The very fact that European production has increased by almost half since 1929, although the important Spanish production has fallen to less than half, makes the future prospects appear favorable. If Europe's self-sufficiency in le ad is better than in copper and tin, it still has considerable room for increase. Russia and Yugoslavia, which have increased their mine production six-fold since 1929, are apt examples. Spain provides the counterexample. Until the turn of the century, it produced at times one -third of the world's lead. The subsequent decline, which led to a shrinkage of production to one -sixth between 1913 and 1938, is not so much due to the depletion of deposits as to the greater decline in the silver content of the deposits. The new Spain will also recognize its tasks here; for even Germany has been able to increase its production by more than half since 1929. In zinc, Europe has already met more than half of its needs itself. European mine production has increased consid erably in recent years, especially in Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and Russia. The most important zinc deposit in Europe is located in Upper Silesia. It was divided into German and Polish halves by the arbitrary Versailles border. The result was that Germany increased its mine production by almost half in the last 10 years, while Polish production fell by a third. This, too, is an example of the economic consequences of the political machinations of England and its allies, but also of the German will to build up in contrast to the Polish mismanagement. In the future, special importance will be attached to the replacement of various non-ferrous metals by domestic light metals and synthetic resin products imported by Germany in particular. Considerable importanc e is also attached to governmental management and consumption control measures. In Germany and Italy, they have played a major role in securing the supply of essential metals for all purposes. For the European economy as a whole, however, such measures are only effective if they are implemented generally and according to uniform principles. Of the important mining raw materials whose increase in production is desirable, petroleum remains the last to be mentioned. European self sufficiency, which will undoub tedly have to keep pace with growing demand in the future, will be able to rely on the production of Russia and Romania, which can still be greatly expanded. Hungary, too, is said to have untapped deposits; other oil -rich areas will have to be explored mor e systematically than in the past.
50
The future of synthesis
The synthetic or industrial production of raw materials has become so important in recent years that its future prospects cannot yet be reliably estimated. What is certain, however, is that th e synthetic production of fats, fuels, textiles and rubber still has a long way to go. Synthetic raw material production, which is highly inconvenient to the British monopoly economy, has been repeatedly described by British propaganda as uneconomical. Dur ing the European war, England had to experience firsthand that such claims were merely purposive. Had it anticipated political developments, the judgment of the well-known Falmouth Committee on the question of synthetic gasoline production would probably h ave been different. The purely technical questions of production seem to have been largely solved today, both in the case of grease and synthetic fibers, fuel and rubber. In the future, therefore, the only factors of importance for the scale of industrial raw material production will be the adequate construction of new plants, the securing of the raw materials needed for synthesis, and the question of the going price - to the extent that the scale of production exceeds vital needs. The last condition can be safely left to the future. Raw materials (coal, lime, pulp) are sufficiently available. Thus, the only thing that matters for meeting backup needs is the practical expansion of production. Apart from the gap in metals, the bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials in Europe could be substantially widened in the future, except for the unimportant luxury foods, at least to the point where synthesis can cover the safeguard requirements necessary for economic freedom. The synthesis will therefore have to star t where the efficiency of the soil ends. While it is clear that Europe will remain viable on its own - apart from certain tensions in the supply of metals, which could be compensated for by an appropriate supply economy - it is nevertheless necessary to ta ke into account the natural complementary areas of the continent, namely Africa and the Middle East, in all considerations of the future.
Middle East oil
The Middle East, which already in ancient times belonged to the cultural area of the Mediterranean as a flourishing region, will also in the future belong to the narrower European sphere of influence. Since the Mongol invasions of the Middle Ages, what has remained of the earlier rich cultures of these regions
51
is mostly water-poor steppe and desert land. But the soil is still fertile today, as is evident wherever irrigation begins. The English, who had made the Middle East a stomping ground for their political intrigues in the last 50 years, did hardly anything to develop the economic forces that act ually existed. Only the great oil wealth seemed to them worth exploiting, but they did not think of the needs of Europe, but only of their capital interests. In the Middle East, i.e. in Iraq, on the Bahrain Islands, in Iran and Saudi Arabia, about 16 million tons of oil were produced in 1938. The production, if it had reached Europe, would have been sufficient to cover approximately the margin between demand and self -sufficiency, even including the British Isles. In the future, however, far higher productio n results can be expected once the British monopoly economy has been abolished and the British capital shackles have been removed.
This is what Europe's fuel supply could have looked like as early as 1938.
Europe
Middle east
Other European fuel production
Total demand: 60,0 mill. t Generation: European petroleum 37,3 mill. t other European fuels 4,2 mill t Middle East crude oil 15,9 mill. t Import from overseas 2,6 mill. t Total: 60,0 mill. t
52
Rest from overseas
The capacity of the Iranian oil fields alone is estimated at 20 million tons per year, and Iraq's capacity at 7 million tons. The Bahrain Islands, which yielded 1.1 million tons in 1938, are still being developed, as are the conditions in Saudi Arabia. Thus, even with a substantial increase in demand, the Middle East could satisfy all or most of Europe's subsidy requirements for crude oil in the future. In this context, oil is only one particularly obvious example. Most of the other treasures of the Middle East are still unexploited. This applies not only to metals and minerals, but also to agriculture, which produces all the products of the Mediterranean region if the necessary water is available. The water supply, however, is a technically quite solvable task. In this respect, the experience that Italy has been able to gain so far in Libya is valuable. The Near East and North Africa, and indeed the entire Mediterr anean region, form a single unit, so that conditions do not differ fundamentally. In Libya, Italy has found that even a relatively small -scale reclamation or irrigation of the desert has a climate-altering effect, so that it seems quite possible for the It alians to open up North Africa, which was very populous in ancient times, to dense settlement. What is possible there, however, can also be carried out in the Near East. An example of such a transformation of the landscape, and even of the climate, is Cali fornia, which today is a veritable fruit orchard, but at the time of the first white settlers still had real desert character. In such tasks, we must not think in terms of too short a period of time and must not cling to outdated ideas, but must remember t hat North Africa and the Middle East were already the granaries of the Mediterranean region in ancient times.
The African reserve
The continent was once rightly called the "complementary continent" of Europe. The mutual complementation is already conspic uously expressed in a comparison of the structure of the basic production of Europe and Africa. What one lacks, the other has. It should be noted, however, that Africa's total basic production has so far barely reached one -fifteenth of Europe's production of foodstuffs and raw materials. Africa has remained an economically largely untapped continent due to the complete oversaturation and the national weakness of England and France. If Africa also possesses a considerable share of the world production in individual raw materials, these have been more overripe fruits that have virtually fallen into the lap of the English and French "colonizers". Until now, it was not labor that ruled in Africa, but capital, which wanted to earn high
53
interest rates as quick ly as possible. Only Italy has made a laudable exception in this respect. Despite the barrenness of its colonial territories, it did not pursue a policy of exploitation, but made considerable investments in the most generous manner in the hope of a later h arvest that would be all the richer.
European-African complement Outline of the basic production of Europe and Africa
Europe
Food
Luxury food
Oil fruits & seeds
Textile fibers
Other raw materials
Metals
Fuels
Africa
Food
Luxury food
Oil fruits & seeds
Textile fibers
Other raw materials
Metals
Fuels
But even the results of the African commodity economy so far would already mean a strong support for Europe. Let us think again of the gaps in Europe's own supply. Africa's oil crops and oilseeds could increase Europe's vegetable fat supply by more than half. Cocoa demand can be more than met by Africa. In textile fibers, Africa already produced a quarter of Europe's output. Of the important steel refining metals, Africa accounted for more than half of the world's production of vanadium, which is completely lacking in Europe, as well as a good third of chromium production and a good fifth of manganese production. Among the no n-ferrous metals, Africa has precisely those which Europe lacks the most, namely copper and tin. In 1938, Europe and Africa together already accounted for more than 70 percent of world production of chromium and manganese, more than 50 percent of world pro duction of food, cocoa, coal, iron, vanadium, and wood, and more than 30 percent of the world's vegetable oil and textile fiber production. Supplemented by the African region, Europe's economic freedom is more than assured.
Europe and Africa's share of world production of some key raw materials (in %)
Food Oil commodities Cocoa Coffee Tobacco Textile fibers Fuels Iron ore Chromium Manganese Vanadium Tin Copper
Europe 50,6 21,8 26,5 24,2 38,6 48,9 41,1 50,6 1,7 11,0
Africa 2,4 12,6 67,5 5,0 2,7 6,0 0,7 3,3 35,7 22,0 57,0 10,1 16,5
As I said, this is how it could have been so far. Here are just a few examples of the prospects for a planned development of Africa. In 1938, European African copper production accounted for about 28 percent of world production. In the future, Europe will be able to obtain sufficient copper, because the huge, cheaply mined copper deposits of Rhodesia and the Katanga 55
region are the most promising deposits on earth. Since 1929, African production has doubled, but Rhod esia's alone has increased thirty -two-fold. Africa's vegetable oil production has so far been limited only by the complete saturation of England and France. It can be increased almost at will. - Textile fiber production - as far as cotton is concerned - is tied only to irrigation. African rubber production still played a major role at the turn of the century, but today it is practically dead as a result of overexploitation and the price dictates of the rubber monopoly. The undoubtedly promising extracti on of plantation rubber is stuck in its infancy. It would also have found no place in the English rubber monopoly. But enough of examples. What are still considerations today can be brought to reality tomorrow for the benefit of all European countries.
The final balance
The prerequisite for the reorganization of Europe's relations with the world economy and thus for the reorganization of world economic exchange in general is the reflection of the European peoples on the vital law of the continent. Werner Daitz, the pioneer of a European large -scale economy, has summarized this law in the words "freedom through self -defense". This means that Europe is only Europe if it preserves its internal and external freedom in all areas of life. This freedom has been l argely lost to Europe in the Anglo Saxon world economy. To regain it is the goal of the present European struggle for freedom against England. A new economic order will also emerge from the political liberation of the continent; an order which will be crea ted by the Axis powers. The example of the National Socialist and Fascist national economies, whose principles and methods have passed their test so brilliantly precisely in the war, is the indication to all the other states of the continent of what the future must and will look like. Since the first public statement by Reich Economics Minister Walther Funk on the future forms of the new economic order in Europe, some of the principles enunciated then have already been put into practice. With the final victory over England, the new European economic order will also become a fully valid reality. It means nothing else than the return of the continent to natural thinking, to the realities of the European habitat and to the foundations of all economy: man, soil and work. This new Europe, to which Africa will belong as a natural complementary space, cannot be bypassed by the "world economy". Its tasks will not be less, but greater than before; for the exploitation of the world by plutocratic methods will be re placed by the incomparably greater task of a comprehensive and healthy development of the earth. 56
Area, population and internal trade of Europe
1937
German Empire with former Austria former Czechoslovakia former Poland-Gdansk The Netherlands Belgium-Luxembourg Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Iceland Italy Albania Bulgaria Romania Hungary Yugoslavia Greek Turkey Estonia Latvia Lithuania USSR European Part*) Spain Portugal Switzerland France Ireland Great Britain Europe: *)
Area
Population
on the sqkm inhabitants
Share of European domestic trade in %. Import Export
In 1000 sqkm
In % Europe
In mill.
In % Eruope
554,3 140,5 383,6 35,0 30,5 44,3 322,7 449,0 382,8 102,8 310,2 27,5 103,1 295,0 104,9 247,5 130,2 762,7 47,5 65,8 52,8
4,6 1,2 3,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 2,7 3,7 3,2 0,9 2,6 0,2 0,9 2,5 0,9 2,1 1,1 6,3 0,4 0,5 0,4
72,8 14,7 32,1 8,6 8,4 3,8 2,9 6,3 3,8 0,1 43,6 1,0 6,3 19,6 10,1 15,4 6,9 16,5 1,1 2,0 2,4
13,5 2,7 5,9 1,6 1,6 0,7 0,5 1,2 0,7 8,1 0,2 1,2 3,6 1,9 2,9 1,3 3,0 0,2 0,4 0,4
131,3 108,5 88,9 246,8 274,1 85,5 9,0 14,0 9,9 1,1 140,5 37,7 61,3 66,6 96,1 62,2 53,3 21,6 23,8 30,0 45,4
17,69 2,85 1,86 6,38 6,46 4,02 2,91 4,44 1,90 0,13 4,89 0,06 0,66 1,46 1,54 1,22 1,40 0,85 0,30 0,45 0,39
23,38 4,14 2,34 6,01 7,81 4,33 2,01 4,96 2,18 0,15 3,54 0,04 0,74 2,61 2,02 1,68 0,87 1,13 0,35 0,63 0,43
6000,2 512,0 91,8 41,3 551,0 70,3 243,2 12000,0
50,0 4,3 0,8 0,3 4,6 0,6 2,0 100,0
132,9 23,9 7,3 4,2 42,0 2,9 47,4 539,0
24,5 4,4 1,4 0,8 7,8 0,5 9,0 100,0
22,1 46,7 79,6 101,3 76,1 41,9 195,0 46,5
1,67 1,28 0,82 3,82 8,47 1,82 20,26 100,00
3,24 1,55 0,45 2,73 6,82 1,42 11,94 100,00
*A r ea an d p op u lat ion o f E u ro p e an Ru s si a. Th e i mp o rt an d e xp o rt sh ar e s ap p ly to th e en t ir e ter ri tory of th e So vi et U n ion .
57
European countries in world trade Percentage shares according to the results of the year 1937 Countries: German Empire f o r m e r Au s t r i a former Czechoslovakia former PolandGdansk The Netherlands BelgiumLuxembourg Denmark No r w a y Sw e d e n Fi n l a n d Iceland Italy Al b a n i a Bulgaria Romania Hungary Yugoslavia Greek Turkey Estonia Latvia Lithuania U S SR Spain Portugal Sw i t z e r l a n d Ireland Fr a n c e Great Britain Total Europe: Total Europe (only traffic with nonEurope):
58
in % of the import of each country: Europe Africa Asia America Au s t r a l i a 55,78 7,56 11,77 23,15 1,74 79,91 2,49 5,43 10,70 1,47
Europe 69,81 85,99
in % of each country's export: Af r i c a As i a Am e r i c a Au s t r a l i a 3,64 10,87 15,34 0,84 2,45 6,30 4,90 0,36
60,78
5,47
10,73
20,50
2,63
74,08
3,95
7,04
14,26
0,67
63,96 61,18
5,75 3,40
7,28 13,57
19,29 21,52
3,72 0,33
81,08 73,62
2,85 3,51
4,32 11,94
12,23 10,41
0,52
57,28 87,35 73,75 67,16 77,83 93,10 54,87 86,67 95,71 89,94 89,40 84,64 79,33 76,11 80,00 81,25 88,76 53,06 70,08 64,23 75,37 67,96 40,24 35,03 52,94 -
10,28 0,75 1,50 1,19 0,60 8,86 0,71 4,57 2,58 1,71 4,19 2,21 4,00 1,79 1,12 0,78 8,89 14,23 3,12 1,29 22,24 7,49 7,88 16,80
6,69 1,61 6,13 5,67 3,02 8,53 6,67 1,43 0,92 2,01 3,41 3,04 4,87 2,67 2,68 3,37 20,09 4,58 3,85 4,67 8,29 13,85 12,29 10,20 21,70
21,95 10,18 18,37 24,85 17,95 6,90 24,25 6,67 2,14 4,57 6,01 9,90 13,13 16,81 13,33 14,29 6,75 23,55 14,82 17,31 16,16 18,42 19,92 33,59 24,01 50,90
3,80 0,11 0,25 1,13 0,60 3,49 0,34 0,28 2,52 1,63 0,38 0,68 4,05 3,75 11,60 4,97 10,60
70,85 94,11 75,64 75,18 81,96 87,50 50,15 87,50 92,16 90,90 89,58 90,48 74,67 80,67 94,44 96,05 94,25 76,44 86,12 66,92 71,72 97,15 54,32 35,69 64,50 -
6,15 1,02 3,54 2,68 4,12 29,75 1,96 4,87 3,24 2,52 2,67 1,12 0,79 1,15 1,47 0,58 15,79 2,73 0,86 25,04 15,42 8,96 25,20
6,94 0,91 5,50 5,88 2,55 4,27 1,96 3,09 2,32 1,12 0,44 3,34 1,39 1,58 1,15 13,99 0,58 2,25 7,51 0,71 6,64 16,24 9,12 25,70
15,44 8,85 14,15 15,42 10,78 12,50 15,24 12,50 3,92 1,64 4,62 5,88 22,22 14,87 4,17 1,58 3,45 8,10 12,72 14,29 16,80 1,78 13,50 21,45 14,54 41,00
0,62 0,11 1,17 1,34 0,59 0,59 0,24 0,75 1,24 0,50 11,20 2,88 8,10
European trade with the four parts of the earth Shares of the individual countries in 1937
Cou n tri e s G er man E m p ir e f or m er Au str ia for m e r C z ech os lo va kia for m e r Po lan d - Gd a n sk Th e N eth e rlan d s Be lg iu m -Lu x em b ou r g De n m ark Nor way S wed en Fin lan d Ic ela n d Italy Alb a n ia Bu l gar ia Ro man ia Hu n ga ry Yu go sl a via Gr e ek Tu r ke y E sto n ia Lat vi a Lith u an ia US S R Sp ai n Portu ga l S witz e rla n d Ir elan d Fran c e Gr ea t B ri tain Tot al :
in % o f t ota l E u r op e an i mp o rt s : Af ri ca As ia Am e ri ca Au stra li a 13, 65 16, 41 13, 72 4,9 9 0,5 6 0,9 5 0,7 9 0,5 3 1,7 2 2,6 1 2,1 2 1,2 6 1,1 3 1,1 0 1,2 4 1,1 6 2,3 9 7,3 5 4,9 5 0,3 7 7,7 9 3,9 2 5,4 6 4,5 7 0,2 3 0,3 8 1,0 3 0,0 5 0,4 0 1,2 5 1,6 0 0,1 1 0,5 3 1,9 5 3,6 2 0,7 9 0,1 0 0,3 8 0,9 7 0,1 6 0,0 2 5,3 0 3,9 4 4,7 6 3,3 1 0,0 3 0,0 1 0,0 3 0,0 5 0,0 3 0,5 0 0,0 8 0,1 6 0,3 0 0,1 8 0,2 3 0,1 7 0,2 6 0,3 2 0,0 5 0,5 0 0,2 8 0,5 1 0,0 5 0,1 7 0,2 8 0,4 2 0,1 0 0,0 5 0,1 1 0,0 7 0,0 8 0,1 7 0,0 3 0,0 8 0,0 6 0,1 7 3,2 7 1,6 4 0,8 4 1,0 9 0,4 4 0,6 0 0,3 2 1,2 3 0,2 6 0,4 9 0,0 5 1,0 6 1,2 3 1,8 0 0,3 7 0,2 3 1,1 5 1,0 9 1,1 6 31, 45 15, 14 9,2 5 8,4 1 35, 03 36, 90 42, 83 71, 45 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0
in % o f t ota l E u r op e an e xp ort s to : Af ri ca As ia Am e ri ca Au stra li a 8,0 7 23, 65 20, 97 5,7 2 0,5 3 1,3 3 0,6 5 0,2 4 1,5 4 2,6 8 33 42 0,8 3 0,4 9 0,8 9 1,5 7 2,0 6 6,9 0 3,7 7 0,9 2 4,8 8 5,4 2 7,5 6 1,5 3 0,3 4 0,3 0 0,7 9 0,1 3 0,6 8 1,0 3 1,6 6 0,7 1 1,2 7 2,5 1 4,5 1 1,9 9 0,7 9 0,4 7 1,2 7 0,3 5 0,0 9 15, 17 2,1 4 4,7 9 0,9 2 0,0 2 0,1 1 0,1 1 0,1 2 0,9 0 0,6 3 0,2 1 0,5 3 0,3 7 0,4 6 0,3 4 0,1 6 0,4 9 0,2 2 0,0 4 1,1 6 0,1 1 0,3 2 0,9 3 0,1 3 0,0 4 0,0 6 0,0 4 0,0 8 0,0 5 0,0 4 0,0 4 0,0 6 0,4 4 4,2 1 1,5 3 0,0 8 0,0 8 1,0 2 0,7 9 0,1 2 0,4 4 0,1 3 0,7 5 2,0 2 2,8 5 1,0 6 0,0 4 0,0 8 0,1 2 22, 63 5,9 0 7,5 2 1,4 1 37, 16 38, 47 31, 89 84, 02 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0
59
Europe's share in the foreign trade of important overseas countries
Countries:
Europe's share of imports in %. 1913 1929 1937 48,3 30,3 27,8 29,2 22,4 24,1 78,0 55,4 53,1 71,6 53,0 53,5 68,8 50,6 44,9 30,2 18,9 13,4 30,1 23,0 32,2 80,3 62,5 47,7 61,2 46,4 43,5 71,7 52,3 50,0 66,2 54,2 54,9
USA Canada Argentina Brasilia Chile Japan China British-Indies Dutch-East-Indies Australian Confederation New Zealand
Europe's share of exports in %. 1913 1929 1937 60,3 44,7 41,0 54,0 37,0 47,4 87,2 82,2 71,0 58,7 44,9 49,4 74,1 55,2 48,5 24,0 7,4 12,0 35,5 26,7 25,9 58,6 47,9 49,1 48,2 36,5 33,2 80,4 68,0 67,8 81,3 80,8 80,4
Shares of the continents in the basic production of the earth (1937 in %)
Con t in en t s
E arth are a
E arth p op u la tion
Tot al b a si c p rod u cti on
Ag ri cu ltu ra l p rod u ct s
E u rop e wi th US SR Af ri ca North - Am e ri ca Ib e ro -A m er ic a As ia Oc ean ia Wor ld
20, 0 22, 8 14, 8 15, 8 20, 2 6,4 10 0
26, 6 7,2 6,7 6,1 52, 9 0,5 10 0
45, 5 2,9 24, 8 7,9 16, 0 2,9 10 0
47, 0 3,1 20, 1 8,7 17, 5 3,6 10 0
60
Non agr icu ltu ral p rod u ct s 40, 7 2,5 39, 0 5,3 11, 5 1,0 10 0
Food p rod u ct s
Ra w mat e ria l s
50, 6 2,4 19, 2 8,7 15, 9 3,2 10 0
35, 1 4,0 36, 1 6,1 16, 4 2,3 10 0
The basic production of the continents Their composition by value in % as of 1937
Production groups
World
Europe
Africa
Agricultural products Non-agricultural products Total production Food Raw materials Total production Food Grains, Potato, sugar Meat Sea fish Milk Wine and hops Coffee, tea, cocoa Tobacco Oil raw materials Textile fibers Rubber Wood products Fuels and petroleum products Metals Non-metallic materials Total production
75,5 24,5 100 66,9 33,1 100 21,1 19,2 1,1 19,8 1,2 1,2 1,5 3,4 8,6 0,5 1,7 12,3 6,1 2,3 100
80,5 19,5 100 77,3 22,7 100 23,8 20,6 1,1 27,4 2,9 0,8 1,5 3,7 1,8 9,8 4,1 2,5 100
79,3 20,7 100 54,7 45,3 100 14,5 13,5 0,1 10,2 3,6 6,5 1,4 14,5 17,6 0,1 3,2 12,7 2,1 100
North IberoAmerica America 61,3 83,4 38,7 16,6 100 100 51,8 74,1 48,2 25,9 100 100 8,3 11,6 19,3 40,5 0,7 20,3 10,4 0,3 0,8 7,5 1,8 1,6 2,1 3,4 10,2 7,7 0,1 2,8 23,4 8,0 8,5 6,4 2,3 2,0 100 100
Asia
Oceania
82,4 17,8 100 66,2 33,8 100 44,6 4,2 2,9 4,2 2,7 3,1 8,9 14,8 2,8 0,5 6,1 3,5 1,7 100
91,4 8,6 100 73,7 26,3 100 12,2 30,1 0,2 30,7 0,3 0,1 0,1 1,0 16,8 0,2 2,7 4,9 0,7 100
61
The production of raw materials of the large economic areas (in % of world production 1937)
Ra w mat e ria l s Me tal s : Ir on Man gan e s e Ch ro mi u m N i ck el T u n g st en Mo ly b d en u m Va n ad iu m L ead C op p er Zin c T in A lu min u m (b au xi te ) Ma gn e sit e M er cu ry Min er al s : C e m en t Pot a sh N it ro ge n Ph o sp h at e s ( cr u d e) Fu el s : Har d c oal Li gn i t e E l ec tri c p o we r C ru d e o il T ext il e f ib e r s: C otton Wo ol F lax Jute H em p Ra w s il k Ar ti fi ci al s ilk Ray on Ru b b er : Wood : Wo od p r od u c t s ( ra w ) Pu l p an d w ood p u lp Oil se ed s an d fru it s : C otton s e ed Lin s e ed P ean u t s Soy b e an s C op ra Ol i v e o il Pa l m oi l
62
E u rop e an d Af ri ca
As ia
North Am e ri ca
Ib e ro Am e ri ca
52, 2 72, 6 76, 8 3,6 6,0 3,3 57, 0 23, 0 27, 5 31, 1 11, 8 63, 2 72, 0 82 , 8
6,1 20, 5 13, 6 1,0 73, 0 26, 5 5,0 4,8 73, 3 6,1 14, 0 1,9
38, 9 0,7 0,2 90 , 9 9,0 93, 0 20, 0 38, 1 44, 0 42, 7 11, 5 14, 00 11, 8
1,5 6,0 5,3 0,1 11, 0 3,7 23, 0 17, 5 22, 7 10, 2 13, 2 18, 9 3,5
58, 6 90, 3 61, 6 60, 5
10, 6 12, 4 2,3
26, 4 9,7 15, 2 27, 5
3,3 8,7 0,6
55, 0 97, 3 51, 9 13, 0
8,5 8,0 9,1
33, 1 1,5 37, 2 61 , 9
0,3 1,4 16, 0
19, 7 31, 0 99, 5 53, 3 10, 3 50, 7 51, 6 1,0
22, 5 7,8 0,5 10 0,0 36, 5 89, 6 20, 3 35, 3 97, 2
49, 6 12, 1 27, 6 3,1 -
8,2 15, 7 10, 2 0,1 1,4 1,7
53, 2 51, 3
4,9 3,6
41, 6 45, 1
0,1 -
20, 4 31, 0 23, 3 2,8 4,3 97 , 2 67 , 9
25, 4 13, 4 66, 7 79, 0 81, 5 2,7 30, 9
45, 2 6,1 8,6 18, 2 0,1 -
9,0 49, 5 1,3 0,6 1,2
Notes: The division of the areas is purely geographical, so that, for example, the production of the countries of the Middle East is included in "Asia"; the Soviet Union, including its Asian part, is included in Europe. The numbers in bold indicate that the emphasis of a production (more than half) lies in a certain economic area. The remainder of the respective cross sum up to one hundred is the share of Oceania which is not listed here and which, moreover, is of little importance.
63