Laplanchean Dialogues with Hélène Tessier

November 1, 2022 - January 3, 2023

1st Dialogue

Bryan Batista-Thomas: Thank you for participating in these dialogues, Hélène. We have worked together on Laplanche’s thinking for the last three years. Aside from being the Vice-President of the Conseil Scientifique de la Fondation Jean Laplanche, you are a Full Professor, psychoanalyst, and former human rights lawyer. I know you have written several papers and books on the themes of ethics, rationalism, emancipation, and epistemology in Laplanche’s work. With this in mind, what are the Ethics of a Laplanchean style? How does this relate to metapsychology, clinical practice, and culture?

Hélène Tessier: I will start with the formulation of the question. I am not comfortable with talking about ethics in general. However, I am more comfortable with the adjective ethical because I would not like to substantiate ethics. Ethics and psychoanalysis are two different things. Analysis can be practiced ethically as much as science. Theory building in psychoanalysis, like metapsychological developments, can be done ethically. Ethics is a domain of its own. There are obviously ethical dimensions in Laplanche’s theorizing and theory of practice. I am comfortable with discussing these ethical dimensions. I also want to emphasize the accuracy of your word “style.” It is very relevant in the context. There is indeed a Laplanche style, meaning that his thinking has a quality found in almost all his work. This style has an ethical component: dedication to clarity, precision, elegance, and coherence. It is ethical since it is the basis of his method of thinking, governed by a quest for truth.

If we want to examine the ethical dimension of Laplanche’s work, we must consider two aspects separately: the scientific and the anthropological aspects in relation to the theory of practice. The ethical dimension of the scientific or metapsychological developments of Laplanche’s theory has to do with truth, scientific truth. The anthropological dimension relates to the conception of what it is to be human that this theory conveys. More specifically, it relates to the conditions for being a human and becoming human. It is closely linked to the theory of practice. Laplanche’s theory postulates a human capable of transformation - aiming for freer and more global auto-historicizations (or phrased a little differently, translations). The distinction between the ethical dimension of Laplanche’s metapsychology and his anthropology is somewhat artificial because the metapsychological conceptions fit with his anthropological conception. Nonetheless, let us keep the distinction for the sake of our discussion.

Let us start with the issue of truth. For Laplanche, science must formulate truth about its object or at least strive to do so. Laplanche argues in favor of a scientific status for metapsychology. This status involves consequences: the possibility of proposing an integrated model coherent with an explanation of the mode of action of psychoanalysis as a clinical method. A model that can also be refutable. Regarding epistemological trends, Laplanche’s choices are in debate with the current postmodern cultural conditions. He formulated strong criticism against eclecticism in contemporary psychoanalysis. He argues, for example, that if a definition of the unconscious is true, an opposite definition cannot be true as well. His definition of the sexual unconscious and his description of its formation are very specific. According to it, mythosymbolic and primary contents are not part of the Sexual or repressed unconscious in a psychoanalytical sense. Epistemologically, Laplanche takes strong anti-postmodern positions. I argued in a previous paper that epistemological choices have ethical dimensions (Tessier, H, 2012). You can find such a position in Laplanche’s work, especially in the papers collected in Between Seduction and Inspiration: Man (Laplanche & Mehlman, 2014).

Many object to Laplanche’s theorizing because of this anti-postmodern and antideconstructivist trend. His theory is a system in which all parts must fit with the others. More precisely, (1) seduction, (2) the “fundamental anthropological situation,” (3) the translational hypothesis of repression, (4) the category of the message, (5) psychic reality, (6) the formation of the repressed unconscious and the ego, (7) and sublimation/inspiration, all these developments require one another. Besides, metapsychology and practice must go hand in hand. Metapsychology should account for the transformative action of psychoanalysis.

Laplanche’s theory is firmly grounded in the rationalist tradition. A manifestation of this orientation is seen in the description of the contents of the sexual unconscious. As I previously mentioned, such content does not exist outside history in the form of universal fantasies, and it cannot precede primary repression. In Laplanche’s theory, fantasies are historical and singular, different from one person to another. However, fantasizing is universal. Therefore, Laplanche’s theory is incompatible with a definition of the sexual unconscious that relies on primordial and universal fantasies, like the primal scene or Oedipus. Acknowledging this incompatibility is part of the search for scientific description, a quest for coherence, and the possibility of debate and refutability.

An example can illustrate the rationalist tradition in Laplanche’s thought, which, according to me, is part of its ethical stance. I will take the example of his rejection of his development on étayage (leaning on). For a certain time, until 1992, Laplanche said that the Sexual came from our self-preservation, which he later called the theory of emergence.

BBT: Leaning on as a theory of emergence

HT: …leaning on, yes. He later rejected it because it did not work in his epistemology. In his epistemology, if something is sexual, it must already be sexual. Something sexual cannot be created out of a nonsexual element. This would be an unexplainable leap, a step into irrationalism. Referring in an ironic way to magic and entertainment, he wrote that you cannot get the rabbit of the sexual out of the hat of the self-preservative. If something is sexual in the child, it is because it was already sexual in the adult.

BBT: Have we moved into the anthropological dimension, or are we still in the scientific?

HT: We are still scientific in the ethical dimension of the quest for scientific truth. To stay in the ethical dimension, we can also mention the sober style of Laplanche, who avoids any type of pathos in referring to the unconscious or metapsychology. It is also part of a rationalist ethos.

We may now move to the anthropological side of Laplanche’s theory. As he writes, his theory is also an anthropology. It means that it describes what a human being is and the conditions for becoming a human. Laplanche does not conceive of humans as being in continuity with animals. Even less so, he does not consider them an imperfect form of machine, as we can see in some forms of trans-humanism. Becoming human implies something specific. What is this specificity in the particular perspective of psychoanalysis? In the general theory of seduction, it is sexualization through primary repression. Primary repression is one of the conditions to become a human because it is the condition for the formation of a sexual unconscious and of an ego, which are continuously engaged in psychic conflict.

Such an anthropology is not very much in fashion today. It is more usual now to situate humans in continuity with nature, even from a psychoanalytic perspective. I am not saying, nor is Laplanche, that from the perspective of other sciences, humans are not in continuity with other species. We are speaking here about the specific angle that is brought by psychoanalysis, which, if we take this discipline seriously, should be considered when considering the human being in its globality. This specific angle pertains to the sexual unconscious. Furthermore, Laplanche defined this specific angle of psychoanalysis, which corresponds to its object, in concrete terms, namely “fantasy in its relation to excitation.”

Laplanche’s anthropological conception is about a human that is historical and, therefore, transformable. His anthropology is one of transformation, in which psychic conflicts are key. They make the human transformable because of the movement they imply. In Laplanche’s metapsychological conception, the residues of translation, which are the core of the sexual unconscious, relate to the ego in only one mode, namely, to attack it. The motor of transformation is from attacks on the ego from the derivatives of the sexual unconscious, even from the sexual death drive, which is the more de-fleshed residues, the more cut off from meaning, the more unbound. Therefore, though it is not part of Laplanche’s terminology, I argued that this anthropology, besides being an anthropology of transformations, carries an ethics of emancipation.

Laplanche never used the word “emancipation.”. He left out the concept of emancipation because it is not a psychoanalytic concept. It belongs to other disciplines. I want to convey that Laplanche’s anthropological conception implies a human capable of transformation and, consequently, of emancipation. It then implies a conception of a world or a society where emancipation is a desirable moral concept. I use the word emancipation in its historical sense: the ending of the status of one as a minor - in the legal sense - where one is not considered responsible for their actions and, at the same time, not allowed to make decisions on their own, at least those involving legal consequences. Emancipation is thus a transformation in the sense of becoming freer and more responsible, acknowledging liability for one’s actions. Borrowing Laplanche’s terminology, this requires a transition from “answering to” to “answering for,” a theme Laplanche discusses in “Responsibility and Response” in Between Seduction and Inspiration: Man

According to Laplanche, unconscious derivatives force one to “answer to.” This derives from the centrality of the message in the general theory of seduction. Even if the message, originally from an external other, becomes an internal otherness, it interpellates, in other words, summons, or, in Laplanche’s terms, “makes a sign,” thus requiring a response. On the other hand, “answering for” one’s action, thoughts, or decisions, is a very different process. A human getting more and more able to “answer for” her/his/their actions is an autonomous human, an emancipated human, in the Kantian sense. The Kantian sense of emancipation can be summarized as not remaining a minor, as coming of age, being accountable for one’s actions.

Such a human who is becoming able to “answer for” his action, is part of Laplanche’s anthropology, though it is no longer in the psychoanalytic domain, but in the moral realm. However, Laplanche’s metapsychology, which includes the possibility of being able to have freer translations, shows some path into fostering this process. This doesn’t mean that analysis is about making a human totally responsible. The conflict will still be there. Humans will be humans, but there is an idea that you can change things to gain a little bit more of a freer translation, more global, more encompassing, less narcissistic, and less rigid.

BBT: You just said emancipation is not a psychoanalytic concept. Can you say specifically what delineation would suddenly bring us out of psychoanalysis?

HT: Psychoanalysis has a specific domain: the sexual unconscious, psychic conflicts, and the way to access parts of the human soul that are not accessible through other methods. It would be ridiculous to argue that psychoanalysis can, as such, account for all human and social activities. Psychoanalysis, according to Laplanche, proposes to take into consideration “psychic reality,” a concept which, writes Laplanche, was often confused with psychological reality by Freud. We will come back to the notion of psychic reality later. Laplanche defines psychic reality as a third order of reality parallel to psychological and material reality. Psychic reality invades everything: it permeates all other human activity, including relations with the body, interpersonal relations, erotic life, love, social activity, intellectual and scientific endeavor, etc. For Laplanche, the psychoanalytic being starts with primary repression, which results in sexualization (not sexuation). Again, sexualization, or erotization, is one of the conditions of becoming human, in the psychoanalytic perspective. This dimension is not taken into consideration by other disciplines, and this is where the boundary of psychoanalysis is drawn.

From this perspective, Laplanche’s work never implied that the psychic agencies, i.e., the sexual unconscious and the ego, were accounting for the globality of the person. When we depart from discussing psychic agencies, we depart from psychoanalysis. We are at the border of other disciplines. What I want to underline is that Laplanche’s anthropological conception is compatible with the idea of a human being capable of forming a project, a quest for greater freedom. Freedom and projects are not psychoanalytic concepts. But psychoanalytic contributions, in their own domain, can enlarge the understanding of freedom, or the challenges humans encounter in the quest for freedom.

BBT: Could you speak a little bit about how Laplanche sees biology and psychology, etc. as outside of psychoanalysis? Which is to say that he sees psychoanalysis as a discipline that deals with aspects of the mind only accessible through the analytic method.

HT: It is important to note that Laplanche has total respect for other disciplines. He is also very strict in defining the epistemological field of psychoanalysis, which, as we said, is the sexual unconscious, its modes of access, and its way of invading other human activities. Biology, or physiology, for example, deal with phenomena central to psychoanalysis, but from a different angle.

Let us take the example of excitation: Laplanche keeps repeating that a nonspeculative definition of the object of psychoanalysis is fantasies in relation to excitation. Biology, neurology, and physiology have much to say about excitation. Psychoanalysis postulates as a starting point a body that is excitable and focuses on the relation between scenes, ideas, fantasies, and their relation to excitation. The whole theory of binding [liaison] in Laplanche deals with the binding of affects, the binding of their quantitative dimension, namely excitation with their qualitative dimensions—the meaning of this excitation. I use this to illustrate the difference in focus between disciplines. The same goes for psychology. It deals, among others, with what is observable: perception, behaviors, etc. Psychoanalysis deals with what is not: the role of fantasies in their relation to excitation, behaviors, thought processes, and even perception. Reading Laplanche is always a good reminder of the epistemological boundaries between disciplines, which does not imply that the other disciplines are unimportant. On the contrary, it is based on the complementarity of disciplines. This is why Laplanche’s theory, according to me, is the only psychoanalytic perspective that allows for genuine bridges between disciplines.

BBT: Let us go back to the ethical dimension of Laplanche’s work. Can you link the ethical dimension and Laplanche’s theory of practice?

HT: To summarize the ethical dimension of Laplanche’s theory of practice, I would use the word freedom. As I just said, Laplanche’s anthropology describes a human capable of transformation and looking for freer, more encompassing translations. This is embodied in his theory of practice in the way he refers to the use of interpretation. Laplanche insists that the interpreter, in Laplanche’s words, the “hermeneut,” in the session is not the analyst but the analysand. The analyst’s role is to focus on de-translation to open up possibilities for freer interpretations by the analysand. This position refers to Laplanche’s focus on the message as the central vehicle and mediator of human experience. Thus, according to him, an analyst in a session should always focus on the position of the analysand as experiencing herself/ himself/themself as receiving messages and asking herself/himself/themself the question: “What does she/he/they (the analyst) want from me?” In my opinion, such a stance helps the analyst not to impose or propose interpretations that can be used as readymade translations. It is deeply respectful of the freedom of the analysand to find her/his/ their way in transformative moments.

Laplanche’s theory of practice revolves around two Freudian principles. First, the analytic method, in other words, free association and de-translation, re-translation, and second, the neutrality of the analyst. On this latter concept, Laplanche has added to the Freudian concept of refusement (Versagung in German). In addition to the fact that the analyst should refrain from giving advice or even direct support, refusement involves what Laplanche has described as an attitude of respect of the analyst towards his unconscious. This means that the analyst must always be aware that he is also a conflictual being and that his unconscious is at work in his perceptions, thought process, and affective reaction. The work of the unconscious remains “unconscious” for the analyst. Refusement is a constant reminder of this fact, which is a basic premise of the whole discipline. Laplanche rejects the current use of the notion of countertransference, as it appears in contemporary psychoanalysis. His arguments are manifold. He argues that the common reference to countertransference, more specifically within the dyad transference-countertransference, is not scientifically sound with respect to his definition of the sexual unconscious. What is called countertransference in contemporary psychoanalysis has, according to Laplanche, little to do with unconscious processes. He argues, for example, that if you see five analysands a day, how can you first identify your reaction as “unconscious” and second, as being related to the patient you are presently seeing, or, in that respect, any of the analytic hours? In addition, if you see transference/countertransference as a pair related to treatment, would you then form five different countertransferences? For further precisions, I refer you to the section “The Instrumentalisation of Countertransference” in the essay “Intervention in a Debate” in Freud and the Sexual (Laplanche 2011, p. 231-232). Furthermore, in his view of the analytic situation as a baquet [a tub], some conditions are necessary to put movement to the analytic process: free association and the method of dissociation/association, as well as free-floating attention from the analyst. These conditions are not in place for the analyst to gain access to his unconscious in a session. How would the analyst be conscious of an unconscious process? This is why, as I said, Laplanche strongly advocates for the concept of “Versagung” when referring to the analyst at work: Versagung [refusement], which, as we just said, is an attitude of respect of the analyst toward his unconscious.

The notion of transfert en creux [hollowed-out transference] is a great contribution of Laplanche to the theory of practice. We can see it as a development with an ethical dimension in clinical analysis. Interpretations should not fill in the fantasies or translations of the patient. The analyst should instead try to identify what in the session could have been taken as messages by the analysand: what kind of messages they became and what kind of translation they have called for. It is a very non-intervening type of interaction. No interpretation is imposed.

BBT: How would an analyst give an interpretation or engage with an analysand in the hollowed-out transference? How would an analyst engage with an analysand in giving an interpretation, or would an analyst not give an interpretation? What would that look like?

HT: You must always remember the distinction between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, which are part of the same treatment. As Laplanche underlines, there are few genuine analytical moments in an analysis. Most of the work belongs to psychotherapy. Analysis has to do with de-translation, whereas psychotherapy involves working with an already existing translation. Working analytically or psychotherapeutically in a particular moment is a matter of clinical judgment. But if we, in terms of analysis proper, offer an interpretation, it aims at delinking, de-translating, and letting the analysand translate for himself in a new way. Remember what we just said about the analysand as the hermeneut: it is part of Laplanche’s ethics of practice. In my terms, I consider it an ethic of freedom.

BBT: The interpretation that is it delinking, would be delinking affect from representation?

HT: Yes, though this formulation remains very theoretical. It is about loosening the link between the quantitative side of the affect, the strength with which it “affects” the ego and the ideational content. We can also say that it is about delinking links that are rigid. It can be said that delinking is related to repetition to change the perspective. Delinking interpretations may provide conditions to highlight the repetitive aspects of thoughts or qualification of affects.

Delinking is not necessarily a dramatic experience. Something repetitive links different situations/messages to the same translations. It is very much about affects, which have two sides: one is the quantitative aspect, the “affective charge.” But this charge is linked with a qualitative aspect, which qualifies the affect as an affect in particular: anger, fear, etc. Binding and unbinding are about linking the quantitative part, the charge, with the qualification. Rigid binding links quantitative experience with rigid qualifications that do not circulate freely along the associative chain. It is defensive insofar as it protects from anxiety, which is a de-qualification of affects. Delinking may allow, at least we hope so, for this possibility of movement to resume. Though Laplanche does not refer to Ego Psychology and developed a very different metapsychology and understanding of the repressed unconscious, he is nonetheless a psychoanalytic theorist who takes the ego and the defense mechanisms very seriously.

BBT: We were discussing affects, and you just mentioned Ego Psychology. How does a Klenian or Object Relations perspective differs from a Laplanchean perspective?

In previous discussions about Laplanche’s work, we discussed how one wants to move from a total object, a totality, or something that is a bit more rigid to be free to circulate as part objects.

HT: You mean that in Laplanche’s thought, the total object is not an achievement as it is in Klein. Laplanche considers the total object a narcissistic binding, a work of the ego always aiming at a totality. That is why he favors the circulation of part objects in his definition of sublimation. But let us start with some more fundamental comments about the conceptual differences between Laplanche and Klein. Laplanche paid tribute to Klein. He borrowed the terms partobjects and total object from Klein’s theory, though he defines them within a different epistemological system and metapsychology. Laplanche’s theory is not genetically or developmentally oriented, as Klein’s case is. For him, the total object is there from the start, as the other who emits the message. The ego, which is formed by primary repression as the translated part of the message, tends to restore this totality as soon as it is formed.

Contrary to the Kleinian perspective, for which the total object is a developmental achievement, the total object, for Laplanche, is there from the start, namely in the other, the other of the message. When he writes that the ego aims at a totality, he means that the ego looks for totalizing linking, which replicates the totality, which is there from the start as (1) the other as a totality and (2) the ego as a totality. However, in Laplanche’s metapsychology, the residues of translation that form the sexual unconscious are the source-objects of the drive. They are the opposite of a totality: they are residues, parts of metabolized messages, out of context, with no connection to meaning and to historicization, which is part of a linking, or if you will, a totalizing movement. They tend to be less and less integrated in fragments of scenes. They have lost their flesh, like a bone without meat. Ultimately, in their extremely de-fleshed status, they are the source-objects of the sexual death drive, quasi-nonobjects. They are not objects but an index [indice] in such a state. We will come back to this notion later. They only interpellate and make a sign. But as they are signs left out of a semiotic system, they attack the attempt at linking, at totalizing by the ego. When some linking happens, but it is most of the time total, the quantitative charge of the indice is linked with ideational contents and becomes fantasies, more organized fantasies, or scenes than the index, they get some “flesh”: these are the part objects. Part-objects are also attacking, but less so. You can see that this is a major difference between Laplanche and Klein.

Another difference would be the definition of the object. Laplanche refuses the paradigm of a philosophy of the subject. He thus refuses the subject/object dichotomy. The reference to the concept of objects in his thinking must then consider this position. An object for Laplanche is a fantasy. Objects are “correlates of our ego (Laplanche & Thurston, 2020, p. 154).” I do not think that this is the case in Klein.

Going back to the formation of part objects, the whole process should not be described in a dry vacuum: it has to do with affects. I have to stress that Laplanche’s theory, contrary to Lacanian streams, is very focused on affects. One precision is that he considers that affects are not unconscious: they affect the ego. Laplanche considers that the mobility of affects is a great discovery of psychoanalysis. But contrary to Freud, he does not consider affects only in their quantitative dimension. He points out that affects also have a signifying aspect, which is linked to content, even though it can become rudimentary due to the de-linking work of the unconscious.

The linking between the quantitative side and the qualitative dimensions which means between the quantum and the meaning given to it—is at its least when the ego is under attack by the index, for example. This de-qualification is the work of de-linking —which is, unbinding the quantitative and the qualitative part of the affect—results in the most de-qualified form of affect, almost a mere quantity that makes itself known in the form of acute anxiety [Angoisse]. To avoid such attacks and to ease anxiety, some binding may be defensive, for example, narcissistic binding. Narcissistic binding tends to be rigid and leads to characterological defenses. Other types of binding are also possible, namely binding on the model of translation by way of symbolic connections, which is freer and leads to forming part objects able to circulate and transform themselves.

Anxiety in Laplanche is not necessarily described as a pathological phenomenon. It is also the motor of transformation. It leads to the rebinding of the quantity with various representations. Laplanche considers that the ego is susceptible to being destroyed in two different ways: either through excessive unbinding and attacks from the derivatives of the sexual unconscious or through excessive binding, totalizing binding, which freezes the ego into rigidity. For this reason, Laplanche defines sublimation as the circulation of part objects, which can always be de-translated, or re-translated.

BBT: It’s anxiety-provoking.

HT: Very much. Circulation of part objects is anxiety-provoking. The longing for a totalizing object is always there to alleviate the anxiety. But as I said, anxiety is the motor of transformation in Laplanche’s metapsychology unless it leads to total unbinding, which is the work of the sexual death drive, the complete destruction of the ego.

BBT: One question for me is “psychopathology.” I know Laplanche doesn’t think much about psychopathology, but patients come in with depression and anxiety. How would he conceptualize this?

HT: I wouldn’t say that Laplanche doesn’t think of psychopathology. Though, I think he never wrote about that very much because, for him, the same model accounts for all states. For example, what is depression in the theory of general seduction? It could be conceptualized as ideas and scenes repeatedly attacking the ego, attacks from the sexual unconscious, which may involve masochistic satisfaction, which might be quite difficult to renounce.

Depending on the clinical presentation, it can also be conceptualized, at least partly, referring to other configurations involving what Laplanche names the “unconscious enclave,” formed of messages which face a radical failure of translation and are therefore not part of the topographical model that revolves around the sexual, repressed unconscious, and the ego. Laplanche conceptualizes the unconscious enclave to be able to present a unitary description of the human soul, whether the individual enters psychotic states or episodes or struggles with neurotic defenses. For Laplanche, nobody has a guarantee against a psychotic decompensation.

A pathological state can always be described in phenomenological terms. Still, for Laplanche, the source of the psychopathology and its unfolding must be described in terms of metapsychology involving seduction, messages, translation, binding, excitation, etc. The goal of the analytic project revolves nonetheless around allowing for less repetitive freer, and more encompassing translations. This is what he considers the cultural destiny of all humans, which, in Laplanche’s metapsychology, corresponds to drive renunciation: “translating and putting into narrative form for himself the messages of the other, including their most enigmatic sexual aspects (Laplanche 2011, 302).”

BBT: Here is a good place to stop for today.

References

Laplanche, J., & Mehlman, J. (1976). Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. John Hopkins U.P.

Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J.-B. (1988). The Language of Psycho-analysis. Karnac Books and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Laplanche, J. (2011). Freud and the Sexual. The Unconscious in Translation.

Laplanche, J., & Mehlman, J. (2015). Between Seduction and Inspiration: Man. The Unconscious in Translation.

Laplanche, J., & House, J. (2016). New Foundations for Psychoanalysis. The Unconscious in Translation.

Laplanche, J., House, J., & Thurston, L. (2017). Aprèscoup: Problématiques VI. The Unconscious in Translation.

Laplanche, J., & Thurston, L. (2020). The Unfinished Copernican Revolution: Selected Works, 1967-1992. The Unconscious in Translation.

Martens, F. (2022). Lacan pris au mot: Les fureurs de bonneval ou Laplanche maudit par son Maître. Hermann. Ornston, D. G. (1993). Translating Freud. Yale University Press.

Tessier, H. (2012). “Métapsychologie, Épistémologie et éthique de la clinique psychanalytique, Psicologia im estudo.” Vol 17, no 3 Jul. Set. 2012, pp 373381.

Tessier, H. (2020). Rationalism and Emancipation in Psychoanalysis: The Work of Jean Laplanche. The Unconscious in Translation.

CONTRIBUTORS

Bryan Batista-Thomas, LCSW, MA, is a psychoanalytic candidate at IPTAR and a graduate of Performance Studies from NYU Tisch School of the Arts, where he focused on the queerness of temporality, the performativity of epistemology, and oral traditions. He is currently preparing a manuscript provisionally entitled Readings of Jean Laplanche in Process: Conversations Amplifying Differences (forthcoming Routledge 2024). Bryan works full-time in private practice.

Hélène Tessier, LL.M., D.E.A., Ph.D. is a psychoanalyst, a member of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society and the International Psychoanalytic Association, and a lawyer member of the Quebec Bar. She is a Full Professor in the School of Conflict Studies in the Faculty of Human Sciences and Philosophy at Saint Paul University (Ottawa). She is the Vice-President of the Scientific Council of La Fondation Jean Laplanche/Nouveaux Fondements pour la psychanalyse and the author of publications on Laplanche’s work and their epistemological and ethical implications.