ANALYSIS China’s increasing role in Africa

BY TAMÁS MAGYARICS

The African continent has been a policy taker for centuries. During the better part of the 19th century, its history was defined by a number of outside powers’ scramble for Africa: the British, the French, the Germans, the Belgians and the Portuguese were engaged in cutthroat competition for the rich natural resources of Africa. The situation changed a bit during the Cold War when the continent, in reality, served as a side theater for the global contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The newly liberated countries from colonial rule were practically pawns in the hands of the rulers in Washington and Moscow. The lofty rhetoric of liberal internationalism and socialism/communism shielded raw geopolitical and geostrategic interests by both superpowers. Systemic corruption, economic mismanagement, domestic violence, political turmoil and the like characterized the majority of the countries, especially in the sub-Saharan region.

A soft target for China

The global balance of power shifted in the 1990s. One of the major factors in this change was the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent contraction of Russian interest in Africa. Another important element in this process was the rise of China as a great power with an increasing aspiration to become a global player next to the United States. Africa, in general, looked quite a soft target for China to break out of its regional power status. Besides the geopolitical considerations, Africa’s lure was predominantly economic: it is a continent that is, relatively speaking, underexploited as far as its natural resources are concerned, while China has a seemingly unlimited appetite for energy and mineral resources in its efforts to catch up with the U.S. At the same time, Africa’s population is expected to double to some 2.5 billion by 2050, thus providing a huge market that great powers can ignore only at their own peril. The 2000s saw a rapid growth of Chinese trade with and investment in Africa – again, relatively speaking. Recent data show that Africa’s share in China’s trade with the world is only 4%, while the similar FDI amounts to 2.9%. Nevertheless, for certain African countries, Chinese economic presence and trade are vital (about 59% in a recent poll expressed favorable view of Chinese economic influence in Africa) – though some observers believe that these countries are falling into a ’debt trap’ which is so well-known in the relations between rich and not-so-well-to-do countries, and evokes criticisms of neo-colonial behavior.

No strings attached

One of the secrets of the successes of Chinese companies and banks is their ’no-string-attached’ approach to the local governments. (According to the Afrobarometer of the Freedom House, 55% of the Africans think there should be no ’strings attached’ to any foreign investment in their countries.) While the Western investors, prodded by their governments, may have such preconditions as suppressing corruption, observing human rights and civil rights, meeting environmental standards, and the like, the Chinese do not ask too many questions as for the domestic affairs of the countries they would like to do business with. Analysts claim that China has four overarching strategic interests in Africa: (1) access to natural resources; (2) finding export markets; (3) acquiring political legitimacy in the world; and (4) it wants stability in the region instead of risky social and/or political changes which might hurt Beijing’s economic interests.

‘Belt and Road’ vs. ‘Global Gateway’ in Africa

The increasingly prominent presence of Chinese companies and, as one of its consequences, growing influence in Africa is part and parcel of Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This endeavor is being looked more and more skeptically by the U.S. and the European Union alike. While Washington is trying to dissuade the Europeans from establishing too intimate relations with China, the EU has announced recently a global investment plan of some USD 340 billion. The Global Gateway Initiative is designed to be a ’true alternative’ to the BRI. It emphasizes a different, democratic approach to China’s hardheaded, realist approach to Africa. The Global Gateway would like to look beyond narrowly defined economic and trade issues; it would also like to address such questions as climate change, good governance, health security, and sustainable development, among others. In fact, these non-material factors may be important in this latter-day ’scramble for Africa.’ In this global contest between China’s authoritarian system of government and valuefree foreign policy and trade on one hand, and the democratic alternative offered by much of the West, it matters for both sides how their different visions are viewed in Africa. China is bent on improving its international image, and would like to use Africa in boosting its global leadership ambitions. Beijing’s efforts in these areas are met with certain skepticism in Africa: it is only about a fifth of the respondents in a recent opinion poll thought that China offers a good model – while the American ’model’ was approved by about a third of the people asked.

The pandemic factor

COVID-19 has not made China’s endeavors easier either economically or ideologically. Africa’s external debt has skyrocketed by 43% in recent years, and a number of countries, including Kenya, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo) have canceled Chinese projects, while Beijing’s responsibility (though, of course, denied by the Chinese) in the spread of the pandemic has not made the Asian power more popular in the world in general, and in Africa in particular either. However, it is not all bad news for China in Africa: a number of countries believe that ”China relates to Africa as an equal partner” (Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda), and the memories of the behavior of the former colonial powers in the past are still quite vivid in the better part of Africa. China does not have this baggage; moreover, it is consciously playing upon the theme of ’the West and the rest’ whenever opportunity arises, and is doing its best to present itself as the protector of the interests of the so-called emerging economies. China is enjoying one of her best chances to sell this policy in Africa, which has remained a continent of policy taker if we strip away the polite rhetoric and diplomatic niceties of the outside centers of power.