Border crossing volume1 issue7

Volume 1, Issue 7

CHRISTIANITY AND WESTERN DIPLOMACY: STRANGE OR OBVIOUS BEDFELLOWS?

Cecelia Lynch

JAPAN’S SOFT POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY: BETWEEN ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND POLITICAL FAILURE

Alexander Bukh

August 2015

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Chief Publisher Eugène Matos De Lara

Letter from the Editor Greetings loyal readers,

Editor

Benjamin Miller

Academic Advisors Arne Ruckert Dave Van Ginhoven Jennifer Haire

Associate Publisher Amelia Baxter

Associate Editors Eric Wilkinson Mete Edurcan Guillaume Lacombe-Kishibe Kristina R. Proulx

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Pierre-Alexandre Lubin

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One of the great advantages of scholarship is the opportunity to step back and ask some of the big questions. After all, when you’re caught up in the day to day demands of diplomacy, you might develop a sense of the major trends, but you can hardly catch your breath long enough to articulate them in any depth. This month, we have some of the world’s leading diplomatic scholars to breathe for you as they wrestle with profound questions about diplomacy’s past, present, and future.

Contemplating the Christian roots of Western diplomacy and the practical implications of those roots today, we have Dr. Cecilia Lynch’s piece "Christianity and Western Diplomacy: Strange or Obvious Bedfellows?". Her reflection will no doubt sensitize you to the ethical, philosophical, and theological sources of the everyday line you walk between the global/universal and state particularity.

Reflecting on the current state of diplomatic knowledge, we have two pieces. Firstly, we have Dr. Leonard Seabrooke’s piece “Transnational Diplomatic Knoweldge”. We’re sure this article will get you thinking about your own skills and knowledge and the new and shifting demands on diplomatic “competencies”. Secondly, following our first book review last month, we have Kristina Proulx’s review of 21st Century Global Health Diplomacy, which, she argues, intentionally or not, is a call for all diplomats to gain new kinds of health competencies.

Taking us into the future, Dr. Ole Jacob Sending makes some compelling and counter-intuitive points about the increasing power of diplomacy at the expense of diplomats. He offers a broad sweep of how modern technological developments have coalesced with diplomatic technique to produce a world in which diplomats still have considerable say over global dialogue, but in very subtle ways.

Finally, we have two fascinating case studies. Dr. Alexander Bukh takes a look at the strengths and limits of Japan’s soft power and James Ker-Lindsay examines the limits of engagement without official recognition through the Greece-Kosovo relationship. Both get under the surface of popular news stories.

Two themes seem to run throughout all the articles: who does diplomacy is changing and how they do diplomacy is changing. While these may be obvious, drawing out the clear implications of these trends will no doubt help us all grapple with them just a bit more effectively.

www.diplomatmagazine.nl

Happy reading,

Benjamin Miller 4

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Contents 6

JAPAN’S SOFT POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY: BETWEEN ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND POLITICAL FAILURE Alexander Bukh

CHRISTIANITY AND WESTERN

DIPLOMACY: STRANGE OR OBVIOUS BEDFELLOWS? 10

Cecelia Lynch

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PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF 'ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT RECOGNITION’

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James Ker-Lindsay

TRANSNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE

Leonard Seabrooke

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DIPLOMATS MAY LOSE POWER, BUT DIPLOMACY IS EXPANDING

Ole Jacob Sending

21ST CENTURY GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY, BOOK REVIEW 22

Kristina R. Proulx

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JAPAN'S SOFT POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY Century: Between Economic Success

Alexander Bukh holds an LLM in International Law from Tokyo University and a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He is currently a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Alexander has published numerous academic articles and book chapters on Japan-Russia relations and Japan's national identity and foreign policy.Alexander is the author of "Japan's Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's Other" (Routledge 2009) which was translated to Russian and published in November 2012.

Alexander Bukh

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n the last decade, the notion of soft power initially coined by Joseph Nye (1990) as part of an attempt to counter the arguments regarding the imminent decline of the United States as a global superpower has become one of the most popular concepts among both scholars and practitioners of international relations. In a nutshell, soft power as construed by Nye (2004) is the ability to shape others’ choices and preferences through non-coercive tools. The positive connotation of the term (as opposed to the strikingly similar concept of propaganda), combined with the promise of potential influence for states whose hard power is not valued greatly in the international arena, are probably the main reasons for its current widespread popularity.

However, what exactly is “soft power”? Power is one of the most complex and hotly debated concepts in political science and its related disciplines. There have been

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numerous attempts to theorize soft power and the notion of attraction which is central to Nye’s idea of getting others to want what you want. It is far beyond the scope of this article to engage these debates.

For the purposes of this article, “soft power” is defined as a successful policy aimed at influencing the behavior of a targeted population through non-coercive and non-material means. As such, soft power is the ability to bring change in the behavior of a target audience through certain policies that involve neither sanctions nor bribes. Needless to say, it is very hard to establish a truly scientific causal relationship between this kind of policy and a change in behavior. Nonetheless, some loose causality can be observed.

Japan, which is occasionally referred to as a “soft power superpower” (Watanabe and McConnell 2008), has been one of the most popular case studies for scholars of soft power. The idea of soft power was swiftly embraced not only by scholars but also by Japanese policymakers. In the early 2000s, the Japanese government appointed numerous ad hoc think

tanks to develop proposals for utilizing Japan’s cultural resources as tools of its soft power. In 2005, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Public Diplomacy Department with the purpose of "creating a system in which Japan's soft power is maximized" (Kondō 2008, 200). In attempts to utilize the worldwide popularity of Japanese pop culture, the Department created the International Manga (comics) Competition and International Cosplay (costume play) Summit, and established the posts of Anime (cartoons) and Pop Culture Ambassadors. In 2013, after a few years of debates and discussions, a semi-governmental Cool Japan Fund was established with the purpose of promoting Japanese products (food, fashion, traditional products) and services overseas.

These are just few examples of a comprehensive effort conducted in conjunction with the public and private sectors aimed at promoting Japan and its products as cool, fashionable, exciting, safe, delicious, and reliable.

Various data and individual examples suggest that Japanese

“culture”, in the broadest sense of the word, is gaining popularity not only in Asia but also in other regions of the world. For example, according to a recent survey published by Japan’s Nikkei newspaper, between 2006 and 2013, the overall number of Japanese restaurants overseas more than doubled. In Africa, the increase was threefold (Kobyashi 2015).

Japan’s popular noodle (ramen) restaurant chain Ippudō is one of the best examples of this popularity. Ippudō only opened its first overseas branch in 2008 but today it has 51 branches mostly in Asia but also in the US, Europe, and Australia. In 2014, it received 700 million yen in financing from the Cool Japan Fund to contribute to further popularization of Japanese food overseas (Cool Japan Fund 2014). With the support of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, World Cosplay Summit, which started in 2003 with participants from only three countries, has become a fully international annual competition with established rules, preliminaries in each of the twenty participating countries and finals held in Japan’s Nagoya (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The numbers of foreign visitors to Japan reached a historic high of over 13 million in 2014.

Tourist spending also peaked in 2014 at an average of about 150,000 yen per person (Japan Tourism Agency 2014).

The question that remains unanswered, however, is whether this popularity should be seen as evidence of Japan’s soft power.

Based on the above definition, it can be plausibly concluded that Japan did manage to exercise soft power in the economic realm.

Indeed, the popularity of Japanese cultural products is not a new

phenomenon and the fascination of Europeans with Japonism goes as far back as the second half of the 19th century. More recent worldwide interest in Japanese popular culture was noted already in 2002 in Douglas McGray’s Foreign Policy article titled "Japan’s Gross National Cool". That being said, the above-mentioned figures suggest that Japan’s recent nation branding policies capitalized on the existing popularity of Japanese culture combined with the intentional weakening of the yen, to successfully stimulate further consumption of Japanese goods overseas and bring more tourists to Japan to consume Japanese culture in its source.

Despite this economic success, Japan has failed to extend its soft power to the political realm of its relations with its most important neighbors. Although Japan does enjoy very good relations with Southeast Asian countries, reflected in the overwhelmingly good general attitudes towards Japan in these countries (Matsumoto 2011), these attitudes are probably better explained by other factors rather than Japan’s polices aimed at "attracting" Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, bilateral relations with China and South Korea remain tense (due mainly to territorial and historical-memory issues) and public opinion polls in China and South Korea show exceptionally high levels of distrust towards Japan (Genron NPO 2013 and 2014).

Yet at the same time, Japan is one of the most popular destinations for tourists from these countries.

In 2014, South Korea and China occupied the first and third places respectively in terms of numbers of visitors to Japan by country of

origin and combined accounted for 37% of the total number of foreign visitors (Japan National Tourism Organization 2015).

What lessons about soft power can policymakers learn from Japan’s case? Nation-branding strategies that skillfully utilize existing images and carefully create new ones do bring results. Cooperation between the public and the private sectors is indispensable for their success.

Delivery of products and services that meet the expectations of the targeted population are important factors that guarantee the sustainability of the soft power effect. For example, a survey conducted by Japan’s Tourism Agency in 2014 shows that over 90% of the foreign visitors were satisfied or very satisfied with their visit and wanted to visit Japan again (Japan Tourism Agency 2014).

At the same time, it is important to remember that consumption of one country’s products and fascination with its culture are not identical with internalization of the political views and other foreign policy goals promoted by that country’s leaders.

South Korean and Chinese citizens seem to have a positive view of Japanese culture, happily visit Japan and consume Japanese products, but this does not necessarily change their views on bilateral political issues. This shows that there are obvious limits to the extent of cultural attraction, especially when the political issues in question are intrinsically related to national identity.

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References Cool Japan Fund (2014). Press release on December 8th, 2014 at http://www.cj-fund.co.jp/investment/project/vol2/ retrieved on July 19th, 2015.

Genron NPO (2013). Dai ikkai nikkan kyōdō seron chōsa (First collaborative public opinion survey between Japan and Korea) at http://www. genron-npo.net/world/genre/ cat212/post-229.html#2 retrieved on July 19th 2015.

Genron NPO (2014). Nicchū kyōdō seron chōsa (Collaborative public opinion survey between Japan and China) at http://www.genron-npo. net/pdf/2014forum_d.pdf retrieved on July 19th 2015.

Japan National Tourism Organization (2015). Hōnichi gaikyakusū (Numbers of foreign visitors) at http://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/reference/tourism_data/visitor_trends/ pdf/2013_15_tourists.pdf retrieved on July 19th 2015.

Japan Tourism Agency (2014).

Hōnichi gaikokujin shōhi dōko chōsa (Consumption trends of foreign visitors to Japan) at http://www. mlit.go.jp/common/001084270.xls retrieved on July 19th 2015.

Kobayashi, S (2015). Kaigai de ninki no nihon riyōri wa?

(Which Japanese food is popular overseas?), Nikkei online 10 July 2015 at www.nikkei.com/ article/DGXMZO89002570X00C15A7000000/ retrieved on July 19th, 2015.

Kondō, S (2008). Bunka gaikō no saizensen nite (in the front line of cultural diplomacy). Chikuma.

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Matsumoto, A (2011). Nicihibeichū oyobi ASEAN shokoku no kokusai seron (Japan/US/China and international public opinion in ASEAN countries). Japan Institute of International Affairs at http://www2.jiia. or.jp/pdf/resarch/H23_Japan_US_ China/13_Matsumoto.pdf retrieved on July 19th 2015.

McGray, D (2002). Japan’s gross national cool. Foreign policy, 130(2002), 49-54.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014).

World Cosplay Summit 2014 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/p_pd/ca_ opr/page23e_000292.html retrieved on July 19th 2015.

Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power. Foreign policy, 153-171.

--- (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs.

Watanabe, Y., & McConnell, D. L. (Eds.). (2008). Soft power superpowers: Cultural and national assets of Japan and the United States. ME Sharpe.

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CHRISTIANITY AND WESTERN DIPLOMACY: STRANGE OR OBVIOUS BEDFELLOWS? Cecelia Lynch is Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies and the Institute for International, Global and Regional Studies (IIGaRS) at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author or co-author of three books, including Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements (Cornell University Press 1999) and the co-editor of two additional books. She co-edits the blog, “Critical Investigations into Humanitarianism in Africa,” or The CIHA Blog, at www.cihablog.com, which brings religious perspectives into humanitarian debates.

Cecelia Lynch Christianity, Sovereignty, and Universalism

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he relationship between Christianity and diplomacy in the modern Western world is a very old and very important one, but it rarely gets the attention it deserves. Yet, if we dig underneath the secularist assumptions of international politics, we can easily see the degree to which religious and in particular Christian ethics, actors, and thought have always been and continue to be an integral part of diplomatic practices. In order to understand contemporary diplomacy, it is useful to understand its roots in a Christian history of conflicts between universalism and particularism, from the early modern period through the creation of global organizations to the present, post-Cold War era. This history also enables us to see how Christian actors – despite the fact that they do not speak with one voice – continue to be influential as

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negotiators and humanitarians in diplomacy today. Additionally, exposing the symbiotic relationship between Christianity and diplomacy in the West also brings to the fore how both Christian actors and Western diplomats must increasingly take into account the ethics and practices of other parts of the world to achieve goals of order and peace among states and peoples.

The Paradox of Christian Diplomacy: 16th Century Foundations

A major paradox underlies the relationship between Christianity and diplomacy. Christian lenses on the world tend to proffer a universalist ethic and approach to the “common good,” while diplomacy is based on difference – drawn by boundaries between sovereign states. Yet, to complicate matters further, there are numerous differences among various forms of Christianity regarding the form and content of universalist ethics and (perhaps paradoxically), among sovereign states there are also numerous pressures in favor of

sameness or universalist "rules of the game". This includes pressures for states to democratize in particular ways, pressure to follow international law, etc. This paradox has produced numerous ethical tensions between and among Christians and Western diplomats in the past over practices such as: the colonization of "non-Christian" areas of the world; the conduct of "just wars" by sovereign states; designing global international organizations to achieve peace; and, in the present over issues such as providing social, economic or humanitarian aid to suffering populations while promoting particular kinds of human rights (some of these tensions will be explored below).

This paradox and the tensions it produces are not so surprising; however, if we understand them as part and parcel of the symbiotic development of Christianity and diplomacy in the modern West.

International relations scholars return to the wars of religion, the Reformation and CounterReformation, and the Treaties of Augsburg (1555) and Westphalia

(1648) to understand the impact of the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism on modern state sovereignty.

Augsburg and Westphalia determined the rule of cuius region, eius religio – the ruler chooses the religion of the land – which broke the monopoly of the Catholic Church’s temporal power in Europe.

The sovereign state was a part of the challenge of Protestantism in a formerly Catholic Europe. Yet, while the Church’s temporal power was displaced, it was never eliminated, nor was the growing power of Protestant ethics in politics.

Christian clerics and sovereign monarchs worked together (albeit sometimes uneasily) to extend their power to new areas of the world through conquest, mission, and colonization. The so-called “secular state” only developed very gradually and scholars today question whether it ever fully developed at all, even in Western Europe. The layers of international legal thinking from Augustine to Aquinas and Vitoria merged with that of Protestants such as Grotius and Pufendorf, each adding to the international legal canon that is still very present today in debates on war, peace, trade, commerce, human rights, humanitarianism, paternalism and equality.

Twentieth-Century Christian Diplomats and the Development of International Organization

By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, trends in favor of global international organization (in particular, European union) were initiated by Christian diplomats who based their policies at least in part on their faith. These included Alfred Zimmern, David Davies

and Norman Angel, who worked strenuously for the establishment and continuation of the League of Nations; John Foster Dulles and the U.S. Federal Council of Churches' Commission for a Just and Durable Peace, who spearheaded U.S. plans for the United Nations; and Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenaur, who initiated the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), eventually to become the European Union.

Both Protestants (primarily in discussions for the League and the UN), and Catholics (for the ECSC) participated in conceptualizing and designing such universalist diplomatic architectures, which for them would promote order, peace and universal values, mirroring the transcendent aspirations of Christian ethics in the world.

Each of these efforts was carried out at “official” diplomatic levels. But all Christians did not think alike on either the official or unofficial levels.

meaningful disarmament, reject the march to war in both 1918 and 1939/41, and the nuclear build-up of the Cold War period.

Zimmern’s universalism differed considerably from that of Dulles, and both contrasted in important ways with the influential theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, whose distinction between individual and state morality became perhaps the most significant justification of just war theory in the 20th century. On the “unofficial” level, right-wing clergy such as the Catholic Father Coughlin lent legitimacy to anti-universalist campaigns such as “America-first.” Many Protestant and Catholic Christians on the left – the members of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi, and numerous others – engaged in their own forms of activism and "citizen diplomacy" to pressure governments to condemn imperialist wrongs, engage in

Contemporary Christian Humanitarians

These debates over the nature of sovereignty versus universalism, the purpose and ethics of multilateral governance in maintaining order, preventing war, and enhancing justice provide the backdrop for Christian ethics and actions in diplomacy today. The line between universal ethical aspirations and sovereign particularism has never been definitively decided, but debates about both reflect the tensions within and tight relationship between Christianity and diplomacy. At the same time, global and regional governance organizations are now taken for granted as sites of engagement that diplomats must traverse on a daily basis while attempting to advance the interests of the sovereign states they represent.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these multilateral organizations are concerned with how to maintain order and create peace in conflict zones and how to cope with the suffering of populations (displacement, famine, disease) that results from conflict and environmental disasters.

State, regional, and UN diplomatic agencies channel large amounts of humanitarian aid in attempts to relieve suffering and rebuild war-torn areas of the world. They do so, however, in a context in which they must rely on increasing numbers of non-governmental organizations, including numerous Christian faith-based NGOs, many of which were created out of long-

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time mission networks of social services, health clinics, and schools.

The Christian foundation of humanitarianism, grounded in these mission activities as well as the 19th century work of people like Henri Dunant and Florence Nightengale, is extremely powerful. It finds expression today in attempts to prevent, reduce, or resolve conflict, address refugee flows, ensure humanitarian aid deliveries, and promote some human rights over others.

The actions of Christian humanitarians take as a foundation the relief of suffering and the Christian call to help one’s neighbor, but they also become bogged down in debates about personal morality, especially regarding sexuality. The Sant’Egidio Community based in Rome began out of local attempts to heal and help the marginalized in its Roman neighborhood, but found as it spread to other parts of the world that it could employ its contacts abroad for "healing" in conflict zones. It eventually made headlines by bringing a resolution to the civil war in Mozambique, and today it continues to engage regularly with "official" diplomats to act as mediators among adversaries. The Jubilee Campaign in the 1990s, which demanded that international financial institutions and governments in the Global North forgive "developing" countries' debt, was another such effort to engage directly with diplomats in both Western and non-Western countries, to institute Christian (and Jewish) conceptions of economic justice as part of the international financial architecture.

Other forms of Christian activism are less conventional and

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more controversial, both among Christians themselves and others.

Christian activists engage in advocacy campaigns to pressure governments to develop specific policies, such as the role of some socially ultra-conservative U.S. Christians in promoting harsh measures against homosexuality in Uganda, to the role of the Catholic and evangelical churches in promoting the ABC (abstinence, be faithful, use condoms only if necessary) policy of the Bush Administration on international HIV/AIDS prevention between 2000 and 2008. Christian groups’ pressure on governments on each of these issues provoke or require additional diplomatic actions, such as specific actions on the part of hospitals and clinics that received USAID funds to allow condom use only as a last resort in the fight against HIV/ AIDS, or the diplomatic scramble to protest against the anti-gay bill introduced in the Ugandan Parliament. It should be noted that many Christian groups, as well as even some Catholics on the ground, strenuously disagreed with the ABC policy; numerous Christians also condemned the conservative Christian activism in Uganda.

Clearly, these actions, campaigns, and goals represent a wide range of ethical positions, and Christians who collaborate on one can vociferously disagree with one another. There is not "one" Christian position on these issues of sexuality, health, and economic justice, just as there is not one diplomatic position. The point here is that these tensions in Christian ethics and activism are played out in tandem with processes of Western diplomacy. They frequently require diplomatic action on both the

national and multilateral/global levels, in part because they target national laws and international conventions and because their funding is tied into state, EU, and UN donor mechanisms.

The Future of Christian Diplomacy

Increasingly, Christians and Western diplomats understand that they are not the only actors in either religious or diplomatic domains, and this recognition of the power of other practices and other ethics adds to the tensions in diplomatic practice and ethics that remain unresolved. Christians and Westerners no longer hold a monopoly on ethical universalism, even while they regularly carry out old and new diplomatic tasks.

Christian ethics and actors – and the tensions they bring – will undoubtedly remain significant in future diplomatic configurations, especially with the rapid growth of Evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity in non-Western parts of the world. But Christianity and diplomacy in the West must also take into account how these forms of Christianity – as well as other religions and other ideas about diplomacy – represent both complementary and competing sources of authority and ethics.

Both Christianity and Western diplomacy are founded on tensions between universalism and particularism, both have developed while negotiating these tensions in tandem with each other, and both will have to continue to negotiate these tensions with each other as well as with increasingly vocal actors who have their own ethics and practices in other parts of the world.

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Mastermind China’s PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF Merging 'ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT RECOGNITION' Energy Diplomacy James Ker-Lindsay is Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of, amongst others, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford University Press, 2012), The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2011), and Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (I.B.Tauris, 2009).

James Ker-Lindsay

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n the 14th of July, the Greek Foreign Minister, Nikos Kotzias, paid his first visit to Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. For most EU foreign ministers, this would have been a wholly unremarkable visit.

However, Kotzias is the foreign minister of one of the five European Union members that still do not recognise Kosovo. This made the trip noteworthy. But what made the trip particularly newsworthy was his announcement that Greece would support Kosovo’s quest to join a number of international organisations, including UNESCO and Interpol, and Kosovo would be allowed to open a representative office in Athens.

For many observers, this all seemed to mark a major development in bilateral relations. Indeed, it even sparked rumours that Athens had at long last recognised Kosovo.

It hadn’t. The next day, following concerns raised by the Serbian Government, the Greek Embassy in Belgrade confirmed that Greece had not changed its long standing policy over non-recognition.

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In truth, for anyone who has been following the situation closely over the past few years, neither the trip nor the announcement was actually that significant. Greece and Kosovo have in fact forged a very close and productive relationship. Officials between the two countries often meet, both at multilateral meetings and on a bilateral basis. Indeed, as far back as March 2013, the Foreign Minister of Kosovo was invited to the Foreign Ministry in Athens for discussions.

More to the point, none of this is secret. It all takes place openly.

In fact, both sides go out of their way to stress how productive and constructive their relationship is.

lies in Greece’s close relationship with Serbia. This is partly true.

Athens and Belgrade certainly do have strong political, economic, cultural, and religious ties. But it is easy to make too much of this. The two countries also have their differences on key matters of national interest. Most notably, Belgrade has never taken Greece's side on the Macedonia name issue.

Many have argued that seeing as Serbia does not offer solidarity to Greece on this issue, then Greece is not obliged to offer solidarity to Serbia over Kosovo. This is especially true when it puts Greece at odds with so many of its EU partners.

Likewise, the decision to support Kosovo’s efforts to join various international bodies is nothing new.

Athens has already voted in favour of Kosovo’s membership of the World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD. More importantly, Greece has long stated its full support for Kosovo’s aspirations to join the European Union.

Of course, given the extent of the ties that exist between Athens and Pristina, the obvious question is why does Greece not just simply recognise Kosovo?

In reality, the reason Greece has not taken the plunge and recognised Kosovo is because of Cyprus. Both Athens and Nicosia strongly criticised Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. As they saw it, it posed a very serious threat to the established principle that separatist territories could not break away without permission. And while both went to great lengths to stress that the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo were very different from each other, they nevertheless argued that basic principles of international law should be

In the minds of many, the answer

respected.

Since then, attitudes have changed a lot. In Athens, the prevailing view is that Greece should now recognise Kosovo. The problem is that while Nicosia also has built up a constructive relationship with Kosovo, it will not be able to follow Greece down this path. This in turn puts Athens in a difficult position. While it may want to press ahead and join the 23 of the 28 EU members that recognise Kosovo, it does not want to break its solidarity with Cyprus or (perhaps more importantly) leave Nicosia even more isolated over the matter. For this reason more than any other, Greece has instead decided to pursue closer relations with Kosovo, but not recognise it.

As interesting as all this is as a case study of diplomatic relations, what makes this whole story especially fascinating is the way that it is throwing light, if not rewriting the rule book, on the question of ‘engagement without recognition’. This is an area of growing interest to both scholars and practitioners of contemporary diplomacy. The rise in the number of territories that have declared independence but have not joined the UN means that countries are

increasingly required to consider how they can interact with territories that they cannot or do not want to recognise.

So, just how far can countries interact with states that they do not recognise? It is actually a rather tricky question to answer.

Recognition has never been as straightforward as it may seem.

There are in fact many different ways that a state can recognise another territory, ranging from issuing a formal announcement, through to the decision to appoint an ambassador or open an embassy. The key problem is that recognition can also be implied. No official announcement is needed.

Instead, recognition can merely be inferred from the way that a state behaves towards another.

Needless to say, this potentially creates ample room for confusion.

However, there is one key factor that helps in such circumstances: recognition requires intent. It is a universally accepted aspect of recognition that it cannot be accidental. Leaving aside certain actions that necessarily indicate recognition, such as opening an embassy, this means that as long as a country insists that it does not recognise the state in question

then it must be taken as a given that it hasn’t. As a result, there is in fact a very considerable amount of leeway in terms of the degree of diplomatic engagement it may have with that state.

It is this principle that makes Greece’s constant insistence that it has not recognised Kosovo so very important. At every stage, the Greek Government has insisted that while it is willing to build strong ties with Kosovo, this does not amount to recognition.

Therefore, the international community has had to respect the fact that no recognition has occurred.

And yet, in every other way, Athens has pushed the boundaries of the principle of engagement without recognition to its very limits. In doing so, Greece has shown that where there is a political will, there is a diplomatic way. In those instances where a country may want to interact with a state that it does not recognise, and cannot recognise for certain political reasons, there is in fact a massive amount of latitude in terms of how much diplomatic engagement is possible. In the case of Greece’s relationship with Kosovo, this effectively amounts to recognition in all but name.

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The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) is the second largest of the four major office sites of the United Nations. It is located in the Palais des Nations building constructed for the League of Nations between 1929 and 1938, and was expanded in the early 1950s and late 1960s.

Chinese Guardian Lions, popular during the Han Dynasty, stand in front of state buildings welcoming entry with mythical protective powers. Chinese embassies around the world greet foreign dignitaries with Guardian Lions.

In addition to Italy's consulate general in Geneva, Italy has four other representations in Switzerland. These representations include an embassy in Bern and consulates in Basel, Lugano, and Zurich. The Italian consulate general is one of 322 foreign representations in Switzerland, and one of 96 foreign representations in Geneva.

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TRANSNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE

Leonard Seabrooke is Professor at the Copenhagen Business School and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. He is Chief Scientist for the ENLIGHTEN project – www.enlightenproject.eu funded by the European Commission (2015-2018), as well as a Senior Editor of International Studies Quarterly, the flagship journal of the International Studies Association. Len is currently completing a solo book titled World For Sale: The Market for International Organization, and a co-authored book titled Global Tax Battles: The Fight to Govern Corporate and Elite Wealth, with Duncan Wigan. The latter will be out next year with Oxford University Press.

Leonard Seabrooke The art and science of political work

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ur common image of diplomats as public officials who develop trust while guarding secrets is a largely 20th century picture.

It is informed by the post-war boom in the ranks of the international civil sector, the growth of Western welfare states, and the idea of the diplomat as a highly educated individual dedicated to public service. This person, who practices more of an art than a science, tactfully engages others on behalf of his or her country. The knowledge base for their work is derived from law and history, and a high price is placed on their capacity to read and interpret situations.

This is the clean-shaven diplomat with the monochrome tie that populates our imagination.

Of course such individuals exist today, often in abundance, but the many aspects of contemporary 'political work' – professional efforts to influence how authorities govern – are changing. We live in an age where best practices, standards, indices, benchmarks, and the like, are thought of as more science than art. Countries must conform to this science to be well respected among their peers and those engaged in political work are encouraged to facilitate this process. Ministries of foreign affairs have been merged, or co-exist, with those on trade for a few decades now, mixing public and private

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interests. On top of these changes, the international civil service can no longer be thought of as a coherent international bureaucracy. Rather, it is a market for skills with increased mobility between the public, private, and civil society sectors. Increasingly, those engaged in 'political work' have varied careers where they are able to provide mixes of art and science.

Transnationality

This mobility is also assisted by what we can think of as ‘transnationality’, or the idea that there are career options beyond national jurisdictions and the international civil service.

Transnationality offers professionals opportunities for horizontal movement between states, international organizations, private firms and NGOs. In many cases these horizontal moves contrast with the difficulty of vertical moves within national and international bureaucracies. They can also provide different experiences and sources of knowledge that can be used in diplomatic and political work. This is especially the case in environments where ‘market-based skills’ are valued and where professional service firms and consultancies are viewed as authorities in their own right. Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, New York, and Washington are all clear centers of formal diplomatic activity among states and international organizations, but also sites where transnational professionals locate themselves in and around firms and NGOs to draw from and influence political work.

Skills and knowledge

Iver Neumann (2012: 171-2) argues that the growth in transnational environments has led to the rise of professionals who "are producing knowledge that is in direct competition with the kind of knowledge that diplomats traditionally attempted to monopolize". From my research on the changing landscape for political work, I can say there are three particular forms of knowledge that are relevant for contemporary diplomacy (Seabrooke 2015). I call them 'diplomatic-tacit', 'economic-systematic', and 'programming-managerial'.

The first conforms to our common understanding of the diplomat – the person that the state expects to harness trust, be polite in public, who knows how to read a room, to 'keep a bracket' in negotiations, and who can keep secrets. This knowledge is firmly within the 'art' camp. The second is based on 'science' and stems from the notable ascendency of economics as the basis for forming arguments for all types of organizations. Here tacit understanding kneels to universal explanation. Such knowledge can be seen in the growth of benchmarks and standards, which are political compromises that have self-reinforcing effects as quantitative governance indicators. The third form, 'programming-managerial', blends art and science. This form of knowledge follows trends in the corporate sector, where organizational competence focuses on being able to replicate the same types of organizing across

different environments. Knowing how to manage people across these environments is also highly prized. Here we have ‘art’ in discussions about executive leadership and science through the rapid uptake of scorecards and key performance indicators.

These 'diplomatic-tacit', 'economicsystematic', and 'programmingmanagerial' forms of knowledge compete and cooperate with each other, and professionals who are able to draw on all three are well-placed to influence the content of political work.

Epistemic arbitrage

There are some professionals who are able to combine these three forms of knowledge in how they conduct political work. I call this act 'epistemic arbitrage', since the point is to play off the different pools of knowledge for strategic advantage (Seabrooke 2014). Those who are able to do so create space within formal and informal diplomatic networks to push forward their agenda. Consider, for example, Carne Ross’s noteworthy intervention in forming the group Independent Diplomat. This group draws on all three forms of knowledge and acts transnationally to influence the formal and informal diplomatic system. Independent Diplomat is formally a charity that has a consultancy-style engagement with its 'clients', including stateless peoples, and which is networked within the formal diplomatic circles in Brussels, London, and New York. Independent Diplomat combines 'diplomatic-tacit', 'economicsystematic', and 'programmingmanagerial' in carving out its own space in

contemporary diplomacy. Other professionals are also engaging in epistemic arbitrage to create space for market-driven ventures concerned with doing political work (see Seabrooke 2015).

Take homes

I have quickly painted one important change in the landscape for political work and contemporary diplomacy. If what I am stating is accurate, then it should push us to ask four different types of questions concerning institutional memory, expertise, transparency, and ethics: If we have a more transnational and mobile population engaging in political work then who owns institutional memory about diplomatic practices?

Some international organizations that rely heavily on consultants and external experts complain that the memory of how work is conducted is no longer retained in their own staff. Does this suggest a creep towards reliance on benchmarks and ‘science’?

How is expertise valued in contemporary diplomacy? Ole Jacob Sending (2015) wonderfully illustrates how expertise is fundamental to making authority claims in world politics. Have we moved from a system where experts are recognized for being able to draw on different forms of knowledge rather than displaying deep knowledge? This would be quite a departure from the common image of the diplomat. To recall Archilochus, via Isaiah Berlin, "the fox knows many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing" - are we all foxes now?

How much transparency is enough? If the

drive for transparency across states and international organizations continues apace, are public authorities encouraged to outsource their less pleasant work to private consultants and firms? Are we moving in an era where diplomats primarily keep secrets with private actors?

Where do we locate our ethics for engaging in political work? Diplomats derive their ethics from their allegiance to their country and from international law.

In the corporate sector ethics is linked to responsibility to clients and shareholders.

In many areas of political work these ethics may compete with each other.

My aim here was not to suggest that diplomats are antiquated or in need of revision. Rather, my point is that there has been a shift towards a transnational diplomatic knowledge that contains within a range of possibilities and problems. What is almost certain is that these changes will continue at some speed as professionals seek greater freedom in transnational arenas rather than following traditional career paths.

References

Iver B. Neumann (2012) At Home with the Diplomats (Cornell University Press, 2012).

Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Epistemic Arbitrage: Transnational Professional Knowledge in Action’, Journal of Professions and Organization 1(1) (2014): 49-64.

Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Diplomacy as Economic Consultancy’, in O.J. Sending, V. Pouliot, and I.B. Neumann (eds) Diplomacy: The Making of World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2015): 195-219.

Ole Jacob Sending, The Politics of Expertise (University of Michigan Press, 2015).

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DIPLOMATS MAY LOSE POWER, BUT DIPLOMACY IS EXPANDING Ole Jacob Sending is Director of Research at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). His research focuses on global governance, with a particular focus on the role and functioning of international and nongovernmental organizations. He has previously worked in the Policy Analysis Unit in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has been visiting scholar at UC Berkeley and Stanford University. His latest publications are Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2015 (co-edited with Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann) and The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance, University of Michigan Press, 2015.

Ole Jacob Sending

D

iplomacy is changing.1 Globalization has spawned ever denser interfaces between societies where a range of private and public actors engage one another on a regular basis, making formal diplomatic channels but one among many modes of communication and negotiation between countries.

Moreover, a key function traditionally performed by diplomats – reporting on economic and political developments in other countries – is less important when all of us can go online and access reports on events and in-depth analysis of developments around the world. Additionally, ministries with domestic jurisdictions are increasingly involved in regulatory work with counterparts in other countries, further undermining the image of the diplomat as the unrivalled mediator between the inside and the outside of a state.

Against this backdrop, it is tempting to conclude that diplomats are becoming less important relative to other actors.

But we misunderstand the role and functioning of diplomacy if we do not also look at diplomacy as an institution, that is, as a particular way of engaging

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other groups. With this reading, the institution of diplomacy is expanding for the very same reason that diplomats are being challenged by new actors: diplomatic practices are expanding in world politics because they offer an infrastructure for interaction that does not rest on a set of shared substantive values. Diplomacy is organized around the recognition of difference, management of friction, and the perpetuation of lines of communication. For this reason, diplomatic practices are increasingly used by nondiplomatic actors as they engage one another; Businessmen, cultural administrators and humanitarian actors are therefore likely to engage in and borrow from established diplomatic practice without even knowing it.

As an illustration, consider the example of humanitarian relief.

Humanitarian action has expanded considerably during the last two decades.

Humanitarian action is organized very much in opposition to diplomacy: it is defined as apolitical and is committed to impartial and neutral engagement to save lives regardless of borders.

Nevertheless, humanitarian actors not only frequently cooperate with diplomats to

negotiate access to civilians during conflicts, to mobilize funds, and uphold international humanitarian law but they also adopt and draw on a broad array of diplomatic practices in their core operations.

When humanitarian actors mobilized to establish a ban on the use of cluster munitions, for example, they adopted a range of diplomatic practices. They became well versed in negotiating texts and establishing alliances aimed at marginalizing recalcitrant states from blocking the initiative.

Moreover, large humanitarian organizations have long had resident representatives and country offices with ex-pats and local staff similar to embassies in the countries where they offer relief. They also have resident representatives at the headquarters of international organizations like the UN where humanitarian actors become de facto parts of the diplomatic community on issues where they are considered to have competence. These humanitarian actors adopt diplomatic practices as part of their modus operandi.

As a former senior UN official observed: "the way large humanitarian organizations operate vis-a-vis members of the Security Council is almost identical to that of the Nordic

states".

Indeed, 'diplomacy' is often invoked as a term to help legitimize non-diplomatic actors’ activities. It is no coincidence that the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' definition of "humanitarian diplomacy" is that it is "concerned with persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for our fundamental principles".2 And the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)– while not an official definition – treats humanitarian diplomacy as being about "making the voices of the victims of armed conflicts and disturbances heard, in negotiating humanitarian agreements with international or national players, in acting as a neutral intermediary between them and in helping to prepare and ensure respect for humanitarian law".3 We see this also in large consulting firms who specialize in services geared towards states’ international engagements: they selfconsciously adopt a diplomatic style to conform to the way diplomats are seen to do their job.

We also see it in the way that large cultural organizations operate as they seek to establish arenas for cultural exchange and for the

promotion of certain values, labelling their activities as "cultural diplomacy".

The upshot of this is that whereas humanitarians and other nondiplomatic actors are certainly highly influential in certain processes because they are considered competent on the content of what is to be done and how, diplomats remain crucially important by virtue of their control over the form or style through which governance arrangements are negotiated and validated. As a result, diplomats can perpetuate a position of dominance or control even in settings where diplomats are wholly dependent on nondiplomatic actors' skills and resources. This continued dominance of diplomacy flows from diplomatic practice being structured around form rather than content.

There is no doubt that diplomats have to re-tool and become much more pro-active to demonstrate their utility and importance.

Whereas diplomats could in the past wait for others to ask them for permission or advice or help, they now have to engage a much broader array of actors to establish access points and be able to engage other actors outside of the diplomatic

community. Nevertheless, diplomats define the criteria by which non-diplomatic actors are assessed and found competent on different issues, and can thereby exert an indirect power that is often not recognized as such.

References

This text draws on my contribution to a forthcoming book on the role and functioning of diplomacy in contemporary world politics.

See Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann (eds) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, forthcoming 2015, Cambridge University Press.

1

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Strategy 2020: Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy, (Nairobi: ICRF, 2009): 25.

2

Marion Harroff-Tavel, ‘The humanitarian diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, (2006), http://www.icrc.org/ eng/assets/files/other/humanitarian-diplomacy-icrc.pdf, 5. See also the discussion in Philippe Regnier, “The emerging concept of humanitarian diplomacy: identification of a community of practice and prospects for international recognition”, International review of the Red Cross, Vol 93, no. 884 (2011): 1211-1237.

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EDITOR'S BOOK REVIEW:

21ST CENTURY GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY

Edited by Thomas E. Novotny, Ilona Kickbusch and Michaela Told, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore/ Hackensack, New Jersey, 2013, ISBN: 9789814522069, E-book USD81.00 Kristina R. Proulx is a second-year Masters Candidate at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. She currently works as a research assistant at the School of Epidemiology, Public Health and Preventive Medicine's Globalization and Health Equity Research Unit on global health diplomacy - focused specifically on the Sustainable Development Goals, non-communicable diseases, and antimicirobial resistance. Her research interests include international development and globalization, public and global health, as well as public policy. She is currently working on her major research paper, which focuses on the influence of donor country interests on the provision of development assistance towards maternal health and family planning programs.

Kristina R. Proulx While this book starts off by elaborating on the 2009 United Nations General Assembly conceived concept of “global health diplomacy”, by the last chapter it becomes apparent that even this definition is unclear and perpetually evolving so as to adapt to the changing needs of, and threats to, global health. With such an evolving definition, the means for conducting diplomacy on global health issues prove to be just as perplexing. 21st Century Global Health Diplomacy offers a comprehensive review and discussion on the interplay of health within foreign policy and state politics, as well as the means and approaches to diplomacy within an area with actors and interests that appear to constantly multiply.

The authors successfully illustrate the interdisciplinary and multifaceted role of global health diplomacy, while offering the reader insight into how to actually conduct diplomatic efforts

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Border Crossing

in global health consultations, and the various actors and interests that must be considered. Instead of solely offering a commentary and overview of the different facets of global health diplomacy, each chapter, whether the authors intended for this or not, seems to justify the need for the inclusion of some degree of training in global health diplomacy, regardless of the field one works in.

Each of the twenty-one authors, editors included, have extensive experience in various aspects of global health – either as professors, researchers, policymakers, or former diplomats themselves--and in their own work focus on a wide range of issues including: trade and health, conflict reconstruction, the social determinants of health, and emerging public health issues. The knowledge and expertise of each individual is apparent throughout the book.

21st Century Global Health Diplomacy begins with the premise that it is only recently that areas of global health have been linked to diplomatic efforts, and offers an

analysis of these various instances through chapters on topics such as: governance, international politics, security, foreign policy, humanitarian action, and policy coherence. While analytical in nature, the chapters also provide an interesting overview of the key practical factors in negotiations involved in global health diplomacy, as well as the key instruments for conducting diplomacy in a sphere as complex as global health. Along with the theme of justifying global health diplomacy training and knowledge sharing, these practical factors and tools appear applicable to all streams of foreign policy and diplomacy. The authors illustrate that the number and types of actors involved in health have grown exponentially, and because of this, diplomacy in the field of global health involves greater considerations for the various interests and linkages involved. For example, while the role of non-state organizations (such as the Red Cross and the Rockefeller Foundation) were not particularly recognized as actors in 19th century health, globalization has strengthened the

role and influence of various nonstate actors, who have been able to defend their own interests with political pressure and strategic alliances (such as the influential role of People’s Health Movement and Global Health Watch as a monitor of global health actors).

Through the book's twelve chapters, the authors make it incredibly clear for those who may have had their doubts that health plays an integral part in every sphere of foreign policy and diplomacy. This includes: humanitarian action, where efficiency and effectiveness are inherently necessary to prevent mortality (such as in the case of the devastated and disabled state that Haiti was left in following the 2010 earthquake); military activities, where properly planned and coordinated diplomatic efforts can supplement programs and objectives (such as the US Africa Command’s use of the MEDCAP model to prevent violence and gather information about extremists through health care provision); security, where an integrated approach that considers aspects of both health and security can complement objectives of each (such as again in the case of Haiti, where efforts to improve the health system as well as improve governance and state legitimacy complemented each other); and governance, where a balancing of the needs of both sovereignty and global health priorities can benefit every actor involved (as seen in the success of numerous global health partnerships, including the Medicines for Malaria Venture and the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative).

The authors provide an interesting commentary on many of the emerging topics of interest related to global health, as well as a justification for expanding academic global health programs worldwide.

While they do discuss the frequently written about topic of securitization, using the example of the prioritization of SARS and the enactment of successful global health interventions which followed as a result of its threat to the interests of powerful states, they also

acknowledge the ongoing power shifts in global health diplomacy.

Contrary to before when developed countries of the global North dominated discussions on global health, countries such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS) have identified the need to recognize the sharing of global health issues by both the global North and the global South, as well as the need to recognize health as more than a low-priority issue in areas such as military policy.

21st Century Global Health Diplomacy fits well into the growing body of literature on globalization, acknowledging the growing interdependence of various fields in global health, the proliferation of both state and non-state actors involved in diplomacy, and the fact that it is now impossible to assume that any health concern, burden or threat remains within strict state borders. While the authors provide an excellent resource for both experts and practitioners in the field of health diplomacy, as well as individuals new to the subject, by providing a summary of the different tools and instruments used in health diplomacy, this book is also a useful supplement to any more general discussion on global interconnectedness. However, the book would have been more effective had it more strongly considered and evaluated the weaknesses and failures of global health diplomacy.

For instance, it would have certainly been interesting to see the authors’ comments and analysis of the response of various actors to the recent Ebola crisis. Additionally, it would have been interesting to see a stronger emphasis on the much criticized role of the private sector in health promotion and service delivery, and how diplomatic efforts might be conducted with actors that do not perceive health as a global public good. In The Impact of Reliance on Private Sector Health Services on the Right to Health by Audrey Chapman, for example, the author acknowledges the role of the private sector in health care provision as reducing the ability of the public sector to improve its quality. She also

treats some of the additional considerations that emerge with private sector involvement, such as accountability, obligation to protect, and access and equity. A deeper analysis of how to engage with an actor with inherently different interests and priorities which do not necessarily fit into the global health dialogue certainly would have been helpful.

Ending on a practical note, 21st Century Global Health Diplomacy provides valuable insight for academics and practitioners alike.

When preparing for or analyzing diplomatic consultations on areas of global health, it is important to recognize the reasons for the prioritization of select global health issues and the ways in which health has come to be connected to fields that were traditionally held separate, the role of divergent actors and the interplay of their interests, and the conditions under which maintaining health as the priority is necessary.

While there are numerous international forums where health is the focus of consultations, health has an increasingly significant role at forums which cover other topics as well, including but not limited to trade, the environment, and development, fuelling the growing need for diplomats and academics alike to have knowledge, understanding, and experience in the field of global health diplomacy. As discussed in the book, “Balancing the demands of sovereignty with those of a shared responsibility for global health, as well as the self-interest of a range of groups and organizations, is a difficult task”. For this reason, it is increasingly necessary that individuals in all fields recognize the emerging role of global health governance and diplomacy.

21st Century Global Health Diplomacy, Edited by Thomas E. Novotny, Ilona Kickbusch and Michaela Told, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore/ Hackensack, New Jersey, 2013, ISBN: 9789814522069, E-book USD81.00 21ST CENTURY GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY,

August 2015

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