Dicta Magazine: 10th Edition by Dicta Law Magazine

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It is my pleasure to introduce Dicta Law Magazine’s Tenth Anniversary Edition. It has been ten years since the conception of this law magazine. Since then, we have released nine annual issues, written hundreds of thousands of words, and created dozens of illustrations to accompany our articles. We also had the absolute honour of interviewing numerous high-profile individuals in the legal profession – including the former President of the Supreme Court, Baroness Brenda Hale. In light of our stellar development since our humble beginning a mere ten years ago, we dedicate this edition to our previous Editors-in-Chief, Editors, Writers, and Illustrators – without which we would not be where we are today. Thank you for dedicating a significant portion of your academic lives to the development of our magazine. Considering the great legacy created by our predecessors, the role of Editor-in-Chief comes with the temptation of maintaining our momentum by capitalising on our connections with high-profile individuals, trailblazers, and bignames in the industry. Yet, I could not help but shake the words spoken to me by colleagues within the racial justice sector: “When you enter a room filled with people, it is often wise to ask yourself: which voices have I not heard?” This phrase has acted as my guiding light throughout the editorial process. Certainly, and as beautifully written by my predecessor, Alex Dunn, it is important we consider the ethics of our society. In a time filled with

tribulations, conflict, and existential crises, it is of utmost importance to listen to the voices of those who have been experiencing the brunt of societal ills. It is my belief that those ‘from below’ – the grassroots, the activists, and the social critics – provide an essential perspective to legal discourse, perhaps providing potential solutions not often considered by those in power. They are the canaries, the sentinels, of societal harmony & conflict. They also come acutely aware of the inextricable relationship between the social and the legal, for the law necessarily dictates the manners in which society functions. Thusly, I introduce Dicta Law Magazine’s Tenth Edition: The Critic’s Issue. This issue has placed due emphasis on the socio-legal analyses of discrimination, identity, interdisciplinary studies, ontology, disability, coloniality, and the defence of civil liberties. It is my hope that the hard work of our writers serves to illuminate paths in one’s mind not previously considered. To finish this foreword, I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to Dylan Gupta, Emiliya Kott, the Creative Team, the Managing Editors, Sude Capoglu, as well as our Editors and Writers – without whom we would not be where we are today. Thank you for your hard work, dedication, and indominable spirit, I hope our work makes you proud.

Japheth Monzon

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Writers

Japheth Monzon

Emily Bell Emily Peyton

Publication Coordinator

Isabelle Xora Asghar-Williams

Dylan Gupta

Kai Drysdale Ambareen Aslam

UBLC Liaison Officer

Editors

Ellie Hands

Sude Capoglu

Takashi Biswas

Noah Robinson

Charmaine Annabelle Mathew

Anna Ashton

Creative Director

Hannah Mackay

Srishti Garg

Emiliya Kott

Juliette Groothaert

Melis Ekren

Sonya Polezhayeva

Hannah Wason

Illustrators

Ke Xuan Tee

Charlotte Clancy

Timothy Cheng

Cristiana-Nicoleta Eftenoiu

Kacey Mair

Alice Tran

James Martin

Lucy Thomas

Chloe Kwok

Annette Lam

Managing Editors

Ana-Maria Tudor

Kylie Chong

Kelly Cheung (Cheung Lok Yee)

[Commercial Law; Economics & Regulation]

Megan Fong

Emily Bell

Sophie Chong

[Equality, Diversity & ESG;

Chien Wen Siow

Legal Frontiers; Rights & Freedoms] Melpo Kourti Jasmine Law Snigdha Sri Parisha [Government & Politics; Constitutional Law] Isabel Armstrong Victoria Egerton Joely Thompson [Crime & Justice; Global Perspectives] James Nelson

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Is It Time for Labour Reform in Qatar? Written by Ambareen Aslam | Edited by Takashi Biswas migrant workers. Theoretically this significantly improves the legal safeguards for migrant workers. However, there have been reports of wages being withheld from migrant workers following the abolition of the kafala system, which makes migrant workers wholly reliant on their employers.

After Qatar was announced as the host of the 2022 World Cup tournament, there was backlash from the global community centred around its treatment of migrant workers in the law. An International Organisation for Migration Report released in 2022 stated that migrant workers make up 77% of the national population of Qatar, highlighting the need for strong safeguards. I strongly believe that Qatar needs to reform its labour laws, focusing on the kafala system, and trade union membership, as these were of particular concern to human rights bodies.

Another area of Qatari labour law that requires reform pertains to trade union membership. The Qatari Labour Code prohibits the establishment of independent trade unions; however, the government has made significant progress by allowing joint committees to exist within companies. These joint committees can bargain collectively, yet the government has instituted rules on the agreements that can be made. The high degree of government control makes it difficult for agreements to be made. This limits the amount of progress the joint committees can make.

The kafala system was set up to allow employers to sponsor foreign workers in some Gulf states, including Qatar. This made the worker’s legal presence entirely dependent on the employer, which unfortunately led to exploitation. If the worker wished to leave the country or change jobs, they would have to seek permission from their employer, which was not always given. This created issues as some employers would deal with requests to change employers by submitting false runaway claims. Once the supposed “runaway” workers were located, they would be deported, often without being able to properly represent themselves due to the expenses associated with litigation, which links to the later mentioned wage withholding. As a result, the system was formally repealed in 2020.

There is also a limitation on non-Qatari nationals and government employees (including healthcare workers) organising in formal strikes. The rationale behind this decision is that it could harm the public or cause damage to property. However, the lack of forums for peacefully discussing concerns means that unlawful strikes do take place. A strike for a company’s failure to increase salary by 90 Nepalese migrant workers led to their deportation in September 2010, which shows how severe the government approach is to collective action. Moreover, the strikes that can lawfully take place by Qatari nationals are subject to further government control. The Ministry of Labour has to approve the time and place, and there has to be a lengthy dispute resolution procedure.

Migrant workers are now able to change jobs at any time, subject to a notice period, which allows the worker more flexibility in their career choices. The International Labour Organisation reports that over 350 000 successful applications to change employers were made, but critics suggest that the kafala system’s effects still linger. Al-Jazeera reports that many workers are facing delays to their applications to change employers, partly due to threats from their former employers. Without rigorous deadlines for employers to approve the change requests made, it is unlikely much progress will be made. This indicates that the exploitative environment where migrant workers are unprotected from their employers continues to exist, even if the kafala system ceases to.

By not allowing legal strikes, a culture of fear materialises as citizens fear the consequences of striking. It also builds some resentment towards the government and employers. If the Qatari government does not address the concerns of its citizens, or the migrant workers who sacrifice so much to come to the country, it risks further destroying employee morale. While the Qatari Ministry of Labour has made the first steps towards progress by formally abolishing the kafala system, it needs to deal with the unintended consequences that have materialised which allow employers to continue to exploit migrant workers. Furthermore, Qatar needs to address its failure to allow trade unions for all citizens, and the degree of control it currently exercises over the Joint Committees- the only forum where some citizens can voice their concerns. Granting migrant workers better safeguards will make them more motivated to do their work to a high quality and make their experience in a new country more enjoyable.

An area of labour reform that has had beneficial impact relates to the minimum wage. In March 2021, a minimum wage of 1000 Qatari Riyals per month was introduced. This was recently raised to 1800 Qatari Riyals, which is equivalent to approximately £2.50 per hour (based on a 40-hour working week). It is non-discriminatory, meaning that it is equally accessible by domestic and

The Sound of Zeros and Ones Written by Kai Drysdale | Edited by Takashi Biswas The United Kingdom is a highly developed country that has a significant impact on global economics, politics, science, and culture. Yet, such an advanced country seems to meet more failures in protecting themselves and their people from their so-called bosom buddy that has played a primordial role in the country’s growth.

Technology, more specifically Artificial Intelligence. Is it a boon or a bane? Is it a loss or a gain?

The White Paper published by the UK government earlier this year, “A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation” emphasises how there will be no propositions to the current legislation on Artificial Intelligence. The only legislations involving A.I are The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). These legal frameworks regulate the collection of any individual data stored online. Understandably, the UK will not follow the methods of the EU regarding A.I after Brexit but is it a wise choice? Or simply an egotistical decision to assert its full independence as a whole? There would be no questioning of the effectiveness of the current legislations but for the continuous rise in legal problems creators are facing against A.I. We are not trying to belittle policymakers. We are trying to send a message that there needs to be a much more critical scrutiny of improving and developing the legislations involving Artificial Intelligence better. This poem aims to hopefully highlight these criticisms and encourage the general public to truly consider why we need stricter laws made to protect everyone from artificial intelligence.

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The Sound of Zeros and Ones It is now the law of the land to be governed by technology. As new life is being given, our life is being taken. Take a singer, whose unique voice is being replicated by the zeros and ones. The tune you hear is her, but not hers. Is it parody? Or thievery? A valid legal concern, or an issue that would laugh her out of a courtroom? Consider an academic, who replicates his own unique voice using the zeros and ones. The article you read is him, but not his. Is it genius? Or is it laziness? Is it a display of creativity, or a shameless example of plagiarism?

The zeros and ones have been waging war against us way before 1984. Orwell’s prophetic pen will not scribble a solution to the artificial intelligence that dares to learn. So to which member of parliament does the responsibility of curating the correct law fall to?

For what is a song if not sung by a singer? What is music if not made by a musician? An article not articulated by an academic? The cautionary tale has had its caution thrown to the wind. These Orwellian invocations are terrifying.

Our life is being taken as new life is being given. To be governed by technology: It is now the law of the land.

Kai Drysdale

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A Duty to Protect the Public from Police Misogyny: A Case for Negligence Liability Written by Isabelle Xora Asghar-Williams Edited by Takashi Biswas

Women are disproportionately the victims of sexual

and domestic violence, crimes that are high volume and high risk. How would you feel to learn that according to the law of Negligence, the police do not owe these victims a duty of care during criminal investigations or following a reported threat? In Negligence, you are owed a duty of care from your employer, the paramedic who attends to you, and the driver on the opposite side of the M4. But a police officer has no duty to protect you and no duty to not be negligent. Joanne Conaghan, a proponent for the imposition of liability on the police, announced that police investigations into intimate partner violence (IPV) are marred with incomprehensible complacency and incompetence. Yet, the infamous cases Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1990], Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] and Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] concerning deaths resulting from violence against women and IPV, illustrated the judiciary’s reluctance to impose a common law duty on the police to prevent violence. It is their position, declared by Lord Keith, that the police are ‘immune’ from suit in respect to omissions. I propose a two – fold criticism of the policing institution and the position of the judiciary because in 2023, the presence of institutional misogyny is undeniable. The police cannot be trusted to protect victims of IPV and their immunity must be confronted. Omissions, otherwise known as failures to act, do not generally give rise to liability. Tofaris and Steel protest that trusted public authorities have a duty that should transcend this long-standing negligence tradition. Before Joanna Michael was killed, she phoned the police twice to report her ex-partner’s threat to kill her following his attack on her new partner. This was not met with an immediate police response. Valerie Forde and her daughter, neglected victims of Black heritage, were killed by Valerie’s ex-partner following the police’s failure to investigate his threat to burn down her house – wrongly recorded as a threat to property rather than obviously a threat to her life. Certainly, there were miscommunications, but a service with knowledge of IPV would have recognised the escalated threat to life following a victim leaving a relationship or moving on to a new one. Morally, is there any difference between officers acting negligently and negligently ‘omitting’ to protect victims of IPV? Lord Keith believed that imposing a duty to protect victims would lead to officers acting defensively. From his privileged position, he assured that the police act for the greater good and ought to be trusted.

Trusted.

Machismo, political conservatism, sexism, and a propensity to violence.

ED ED ED

These are the core tenants of policing culture, as described by criminologist Robert Reiner. At the time of Lord Keith’s comment, new female recruits continued to have their skirts lifted whilst bent over desks and branded with the office stamp. Forty years later, concerns over the institution’s misogynistic ‘canteen culture’ and mishandling of sexual and domestic violence cases have increased in the public domain. Baroness Casey’s review of the metropolitan police evidenced the presence of institutionalised misogyny. Perverse values were revealed in officers’ language and behaviour: male officers WhatsApp-ed that ‘knocking a bird about’ made them love you more, whilst greater than 1 in 10 of female metropolitan officers had been sexually harassed or assaulted. Casey accused senior officers of valuing loyalty over integrity, and essentially, above the protection of women. Undeniably, a culture of misogyny and permittance of unaccountability allowed officers Wayne Couzens and David Carrick, prolific for perpetrating unimaginable crimes against women, to feel that they were untouchable. Beyond these ‘bad apples’, the Centre for Women’s Justice records that one woman a week reports their partner, employed by the police, for abusing them or their children. Merely 50% of officers found guilty of sexual misconduct are sacked. How can the public trust the police to respond to domestic abuse and prevent others from behaving in the same way as they do themselves? It would be inconceivable to suggest that the widespread participation and perpetuation of a culture that dehumanises women and normalises IPV has not impacted the institution’s ability, or willingness, to investigate violence against women.

The judiciary must abandon its unwavering trust in the police. They are not infallible, but rather a deeply flawed institution in need of greater scrutiny.

The police should be liable for negligently failing to protect victims of sexual and domestic violence when falling beneath the reasonable standard of conduct; when it is reasonably foreseeable that inaction would lead to harm; and a sufficiently proximate relationship exists with the victim. Do not expect this alone to trigger a process of internal transformation. It should at least assist in regulation. It should make justice available for those who have been failed by the police.

Flawed and Failing: The Criminal Justice System and Rape Victims Written by Anna Ashton Edited by Charmaine Annabelle Mathew

amount to a charge due to the lack of evidence, but the threshold for criminal guilt is so high that if the jury do question the victim’s account because of their incorrect perception of rape, the victim is in a disadvantaged position compared to victims of other crimes. The CJS cannot correct these myths alone, however, would reforming the system, perhaps not using a jury, or removing the adversarial system in such cases, increase the access to justice for victims of rape?

Reports of rape have tripled since 2013 yet the

number of convicted rapists was at a record low in 2020 and is still only slowly increasing. Greater recognition of the severity of rape in recent years and a shift in societal attitudes is welcomed, but whilst this is reflected by the exponential growth in the number of victims reporting rape, the same cannot be said for the rate of convictions. Those responsible for such heinous crimes should be prosecuted, but the astonishingly poor rate of charges (1.3% in 2021 according to the CPS) shows this is largely not the case. The Criminal Justice System (CJS) has not kept up with societal changes and is seriously failing victims of rape.

An Irish case in 2018 was a clear example of the ongoing outdated perception of rape. The defendant’s barrister claimed that the victim’s choice of underwear identified her willingness to engage in consensual sex. Although there was uproar in the media, the fact the barrister chose to do this highlights a belief that the court and jury would believe such a degenerate claim. Moreover, the fact this is permitted is completely inconsiderate of the victim and highlights the deplorable structure of the CJS in dealing with cases of rape.

Why, then, are the conviction rates for this crime so low? Rape will always be a particularly difficult crime to prove because a successful conviction very often relies on proving absence of consent and, being a crime that usually takes place in private settings, obtaining sufficient evidence of this is very difficult. Contrary to common belief, rape victims often do not try to resist their attacker, meaning there can be no physical evidence proving guilt. Despite these obstacles, a 1.3% conviction rate is inexcusable, so what needs to change to correct this?

It is clear, then, that victims of rape are being let down by the CJS, they are not viewed as victims and are not being prioritised. Why is more not being done to increase the prosecution rate of an already difficult crime to prove and one which traumatises so many? Our system is fundamentally flawed.

Firstly, numerous charges are dropped by victims themselves. Factors which influence victims to withdraw could be ameliorated, the most significant being enormous delays in cases going to court, with one victim reporting waiting eight years before her trial date. The unprecedented impact of COVID worsened these delays, followed by barrister strikes in 2022. Ultimately though, the culprit is the limited funding available to the CJS, leading to fewer staff and diminished support available to victims. Numerous specialist sexual offence units have also been shut down which were formed to provide specialist support to victims who are now in a more isolated position and unaware of when they will face their abuser in court due to frequent trial cancellations which can occur at the very last minute.

This is not a criticism of those working within the system who are doing their best to support rape victims with the limited resources they have, but a criticism of the system itself. It is difficult to accommodate rape victims in a system which prioritises defendants and was created to deal with crimes that are incomparable to rape and of a completely different nature. A one size fits all approach will not and is not working; the CJS is in dire need of reform. Although a more accepting attitude is being taken towards victims of sexual assault in general, without funding, the adequate reform will not happen. Rape needs to be recognised as a unique and sensitive crime, victims need to feel supported so they feel they can go through with the process, and a court room should not feel like a ruthless argument.

The common dropping of charges goes hand in hand with rape myths which have been largely discredited, however, do still circulate. Some examples include that rape occurs in a dark alley, committed by a stranger, and that the victim resisted their attacker, when, in fact, the opposite is true. If the public hold this false perception of what rape is, then the jury are also likely to subscribe to this idea and consequently undermine a victim’s account in court. Not only do such cases rarely

*Image sourced from the British Library Open Archive: Women of the World.

Overturning Roe v Wade: Criminalising Abortion, Endangering Women’s Health Written by Ellie Hands Edited by Charmaine Annabelle Mathew

On the 24

of June 2022, the United States Supreme Court revoked the constitutional right to seek abortion care, altering women’s rights and potentially allowing for the criminalisation of a procedure that had been protected for decades. The landmark case of Dobbs v Jackson delivered the final devastating blow to reproductive justice when the decision of Roe v Wade, which guaranteed safe access to abortions, was reversed. In doing so, the Court turned its back to medical evidence, public health, and human rights in allowing access to abortion to be determined by individual states. As a result, states have created a patchwork of limited abortion laws, some even taking steps to ban the procedure in all instances. The primary concern arising from the Dobbs ruling is whether states may employ criminal penalties in order to uphold restrictive abortion laws. When the court dismissed the decision in Roe, thirteen states were prepared to severely restrict abortion rights, primarily through the implementation of "trigger bans" – laws which took immediate and automatic effect after the case was overturned. Since this dismissal, punitive laws have been established regarding abortion care in 24 out of 50 states – including extreme penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment for abortion providers in states like Louisiana, Oklahoma and Wyoming – and similar restrictions are likely to be implemented by additional states in the near future. The legislation framework that aids the antiabortion movement demands for the criminalisation of those who offer instructions on self-administered and illegal abortions and other influences such as "aiding and abetting" a woman in obtaining a procedure. Its scope of soon-to-be ‘prohibited’ acts even includes some widely used medications. In early 2023, a lawsuit filed against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over the distribution of mifepristone, a successful medication allowed women all over the US to discreetly end a pregnancy that is less than 70 days in duration. While no final judgment has been passed, if successful, the lawsuit could result in banning the drug across all states. These actions and attempt at criminalising providers of abortions will have a debilitating impact on the delivery of medical treatment by placing doctors and other medical personnel in danger of being criminally charged, especially in cases involving obstetric issues. Criminalising abortion opens a variety of issues for women to be prosecuted for pregnancy outcomes such as miscarriages and still births. These can result in scenarios whereby charges can be brought under manslaughter, homicide and even extremes

like “chemical endangerment” laws, as mentioned in Dobbs v Jackson. While some states have limited exemptions in circumstances where pregnancy is a risk to life, or there are instances of rape and incest, investigations are likely to be conducted where there is a degree of suspicion. For example, the aforementioned case highlights incidents where women who have been injured have been arrested for “attempted fetal homicide” and women charged with second degree-murder after experiencing a stillbirth. The criminalisation of abortion is not just an assault on pregnant women’s physical liberty, but also their right to life. According to studies, a ban on abortion may result in a 21% rise in mortality rates (Stevenson, 2021). Furthermore, these laws disproportionately effect women from low-income backgrounds and ethnic minorities, as they are likely to endure heavier consequences of the Dobbs ruling. In the same study, it was found that a ban on abortion may result in a 33% rise in mortality rates for Black women (Stevenson, 2021). As a result, there is a significant disparity in maternal death rates such that the maternal death rate for Black women is currently 2.9 times higher than White women (Hoyert, 2020). Additionally, this data does not include women being forced to seek unsafe abortions, a leading cause of mortality and morbidity worldwide. In regions of the globe where abortions are prohibited, mishandled abortions to account for 8 to 11% of all maternal fatalities, or around 30,000 each year (Guttmacher Institute, 2017). Therefore, criminalising abortion worsens not just women's health outcomes but also the systemic prejudice that ethnic minority populations endure due to overcriminalization, over policing, and mass imprisonment. Evidently, criminal sanctions against people seeking necessary medical treatment and those who perform abortions violate both the right to health and, ultimately—for many women and girls—the right to life.

This possible criminalisation is an outcry for change else desperate women who fall unexpectedly pregnant will be left without options. Otherwise, the financial difficulties and social shame associated with unplanned pregnancies will only exacerbate circumstances and endanger the lives of women who have ‘no choice’.

The Reasonable Person: The Myth of Equality in Blindness Written by Noah Robinson Edited by Charmaine Annabelle Mathew

The ‘reasonable man’ illusively inhabits every aspect of the law, yet we only have the briefest sketches of his biography.

flatly inegalitarian, resting on all else being equal. Within the legal system, it is well-documented that the law fails to provide equitable outcomes for those of marginalised identities. The vision of the majority projects itself into the legal system, tainting the standard of objectivity and eschewing it with prejudice.

Who is the reasonable man and may he please stand up?

A shift in language from ‘man’ to ‘person’ has been proposed. Whilst attempts to eradicate the masculine nature of the reasonable man represents a shift in legal ideology, it only reconstructs rather than reforms. The enquiry will naturally fall back into the same habits. It excuses the individual circumstances of varying defendants, failing to account for the inherent biases and prejudices within the system.

Within criminal law, the ‘reasonable man’ exists as an all-encompassing measure by which to judge a defendant’s culpability. As the exemplar figure of justice, he acts as the absolute standard of moral conduct. The central question is whether the ‘reasonable man’ would have acted the same if confronted with similar circumstances as to the defendant.

In this way, constructing ‘reasonableness’ based on individual identities is not only futile but counterproductive. As a form of essentialism, it assumes that there are common perspectives which are held by all those within a particular group. However, there is no ‘totalising’ idea of identity, and the law should recognise the individuality of all aspects of a person. Further fragmentation is dangerous as it would unnecessarily complicate the operation of the test, as well as resist intersectionality. Appreciating individual identities is a declarative act, recognising the politicisation of marginalised bodies and how they operate within legal spaces. Only by recognising this oppression are we able to offer the potential of liberation from it.

Yet, the ‘reasonable man’ has the illusion of objectivity. What is often considered as an independent and impartial examination of the defendant’s conduct is blind to its reality as a prejudicial enquiry. The hypothetical man is a product of legal fiction, created within a system victim to bias and structural inequalities. This matter of fact passes into law, codifying reasonableness as the unrestricted standard of the majority. The standard of ‘reasonableness’ is ‘what is expected’: how the defendant should or ought to act in respect to the interests of those at the top of the societal hierarchy. As a figment of judicial imagination, it is created within a system that judges both inherit and construct. Those in positions of power will inevitably privilege the interests of those who they seek to represent. The identity of the reasonable man is, therefore, wellknown, even if it is not spoken.

The result is that the law should employ a contextual analysis. Reason, as the centre of the enquiry, can be fortified by abolishing the person entirely. By removing the comparative analysis to a hypothetical person, the standard will not be inhabited by majority identities. Yet, it is no doubt unrealistic to expect the courts to abolish a personbased standard as such an integral assessment across all elements of the law.

The gap between the defendant’s conduct and the reasonable man is bridged by comparative analysis: whether the normative societal standard is met. This conception of what is ‘normal’ justifies discrimination, ensuring that the ‘status quo’ is adhered to.

Even with reform, an individual assessment remains based on presumptive statements. By primarily focusing on how the characteristics of the individual person impact their culpability, the law will fall back into essentialism. The court will continue to make their analysis based on construed notions of how a certain individual is expected to behave. In a system that continues to manifest injustice and inequality, the ‘reasonable’ standard will continue to draw on biased and prejudicial assumptions: the fault lies with the people who uphold the law.

Whilst adapting the reasonable man to the individual circumstances of the defendant ensures a proper examination of their individual situation, the standard becomes fossilised. By recording the characteristics of the reasonable man, he is concentrated and defined, failing to acknowledge the nature of shifting norms and identities. Whilst an unwritten standard is no doubt the enemy of legal certainty, his statutory conception leads to the same fixed conclusion: a fatal flaw of objectivity. Sketching in the details of his biography subjectively is necessary for equal consideration of what is understood as ‘reasonable’, before rubbing it out again for the next analysis of an individual’s conduct. Overall commitment to objectivity is

Without fundamental change to the judiciary and legal system itself, how can we expect to this evaluation of ‘reasonableness’ to be isolated from the perspective of those in positions of power?

On Making Class a Protected Characteristic: a Bureaucratic Tick Box or a Step Towards Improving Social Mobility? Written by Joely Thompson Edited by Chloe Kwok would be necessary, challenging the narrative surrounding working class individuals. From the ‘undeserving poor’ in Victorian times, to Thatcherite policies declaring poverty resulted from poor budgeting and, more recently, the government’s attempt to implement a benefit cap on parents with more than two children, there has been an enduring narrative of poverty blaming in society.

Due to an increasingly diverse society, markers of class, such as clothing and accents, are harder to recognise, leading people to believe modern society has transcended class. Often there is a failure to recognise how deeply rooted the effects of class-based discrimination can be. Consider the duality of British society questioning whether the class system still exists, whilst 37% of the population believe individuals receiving benefits are “fiddling” the system. This hinders social mobility because harmful beliefs predicated on class prevent individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds from attending top schools and universities and securing top jobs. This allows the myth of meritocracy to persist, resulting in 39% of those in top jobs attending private school (2019).

However, there is increasing awareness of the impact of class-based discrimination (especially in corporate spaces), from unconscious bias training to removing school and university names from CV’s, and the Social Mobility Commission’s discrimination toolkit, companies seem to be implementing policies to counteract years of discriminatory practice. This suggests society would be receptive to legal change challenging systemic classism and would build upon the legal framework to produce strategies improving social mobility.

Adding class to the Equality Act (2010) as a protected characteristic would make both direct and indirect discrimination illegal. Protecting workers from discrimination based on accent and indirect traits such as lack of confidence or gravitas. This could improve social mobility by removing some of the barrier’s children from lower socio-economic backgrounds face when attending university and applying for jobs.

However, Parliament is reluctant to implement legal change. There are multiple reports calling for making class a protected characteristic from the Trade Unions Congress, the Social Metrics Commission, and the British Psychological Society. However, following the SMC’s 2021 report, there have been no further discussions. It seems unlikely that progress will be made whilst Sunak is in office, as he dismisses prospective changes to the Equality Act as “woke nonsense”. Furthermore, if the resurfaced video stating he has “no working-class friends” is indicative of his priorities regarding class-based discrimination, it seems unlikely any legal changes are on the horizon. The lack of momentum from lawmakers is unsurprising considering 57% of the House of Lords and 39% of Cabinet ministers attended private school (the national average is 7%).

Social mobility is a central tenet upon which an equal society rests. Therefore, improving social mobility assists with dismantling the entrenched class system, for example, by disrupting the pipeline from private school to Oxford to top jobs found in Elitist Britain (2019). However, would making class a protected characteristic produce meaningful change or act as a bureaucratic tick box? You do not need to cast the net widely to see examples of discrimination occurring even though a characteristic is protected by the Equality Act. Race is a protected characteristic, however, this failed to prevent the wrongful deportation of British BAME citizens during the Windrush scandal. The government refused to release the Home Office report finding institutional racism as the cause of the scandal. Instead releasing the Tony Sewell report suggesting there was no evidence of institutional racism in Britain, leading to speculation that the Windrush report was withheld because it did not align with the government’s narrative on race. This exemplifies how enshrining a characteristic in the Equality Act does not prevent discrimination because it does not tackle systemic issues. Instead of attempting to overcome systemic issues causing Windrush, the government buried the incriminating report.

Therefore, making class a protected characteristic could be considered a bureaucratic tick box activity if social changes do not occur alongside legal changes, leading to a disaster like Windrush. However, recent societal changes reflect an increasing consciousness around the importance of improving social mobility, suggesting society would be receptive to legal change. Nevertheless, the legislators (formed by an elite majority) will not implement legal change. The reluctance to discuss changing the Equality Act indicates a laissez faire attitude from legislators regarding class-based issues, suggesting if legal changes were implemented, social reforms (required to make meaningful change), would not necessarily follow. Whether the current institution is fit to implement effective legal and social change stretches beyond the scope of this article. However, for now, making class a protected characteristic is an important first step towards improving social mobility as long as parallel social policies is implemented, and society is receptive to the change.

Similarly, without tackling systemic issues preventing social mobility, meaningful changes cannot occur. To challenge systemic classism a socio-legal approach

Prosthetics and the Body: How Far Does the ‘Body’ Extend? Written by James Nelson Edited by Chloe Kwok

propose for something simpler. We can seek to extend the definition of the body to include anything which is actively performing an essential function. This definition would have several key advantages.

My body is mine and it is only for me. A sentence that is self-evident and unquestionable, but it does make many curious. How far does the “body” extend? Is it simply the boundary of the skin? Does hair count? Or do we define the body by its function, is it what we have direct control over?

Firstly, manufacturers of medical devices could still be kept liable for faulty devices as if a device is not performing its proper function, it is therefore not part of the body. Product liability would still be in place and companies could still make a profit selling their products without fear of new liabilities.

You may say, “That must be simple, easy, no problem for any legal mind to understand!” and, for now, you may be right. Collins v Wilcock, R v smith, R v Thomas among thousands of cases illustrate that, in fact only the biological body you have, and your clothes will count in the definition of our “body”. As far as criminal law and the law of tort is concerned, these areas cover the most immediate injustices for disabled people when regarding their body; the lack of value attracted to injuries that they suffer. No more, no less. “That’s it, no argument, no need to waste my precious minutes reading some article. Case closed.” But the case is very much open... as to how far the body should extend. Because the law as of present is based on centuries of precedent and as recent times have told us, we are in unprecedented times. “So why change? Why throw out what we knew and try again?”

Secondly, no person who accidentally breaks a pair of glasses when not in use would be made criminally liable. They would lack the intention for this to be the case and so this is not a major concern. Thirdly, what is essential can change and does not need to be kept in line with the constant innovation of the medical industries. Case law and secondary legislation is perfectly capable of adapting to new innovations at a sufficient pace as can be seen with drugs legislation being kept in line with new illicit substances. But even now is it right to even make this change? We are living in a time of changing definitions and demographics therefore implying a need for modification in our laws as well. The law has never sat still, and the catalyst for change has always been there to prompt new laws. Whether that catalyst will be, yet another Engracia Figueroa is up to our parliamentarians and judges. However, it is worth bearing in mind that 25.4% of households have at least one disabled member and 5% of individuals over 16 are veterans (many of whom will be amputees or injured in some way).

Well, hopefully my explanation can reshape your understanding of what is “mine.” If I, like disability rights activist Engracia Figueroa, were to use an assistive device to do the same task my body does. Would that piece be performing a bodily function? Would it be performing the function of a limb or an eye or a finger? Could it do that? If so, then is it not part of my body? Would it then just be an accessory? I argue this because Engracia Figueroa died in part as her purpose-built wheelchair was broken by an airline. As a result, she had to use a loaner chair which caused her a pressure sore, which led to fatal complications. She had long argued that an airline should have looked after her wheelchair like it was a person, and that the damage of her mobility device, an extension of her body, led to her being redisabled.

Therefore, when considering “what is my body” and “what is mine” it would be useful to consider that the difference between one body and another isn’t as clear as it seems. One man’s stick is another's leg, one woman’s chair is another's freedom, one person’s hearing aid is another's access to the world. What is part of our bodies is complicated and subjective to the individual based on their needs but what is clear is that what constitutes as part of the body could extend pretty far.

This must come to an end and there are already proposals in place to achieve this. Flora Renxz has proposed to allow what the body is to shift with context, Rachel Clement Tolley would allow mobility aids to count. Both are academics in the areas of socio-legal studies and law respectively. As an autistic (and therefore disabled) person I

Parthenon or Bust: Should we (and can we) give the Elgin Marbles back? Written by Isabel Armstrong Edited by Chloe Kwok

“The ruins are as poetical in Piccadilly as they were in the Parthenon – but the Parthenon and it’s rock are less so without them. – Such is the Poetry of Art.”

Legislative efforts involved in repatriating the Parthenon Marbles are the only realistic option for Greece to regain possession of the statues in the modern era. Previous attempts at litigation using the European Court of Human Rights have been rejected on the grounds of temporality, particularly because the current Hellenic Republic was not even founded until 1830. Brexit further complicates the issue, given that the European Court of Justice can no longer compel the British government to abide by its legislation, leaving Greece with no legal route to challenge possession of the marbles. Even attempting to compel the British Museum to return the Marbles out of goodwill would be unsuccessful. The 1963 Museum Act safeguards the Museum’s possessions from almost any attempts at repatriation, being introduced in the aftermath of post-war independence efforts from the majority of Britain’s colonial territories. The Act ensures that items which may be duplicates, made after 1850 (conveniently, when the vast majority of Britain’s colonial territories had been captured), or deemed “unfit to be retained.”

Lord Byron in The Complete Miscellaneous Prose

T hus wrote Lord Byron, critiquing the (then) recent purchase of a number of Grecian statues by the British Museum in 1816 from the 7th Earl of Elgin. These marbles – then ‘Elgin’, but now ‘Parthenon’ – have remained controversial due to their legally murky acquisition by Elgin, and then by the British government. They currently reside in the British Museum, having been removed from the Athenian acropolis by Elgin in the early 19th century. Elgin claimed authority to remove the sculptures from the Parthenon with a firman, an edict issued by the Ottoman sultan – Greece having been colonised by the Ottoman Empire three centuries earlier. Government hearings discussing the value of acquiring the stones assumed Ottoman ownership of the marbles, based on the rights of conquest which the British empire was more than happy to enforce in its own colonies.

Section 5(i)(c) of the 1963 Museum Act allows an object to be removed from the British Museum if it is “without detriment to the interests of students.” Whilst the Parthenon Marbles may be the largest collection of sculptures taken from the greatest extant Ancient Greek temple, the British Museum is overflowing with examples of Classical sculptures. Within the Museum itself, rooms dedicated to the Greco-Roman collections take up almost triple the floor space as those inhabited by the Ancient Egyptian collection, despite the fact that each civilisation existed for a similar length of time. Furthermore, the city-state period of Greek civilisation, when Athens built the Parthenon, is over-represented amongst the Museum’s Greekspecific objects. One can argue that placing the Parthenon on such a historical pedestal, as a representative of “Ancient Greek history”, simplifies a complex, multicultural history spanning two millennia into a neat marble 200-year period wherein Athenian democracy was practiced, going against

However, debating whether Elgin himself took the marbles illegally, unknowingly or not, is a more complex legal issue. The original firman was never produced by Elgin in court, only an Italian translation, and historical debate rages today as to the extent to which this translated firman reflects the original meaning of the law as understood by the Ottoman officials who wrote it. Nevertheless, the use of “rubble” when defining which stones Elgin was able to remove strongly hint that Elgin was not given permission to remove large portions of the Parthenon’s decorative features. Furthermore, Elgin’s chaplain, Dr. Hunt, testified at the government hearings that Elgin had been induced “rather to extend than contract” the minutiae of the firman. The fact that Ottoman officials later assisted Elgin in removing more Parthenon chunks has been used to argue that the Ottoman state granted Elgin some sort of absolution for overreaching the firman’s terms. However, this cannot be proven, and can perhaps be better attributed to the Ottoman bureaucracy. Elgin was required to constantly bribe officials, even when acting within the law, and the Parthenon had been left for looters after having been shelled during the Morean War. The evidence involved in determining whether Elgin’s transactions with the Ottomans and the British government were legal is dated, confusing an already complex legal situation.

the very purpose of a museum: documenting and educating. The return of the Parthenon Marbles to Greece is long overdue, which is why the legal process involved in their repatriation is so complex and convoluted. The Greek government is currently more focussed on diplomatic enticements, particularly as the British government can no longer be legally compelled through the European Court of Justice. Sadly, seems likely that the Marbles must remain in Piccadilly for now, “thy walls defaced, thy mouldering shrines removed by British hands”.

Unravelling Britain's Influence on India's Legal Narratives Written by Srishti Garg Edited by Japheth Monzon

T ake a stroll through Bristol's Castle Park this evening. Observe the Khanda – Sikhism’s religious

As a result, the discourse and weaponizing of law in India today upholds racist colonialist views, especially through the superiority of Hindus over Muslims and other religious minorities. We have colonial rule to thank for the deep-rooted racial prejudice that replaced white supremacy with Hindu nationalist supremacy and Hindutva in parts of Kashmir, Punjab, and East India (e.g., the BJP government revoking article 370 in Kashmir).

symbol. Look closer and you can see the names of Sikh soldiers who gave their lives fighting in Britain’s wars. A quote by Prime Minister Winston Churchill is engraved on its edifice. One cannot help but feel gratitude for such brave men being recognized by the British. But reality seldom shares the same truth. The British Empire, the Raj, used martial race theory to build these British Indian armies for World War II. Propaganda was used to make people join, (primarily the poor and minority religions) as the British censored revealing letters to hide the atrocious reality of war.

Scholars and historians' debate over whether the British invasion helped India. Supporters point to the fact that it provided many of the necessary tools to modernise and grow India. These included introducing a centralised administrative system, economic policies and laws that encouraged agriculture growth. However, property laws disrupted the entire agriculture system and had farreaching consequences, often at the expense of marginalized communities that relied on communal land. This placed a heavy burden through high land taxes, fluctuating crop prices, and exploitative lending practices that pushed many farmers into cycles of debt and poverty.

Churchill's policies are attributed to the man-made Bengal Famine in India, taking more than three million lives. He said Indians bred like rabbits' He once said: “If inflation and food shortage were so serious why was Mahatma Gandhi still alive?” He made exhaustive use of Indian resources despite being warned of its consequences. Considering this, it is worth questioning whether memorials like these depict the true horrors of the colonial era, or if they are trying to rewrite the truth to their advantage. It is concerning that the people used in this revised narrative are the same people who were responsible for the harm inflicted.

Stephen Morton explains how the British improved healthcare systems and challenged certain ‘barbaric’ practices such as ‘Sati’ (ritualistic selfimmolations of widows at their husband’s funeral pyre) and the bridal ‘dowry.’ However, if looked thoroughly, these reforms were implemented primarily to exert colonial control by presenting the British with a moral high ground. This idea that Indian women needed 'saving’ from their men is an orientalist and colonial fiction. Secondly, oppressive practices were abolished after huge support from Indian leaders like Raja Ram Mohan Roy. These leaders campaigned vigorously against these social ills and pressured the British authorities to act. Moreover, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar's efforts led to the Widow Remarriage Act of 1856.

The British East India Company acquired control of Indian territories in the eighteenth century via rivalries, alliances, and diplomatic manoeuvring. Trade imbalances and discriminatory legislation robbed India of her natural wealth and used it as a ‘warehouse for raw materials.’ The British left the country in ruin. It was divided into India, Pakistan and West Bengal and a huge religious divide was made – also creating one of the largest refugee crises in history. Done by Cyril Radcliffe, he did not even see the places he was dividing and, in over five hours, solely dictated the future of 88 million people.

“ HOW OUR BRAVE INDIANS FORGET ABOUT THEIR WOUNDS ”

Photograph depicts the Indian Army in the First World War. [Brighton, England, 1915]. Photographer: H. D. Girdwood.

Britain's formal equality under the rule of law was far from what it appeared on paper.

opportunity. Worldviews are shaped heavily by history. An incorrect narrative is being used to rewrite history and neutralize colonialism. Young children and everyone in the world have the right to know what deep-rooted prejudice is capable of. It also affects the present, taking different shapes and forms in law-making, favouring one people over the other. The purpose here is not to point the finger at people today for their ancestors' actions. Rather, it is simply acknowledging the truth to ensure that all future generations understand the terrible consequences of racial prejudice – hopefully, done accurately and impartially with compassion.

These debates are futile, and the question is whether India could have developed despite the British Raj invading it. This article argues in the affirmative. The Indian economy grew significantly, revolutionized, became a global hub, had agricultural reforms and entrepreneurship, and had a diverse and strong constitution made by B.R. Ambedkar shunning all caste prejudice. Within 75 years, they achieved more than most countries. Recently, the Indian Penal Code Section 377 was amended to legalize being LGBTQ+. Clearly, it can escape oppressive practices alone if given the

*Images sourced from the British Library Open Archive.

The Global Phenomenon of Far-Right Politics Written by Melis Ekren Edited by Victoria Egerton

The recent general elections in Turkey were

concluded with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s win once again, despite the first-ever second round in general elections since the Turkish President came into power in 2014. His campaign remained focused on the same unfulfilled promises, such as to pull inflation levels down to 20% in 2023, with an aim to decrease it by a further 10% in 2024. For many years, the Turkish public has been split into two sides over political views, with one side fighting for a secular state, and the other for traditional values through the integration of religion into politics. However, one topic that the two sides have appeared to agree upon was the conversation surrounding the Syrian refugee intake in Turkey. A fear amongst the Turkish population was born from the increasing numbers of Syrian refugees settling in Turkey, reaching 4 million in population. This was rationalised by the assertion that there appeared to be more gender-based violence rooted in far-right Islamist views. Erdogan, during his campaign, was very discreet about the topic in question, seemingly avoiding giving an answer about whether his government would ‘send Syrians back to their country’, one of the main premises of the left-wing opposition candidate Kilicdaroglu. However, the welcoming sentiments towards migrants from Erdogan’s far-right coalition are not matched by the sentiments felt by far-right parties of Europe. The newly elected governments in Italy and Sweden built their pre-election campaigns on the premise that they would impose stricter migration policies, which led to both their successes. The now-Prime Minister Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy, promised measures of accelerated repatriation and more stringent asylum rules, as well as a naval blockade of North Africa in order to prevent migrants transporting through the sea to Italy. The new Italian government showed that their promises would be reflected in practice, as the Senate signed off on Meloni’s new immigration package that limits integration of migrants and creates more detention facilities among other things in April of this year. In Sweden, the new Prime Minister Kristersson’s political pact with the far-right Sweden Democrats meant a change regarding immigration and integration policy, as Swedish Democrats hold intense anti-immigration sentiments. Tightening immigration rules and making it more difficult for new immigrants to claim financial support benefits are included the new government’s plans. Kristersson explained these in an article titled Three Things Are Required to Put Sweden Back

Together, namely that he intends on implementing a radical reform into Sweden’s immigration policies and make it the strictest in Europe. Another common point in both Italy and Turkey’s campaign was their take on ‘gender ideology’ and the LGBTQIA+ community in relation to the concept of family. Italian Prime Minister Meloni, in a speech following her success, stated that she does not ‘believe in a state that places a legitimate desire of a homosexual to adopt a child before the rights of that child to have a father and a mother’.

She later declared that ‘a fair state cares of the weakest’ in the same speech, underlining the irony of her words. Her anti-LGBTQIA+ stance was criticised by other world leaders, such as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. However, he was later criticised for mansplaining LGBTQIA+ rights to the first-ever female Prime Minister in Italy. It appears as though Meloni thinks of herself as a feminist hero through her declaration that she is ‘a woman and a mother’, and her leadership of the party called ‘Brothers of Italy’. Despite her potential to fight for the rights of the vulnerable, or ‘the weakest’ in her words, she seemingly chooses to represent no female interest, or the interests of those in vulnerable positions, in other words, migrants and members of the LGBTQIA+ community. President Erdogan’s stance on LGBTQIA+ rights have always been clear and were emphasised through Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Agreement due to the use of the wording ‘gender ideology’, a concept that is not legally or politically recognised in Turkey. In the most recent elections, Erdogan’s party’s coalition with other far-right Islamist parties, such as the Free Cause Party (HUDA PAR) and the New Welfare Party, led Islamist members to enter the Turkish Parliament, with explicit intentions to limit women’s freedoms. The leader of the Free Cause Party suggested that ‘owners’ should be found for single women in Turkey. In addition, both Islamist parties were openly opposing Rule 6284 of the Turkish Constitution, which aims to protect women from gender-based violence. In conclusion, there is a clear rise in ideological issues surrounding the rights awarded to politically marginalised groups which is translated through the rise in the global phenomenon of far-right politics. Should we expect to see a change in the world order rooted in this new far-right European trend?

Transgender Rights and Discourse: Everyday Lives Shaped by the Law Written and interviewed by Emily Bell Edited by Japheth Monzon

anguish faced in the process of doing so could have been alleviated.

Transphobia in the UK remains rife. Though societal attitudes are headed in the correct direction, with 76% of people believing that prejudice against those who identify as transgender is inherently wrong (NatCen’s British Social Attitudes Survey, 2020), the law is more powerful. Anti-transgender legislation both reinforces existing prejudices and discrimination, as well as upholds the difficulties which transgender people face in their everyday lives.

Another major concern was the UK government’s exclusion of transgender conversation therapy in the blanket ban on conversation therapy in 2022. Conversation therapy aims to reverse changes to gender or sexual identity through talking. Though Culture Secretary Michelle Donelan has confirmed this year that the ban would include transgender conversation therapy, it is questionable why both were not included from the outset, considering both are equally protected under the Equality Act 2010. To me, this indicated virtue signaling within the law.

Moves of the UK legislature The greatest source of protection in the UK for transgender people falls under Section 7 of the Equality Act 2010. This serves the protected characteristic of ‘gender reassignment,’ whereby an individual planning to undergo, is undergoing, or has undergone any process ‘for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.’ It is illegal to discriminate against someone based on a protected characteristic. This seemingly affords those identifying as transgender a wealth of protection.

These examples of the contradictory moves of the UK legislature are merely passing to most. Though they may spark concern upon reading, they do nothing to cast light on the lived experiences of transgender individuals. It is this which should not be ignored; they best illustrate the heartbreaking impacts that these moves have on the life of the normal person. Lived Experiences: Interview with Theo* I came out to my mum and best friend in 2015, at the age of 12. I felt ‘different’ for my whole childhood, and especially after starting puberty. After researching the meaning of transgender, I realised this described me. Things initially progressed slowly due to long waiting lists for NHS Gender Identity Clinics. Though I was legally able to change my name, I went private a few years after coming out. This enabled me to get a diagnosis of gender dysphoria to start taking testosterone (male hormones) and undergo top surgery. I am currently on the way to getting my GRC.

Despite the clear intention of the UK Parliament, steps have been taken which counter this. Section 11 of the Equality Act 2010 provides for the protected characteristic of sex. However, Conservative MP Kemi Badenoch has proposed, in a bid to distinguish between individuals who identify with the sex they were assigned at birth to those who transition from it, a change to the legal definition of sex. This would mean only the biological sex of an individual would be recognised, despite any transition attempts. This would convolute the process, important for those identifying as transgender, in obtaining a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC), which legally recognises gender change. Furthermore, it would create division transgender individuals could legally be excluded from facilities that are single-sex, such as prisons.

What emotions would you use to describe your transition journey? Changing my identity throughout school and college was incredibly challenging. Even if people were supportive, my negative self-esteem would lead me to assume that people thought differently of me. Having now completed practically all steps of my transition that I want to at this stage, bar my GRC, I feel euphoric to live my life the way that feels right.

Labour have also failed to challenge this proposal. In line with justifying discrimination, is this proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? Nothing about it is proportionate, and the aim is illegitimate; it counters the Equality Act 2010 and would make something already justifiably legal, illegal. Additionally, the UK Government has blocked a law, proposed by the Scottish Parliament, which would have enabled transgender people in Scotland to change their gender without a medical diagnosis. Whilst there is a need to protect formality, the psychological and physical

To what extent do you feel that public institutions (e.g., workplaces and schools) have been accepting?

*Note from Editor-in-Chief: The interviewees name has been anonymised for his safety.

They have mostly been accepting. During school, teachers and friends made a fantastic support system. Student attitudes were varied due to limited knowledge at the time. Being ‘different’ as a teenager is always something that will cause problems. Workplaces have always been accepting, however, due to me now living as ‘stealth,’ only management knows on a ‘need-toknow’ basis for things like medical appointments. Confidentiality for this has always been respected, though.

What are your opinions on: Kemi Badenoch wanting to amend the legal definition of ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010 to cover just your biological sex, which would go against the gender stated on GRCs (Gender Recognition Certificates) It is unnecessary. Not only does it go against the substance of the Equality Act 2010, but it also goes against the reason for GRCs. It needs to be challenged as it would completely affect the livelihood of all transgender individuals wanting to live as their authentic selves. For example, not being able to marry, or classed as a father/mother to children as your preferred gender, would be detrimental. It would also fuel greater issues in terms of discrimination and prejudice.

What barriers have you faced within the healthcare system in relation to your transition? Referral wait times to NHS services made it almost impossible to carry out my transition in a timely manner. I was lucky to be able to go private. If I had to wait for the NHS, it would have been even more detrimental to my physical and mental health.

The UK Government blocking a law allowing transgender people in Scotland to change their gender without a medical diagnosis.

What physical, psychological, and societal changes have you noticed over the period of your transition?

There are many arguments to this. De-transitioning seems like a big issue, but very few people regret their transition. With the process of acquiring medical intervention under the NHS already being so lengthy and difficult for transgender individuals, I disagree with the UK Government.

Since socially and medically transitioning, as well as the journey of self-acceptance, as a whole, I see who I recognise in the mirror. I have simultaneously grown more empathetic towards those who do not have it as easy. Healthcare barriers and overall disapproval of the transgender community is killing those who simply want to live as their authentic selves.

Conversation therapy Conversation therapy is an outdated concept. Scientific research recognises gender dysphoria as an overwhelming feeling of distress from a mismatch between their biological sex and gender identity. Conversion therapy would not be able to ‘help’ this feeling; it would suppress their true emotions.

Are you aware of your legal rights and protections? Do you feel as though they are enough? They are not enough. As stated, confidentiality of my identity and medical needs have always been respected. However, after hearing about the negative experiences of other transgender individuals in public institutions, I believe this is due to an accepting workplace. I feel that no matter how many protests or events there are, the government does not make an effort to understand how the LGBTQIA+ feel in terms of their protections and legal rights.

The current situation of transphobia in the UK today (through your lived perspective) Transphobia is on the rise. As much as there are many allies to the LGBTQIA+ community, the general lack of understanding and awareness contributes to this. The government’s inability to protect transgender people is creating an even bigger stigma.

What resistance and/or pushback have you experienced, or seen, from queer people and their allies? Simple resistance, like not being able to compete in boys’ sports teams at school, negatively affected my mental health. It made me feel inferior and as though I did not fit in anywhere. Since living as ‘stealth,’ I have had an accepting transition, so I have not been subject to much resistance or push back from others.

As living as ‘stealth,’ I do not get any transphobia directed at me, but it certainly exists. I hear countless comments of transphobia. Many choose not to challenge these comments either, which makes transphobia seem acceptable. *

However, I have heard many stories from members of the transgender community where individuals have been denied jobs, living arrangements, relationships, friendships etc. due to their identity.

The law is often seen as beyond reach. Whether this is in understanding it, or where and when it applies, we disregard its power. However, the law is ubiquitous. Therefore, we must not become ignorant of how discrimination can impact the life of the everyday person.

'Our days of denialism and superiority over the law?’ Written by Hannah Wason Edited by Hannah Mackay superiority over the law. Not only that but UK Itidet isofhardly news that the riffraff pulled in by the democracy itself was side-lined. our ever-changing Executive have a rather dubious relationship with the rule of law. Whilst we may look back to the pre-Brexit years when our Ministers perpetuated un-truths about the Iraq War, Executive affront to the rule of law has never been as palpable as now. The last ten years of Government have been riddled and infected by instances whereby the laws that served to protect us against the tyranny of the UK institutions were undermined by greedy politicians.

Truss’s position was not mandated by a General Election or even Westminster- she was selected by only a small majority within the Tory Party. Sunak too has failed to uphold the rule of law. The Rwanda immigration policy being pushed by Sunak and Braverman is scandalous. The Court of Appeal has already found that sending asylum seekers to Rwanda, a country with a history of human rights abuses, would contravene Article 3 of the ECHR (the absolute right to not be tortured). Strikingly, Sunak nevertheless upholds the policy's viability. Like his predecessors, Sunak has disregarded the guardians of the rule of law: the Courts.

The Brexit Saga initiated this dangerous trend in Executive disdain towards the rule of law. Miller I and II highlighted this. Both represented Executive attempts to undermine fundamental constitutional principles afforded by the rule of law, namely the use of the royal prerogative and the prorogation of Parliament. Twice the Executive sought to extend their own power to the detriment of UK democracy. Fortunately, thanks to Gina Miller, the Executive were never able to ignore the rule of law, but the fact they even tried to reveal a disappointment for democracy.

The Scottish Executive’s behaviour has hardly proven much better: Sturgeon was arrested for alleged financial misconduct. Even the ex-First Minister of Scotland, perhaps the loudest critic of Westminster, has fallen to the sentiment of disdain towards the rule of law that now saturates British politics.

Furthermore, the proposal of the Internal Market Bill in 2020 provides another startlingly explicit example of Executive willingness to disregard the rule of law to further their political agenda. Here, the Government sought to blatantly ignore law to protect their reputation as the people who would ‘Get Brexit Done’. Clauses 42 and 43 aimed to bypass international trade laws, whilst Clause 45 restricted judicial review, a fundamental means of holding an Executive to account. Despite the Bill’s criticism- it was rejected several times by the House of Lords, it was nevertheless enacted. Simply, the fact the Executive knowingly proposed legislation that breached the rule of law is an obvious indication of impudence. This entrenched the notion that the UK Executive no longer respected the laws that serve to protect democracy.

This development is by no means peculiar to the UK. Just look at how Trumpianism has undermined the rule of law in our global hegemon the US. Trump’s disdain towards the law has always been startlingly explicit: his tenure began off the back of his claims that the US Supreme Court was ‘biased’ and ‘very dangerous and unwise’. As the body representative of the protection and upholding of the rule of law, a President undermining the Supreme Court in such a way was a staggering affront to its importance. The ex-President’s sentiment was only further propagated throughout his term; grounds were found to be able to launch impeachment proceedings twice. Perhaps Trump’s most audacious and dangerous undermining of the rule of law came at the very end of his tenure. The storming of the Capitol, the epicentre of US democracy, shocked the world. A President incited anarchy.

Despite all this, the COVID years provided the most audacious examples of Governmental willingness to ignore the rule of law. Look at Partygate; amidst the dystopia of lockdowns, the very people who mandated the measures meant to keep us safe broke them. From drinks at No.10 to incriminating WhatsApp messages, the Government’s superiority over the rule of law was blatant. Admittedly, the investigations led by Sue Gray and Michael Marmot have gone some way to hold the Executive to account, but they have no special retroactive power that removes the ignorance towards law already cultivated.

It is the dire situation we now face that reminds us of the Hobbesian maxim that humans are only ‘nasty, brutish, and short’. Executives across the globe have proven that, even in democracies, the rule of law is only as strong and protected as the Executive accords. The impact? A lack of faith in the checks and balances meant to be provided by constitutions, leading to disenfranchisement whereby the public are longer able to treat Executives seriously. Whilst this conclusion is rather frightening, we may look to Johnson’s recent resignation following the COVID Inquiry and Trump’s numerous indictments post-Presidency to see the law slowly catching up on them. Maybe redress for Executive disdain towards the rule of law is yet to come.

Even Truss’s comically short stint as PM continued this legacy. Whilst her policies never reached a maturity which allowed the rule of law to be materially damaged, Truss’s aloof and libertarian attitude no doubt conveyed a general sentiment of

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Begum and Migration Written by Kacey Mair Edited by Hannah Mackay

British immigration has been complex and

uncertain from its point of existence, however the law has become increasingly vague; forcing people to go unaccounted for, therefore, allowing them to slip through the cracks unprotected. The government has, through this lack of clarity, left the fate of immigrants to the discretion of those who do not have any goal apart from deporting them. This has disproportionately hurt people of colour, alienating them through giving them uncertain standing within the UK; this has been displayed more recently through the case of Shamima Begum and the recent passing of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA). A young British schoolgirl, Shamima Begum, was groomed at the age of 15, and as a result travelled to Syria to support the Islamic State. There, she was exploited, and not only that, but as she was found to have a potential right to Bangladeshi citizenship, her British citizenship was revoked as she was deemed to not be stateless upon its removal. However, Bangladeshi authorities clarified that she did not have a right to citizenship, rendering her stateless. For years Begum has tried to return to the UK, however, due to these legal acrobatics, she was unable to do so. This begs the question of why; why a child who was groomed cannot return to their country of origin simply because they have the potential for citizenship of another country. This question is specifically poignant when one considers how if Begum had not been of Bangladeshi heritage, she would not have had her British citizenship stripped. Begum being denied safe return just because she is of Bangladeshi origin, was due to the NABA changing the way in which people view immigration, or arguably, displaying the already existing attitude towards immigration. It extends hostility towards immigrants and indirectly discriminates against people of colour. For example, s10 NABA now allows the government to not notify people if they have had their citizenship stripped so long as they are perceived as a threat to national security. This has led to men of colour being unduly targeted, especially after the ‘war against terrorism’ in the wake of 9/11. The NABA allows for discrimination, specifically centered around race, to be acceptable and legal. Additionally, s12 NABA split refugees into: 1) those who have documentation to remain, and 2) those who enter through alternative routes without the requisite documentation. Many refugees are unable

to retain such documentation, as they are in times of crisis, not in times where they can fill out forms or even have access to the internet or a computer. The 2-tier system instigated by s12 creates a hierarchy in which

those who have less access to resources are more likely to end up slipping through the cracks. It is intrinsically worrying that people are being hurt due to racial prejudice and widespread misconceptions, however, this anxiety has been furthered through conversation on the Illegal Migration Bill 2023. In the Bill, the government has used the rhetoric of protecting refugees to blanket the sinister motivation of intimidating immigrants of colour and preventing their entry through unconventional methods. One may ask how preventing ‘illegal’ entry to the UK is specifically targeting people of colour, however s2(4) and (5) of the Bill allow for the Secretary of State to remove people from the UK if they have entered another country since fleeing their country of origin. As people from the Global South are usually unable to directly enter the UK, and additionally, the UK may not be their first point of refuge, this is an ignorant position. This is an extremely disappointing stance especially given recent issues with the Windrush Scandal in which members of the Commonwealth who entered the UK without needing specific documentation apart from their passports, suddenly needed documentation and were deported. To conclude, the UK government has pursued a line of immigration laws which purposefully exclude immigrants of colour and inadequately protect those most in need of protection. Whether a victim of child-grooming like Shamima Begum, or someone unable to gain refugee status in their first port of call, the UK government has reduced their need to take accountability for people in such desperate situations. Unfortunately, the UK is now actively engaging in anti-immigration legislation selected to purposefully deny safety to those who do not choose to be in such a precarious situation, and therefore, one can reasonably speculate that more legislation will be passed to create a hostile environment for immigrants and specifically immigrants of colour.

Can Lawyers End Wars? Written by Charlotte Clancy Edited by Hannah Mackay

significance of these cases, and the importance of setting a strong international precedent would make this extremely damaging to the strength of international organisations.

From the Nuremberg trials to the more recent

analysis of conflicts in Gaza, lawyers have often played a role in the aftereffects of wars. The conduct of war is governed under the international law of armed conflicts, also known as International Humanitarian Law, and codified in the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, which aim to balance imperatives of humanity and military necessity. In Ukraine, open warfare means that

Opponents of the war in Ukraine are already putting pressure on international lawyers to do something more than delegate these cases to Ukrainian Law. Op-eds, Tweets, and Facebook posts revealing the atrocities of the war are already generating international anger, while UN reports have monitored the devastating impact of the war on civilians. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty international, and other human rights groups are currently documenting and condemning the litany of violations of international humanitarian law committed by Russian forces, including indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing and shelling of civilian areas that hit homes, healthcare, and educational facilities. The Law must therefore take a predominate role in bringing the perpetrators of these crimes to justice by bringing military and political leaders closer to an appearance before the International Criminal Court. Although neither Russia nor Ukraine is party to the court, the Ukrainian government granted the ICC jurisdiction to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on Ukrainian territory by Russian forces following the 2015 Crimean War. Therefore, there is a precedent for international legal intervention when it comes to the prosecution of international war crimes, and it is the job of leading western nations to ensure that the legislating of wars remains a strong show of international legal power. In the year since an ICC investigation was opened to prosecute war crimes committed by Russian forces in Ukraine, Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan has assembled the largest investigative team ever deployed by the ICC, with some investigators based nearly permanently in Ukraine. This broad investigation reflects the unprecedented support and cooperation between many European governments, as well as the growing necessity of addressing the legal limits of wars even during the throes of active conflict. The ICC’s response to the conflict has therefore been far more reflective of the unprecedented nature of the war, and the full extent of international involvement will only be revealed after the conflict ends.

not far behind the end of the conflict lurks the intellectual equivalent of a battlefield, namely “lawfare”. Waged in the media, at the United Nations and in legal and academic circles, lawfare is a fight over the rules of war, the fate of civilians, and the international legal protocols that purport to govern armed conflict. This has never been more important than now when our legal approach to war will ultimately decide the relevance of law in modern conflict and the implications of international condemnation of Russia’s illegal war. In October last year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told lawyers that they would play a crucial role in ending the war with Russia. Addressing the International Bar Association conference he stated that the Law could bring closure to the conflict once fighting ends through the prosecution of war crimes committed by Russian forces. In his own words, “lawyers will put an end to this war after the military, after the politicians.” Since last year, Ukraine has therefore been cooperating with law enforcement in the United States. This is ultimately vital to ensure that perpetrators of war crimes are brought to account and that all damages caused by Russia are compensated through the channelling of Russian assets. President Zelensky’s message confirms that lawyers must ensure that those guilty of terror are brought to justice. However, although seemingly a chance to establish the force of international law, the difficulty of prosecuting these cases is threatening to reserve them to Ukrainian law. International criminal law expert and International Bar Association executive director Mark Ellis expressed concerns about whether the international community agrees on how and whether to prosecute certain individuals. Ellis also downplayed expectations that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would play a central role in prosecutions, suggesting instead that most cases should be heard in Ukraine itself. From a strictly legal interpretation, this may seem like the easiest route to take, however the political

For the international community, legal proceedings are the vehicle which its prosecutors, judges, and diplomats are hoping will prevent future wars. In order to adapt to a changing legal and geopolitical landscape, lawyers must ensure that they continue to play an active role in defining the legal limits of warfare. Ultimately when the dust finally settles in Ukraine, the battle must head to the courtroom.

ENDING THE

MICKEY MOUSE

PROTECTION

Kicked from his Clubhouse

ACT

YEARS LATER 25.07.23 25

Ending the Mickey Mouse Protection Act Written by Megan Fong Edited by Ke Xuan Te feel formulaic due to studios sticking to tried and tested tropes in order to maximise sales. In a study of the rise of Napster, a file sharing application that allows listeners to override copyrights and pirate music, no evidence is found on the quantity or quality of music declining. With the benefits of a long copyright duration being blurry and minimal, it certainly does not justify the tangible and significant loss of creations.

After an exceedingly long wait, “Steamboat Willie”, the

black-and-white version of Mickey Mouse whistling while driving a boat, is finally entering the public domain in 2024, despite it debuting long ago in 1928. Its shockingly late entry is caused by a series of Acts extending the copyright duration each time Mickey Mouse’s copyright was about to expire. The current Sonny Bono Act in the US, mockingly termed the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act” due to Disney allegedly pressuring its enactment, extended the copyright term to the author’s life plus 70 years, and 95 for works created by corporations, which is the same for the UK. Is such a considerable copyright length of nearly three-quarters of a century justified, or should it be shortened?

But even if this underlying assumption is true, that creators are strongly motivated by monetary rewards, the revenue gained from copyrights is too uncertain to be sufficiently consequential. Successful innovation is rare. Of the over 3 million books published in the US annually, less than 500 books make it to the New York Times bestseller list and even less authors stay on the list for more than ten weeks. Additionally, most profit from copyrights are made in the immediate years post publication. On average, works are the most profitable in the first two years –– the whole commercial life of musical works lasts merely between 2 to 5 years, 1.4 to 5 years for books, and 3.5 and 6 years for films. The copyright basically sits there for decades, making little income for the creator but costing society the loss of many opportunities for further innovation. The income from copyright is also insufficient for the artist, with a study finding only 2.4% of songwriters able to sustain their living expenses solely from their copyright earnings. Moreover, massive corporations like Disney disproportionately benefit from lengthy copyrights compared to independent creators. To reach a wider audience, artists have to sell their work and its copyright to oligopolies that oversee their production, distribution and commercialisation. The small-scale monopolies conferred by copyrights to an individual are then expropriated by giant corporations to create extensive monopolies. Amazon’s Audible division virtually controls the whole audiobook market, and uses this advantage to enforce onerous terms onto creators, which includes forcing audiobooks to only run on Audible and no other platforms. Giving more money to a bullied child is not going to help him avoid getting beaten up by his bigger peers. No matter how much money the kid receives, all it will ever accomplish is making the bullies richer. Similarly, longer copyrights are not going to benefit authors in beating a concentrated industry dominated by a few corporations. 70 years of copyright could hardly incentivise individuals to create when their works can barely support themselves, any longer is just beating a dead horse.

The purpose of copyrights is to strike the delicate balance between protecting the rights of creators and allowing the public to benefit from the free access to resources. Most students would be familiar with clicking away from a research paper locked behind a paywall. Similarly, the New York Times’ implementation of a subscription fee significantly declined the number of users and hampered user-generated content creation. This highlights the principle that while copyrights raise the revenue of creators, it is at the cost of restricting access to works.

The author deserves to be rewarded for their invention and copyrights provide incentive for that innovation, but an excessive copyright duration does more harm than good. Further creativity is stifled as others cannot build upon existing works or incorporate them into their own works. Giorcelli and Moser (2019) analysed the adoption of copyrights within Italian states in the 1800s, and found that states with copyrights had a 150% increase in the annual creation of operas compared to those without; yet a copyright length longer than the life of the author plus 30 years brought about no detectable positive effect, and could even deter the creation of new work. While having some copyright is definitely desirable, the current copyright duration of 70 years beyond the author’s death is excessively long –– it skews the balance too much towards individuals and does not justify the massive loss of potential creations from the public, nor does the additional profit effectively encourage innovation. The underlying assumption behind copyrights is that creativity can be incentivised through monetary rewards to the author. The long years of monopolisation awarded by copyrights are justified if an author subsequently churns out more work. However, creators are often motivated by reasons more than money, such as the desire to do good, to gain self-satisfaction, to express ideas and more. For an example close to home, look no further than Banksy. Moreover, more money does not necessarily adequate to better creativity, and often the converse. For an artist to become mainly motivated by money, devotion and investment in their work is lost, and innovation is merely reduced as a means to an end. Just think of the numerous Hollywood franchise movies that

Not only does a lengthy copyright yield uncertain motivation and profit for authors, it is unfair to the public and to independent creators that such meagre benefit should come at the heavy cost of a massive loss of potential works. While the public will soon be able to use the first iteration of Mickey Mouse without Disney’s permission, all other versions, including the most iconic and recognisable red and black Mickey, are still firmly monopolised by Disney for many more years. How is the current egregiously long copyright term benefitting anyone but large corporations? There is a dire need for reform. It is high time we take back the opportunities for creativity that lengthy copyrights have denied us.

Cryptocurrency: Who gets what in divorce? Written by Kelly Cheung Edited by Sonya Polezhayeva

partners are completely ignorant of the presence of a crypto wallet owned by the other. Even in cases where the party is aware of cryptocurrency ownership, such ownership cannot be proven if the key to the crypto wallet has been deliberately hidden.

In 2023, gone are the days when people

accumulate wealth solely through traditional investments, such as stocks and bonds. Cryptocurrency, as an innovative digital asset, is now widely used as an alternative investment. Decentralisation of cryptocurrency means that investors’ returns are not tethered to traditional investment trends and government policies, offering potential alternative revenue streams in recession. Moreover, the utilisation of blockchain technology as a data storage system that is free from government interference ensures the security of transactions while protecting investors’ privacy through maintaining anonymity.

Proposals to overcome the challenges The main issue with valuation is that fluctuations in cryptocurrency value will cause changes in that partner’s total asset values, which may lead to a different distribution decision. To eliminate such uncertainty, there have been proposals to either divide cryptocurrencies in their actual form proportionally or to set a fixed time point for value assessment. While the first proposal can effectively mitigate the risk, it has limited applicability since such division is possible only if the parties agree with the sale, and that the cryptocurrencies held are divisible and identical in class and value. Due to its wider applicability, the second proposal should be adopted as the standard measure. Since divorce is ultimately a highly personal matter, partners’ agreement to adopt value at another time point or to split in specie should prevail over the standard measure, save from unjust situations.

As of 2021, about 18% of the UK have owned cryptocurrency, with a fairly equal gender distribution. In light of the developments of innovative digital assets, various areas of law have recognised the status of cryptocurrency, including matrimonial law on divorce. Under s25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court will consider all relevant factors, such as each partner’s wealth and income, in ordering a fair asset distribution in divorce. To do so, each party must list all their assets in compliance with Form E, which now includes cryptocurrency, as confirmed in a recent decision by the Court in AA v Persons Unknown [2020] 4 WLR 35.

As for disclosure, since cryptocurrency first purchases are still predominantly made with traditional currency, the whole string of transactions can easily be traced from bank statements to data permanently stored on the blockchain ledgers by forensic experts. Yet, to enhance protection of clients’ privacy, new cryptocurrencies emerge rapidly to include features that hide more information. For example, Zcash offers the option for investors to hide crypto wallet addresses and transaction amounts. Such developments would make court investigations into cryptocurrency holdings harder. Alternatively, it may be more effective if there are reforms to increase the legal punishment for non-disclosure of cryptocurrencies in divorce proceedings for the dishonesty and waste of court resources in the investigation.

Difficulties of handling cryptocurrency in asset distribution during divorce proceedings Firstly, the highly volatile pricing enabled by the decentralised nature of cryptocurrency is a doubleedged sword. On one hand, it promotes new profitable opportunities. On the other hand, the volatility exposes investors to high risks of substantial loss caused by sudden large drops in cryptocurrency value. The FTX crash in November 2022 is a prominent example of the volatile pricing problem, with only 10 days between the beginning of the crash and the ultimate bankruptcy of the FTX exchange. It is highly possible that lucrative cryptocurrencies at the commencement of divorce may become worthless before the case even reaches the court. Likewise, there is a chance of a substantial change in cryptocurrency value between the end of a trial and the handing down of judgment, leading to risks of unfair outcomes due to value fluctuations. Given the potential drastic difference in value between the purchase, proceedings commencement and trial date, the lack of court guidance on when the valuation of cryptocurrencies should be conducted causes confusion and may lead to judicial inconsistencies.

Conclusion Cryptocurrency, like other innovative digital assets, evolves rapidly but is prone to exploitation. In the matrimonial law sphere, parties’ qualified assets are assumed to be for their common benefit as a couple, which justifies their entitlement to a fair distribution upon divorce proceedings. In alignment with the recent introduction of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020, which aims to reduce parties’ conflicts during divorce proceedings, the implementation of regulations and safeguards against the underlying dangers of the price volatility and non-disclosure of cryptocurrency are necessary in protecting parties’ rights.

Secondly, the high degree of privacy offered by blockchain technology enables the deliberate nondisclosure of cryptocurrencies by the divorcing partner(s). It can often be the case that divorcing

U C R O REN T P Y C R Y C

The Intersection between Sports and Crypto: The Evolving Story Written by Ana-Maria Tudor Edited by Sonya Polezhayeva

lacking protection. The Westminster Hall debate further highlights these issues, putting pressure onto the government to recognise that regardless of crypto benefits the economy may enjoy, the regular people, the sports fans, require the worrying development and marketing of crypto to be regulated.

It may be difficult to imagine a relationship

between sports and crypto, yet that is exactly what UFC’s sponsorship by Crypto.com reflects: an intersection between hands-on, bloody brawling and a cryptocurrency platform. Despite their differences, crypto and sports are closely associated, as demonstrated by a period of increasing presence of crypto companies as sport sponsors, aiming to expand audience outreach and grappling for the biggest deals. It is not just UFC that has been captured by the greedy claws of crypto platforms; football, basketball and Formula 1 are all collectibles in the race for brand recognition.

Luckily, the UK government is planning to impose the much-needed regulation, especially as Rishi Sunak aspires to mould the UK into a ‘crypto hub’ following its EU departure. A range of crypto assets and their marketing will be regulated, ensuring that crypto products are not misleading; Arsenal fans did not enjoy this during the advertisement of the tokens. However, it is possible that the relationships between crypto companies as sponsors and sports teams may gradually decrease, as they will be deterred by the increased financial regulation and the required contractual safeguards. Furthermore, crypto companies that wish to advertise their crypto products are required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority, in order to be placed under their watchful regulatory eye. This is both expensive and time-consuming, and crypto companies may question whether marketing their products and increasing their outreach is worth it. On the other hand, where it is assumed that these crypto companies do have the funds and will ultimately benefit from the highlevel sporting exposure, registering with the FCA may be insignificant. Nevertheless, even when crypto marketing will be required to be more transparent, the crypto companies will adapt to regulations if they wish to relish in the benefits of advertising through sports. Sports teams may even demand more due diligence and research into crypto companies prior to forming relationships, yet even they understand the opportunities they may gain from well-funded sponsors.

However, it is a marathon, not a sprint; with the downturn of the crypto market, sponsorships have stagnated. Crypto’s volatile nature is demonstrated, whereby the market has been aggravated by inflation and global economic uncertainty. It is the ‘crypto winter’, plagued by the 2022 FTX collapse. Regardless, where crypto has retained its turbulent nature, there is hope for recovery, and sponsorship deals are yet again gearing up for what is hoped to be a successful season. Crypto companies are reaching far and wide in order to build engagement and elevate their reputation, and sports fans may be the right way to do so. It is a logical choice, as they account for a major global demographic; 40% of US households watched the 2023 Superbowl, while FIFA 2022 amassed 1.5B viewers. Manchester United is building a metaverse stadium, its association with crypto providing an otherworldly experience. Arsenal provided cryptocurrencies in the form of fan tokens, bridging connections between the team, the fans and crypto. However, this approach emphasises crypto’s turbulent nature. The UK banned Arsenal’s promotion of fan tokens due to their misleading nature; the tokens were not being called what they essentially are, which is cryptocurrency. Fans could be taken advantage of, due to the lack of information for risks involved in crypto investments, resulting in them investing into potentially unregulated crypto assets that would not continuously reap benefits. The connection between Arsenal and crypto required a ‘greater duty of care responsibility towards their fans’ and increased regulation (Tim Payton, head of Arsenal Supporters Trust), and in the marathon to success, this was not demonstrated.

The intersection between sports and crypto provides exciting opportunities. Per Tracey Crouch, football clubs present social importance, and this importance extends across all sports due to the major global demographic they account for. Yet, crypto’s turbulence establishes the crypto-sports intersection as troubling, as supported by officials of UK’s culture ministry. The UK’s plans for a stringent approach to regulation will provide much-needed regulatory hurdles for crypto companies, reducing the troubling risks. However, in their marathon for brand recognition, passing these hurdles will allow crypto companies to be established as reputable operators instead of controlling overseers of sports teams and fans.

Yet, Arsenal’s tokens and accompanying regulatory concerns are only representative of surface level issues. There is an overall lack of regulation of cryptocurrency in relation to sports. From Manchester United to Arsenal, where football fans relish in gambling, they are effectively doing the same when getting involved in crypto, yet this time

Modern Slavery: just not a priority Written by Emily Peyton Edited by Japheth Monzon

Dame Sara Thornton DBE QPM is a decorated

and well-established figure within the world of policing and modern slavery. During her 33-year police career. She has fulfilled roles such as Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police and first Chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. She served as Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner (IASC), a role created by the Modern Slavery Act, from May 2019 to April 2022. Currently, she is a Professor of Practice in Modern Slavery Policy at the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab where her research involves ‘business responses, supply chains, and the role of the financial sector’ in tackling modern slavery.’ Alongside this, she works as a modern slavery consultant for CCLA to help investors make informed and ethical choices where their capital will ‘do good in the world’. When discussing the circumstances that gave rise to the 2015 Modern Slavery Act, the first legislation of its kind in the world, Thornton attributes its creation in part to a global ‘gradual realisation’ which in turn had a domestic impact. This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking which the UK signed in 2009, from which the principle of non-punishment that later became s.45 of the Act was derived. Alongside this, Thornton identifies a report published in 2013 by the Centre for Social Justice, which called for the creation of an Act, as a ‘catalyst’ for Theresa May ‘championing’ the cause and Karen Bradley MP ‘shepherding’ the legislation through parliament.

In conversation with Dame Sara Thornton – on the Modern Slavery Act, the Illegal Migration Act and her time as Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner Dame Sara Thornton DBE QPM is a decorated and well-established figure within the world of policing and modern slavery. During her 33-year police career she has fulfilled roles such as Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police and first Chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. She served as Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, a role created by the Modern Slavery Act, from May 2019 to April 2022. Currently, she is a Professor of Practice in Modern Slavery Policy at the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab where her research involves ‘business responses, supply chains, and the role of the financial sector’ in tackling modern slavery. Alongside this, she works as a modern slavery consultant for CCLA to help investors make informed and ethical choices where their capital will ‘do good in the world’.

Despite its revolutionary conception, the Modern Slavery Act has not been immune to criticism, with some branding it as

toothless and ineffective in actually combatting modern slavery.

Slavery, as defined by the Modern Slavery Act 2015, occurs when someone ‘holds another person in slavery or servitude’ or ‘requires another person to perform forced or compulsory labour’ (part 1 s.1(a) and (b)). The Modern Slavery Act was enacted to combat slavery, servitude, forced compulsory labour and human trafficking through consolidating previous offences, introducing new guidance for certain businesses and creating the role of Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Part 4 s.41(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act sets out that the Commissioner ‘must encourage good practice in the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of slavery and human trafficking offences.’ The role of Commissioner and the Home Office’s supervision of it have received criticism, especially following the failure to appoint Thornton’s successor for over a year, despite s.40 (1) of the Act detailing the legal requirement to have someone in post at all times.

This manifested in the 2018-19 Independent Review which included recommendations on the role of the Commissioner and transparency in supply chain reporting – or s.54 of the Act. The review felt that the Act ‘wasn’t tough enough’ because it lacked sanctions for failure to report and made various recommendations about ‘improving the quality of statements’ and ‘enforcing compliance’ to remedy this. As Thornton explains, the government accepted most of the recommendations in this area, committing to ‘revise the statutory guidance on transparency in supply chains’ and claiming that they would bring forward legislation when time allowed. However, despite including these recommendations in the 2022 Queen's speech, efforts towards bringing them into effect were quickly discarded in favour of focussing on the recently passed Illegal Migration Act 2023.

Such stagnation in an area of review readily accepted by the government paints a concerning picture for the future of the role of Commissioner, given the government’s less than willing attitude towards recommendations related to the role. For example, the government categorically rejected recommendations such as waiting for the Independent Review’s published findings before appointing a new Commissioner (Thornton herself). According to the government’s response, least part of the reason behind this rejection was because of how ‘crucial’ the role of Commissioner was and as such it needed to be filled at all times where possible.

Thornton and her colleagues at the Rights Lab predict that the number of people refusing support within the national referral mechanism will increase significantly and that half of the people previously supported will now be excluded with the passing of the Bill. Ultimately this change reflects a view of modern slavery victims ‘completely through that immigration lens rather than thinking about the harm that they have suffered’. As Thornton explains, many people ‘don't examine the issue in any depth’; they fixate on ‘stopping the boats’ without considering the knock-on domestic effect of the Illegal Migration Act seemingly being prioritised over appointing a Commissioner as required by the Modern Slavery Act. The Commissioner is uniquely positioned to ‘scrutinise what the government is proposing’ and ‘encourage good practise’ most effectively. Therefore, victims of modern slavery surely cannot be adequately safeguarded without a Commissioner in office. This is especially poignant given that, as Thornton points out, the largest nationality group victimised by modern slavery ‘had always been British’ before falling to second last year.

This rejection and its accompanying reasoning ought to be viewed within the context of the Home Office’s failure to appoint a successor in the year since Thornton completed her time as Commissioner. Thornton does not claim that the extended lack of a Commissioner is ‘deliberate’ but emphasises that, ‘deliberate or not’, having no Commissioner to serve as an ‘expert view’ and a ‘form of accountability and objective voice’ appears to ‘suit the Home Office very well’, especially in the debate surrounding the bill that has become the Illegal Migration Act 2023.

The Illegal Migration Act may have exacerbated the tension between Home Office and the Commissioner, but it certainly did not originate it. The Independent Review raised concerns that the Commissioner was ‘too heavily influenced and constrained by Government’, a sentiment reinforced by the previous Commissioner, Kevin Hyland. Hyland expressed that during his time as Commissioner his independence ‘felt somewhat discretionary from the Home Office, rather than legally bestowed. Thornton expressed that while she felt that her office could ‘say what we needed to say without fear or favour’, there were ‘consequences’ for that independence, including a cold shoulder from the Home Secretary after the publication of Nationality and Borders Bill in 2021 which only worsened as the Illegal Migration Bill developed.

The Illegal Migration Act was introduced with the intention of enacting ‘radical’ change to UK Migration law, allowing the government to detain and remove those deemed ‘irregular’ immigrants. The government cited ‘abuse of our modern slavery system’ as one reason for introducing the Bill despite the Office for Statistics Regulation finding ‘no evidence’ of this (Dearden, 2022). The irony of this supposed concern with the integrity of anti-modern slavery mechanisms is furthered when one remembers the extended lack of a Commissioner throughout this process. The Illegal Migration Act is described by Thornton as a ‘hugely disappointing’ attempt to ‘undermine protections for modern slavery victims’ by way of ‘prioritising concerns about immigration over support for victims dealing with traffickers’, a sentiment supported by Labour MP Jess Phillips who describes it as ‘a trafficker’s dream, a tool for their control’ (Quinn, 2023).

Thornton’s account of the current state of affairs does not evoke a hopeful image of the future fight against modern slavery. Her lasting impression of the 2021 Modern Slavery Amendment Bill, which some hope will continue the UK’s ‘pioneering’ approach to fighting modern slavery (Humphrey’s, 2022), is that it is unlikely to be ‘going anywhere’ fast. She warns that ‘we are in grave danger of getting left behind’ when it comes to combatting modern slavery, especially compared to the EU’s newly introduced Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the introduction of the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act in the US, resulting in import bans. Claims that the Home Office is in the ‘final stages of a recruitment process’ do little to assuage the growing unease over the state of antislavery efforts when same thing has been said since April 2022. Ultimately, Thornton feels that ‘the government could be tougher’ on modern slavery ‘without contradicting the particular line they've taken on the Illegal Migration Bill’. She sums up the government’s approach to the search for her successor in a way that can be ascribed to their approach to modern slavery in general: ‘it’s just not a priority’.

For Thornton, the consequences of this legislation on victims of modern slavery are ‘pretty awful’, as they represent a ‘complete reversal’ of the previous protection afforded to them. This is especially clear in the context of the repeated rejections of amendments, like amendment 90, which would exempt those who were ‘unlawfully exploited’ from being detained or removed without being given due process for claims to remain in the UK. Thornton questions why victims would risk coming forward when they ‘would probably take a view that it's better to stay in exploitation than to be detained and removed’. Last year the Home Office recorded 17,000 referrals into the national referral mechanism, which it describes as the ‘framework for identifying and referring potential victims of modern slavery and ensuring they receive the appropriate support’, and 4,500 people who refused to be referred.

You’re Not EU When You’re Hungary Written by Lucy Thomas Edited by Juliette Groothaert

From 2004, only stable liberal democracies with a

strong rule of law protection could ascend to the EU. Hungary joined the EU as a fledgling, but promising, democracy. It was regarded favourably compared to its neighbours, and was noteworthy for its mature and stable political system. The ‘political conditionality’ of the EU accession process was, in short, a non-issue for Hungary. Alas, in 2010, prime minister Victor Orbán made his political comeback, signalling the start of a new era for Hungary. Orban tapped into the political niche of ‘illiberal democracy’ and vowed to put ‘Hungary first’. Since, he has merrily dismantled Hungary’s promising democracy brick by brick and propelled the country down the path to autocracy. Hungary has shown us a prime example of ‘democratic backsliding’, exemplified by Orbán’s bitter scorn of the ‘rule-of-law people’ of the EU. This scorn is hardly confined to rhetoric. It has manifested itself through various governmental attacks on judicial independence, press freedom, minority rights and the rights of asylum seekers. Orbán has sniffed at rule of law protections, complaining of their ‘Hungarophobic’ implications. He has also sought out a ‘system of national co-operation’, namely the often-blatant alignment of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state. One must ask, in the face of such brash dissent against the values of democracy and the rule of law, tenets on which the Union is founded, how is Hungary’s place in the EU untroubled? Further, if Orbán derides the ‘evercloser’ union why doesn’t he just leave? So goes the current dilemma. Maybe the only solution for both parties is to grin and bear it. All about the money? Unfortunately, the EU has incidentally constricted what it dubs as Hungary’s ‘hybrid regime of electoral autocracy’ and also paradoxically propagated it. This is because the EU funds given to Hungary are misappropriated: used to corruptly line the purses of Orbán’s political allies, they keep his autocracy ticking. For the Orbán regime, the stabilising effect of EU money on the economy doesn’t carry enough political benefit to warrant a Hunexit. The overwhelming importance of this money is illustrated by the recent reforms of the Hungarian judicial system. These were prompted not by rule of law concerns, but as a response to the EU’s attempt to clamp down on Orbán. The EU has exploited its economic advantage and frozen

several EU funding lines for the state, withholding tens of billions of euros. These can only be unfrozen when Hungary meets over two dozen ‘super milestones’ oriented around rule of law issues. The state needs this money: they have the highest inflation and interest rates in the EU by a fair margin. As the economic situation worsens, Orbán will begin to sweat. We will have to wait and see how far he will go on the basis of EU economic dependency, and whether the Commission can pull Hungary back up from the slippery slope to autocracy. Handling Hungary There has been a resurgence of calls to remove Hungary from the EU. It is unlikely that this is in the union’s best interests. The EU’s best bet is to keep a handle on Orbán: cutting off funds is an appropriate punishment - this sends a stronger signal than previous disciplinary efforts (which were minimal) and brings Hungary’s dependency on the EU to the fore. It may even be able to incite meaningful reform. Expelling Hungary, a power which the EU doesn’t even have (and one which would also be hard to create), would be a bad move. In a similar sense, pushing the state to exit would also be undesirable. It is better for the EU to keep Hungary under its thumb - although EU membership has not had an exactly ‘civilising’ effect on Hungarian politics, it is preferable to the likely alternative. If Hungary feels disenfranchised and isolated by the bloc, it would certainly make a good bedfellow with Russia. In addition, if Hungary crashes out of the EU, the cracks in the project will be revealed and other countries could follow suit. The freezing of Hungary’s funds is a step in the right direction, but the EU must devise a plan to build up the weaponry in its rule of law toolbox. New procedural constraints on member states are needed now, or else other right leaning populist member states might get plucky. If the EU doesn’t continue to act decisively, they may start using Orbán’s path of democratic backsliding as a blueprint for their own action. Currently, the European Parliament is pushing against Hungary’s upcoming EU presidency. This is prudent Hungary’s power in the hot seat must be dampened. With Hungary at the helm, the EU risks becoming a willing accomplice in the undermining of their own plethora of liberal values.

Is the Coronavirus Act 2020 a sabotage to salvation to the Rule of Law in the era of precarity? Written by Annette Lam | Edited by Juliette Groothaert

“The RIGHT HONORABLE G.REAPER VISITS PARTYGATE” 33

The demands of emergency served to converge law-making power to the Executive which not only disrupts the Separation of Powers but also risks overuse, misuse or even abuse of powers by government ministers. The Act itself received minimal parliamentary scrutiny, with only 5 hours of parliamentary debate allowed due to the urgency of passing the Act. Notably, the Government routinely employed urgent procedures to make regulations “by reason of urgency”, which allowed no or minimal level of parliamentary scrutiny. While this has violated the bare principle of legality, which merely requires laws to be enacted in a prescribed procedure, this violation might be justified by the necessity to employ urgent procedures in an emergency. Yet, this urgent procedure has been repeatedly exploited long after the initial emergency, which led Lindsay Hoyle, the current Speaker of the House of Commons to chastise ‘the use of urgent procedure has not always been justified’. Nonetheless, delegated legislation which is intrinsically unamenable by Parliament is habitually invoked by the Government to introduce measures. This incessant sidelining and marginalisation of Parliament subsequently galvanised the need for the Government to rebuild the trust with the House as to do otherwise would render Parliamentary Sovereignty and Executive Accountability nugatory. Further, non-compliance with the rules by members of the Executive has been criticised to breach equality before the law. Boris Johnson’s engagement in the Downing Street Party has exemplified his disregard for the rules at the highest level. Although there are ongoing police investigations regarding the allegations, rulebreaking by parliamentarians has exposed that ‘the rules are not being properly followed by the people who make the rules’, eroding the credibility and trust of the public towards Parliament.

In March 2020, when the world was hit by the

Covid-19 pandemic, a tempestuous wave of moral panic in public health and safety pervaded across the globe. To combat the threat posed by this unprecedented global health crisis, the UKa Government implemented the Coronavirus Act 2020, in the hope of establishing temporary guidelines to restore public order and mollify the public’s disquietude. Unexpectedly, the exigency required for impending governmental action provides an opportune guise for the use of power without restraint or scrutiny, with the Act being drafted and enforced at the Government’s discretion. However, this ‘rule-by-decree’ has placed the rule of law in jeopardy where the principle should serve as a “perimeter of legitimacy of the restrictive measures taken in response to the pandemic”. But the ultimate paradox comes down to whether legal certainty and executive accountability should be critically observed in an era of precarity. Legal uncertainty permeated the initial stage of the pandemic. The new laws were hardly accessible as they were enacted and enforced at limited notice, making it virtually impossible for individuals and businesses to claim their rights or perform their obligations. The Act was never unequivocal nor predictable, as it was constantly subject to amendments to adapt to the erratic atmosphere, not to mention the absence of a consolidated, comprehensive version of the original regulations being readily publicised. Clarity was nearly absent throughout the period during which the Act was in force. In particular, there were misleading convolutions between government statements of public health advice and the Act itself, conveying conflicting messages to the public and even the police force. As lay people do not necessarily possess sufficient legal proficiency to decipher between statements of law or public health advice, this morphed into the police improperly issuing fixed penalty notices to individuals who had acted in contravention of the public health advice. Furthermore, the obscurity of the wording of the provisions themselves also gave rise to unclarity. For instance, isolation regulations required people to stay in a “suitable place” without definitive criteria of “suitability”, rendering it difficult for individuals to respond whether adhering to the law or not. While unpredictability could somehow be rationalised given the inherent precarious environment the Government, the UK public and the wider world were stuck in, the aforementioned instances appear to inherently obstruct the rule of law.

Albeit the urgency needed for immediate regulations to be stipulated, the government’s response to the pandemic appeared disproportionately unlawful to the threat it was facing, not to mention the Act itself was ‘uncertain in its meaning, arbitrary in its question, and of questionable basis of the law’. While urgent procedures may be justified in some exceptional circumstances, the overuse of delegated legislation to entrench regulations may be deemed unnecessary or unfit. Although the pandemic has exposed the government’s sabotage of the rule of law, it serves as a valuable lesson for the government and the general public that the rule of law as an indispensable constitutional fundamental must never be set aside amidst any emergencies.

Carbon Credits: The Ultimate Solution for a Net-Zero Future? Written by Chien Wen Siow Edited by Cristina-Nicoleta Eftenoiu

was ‘entirely carbon-neutral’; years later, it removed this claim after the investigation on Verra, from whom Gucci purchased carbon credits. This raises alarm bells on how effective corporations’ net-zero goals actually are. Scientists argue that carbon credits should be treated more as green investments rather than as compensation for a company’s emissions. Yet, with no cap on how many credits companies can buy, businesses may heavily rely on them instead of creating long-term plans to scale back on their carbon footprint. Thus, consumers such as you and I fall under the false belief that services offered to us are ‘green’ and ‘carbon-free’.

Global warming is reaching a tipping point, as

shown by the extreme temperatures in usually colder regions. The global carbon market hit an alltime high valuation of £750 billion in 2022 making carbon credits a prevalent investment for businesses in the face of our climate crisis. However, there is much ambiguity surrounding how these assets are traded in this booming industry. We constantly see companies gloat about their carbon-neutral goals, yet how much of their achievements are attributable to effective plans? As the situation becomes increasingly urgent, it is crucial to determine whether carbon credits are a viable long-term solution to achieving our 2050 net-zero goals.

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As the VCM is largely unregulated by officials, the integrity and transparency of its credits remains questionable. Not all carbon credits are created equally. Although a credit represents a tonne of carbon dioxide emissions, the way it has been generated and calculated varies across different projects. Even the amount of carbon dioxide absorbed by different trees through a reforestation project can differ. Studies show that about 29% of offsetting projects that generate credits have overestimated their climate impact. Despite some guidance provided on how to develop a highquality carbon offsetting project, there are large gaps in how they are monitored.

What are carbon credits? A credit can be thought of as a permit representing one tonne of carbon dioxide emissions. The main types of carbon markets are the ‘compliance’ and ‘voluntary’ market. The compliance market is a ‘cap-and-trade’ program, where the government sets a limit for how much greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions industries can release. For the voluntary carbon market (VCM), there are no set regulations to reduce emissions. Companies are usually incentivised to do so because of shareholder or societal pressures. Carbon offsetting projects such as reforestation plans or renewable energy investments are set up by organisations. In return, a carbon credit is generated for every tonne of GHG emissions reduced through these projects.

While there is tighter regulation within the compliance market, it also faces issues on a global scale. As different countries have different carbon markets, some have made efforts to link their markets with each other, hoping to benefit from increased efficiency in climate change mitigation and reduced market volatility. However, differences in environmental and political considerations, as well as laws and governance on the carbon industry, makes linking programs easier said than done. For instance, prices of carbon credits vary from one jurisdiction to another, resulting in a lack of compatibility between different markets. Without joining forces together, how are we able to ensure a truly effective impact on cutting down our carbon emissions worldwide within the next few decades?

For these VCM credits to be created, they are verified according to specific standards. However, their legitimacy must be contested. In January 2023, an investigation found that 94% of the credits verified by Verra, the largest carbon credits provider which has issued more than 1 billion credits, were found to be ‘phantom credits’. They were not actually representative of the amount of carbon claimed to have been reduced. Most of the carbon offsetting projects which generated the credits were largely ineffective and ‘worthless’. However, companies were buying them to offset their emissions, claiming that they had contributed to achieving their net-zero goals.

Despite these concerns, the potential of carbon credits in reaching our carbon-neutral goals cannot be dismissed. For some companies, lowering their emissions may not be a possible option now, given the high costs of restructuring their operations or adopting new technologies. With carbon credits, businesses are able to address climate issues while supporting carbon-offsetting projects. Still, reform to the carbon market and its stakeholders needs to be implemented for carbon credits to represent a long-term, effective measure towards curbing our climate crisis. Otherwise, it may truly be too late for us to reverse the damage done to our planet.

We must now place the companies themselves under the spotlight. Corporations often promote their commitment to ‘go green’. In reality, some of them fail to create comprehensive plans to reduce in-house GHG emissions. Instead, they turn to purchasing carbon credits to ‘offset’ their emissions as a cheaper, more convenient route. In 2019, Gucci announced that it

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Law of the Land: The Growth of the Rights-of-Nature Movement Written by Sophie Chong Edited by Cristina-Nicoleta Eftenoiu

The continued acceleration of climate change,

biodiversity loss and ecological degradation indicate that our current laws are manifestly inadequate to safeguard our environment. In recent years, a striking concept granting legal personhood to nature and its elements such as rivers, lakes and forests has developed as an alternative mechanism to protect the environment. These ideas form the legal framework of a growing international rightsof-nature movement. In Western jurisprudence, ideas involving environmental personhood were first articulated by Professor Christopher Stone in his seminal 1972 thesis ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ By proposing that natural objects should be granted enforceable legal rights, exercised by a human guardian, this would effectively mean bringing claims on behalf of that natural entity. They would also be the sole beneficiary of an award or remedy by the court so that damages can be directly used towards restoring the land itself (rather than enriching the human or corporate plaintiff). Although the thought of giving natural entities legal rights may seem surprising, Stone reasoned that this was not as revolutionary as it initially appeared given the undisputed prevalence of inanimate rightsholders in the modern legal system. Examples include corporations, joint ventures, nation-states, and even ships. If legal standing can be granted to these non-sentient entities, why not extend this to natural entities? Throughout legal history, conferring rights on rightless ‘things’ such as the suffragist movement or abolition of slavery has always generated contemporary resistance. Stone noted that

“until the rightless thing recieves its right, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of ‘us’ - those holding the rights at the time.” Stone’s proposition for environmental personhood thus invites us to reach beyond the present bounds of collective consciousness, shift away from our anthropocentric worldview, and imagine a different relationship between humans and nature. What previously was a fringe and obscure legal doctrine has now seen growing contemporary relevance in environmental governance through the burgeoning rights-of-nature movement, which has made significant international headway. In the last two decades, many jurisdictions have embraced Stone’s theory and have accorded certain rights to nature. In 2008, Ecuador became the first country to enshrine legal rights of nature in its constitution. Other Andean countries followed suit; Bolivia

enacted a similar ‘Law of the Rights of Mother Earth’ in 2010 and the Colombian Supreme Court recognised the Amazon River as a subject of rights and protection in 2018. Meanwhile, in New Zealand, legislation was introduced granting legal personhood to Te Urewera National Park in 2014 and to Whanganui River in 2017. More recently, Canada recognised the legal rights of the Magpie River in 2021 and last year, Europe’s largest saltwater Lagoon, Mar Menor, was granted legal status by the Spanish Parliament. Proponents of the rights-of-nature movement argue that granting rights to nature may improve environmental outcomes, allowing more lawsuits to be brought without the requirement of proving ‘injury’ to landowners or third parties. Scholars argue that this would also better honour indigenous communities’ deep connection to their natural surroundings; codification of such conceptions may grant native people greater agency within their lands as was the case with the Māori in New Zealand. However, the efficiency of this rightsbased approach to environmental protection remains contestable due to enforcement difficulties. Firstly, lawsuits are expensive. Even with the right to sue on behalf of nature, guardians may lack the funds to do so. For example, in Ecuador, Global Alliance for Rights-of-Nature sued a construction company trying to build a road across a river and initially won in court. Yet, when the company failed to obey the ruling, the NGO could not afford to initiate another court case. The second issue is jurisdictional; natural entities such as rivers often traverse other nation-boundaries. So, if a country has granted legal rights to a river but neighbouring states have not, it becomes inherently difficult to legally protect. This played out in India; after the high court in Uttarakhand granted legal status to the Ganges and Yamuna rivers in 2017, the state government successfully appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds of impracticality as they argued that the rivers extended so far beyond the borders of Uttarakhand. Lastly, questions remain over how conflicts between nature’s rights, corporate rights and human interests will be adjudicated; a balance must be struck when assessing what kinds of human activities are permissible so that such measures do not overly infringe upon the livelihoods of certain communities. We can expect to see further legislative efforts acknowledging the rights of nature in the future as the movement continues to gain global traction. Environmental personhood may prove a promising tool in overcoming difficulties that have plagued traditional environmental protection measures involving standing and justiciability, but it is by no means a cure-all solution: effective enforcement will require copious funding, cross-border cooperation, and political backing.

Changing Rights and Freedoms: Abortion in the USA Written by Melpo Kourti Edited by James Martin deeply rooted in America’s history nor fundamental in the notion of liberty. They further ignored the concept of Stare Decisis (the fundamental principle of legal precedent) in taking away a constitutional right without justification. Seemingly, the Court made its decision based on what the 14th Amendment encompasses; nonetheless, this resulted in the adoption of a pro-life stance. Nothing has changed to suggest the overruling of Roe, other than the Court’s composition, implying that the judges’ political beliefs played a critical role in the decision. The negative impacts that such a decision places on socially deprived women were only discussed in the dissenting opinion.

“With sorrow - for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection”, stated the dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which on the 24th of June 2022 overruled Roe v Wade (1973), the case that constitutionally protected the right to abortion within the USA. The right to an abortion now depends on state laws, and ethnic minorities, the poor, and the economically deprived are the ones mostly suffering the consequences. In 1969 Norma McCorvey was denied an abortion in Texas. Under the pseudonym of Jane Roe, McCorvey filed a lawsuit against Wade (Dallas District Attorney), claiming that Texas laws criminalised abortion and violated Amendments of the Constitution. After appeal, The US Supreme Court held that the right to abortion was constitutionally protected. In the majority opinion (7-2) by Justice Blackmun, the Court held the protection of the right to privacy, which extends to a right to an abortion, through the 14th Amendment. They also acknowledged the 9th Amendment right to end a pregnancy.

States are now free to restrict abortion or even ban the procedure. Currently, 14 states have banned abortion in most instances, and some do not even provide an exception for cases of rape or incest. Only 25 out of the 50 states have deemed abortions legal with protections. Following Dobbs, abortion is no longer a guaranteed right in the USA. Whilst women still have the right to travel to other states where abortion is accessible, those that do not have the means to do so may be forced to perform dangerous at-home abortions, putting their lives at risk. On a global scale, the USA is marginalized as one of only 4 countries that have removed legal grounds for abortion since 1994. Yet as arguably the most influential country in the world, this decision could establish a dangerous precedent and inspire a decline in abortion rights worldwide, placing women across the world at risk.

Following Roe, every American woman had a right to an abortion within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Planned Parenthood v Casey (1982) reaffirmed this position and held that states could not enact laws that produced ‘substantial obstacles’ when seeking abortions up to 24 weeks. These two cases gave women the right to choose what to do with their bodies and allowed them to safely terminate pregnancies.

There is a growing fear that abortion rights will continue to be restricted. A recent Texas case suspended approval of the abortion pill mifepristone, and the Iowa Attorney General’s Office has halted funding for emergency contraception and sometimes abortion for sexual assault victims.

Before Roe, there were approximately 1 million abortions performed illegally in the USA annually. After Roe, the number of abortions remained the same, but the procedures performed were now legal. Abortions were no longer accessible to the few who could afford travel and procedure expenses; and became widely and safely available to all.

However, there is still hope. For example, a referendum in Kansas found the majority supporting abortion rights. In the political fight against abortion, the American people continue to support abortion rights and hence contribute to restoring access to abortion.

Various cases attempted to limit the right to abortion and the recent effort by Dobbs (2022) succeeded. The Centre of Reproductive Rights endeavoured to block Mississippi’s ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, claiming it was unconstitutional. Justice Alito’s majority opinion (6-3) went against the 50 years of precedent set by Roe. It is the first time in history that the Supreme Court has deprived its people of a fundamental right.

Banning abortion does not change the fact that women have a right of choice in the freedom of their bodies, nor does it change women’s need for the procedure. It only deprives them of the freedom to choose what happens to their body, and forces poor and at-risk women to pursue dangerous illegal abortions, putting their lives at risk.

The Court held that the 14th Amendment does guarantee the right to an abortion. The justification for this was that the right to an abortion was not

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Quandary of By Snigdha Sri Parisha | Edited by James Martin it. Legal because active euthanasia requires sanction from the court for it to be administered, and ethical because it raises the question whether any person or institution can judge whether a life should end. The irreversible nature of euthanasia makes it an extremely difficult topic to rule on, and many debate whether such decisions should be left to the courts.

The term Euthanasia is derived from the Greek word "eu" meaning easy, happy and painless, while the meaning if "thanatos" is death. Euthanasia is known as mercy-killing because of the declared intention is to bring about an easier death to a person who is in pain or is suffering. However, it is a concept that is extremely complex and debated throughout the world.

In the 1990 case of Cruzan v Missouri Department of Health, Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state, and her guardian wanted to discontinue life support. The US Supreme Court held that clear and convincing evidence that the patient had requested prior wishes to be allowed to die must be shown to exist. The evidence was from Ms. Cruzan’s psychotherapist, and crucially a statement from her housemate, who testified that Ms Cruzan had said that if she ever faced a life of vegetation, she did not want to live and preferred to die instead. Therefore, the US Supreme Court ruled that the substituted judgement of the psychotherapist and the housemate reflected that of the patient. Cruzan was hence granted euthanasia. The Court had initially rejected the petition because it felt that Cruzan’s psychotherapist’s account was unreliable as evidence of Cruzan’s own wishes. It may have also been concerned that easily granting euthanasia means that in other cases, vulnerable groups will be at the risk of coercion into making such a decision, showing the risks that are involved with legalizing euthanasia.

In today's day and age, Euthanasia is considered to be a tenet of an advanced medical directive, which in essence means that it is a procedure that requires legal consent. In countries where euthanasia is legal, the procedure must be sanctioned by the courts, following intense scrutiny – however for the majority of the world, this is not an option. Euthanasia is legal in some jurisdictions, such as in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and in parts the USA. For example, In Oregon, the Death with Dignity Act allows physicians to prescribe lethal drugs to a patient who requests them under stringent conditions. However, in the UK euthanasia remains illegal. If carried out, a doctor will likely face a charge of murder or attempted murder, as under UK law intentional killing by doctors, no matter the patient’s wishes, is considered the same offence as intentional killing by anyone else. Euthanasia is a legal issue with an ethical twist to

In the United Kingdom, challenges have also been made against euthanasia. The House of Lords decision in R (Pretty) v DPP denied a “right to die”, citing that the European Convention of Human Rights protects Man’s right to live freely above everything else. This suggests that the ethical dilemma of whether or not Man’s sanctity of life is displaced due to euthanasia can act as a barricade in place of any pro-euthanasia arguments.

These cases show it is very obvious that euthanasia is a fine amalgamation of ethical and legal contributions. I believe that a human should have physiological autonomy over his own body, especially in the case of euthanasia, and not the courts, as unfortunately the focus of euthanasia cases is rarely on the individual themselves. Instead, the courts are more concerned about potentially establishing radical legal precedents, and fear of public outrage over such an emotive issue.

However, David P. Gushee argues that despite an individual’s moral standing with regard to euthanasia, the legally challenging aspect of this topic has a more tangible impact on its ruling. Whether or not an ailing person is granted euthanasia depends more on whether or not the Law deems for it to be justified, more than whether it is ethically justified. Therefore, the ECHR overruled the Lords in Pretty v United Kingdom, recognising the right to die under Article 8 of the ECHR. This showed that the moral belief in the sanctity of life should not be able to overrule the legal right for Man to end his own life.

To sum up, if palliative care cannot meet the patient’s physical, mental or emotional needs, euthanasia should be legalised for terminally-ill patients facing death or unbearable suffering. The main focus in the debate around euthanasia should be the individual themselves, not the court’s interests, not the future precedents, and not ethical philosophies. Should a patient be suffering from irrecoverable illness, he should be able to exercise the right of deciding to end his life, regardless of the courts.

editorial team Editors

�� Takashi Biswas UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Editor-in-Chief

Japheth Monzon PG, Socio-Legal Studies (MSc)

Publication Coordinator Dylan Gupta UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Charmaine Annabelle Mathew UG, Law Graduate (LLB) Hannah Mackay UG, Honours Law (LLB) Juliette Groothaert UG, Honours Law (LLB) Sonya Polezhayeva

UBLC Liaison Officer Sude Capoglu UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Ke Xuan Tee UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Cristiana-Nicoleta Eftenoiu PG, Company Law and Corporate Governance (LLM) James Martin UG, Honours Law (LLB) Chloe Kwok UG, Honours Law (LLB)

creative team Creative Director Emiliya Kott UG, Law with Study Abroad (LLB)

Illustrators Timothy Cheng UG, Honours Law (LLB) Alice Tran UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Managing Editors

Kylie Chong UG, Honours Law (LLB) Emily Bell UG, Honours Law (LLB) Jasmine Law PG, Law (MA)

Victoria Egerton UG, Honours Law (LLB)

our writers Kacey Mair Emily Bell UG, Honours Law (LLB) UG, Honours Law (LLB) Lucy Thomas Emily Peyton UG, Honours Law (LLB) UG, Law and Spanish (LLB) Annette Lam Isabelle Xora Asghar-Williams UG, Honours Law (LLB) PG, Law (MA) Ana-Maria Tudor Kai Drysdale UG, Honours Law (LLB) UG, English (BA)

� �� Kelly Cheung (Cheung Lok Yee)

Ambareen Aslam

UG, Law with Study Abroad (LLB)

UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Megan Fong

Ellie Hands

UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Sophie Chong

Noah Robinson

PG, Law (MA)

UG, Honours Law (LLB)

Chien Wen Siow

Anna Ashton UG, Law with Study in Continental Europe (LLB)

UG, Honours Law (LLB) Melpo Kourti

Srishti Garg

UG, Honours Law (LLB) Melis Ekren

UG, Honours Law (LLB) Hannah Wason

UG, Law with Study Abroad (LLB) Charlotte Clancy

UG, Honours Law (LLB) Snigdha Sri Parisha

UG, Honours Law (LLB) Isabel Armstrong

UG, History (BA)

Joely Thompson UG, Law with Study in Continental Europe (LLB)

UG, Law and French (LLB) James Nelson UG, Honours Law (LLB)

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