Counter-IED Report Winter 2026

ISSN2050-6732(Print)

ISSN2050-6740(Online)

MAYBENOTEXACTLYA“HAPPYNEWYEAR”FOR2026: UPDATEONTHREATDYNAMICSFROMNON-STATEARMEDGROUPS

QUANTIFYINGRESIDUALRISKINLANDRELEASE THEROLEOFUGVS INMODERNWARFARE

ENHANCINGPORTABLEX-RAYIMAGINGFORMODERNEOD, IEDDANDUXOOPERATIONS

8TH EDITIONOFTHENATOEODDEMONSTRATIONSANDTRIALS

ZHDUN:STATIONARYFPVLOITERINGMUNITIONAMBUSHTACTIC

ITISNOTTHECARBUTTHEDRIVER...TRENDSINTHEUSEOF (GROUND)VEHICLEBORNEIMPROVISEDEXPLOSIVEDEVICES

EDITORIALANDTECHNOLOGYPARTNERS

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IFCSMARTRAYVISION

5ICORTECHNOLOGY/MED-ENG

7NOVODIGITALRADIOGRAPHY

8VIDISCOLTD

8CANADIANTECHNOLOGYSYSTEMS–CTS

9FOREWORD

ByRobHyde-Bales,ConsultingEditor,Counter-IEDReport

20JOINTCBRNSYMPOSIUM2026

21MAYBENOTEXACTLYA“HAPPYNEWYEAR”FOR2026: UPDATEONTHREATDYNAMICSFROMNON-STATEARMEDGROUPS

ByJoseMRufas,SubjectMatterExpertinC-IED,AttacktheNetworks, TechnicalExploitation&IEDAnalysis

32 MSPO – 34TH INTERNATIONALDEFENCEINDUSTRYEXHIBITION

33QUANTIFYINGRESIDUALRISKINLANDRELEASE

ByDrRobertKeeley,RKConsulting(EOD)Ltd

41THEROLEOFUGVS INMODERNWARFARE

Byaunav—aregisteredtrademarkofEM&EGroupfor AutonomousRoboticSystems(RAS)andUnmannedGroundVehicles(UGVs)

47ENHANCINGPORTABLEX-RAYIMAGINGFORMODERNEOD, IEDDANDUXOOPERATIONS

ByScannaMSC

568TH EDITIONOFTHENATOEODDEMONSTRATIONS ANDTRIALS

ByLtCWitoldPlezia,projectmanager,NATOEODCOE

65ZHDUN:STATIONARYFPVLOITERINGMUNITION AMBUSHTACTIC

ByChiefSuperintendent(ret.)MichaelCardash,Terrogence–Global

74FUTUREFORCESFORUM2026

75ITISNOTTHECARBUTTHEDRIVER... TRENDSINTHEUSEOF(GROUND)VEHICLEBORNE IMPROVISEDEXPLOSIVEDEVICES

ByJoseMRufas,SubjectMatterExpertinC-IED,AttacktheNetworks, TechnicalExploitation&IEDAnalysis

83SAHAEXPO2026–INTERNATIONALDEFENCE &AEROSPACEEXHIBITION

FOREWORD

ByRobHyde-Bales,ConsultingEditor,Counter-IEDReport

Asweenter2026Anti-personnel(AP)Landmines andImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IEDs)continue tocausethedeathsandseriousinjuriesofthousandsof civiliansaroundtheglobe.

Atleast6,279civilianswerekilledorinjuredby landminesandexplosivesin2024,accordingtothe LandmineMonitor2025report.Atleast57countriesand otherareasarecontaminatedbyAPmines.Atleast25 countriesarebelievedorknowntohavecontamination arisingfromIEDs.Morethanhalfoftheaffected countriessucceededindecreasingtheextentoftheir contaminationthroughlandreleaseactivitiesin2024.1

Majorconfictscontinuetoproliferateglobally.The currentwarinUkrainerepresentsthemostsignifcant confictonmainlandEuropesinceWorldWarTwo. Africaremainsparticularlyblightedbywar.Incentral AfricafghtingcontinuesbetweentheforcesoftheDRC andRwandanbackedrebels.Thesavagecivilwarin Sudanisexactingaterribletollonthecivilianpopulation. IslamistterroristscontinuetheirjihadinNorthern Nigeria,sub-SaharanAfrica,andSomalia.IntheMiddle EastunrestremainsinGaza,Iran,IraqandSyria.

U.S.LANDMINEPOLICY

AccordingtoareportfromTheWashingtonPoston 20thDecember2025,thecurrentU.S.administration

is reversingcourseonapreviousadministration policythat‘prohibitedtheuseofantipersonnel landminesexceptontheKoreanPeninsula.’Thepaper citedPentagondocuments,includinga‘previously unreportedmemo’thatwassignedbySecretaryof DefensePeteHegsethon2ndDecember2025.The defensesecretaryoutlinedfveobjectivesinthenew landminepolicy,whichincluded‘liftinggeographiclimits ontheuseoflandmines’andallowingforAPLstobe usedaroundtheglobe,withcombatantcommands giventheauthoritytodeploythemastheysee necessary.Hegsethfurthercalledforplacinglimits onthedestructionofU.S.landminestockpiles.The previouspolicieshadcalledforthedestructionofAP landminesthatweren’tnecessaryforthedefenceof SouthKoreaalongtheDemilitarizedZone(DMZ)with NorthKorea.Aninterimpolicyhadcalledfortheuseof ‘remotelydelivered’APlandminesequippedwithselfdestructfeaturesthatwouldallowtheirdestructionafter aconficthadended,butsomecriticsoftheordnance hadwarnedthatthesemay‘havehighratesoffailures.’ TheUnitedStatesisnotasignatorytotheOttawa Convention,whichprohibitstheuse,stockpiling, production,andtransferofanti-personnellandmines. Intotal,thereare34non-signatorystatesincluding Russia,China,IndiaandPakistan.2

1 https://the-monitor.org/online-reader/landmine-monitor-2025?anchor=Major-Findings-183992

2 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pentagon-just-reversed-landmine-policy-again-ps-122425

AGROWINGNUMBEROFCHILDRENAREBEING KILLEDORINJUREDBYEXPLOSIVEWEAPONS

AreportbySavetheChildren3 indicatingover60%of confict-relatedchilddeathsandinjuriesfrom2020to 2024werecausedbyexplosiveweapons.Nearly 50,000childcasualtiesarereported,equatingto200 planesfullofchildren.Theincreaseinexplosive weaponusage,particularlyinpopulatedareas,hasled tothiscrisis,whichhasshiftedfromindirecteffectsof wartodirectimpactsfromlethalmunitions.Countries suchasSudanandGazahaveseenalarmingchild casualtyrates.Medicalprofessionalswarnthatthe uniqueanatomicalvulnerabilityofchildrentoblast injuriesresultsinseverelong-termeffects,including disabilitiesandlifelongmedicalneeds.Urgentquestions abouttheadequacyofinternationallawsprotecting civilians,particularlychildren,inconfictshavebeen raised,astheselawsareincreasinglyignored.

ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE(AI)ISSUES

WhileemergingtechnologiessuchasArtifcial Intelligence(AI)canbeleveragedtoautomateand speedupdetectionofexplosivehazards,theycan alsobeapotentialsecuritythreat.InearlyFebruary 2026,theExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalTechnology Center(EODTECHCEN)issuedastarkwarningto bombdisposaltechniciansregardingtheuseof generativeAI.4 Themilitary'stopEODauthority cautionedpersonnelagainstuploading‘highly sensitive’orrestrictedtechnicalmaterialinto generativeAIsystems,includingbothcommercial platformsandPentagon-approvedofferings.The warningspecifcallyaddressedattemptstoupload datafromtheAdvancedExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal RoboticSystem(AEODPS)andothercritical databases.Offcialsnotedthatthisdatafallingintothe wronghandscouldhaveuniqueconsequencesfor bothoperationalsafetyandnationalsecurity. GenerativeAImodelscaninadvertently‘memorise’ andleakprivateorclassifeddataintheirfuture

outputs.Despitethesewarnings,theJointEOD communityisactivelyexploringwaystouseGenAIfor synthesisingtechnicaldatasafelytomaintaina ‘decisiveedge’withoutcompromisingthemission environment.

REGIONALSECURITYDYNAMICS

Russia–Ukraineconfict

SinceOctober2025,thewarhasenteredanintense phasecharacterisedbya‘deep-strike’energywar,with bothsidessignifcantlyexpandingattacksoncritical infrastructuretodisrupttheenemy'seconomyand militarylogistics.Inthesecondhalfof2025 Ukrainehassignifcantlyintensifeditslong-range strikecampaignagainstRussianrefneries,depots, exportterminals,andexpandeditsnavaldrone operationstotargetRussia'smaritime‘shadow’oil transport,whileRussiahaslaunchedrecordnumbers ofmissilesatUkrainianenergyfacilitiesresultingin rollingblackoutsacrosslargepartsofthecountry.As theconfictapproacheditsfourthanniversary,theU.S. brokerednegotiationsaimedtoendtheconfict havetakenplaceinAbuDhabi,UAE.Themajor stickingpointsofnegotiationareterritory,security guaranteesandcontroloverZaporizhzhiaNuclear Plant.Ukraine'sEuropeanallies,ledbyFranceand Britain,arecurrentlyintheprocessofmakingdetailed preparationstodeploytroopstoUkrainetomonitora futureceasefreifapeacedealisreached,however Russiaviewsthedeploymentofanyforeignmilitary forcesorinfrastructureinUkraineasforeign interventionposingadirectthreattoRussia'ssecurity.5 Asthetwosidesremaindeeplydivided,itremainsto beseenifthelatestroundofnegotiationswillbeable toproduceasignifcantbreakthroughorleadtodeescalationofthehostilities.Ukraineiscurrently themostlandmine-contaminatedcountryintheworld, andnearly25–30%ofitsterritoryispotentially contaminatedbylandmines,clustermunitions,and

3 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/child-casualties-from-explosive-weapons-at-record-high/ 4 https://defensescoop.com/2026/02/10/military-warning-eod-tech-data-generative-ai-systems/

5 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-foreign-forces-ukraine-would-be-legitimate-targets-2026-02-02/

otherexplosiveremnantsofwar(ERW).Over13types ofanti-personnelminesandnumerousanti-vehicle mineshavebeendocumented.IEDsandboobytraps areleftbehindaftertroopsretreatandarefrequently foundinresidentialareasandabandonedbuildings. Behindthefrontlinesofthedeadliestconfictin EuropesinceWWII,RussianandUkrainianmilitary intelligenceagencieshavefoughtashadow‘hybrid’ warinvolvingcyber-attacks,disinformationcampaigns, strikesatstrategicinfrastructureandkillings.6

AnumberofIEDattacksandcarbombingshave beenreportedinUkraineandRussiainrecentmonths.

InUkraine:Onthe11thDecember2025,aNational Guardmember,whowaspatrollingtheareawitha colleague,diedinanIEDexplosioninKyiv’sDarnytskyi district;Onthe4thJanuary2026,anSUVexplodedin theObolondistrictofKyiv,injuringaservicemember –theauthoritieshaveclassifedthatincidentasa terroristattack.7

InRussia:Onthe22ndofDecember,theHeadof theOperationalTrainingDirectorateattheGeneral StaffoftheRussianArmedForces,LieutenantGeneral FanilSarvarov,waskilledinacarexplosion – an explosivedeviceplantedunderacarwasremotely activatedonYasenevayaStreetinsouthernMoscow;8 Onthe24thDecember,twoRussianpolicemendiedin anexplosionwhiledetainingasuspectinsouthern Moscow – asbothoffcersapproachedthesuspect,an explosionoccurred,killingallthree.9

MIDDLEEAST

Gazaconfict

InSeptember2025,afterintenseroundsofnegotiations, theU.S.presidentDonaldTrumphasannouncedthe Gazapeaceplan.Offciallythe‘ComprehensivePlanto EndtheGazaConfict’–it’samultilateralagreement betweenIsraelandHamasthataimstoaddressthe ongoingGazawarandbroaderMiddleEasterncrisis.It

wassignedonthe9thOctober,comingintoeffectthe followingday,andwasendorsedbytheUnitedNations SecurityCouncilonthe17thNovember.Whilethe securitysituationinGazaremainstense,theplan providesaglimmerofhopeforcessationofhostilities andreductionoftensionsthroughouttheregion.The warinGazahasresultedinunprecedentedlevels ofexplosiveordnancecontamination,creatingan unmappedminefeldthroughouttheGazaStrip.Asof early2026,itisestimatedthat66,000to70,000tons ofunexplodedordnance(UXO)–rangingfromaircraft bombstoIEDs–arescatteredacrossthedensely populatedterritory,withsomeestimatessuggestingit couldtakeupto30yearstosafelycleartherubble.

U.S.–Iranconfrontation

TheconfrontationbetweentheU.S.andIranis currentlyatacriticaljuncture,balancingbetween high-stakesdiplomacyandthethreatofdirect militaryconfict.Afteraperiodofintenseescalation, includingU.S.airstrikesonIraniannuclearsites inJune 2025,bothnationsareengagedintalksinearly2026 mediatedbyQatarandOman.

Iraq

Iraqremainsoneofthemostheavilycontaminated countriesintheworldintermsofexplosiveremnantsof war(ERW),withanestimated2,100sqkmtoover 3,000sqkmoflandcontaminatedbylandmines,cluster munitionremnants,andIEDs.Thiscontaminationisa resultofdecadesofconfict,includingthe1980–1988 Iran-IraqWar,the1991GulfWar,the2003invasionled byU.S.andUK,andthe2014–2017waragainstISIS. Thecurrentsecuritysituationasofearly2026remains complex,characterisedbyafragile,relativestability comparedtopreviousyears.Whilemajorcombat againstISIShasceased,threatsfromterrorism,militia activity,andviolentcrimepersist,causingongoing securityrisksforlocalpopulationandforeign

6 https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-man-suspected-shooting-top-general-has-been-detained-dubai-2026-02-08/

7 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/car-explodes-in-kyiv-s-holosiivskyi-district/ar-AA1WazQ9

8 https://tass.com/emergencies/2062889

9 https://tass.com/emergencies/2063931

nationals.Sporadicattacksfromarmedgroups,militias, andISISremainathreat,particularlyinnorthernand centralregions.Militiasoftenoperateindependentlyof governmentcontrol,impactingsecurityand,insome cases,targetingsecurityforcesorforeigninterests.

Syria

ThesecuritysituationinSyriaremainshighlyvolatile andfragilefollowingthecollapseoftheBasharalAssadregimeinDecember2024.Whilethe transitionalgovernmentledbyAhmedal-Sharaahas consolidatedcontrolovermajorurbancentres,the countryfacessignifcantchallengesfrominternal fragmentation,persistentterrorism,andexternal militaryinterventions.GroupssuchasISIL(ISIS) andAl-Qaedaremainactive,particularlyinthe northeastandcentraldesertregions.ISIShasrecently increaseditsattackrate,attemptingtoexploit thecurrenttransitiontoregainafoothold.Controlis dividedbetweenseveralfactions:Transitional Government,whichcontrolsDamascus,Aleppoand Hama,butstrugglestointegratediversearmedgroups intoaunifedmilitary;SyrianDemocraticForces (SDF),whichmaintainsdefactoautonomy,thougha fragile‘CeasefreandFullIntegrationAgreement’was announcedinJanuary2026tointegratetheSDFinto centralgovernmentstructuresbytheendoftheyear; SyrianNationalArmy(SNA),whichoperatesprimarily innorthernborderregionswithTurkishsupport. Outbreaksofviolencetargetingminoritygroups,such astheAlawiteandDruzecommunities,havebeen reportedincoastalareasandtheSuweida governorate.Ariseinviolentrobbery,carjacking,and kidnappingforransomhasbeennoteddueto theongoinghumanitariancrisisandsecurity vacuum.Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar remainwidespread,especiallyinruralandpreviously contestedareas.Contaminationcoverstheentire country,particularlyformerfrontlines,agricultural felds,andurbancentres,withupto300,000explosive itemsestimatedtohavefailedtodetonate,hindering returnofdisplacedpeopleandeconomicrecovery.

ASIA

India

MajorcarbombingsinIndiahavehistoricallytargeted high-proflegovernmentbuildings,busymarkets,and securityconvoys.Themostrecentsignifcantincident occurredonthe10thNovember2025,whenacar explodedneartheRedFortmetrostationinDelhi, India,killingatleast15andinjuringmorethan 20people.10 Theblasttriggeredafrethatdamaged multiplenearbyvehicles.Policeinvestigationresults indicatethattheexplosionmayhavebeencarriedout byasuicidebomberandAmmoniumNitrateFuelOil (ANFO)wasidentifedastheprimaryexplosive.ANFO isacommonindustrialexplosivemadebymixing porousammoniumnitratewithfueloilandhasbeen previouslyusedtocarryoutdeadlyterrorattacksin BeirutandtheUnitedStates.Investigatorslatertraced thecarusedintheDelhiexplosiontoUmar Mohammed,aPulwama-baseddoctor,whoworkedat Al-FalahUniversityinFaridabadandhadallegedlinks toindividualsarrestedduringtheearlierpoliceraids conductedinthecitywhichledtothecaptureofmore than2,900kg(6,400lb)ofexplosives.Basedon evidenceuncoveredbyinvestigation,hewasallegedly partofalargernetworkconsistingofseveral doctorsfromFaridabadandKashmir,withlinksto foreignhandlers.

Pakistan

Pakistancontinuestofaceacomplexandadaptive threatlandscape.Militantgroupsaffliatedwiththe Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP),theBaloch insurgency,andtheIslamicStateKhorasanProvince (ISKP)haveregeneratedandevolved,positioning themselvestoexploitPakistan’svulnerabilitiessince theU.S.withdrawalfromAfghanistan.Accordingtoa recentreportbythePakistanInstituteofPeace Studies,Pakistanwitnessedasharpsurgeinmilitant violencein2025,with699terroristattacksrecorded acrossthecountry–anincreaseof34%comparedto thepreviousyear.Thisrenewedwaveofviolence

10 https://thelogicalindian.com/nia-calls-delhi-blast-a-car-borne-suicide-attack-arrests-key-plotter-amir-rashid-ali-all-updates-inside/

claimedatleast1,034lives,markinga21%risein terrorism-relatedfatalities.Inaddition,1,366people wereinjuredoverthecourseoftheyear,underscoring thegrowinghumancostofterrorism.Securityandlaw enforcementpersonnelborethebruntoftheterrorist violence.Ofthetotalterrorism-relatedfatalities,as manyas437,ormorethan42%,werepersonnelof securityandlawenforcementagencies,including174 policemen,122armysoldiers,107FrontierCorpsand FederalConstabularymembers,21Leviespersonnel. Civilianswerealsoheavilyaffected,with354noncombatantslosingtheirlives.Meanwhile,243militants werekilled,eitherinsuicideattackstheycarriedoutor duringretaliatoryfrebysecurityforces.11

ArecentdeadlysuicidebombinginPakistan occurredonthe11thNovember2025outsidethe DistrictJudicialComplexinIslamabad'sG-11sector. Theattackinvolvedasuicidebomberwhosetoffan explosionafterattemptingtoenterthebuilding,killing 12peopleandinjuring36.Thevictimswereprimarily passers-by,lawyers,andindividualsattendingcourt hearings.Jamaat-ul-Ahrar,asplinterfactionofthe Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP),claimedresponsibility, statingtheytargetedjudicialoffcialsforimplementing ‘un-Islamiclaws’.Inthefollowingdays,Pakistani authoritiesreportedlyarrestedfoursuspectslinkedto anAfghancellfortheirallegedinvolvementintheblast.

Onthe6thFebruary2026,asuicideattacktargeted theKhadijaTulKubraMosque,aShiaMosqueinthe TarlaiKalanareaofsouth-easternIslamabad.The explosiontookplaceduringFridayprayers,killing32 peopleandinjuring170others.TheIslamicState militantgroupclaimedresponsibilityfortheattack.

Myanmarcivilwar

Myanmariscurrentlyembroiledinamulti-frontcivilwar thatescalatedfollowingaFebruary2021militarycoup. Whilethecountryhasfacedinternalconfictsinceits independencein1948,thecurrent‘SpringRevolution’ hasseenunprecedentedcoordinationbetween traditionalethnicarmedorganisations(EAOs)andnew

pro-democracymilitias.Landminesarepresentinat least90townshipsacross10-14states/regions,with contaminationexpandingsignifcantlyafterthe2021 coup.AccordingtotheEuropeanCivilProtectionand HumanitarianOperations(ECHO),Myanmarhasfor thesecondconsecutiveyearrecordedtheworld’s highestnumberoflandminecasualties(2,029),which isdoublethetotalreportedfortheprecedingyear. Syriahadthesecondhighestnumberofcasualties (1,015),followedbyAfghanistan(624)andUkraine (293).In2023,morethan1,000casualtieswere recorded,andin2024thisfgureexceeded2,000, makingthecountryoneofthemostdangerousinthe worldforthenumberoflandmineincidents.The military(SAC)primarilyusesfactory-made,longlastinganti-personnelmines.Non-statearmedgroups (NSAGs)frequentlydeployIEDsandhand-made mines.Ongoing,intensefghtingseverelyrestricts,or completelyhalts,formaldeminingoperationsinmany areas.Sincethe2021coupaerialwarfarehasbeen crucialtotheconfict.Despitesufferingterritorial setbacks,Myanmar’smilitaryjuntahasretainedair superiorityandwithit,itsgriponpower.Butoverthe past12months,theMyanmarmilitaryhasmadea notableshiftinitsaerialwarfarestrategy:aheavier investmentinthedronetechnologythattheresistance haslongusedintheconfict.Asbothsidesincreasingly relyondronestogainstrategicadvantageintheair, theconfictinMyanmarnowranksthirdintheworldin termsofthenumberofdroneincidentsrecordedby ACLED,onlybehindUkraineandRussia.12

Thailand

Inearly2026,Thailand’sYalaandNarathiwat provinceshaveseenaresurgenceofIEDactivity,part ofapersistentethnonationalistinsurgencyintheDeep South.Theseincidentsfrequentlytargetsecurity forcesandgovernment-linkedinfrastructure.Onthe 3rdJanuary2026,aroadsidebombinNarathiwat injuredfourpoliceoffcersandfourparamilitary rangersduringavillageprotectionmission.Aweek

11 https://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/PIPS%20Security%20Report%2025.pdf

12 https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-confict-myanmar

later,onthe11thJanuary2026,coordinatedbomband arsonattackstargeted11PTTpetrolstationsacross Yala,Narathiwat,andPattani.Onthe4thFebruary 2026anEODspecialistwasinjuredwhiledefusing bombsatapetrolstationinMuangdistrictofChiang Maiprovince.13 Onthe8thFebruary2026,a homemadebombstruckaREVAarmouredvehicle convoyintheBannangSatadistrict,Yalaprovince, injuringonesoldier.Onthesameday,objects resemblingIEDsandanti-governmentbannerswere discoveredat17locationsacrossninedistrictsin Narathiwatpromptingahighalertaheadofthegeneral election.Onthe11thFebruary,abombplantedina culvertbeneatharoadinBanKadovillage,Moo4, Ruesodistrict,Narathiwat,explodedinjuringthree peopleanddamagingavehicle.

Cambodia–Thailandborderconfict

TheongoingterritorialdisputebetweenCambodiaand Thailandhasescalatedintoadirectarmed confrontationonthe24thJuly2025alongthe Cambodia – ThailandborderafteraThaisoldierwas seriouslyinjuredbywhatThailandisclaimingtobea PMN-2anti-personnellandmineinNamYuendistrict, UbonRatchathaniprovince.Bothsidesassertedthat theiractionsweretakeninself-defenceandaccused theotherofinitiatingtheconfict.

BetweenJulyandAugust2025,severalincidents involvingThaisoldierssteppingonlandminesnearthe Cambodia-Thailandborderoccurred,resultingin severeinjuriesandamputations.Notably,fveThai soldierswerereportedinjured,withincidentsonthe 16thJuly,23rdJuly,28thJuly,9thAugust,and12th August,furtherescalatingdiplomatictensionsand mutualaccusationsbetweenthetwocountriesoverthe useoflandmines.BangkokaccusedCambodiaof plantinglandminesontheThaisideofthedisputed border.PhnomPenhrejectedtheaccusations,saying

thesoldiershadtriggeredoldlandminesleftfromits decadesofwar.14

Onthe11thNovember2025,Thailandsaidithas indefnitelypausedimplementationofaU.S.-brokered ceasefre,thattookeffectonthe29thJuly,afteraland mineexplosiononthe10thNovemberinjuredfourThai soldiersinSisaketprovince.15

Onthe11thFebruary,threeThaisoldierswere injuredbyalandmineexplosionneartheCambodian borderinSisaketprovince.Theexplosiontookplace afterweeksofrelativecalmfollowingaceasefre, reachedinDecember2025afterrenewedclashes alongtheborderoftwocountries.16

AFRICA

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo–Rwanda confict

RelationsbetweentheDemocraticRepublicofthe Congo(DRC)andRwandaarecurrentlyatacritical breakingpoint.Tensionsdatebacktothe1994 RwandanGenocidedrivenbythefightofHutu extremistsintoeasternCongo,creatinglong-term securitythreats,ethnictensions,andcompetitionfora controlofnaturalresources.Theconfictin2025 escalatedsignifcantly,primarilyduetotheactivitiesof theM23rebelgroup.TheM23arethemostprominent ofmorethan100armedgroupsvyingforcontrolof easternCongo’strillionsofdollarsinmineralwealth that’scriticalformuchoftheworld’stechnology.The fghtinghasdisplacedmorethan6millionpeopleinthe region,makingitoneoftheworld'sdeadliestandmost overlookedhumanitariandisasters.17

Despitemultiplehigh-levelpeaceagreements brokeredbytheUnitedStatesandQatarthroughout 2025,activeconfictpersists.

Afteryearsofwar,thereisasignifcantlandmineand IEDscontaminationintheDRC,particularlyinNorth

13 https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3190134/bomb-expert-injured-in-blast-at-southern-ptt-station

14 https://apnews.com/article/land-mine-army-cambodia-ceasefre-border-confict-0132bac83b36d3b5f3e70eb61b6ea3fc

15 https://apnews.com/article/thailand-cambodia-land-mine-border-b2783683c22e9db45fdedd3cb2b606b4

16 https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/new-landmine-blast-tests-thailand-cambodia-ceasefre

17 https://apnews.com/article/congo-m23-rebels-bukavu-southkivu-14527185304baa9a5e40eff4cfccba85

KivuandIturiprovinces.In2022,theCounter-IED ReporthadsoundedanalarmoverthespreadofIEDs inEasternDRCongodrawingattentiontotherising rateofIEDusageduetoenhancementsinthedesign ofthesedevices,increasedinternationallogisticsand connectionstobombmakers.18

Asof2024 – 2025,atleast31confrmedor suspectedhazardousareasexist,withwidespread, undocumenteduseofpressure-releaseimprovised minescausingsignifcantthreatstocivilians, humanitarianaccessandreliefefforts.

TherecentfghtingandM23armedgroup’scapture ofGomaandBukavuin2025ledtothetemporary suspensionoftheUnitedNationsMineActionService (UNMAS)andotheroperators’activities,limitingthem tonon-technicalsurvey(NTS),markingofunexploded ordnance(UXO),andriskeducation.Simultaneously,a sharpdropinfunding – duetotheendofSouthKorean (KOICA)supportandthesuspensionofUnitedStates (US)funding – threatenstobringallmineaction operationstoahalt.Inthiscontext,DRCongo submittedathree-yearArticle5deadlineextension requestinordertoaddresstheremaininghazardous areas,carryoutsurveyinDungu(aterritoryinHaut Ueleprovince),andstrengthennationalexplosive ordnancedisposal(EOD)andimprovisedexplosive devicedisposal(IEDD)capacities.Therequestseeks anewdeadlineof31December2028.19

Sudancivilwar

ThecivilwarinSudan,whicheruptedonthe15thApril 2023,hasevolvedintooneoftheworld'smost severehumanitariananddisplacementcrises.The confictisprimarilyapowerstrugglebetween theSudaneseArmedForces(SAF),ledbyGeneral AbdelFattahal-Burhan,andtheparamilitaryRapid SupportForces(RSF),ledbyGeneralMohamed HamdanDagalo(Hemedti).Inasignifcantsymbolic andstrategicmove,themilitary-ledgovernment offciallyreturnedtothecapital,Khartoum,inJanuary 2026afternearlythreeyearsofoperatingfromPort

Sudan.TheSAFrecapturedthecityinMarch 2025.TheRSFcontinuestocontrolmostofthe Darfurregion,includingitslastmajorurban stronghold,ElFasher,whichfelltotheparamilitary groupinlateOctober2025.Fightinghasintensifedin theKordofanregion,particularlyaroundDilling andKadugli,wheretheSAFrecentlybrokelongstandingRSFsiegesinearlyFebruary2026. Bothsideshaveincreasinglydeployed"advanced droneweaponrysystems,"leadingtoasurgein civiliancasualtiesandattacksonhumanitarian convoys.Sudanisheavilycontaminatedwith landmines,IEDs,andUXOresultingfromdecadesof confict,withthe2023–2025confictbetweenSAF andRSFcreatingnew,widespreadcontamination. Over11millionpeoplearedisplaced,whileexplosive hazardsinareassuchasKhartoum,BlueNile,and SouthKordofanrestrictmovement,agriculture,and aidaccess.Asofmid-2025,explosiveincidentshave killedatleast23peopleandinjureddozensmore sincethe2023confictbegan.Heavyrainshave exposedlandminesinnorthofBahri,exacerbatingthe risktocivilians.Althoughsurveyandclearance activitiesrestartedin2024,effortsarehinderedby limitedfunding,lackofspecialisedequipment,and ongoinghostilities.

JihadistinsurgencyinMaliandBurkinaFaso MaliandBurkinaFasoarefacingsevere,intertwined crisesdrivenbyrampantjihadistinsurgency,military coups,andacutehumanitarianemergencies.Since 2020/2022,militaryjuntasinbothnationshave severedWesternties,relyingonRussianforceswhile battlingal-Qaeda-affliatedJNIMandIslamicState groups.Islamistmilitantgroupscontrolvast, ungovernedterritories,launchinghigh-impactattacks onmilitarybasesandcities(e.g.,inDjibo,Burkina Faso,andBamako).Followingcoups,bothcountries haveestablishedafragileAllianceofSahelStates (AES)alongsideNiger,withdrawingfromECOWAS. Theyfaceworseningviolencedespiteusingdrones

18 https://counteriedreport.com/alarming-ied-proliferation-in-eastern-dr-congo/

19 https://www.mineactionreview.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/anti-personnel-mines

andRussianmercenaries.Over2millionpeopleare internallydisplacedinBurkinaFasoalone(approx. 10%ofthepopulation).Thesecurityinstabilityis spreadingsouthward,threateningcoastalWestAfrican nationsandstemsfromweakstatepresence,extreme poverty,foodshortages,schoolclosures,climate vulnerability,andafailuretoaddresslocalgrievances, causingyouthstojoinextremistgroups.Maliand BurkinaFasoarefacingaseriousandgrowingcrisis causedbyIEDsandlandmines,largelydrivenbynonstatearmedgroupsintheSahelregion,whoare increasinglyusingvictim-activated,pressure-plate IEDsthatfunctionlikebannedanti-personnelmines.In BurkinaFaso,theNationalCommissionfortheControl ofArms(CNCA)developedafve-yearstrategyand validatednewstandardsforexplosiveordnance disposal.InMaliUNMASprovidesexplosiveordnance training,buteffortsarehinderedbyinsecurity,limited resources,andalackoflandminemaps.Reduced fnancialsupportforMineActionhampersdemining operationsintheregion.

Nigeria

ThesecuritysituationinNigeriaisgoingthroughthe multipleoverlappingcrisesincludingterrorism,mass kidnappings,andintercommunalviolenceandaffects nearlyeveryregion.PersistentinsurgencyfromBoko HaramandISWAP(IslamicStateWestAfrica Province)groupsintheNorth-Eastcarryoutsuicide bombingsandtargetedattacksonmilitaryoutposts, civilians,andhumanitarianworkers.Reportsindicate thatinsurgentshavebegunusingcompressedanimal dungandorganicwastetocreatemethane-based explosives,whicharehardertotracethanindustrial fertilisers.WhileISWAPtraditionallytargetsmilitary personnel,recentincidentsshowanincreasingtollon civiliansusingpublicroads.

Inrecentsecurityoperations,onthe7thFebruary 2026,jointpoliceandmilitaryteamssuccessfully dismantledanIEDplantedalongtheDanjibga–KuncinKalgoaxisinTsafeLGAinZamfara.Also, policeinterceptedavehicleloadedwithexplosivesand

recoveredalargecacheofmaterialsinKatsinain January2026,arrestingthreesuspects.Onthe28th December2025,theNigerianAirForceconductedair strikesdestroyinganIEDmanufacturingcampandan "IEDhub”inZamfaraoperatedbybandits.Despite ongoingeffortstodisruptIEDnetworks,IEDattacks continuetobefrequentanddeadly.Atleastnine soldierswerekilledinanIEDblastalongthe Maiduguri–GubioroadinBornoStateonthe6th January2026-theexplosivewasbelievedtohave beenplantedovernightbyBokoHaraminsurgents. Fivepeoplewereinjuredonthe17thJanuary2026in ZamfaraStatewhenamotorcycleranoveranIEDon theTakalafya-GadarZaimaroadinBukkuyumLGA –thedevicewasreportedlyplantedbyarmedbandits.20

Tocounterthethreat,Nigeriansecurityforceshave implementedfemalescreeningatcheckpointsand increasedintelligence-ledoperationstodetectIEDs placement.Thegovernmentbannedcertainfertilizers usedinIEDmanufacturing,whichsignifcantlyreduced productionofspecifcbombtypes.Theinitiativeis anchoredonthedevelopmentofaNationalCounterIEDEnterprisePlan,coordinatedbytheOffceofthe NationalSecurityAdviserthroughtheNationalCounter TerrorismCentre.Theplanisdesignedtoensurea unifedandcoordinatedgovernmentresponsetothe increasinguseofIEDsbyterroristgroups.

InFebruary2026,theU.S.commandforAfrica confrmedthattheU.S.hassent‘asmallUSteam thatbringssomeuniquecapabilitiesfromtheUnited States’toNigeria,afterbothcountriesagreedthat moreneededtobedonetocombattheterroristthreat inWestAfrica.Thisisthefrstacknowledgmentof theU.S.troopspresenceonNigeriansoilsince WashingtonlaunchedstrikesinDecember2025 againstwhatPresidentDonaldTrumpdescribedas IslamicStatetargetsandsaidtherecouldbemoreU.S. militaryactionthere.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabweiscurrentlyfacingacriticalfundingcrisisfor itslandmineclearanceoperationsin2026,primarily

20 https://dailypost.ng/2025/12/22/major-terrorists-attacks-that-shook-nigeria-in-2025/

duetotheabruptterminationofmajorgrantsfrom theUnitedStatesandotherinternationaldonors.21 This shortfallhasledtothecompletewithdrawalofsome humanitarianorganisationsandsignifcantcapacity reductionsforothers,stallingprogressasthecountry nearsitsgoalofbecomingmine-free.Asof2026, approximately12sqkmremainsinfestedwithmines,a fundingshortfallof$23.79millionisrequiredto completetheclearanceoftheseremainingareas.By theendof2024,landmineshadcausedan estimated1,660injuriesordeaths.Zimbabwe originallycommittedtobeingmine-freeby2025 undertheAnti-PersonnelMineBanConvention. However,citingthedeclineininternationalaid andreduceddeminingcapacity,inApril2025the governmentsubmittedarequestforafve-year extension,movingthetargetcompletiondateto the31stDecember2030.Expertswarnthateventhis newtargetmaybemissedifrenewedfundingis notsecured.

LATINAMERICA

EvolutionofTactics&MilitarisationinMexico

Mexicoisexperiencingasevereescalationincartel violence,drivenbyinternalfactionalwarsand theexpansionofmilitarisedcriminalgroupsintonew territoriesandindustries.CurrentlyMexico’smost aggressivegroup,theCJNGhasexpandedintoat least27of32states.Cartelshaveincreasingly adoptedinsurgent-styletactics,utilizingmilitary-grade equipment.

RecentreportsindicatethatMexicandrugcartels areconductingdroneoperationsalongtheU.S.–Mexicoborderatindustrialscale,withfederalagencies nowconfrmingtensofthousandsofunmannedfights usedtotrackBorderPatrolagents,coordinate smuggling,andprobeAmericanairspace.U.S.

CustomsandBorderProtectionrevealedthatagents detectedmorethan42,000unmanneddronefights neartheborderinFiscalYear2025,callingthethreat ‘rapidlyevolving’ascartelsexpandtheiraerial surveillancecapabilities.22

Theuseofdronestodropexplosivedevices andIEDshasbecomecommon.Cartelshavebeen reportedrecruitingColombianfghterswithcombat experiencetotraintheirmembers.23 Explosive attacksremainconcentratedinthefollowingstates: Guanajuato,Chihuahua,BajaCalifornia,Sinaloa,and Michoacán.AreportfromJanuary2026indicatedthat injustoveroneyear,authoritiesinMichoacán deactivatedmorethan1,600IEDs,anincreaseof 122.5%comparedto2024.24

Signifcantincidentsinthepast4monthsincluded: DroneattackinOctober2025,whenthreeexplosiveladendronesstruckagovernmentbuildinghousingthe stateattorneygeneral'soffceinTijuana,Baja California;ArrestofaGulfCartelmemberintheborder cityofReynosa,Tamaulipas,inpossessionof151 droneexplosives,18drones,threeIEDs,andvarious otherweapons – theseizurealsoincludedstate-of-theartanti-droneweapons;Theexplosionofacarbomb, whichoccurredoutsideapolicestationinMichoacán onthe6thDecember2025,killingatleastsix people,includingthreepoliceoffcers,andinjuring sevenothers.25

Colombia

Colombiacontinuestofaceinsurgentactivityand terroristattacks,drivenprimarilybyillegalarmed groupsandnon-stateactorsthatexploitnarcoticsto expandtheirterritoryandgrowtheirmanpowerto opposethestate.IncidentsthatincludeuseofIEDs, VehicleBorneIEDsandhomemadedronestrikeshave signifcantlyincreasedincomparisonto2024.In2025, guerrillagroups – includingELNandFARCdissidents

21 https://www.context.news/socioeconomic-inclusion/international-aid-cuts-hobble-drive-to-declare-zimbabwe-mine-free

22 https://www.breitbart.com/border/2026/02/15/cbp-cartels-few-42000-drones-near-u-s-border-in-fy25/amp/

23 https://www.the-express.com/news/world-news/178972/Mexican-cartel-Ukrainian-drones

24 https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/michoacan-authorities-deactivated-improvised-explosive-devices/

25 https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/car-bomb-police-station-michoacan

– launchedover8,000drone-basedstrikes,resultingin 20deathsandnearly300injuries.DefenseMinister PedroSancheznotedthatarmedgroupshave perfectedriggingcheap,off-the-shelfcommercialand agriculturaldroneswithimprovisedexplosivesto create‘kamikaze’or‘bomber’units.Militaryintelligence suggeststhesegroupsreceivedtrainingindrone warfarefromforeignarmedentities.Tocounterthis threat,theColombianarmyunveileditsfrstdrone battalioninlate2025toperformbothoffensiveand defensiveoperations.

InJanuary2026,theColombiangovernment implementedanewdecreetorestricttheimportationof drones,directlyrespondingtoasignifcantsurgein theiruseforexplosiveattacksbyguerrillagroups.26 Thedecreerestrictstheimportofdronesviapostal traffcandexpressshipmentservices.Legaldrone importsarenowfunnelledthroughonlytwohighsecuritycustomshubs:theElDoradoInternational AirportinBogotaandthePortofCartagena.Travellers mustformallydeclareanydronesuponarrival,and commercialimportersarerequiredtoprovideadvance documentationtoensurefulltraceability.27

INTHISEDITION

InahighlytopicalandinformativearticlefromScanna MSC,“EnhancingPortableX-rayImagingforModern EOD,IEDDandUXOOperations”theauthorexplains thecriticalnecessityforportableX-raysystemsin today’sconfictzones–particularlythecurrentwarin Ukraine–forEODteamsfacingtheconstantthreatsof IEDs,UXOandotherERW.Suchsystemsprovide imagingtechnologiesthatarerapid,safeand interoperable.Thearticledescribesthelatestversatile advancesinScanna’sComputedRadiography(CR) andDirectRadiography(DR)systems,andhow Scanna’sScanSilcDRandScanXScoutCRsystems haveenhancedworkfoweffciency,operatorsafety andforensicdocumentation.Thepaperalsoexamines dual-modeimaging,roboticdeploymentand integrationwithNATO–standardsoftwareplatforms. TheauthoroutlinesImagingtheModernBattlespace andexplainstheexplosivethreatsfacingEOD operatorstoday,includingthewidespreaduseof booby-trapsleftbehindbyretreatingforces.Portable X-rayimagingprovidesasafeandnon-intrusivewayto identifypotentialhazardsonthebattlefeld.Twotypes ofradiographyaredescribed.ScanXScoutComputed Radiographythatusesreusablefexiblephosphor platesthatarescannedbyareadertoproducedigital images.ScanSilcDirectRadiographyemployssolidstatepanelsthatinstantlyconvertX-raysintoelectronic data.Heoutlinestherecurringoperationalproblems thatfaceEODteamstoday:shortexposurewindows, complexgeometries,communicationsconstraints, datasharingandforensiccontinuity.Heconcludesby outliningthecharacteristicsoftheScannacomputing systemsthatdirectlyaddresstheoperationalneedsof EODtechnicianstoday:Pulse-controlledimaging, Offinestorage-modecapture,Mesh-radiointegration, Pseudo–3Dvisualisation,Roboticcompatibility,Dual CR/DRcapabilityandDatainteroperability.

26 https://presoffministry.gov.mm/en/news/23909

Inamostinformativearticle,theSpanishtechnology EM&EGroupdescribetheiraunav.BEST,amediumsized,multi-role,unmannedgroundvehicle(UGV). ThishighlyversatileUGVisdesignedtooperateinthe mostdemandingofenvironmentsinordertoconducta varietyofcombatroles.Thearticlepointsoutthatthe openingofthefrstschoolsdedicatedtotrainingthe operatorsofunmannedgroundplatformsconfrmsthe recentdramaticchangesandtechnologicalevolution ofthreatsonthebattlefeldoftoday.UGVsarekeyto thereductionofrisk,theexpansionofcapabilitiesand protectionofhumanlivesinhostileenvironments. FormanyUGVstodaytherealchallengeisaccessing thethreatwhilstnavigatingmanifoldterrainand topographicaldifficulties.Theaunav.BESTis specifcallydesignedwiththesediffcultiesand challengesinmindtoundertakeavarietyofcombat roles:EOD,Counter-IED,CBRN,Counter-UAS,force protection,reconnaissanceandsurveillance,logistics

27 https://www.barrons.com/news/colombia-restricts-import-of-drones-used-in-explosives-attacks-bf72cd9f

supportandCASEVAC.Itweighslessthan400kgs andhasarangeofupto20kms.Toallowittonavigate themostchallengingterrainithasanadvanced operator-assistancesystem.Toensureoperator continuityinthemostcomplexenvironmentsits communicationsrangecanbeextendedvia-UAV basedrelaysinadditiontoRF-links.Itssizeandweight meanthatitiseasilytransportableacrossdiverse environments.Theaunav.BESToffersamost impressivecombinationofautonomy,versatility, comprehensivetechnologicalsupport,andoperator safetyinthemostdemandingscenariosonthe battlefeldtoday.

Inathought-provokingpaper“Quantifyingresidual riskinlandrelease”theauthorDrRobertKeeleyofRK Consulting(EOD)Ltdoutlinestheissuesrelatedtothe releaseforHumanitarianMineAction(HMA)ofland contaminatedbyexplosiveordnance(EO)andother ERWastheresultofconfict.Landreleasecanbe summarisedasameansofdeterminingwheremines andotheritemsofEOaren’t.Thus,landreleaseallows mineactionactivitiestofocusonareasthatareactually contaminated.Itisthereforeaneconomicprocessin thatithelpsmineactionprogrammestooptimisethe useofscarceresources,particularlyareaclearance. LandreleaseisnowdefnedinInternationalMine ActionStandards(IMAS)28 as:“…theprocessof applying“allreasonableeffort”toidentify,defne,and removeallpresenceandsuspicionofExplosive Ordnancethroughnon-technicalsurvey(NTS), technicalsurvey(TS)and/orclearance.”Thepaper defnesriskandresidualriskandintroducesthe conceptofanaccidentprofleandidentifesactions thatcanreducethelikelihoodofEOaccidents.The paperthenintroducestheprincipleof‘CircularError Probability’(CEP)alreadyusedinmilitaryoperations researchasawayofquantifyingaccuracyofweapon systemssuchasaircraftbombsandartillery.The authoropinesthatCEPanalysiscouldbeusedto identifythe‘sixsigma’(oneinamillion)pointof contaminationinclustermunitionordenseminefeld contamination.Thepapermakesthepointthat‘Onein

28IMAS04.10SecondEdition(Amendment12,October2024)

amillion’isawidelyacceptedresidualriskinother sectors,suchasthenuclearpowerindustryandthe insurancesector.Theauthorpointsoutthatitis possibletoquantifyresidualriskinHMAusingthe approachofothersectorssuchasthenuclearindustry. Intheseandothersectorsitisdonebyidentifyingthe tolerableriskthresholdandthenanalysingprocesses toachievethisstandard.Itisalsopossibletousethe conceptofatolerableriskthresholdinthesame mannerasusedinhealtheconomicstomeasurethe riskofEOaccidentscomparedtoothercausesof deathorinjury.■

RobHyde-Balesbiography

DuringhiscareerintheUKRoyal Engineers, RobHyde-Bales was responsibleforlandmineclearance inLibyaand,morelatterly, Afghanistanintherunningofthe frstUnitedNationshumanitarian landmineclearancetraining programme–OperationSalam.The programmetrainedAfghanmalerefugeesinlandmine clearancetechniques,andAfghanwomenandchildren inmineawarenessandavoidancetraining.More recentlyhesetuptheCaribbeanSearchCentrein Kingston,Jamaica.TheCentreisdesignedtotrain securityforcesacrosstheCaribbeaninmodernsearch techniques.Afterretiringfromthearmyhejoined CranfeldUniversityatShrivenham,nearOxford,and undertookaresearchprojectonbehalfoftheUK MinistryofDefencethatexaminedwaystoimprovethe sharingofIEDthreatinformationbetweenthemilitary andcivilianorganisationsinhazardousareas.

“Sometimes,ifyouwanttochangeaman'smind,youhavetochangethemindofthemannexttohimfrst.”

(StevenKinginhisbook“11/22/63”,frstpublishedin2011)

Weshouldacceptthatthecurrentinternational environmentisnothavingoneofitsmostquiet andbalancedtimesaftertheSecondWorldWar… Althoughasignificantreductionofhostilities betweenIsraelandPalestinianmilitiashas beenevidencedduringthelastquarterof2025, thepotentialglobalimpactofthesituationinthe GazaStripandWestBankcontinuesbeing relevantregardingitsinfluenceovertheextremist violence.

A“perfectstorm”fortheSouthernOldWorld…

Nonetheless,theconvergenceoftheGazaconfictwith othergeopoliticalmattershasbeenrefectedinthe 2025fnalmetricsondetentions,attacksand

dismantledplotsrelatedtoreligiouslymotivated extremistviolenceinEuropeanandNorthernAmerican territories,whicharecurrentlyshowingasignifcant increaseascomparedwithpreviousyears.

Figure2:Operations/ detaineesforreligiouslymotivatedextremistviolenceinSpainin2025andearly2026. (Source:OIET)

Withoutanydoubt,theAfricancontinentisthe onewhichhassufferedtheworstofthethreat evolutionsduring2025:Nigeriahastheannual worldrecordconcerningattacks,whileSahelhas beentheareainwhichthenon-stateactorshave beengainingmoreterraincontrol,relevanceand opportunitiesforalternativegovernance…butthe restofAfricanregionsasaffectedbyirregularthreats havenotsignifcativelyimprovedtheirrespective situations.

RegardingMali,thesmartstrategyofblockageof themainsupplyroutestothecapitalandother relevanturbancentersbyJamāʿatnuṣratal-islām wal-muslimīn(JNIM)iscurrentlystranglingthe internationallyisolatedmilitaryjuntainpowerdueto dramaticallyrestrictingtheaccesstofuel.JNIMis alsothreateningthecapitalcityinBurkina-Faso, whileNigerisnotabletoeffectivelyfghtthe terroristthreat.

Ontheotherhand,theTuaregFrontforthe LiberationofAzawad(FLA)ispressingtheMalian governmentfromtheEastthroughaveryeffectiveuse ofnewtactics,techniquesandproceduresbytheuse ofexplosive-ladenfrst-personview(FPV)dronesin bothambushesandsurgicalattacks.

DuetothereturntohostilitiesbetweenDAESHin WestAfricaWilayat(ISWAP)andthetwomain remainingfactionsfromformerBokoHaram(JAS) groupinLakeChadBasin,thesituationinNigeria, CameroonandChadisfranklynotgood.

TheconfictsinSudanandDemocraticRepublicof Congoarestillcontinuing,whilethethreatbyDAESH Mozambiquehasbeengrowingduring2025andthe powerofAlShabaabinSomalia(whichisapparently havingcontactswithAnsarAllahinYemen)isgaining relevance,althoughtheweakenedDAESHSomalia hasbeensufferingfromthepressureoftheSomalian forcesassupportedbytheUnitedStates.

Figure3:Overalldistributionofnon-statearmedgroups(NSAGs)inWestAfrica. (Source:www.africacenter.org)

…althoughtheSouthernportionisalsonot “adequatelyprogressing”

WithregardstoCentralAsia,lastreports(tobefully confrmed)areindicatingapotentialsupporttoAl QaedaandotherterroristgroupsbytheIslamic RepublicofAfghanistan,alongwithacurrentlyprudent posturefromDAESHinKhurasananddisputes withPakistan.

Pakistanissubjecttothethreatposedbyseveral groups,fromwhichTehreekiTalibanPakistan(TTP)

istheclearlypredominantone,andalsoacting insideAfghanistan.

Meanwhile,theuseofimprovisedexplosivedevices (IEDs)continuesbeingnotableinMyanmar,wherethe insurgencyischallengingthegovernanceofthe militaryjunta:infact,itcurrentlyranksthirdworldwide (afterRussiaandUkraine)inreportedexplosive-laden droneattacks.

Figure4:OffcialclaimoftheattackbyDAESHKhurasaninKabulCityon19thJanuary2026. (Source:AmaqNewsAgency)

Figure5:Myanmarfghterspreparinganexplosive-ladendrone. (Source:X)

WouldtheNewWorldgiveusanyhoperegarding threatdynamics?

Althoughnotdirectlyrelatedtoreligiously motivatedextremistviolence,theUnitedStatesof AmericaisshowingasignifcantnumberofIEDrelatedincidentsyearafteryear.

MovingSouth,IEDsfromunmannedaircraft systems(UASs)isdramaticallygrowinginthehandsof drugcartels,bothagainsttheiropponentcartelsand thegovernmentsofMexicoandColombia.

(Source:www.smallwarsjournal.com)

Figure6:Explosive-ladendroneincidentsbymaincartelsinMexico,2021–2025.

Howabouttheterroristmarketing?Jihadist propagandadynamics

Althoughtheintensityinpropagandahasdecreased from2024,thethreatisstillalivealthoughless “propelled”byviolentmessaging.Infact,theamount ofinformationrelatedtoIEDsmanufactureanduse hasbeengrowingduring2025,andthenumberof detentionsanddismantledplotsinEurope,as connectedwiththatreligiouslymotivatedextremist violence,hasbeenalsohigherthanitwasduring 2024.

Oneofthemostrelevantchangesascompared withpreviousyearshasbeenevidentregardingthe hugedecreaseintheproductionofpropagandainthe EnglishlanguagebyDAESHinKhurasanWilayat(ISKP)throughtheirmediaoffceAl-AzaimFoundation. The46theditionof“VoiceofKhurasan”digital magazinewaslaunchedinJune2025,mostprobably duetothedetentionofaCanadiannationalbehinda multinationalcellofAl-Azaim…nonetheless,the

Figure7:Callforattacks byAlSaqriFoundation forMilitarySciences. (Source:Matrix,April2025)

Figure8:Capturefromthecoverof47thissueofthe digitalmagazine“VoiceofKhurasan”. (Source:Matrix)

AsianregionaloffcecontinuedproducingtheUrdu versionofthemagazine,andanewedition(47th) waspublishedon1stFebruary2026.

Andfinally,weshouldacceptthattheuseofIEDs inUkraineandRussiahasbeengrowingsince 2014.

Nowadays,itlooksliketheCounter-IEDapproach isnotonlystillvalidbutalsoessentialtoanticipate threatsaswellasassessinghowtoreduce,denyor impedethecapabilitiesofadversaryhuman networks.

Meanwhile,theweeklynewspublicationofthe DAESHnewsletter“AnNaba”hasbeenconsistently maintainedeveryThursdayduring2025and2026, intheaimofposingamoregraphicthanwritten sourceofinformationregardingtheoperationsas conductedbyDAESHallaroundtheworld.

AstheAfricancontinentistheareainwhich currentlytheattacksandterritorycontrolbyDAESH hasbeenmoreevident,therehasbeenanincrease inthecallingforsupportand“holy”migration(hijrah) toSahelarea.

Figure9:MetricsonDAESHoperationsduring2025byAmaqAgency.(Source:X,January2026)

Figure10:Coverof“INSPIREGUIDE11”.

(Source:RocketChat,September-November2025)

WithregardtoAlQaeda,theactivity hasbeenevidencedasmoredynamic thanitwasduring2024:therewere launchednewdigitalmagazines(e.g. “HIJRA”byAl-GhaziFoundationforMedia Productions)andeventhreeeditions(9th, 10th&11th)ofthe“INSPIREGUIDES”by AlMalahem.

Meanwhile,andalthoughbasedinside theoverallAQ“enterprise”,Jamāʿat nuṣratal-islāmwal-muslimīn(JNIM)has stablishedtheirowninfuencecampaign undertheleadershipofAzZallaqaover otherassociatedmediaoffces.

Figure11:Coverof“HIJRA”.

(Source:RocketChat,September-November2025)

Figure12:MetricsonJNIMoperations21December2025-19January2026byAzZallaqa (Source:Chirpwire,January2026)

InthespecifccaseofTehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP), theyarestillactiveintheproductionofposters,videos anddigitalmagazines,aswellasconductingarelevant numberofattacksinPakistanandneighbourcountries.

Figure13:MetricsonTTPoperationsduringJanuary2026. (Source:X,February2026)

Inthelightofthecurrentthreat dynamicsbynon-stateactors,itwould bestupidtounderestimatethe potentialrisksbehindthegainin relevanceandcallstoviolentactions bythosegroups.

Asasummary,theinfuence operationsbyreligiouslymotivated violentorganisationsseemstobe relativelydecreasingattheendof2025 andearly2026,butthecurrently evidencedpropagandacallingfor killingactionsandtheonlineresources neededforconductingattacksagainst theinterestsofWesterncountriesare posingarelevantthreat.

Nowadays,itlooksliketheCounterIEDapproachisnotonlystillvalidbut alsoessentialtoanticipatethreatsas wellasassessinghowtoreduce,deny orimpedethecapabilitiesofadversary humannetworks.■

“Trucesmaystopthebattles,butpartofyouwill alwaysfeellikeyou'reatwar.”

(DavidLevithaninhisbook“TwoBoysKissing”,frstpublishedin2013)

REFERENCES

•X(formerTWITTER)

•TELEGRAM

•FACEBOOK

•LINKEDIN

•VKONTAKTE

•MATRIX/ELEMENT

•Reutersagency

• https://jamestown.org/red-fort-blast-brings-urban-operationsto-india/

•@HKaaman

Disclaimer

Thisarticlewouldneverrepresenttheopinionofanynational ormultinationalorganization,soitswholecontentshouldonly beconsideredastheopinionfromtheauthor.Asallthe informationhasbeenobtainedfromopensources,potential mistakescouldhavebeenmadeduringtheresearch process.Pleasefeelfreetosendyourcomments, corrections,andinputstotheauthor;itwouldbehighly appreciated.

Figure14:CallforIEDonChristmasbyAlSaqriFoundation forMilitarySciences. (Source:Matrix,30DEC2026)

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

LieutenantColonelJoseMRufas graduatedfromthe SpanishArmyMilitaryAcademyin1993.Hewas commissionedintotheC-IEDCentreofExcellenceas HeadoftheDefeattheDeviceBranchinAugust2016 andcurrentlyholdsthepostofChiefofAttackthe NetworksBranch.AsaMilitaryEngineerOffcer,his backgroundhasbeenmainlybasedonExplosive OrdnanceDisposalactivitiesintheSpanishArmyand C-IEDstaffissuesatthemultinationalheadquarters.In additiontohisEODOperator/EODOffcereducation,he attendedsomeothermilitarycoursesincluding Parachuting,ArmyStaff,InformationOperations,War CollegeGeneral/JointStaff,MilitarySearch,Technical ExploitationOperations,WeaponsIntelligenceTeam, ExploitationLaboratories,HomemadeExplosivesand otherC-IEDcourses.Hisoperationalassignments includeBosniaandHerzegovina(3), Afghanistan(3),the RepublicofEcuador,IraqandUganda.

QUANTIFYINGRESIDUALRISKINLANDRELEASE

ByDrRobertKeeley,RKConsulting(EOD)Ltd

INTRODUCTION

Landreleaseallowsmineactionactivitiestofocuson areasthatareactuallycontaminated.Landreleaseis thereforeaneconomicprocessinthatithelpsmine actionprogramstooptimisetheuseofscarce resources,particularlyareaclearance.

Thepaperfrstdefnesriskand‘residualrisk’using establishedguidelinesfromothersectors.Itthen briefyexploreswhatcancauseresidualriskinland releaseactivities.Itidentifestheproblemwhensurvey techniquesarenotheldtothesamestandardas clearancetechniques.

Thepaperintroducestheideaofan‘accidentprofle’ andidentifesthethreedimensionsalongwhich variousactionscanbetakentoreducethelikelihoodof EOaccidents.

Thepaperthenintroducestheprincipleof‘Circular ErrorProbability’(CEP)alreadyusedinmilitary operationsresearchasawayofquantifyingaccuracy ofweaponsystemssuchasaircraftbombsand artillery.ThepaperpositsthatCEPanalysiscouldbe usedtoidentifythe‘sixsigma’(oneinamillion)pointof contaminationinclustermunitionordenseminefeld contamination.Thepapermakesthepointthat‘Onein amillion’isawidelyacceptedresidualriskinother sectors,suchasthenuclearpowerindustryandthe

insurancesector.Thiswouldallowthesectorto quantifytheresidualriskfromusing‘fade-out’ techniques.

Thepaperthenexplainshowthisprinciplecouldbe extendedtohelpquantifytheresidualriskimplicitin usingdogstoconductareareduction,supportedby fade-out.Itispotentiallyusableonallclustermunition strikesanddenselyminedareas,whichspeakstoits possiblescalability.Thepaperalsoreferstoalternative riskmanagementtechniqueswhereitisnotsuitable.

Additionally,thepaperpositstheuseofthesixsigmaconceptatastrategicleveltoidentifythe‘end state’fornationalmineactionprogramsintermsof casualtynumbers,thusprovidinganobjectivemeans tojustifycontinuedsupportforcountriesthatare continuingtoexperienceEOcasualties.

Finally,thepaperbriefysummarisesthepractical researchanddataanalysisthatwouldbeneededto establishandconfrmthe‘groundtruth’ofthe‘six sigma’approachtoquantifyingresidualriskfromland release.Theresearchanddataanalysismethods requiredareeminentlyfeasibleastheybuildon establishedtechniquesfromothersectors(although theyarenotcurrentlyemployedinhumanitarianmine action).

BACKGROUND

Landreleaseasaconceptwasfrstwrittenaboutina 2004evaluationreportonmineactioninCambodia1.It canbesummarisedasameansofdeterminingwhere mines(andotheritemsofexplosiveordnance(EO) aren’t.Thus,landreleaseallowsmineactionactivities tofocusonareasthatareactuallycontaminated.Land releaseisthereforeaneconomicprocessinthatit helpsmineactionprogramstooptimisetheuseof scarceresources,particularlyareaclearance.Land releaseisnowdefnedinInternationalMineAction Standards(IMAS)2 as:

“…theprocessofapplying“allreasonable effort”toidentify,defne,andremoveall presenceandsuspicionofExplosive Ordnancethroughnon-technicalsurvey[NTS], technicalsurvey[TS]and/orclearance”.

AIM

Theaimofthispaperistointroduceanewapproachto quantifyingresidualriskinhumanitarianmineaction (HMA),buildingonmethodsalreadyusedinother sectors,andproposingfurtherstudy.

DEFININGRISK

Inordertoquantifyresidualrisk,itisfrstnecessaryto defneriskandsetoutwhatismeantbyresidualrisk. Peopleoftenusetheterms‘risk’,hazard’and‘threat’ interchangeably.However,riskisamathematical conceptandassuchhasaformaldefnition.IMAS 04.103 givesaversionofthatdefnition,whichittakes fromISOGuide51:1999:

A“combinationoftheprobabilityofoccurrence ofharmandtheseverityofthatharm”.

Expressedformally,thistakesthefollowingform:

R=f(ip,os)

WhereR=risk,ipistheprobabilityoftheincidence and os istheseverityoftheoutcome.

Practicallyspeaking,riskcanalsobeconsidereda functionofhazardplusactivity:itdoesn’tmatterhow contaminatedanareaisifnobodygoesthere(froma riskperspective).

IMASalsosuggestsaminimumstandardfor clearance.Itdefnesaclearedareaasfollows:

“Adefnedareaclearedthroughtheremoval and/ordestructionofallspecifedEOhazards toaspecifeddepth” 4

Clearancedoestwothings:itremovestheEO hazardandallowstheproductiveuseoftheland.Ifitis acceptedthatEOriskisafunctionofhazardand activityitfollowsthatanyformof‘roughandready’ clearanceactuallyincreasesrisk.Peopleareatzero riskfromEOiftheydon’tenteracontaminatedarea. Enteringanareathathas,forexample,onlyhad80% ofitscontaminationremovedmeanstheriskisgreater thanzero.

Quantitativedefnitionsofresidualriskexistin industry.Thereisagenerallyacceptedruleofthumb thatatolerableresidualriskisof1:1,000,000peryear 5 Twoprinciplesareunderstoodintheconceptof residualrisk:

•Evenwhentheriskistolerable,itmustbereduced toalevelwhichisaslowasreasonablypracticable (ALARP).

•Apointisreachedatwhichtheriskis,orhasbeen made,sosmallthatnofurtherprecautionis necessary.

1 JointEvaluationofMineActioninCambodiafortheDonorWorkingGrouponMineAction.RGriffnandRKeeley,December2004. See https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/1154/?utm_source=commons.lib.jmu.edu%2Fcisr-globalcwd%2F1154&utm_ medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages 2IMAS04.10SecondEdition(Amendment12,October2024) 3Ibid.

4Ibid.

5 Seeforexample: https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/graphiteknowledgebase/wiki/Guide_to_Graphite/Tolerability%20of%20Risk%20 the%20ALARP%20Philosophy.aspx

WhatcancausetheretobearesidualEOrisk?

Inordertoquantifyresidualrisk,itisimportantto understandwhatcancauseit.Therearethreemain circumstanceswhichcanmaketheresidualriskinan areadeclaredclear.Thesearediscussedbelow.

•Poormapping.Thiscoversasituationwherethe contaminatedareahasnotbeenadequately defned.Thiswillbeexploredinaseparatepaper.

•Poorclearance.Thiscoversasituationwhere clearanceprocessesdonotproduce‘clearedland’ withinthedefnitionsetoutinIMAS.Onemight expectaccreditationandqualitymanagement processestoaddressthisrisk.

•Deepburieditems.Perhapsthemainlikelyresidual riskiswhereitemsofEOareburieddeeperthanthe depthspecifedinnationalstandards.Thiscan happenforseveralreasonsbutincludesdeep buriedprojectiles,mortarsoraircraftbombsthatare outsidethedetectiondepthofstandardmine detectors.Thiscanbemanagedbycarefulscopeof worksoninfrastructureandconstructionsitestouse ‘bomblocation’techniquesonareassuchas buildingfoundationsthatneedtobeexcavated. Bombingdatacanhelppredictwheresuch precautionsmightbenecessary.

ResidualriskfromNTSandTS

However,assetoutabove,thereismoretolandrelease thanjustclearance.BothNTSandTSareimportant waystomakelandreleaseeffcientandachievable.

Whatsetsclearanceapartfromboththesesurvey techniquesisthatclearanceistheonlyoneofthethree thatalwaysinvolvesa100%searchofthetargetarea. Surveythusfacesapotentialdilemmawhichis summarisedinthematrixsetoutinTable1above.

ThematrixsetoutinTable1includestwopositive surveyresults:whenthesurveyaccuratelyreportsan areaasbeingclear,andwhenasurveyaccurately reportsanareaasbeingcontaminated.Thequestionof surveyeffciency–reportinganareaascontaminated wheninfactitisclear,can,itissuggested,be addressedbytraining–particularlyinboundarysetting. Previousexperiencesuggeststhatindividualsurveyors aresoconcernedthattheywillinadvertentlydeclare contaminatedareasclear,theywillinsteadmakethe boundariesofsuspectedhazardareassolargeasto makethesurveyresultslargelymeaningless.Improving theeffcacyofNTSisoutsidethescopeofthispaper.

Thisleavesthesituationwhenasurveyfailsto reportacontaminatedarea.Itraisesthefollowing question:dowehaveanyrighttodeclareanareaclear withdifferentstandardsofrisk?Itisheldthatwhatever themethodused,themineactionpractitionermust deliverlandofthesamestandardofresidualrisk regardlessofthemethodused.

Managingriskinlandrelease

TakingEOriskasbeingafunctionofafunctionof hazardandactivity,andaddingathirdelement,thatof behaviour,itispossibletounderstandEOriskinthree

dimensions,asshowninFigure1below.Itisthen possibletounderstandthesethreedimensionsas preconditionsforanaccidenttohappen(the‘accident profle’).Firstly,theremustbecontaminationpresent (thehazard),secondly,theremustbeareasonfor activitytotakeplaceonthecontaminatedland(usually aneconomicreasonforusingtheland)andthirdly,the at-riskpopulationmustexhibitaformofrisk-taking behaviour(asdefnedbyUNICEFin2005) 6

Figure1.ThethreedimensionsofEOrisk.Onlywherethe threepreconditionsareinplacewilltherebeanEOaccident.

Inturnthismodelhelpshighlightthatthereare threeaxesofactionthatcanbeundertakentoreduce risk.Firstly,ofcoursethehazardcouldberemoved, butitisalsopossibletoactontheothertwoaxes: EOREcanbeusedtohelpmodifybehaviourand livelihoodprogramming(notalwaysinthemineaction toolbox)canbeusedtoreducetheeconomicdemand fortheland.

Quantifyingresidualrisk

Threemethodsforquantifyingresidualrisk,andtheir likelyusecases,aredescribedbelow.

Fadeoutandtheprincipleofcircularerror probability(CEP)

Thismethodisparticularlyusefulinsurveyingcluster munitionstrikesorminedareas.Theaccuracyof ordnance,particularlyair-deliveredordnanceis describedintermsofitscircularerrorprobability (CEP).IfanaircraftaimsabombatpointX,theCEP willgiveastatisticalmeasureofthechanceofithitting thetarget.SeethedescriptionofCEPinBox1below.

CEPis defned astheradiusofacircle(n), centredonthemean,whoseboundaryis expectedtoincludethelandingpointsof 50%ofthe ordnance.Itisbasedona normaldistribution,where50%fallswithin aninnercircle(withradiusofn),afurther 43.7%willfallinthe‘middle’circle(with radius2n),andafurther6.1%willfallinthe outercircle(withradius3n).Thistotals 99.8%:theremaining0.2%are‘outliers’that falloutsidetheoutercircle.Seethe examplein Figure2

Box1.DefnitionofCircularErrorProbability(CEP)

Figure2.DistributionofordnancepredictedbyCEP.

6 https://reliefweb.int/report/world/imas-mine-risk-education-best-practice-guidebook-1

Mineactionprogramsgeneratelargeamountsof data.Itisverycommontomarkthelocationofevery pieceofEOfoundduringareaclearance,asshownin Figure3(below).

Figure3.Anexampleofatacticalminefeld.Thewooden stakesmarkwheremineswerefound.

Puttingthesetwoelementstogether,itcanbe possibletoplotthedistributionofdistancesbetween anytwopiecesofEO.Oncethesedistancesare compiled,itispossible,usinganExcelspreadsheet,to calculatethemeanandthestandarddeviation (σ). The standarddeviationisameasureofvariancefromthe mean.Usinganormaldistribution,sixstandard deviationsfromthemeanwillcapture99.9999998%of theitems:inotherwords,withafadeoutdistanceof6 σ thechancesofanitemfallingoutsidethefadeoutarea islessthan1:1,000,000–i.e.withinstandardmeasures ofresidualrisk.

TwoworkedexamplesareshowninTable2.Inthe frstexample,theitemsofEOformadensepattern;in thesecond,theyaremorewidelyspread.Theoptimal fadeoutdistanceiscalculatedforeachexample.Thisis moreaccuratethanthecurrent‘ruleofthumb’method usedthatcanbefoundinmanymineactionprograms.

Limitations7

Thismethodcanbeappliedtoclustermunitionstrikes andtolarge,comparativelydenseminedareas.Its suitabilitydecreaseswithfewerdatapoints.Thus,in areaswherecontaminationistypicallyoneortwo minesplacedtoharass(sometimesreferredtoas

Table2.Workedexamplesofstandarddeviation

7ThankstoDrRussellGasserfordiscussiononstatisticalanalysis.

‘nuisance’mining)itwon’tbepossibletousethis method.However,assetoutabovetherearethree dimensionstoEOrisk,oneofwhichis‘activity’.Itis possibletouseNTStechniquestoidentifywhya populationwantstoaccessaparticularareaandusea project-orientedapproachtoclearingland.

Thisproject-orientedapproachisdiscussedinmore detailinaseparatepaperbytheauthor8.

Residualriskforareareduction

Thefrsttooldescribedaboveisusefulwhendealing withaconfrmedhazardousarea(CHA).Itisless helpfulwhenasuspectedhazardousarea(SHA) needstobeinvestigated,orwhentheboundaryofa CHAcannotbeeasilydefnedoriswithinalarger SHA.Insuchacaseamineactionprogrammaywish touseanareareductionmethodologysuchasdogs (perhapswithmachinesasgroundpreparationsothat thedogscangainaccess).Numerousincidentsinthe pasthaveshownthatdogsandmachinesarenot totallyreliableasprimarysearch/ clearancetechniques,butitmaybe lessthandesirabletouseslowmanual areaclearancetechniquestofxthe boundariesofaCHA.

Nevertheless,itispossibletoutilise areareductiontoolsusingthesame fadeoutprincipledescribedabove. Consideranareaalreadyidentifedby NTS(withindirectindicatorsof contamination)as‘probablymined’,or anSHAwhichisbelievedtohaveaCHA withinitwhoseboundariesare undefned.Ifdogsareusedtosearchall thatarea(perhapsfollowingmachines) andreducethatarea,theycanbe expectedtodefneaboundaryforthe CHA.Theareawithinthenewboundary includesthe‘defnitelymined’CHA.The areaoutsidethenewboundarybut withintheareaidentifedbytheNTScan

bedescribedashavingoriginallybeenhypothesisedas beingcontaminatedbutnowtheevidencefromthedog search.However,asstatedabove,thereisthequestion ofwhethertheeffcacyofthedogsearch(its‘sensitivity; instatisticalterms)issuffcienttoconfrmthatthe reducedareaisnowsafetothesamestandardasmight beestablishedbymanualdemining.Thiscanbe resolvedbyusingthesame‘fade-out’processdescribed above.TheouterboundaryofAreaAinFigure4below representsanareaidentifedas‘possiblymined’during anNTS.AreaBrepresentsanareaidentifedasbeing ‘defnitelymined’bydogs.Inthisexample.Acentreline XX1 isestablished,andtheareaisthenclearedtoa distanceestablishedbythefade-outprocessdescribed above.InthiscaseareaYrepresentsthetotalarea searchedbymanualdeminers.Theresidualriskcan nowbequantifedas1:1,000,000.Notethattheentire arearepresentedbyA-Bissearched:thisisnota samplingtechnique.

Figure4.Using'fade-out'tocheckareareduction.

8 ‘Infrastructureandcommercialprojects:EOclearanceandriskmanagement’ byDrRKeeley.Publishedin ‘Counter-IEDReport’,April2025.

Casualtynumbersandastrategicperspectiveon residualrisk

Thetwopreviousexamplesshowhowaquantifedrisk threshold,basedonlevelsacceptedinothersectors (i.e.1:1,000,000)canbeusedonasitetoidentifythe boundariesofacontaminatedarea.However,itisalso possibletousethisconceptatastrategiclevel. Resourcespermitting,everyoneinthemineaction sectorwouldliketoseecasualtiesfromminesand otherEOreachingzero.However,resourcesdon’t alwayspermitthisandevenwheretreatyobligations canbemet,thereremainsthehazardposedbyother formsofEO.Contaminatedcountrieshavecompeting requirementsonfunds.Eveninnoncontaminatedcountries,itisn’t possibletohaveaninfnitenumberof ambulancesorkidneymachines.This questionoftheallocationofscarce resourcesisacoreissueinhealth economics.

ConsidertheexampleofLao People’sDemocraticRepublic(Lao PDR).LaoPDRhasapopulationofjust under8millionpeople9.Accordingto theLandmineMonitor,LaoPDR suffered47casualtiesin202310.Using thesame1:1,000,000riskthreshold,47 is6timesgreaterthanthetolerable risk.Thissupportsthecasefor continuedfundingoftheUXOprogram inLaoPDR.Achievinganational UXOriskthresholdinLaoPDRof 8 casualtiesperyearcouldbe considereda‘frstorder’target.Butnot allprovincesarecontaminated.The tableatTable3disaggregatesboth populationandcasualtiesusing2023 data.Thus,asecondordertargetcould beidentifedbyapplyingthesamerisk thresholdtothepopulationof the

sevenprovincesthathadsufferedcasualties,i.e.3per year(whichisnearly1/16thofthecurrentcasualty rate).Thecalculationincolumn(e)ofthetableshows therelativeriskexposureineachprovinceandis foundbydividingthecasualtynumberbythe populationsize.Thiscontrolsfordifferencein populationsizes,althoughitcanbeseeninthecase ofLaoPDRin2023thatXiengkhuangprovincehad boththelargerabsolutecasualtynumbersandthe largestrelativeriskexposure.Quantifyingtherelative riskexposureissuggestedasausefulwayof allocatingresourcesinanationalmineaction program.

=I2&language=en 10 https://the-monitor.org/country-profle/lao-pdr/impact?year=2023

WHATNEXT?

Firstly,itwouldbenecessarytoconductdata analysisoffndstoconfrmtheapplicabilityofthe CEPprincipletocontamination.Ideallythiswouldbe donebysecondarydataanalysis,inprograms wherethelocationsofthe‘yellowpickets’were adequatelyrecorded.Wherethereareinsuffcient records,itwouldbenecessarytoworkwithwilling clearanceorganisationstofacilitatetherecordingof adequatedata.

Secondly,asimilardataanalysiscouldbe conductedonthecombinationofareareductionby dogssupportedbyfade-outclearancetoincreasethe understandingofdog’sabilitytoestablishaboundary ofcontaminatedareas.Thisshouldallowtheresidual riskofusingdogsforareareduction,andany necessarybufferzone,tobequantifed.

Finally,theconceptofresidualcasualtiescouldbe animportantwaytohelpquantifyan‘endstate’for nationalmineactionprograms,especiallyinsituations ofscarceresources.Itissuggestedthatthiscouldbe asubjectforadiscussionbetweendonorsandnational mineactionprograms.Itmaythereforebeusefulto facilitateaworkshoptoallowsuchdiscussions.

CONCLUSIONS

ItispossibletoquantifyresidualriskinHMA,borrowing approachesfromothersectors,suchasthenuclear industry.Intheseothersectorsitisdonebyidentifying thetolerableriskthreshold(whichiscommonlysetat 1:1,000,000)andthenanalysingprocessestobesure thatthisstandardcanbemet.Borrowingagainfrom theestablishedCEPtechniqueandapplyingstatistical analysistoEOdistributionpatternsitshouldbe possibletoestablishaquantifable‘fade-out’whenthe riskofanitembeingoutsidethatpatternislessthan 1,000,000.Thistechniquecannotreliablybeappliedto areaswithverylow-densitycontaminationbut understandingriskasafunctionofhazard,activityand behaviourallowstheuseofaproject-oriented clearanceapproachtominimiseriskinsuch circumstances.

Moreresearchcouldbedoneonidentifying minimumdatasetsandonindependentresearchof

dogstoestablishareplicablemeansofmeasuring their‘sensitivity’(inthestatisticalratherthanthe olfactorysense).

Finally,itisalsopossibletousetheconceptof tolerableriskthresholdinthesamemannerasusedin healtheconomicstomeasuretherelativeriskofEO accidentscomparedtoothercausesofinjuryordeath. Inthiswayitcanhelpjustifycontinuedexpenditureon HMAprogramsandalsohelpwithallocationofmine actionresourcesataprovinciallevel.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Dr.RobertKeeley isaformer BritishArmyBombDisposalOffcer activeinhumanitarianand commercialmineactionand explosiveordnancedisposal(EOD) since1991.Hehasworkedin numerouscountriesandforseveral governmentsandinternational organisations.Hespecializesinprojectdesign, evaluation,andqualityassuranceofallaspectsofmine actionandhashelpedshapetheemerging humanitarianimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED) sector.Dr.KeeleyisamemberoftheInstituteof ExplosivesEngineers,aMemberoftheInternational AssociationofBombTechniciansandInvestigators, andisaFellowoftheRoyalGeographicalSociety.He holdsaPhDinAppliedEnvironmentalEconomics;his thesiswason“theEconomicsofLandmineClearance.”

ContactInformation

Dr.RobertKeeley,Director,RKConsulting(EOD)Ltd Ashford,Kent,UnitedKingdom Bobkeeley@rk-consulting.net www.rk-consulting.net

THEROLEOFUGVS INMODERNWARFARE

By aunav aregisteredtrademarkofEM&EGroupforAutonomousRoboticSystems(RAS) andUnmannedGroundVehicles(UGVs)

Recentnewsreportsontheinaugurationofthe frstschoolsdedicatedtotrainingoperatorsof unmannedgroundplatformsconfrmingtherevolution takingplaceinwarfareandthetechnologicalevolution ofthreats.

Inthisnewoperationallandscape,unmanned groundvehicles(UGVs)havebecomekeytoolsfor reducingrisk,expandingcapabilities,andpreserving humanlives,especiallyinhigh-threatenvironments.

THECHALLENGEISNOTONLYTONEUTRALIZE THETHREAT,BUTTOREACHIT

DespitethewiderangeofUGVsavailabletoday,many fallshortwhenexposedtotherealdemandsofthe operationalenvironment.

Toooften,thetruecostbecomesevidentonlyafter deployment:operatorsthatmustdividetheirattention betweenthemissionandtherobot’sownsurvival, preventingrollovers,managinginstability,avoiding obstacles,oracceptingthattheplatform’sgeometry simplydoesnotallowaccesstothetargetarea.

Intheseconditions,thedefningchallengeisnotthe neutralizationofthethreat,buttheabilitytoreliably reachitunderoperationalconstraints.

AUNAV.BEST:DESIGNEDFORREAL OPERATIONALDEMANDS

Inthiscontext,aunav.BEST,developedbyEM&EGroup, wasconceivedasaresponsetothisoperational requirement,identifedduringArmyevaluationsof unmannedsystemsintendedforfrontlinedeployment, wheretroopmovementisextremelydangerous, particularlyduetoaerialthreats.

Conceivedasamedium-heavy,multi-mission UGV,aunav.BESTprioritizesmobility,stability,and adaptabilityascoredesignprinciples.Thisdesign approachsupportssustainedaccesstotheoperational areaacrossdiversemissioncontextssuchas EOD/C-IED/CBRN,C-UAS,forceprotection, reconnaissanceandsurveillance,logisticalsupport,or casualtyevacuation(CASEVAC),whilekeepingthe platformdeployableandmanageable,withaweight under400kgandanoperationalrangeofupto20km.

LESSCOGNITIVELOAD,GREATERMISSIONFOCUS

Inhigh-riskoperations,operatorsshouldnotbefocused onhowtomovetherobot,butonwhatishappeningin theenvironment.Toachievethis,aunav.BESTintegrates anadvancedsetofoperator-assistancesystems:

•Variable-geometrysystem allowing adjustmentofplatformwidth

•Stablecenter-of-gravitysystem thatmaintainsthecenterofgravityin itssafestposition

•Horizontalplatformsystem with auto-levelingonslopesanduneven terrain

•Stairandrampclimbingmode automaticallyadaptingthefippers

•Out-of-coveragemode withautomaticreturntosignalrecoverypoint

•Autonomousnavigationand environmentself-discovery, generatingreal-time3Dmaps

•Anti-rolloverandanti-collision systems,bothagainstobstacles andself-collision

Thesefeaturesallowtheoperator tofocusfullyonthemission, improvingdecisionqualityand enhancingexecutionsafety.

ONEPLATFORM,MULTIPLE MISSIONS

Oneofaunav.BEST’skeystrengths isitsmulti-platformapproach,based onmissionmodulesandPlug& Playtechnology,enablingrapid reconfgurationaccordingto operationalneeds.

•EOD/C-IED/CBRNMissions

Forexplosiveordnancedisposaland CBRNenvironments,aunav.BEST incorporatesa7-degree-of-freedom electricroboticarmwithalifting capacityexceeding150kg,integrated weightmeasurement,andspecialized sensors.Thisconfgurationenables identifcation,manipulation,and neutralizationtaskswhilekeepingthe operatoroutsidethedangerzone.

aunav.BESTinEOD/C-IED/CBRNconfguration

•ForceProtection Missions

Inforceprotectionand directsupportmissions, aunav.BESTcanintegrate theGUARDIANASPIS® remoteweaponstation, featuringdualstabilization inelevationandazimuth, andcompatiblewith5.56 mmor7.62mmcaliber weapons.Thissystem providesdeterrence, coverage,andremotefre capabilities,protecting criticalsectorswithout exposingpersonnel.

aunav.BESTinForceProtectionconfguration

•LogisticalSupportandCASEVACMissions

Forlogisticalsupportandcasualtyevacuation, theplatformcanbeconfguredwithalogistics basketcarryingupto300kgwithintegrated weightdetection,aswellasanevacuation stretcher.Thissetupenablesresupplyofhighriskareasandcasualtyevacuationwithout compromisingforcesafety.

•C-UAS Missions

Inresponsetotheproliferationofdronesand UAS,aunav.BESTcanintegrateaground surveillanceradar,providingactivedetection capabilitiesfromamobileplatform.Its repositioningcapabilityandnetworked operationwithotherUGVsenablethecreation ofdistributeddetectionsystemswith360° panoramiccoverageandenhancedoperational survivability.

MULTIPLEINTEGRATEDCOMMUNICATIONSYSTEMS

Toensureoperationalcontinuityincomplex environments,communicationrangecanbeextended viaUAV-basedrelaysinadditiontoRFlinks.

Asanalternativeorcomplement,theUGVcanbe equippedwithaKevlar-reinforcedfber-opticreelofupto 10km,providingahighlyreliable,interference-resistant link,recommendedtomaximizemissionautonomy.

LOWLOGISTICFOOTPRINT,EASY TRANSPORTABILITY

Designedwithlogisticalconstraintsinmind, aunav.BESTminimizesdeploymentburdenthrough optimizedweightandcompactdimensions.

Theplatformcanbetransportedonatrailer compatiblewithlightmilitaryvehicles,enabling rapid,fexibledeploymentacrossdiverseoperational scenarios.

ONEPLATFORM.MULTIPLECAPABILITIES

Inanunpredictableoperationalenvironment,thetrue advantageliesinhavingasystemcapableofadapting toanyscenario,integratingmultiplecapabilitiesintoa singleplatform,andreducingoperatorworkload.

Withaunav.BEST,thecombinationofautonomy, versatility,andtechnologicalsupportextends operationalreach,improvespersonnelsafety,and ensureseffectivenesseveninthemostdemanding scenarios.■

ABOUTEM&EGROUP

EM&EGroup isaleadingSpanishgroupinthe engineeringandmanufacturingofcomplexDefense andSecuritysystems,distinguishedbyitshigh investmentininnovation,itscommitmenttojob creation,andthedevelopmentofdualtechnologies, withaspecialinterestinincorporatingAIintoits solutions.Thegroup'ssystemsincluderemoteland andnavalstations,ammunitionguidancesystems, electro-opticalsurveillancesensors,androbotic systems,amongothers.Inaddition,thegrouphasa subsidiary,EM&EElectronics,focusedondeveloping electronicsandphotonics.Withsolutionsinmore than25countries,EM&EGrouppostedaturnoverof over€355millionin2024andcurrentlyemploysover 1,700people.Findoutmoreat: https://eme-es.com/

AnaCitoler–ProductManagerataunavbyEM&E

Accompanying events include, among others:

• National Police Headquarters Conference “Together towards a safe future – the role of the Police in a changing world”

• Civil Protection and Strategic Reserves Exhibition STRATEXPO

• Presentations of the latest equipment and gear for uniformed services

ENHANCINGPORTABLEX-RAYIMAGING FORMODERNEOD,IEDDANDUXOOPERATIONS

ByScannaMSC

Abstract

PortableX-raysystemsarecriticaltoolsforExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal(EOD)teamsrespondingtoimprovisedexplosive devices(IEDs),unexplodedordnance(UXO),andexplosiveremnantsofwar(ERW).Therapidevolutionofconfictzones, suchasUkraine,whereoperatorsaredealingwithdronedelivereddevicesandmunitionsabandonedintrenches,has drivendemandforimagingtechnologiesthatarefast,safe,andinteroperable.ThisarticlediscussesadvancesinComputed Radiography(CR)andDirectRadiography(DR)andhowScanna’sScanSilcDRandScanXScoutCRX-raysystems enhanceworkfoweffciency,operatorsafety,andforensicdocumentation.Featuressuchassingle-pulseand programmablepulse-trainimaging,offinestorage-modeacquisition,andsecuremesh-radiocommunicationenable effectivestandoffassessmentandreducetimeontarget.Thepaperalsoexaminesdual-modeimaging,robotic deployment,andintegrationwithNATO-standardsoftwareplatformstoimprovemissiontempoanddatasharing.

INTRODUCTION: IMAGINGTHEMODERNBATTLESPACE

AcrossEasternEuropeandotherconfictregions,EOD operatorsfaceanewgenerationofexplosivehazard scenarios:improviseddronescarryinggrenades,tripwiredammunitionboxes,andordnanceburiedwithin defensivepositionsortrenches.Onenotablereport documentedtheuseofanimalcarcassesriggedwith explosivesanddroppedbydronesbyRussianforcesin Ukraine1.Similarly,laptopsleftbehindbyretreating unitshavebeenbooby-trappedwithplasticexplosives andballbearings.Otherriggeddevicesincludepower banks,portableradios,carbatteriesandprintersor anythingthattroopsmightexpecttoprovidethemwith enemyintelligence.Thesethreatsfrequentlyappearin unstablestructuresorinthefeld,oftenunderenemy

observation.Directmanipulationisrarelysafe.Serhii Beskrestnov,aUkrainianmilitaryconsultant,reported that‘theyshouldexercisecautionwhendealingwith electronicsleftbehindbyRussiantroops’.X-ray equipmentinthesesituationscanprovidevaluable informationonthesafetyofitemsencountered.

PortableX-rayimaginggivesoperatorsanonintrusivewaytoidentifyinternalcomponents,confrm safe-to-movestatus,andguideneutralisation techniques.Modernsystemsmustcombinespeed, reliability,andoperatorprotectionwhileproducing forensic-gradeimagerysuitableforintelligenceand prosecution.Thechallengeistoobtainclear,actionable imageswhileminimisingtimeinthedangerareaand maintaininginteroperabilitywithalliedpartners.

1 https://defensemirror.com/news/39601, https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/rosiyany-nachynyayut-tushi-zviriv-vybuhivkoyu-dlya-skydu-z-droniv/#google_vignette

DualCR-DRX-rayimagingtechnology,poweredbyasingleScanViewXplatform.

EVOLUTIONOFPORTABLEX-RAYTECHNOLOGY

ThetransitiontoComputedRadiography(CR)andDirect Radiography(DR)revolutionisedX-rayimaginginthe feld,butusershadtochoosewhichtechnologytofavour.

•CRusesreusablephosphorplatesthatare scannedbyareadertoproducedigitalimages.

•DRemployssolid-statepanelsthatinstantly convertX-raysintoelectronicdata.

ThechoicebetweenCRandDRdependsonthe missionenvironment,mobility,decontamination requirements,andbudgetconstraints.Recognising that,Scannaisoneofthefewmanufacturerstooffer dualtechnologysystemstoallowtheusertoselectthe detectorplatetechnologysuitedtotheirtaskwhilstonly needingonecontrollerandsoftwareplatform.

IntegratingperfectlywithbothCRandDRimaging platesareGolden’srangeofpulsedX-raygenerators XRS-200(150kV),XRS-3(270kV),andXRS-4(370kV), whichprovideabattleprovencapability,withmany decadesofsafeandreliableusewithnumerousEOD forcesworldwide.Theirlatestmulti-directionalmodels offeringcompact,lightweight,battery-powereddesigns withstrongpenetration,minimaloperatorsettingsand minimalexclusionzonescontinuetoleadtheway.

OPERATIONALREALITIESINEODANDUXO TASKS

EODteamsinconfictareasfacerecurringoperational problems:

•Shortexposurewindows–operatorsshouldaimto minimizetimeontarget,particularlywhenatriskof hostilefre.

•Complexgeometries–objectshiddeninwalls,under vehicles,orbeneathcollapsedstructuresdemand fexibledetectors.

•Communicationsconstraints–interference,jamming, orterraincanlimitWi-Firange.

•Datasharing–teamsrequireinteroperableimagery thatintelligencecellscananalyseremotely.

•Forensiccontinuity–evidencecollectionanddigital record-keepingareessentialforpost-incident analysisandwar-crimesdocumentation.

Booby-trappedlaptopsfoundinfrontlineareasof Ukraineillustratethebeneftofhighcontrast,high resolutionX-rayimaging.CRimageplatesprovide 50micronqualityimagesandDRplatestypically 140-76micronsdependentonthesizeoftheplate. Successfultasksbeneftfromsystemssuchas Scanna’sthatdeploywiththeminimalofoperational

ScanSilc3643UDRruggedX-raysystemwithlightweightXR150pulsedX-raysource.

WirefreeX-rayplateinstorageallowscollectionof300X-rayimagesoffine.

complexity,andoffersingle-buttonenhancement flters,allowingoperatorstorapidlyassesswhether theycansafelyexploitalaptopforintelligence purposesorneedtoapplyrendersafeprocedures.

HostileenvironmentsalsorequirePortableX-ray systemsthatarerugged,resistanttochallenging environmentalconditions,lightweight,andadaptable whilepreservingdiagnosticimagequality.

PULSE-CONTROLIMAGING:SAFETYTHROUGH PRECISION

ModernpulsedX-raysourcesaresimpletosetupand allowtheoperatortocaptureaclearX-rayimageusing asinglepulse,minimisingexposuretobothradiation andthreat.Insensitivesituationssuchasboobytrappedelectronicsoranti-handlingdevices,this single-pulsecapabilitycanbedecisive.

Programmablepulse-trainimagingaddsfurther fexibility.Multiplelow-energypulsesthroughatarget,

workwelltoenhancecontrastandpenetrationwith minimalradiationforeachshot.Inthisway,operators canreviewlayereddetailsuchasbatterypacks, detonators,andfringcircuits,withoutincreasingrisk.

STORAGE-MODEOFFLINEIMAGING:REDUCING TIMEONTARGET

Scanna’sScanSilcDRintroducesanoffinestoragemodecapabilitythatallowsupto300X-rayimagesto becapturedwithoutanycablesorWi-Ficonnectionto theX-raysourceandwithoutanyconnectiontoa laptop/tablet.Operatorscansweepalocation,suchas atrenchlineorabandonedcommandpost,collecting X-raysofmultipleitemsbeforewithdrawingforimage downloadandanalysis.

InmodernbattlefeldEODpractice,thisis invaluable:

•Reducedexposure–lesstimenearsuspect ordnance.

ScanSilc36x43cmpanelusedforvehicleinspection

•Fasterclearance–multipleobjectscanbeimaged sequentially.

•Improvedforensicworkfow–datacanbe cataloguedandanalysedoncetheteamissafe.

This‘capturenow,analyselater’approachaligns withclearanceoperationsinhigh-riskzonessuchas Ukraine,whereabandonedorbooby-trappedpositions requireminimalpresenceinthedangerarea.

COMMUNICATIONSRESILIENCE:MESH-RADIO INTEGRATION

Whileshort-rangeWi-Fisuffcesforurbanpolicingin benignenvironments,militaryoperationsdemand longer,secureandrobustlinks.Scannasystemscan integratewithmilitarymeshradionetworks,enabling encrypted,low-latencyX-rayimagestobecollected andtransferredoverlongdistancesoraround obstacles,makingthemusefulinbothurbanor contestedenvironments.

Alternativelongdistancecommunicationsolutions suchasScanna’sScanWaverangeextender,allow real-timeimagerelayfromforwardoperatorsor roboticplatformsbacktotheoperator’slocation. Sincetheimagingsoftwareiscompatiblewithall compactandbody-wornWindowsdevices,theresult iscontinuoussituationalawarenessevenunder electronic-warfareconditions,withoutadditional cablingorinterfaceboxes.

MULTI-ANGLEIMAGINGANDPSEUDO-3D VISUALISATION

IEDsandmodifedmunitionsarerarelysymmetrical. Asingleimagemayconcealthetrueconfgurationof powerunitsortriggeringmechanisms.Bytaking sequentialexposuresfrommultipleanglesand replayingthemasashortloop,operatorsgaina pseudo-3Dperception.

ThistechniqueimprovesX-rayinterpretation andreducesmisidentifcationofbenignorthreat items.Italsoservesasatrainingtoolsincefeld imagescanbecompiledintolibrariestorefresh recognitionofinitiators,batteries,andswitching arrangementsencounteredintheatre.

ROBOTICINTEGRATION:EXTENDINGTHE STANDOFF

Wheretheriskofanti-handlingorboobytrapsishigh, remotedeploymentisessential.Scannahasworked withRCVmanufacturerstointegrateitsdetector handledirectlyintotheRCVmanipulatorarm.The X-raygeneratoristhenpositioned,fred,and withdrawnbytherobotusingitsnativemesh-radio linkfordatareturn.

Beneftsinclude:

•Eliminationofcablestrailingacrossthedanger zone.

•Fasterrepositioningbetweentargets,byreducing manualapproaches.

•ImmediateimagereviewattheICP.

•Reducedoperatorfatigueandexposure.

Recentfeldtrialshaveshownthatagilequadruped robotscancarryportableX-rayequipmenttosuspected

ScanSilcX-rayplateonquadrupedrobot.

X-rayofpipebomb.

IEDs,placeX-rayimagingpanelswithprecision, andstreamradiographsbacktoaremoteoperator. Anewclassofsoftwareplatformsnowmerges therobot’scameras,LiDARmappingandX-rayimages intooneinterface,oftenincludingVRteleoperation,so thatEODteamscaninspect,classifyandneutralise threatswithoutsendingpersonnelforward.Alldataare archivedforintelligenceandforensicanalysis,creating asafer,repeatableapproachtoCounter-EOworkin confictzones.

DETECTORTECHNOLOGIES:MISSION-LED CHOICE

ScanSilcDR–Real-TimeDigitalRadiography

Scanna’sScanSilcDRpanelrange – availablein 10x24cm,18x24cm,24x30cm,36x43cm,and 43x57cm – withdualandmulti-panelsystem confgurationsaffordsoperatorsmissionappropriate choice.Thechoiceofpanelsizescoversallbattlefeld missionswhetherit’sacompactpanelforagrenade, smallsuspectdeviceorbody-wornIEDoralarge format43x57cmpanelthatallowsaholdall, backpackorcabinbagtobeinspectedinasingle X-rayscan.

ScanSilcX-raypanelssharekeyattributesincluding:

•2cableorcablefreeoperation–noadditional interfaceorcommsboxrequired

•Imagein<10secondswithAutomaticExposure Adjustment

•Highsignal-to-noiseratioforfne detailindetonatorandcircuit regions.

•IP67water-anddust-resistant construction;one-metredroptested.

•Compatible with ScanView X softwareforpulsecontroland enhancement.

•IntegrateswithGovernment-toGovernmentXTKplatformfor multinationalsharing.

FormobileEODdetachments,ScanSilcDRdelivers thespeedandimmediacyneededwhendecisionsare timecritical.

ScanXScoutCR–FlexibleComputed Radiography

Forburied,obscured,oroddly-shapedtargets,the ScanXScoutCRsystemwith50micronresolution imagingremainsunmatched.Itslightweight,thin, phosphorplatescanbeslidbehindordnance, wrappedaroundpipework,ortapedtoirregular surfacesandcuttocustomsizesandshapes.

Advantagesinclude:

•Zerodead-areaforedge-to-edgehighresolution imaging.

•Platesavailableinmultiplesizesandcuttableto customshapes.

•Abilitytostitchmultipleplatesintoasingle exposureforlargeitems.

•Rugged,feld-readyplatereader–batterypowered, sub30-secondreadout.

•Cost-effectiveforhigh-volumeUXOclearance missions,duetotherelativelylowcostofCR platescomparedtoDRsystems.

IntheUkrainetheatre,aswithtrenches,anddronedelivereddevices,fexibleplatescouldprovide accesswhererigidpanelscannot.Insituationswhere electronicscanningisnotviable,singletimeuse chromographicflmcanbeusedasabackupalthough imagequalitymaybecompromised.

FlexibleCRX-rayplatesandlightweightXR150generatorusedwiththeScanXScoutsystem,carryinone handenablingX-raystobetakenindiffculttoaccessareas.

Dual-TechnologyAdvantage

BothsystemsoperatethroughthesameBritishdesigned ScanViewXsoftware,givingteamsaunifedinterfacefor CRandDRimaging,generatorcontrol,automatic exposure,imageenhancement,stitching,andreporting. Operatorscanswitchmodeswithoutretraining,choosing DRforspeedorCRforgeometryandreach.

IMAGINGINCONFINEDORCONTAMINATEDAREAS

Trenchsystems,basements,collapsedbuildingsand urbanrubbleimposeseverespaceconstraints.CR’s fexibleplatescanslideintovoidswhereDRpanels cannotftandareeasytowipedownandcosteffective tosacrifceifcontaminated.BecauseCRplateshave negligibleinactiveborders(deadareas),theycan recordedge-closeimageryofconcealedtriggers.

Incontrast,DRpanelsallowimmediateverifcation. Ifaninitialimageisunclear,theoperatorcanrefre fromasaferdistance,refningexposureinseconds.

Combined,CRandDRcovereverylikelyscenario, andwithhighlyagileroboticintegrations,thefullrange ofbattlefeldmissionscanbeaccomplishedscanning

intightundergroundspacestoopen-areadroneor vehicleinspections.

WheretheUkraineconfictisseeingextensiveuse ofanti-handlingboobytrapsincivilianinfrastructure andbattle-destroyedbuildings,thereisadistinct advantageforthesetypesoffexibleimagingsolutions.

SOFTWARE,TRAININGANDHUMANFACTORS

TheScanView Xplatformsupportsbothoperational imaging,trainingandreporting.Built-inoperator-assist algorithmsenhanceimagecontrasttorevealregions thatmayconcealdetonatorsorexplosiveswith minimalhumaninput,toreducetrainingburdenonthe operator.Incidentscanbestoredwithannotations, voicenotesandGPSinfowhereappropriate.

ForNATOandpartnernations,compatibilitywith freeissueG2GXTK(X-rayToolkit)softwareensures thattraininglibraries,imageannotations,andforensic metadataremainconsistentacrossalliedforces.The abilitytoaccesstheRECONIEDcomponentidentifcationlibrarystrengthensrecognitionskillsand enablescollaborativeintelligenceupdates.

X-rayofIEDtakenwithScanViewXsoftware.

WiretracingmodeinScanViewXsoftware.

Inclearanceoperationssuchasthosefollowing front-lineretreatsinUkraine,teamswithvarying experiencelevelsbeneftfromrapidupskillingand consistentimage-analysisstandards.

INTEROPERABILITYANDDATASECURITY

EODX-rayimageryincreasinglyformspartofwider joint-taskdatasystems.Scanna’splatformssupport secureencryption,standardfleformats(e.g.,JPG, TIFF,PNG,BMP,.DICOM),anddirectexportto command-and-controldashboards.Thissimplifes after-actionreview.

Asmentioned,Scanna’sportableX-raysolutionis designedtofitintoexistingmilitarycommunications andcommandworkflows.TheX-raypanellinkstoa meshruggedradiothatsendsimagesandtelemetry backtotheoperator’scontroller;additionalradios carriedbyteammatesormountedinvehiclescan extendthatlinkacrossbuildings,terrainorlong distances.Thosesameimagescanbesharedvia ATAKonbody-wornAndroiddevices,giving commanders,EODspecialistsandremoteanalysts thesamereal timepicturetodiscussandacton.All trafficisencryptedtopreserveoperationalsecurity, andthesystemisbuilttoworkwiththeradios,bodywornhandsetsandSOPsalreadyinuse,soX-ray imagesharingbecomesanothertrustedpieceof intelligencewithintheforce’smissionkit.

InoperationslikethoseinUkraineandthewider Europeanconfictzone,thiscapacitytosharedata seamlesslyacrossalliedorganisationssupportsboth tacticalresponseandstrategicintelligence.

FROMCLEARANCETORECONSTRUCTION

Beyondimmediaterender-safeactions,imaging supportslong-termclearanceandreconstruction.In post-confictareas,teamsfromNGOsandnational agenciesuseportableX-raysystemstoconfrm ordnancetypeandstatusbeforeexcavation,reducing accidentaldetonationsandspeedingredevelopment. CR’slowcostandportabilitymakeitidealforthese sustainedUXOandECmissions,whileDRadds effciencywhenrapidthroughputisneededatcentral collectionpoints.

LOOKINGAHEAD:AIANDASSISTEDDECISIONMAKING

Scannacontinuestoresearchartifcial-intelligence toolsthatcanautomaticallymarksuspectfeatures, detonators,batteries,withinX-rayimages.Such algorithms,trainedonextensiveEODimagelibraries, couldassistless-experiencedoperatorsandfurther shortendecisioncycles.Combinedwithmesh-radio connectivityandpseudo-3Dvisualisation,AI-assisted interpretationpromisesapowerfulstepforwardin battlefeldsafetyandeffciency.

CONCLUSION

Intoday’soperationalenvironment,fromurban counter-EOtowide-areaUXOclearance,time,safety, andinformationdominancedefnesuccess.Modern portableX-raysystemsarenolongerjustdiagnostic tools,theyareinformationnodesconnectingfront-line operatorstocommandandanalysisnetworks.

Scanna’sapproachcombinesprovenfeldreliability withinnovationthatdirectlyaddressestheneedsof EODpersonnel:

•Pulse-controlledimagingminimisesriskand optimisesexposure.

•Offinestorage-modecaptureacceleratesmultitargetassessment.

•Mesh-radiointegrationensuressecurelong-range connectivity.

•Pseudo-3Dvisualisationenhancesthreat recognitionandtraining.

•Roboticcompatibilityextendsthesafestandoff distance.

•DualCR/DRcapabilityprovidescompletemission fexibilitywithasinglesoftwaresolution.

•Datainteroperabilityguaranteesseamless collaborationanddatasharing.

Whetherexaminingpotentiallymodifedelectronic items,ordnancehiddenintrenchsystems,orverifying acacheforforensicexploitation,Scanna’sScanSilc DRandScanXScoutCRsystemsgiveEOD professionalstheclarityandconfdencetomake rapid,informed,andsafedecisionsinthehostile environmentsfacingthemtoday.■

8TH EDITIONOFTHENATOEOD DEMONSTRATIONSANDTRIALS

By LTCWitoldPlezia, projectmanager,NATOEODCOE

BACKGROUND

In2025theNATOExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal CenterofExcellence(EODCOE)organizedits diamondevent–the8thNATOEODDemonstration andTrials(DandT).Thebiennialevent,co-sponsored byNATODefenceAgainstTerrorismProgrammeof Work(DATPOW)establishedundertheauspicesof theNATOInnovation,HybridandCyberDivisionand supportedbyMinistryofDefenceoftheSlovak Republic,tookplaceatINCHEBAExpoinBratislava, October08-09,2025.BringingtogetherEOD/ IEDDexperts,scientists,manufacturers,industry representativesandSMEs,theEODCOEprovides acommonplatformfordiscussingtechnological solutionsandinnovationsthatimproveAllianceforces interoperabilityandenhancethecapabilitiesofEOD personneltoprotectforcesandcivilianpopulation.The DemonstrationsandTrialsalsoassistinguidingfuture technologicaldevelopment.

The8theditionwasthelargestsofar.Over570 registeredvisitorsfrom28NATOandNATO partnershipcountrieshadtheopportunitytosee53 exhibitorsfrom21countries,13speakers,and222 minutesoflivedemonstrations.Duringtwodaysof staticexhibition,livedemonstrationsandconference, visitorswereacquaintedwiththelatestEOD technologyachievements.

Traditionally,DandTisdividedintotwodays. ThefrstdayfeaturedLivedemonstrationsof technologicalinnovationsdesignedtopromote commonunderstandingandfurtherdevelopEOD capabilities,whiletheseconddaywasdedicatedtothe conferencediscussionsaimedataddressingshared challenges,identifyingcapabilitygaps,andfndingnew opportunitiesforcollaboration.Theconference’smain themewas “EODinNATOMulti-DomainOperations". Astaticexhibitionwasalsoheldduringthesetwodays –acommonplatformformanufacturers,researchand developmentinstitutes,NATOorganizations,and nationstopresenttheirneedsforEODequipmentand thelatesttechnologicalsolutions.

OPENINGCEREMONY

OpeningceremonywashostedbyMrs.Aneta Pariskova,accompaniedbySVKmilitaryorchestraand theGuardofHonourofSlovakArmedForces.The Inaugurationspeechwasdeliveredby2ndState SecretaryofSVKMinistryofDefenceMr.Martin VojtasovicaswellasbyDirectoroftheNATOEOD COE,COLFrantisekMihalovicwhohighlightedthe importanceoftheeventfortheNATOEODcommunity ofinterest,andrecalledtheachievementsofNATO EODCOE.

LIVEDEMONSTRATIONS

DuringthefrstdayoftheNATOEODDemonstrations andTrials,thecompanieshadtheopportunityto presentnewtrendsandtechnologiesaswellastheir productsinthefeldofEODthroughLive Demonstrations.Thispartofevent,hostedbyCPT RadekMichalkaCZE(A)tookplacemainlyindoors, howeversomecompanieswithheavyequipment(e.g. explosionproofcontainer,heavyrobots,demining machine)presenteditoutsidebythemainentranceof INCHEBApavilion.

Demonstrationsincludedthefollowingcategories: RemotelyOperatedVehicles(ROVs),Detection andIdentifcation,Demining,EODtoolsfor operator’ssafetyandfnallyAISupporttoEOD. Over 222minutes,16companiesdeliveredmemorable presentationsthatallowedgueststolearnabout thelatesttechnological advancements andnew solutionsimportantfortheEODCommunityof Interest(COI).

OutdoorLiveDemonstration. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

OutdoorLiveDemonstration. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

OutdoorLiveDemonstration. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

CONFERENCE

Theconferencetitled “EODinMulti-Domain Operations” wasdividedintotwoblocks.

DuringBlock1“Threatsidentifedfromcurrent confictsandtheirinfuenceontrainingprocedures, tacticsandmilitaryrequirements” ledbyCPTSimon Brigant,SVK(A),sevenspeakersexplainedtheroleof EODunitsinMulti-DomainOperations(MDO)aswell asfamiliarizedtheaudiencewiththenewestthreats, mainlyinLand,MaritimeandAirdomains.

Byproperlydefningproblems,gapsandthreats bymilitaryspecialists,wecanprovideresearchers,

LtCBlakeZenteno–USA

Mr.Srdjan Popadić –SRB

academiaandmanufacturerswiththespacetofnd appropriatesolutions,whichwasthegoalof Block2oftheconference,hostedbyLTCPhD AlexanderHugyarSVK(A). Itstitle “Newtechnologies asaresponsetomodernwarfareidentifedthreats andmilitaryrequirements” refectedthepurposeof thesixspeakers’presentations.

Theoutcomesoftheconferencewillbepartofthe fnalproductoftheNATOEODDemonstrationsand Trials2025–BookofPapers,scheduledforreleasein January2026,andwillincludeabstractsfromthe following presentations:

CONFERENCEPRESENTATIONS

EODinMutli-DomainOperations

ClearingtheSunkenGermanFleetfromtheDanubeRiverat Pramovo:ProjectProgressandChallenges

1SGDavidGuyett–USA UnmannedAerialVehiclesThreat

Dr.1LTAttilaElliot–HUN InlandWatersMineWarfare

Mr.OhadMilo–ISR

OR-7MiguelPerez–USA

AIandARbasedX-RaytechnologyinsupportofEOD operations

ManufacturingPlaysaCrucialRoleinSupportingEODTasks, UtilizingToolse.g.3Dprinting,3Dscanningandsimulations

CPO2ScottDanells–CAN MaritimeEOD

Mr.CharlesValentine–SWE

M.Sc.RobinGerster–DEU

SpatialComputinganditsapplicationsduringLSCO(Large ScaleCombatOperations)

AdaptiveSpectrumRefnementForTrustworthyHyperspectral Demining

Prof.JohnFrucci–USA AIandDetectingLandminesandOrdnance

Mr.Tomas Černohorský –CZE ExplosivesDetectionandCBRNE:NewTrendsand Developments

Mr.ArisMakris–CAN

PPETechnologiesfortheRangeofExplosiveThreats

Mr.ChrisButtler–USA FutureEODOperations

Conference´sspeakerMr.OhadMilo. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

Discussionduringtheconference. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

PresentationofBostonDynamicsCompany“Robodog”. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

STATICEXHIBITION

Oneoftheobjectivesoftheeventwastoprovidea forumforequipmentmanufacturerstomeetwithendusers, enablingnetworkinganddirectfeedback, refectingthecoreideaandmottoofthe NATOEOD DemonstrationsandTrials2025.

Duringthestaticexhibition,53companiesand otherexhibitorspresentedhighvalueand high-techequipment:

•Detectors,includingdigitalradiographysolutions andchemicalanalysers;

•RemotelyOperatedVehicles(ROVs),androbot dogplatforms;

•UnmannedAerialVehicles(UAVs);

•Devicesforneutralizationanddisposalof hazardousmaterials;

•EquipmentforpersonalprotectionofEOD personnel;

•EODtrainingtools,includingvirtualrealityand mixedreality;

•Deminingmachinery;

•EODToolkitsandpyrotechnicalsolutions;

•EODrelatedinstitutions.

Honouringofspeakers. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

Exhibition. Photocredit:JaroslavLACKO

Thankstothestaticexhibition,visitorswereableto convincethemselvesthatdevelopmentintheEOD areaisongoingandsignifcantlyinfuencedbythe currentarmedconficts.Producersrapidlyreactto emergingwarfarethreats,therebykeepingpacewith theirdevelopmentbyseekingbettersolutionsrelated toEODoperatorprotection,detection,anddisposalof alltypesofexplosivethreats.

OUTCOMESANDBENEFITSFOREODCOI

DemonstrationsandTrials25eventisawell-known platformforinformationexchange,andboosts cooperationbetweenvariousstakeholders.Thevalue ofDandT2025liesinmutualnetworking,potential contracts,distributedandsharedknowledgeand experienceamongthewholeEOD,MILENG,CBRN, DAT,andC-IEDcommunitiesofinterest.

Thistwo-dayevent,consistingofthree interconnectedelements:livedemonstrations,a conferenceandastaticexhibition,remainsakeyfactor instrengtheningtieswithintheexplosiveordnance disposalcommunity.

Wewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetoall distinguishedguests,exhibitorsandspeakersfortheir participationandlookforwardtothenextexhibition in2027.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

LTCWitoldPlezia graduatedfromthe LandForces AcademyinWroclaw(Poland)in2008asaMILENG Offcer. Hespentmostofhismilitarycareerinthe21st PodhaleRifemenBrigade(Poland)asaplatoon commander,companycommanderandthenChiefof theEngineeringSection. Duringthisperiod,hewas assignedtotheVJTFbrigadeas Chiefofthe EngineeringSection. Afterayearofserviceinthe18th MechanizedDivision(Poland),heservedattheEOD CentreofExcellence(Trenčín,Slovakia)as Headof theTechnologiesDepartment. Healsoservesasthe projectmanagerfortheEODDemonstrationsand Trialsand theETCAP.Inhispersonallife,heismarried andthefatheroftwosons.Heisanavidtraveller with apassionforhistoryandreading.

ZHDUN:STATIONARYFPVLOITERINGMUNITION AMBUSHTACTIC

ByChiefSuperintendent(ret.)MichaelCardash,Terrogence – Global

SUMMARY

SinceJune2025,anewTTPemergingfromthe Ukraineconfictinvolvesthecovertdeploymentof improvisedloiteringFPVdronesinadormantstate alonganticipatedenemymovementroutes.Both RussianandUkrainianforceshaveutilizeddrones thatarecovertlylandedandremainstationaryuntila targetisdetected.Upondetection,theFPVpilot commandsthedronetotakeoffandengagesthe targetwithspeedandsurprise.Thesemunitions frequentlyfeatureimprovisedlandinggearandmay incorporatebatterypowersupplysavingmethodsand advancedcommunicationsolutions,suchasfberopticcablesorradiolinkswithrepeaters.Thetactic enablesrapidandunexpectedengagements,leaving minimalreactiontimefordefendersandfacilitating real-timetargetacquisitionandprioritization.

ANALYSIS

OnJune12,2025,aRussian‘Zhdun’(Ждун) First PersonView(FPV)improvisedloiteringmunitionwas successfullycapturedbyUkrainianforcesinthe bordervillagesoftheSumyregion.Examinationofthe

capturedassetrevealedamodifedconfguration, specifcallyfeaturingmakeshiftlandinggearskidsand adoublebatterypack.Colloquiallytermed“Zhdun”–Russianslangfor“TheAnticipator”–thistacticisalso commonlyreferredtoas"TheWaitingDrone."

Laterthatmonth,onJune30,2025,avideowas publishedonUkrainianTelegramchannelsshowinga RussianFPVdroneintheDniproregionwithwhat seemstobetworectangularsolarpanelsmountedon topoftheUAV.Additionally,onJuly15,2025,images capturedfromareconnaissancedrone'scamera showanotherRussianFPVdronerestingon improvisedlandinggearatopanoldsiloorwater tower.SimilartothepreviouslydocumentedUAV,this droneisalsoequippedwithasolarpanel.

Notably,footageofthisTTPcontinuedtoemergein thefollowingmonths.Inavideopublishedby UkrainianforcesinOctober2025,severalincidents showuptofourdronesmountedonlandinggear,in somecasesequippedwithlong-rangefber-optic cables,clusteredtogetheronaroadandawaiting approachingtargets.

TheimprovisedFPVloiteringmunitionwithmakeshiftlandinggearskidsandadoublebatterypack,June15,2025

AnFPVdronefttedwithtwosolarpanels,Dnipro,easternUkraine,June30,2025

RussianimprovisedFPVloiteringmunitionswithmakeshiftlandinggear;fourclusteredtogetheronaroad(bottom)

RussianFPV“Zhdun”loiteringmunitionwithlong-rangefber-opticcable(top);thedroneistargetedbyaUkrainianC-UAS loiteringmunition(bottom)

ASSESSMENT

BothRussianandUkrainianforcesareincreasingly employingtheZhduntactic,whichinvolvesdeploying anFPVloiteringmunitiontoastationary,often

concealed,positiontoawaitenemytargets.Thetactic wasdescribedinvariousTelegramchannelsin2024, andalsofeaturedinRussiantacticalmanuals.

Thesemunitionsaretypicallymodifedwithadditional makeshiftor3D-printedlandinggear(skidsorlegs)to ensurestabilityandsmoothfunctionalityduringlanding andsubsequenttakeoff.

Differentlegconfgurations

ThecoreprincipleoftheZhduntacticinvolves placingtheFPVloiteringmunitiononorinclose proximitytoanticipatedenemymovementroutes,such aspathsandroads.Whenstationary,thedrone remainspowered,albeitwithreducedpower consumptioninthisstate.Standardsingle-battery setupstypicallyoffer10-20minutesofstandbypower, althoughperformancecandegradesignifcantlyincold

weatherconditions.Theobserveddoublebattery packsonsomeZhdundronessuggestarequirement forextendedoperationalendurance.Foraneven longerambushtime,somedronesmayfeaturepowersavingmodesortheabilitytodisablevideo transmission,inwhichcaseexternalobserverdrones orpersonnelareutilizedfortargetidentifcation.

ARussianpilotoperatesaZhdunFPVloiteringmunitionwaitingonthesideoftheroad.Thepilotseesanapproachingtarget viathedrone’svideotransmission

TheRussianpilotengagesthetarget

Duringnighttimeoperations,enabledbynightvisionor thermaloptics,Zhdundronesaresometimesplaced directlyonroads,exploitingreducedvisibilitytomaximize theelementofsurprise.Upontargetacquisition,theFPV pilotcommandstheFPVloiteringmunitiontorapidlytake

offandengagethetarget.Acommonengagement strategy,particularlyagainstvehicles,involvesadirect, linearascentintothetarget'sfrontwindshieldtooptimize impact.Zhdunloiteringmunitionsaretypicallyequipped withimpactinitiationsystems.

RussianZhdunwiththermalimagingopticsawaitsatargetontheroadandswiftlyengagesitassoonasitiscloseenough

CommunicationandcontrolforZhdundrones vary.Someareequippedwithlong-rangefiber-optic cables,whileothersrequirearadiochannel.The lattermayrequirethedeploymentofground-based radiorepeatersortheuseofairbornerepeater

dronestomaintaincontinuouscommunication duringtheambushphase,atadistancerequiring extendedcommunicationlinksbetweenthepilotand themunition.

Thistacticofferssignifcanttacticaladvantages, primarilythroughitsemphasisonsurpriseand immediacy.Itenablespilotstoengagetargetswith minimaltimefordefensivereaction,providingamore clandestineapproachcomparedtomethodsrelyingon

loiteringmunitionsthatapproachthetargetfroma largedistance.Whenoptimallypositionedand camoufaged,theZhduntacticallowsthepilotto observetheambushareafromthegroundandacquire andprioritizetargetsinreal-time.

Zhdunequippedwithalongfber-opticcable

AnexampleofapoorlypositionedZhdunwithafber-opticcablethatwascompromisedanddestroyedbytheadversary’s FPVloiteringmunition

TheeffectivenessoftheZhduntacticisevidentin scenariossuchas:

•Targetingcriticalassetslikeammunitiontrucks, vitalequipment,orhigh-rankingpersonnel

•Targetingarrivingorretreatingenemyforcesat chokepoints

SuccessfulimplementationoftheZhduntacticrelies onseveralkeyfactors:

•Pilotsarelikelytoselectstrategicchokepoints, includingspecifcpassages,roads,villages, blockades,orgates.

•Prioritizationisgiventocovertlylandingthedrone atthechosenlocation.

•Selectionofalandingzonethatprovidesnaturalor artifcialcoveriscriticaltoavoidpremature detection.

TheprecisemethodofZhdunemploymentis determinedbyprevailingfeldconditionsandavailable equipment,requiringabalancebetweenmaximizing batterylifeandminimizingtheriskofenemydetection, whichcouldcompromisethemission,thusprovidinga

limitedandoccasionallyshorttimewindowforthe ambush.TheZhduntacticremainssusceptibletoearly detectionifimproperlyconcealedordeployedin predictablepatterns.Nevertheless,thesuddenand unexpectednatureofanattackfromaseemingly stationaryobjectonaroadornearitcangenerate substantialsurpriseandheightenvigilanceinenemy forces,impactingoperationaltempo. ■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

ChiefSuperintendent(ret.)Michael Cardash,Seniorbombtechnician andformerdeputyheadoftheIsraeli policebombdisposaldivision, commandedbombdisposalunits withintheborderguardsandpolice duringintenseterroristconfictsin Israel.Michaelcurrentlyisthesenior CIEDanalystatTerrogence-Global,researchesIED’s andauthorstheTerrogenceMöbiusC-IEDreports analyzingandassessingglobalIED-relatedtechnical andtacticalintelligence.

ITISNOTTHECARBUTTHEDRIVER… TRENDSINTHEUSEOF(GROUND)VEHICLEBORNE IMPROVISEDEXPLOSIVEDEVICES

ByJoseMRufas,SubjectMatterExpertinC-IED,AttacktheNetworks,TechnicalExploitation &IEDAnalysis

“Takeaction!Aninchofmovementwillbringyouclosertoyourgoalsthanamileofintention.” (SteveMaraboliinhisbook“UnapologeticallyYou”,frstpublishedin2013)

On10thNovember2025, thepopulationofthe Indiancapitalcity,Delhi,was shockedbythedetonation ofanimprovisedexplosive device(IED)withamain chargecomposedof ammoniumnitratefueloil (ANFO)stuffedintothebackof aHyundaii20.Theattacktook placeinfrontoftheRed Fort,withtheresultofthirteen casualties.Itwasaterrible introductionofterroristvehicle borneIED(VBIED)tactics, techniquesandproceduresto theIndiancapital,13years afterthelastterrorattack affectingthecity.

Thecellbehindtheattack waslinkedtoJaish-eMohammad(JeM),abanned Pakistani-basedjihadistorganization,andtoAnsarGhazwatulHind(AGuH),aregionalAlQaedaaffliated cell.

Figure1:ImageoftheRedFortareainDelhiaftertheVBIEDdetonation on10thNovember2025. (Source–FACEBOOK)

Newmembersareapplyingforthe “MultinationalVBIEDFanClub”: Africa

On5thFebruary2026,DAESHSahel (ISSP)carriedoutanup-armoredsuicide VBIEDattackagainstaMalianarmy convoyontheroadnearMenaka.In accordancewiththeclaimfortheattack,the up-armoredvehiclewasdrivenby someonecalled“AbdulRahmanal-Ansari”.

Thefrstuseofanup-armoredVBIED byDAESHSahelwasreportedon19th June2025,duringtheirattackonBani BanghouinNiger,wherenewtactics, techniquesandprocedures(TTPs)were evidenced:itisestimatedthatthe potentialsupportbyDAESHinWest AfricaWilayat(ISWAP)isevidencedby themigrationofTTPs.

Thefrstuseofanup-armoredVBIED byDAESHSomalia(ISS)wasalso documentedearlyFebruary2025,after Somaliforcesstoppedanexplosive-laden SUVwithextraarmorprotectingtheengine, windowsandthewindscreenofthevehicle.

Figure2:CapturesofpropagandafromtheDAESHSahelVBIEDattackin Mali,5thFebruary2026. (Source–AnNabaNewsletter534)

Figure3:CapturefrompropagandavideobyDAESHshowingasuicideup-armoredVBIEDinNiger. (Source–X)

Butalso,otherreligiouslymotivatedextremist violentgroupsfightingontheAl-Qaedasidewere adoptingasimilarTTP:JNIM(Jama'atNasral-Islam walMuslimin),evidencedtheirfirstuse(atleast

Figure4:Capturefrom propagandavideoby DAESHshowinganuparmoredVBIEDin Puntland,Somaliain February2025. (Source–X)

from2016on)ofup-armoredsuicideVBIEDsas partofanattackonamilitarybasesharedby MalianforcesandRussiancontractorsatBer,Mali on6thOctober2024.

Figure5:PicturebyJNIMshowinganup-armoredVBIEDinMali,October2025. (Source–X)

Not(really)newbutmaybenotverywell-known useofVBIEDs:Asia

Asalogicalexpectationafterreadingthefrst paragraphsofthisarticle,weshouldbeaware ofthehighandgrowingimpactfromtheuseof VBIEDsbynon-statearmedgroups(NSAGs),asan exampleaboutwhatishappeninginIndiaand Pakistan.

OneofthemostactivegroupsusingVBIEDTTPsin theareaistheBalochLiberationArmy(BLA),which includesfemalesuicidedrivers(e.g.VBIEDattackin NoshkiagainstPakistaniforceson31stJanuary2026): infact,BLAleadstheusageofVBIEDsduring2026, followedbyFitnaAlHindustan(FAH).

Figure6:ActivityinKhyberPakhtunkhwa&PunjabprovincesinPakistanreportedon13thFebruary2026. (Source–TELEGRAM)

(Source–X)

Ontheotherhand,andduringfrstmonthsof2026, SyriacontinuessufferingfromtheuseofVBIEDs,as wellasYemenhasalsobeentargetedbyVBIEDs.

Despitecounterterroristeffortsinrecentyears,the remainingcapabilitiesofDAESHinsideIraqiterritory includeproductionanduseofvehicleborneIEDsinthe MiddleEuphratesRiverValley:theVBIEDattack againstaPolicestationinal-Mayadir(nearDeirezZor) on18thMay2025posesagoodexample

InAfghanistan,itisevidencedthatDAESHin Khorasan(IS-KP)isconductingsomeVBIEDattacks

againstlocalforces,mostlyusingmotorcyclesor IEDsinsidebuses:ontheotherhand,someelements aspresentinsideAfghanterritoryaresuspectedto planandfacilitateVBIEDattacksinPakistaniterritory.

Butnotonlynon-stateactorsareevidencingthe useofVBIEDsin2025-2026:theIsraeliArmed Forces(IAF)haveutilizedobsoletearmoredcombat vehicles(ACV)M113modelsflledwithexplosive devicesasaweaponofchoiceinGazaandWest Bankterritories:somethingsimilarhasbeen observedinSyria.

Figure8:Metricsontheuseofremotely-controlledVBIEDsinGaza2024-2025. (Source–Reuters/ACLED)

Figure7:VBIEDeventsinRaqqa,Syriaon25thJanuary2026andSanna,Yemenon21stJanuary2026.

Figure9:ExamplesofarmoredVBIEDuse. (Source–X)

WheeledbombsintheNewWorld:America…

ThedrugcartelsintheAmericancontinentare progressivelyincreasingtheiruseofVBIEDTTPsin boththefghtagainstthegovernmentsandagainst rivalcriminalgroups,butalsoutilizedbyextremist

radicals(e.g.VBIEDattackagainstafertilityclinicin PalmSprings,CalifornialastMay2025)

WecouldfndexamplesofVBIEDuseinColombia, astheincidentinBeléndelosAndaquíes,Caquetáon 22ndDecember2025.

Figure10:PicturesfromtheVBIEDasfoundinBeléndelosAndaquíes,Colombia,22ndDecember2025. (Source–CaracolRadio)

Inasimilarmanner,Mexicoiswitnessingincidents withVBIEDs:e.g.anattackagainsttheCommunity PolicefacilitiesinCoahuayana,Michoacanstateon 6thDecember2025.

Butalso,theRepublicofEcuadorwasaffectedby VBIEDs,astheattackinGuayaquilon15thOctober 2025evidenced.(ItwasthelastofatotaloffveVBIED incidentsduring2025).

…butnotonly:VBIEDsinsideEurope

TheUkrainiantheatreofoperationshaswitnessed numeroustacticalandcriminalincidentswithbothremotecontrolexplosive-ladenunmannedgroundvehiclesand emplacedVBIEDcases:thatwasnotasurpriseinsucha dynamicandadaptivecombatenvironment.

Maybewithsomepotentialrelationtothe referredcrisisintheneighbouringcountry,Russian LieutenantGeneralFanilSarvarovwaskilledin acarbombexplosioninsouthernMoscowon22nd December2025.

on29th October2025. (Source–www.9111.ru)

Inasimilarstyle,we couldidentifyexplosiveladenvehiclesinsidethe EuropeanUnion,as mostlyusedbycriminal networksagainstrivalsbut notexclusively(e.g.Dutch Policereportedasafailed terroristattackanincident withapotentialVBIED whichtookplaceonDam SquareinAmsterdamon 3rdApril2025).

Anotherrecentcase involvingaVBIED couldbetheattempted attackagainstthe ItalianjournalistSigfrido Ranuccion16thOctober 2025inPomezia,near Rome.

Figure11:PicturesfromtheVBIEDincidentinGuayaquil,Ecuador,15thOctober2025. (Source–Telegram)

Figure12:VBIEDinthebatterycompartmentofanelectriccarseizedneartheCrimeanbridge

Whiletheuseofvehicle-borneimprovisedexplosive devicesisnothingnew,thedevelopmentand refnementoftactics,techniquesandproceduresfor employingsuchdevicesinAfricaposesarealthreatto thesouthernfankoftheEuropeanUnionandthe NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization.

TheVBIEDisnotonlysomesortof“weaponof (potential)massdestruction”abletokill/ injurealotof personsormakebuildingstocollapse,butalsoa powerfulpsychologicaltoolforpublicterror.■

“Youhavetobeluckyallthetime. Weonlyhavetobeluckyonce.”

(StatementreleasedbytheIRAintheaftermathoftheirattempt in1984tokillMargaretThatcherwithanIED)

REFERENCES

•X(formerTWITTER)

•TELEGRAM

•FACEBOOK

•LINKEDIN

•VKONTAKTE

•MATRIX/ELEMENT

•Reutersagency

• https://jamestown.org/red-fort-blast-brings-urbanoperations-to-india/

•@HKaaman

Disclaimer

Thisarticledoesnotrepresenttheopinionofanynationalor multinationalorganisation;itswholecontentshouldonlybe consideredastheopinionoftheauthor.Asallinformationhas beenobtainedfromopensources,potentialmistakescould havebeenmadeduringtheresearchprocess.Pleasefeel freetosendyourcomments,correctionsandinputstothe author;theywillbehighlyappreciated.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

LieutenantColonelJoseMRufas graduatedfrom theSpanishArmyMilitaryAcademyin1993.Hewas commissionedintotheC-IEDCentreofExcellenceas HeadoftheDefeattheDeviceBranchinAugust2016 andcurrentlyholdsthepostofChiefofAttackthe NetworksBranch.AsaMilitaryEngineerOffcer,his backgroundhasbeenmainlybasedonExplosive OrdnanceDisposalactivitiesintheSpanishArmyand C-IEDstaffissuesatthemultinationalheadquarters.In additiontohisEODOperator/EODOffcereducation, heattendedsomeothermilitarycoursesincluding Parachuting,ArmyStaff,InformationOperations,War CollegeGeneral/JointStaff,MilitarySearch,Technical ExploitationOperations,WeaponsIntelligenceTeam, ExploitationLaboratories,HomemadeExplosivesand otherC-IEDcourses.Hisoperationalassignments includeBosniaandHerzegovina(3),Afghanistan(3), theRepublicofEcuador,IraqandUganda.

Figure13:DAESHmanualonVBIEDmanufactureaspublishedinSeptember2025. (Source:MATRIX/ELEMENT)