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Counter-IED Report Winter 2023/24

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM LEGALLY EMPOWERED C-IED ENTERPRISES INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS: A PRIMER HAMAS TERROR TACTICS EMPLOYED IN ISRAEL’S DEADLIEST TERROR ATTACK - OCTOBER 7, 2023 “PROTECTING STEEL FROM HORNETS”: RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES IN THE UKRAINIAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS GOLIATH’S SON AGAINST DAVID: EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTPs) AGAINST ISRAEL

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INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY By Colonel H R Naidu Gade (Retd.)

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS: A PRIMER By William Ramirez, a veteran of the Colombian military from Military Engineers Corps

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report

023 saw increasing instability across the globe. The major conflict continues to be the war in mainland Europe following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both sides continue to use IEDs, landmines, cluster munitions alongside advanced conventional weapons (ACW). The most crucial battle adaptation in this war was the employment of hundreds of thousands of landmines by Russian forces to repel the Ukrainian army counter-offensive. Ukraine has not yet succeeded in breaching the Russian defences, with the aim of reaching the Sea of Azov, and is now building its own defensive lines facing a potential Russian attack. In the Middle East, conflict dramatically expanded when the Hamas terrorist group based in Gaza launched a brutally coordinated attack against Israel, which started in the early hours of 7 October. The attack, which had been planned in detail for more than a year, caught Israel by surprise and revealed key shortcomings in its intelligence services. Israel has described the attack as the worst ever against its homeland. The Hamas tactics used in this attack are described in extensive detail in this edition of CounterIED Report by a retired Chief Superintendent of the Israeli Police Force – Michael Cardash – currently a member of Terrogence Global, and by Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch of the C-IED Centre of Excellence. At 0625 hrs on 7 October Hamas launched at least 2,200 missiles against Israel in just 20 minutes – the attack overwhelming the sophisticated IDF Iron Dome antimissile defence system. The missile strikes were followed by coordinated air, sea and land infiltrations

by some 3,000 terrorists. The air attacks were undertaken by motorised paragliders and the ground assault succeeded in breaching the very sophisticated border defence system between Israel and Gaza. Some 1,400 Israeli civilians and soldiers were slaughtered by the terrorists and more than 240 hostages were kidnapped to Gaza by Hamas. On 8 October Israel declared itself to be at war with Hamas, with the stated aim of eradicating the terrorist organisation, and on 9 October imposed a “complete siege” of the Gaza Strip, accompanied by air strikes. At the end of October IDF ground forces entered the Gaza Strip. According to Gaza Health Ministry, to date more than 20,000 Palestinians have lost their lives and more than 50,000 have been injured. At the time of writing this Foreword the conflict continues. In another regional development, the Iranian-backed Houthis who seized much of Yemen in a civil war, have launched a persistent campaign of drone and missile attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea to show support for Hamas in its war in Gaza. On 12 January the U.S. military forces together with the United Kingdom and with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands conducted strikes against a number of targets in Yemen used by Houthi rebels to endanger freedom of navigation in the region. In Iraq and Syria, a group of Iranian-backed militias has carried out more than 120 attacks on U.S. bases since mid-October using rocket fire and explosive-laden drones. U.S. forces have conducted several retaliatory airstrikes, including one on 4 January, killing an Iranlinked militia commander in Baghdad.

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FOREWORD

Turkish armed forces continue to target sites that officials claim to be associated with the PKK in Iraq and Syria. In recent months Turkish police and security services made a number of arrests targeting PKK and ISIS terror cells as well as organised crime groups. In Iran, on 3 January, in an apparent twin suicide attack, which was later claimed by the Islamic State, 103 Iranians were killed and 171 injured in the south-eastern city of Kerman. The dead and injured were mourners at a ceremony marking the 2020 assassination by a drone attack of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander, Qassem Soleimani. According to the state media, the main suspect who planned the attacks had entered Iran in mid-December by crossing the southeast border and left two days before the attack after making the bombs. Authorities have arrested 35 people suspected to be involved in the attacks. In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s efforts to establish security are facing ongoing challenges. Despite recent successes in stamping out opium poppy cultivation which has plunged by an estimated 95 percent following a drug ban in April 2022, frequent car bombings and suicide bomb attacks underline the difficulties to bring stability and order in the impoverished, by the decades of conflict, country. In Pakistan, militants continue to deploy IEDs, VBIEDs, suicide and gun attacks to target civilians and security personnel mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Punjab. Despite police, army and security services’ ongoing efforts, in 2023 the country saw a surge in violence for the third consecutive year, with 1524 violence-related fatalities and 1463 injuries in 789 terror attacks and counter-terror operations. In India, the explosive violence and attacks on security forces continue to pose a challenge. In the State of Chhattisgarh alone around 180 IEDs were recovered by the security forces in 2023. In late December 2023 in Jharkhand State Maoists blew up a railway track at Binuan village which severely affected train movement on the Howrah-Nagpur-Mumbai route, luckily no one was hurt in this incident. In Jammu and Kashmir, police and security forces regularly recover IEDs and their components.

12 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

In Somalia al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab militants continue to launch armed attacks and bombings against civilians and government forces in various parts of the country including Somalia capital Mogadishu, which has seen a notable decline in the attacks in the recent months after Somali security forces and police stepped up their efforts to restore peace and stability in the country. In December 2023, the Somali government has welcomed the United Nations Security Council decision to lift the arms embargo which was imposed on the country in 1992 in order to cut the flow of weapons to feuding warlords, and said that it will significantly bolster the capabilities of the Somali National Army and security forces to combat terrorist threats. In Kenya, 30 terror attacks planned by al-Shabaab and Daesh terror cells were foiled by police in 2023, however, bomb and IED attacks continue to claim the lives of security personnel as well as civilians. In Nigeria, ISIS-linked insurgency presents serious challenges to Nigeria’s national security, as gun and IED attacks continue to target government officials, security forces and civilians across the northern and central regions of the country, resulting in deaths and injuries. Kidnappings and armed banditry continue to wreak havoc; in the recent attacks between 23 and 25 December 2023 at least 200 people were killed and more than 500 injured in several rural communities in the central state of Plateau. In September 2023 Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formed the Sahel Alliance to tackle jihadist insurgency, which erupted in Mali in 2012 and spread to Niger and Burkina Faso by 2015. In Mexico, drug cartels are increasing the use of bomb-dropping drones and improvised explosive devices. On 3 December 2023 ten IEDs were found by Mexican authorities after a Tucson border patrol observed gunshots at the U.S.-Mexico border. In Northern Ireland, police record an increase in callouts to investigate IEDs and pipe bomb threats, and petrol bomb attacks continue to take place in the region. In Sweden, violence from gang-related shootings and bombings which previously affected bigger cities, is now spreading to quieter suburbs and towns, presenting significant challenges for law enforcement.

FOREWORD

Landmines and ERW continue to pose risks and claim lives in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Angola, Azerbaĳan, Cambodia and Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian government, Ukraine has allocated about €500 million for mine clearance, which will be spent on survey equipment, machinery and equipment for bomb disposal experts. Since the beginning of 2023, Ukraine's and non-governmental organisations’ bomb disposal units have inspected and brought back into use over 200,000 hectares of agricultural land. In Southeast Asia, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) revealed that in 2023, over 30 individuals experienced the impact of explosive ordnance, marking a 24 percent decrease from the same period in 2022. The CMAA reaffirmed its commitment to achieving the demining target to the mine-free Cambodia 2025 goal. Emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence in combination with aerial surveys promise to speed up demining efforts and improve the safety of EOD technicians. In his article, Paul Amoroso of Assessed Mitigation Options consultancy provides the latest in a series of articles in this publication devoted to national and regional Counter-IED efforts. This time he highlights the need for C-IED enterprises to be legally empowered through an appropriate legal framework that matches the C-IED approach adopted by the State. The development of an appropriate national C-IED approach linked to a supporting legal framework within which a national C-IED enterprise is undertaken will support internal coherence, cooperative culture and collaborative efforts between members of the enterprise. The legal framework refers to the rules, rights and obligations to which those involved in C-IED efforts must adhere. His innovative approach examines the various types of increasing and indiscriminate usage of IEDs in criminal use, terrorist usage, use by insurgents and finally in open warfare. He goes on to recommend a spectrum of C-IED approaches to counter the different types of outlined IED usage. He begins with a Criminal Justice Model, moving then to a CT approach, then COIN and finally to a War Model – de facto combat engineering. He suggests various

factors that may be considered when assessing existing C-IED capabilities and capacities. These include, inter alia, finances and funding, infrastructure, legal framework, equipment, leadership, personnel, training and interoperability. Using these factors to assess a Counter-IED enterprise in terms of capabilities and capacities will identify areas requiring further attention. In a most informative article based on a wealth of operational knowledge and experience, William Ramirez, a retired Colombian Military Engineer, provides a detailed breakdown of the necessary considerations, processes and procedures to be addressed when purchasing landmine and IED detection equipment. He outlines in detail 10 critical factors for consideration when purchasing such equipment. He highlights the differences between operational and humanitarian landmine detection and how this will likely affect purchasing decisions. The sum total of his extensive experience in both operational and humanitarian demining results in a most comprehensive guide for key decision makers tasked with purchasing detection equipment. ■

ROB HYDE-BALES BIOGRAPHY During his career in the UK Royal Engineers, Rob Hyde-Bales was responsible for landmine clearance in Libya and, more latterly, Afghanistan in the running of the first United Nations humanitarian landmine clearance training programme – Operation Salam. The programme trained Afghan male refugees in landmine clearance techniques, and Afghan women and children in mine awareness and avoidance training. More recently he set up the Caribbean Search Centre in Kingston, Jamaica. The Centre is designed to train security forces across the Caribbean in modern search techniques. After retiring from the army he joined Cranfield University at Shrivenham, near Oxford, and undertook a research project on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence that examined ways to improve the sharing of IED threat information between the military and civilian organisations in hazardous areas.

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BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

NTRODUCTION

Previous articles by this author, in recent editions of The Counter-IED Report, on national and regional approaches to C-IED have spoken of national and regional C-IED enterprises. This article will examine what is meant by a national C-IED enterprise and how broader, less security centric only approaches, are preferential. It will then discuss how one may go about building such an enterprise with a particular examination of who may and should be part of such alternative whole of society C-IED enterprises. This article is based on the experience of the author from working on strategic C-IED initiatives over the past few years along with research conducted on the identification of strategic C-IED principles for East Africa. For any national C-IED enterprise to be effective it must first understand the problem it is trying to counter. In this case, a national C-IED enterprise is attempting to counter an IED system. We will start by first examining what do we mean by the term IED system.

DEFINING AN IED SYSTEM If the starting point for contemporary C-IED is taken to emerge from Western efforts to counter their use in Iraq and Afghanistan,1 initial efforts were mostly military centric owing to the operational environment they were conducted in and those who were available and hence tasked to undertake various C-IED activities. These initial C-IED efforts were typically defeat the device activities and then expanded to include attack the network and prepare the force or variations of these lines of effort. These three lines of effort may be considered the traditional military paradigm of C-IED. Initial military led attack the network activities were often kinetic in character using C-IED exploitation to support targeting approaches employed against IED network personnel such as find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate. It was common practice for these attack the network activities to focus on targeting IED network members involved in IED manufacture, their transport, or components thereof, their emplacement, or their use, including suicide bombers.

1 The author acknowledges that, before this response to IED use in Iraq and Afghanistan, other IED affected states had undertaken initiatives and collective efforts to counter their use but did not use the term C-IED. Examples include the UK, Turkey, Sri Lanka and Columbia. These collective practices referred to as C-IED continue to evolve.

counteriedreport.com 15

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

However, with time, as an appreciation of the wider network of personnel needed to support IED attacks emerged, it became apparent, that attack the network activities needed to consider all personnel involved in facilitating IED use. As such, IED network members who can be targeted, include all persons involved in any aspect of the illegal supply of components, manufacture, transport, storage, and placement or employment of IEDs. It can also extend to those involved in financing network activities, radicalizing, and indoctrinating its members, providing life support or sanctuary to network members, and publicising its activities or other related propaganda support. While attack the network activities, typically focused on targeting members of the IED network, efforts were also needed to target the processes and material supply that any IED system needs to operate. In terms of targeting the processes of an IED system, this can involve counter radicalisation or counter finance

16 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

initiatives as well as population engagement in attempts to remove the sanctuary that IED networks may get from the population. It may also look towards the cyber domain to limit or restrict access to technical or tactical IED knowledge as well as violent extremist material. For the targeting of material supply, this can involve the security and control of explosives, border controls, control of IED precursors as well as regional and international cooperation efforts. This holistic approach of considering the network of personnel, as well as the processes and material supply needed to support IED use, leads us to the term, IED system. As such, an IED system is the combination of people, processes and material that go into planning, supporting, financing, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing, and publicising any element of an IED incident, including the indoctrination, training and life support of the persons involved.

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

WHOLE OF SOCIETY APPROACH TO NATIONAL C-IED ENTERPRISES As C-IED efforts progressed in various IED affected states and regions, a recurrent lesson has been identified, which is common in most security and counter terrorism initiatives, that prevention is better than cure. Preventative C-IED efforts are self-evident in that that they reduce the number of IED incidents and hence the need for responsive IED activities. However, practical implementation of C-IED preventative efforts is challenging for several reasons. Primarily preventative C-IED efforts can take considerable time to see impact and benefit in terms of reducing the number of IED incidents and increasing the safety and security of the State, its citizens, and interests against the IED system. An alternative way of seeing this challenge is that compared to responsive C-IED efforts, preventative C-IED efforts take time to see a return on investment. However, over the longer term, preventative C-IED efforts are deemed to be more effective than purely responsive ones. As attack the network efforts moved from a narrow focus to one that was more holistic in considering all personnel in an IED network along with the processes and materiel supply needed to support IED use, an increasingly widening C-IED aperture emerged which targeted all elements of the IED system. This has led to an overlap with many other defence, security, stabilization, and development initiatives such as humanitarian mine action, weapons and ammunition management, border control, countering violent extremism, population engagement, counter/ deradicalization programs, regional cooperation, counter-terrorist financing / anti-money laundering and broader counter terrorism activities. This expanded and broader approach to C-IED may be considered as a comprehensive approach. As this aperture of C-IED expands, so too does the number

of stakeholders who need to be engaged. The author’s preferred term for all those who need to be involved in national C-IED efforts is a national C-IED stakeholder community. A common theme when building a national C-IED enterprise is that the right stakeholders are not engaged from the start. So we may now ask, who needs to be part of a national C-IED stakeholder community? It is important to employ inclusive processes to include a wide stakeholder base, by looking at those who are impacted by IEDs, or who can play a role in countering their use. An initial process of stakeholder mapping can prove to be an effective means to identify potential members followed by their engagement. One means to undertake C-IED stakeholder mapping is to consider what C-IED efforts need to be invested in and what ‘good may look like’ to achieve a comprehensive national C-IED enterprise. The author proposes the following 15 elements2 that form the basis for a national C-IED enterprise.3 These 15 C-IED elements are grouped under those which are preventative, responsive, and cross-cutting in nature. Preventative C-IED elements: • National policy, regulations, and legislation • Control and security of explosives • IED precursor controls • Border controls • Intelligence led operations Responsive C-IED elements: • Defeat the device • Exploitation • Investigation • Judicial processes • Victim assistance

2 These 15 C-IED elements are a synthesis of the UNIDIR C-IED CMM SAT, the IGAD regional C-IED strategy, the draft AU C-IED strategy and research conducted on C-IED for East Africa. 3 It is acknowledged that other C-IED elements can be included or those listed expanded into sub-elements as suits the State needs for the C-IED enterprise they intend to establish and invest in.

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BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

Cross-cutting C-IED elements: • Understanding • Preparation • Interagency and international cooperation • Information management • Adapting the C-IED enterprise Taking these 15 elements of a comprehensive approach to a national C-IED enterprise and undertaking generic stakeholder mapping it is possible to identify potential members within a national C-IED stakeholder community as provided in Table 1. Review of Table 1, identifies the following: • Internal stakeholders within the state; • External stakeholders supporting the state; • Security and defence elements; • Members from across government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies; • Civil society organisations; • Commercial and industry entities, including representative associations; • Regional organisations and international community organisations.

national C-IED enterprise. To define a national C-IED enterprise, it is informative to consider the C-IED efforts these stakeholders may be involved in. C-IED efforts is the collective term to refer to all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities, and capacities that C-IED stakeholders may be involved in delivering or supporting. It can include inter alia, training, mentoring, advising, accompanying, assisting, technology and equipment provision and intelligence support. As such, a national C-IED enterprise is the collective term to describe all C-IED efforts which stakeholders invest in, intended to at least match but ideally overmatch the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs. A national C-IED enterprise can involve anything which is intended to predict discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to, or neutralize, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks.

BUILDING A NATIONAL C-IED ENTERPRISE

This wide array of potential C-IED stakeholders points toward a whole of society approach to C-IED.

When building a national C-IED enterprise it is first necessary to understand the IED threat faced or the assessed threat that may emerge. Secondly, it is necessary to know existing state capabilities that will be needed to support the planned national C-IED enterprise. This second requirement in C-IED understanding is informed by a baseline assessment,

This may be considered to be a comprehensive approach to national C-IED and may include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Whole of society national C-IED approaches often have stakeholders with complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, a cooperative culture and collaborative efforts between members within the enterprise to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the IED threat faced. Now that a whole of society approach to national C-IED has been outlined and potential members of a C-IED stakeholder community have been identified, we will next consider what is meant by the term

which compares current C-IED capabilities to those required to achieve the planned C-IED enterprise. Such a baseline assessment can be facilitated by the UNIDIR C-IED CMM SAT or a modification thereof. Ideally, a designated lead entity needs to be charged with responsibility for building the national C-IED enterprise. They will be required to undertake an iterative process of C-IED stakeholder analysis, mapping and subsequent outreach and engagement that best reflects the intended national C-IED enterprise intended to be established. The starting point in this process will be the need to identify who will be members of the C-IED stakeholder community. Table 1 may be used; however, the C-IED stakeholder community for a given State will be nuanced and needs to be chosen based on the threat, the enterprise to be developed and the resources that will be allocated. For

18 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

Preventative C-IED Elements National Policy, Ministry of Justice; National Commission on Small Arms; Law reform Legislation & Regulations commissions; Office of the president / Prime minister Security and Control of Explosives

Ministry of Justice; National Commission on Small Arms; National Armed Forces; Ministry of Mines & Energy; Environmental Protection Agency; Forestry Development Authority; National Fisheries Authority (marine life protection); Commercial Explosive Users

Control of IED Precursors

Ministry of Justice; Law Reform Commission; Ministry of Agriculture; Drug Enforcement Agency; Environmental Protection Agency

Border Controls

Immigration Service; Customs/Anti-Smuggling Unit; Armed Forces of (coastal) / Coast guard; Forestry Management Authority; Regional Body Representatives

Intelligence-Led Operations

National Security Agency; Ministry of National Defense; National Armed Forces; National Police

Responsive C-IED Elements Defeat the Device

Ministry of National Defense; National Armed Forces; Ministry of Internal Security; Ministry of Justice; National Police; Academia; Industry

Exploitation

Ministry of National Defense; National Armed Forces; National Police; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Internal Security; Forensic laboratories

Investigation

Ministry of Justice; National Police; Ministry of National Defense; National Armed Forces; Ministry of Internal Security; Security Services / National Security Agency

Judicial Process

Ministry of Justice; Court Services

Victim Assistance

Ministry of Justice; Ministry for Health; Ministry of Social Protection

Cross-cutting C-IED Elements Understanding the C-IED Enterprise

National Lead entity with responsibility for C-IED; Office of the National Security Advisor to the Office of the President / Prime Minister; Security Services / National Security Agency

Preparation

Ministry of National Defense; National Armed Forces; National Police; Executive Protection Service; Ministry of Education

Interagency & International Cooperation

National Lead entity with responsibility for C-IED; Office of the National Security Advisor to the Office of the President; Security Services / National Security Agency; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Community; Regional Body Representatives

Information Management

Office of the National Security Advisor to the Office of the President; Security Services / National Security Agency; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Justice; Regional Body Representatives

Adapting the C-IED Enterprise

National Lead entity with responsibility for C-IED; National Commission on Small Arms / Arms and Ammunition; National Mine Action Centre

Table 1. Potential members within a national C-IED stakeholder community counteriedreport.com 19

BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

example, the preventative C-IED element of security and control of explosives, in particular commercial explosives, requires that all entities involved in their handling and use, need to be included, possibly through representative associations. This may include those involved in regulated commercial as well as artisanal mining, quarrying and bore hole drilling. Similarly, inclusion of civil society organisations can be an asset in public IED awareness efforts to assist in community engagement and in influencing the public in terms of being part of the national enterprise. It may be challenging to get certain civil society organisations to buy-in and engage in a national C-IED enterprise as they often seek to remain independent of the State or to be perceived as impartial actors. As such the State can try, through appropriate engagement, to convince them of the merits of being part of a national C-IED enterprise or certain elements thereof. Citizens can be empowered to play a role in watching out for and reporting potential IED activity through IED risk education and public safety initiatives to raise wider public C-IED awareness.4 By making the C-IED enterprise a whole of society effort and encouraging social responsibility to report any suspicious activity can be significantly beneficial. It is important to appreciate that not all potential C-IED stakeholders may be attuned to what is needed within national C-IED or their role within it. This highlights the importance of outreach and engagement to communicate effectively with all potential C-IED stakeholders. Such outreach and engagement should ideally be undertaken prior to conducting a national C-IED baseline assessment.

STRATEGIC MINDSET THINKING Investing in a national C-IED enterprise with an emphasis on preventative efforts are to be promoted. However, it is also acknowledged that compared to responsive C-IED efforts, preventative C-IED efforts typically take longer to see impact and benefit from, in protecting itself, its citizens, and its interests by reducing the number of IED incidents. This can be a

significant challenge to justify, particularly politically, as return on investment is needed to show the State is taking impactful steps against the IED system. It is also challenging to secure buy-in from international donors and the wider international community when such investments need multiyear project / program planning to ensure they mature to being impactful. These challenges may be addressed when building a national C-IED enterprise by adapting what can be considered a strategic mindset or what Robert Greene, may consider to be grand strategy thinking and in military terms may be considered as campaign planning. For this article, the author uses the concept of strategic mindset thinking when it comes to developing a comprehensive national C-IED enterprise. Human nature as a self-protection mechanism tends to focus on the most proximate threats and to act in a way that is deemed to most likely address or counter the threats faced in the near term. Such a mindset is common when having to address the use or threatened use of IEDs. A strategic mindset approach involves a broader way of thinking about a given problem or challenge being addressed. This requires looking beyond the immediate problem, to instead consider the context and wider factors that contribute or significantly influence it. A strategic mindset approach forces us to zoom out from the immediate and ongoing threat posed by IEDs, and instead to have a broader understanding of the contributing factors that facilitate their use. This involves looking beyond the immediate use of IEDs or what may be considered the technical and tactical issues related to their use. At a minimum this requires, in addition to an understanding of the technical and tactical issues, an examination of at least the three components of the IED system, namely the network of personnel involved, the processes they use and the supply chain of components and related materiel. Deeper strategic thinking when developing a national C-IED enterprise can involve gaining an understanding of why IEDs are in use in terms of the tactical intent, their operational

4 For example, a national ‘See Something, Say Something’ publicity campaign.

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BUILDING THE C-IED ENTERPRISE TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

objectives, and the strategic impact they are attempting to achieve. Strategic C-IED thinking can extend even further, to being even more comprehensive, by considering the wider historical, political, cultural, and socioeconomic context and wider contributing factors that facilitate or influence their use. This involves the examination of the broader causes and contributing factors to the insecurity and instability that create the environment that promotes the use of IEDs and other associated threats to security, stability, and development. With such a mindset when developing national C-IED enterprises it is possible to identify how the various elements which make up an IED system can be targeted and degraded to overmatch or at least match their impact in support of wider security, stabilization, development, and political initiatives. However, strategic thinking when building a national C-IED enterprise does not address the issue of a state needing to show success against the IED system, in being able to protect its safety and security along with that of its citizens and interests. This challenge can be considered under two different scenarios. The first scenario involves an emerging non-established IED threat with the second being an established potentially growing IED threat. This first scenario lends itself to such strategic thinking when developing a national C-IED enterprise; however, it too has significant challenges associated with it. Firstly, a state can be reluctant to invest time, personnel, expertise, and finances in something that is not an existential threat. Secondly, since the threat is only assessed and potentially emerging, it is difficult to achieve the necessary understanding needed to inform the C-IED enterprise required. In such a scenario a state may wish to undertake a threat assessment based on regional IED threats and horizon scan for potential threat migration5 to inform them of the IED threat(s) which they will need to be able to counter. This can then inform the C-IED enterprise which the state wishes to establish and the associated resources which will be required. This will in turn inform the C-IED

stakeholder community that needs to be engaged and nurtured to support the planned C-IED enterprise. In such a scenario, it is ideal for a state to be proactive in the development of a national C-IED enterprise with the appropriate balance between preventative and responsive C-IED efforts by establishing an appropriate framework of threat aligned, sustainable C-IED elements which reflect the state’s desired vision for the enterprise. Unfortunately, in many cases the state will seek to establish a national C-IED enterprise in response to an established and potentially growing IED threat. Such a scenario is in many ways more challenging than the previous scenario considered. While the threat may be established, which can facilitate better understanding and hence informing the IED enterprise required, it is likely that the IED system owing to its dynamic and evolving nature will adapt to circumvent the C-IED efforts introduced against it. This challenge of trying to counter an adaptive IED system may be described as trying to build a plane while in flight and under attack. Secondly, the previously highlighted challenge of needing to show results in terms of the safety and security of the state, its citizens and interests typically results in the development of a C-IED enterprise which is response focused and even device centric with little or no initial investment in preventative C-IED efforts. Added to these issues, depending on the wider security environment, it is possible for there to be an initial military or security force centric C-IED stakeholder community, which is not what a comprehensive approach to C-IED seeks. In such necessarily reactive approaches to established IED threats, initial imbalances in the C-IED enterprise developed, can in time be addressed through the gradual but continual investment in appropriate and sustainable preventative C-IED efforts. It is again acknowledged that preventative C-IED efforts typically take longer to mature with the need for political understanding of their benefit followed by political backing of such comprehensive approaches to addressing the use of IEDs.

5 Often referred to a ‘spillover’ of IED use from neighbouring or regional IED affected states.

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CONCLUSION A definition of an IED system has been laid out to facilitate an effective understanding of the problem which C-IED efforts at a national level are required to address. The rationale for more comprehensive approaches to C-IED at the national level have been provided with the proposal that there is a need for a whole of society approach to effectively address their use. A comprehensive approach to national C-IED can be best summed up as a national C-IED enterprise. This is the collective term to describe all the C-IED efforts which stakeholders invest in, intended to at least match but ideally overmatch the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs. A national C-IED enterprise can involve anything which is intended to predict discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to, or neutralize, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks. The stakeholder community involved in a C-IED enterprise may include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Such diverse stakeholders can have complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, a cooperative culture and collaborative efforts between members within the enterprise to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the assessed IED threat faced. When building a threat aligned national C-IED enterprise that reflects the State’s vision for it, a strategic mindset may assist in identifying an appropriate C-IED stakeholder community. Once a C-IED stakeholder community has been identified, outreach and engagement with those identified as potential members are needed to inform them of their role and importance. Once such efforts to build the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system have been completed, it is necessary that it is legally empowered with a designated lead entity. This will be a topic of a subsequent article. ■

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas. Linkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulamoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

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LEGALLY EMPOWERED C-IED ENTERPRISES By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

s part of a series of articles related to national and regional Counter IED (C-IED) efforts, the author has discussed amongst other issues, the need to build a C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system.1 A C-IED enterprise is the collective term to describe all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that contribute to the C-IED efforts2 intended to at least match but ideally overmatch the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs. It can involve anything which is intended to predict discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks. This article will seek to outline the need for legally empowered C-IED enterprises through an appropriate legal framework which matches the C-IED approach taken by the State. The development

of an appropriate national C-IED approach linked to a supporting legal framework under which a national C-IED enterprise is undertaken, will support internal coherence, a cooperative culture, and collaborative efforts between members within the enterprise. This is best achieved when it is captured in appropriate legislation which clearly identifies each stakeholder’s roles, duties, responsibilities, jurisdictions, and interrelationships. Such an approach may reduce the inevitable turf battles, jockeying for positions of power and influence and unnecessary competition which often arises when various entities compete for resources and budgets. It can also reduce the challenges faced in sharing information between C-IED stakeholders, which is essential for an effective C-IED enterprise. The East African IGAD3 regional

1 An IED system is the combination of people, processes and material that go into supporting, funding, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing and publicising any element of an IED attack, including the indoctrination, training and life support of the persons involved. 2 C-IED efforts refer to all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that collectively make up a C-IED enterprise. C-IED efforts can include, inter alia, training, mentoring, advising, accompanying, assisting, technology and equipment provision and intelligence support. 3 The East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986 to mitigate the effects of the recurring severe droughts and other natural disasters that resulted in widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the region. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda – acted through the UN to establish the IGADD for development and drought control in their region. Eritrea became the seventh member after attaining independence in 1993 and in 2011 South Sudan joined IGAD as the eighth member state. With the new emerging political and socio-economic challenges, the assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in Addis Ababa in April 1995, resolved to revitalize IGADD and expand areas of cooperation among Member States. The new and revitalized IGAD was launched during the 5th Summit of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in November 1996 in Djibouti. The Summit endorsed the decision to enhance regional cooperation in the priority areas of food security and environmental protection, economic cooperation, regional integration and social development, peace and security.

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C-IED strategy proposes two approaches to national C-IED strategies, namely a criminal justice model approach and a war model approach. A criminal justice model approach to C-IED may best be suited for low intensity IED threat environments while a war model approach may be more suited for high-threat IED threat environments which are non-permissive to state security forces. In addition to a criminal justice or war model approach, there is also the potential for a state to undertake C-IED under a counter-terrorism (CT)4 or a counter insurgency (COIN) approach. We will first examine what is meant by the concept of the legal framework under which a national C-IED enterprise is undertaken.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF A C-IED ENTERPRISE For this paper, legal framework refers to the rules, rights, and obligations that all members of the C-IED stakeholder community must operate under, as set out in a system of legal documents. The documents within a legal framework can include, inter alia, a country's constitution, legislation, and policy regulations as well as contracts. This set of legal documents which make up the legal framework of a national C-IED enterprise will vary depending on the C-IED approach taken by the state.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MODEL APPROACH TO C-IED The UNIDIR capability maturity model self-assessment tool states, “effective security sector governance and

compliance within the rule of law are fundamental to all successful C-IED activities.”5 The suitable national legislation prohibiting all activities associated with the development, acquisition of components, manufacture and use of IEDs,6 is the upstream element of a criminal justice model approach to C-IED, with ‘judicial process’ being the complementary downstream component.7 A state may be proactive in establishing a national C-IED enterprise due to regional use and the fear of spillover from neighboring states. In such a scenario, a state may choose to treat IED use as a criminal offence using existing legislation; however such legislation may need to be amended. Legal reforms may be necessary to establish the required legislative instruments, government policies and legal powers to empower a criminal justice model approach. While no comprehensive international instrument currently exists to address the threat posed by IEDs,8 where possible reference should be made to supporting national and international instruments when undertaking such legal reforms. An example of a potential national instrument would be amending existing national CT legislation to account for IED use, if not already covered. A criminal justice model approach to C-IED can involve national police, intelligence, and security agencies (civilian security forces) taking primacy to prevent, pre-empt, respond to, and reduce the use and threatened use as well as the impact of IEDs within a State. This includes IED exploitation of IED incident scenes as well as the

4 Terrorism is taken to refer to an act involving (destructive) physical violence intended to cause damage to person(s) and or public or private infrastructure, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate or to compel a state, population or organization to undertake or to abstain from undertaking any specific action. The UN has not adopted a single definition for terrorism. Noting that there are numerous definitions of terrorism, an aggregate of those elements which recur most frequently have resulted in the following: Terrorism is a tactic primarily used by non-state actors, which can be an entity either with no clear leadership or one without hierarchical organization (i.e., one that does have clear command and control), to create a psychological climate of fear within the civilian population using threats or actions in order to compensate for the legitimate political power they do not possess. It can be distinguished from guerrilla warfare, criminal abduction, or economic sabotage, although organizations that practice terror can resort to these too. Source: Adapted from Security Risk Management Manual, UN Security Management System, Issued 11 Dec 2015, Revised Oct 2017 5 (UNIDIR 2020, 20) 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid, 20. 8 IEDs are addressed under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Additional Protocol II. IEDs are also considered in the 2017 UNGA resolution 2370 on threats posed by IEDs, unanimously adopted by the UN security council, which called on all States to eliminate the supply of weapons, including but not limited to IED components, and their acquisition to those involved in terrorist acts. Resolution 2370, is the first dedicated to addressing the linkage between weaponry and terrorist acts, thus acting as the key UN document linking arms control to counter terrorism.

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Figure 1. Possible IED Network Personnel subsequent exploitation of information recorded and evidence recovered primarily in support of building judicial cases for prosecution within the state’s legal system. Such prosecution can be against IED network personnel,9 IED materiel supply chains10 and the processes of the IED system.11 In a criminal justice model approach, the military may be used in an internal security role that is supportive of civilian security forces. This may be necessary when resource requirements are beyond the capabilities and or capacity of the civilian security

forces and are used as such for a limited period of time and or for defined tasks. In States where the primacy for specialized state security capabilities such as defeat the device capabilities12,13 reside permanently with the military, the related military personnel may operate in support of or under civil authority.

WAR MODEL APPROACH TO C-IED In a war model approach to C-IED, the military have primacy in developing and implementing strategies and activities to counter the use of IEDs. This

Personnel needed to support IED attacks involving those directly involved in the supply, transport, manufacture, planning, emplacement, execution of an attack as well as those indirectly involved in such activities as financing and publicising attacks and includes those who facilitate such activities actively or passively. 10 IED materiel supply chains refer to all elements including organisations, people, activities, information and resources of an IED system involved in the procurement, manufacture, possession, storage, importation, transport and sale of IED components and other items used to execute IED attacks. IED components can involve power sources, initiators, energetic material (often referred to simply as ‘explosives’ or main charges), containers, enhancements and switches. 11 IED system processes refer to all actions or steps used by an IED system to facilitate the supply, transport, manufacture, planning, emplacement, or execution of an IED attack including financial and publicising activities. 12 Defeat the device refers to a defensive line of operation involving a suite of responsive C-IED efforts which include all actions and activities designed to reduce the number of or the effect of IED initiations. Many C-IED efforts can be considered defeat the device activities, including, mobility planning advice; and Force Protection (FP) advice; search activities; route clearance package capabilities; Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) activities; Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) assets; and Improvised Device Disposal (IEDD) activities. 13 In some cases, Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI), host nation support from one state to an IED affected state and local population engagement have been considered as defeat the device activities. The author contends that WTI is more appropriately considered as an enabler to defeat the device and attack the network / degrade the system activities. Similarly, host nation support can be better considered as a component of C-IED regional and international cooperation. Finally, local population engagement is considered as part of Understanding and Preparation within a C-IED enterprise.

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approach may be appropriate when IED use has resulted in non-permissive ungoverned space(s) across or within areas of a State, making activities by police or other elements of a state’s security apparatus not possible. According to the IGAD C-IED strategy, the military should only be employed in countering the use of IEDs after the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of using military personnel have been considered. Potential consequences in using a military-led response to IEDs include: • Heightened risk of undermining democratic principles and the rule of law; • Increased civilian-military tensions regarding the legitimacy of the controlled use of violence or use of force against non-state actors; • Ineffective local population engagement due to distrust of state military or lack of ability to protect those who do engage with the State’s military from reprisal attacks. A war model approach to C-IED may have less of an emphasis on building cases for the judicial prosecution of the IED system but focussed more on generating intelligence products for use in intelligence led operations against the IED system. However this is not to say that under a war model approach legal prosecution of the IED system cannot take place or intelligence led operations cannot be supported under a criminal justice model approach, provided they are legally empowered to do so. A tactical approach involving the demolition or counter charge clearance of IEDs, viewing them as counter mobility obstacles, may at times be necessary. Such counter charge clearance of IEDs places little or no emphasis on IED exploitation and may take place under combat conditions or other situations when mobility is essential and operational urgency precludes longer responses. Such counter charge clearance of IEDs may be considered as a combat engineering approach to C-IED.

COUNTER TERRORISM (CT) APPROACH TO C-IED In a situation in which an IED threat emerges within a state and establishes itself without the state being capable of implementing effective C-IED efforts to counter them, the state may choose to draft new legislation which considers IED use as a terrorist rather than a criminal offence. This may include the passing of special or emergency powers which could include terrorism courts, special criminal courts, non-jury courts or similar. A CT approach to the use of IEDs could involve all proactive and reactive efforts to deter, prevent and counter IED use through a broad spectrum of law enforcement, political, psychological, social, economic and (para-) military efforts. CT approaches can be civilian security force or at times military led, in which case it can typically involve specialist military units, or it can be a hybrid of civilian and military elements working together. An example of hybrid CT approach may be the combination of military EOD and special forces units working under or alongside civilian intelligence, operations and investigations personnel.14

COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN) APPROACH TO C-IED An alternative to the IGAD war model approach to C-IED could be a COIN approach in which IED use is part of an insurgency within a State. In such situations, IEDs are typically but one of several weapon systems and tactics used by a non-state actor intended to undermine and replace the existing state. In such circumstances the state may use their own military or paramilitary forces in an internal security role, and, or involve regional or international coalitions. A COIN approach involves C-IED efforts being undertaken within a wider COIN strategy, in which winning the hearts and minds and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace is seen as central to the efforts being undertaken. This approach intends to deprive the IED system of their support base and to gain vital information on them. To achieve

14 Source: Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.

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this selective political, economic and social reforms, civil actions and psychological operations are used in support of efforts to counter their use. The theory of COIN is that from secure bases larger and larger parts of the insurgent controlled areas of influence are made non-permissive to them, as the security forces increase their own freedom of activity in these areas. Although there is no defined template for the conduct of COIN operations, it may involve disrupt, clear, hold, build and deter/deny phases. Various C-IED efforts can be involved in all or parts of these phases of a COIN campaign, depending on the use of IEDs within the insurgency and the COIN campaign structure. Various legal instruments will be part of any COIN approach to C-IED. In the case of C-IED being part of an internal security COIN campaign, the legal basis and relationship between various elements of the state security apparatus and the C-IED enterprise needs to be clearly set out. This is particularly important in relation to the handling and use of information and evidence in the investigation of the IED system. Different levels of information and evidence handling standards will be needed whether they are to be used to build legal cases against the IED system or primarily used in support of intelligence led operations. In the case of C-IED being part of a

particular, this may require an agreement on the appropriate handling of biometric information between the states involved.

multinational coalition COIN campaign, various Status Of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Status Of Mission Agreements (SOMA), Memorandums Of Understanding (MOU) and other legal instruments need to be in place to ensure the effective and efficient operation of the C-IED enterprise which is to be established and maintained as part of the wider COIN campaign. For example, in the case that IED exploitation is to involve support and assistance from a coalition partner the protocols for the exchange of information and evidence needs to be clearly established to optimize understanding and other efforts that make up the C-IED enterprise. In

approach which is appropriately legally empowered. In situations where the threat significantly escalates and an insurgency emerges a COIN approach may need to be adapted and in a worst-case scenario a war model approach may be needed. This is not to say that such a stepwise approach may be appropriate or possible in all scenarios. Alternatively, there is the potential to transition from a criminal justice model approach straight to a COIN or war model approach as well as the possibility of a state faced with a new IED threat initially adapting a CT, COIN or war model approach. In all cases the approach taken should consider the threat, its

ADAPTING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF A C-IED ENTERPRISE According to the IGAD C-IED strategy, a war model approach to C-IED may ‘prove preferable at the initial stage of countering certain IED environments but should continuously be framed in terms of and tied to goals of transition to the criminal justice model for durable C-IED capabilities and environment shaping.’ This transition from a war model to a criminal justice model approach is an important one, in that it highlights the potential need for change in the approach and hence legal framework under which C-IED is undertaken as a national C-IED enterprise evolves. There are a multitude of reasons why this change in approach to C-IED may be necessary with the need to account for changes in the IED threat or the maturing of the C-IED enterprise being two common reasons. A state may, for example, initially have an emerging IED threat which is addressed through a criminal justice model approach, but in time their use develops to undermine the state and overwhelm its capacity15 to counter them. In such a case the state may need to transition to a CT

15 Capacity refers to the means of an individual/organization to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual and collective competencies and experience), physical capacity (appropriate assets) and institutional capacity (systems, structures and organisational culture in place).

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Figure 2. C-IED spectrum of approaches scale, the capabilities16 existing in the state and their associated capacities, the desired end state and the means it wishes to develop for its C-IED enterprise. One means to consider the various approaches to C-IED outlined, is to consider them as variations in how national C-IED may legally be approached and that they have overlap in certain elements. This can lead us to model them as a C-IED spectrum of approaches as illustrated in Figure 2. The utility of such a spectrum of C-IED approaches is that it can be used to illustrate the overlap between the various approaches and avoid the perspective of each approach being siloed. It also lends itself to the idea that over time a State may transition to different points along the spectrum depending on variables such as changes in the IED threat and the state’s capabilities and capacities to counter their use as the national C-IED enterprise matures. Finally it can also be used as a tool to assist in the planning and development of a national C-IED enterprise in terms

of a baseline assessment establishing understanding of the assessed current use of IEDs and existing C-IED capabilities and capacities. Various factors may be considered in determining existing C-IED capabilities and capacities of which those given by the acronym FILLED-OIL-TIPP17 is used in the example provided in Figure 3. Once existing C-IED capabilities and capacities are determined, the desired national C-IED enterprise should be agreed upon. By comparison of existing capabilities and capacities with the desired national C-IED enterprise, gaps can be determined which can then be used to inform a C-IED strategy in terms of the appropriate ways and means that can facilitate the development of the planned national C-IED enterprise. From such a strategy a national C-IED action plan can be developed. For example, IEDs may appear as part of a terrorist campaign within a state with well-developed capabilities and capacities to counter their use allowing a criminal justice model or CT approach. Alternatively, if there are only limited or

16 Capability refers to the means of an organization or entity to be proficient in a stated activity from the collective contribution of assets and competency of individuals and groups to undertake it safely, effectively and efficiently. 17 FILLED-OIL-TIPP is an acronym for Finances/Funding sources – Infrastructure – Logistics – Legal framework – Equipment – Doctrine & concepts – Organisation – Interoperability – Leadership – Training – Information – Personnel – Policy. It can be used as a tool to support the assessment of capabilities and capacities available to respond to the use of IEDs. From this a gap analysis between what is currently available in terms of capability and capacity and the desired end-state can be undertaken. Such a gap analysis can then inform the capability development and capacity generation roadmap requirements in terms of resource requirements.

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Figure 3. Assessing C-IED Capability and Capacity Gaps for National C-IED Enterprises

non-existent capabilities and capacities an initial combat engineering approach may be necessary. In time as capabilities are developed and capacities are generated a transition to a criminal justice model or CT approach can be made.

EXAMPLES OF C-IED LEGISLATION C-IED legislation can be specific in support of a C-IED enterprise or can be part of wider law enforcement, security and defence legislation. For

example, regulations to control the access to key IED components are needed as part of any coherent C-IED enterprise. In this regard, the EU has made significant strides to increase control of access to potential IED precursor chemicals which is an example of specific C-IED legislation. The UNIDIR capability maturity model self-assessment tool tells us national legislation and regulations should cover the lawful use of explosives (and explosive precursors).18 Such regulations should consider:19

18 (UNIDIR 2020, 20) 19 (UNIDIR 2020, 20)

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• The lawful acquisition, control, transport, storage and end use of explosives by civilian entities (e.g. industries associated with mining, quarrying, exploration and extraction of oil and gas, and civil engineering and demolition); • The acquisition, storage and use of ammunition and explosives by the armed forces and the law enforcement community; • The storage and transport of explosives. Wider security legislation which can have multiple security benefits can be enacted that can support a national C-IED enterprise. Examples of such legislation include counter terrorism financing and money laundering legislation. Similarly legislation to regulate new and emerging technologies and processes that can be employed by IED networks can have multiple security benefits; however all such legislation needs to consider unintended consequences which may interfere with the legitimate use and employment of emerging technologies and processes and hence negatively impact trade and commerce.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Owing to the nuances of the IED threat faced by a state along with the uniqueness of individual

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United

state legal systems coupled with the individuality of respective national C-IED enterprises, the legal approach taken to counter the use or threatened use of IEDs will vary significantly. When a State understands the approach taken in countering IEDs along with the desired end state of their C-IED enterprise, the gap between existing and desired capabilities and capacities can be identified. This in turn can be used to inform the optimal ways and required means, which in turn will inform the C-IED strategy to be developed and related national C-IED action plan. Regardless of whether a State is undertaking C-IED under a criminal justice, a CT, a COIN or a war model approach it needs to be defined legally under the appropriate legal framework. ■

Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas. Linkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulamoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

CONCLUSION

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INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY By Colonel H R Naidu Gade (Retd.)

NTRODUCTION

India today faces immense internal security challenges, militancy in the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, insurgencies in the North Eastern States and the Maoist dominated ‘Red Corridor’ covering about 80 of 100 districts of India, terrorism sponsored from across the border and civil disorder on various social issues. A large number of security forces which include the Army, the Central Armed Police Forces, and the Police Forces of the 29 States are deployed to meet the challenges. India’s Internal Security Challenges. (Source: www.governancetoday.co.in) Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have over time become the weapon of choice THE THREATS for these elements and constitute a great part of the In India, the IED threats emanate from a number of overall security threat. In the absence of a common networks of militants, insurgents and terrorists, who approach, doctrine, strategy, techniques, tactics and operate in an environment characterised by the easy procedures in countering the IEDs, each of these flow of dual-use components and one with access to forces operates within their respective standard operating procedures, lacking uniformity. Hence, there is a need for a common strategy based on basic principles (doctrine) and a plan to Counter IEDs.

locally available explosive materials. These networks adapt rapidly, have proven to be resilient, and quickly respond to any counter measures. They adapt technology; rapidly evolve tactics, techniques,

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procedures, and operate unbounded by any rules of engagement and moral constraints. Today’s IEDs, relatively simple “low-tech” devices, routinely use command-wire, victim-operated, or radio-controlled triggers, and have been routinely employed against

targets including a variety of innovative techniques like drones. There is no one solution to defeat the IED because there is no one enemy IED network.

security forces and civilian targets. The threat networks employ a variety of means to deliver IEDs to their

To counter these enduring threats, lasting strategies and capabilities which are affordable, adaptable, and

IED Incidents India-2021. (Source: Bomb Shell, NSG, India) 34 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

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INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

IEDs - A Global Problem. (Source: AOAV, UK) support a whole-of-government approach will have to be developed and integrated. These capabilities include: • rapid acquisition and fielding of C-IED solutions; • enabling analytic capability to understand and counter threat-network activities; • establish standards and provide training; • exploit weapons technical intelligence;

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING NATIONAL STRATEGY

These enduring capabilities should be employed through mutually supporting lines of operation which include: • offensive operations against complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure; • providing technologies to detect IED components, neutralise the triggering devices, and mitigate the effects of an IED blast.

The common strategy should be governed by certain basic principles which should be to: • discover, prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate IED attacks and their consequences; • focus on protecting lives and properties and minimising damage; • enhance nation’s effectiveness to counter-IEDs by leveraging, integrating, and aligning all governmental efforts, which include the security forces, intelligence agencies, law enforcement organisations, regulatory bodies, diplomatic entities and research organisations; • engage the people and make counter-IED efforts people centric; • involve the academia, non-governmental organisations, and the industry that would add value to the overall C-IED efforts; • and seek and promote cooperation with

Likely capability gaps need to be identified, maintain focus to develop C-IED solutions and leverage technologies related to the C-IED operations.

international organisations in order to reduce the IED threat by sharing intelligence, building capacities, and developing technologies and complementary support activities.

• and synchronising actions among interagency, interstate, international, and other C-IED stakeholders.

counteriedreport.com 35

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN The implementation of the national policy necessitates making of the strategic plan encompassing all the basic phases of C-IED operations i.e.: • attacking the hostile networks; • preparing the forces; • defeating the devices; • and exploiting IED incidences. The objectives of the strategic plan should be to: • rapidly identify, validate, and prioritise immediate and future C-IED requirements enabling security agencies to effectively attack complex IED production and support networks; • detect and neutralise IEDs; employ trained forces capable of addressing the IED threat; • provide operational and intelligence fusion, analysis, training, and sensitive activity support to the security and other agencies; • enable freedom of maneuver from IEDs; • enhance a collective ability to counter threat networks and supporting activities; • seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutions to fulfil validated requirements of security forces; • C-IED training and capability development that prepare security forces to successfully attack the network and defeat the device in contemporary and future environments; • and build interagency, interstate, and international C-IED community of action through collaborative planning.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN The strategic plan should: • set the path for the C-IED effort in collaboration with domestic and international agencies and organisations to enable the defeat of the device; • facilitate public outreach and awareness of IED threats and preparedness measures that would enable public reporting of suspicious activity to local authorities through enhanced information sharing;

36 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Pillars of Counter- IED Operations. (Source: CBRNe Secure India) • cater for a process to identify IED networks, their tactics, techniques and procedures; • coordinate IED collection and exploitation efforts; • better gather, share, and analyse forensic, technical, and biometric information; • and enhance processes and mechanisms to analyse more effectively and share IED exploitation results. The security and intelligence agencies should: • improve their understanding of technologies, trends, and networks by enhancing the reporting on and dissemination of criminal intelligence, incident information, and suspicious activity involving explosives; • make counter-IED-specific intelligence resources more accessible to those who need it; • conduct multi-mode data analysis of IED patterns, trends, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to anticipate future IED threat evolutions; • and advance the analytic tools available to better link information across sources, including financial information, biometrics, movements of people and technology, and other intelligence, in a secure manner.

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

Preparing the Force. (Source: Indian Army)

Attack the Networks. (Source: www.zeenews.india.com) counteriedreport.com 37

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

Defeating the Device. (Source: www.dailyexcelsior.com) The strategic plan should envisage developing and maintaining deployable C-IED capabilities and resources including personnel, equipment, and continuous research to upgrade technologies, techniques and procedures.

• promoting mechanisms for industry to better detect, report, and prevent the illegitimate acquisition, theft, or diversion of explosives and related materials;

Conducting joint field exercises with these C-IED resources to improve their efficacy should be included in the plan. The strategic plan should cater for developing and using advanced protection and detection technologies and capabilities for screening, detecting, and protecting people, facilities, transportation systems, critical Infrastructure and commercial activities. It should enhance abilities to identify, prevent, and interdict the illicit diversion or transport of select materials used Leveraging Technology. (Source: www.bharat-rakshak.com) to manufacture IEDs through:

38 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

• enhancing enforcement of laws regulating commerce in explosives and materials that could be used as IED components; • increasing national awareness of actions to mitigate the use of munitions, precursor chemical, and other components in IED construction; • evaluating methods to further restrict, control, or monitor select dual-use precursors and components; • and coordinating domestic and international efforts to investigate, disrupt, dismantle and arrest members of networks involved in the financing and illicit movement of IED components.

Force Multipliers. (Source: Indian Army)

International Collaboration. (Source: Indian Army) counteriedreport.com 39

INDIA – THE NATIONAL COUNTER-IED STRATEGY

DESIGNATE A NODAL AGENCY

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The other important elements of the plan are: • Updating assessment of national counter-IED training and equipment needs and priorities; • coordinating delivery of standardised training to security and intelligence agencies; • incorporating the lessons learned from previous incidences into training and equipment requirements; • evolving and implementing national guidelines for explosives detection canine teams; • and leveraging technology to address counter-IED capability gaps at the national, state, and local levels. Developing interstate and interagency counter-IED operational plans to advance the nation's ability to counter the use of IEDs, establishing measures to assess overall effectiveness and progress, and enhancing counter-IED preparedness planning for national, state, and local response should form part of the strategy. The plan should include a designated nodal agency to coordinate and track progress across all the agencies at national, state and local levels towards building the C-IED capabilities. It should facilitate harnessing the innovative potential of the research and development organisations to meet a dynamic, complex, and adaptive threat and to promote an informed and agile research and acquisitions process that stays ahead of the threat, and develops timely and effective C-IED systems and solutions.

CONCLUSION Under the Indian Constitution, the subject of law and order/internal security is the responsibility of the 29 state governments. The role of national government is limited to coordination and supplementing the resources of the states in dealing with the security challenges. Due to the federal nature of governance, and in a case when a large number of state governments are ruled by political parties whose ideology is at variance with that of the party in power at the centre, evolving a common national doctrine and strategy and ensuring its effective implementation by the states requires great patience, persuasion and political statesmanship. ■

40 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran [B E (Civil), M Sc (Defence Studies), M B A (HR)] Commissioned into the Corps of Combat Engineers. A Civil Engineer, and Security Professional, with 47 years of rich experience in the field of Combat Engineering, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNe) Defence, Security & Disaster Management and Counter-IED Operations. Is a qualified CBRN and Counter-IED Professional. Is a former Member International Civil Service while working as Chief CW Inspector 1997-2004 with the ‘Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)’, The Netherlands, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2013. Led teams of international professionals on many verification missions to various member countries, to verify the inventory of Chemical Weapons and monitor their destruction. Presently, Chief Consultant with ‘CBRNe Secure India’ a ‘forum and a knowledge centre’ for bringing awareness in the general public, government and security entities on the threats arising from the use of CBRNe material and their disastrous consequences. A prolific writer and speaker, participated in various international and domestic conferences on CBRN Security, Disaster Management and Counter Explosive Issues and writes articles for professional journals worldwide on these subjects.

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS: A PRIMER By William Ramirez, a veteran of the Colombian military from Military Engineers Corps

he discovery and removal of explosive ordnance is extremely challenging, particularly dangerous, and is an often thankless ordeal. The experts tasked with completing this life-or-death work deserve tools of the trade produced with their comfort, safety, and success in mind. Proper training, budget constraints, and challenging work environments are but a few of the factors that add to the stress of this objective. Militaries, demining groups, and countermine agencies must make smart choices when it comes to handheld mine detection and UXO removal detection equipment. Years ago, some of these groups used magnetometers, which came with several disadvantages. Magnetometers are only used for locating ferrous (iron) metals, and they frequently emitted many false signals when “hot rocks” were encountered. Usually containing magnetite, hot rocks generate an audible signal response that frustrates users when they are unable to eliminate such false responses. Modern metal detection equipment goes beyond the capability of such magnetometers. Various standards, such as the Military Standard (MIL-STD)

Countermine/ERW detectors must take factors like durability, submersibility, cost, and even manufacturing procedures into account when making such an important purchase. Each agency will develop its own criteria for the purchase of detection gear, often related to the strategic mission of the gear. What may be the right fit for one military or humanitarian group may prove unworkable for others. This article is intended to serve as a primer for key decision-makers in the UXO/ERW field in relation to fulfilling such needs. The following list of factors represents a great starting point to weigh the various countermine/ERW features available in today’s detection marketplace.

or Defense Standard, were established after World War II to be used as standards by military branches and as guidelines for rating a product’s ability to withstand extreme conditions. Purchasing agents of

specific targets with very little metallic content in them. It is highly recommended that your users have a safe testing area where the detection of specific “targets” can be verified.

1. Detection strength / ability Each group will have a unique set of test targets that absolutely must be detected. Test plots may include parameters such as: depth of detection; ability to pick up a target within a junk-laden area; ability to overcome electrical interference (EMI); ability to ground balance to terrain that is highly mineralized; or ability to detect

counteriedreport.com 41

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

Ethiopian Army officers receiving training and general knowledge on IED and UXO detection in field conditions.

2. Ease of use In many operations it is critical that the detection gear be simple to operate. In Ukraine, for example, there is such a huge need for mine clearance that very basic metal detectors are often operated due to a lack of funds for more expensive equipment. Ease of use is especially important on the front lines of any combat zone, especially when factoring in the additional hazards of soldier fatigue and stress. Even in humanitarian demining, where more funds may be available for high-tech equipment, it is imperative that operators clearly understand all

42 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

functions of their countermine detectors. In many cases, these operators are not advanced users of metal detection equipment. Their success and their safety depend on their ability to comprehend the key functions of their equipment. One such key feature that should be included on your detector is ground balance, a quick function where the user can eliminate environmental instability by balancing the detector’s electronics to the current soil condition. This should be a direct-drive control that does not require the user to fumble through submenus to reach the Ground Balance function.

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

3. Weather resistance / submersible In areas where streams or shallow water areas have been contaminated with explosive ordnance, your detection units will need to be fully submersible to at least a shallow depth of 3 meters or more. Some highly specialized applications may require even greater submersion depth. Even if your countermine units will not intentionally be fully submerged, they need to be able to withstand the elements. This can include heavy rain, blowing sands, dusty environments, and extreme heat or cold. The MIL-STD-810H certification means that a product has met nearly thirty test situations regarding environmental conditions and has passed them. Such devices qualify as being heat-resistant, dust-resistant, water-resistant, and shock-resistant. These units have been tested for leakage, high and low temperature shocks, rust testing, transport shock, random vibration, humidity, and other elements. Not all detectors are well suited to some of our planet’s most punishing environments. In some parts of Latin America, jungle conditions are hot and humid, where temperatures can easily exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit and where humidity hovers around 90%. Less expensive “hobby” detectors used as an economical tool for ordnance removal may work in clear weather. But the same devices may not be engineered to keep out blowing sand in the desert or to prevent water from seeping into the control box even when the unit is only momentarily submerged. The environmental conditions of an active war zone can reduce the life expectancy of these hobby detectors from multiple years to just a few weeks.

4. Ergonomics Countermine detectors must be easily deployed. Factors to consider include weight, compactability, and storage/transport considerations. Does the unit easily fold up or compact down to a manageable size for transport? Does it come with a protective case or carry bag that can easily be hauled to your site? Regarding compactability, you should learn whether the detector is usable while in a collapsed or partly collapsed state. Certain search space constraints may

Military demining in the Colombian jungle.

mean that the detector cannot be used effectively while fully extended, and different operators may require different shaft lengths due to their own height and reach. In some military demining situations, the operator may be on his or her knees or even in a prone position while sweeping the coil for unseen ordnance. Being able to adapt to the end user is important. What is the weight of the detector? Units that are very light should be studied regarding their durability. If made of lightweight plastics, will the unit survive a drop on rocky soil? If the unit is more robustly built but slightly heavier, are there straps or harnesses available to help alleviate strain on the user’s arm?

counteriedreport.com 43

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

to see a detector operating quietly in an office environment – because not all countermine detectors can handle this electrical noise. The sands of the Tatacoa Desert or river lands in Caquetá department in Colombia are contaminated with iron and aluminum that can easily blind the wrong kind of detector. That said, there are use cases where a VLF detector may be preferred. Often, VLF detectors are more capable at detecting the small copper wires and triggers used in some landmines and IEDs. Whether the need for environmental compensation or small wire detection is greater will depend on your use case. Does the unit comply with humanitarian demining standards? While not necessary for all applications, compliance with the test and evaluation requirements for mine action equipment provided under IMAS 03.40, particularly CWA 14747-1 and CWA 14747-2, serves as a useful baseline for metal detector demining operations in both humanitarian and military contexts.

Unexploded ordnance detected during operations in the jungles of Panama.

5. Technologies and frequencies Mine detection equipment often utilizes one of two frequency technologies: a fixed, single very low frequency (VLF) format, or a pulse-induction (PI) technology that employs a variety of frequencies with a varying pulse rate. In highly mineralized soils, a PI machine is better suited to overcoming this environmental challenge than a VLF machine. These difficult soils – which can originate naturally in diverse environments or artificially through the detritus of a combat zone – must be addressed ahead of purchase. Detectors that cannot handle the expected soil conditions are rarely able to compensate for them with a simple change of settings. For saltwater conditions, the detection gear must include a salt elimination/ reduction mode, or a PI detector may be best utilized. There are many kinds of “noisy” detection environments. I have seen officials in Bogotá shocked

44 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Danger warning signs in a Colombian mountain area plagued with guerrilla land mines.

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

Training of Halo operators in Macarena's Serranía mountains in Meta, Colombia.

6. Important key features These include static detection (also known as nonmotion mode detection), stealth modes, sensitivity, and electrical interference (EMI) reduction. A true nonmotion mode allows a detector’s search head to hover motionless above a metallic target and continue reporting the target’s presence. A motion-mode detector requires the user to continually swing the search head back and forth over a target to generate a response, which increases operator fatigue and elevates the ongoing hazard of nearby ordnance. Stealth mode features include any that allow operators

to keep a low profile while detecting, including alternate lighting, sound, and alarm options. All these features need to be easily accessible, either as direct-drive functions or with a quick press of a menu button or two. A feature that is hard to access or understand is close to useless in a high-stress environment, particularly when training may be in short supply. Humanitarian demining efforts can tolerate a more complicated interface than those used in a combat environment. Where speed is a low priority, cost or other features may take precedence.

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SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

7. Durability What is the build quality of the detection unit you are evaluating? Has it been tested for withstanding accidental drops? Is it comprised of light plastic rods or arm cuffs that might easily snap during transport or against pressure? Extreme field conditions, like heavy mud or mountainous inclines, can increase the risk that the operator drops his detector. Vehicular accidents are also more common in Counter-IED contexts like a war zone, where roads may become unreliable, and the presence of enemy forces may exacerbate difficult driving conditions. When a detector falls out of the back of the transport, does it survive the impact with the road? Working in dense jungle terrain like that found in Panama’s Darién Province has taught me the importance of this requirement. Treacherous terrain means that operators are exposed to significant tripping hazards. What will happen to the detector not just when it is dropped, but when its operator falls directly onto it? It is important to work with equipment where operators are able to make repairs in the field as Training of CCM operators from a humanitarian demining organization in necessary. Check to see if spare Algeciras mountain town of Huila Department. parts are available from the locations that can be remote or without reliable power. manufacturer as replacements when A realistic assessment of this trade-off is easy to such repairs are necessary. neglect, especially when end users place a high premium on low weight. But a metal detector with no 8. Power source Alkaline or rechargeable batteries are easy to find in charge is as good as broken in the field. For swappable most countries and are therefore used in many batteries, a higher premium should be placed on countermine detectors. Built-in, rechargeable batteries detectors that use the most commonly available types. remove excess weight from the machine, but come at AA batteries are ubiquitous, but not all alternatives are the cost of requiring available charging stations in so common.

46 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

SMART CHOICES IN SOURCING COUNTER-IED DETECTORS

9. Supplier considerations This is equally important as some of the features above when evaluating a countermine/ERW detector. It is vital that the manufacturer has a solid qualitycontrol process in place, that they utilize militarygrade components, and have a robust production standard for creating consistent products. What is the country of origin? What is the typical acquisition process through this manufacturer? How long are lead times? Some suppliers have units readily available in their warehouse, whereas another manufacturer might need a one to two-month lead-time to produce a larger order. What are the manufacturer’s reliability ratings from past customers? How long has this supplier been producing security and/or military-grade products? Repairs are expected from time to time. How easy is it to acquire spare parts from the manufacturer or its distributors? Are there service centers available that are convenient? What is the length of the product warranty? A quality manufacturer will have simple, easy-toaccess video tutorials on the use and maintenance of their equipment. I prefer to work with companies where I know that expert technical feedback can be obtained with a simple phone call or email.

Inspection of pins of hand grenades and metal wires that must be detected in a highly mineralized soil in Ethiopia.

10. Cost At the end of the evaluation process, this is always a factor with any purchasing agent. You want the most efficient, highly sensitive, feature-rich, sturdily built machine for your money. The cheapest solution on the market may not be the safest or most effective tool of the trade, but paying top-dollar is also not necessarily required. Rank your required features (such as ground balance, RFI elimination, etc.) and see if some of the available units are eliminated just through this exercise. Then, drill down into the manufacturer’s reputation and acquisition process and lead-time to further rank your top choices. In the end, there is no substitute to knowing your application. What works for demining in the humid jungles of Colombia may not when it comes to the cooler steppes of Ukraine. What works for veteran

demining professionals may not work for humanitarian volunteers. What works for recovering UXO may not work for picking up low-metal mines. Know your mission and know your users. Everything follows from that. If you have a good grasp on that information, then the 10 factors above can help triangulate the right product for you from the data you already have. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR William Ramirez is a veteran of the Colombian military from Military Engineers Corps who has traveled to many countries to participate in countermine/ERW efforts. He serves as a consultant and trainer for military and humanitarian demining projects.

counteriedreport.com 47

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS EMPLOYED IN ISRAEL’S DEADLIEST TERROR ATTACK - OCTOBER 7, 2023 By Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash

UMMARY

In the early morning hours of October 7, 2023, the last day of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Hamas terrorist organization, in cooperation with other Palestinian terrorist groups, launched a surprise attack on Israel. The meticulously coordinated attack incorporated a number of tactics, employed simultaneously, which enabled the terrorists to successfully infiltrate towns and kibbutzim in the Western Negev region near the Gaza Strip, as well as military bases, by air, sea and land. The terrorists overcame the defense measures deployed along the border, while firing heavy rocket barrages at Israel. In the space of one day, over 3,000 terrorists infiltrated Israel, slaughtering some 1,400 civilians and soldiers, and concluding with 240 people being kidnapped to Gaza.

The attack commenced with a heavy barrage of rocket fire 48 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

ANALYSIS Hamas led the October 7, 2023, attack, calling it “Toufan al-Aqsa” (Lit. "Al-Aqsa Flood") in Arabic. In Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) designated the name of the war “Harvot Barzel” (Lit. "Iron Swords.”) The start of the attack, at 6:25 AM, was characterized by a massive barrage of rockets fired toward towns and kibbutzim in southwest Israel. Concurrently, the infiltration of armed terrorists into Israel began - by air, sea and land - who neutralized the defense and military command posts, and set about slaughtering as many people as they could in the targeted towns and cities. The terrorists blocked roads to prevent access to or from the areas, and killed the occupants of all the vehicles on the road. The farthest location the terrorists were able to reach and take hostages was the city of Ofakim, located about 25 km from the Gaza Strip.

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Under the cover of the rocket attack, armed terrorists penetrated from the air on powered paragliders (PPGs) and landed in the towns and kibbutzim, as well as around the music festival, attended by over 3,500 mostly young people, near Kibbutz Re’im – located 5-6 kilometers east of the

Gaza Strip. Those who reached their vehicles and attempted to flee to safety were mowed down by heavy gunfire from terrorists patrolling the roads. Others sought refuge in the area but were ruthlessly hunted down and shot dead or kidnapped to Gaza.

Hamas PPGs start to land near the music festival

One of the PPGs that landed inside Kibbutz Kfar Aza counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

The sea invasion came from the northern part of the Gaza Strip, and targeted the coastal area of Ashkelon, specifically Kibbutz Zikim and Kibbutz Karmia, using small, fast Zodiac-type boats, and Hamas combat divers equipped with rebreathers to mask their presence in the water. Rebreathers are closed circuit breathing systems where no telltale bubbles rise to the surface that could reveal their presence.

Hamas Zodiac-type inflatable boats

Attacking Zikim beach in southern Israel 50 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

The land invasion constituted the main effort and main force concentration, with terrorists breaching approximately 20 points along the border between the Gaza Strip and southwest Israel. Through these breach points, groups on motorcycles, in pickups (some with mounted machine guns) and in other vehicles, with more on foot, entered Israel. During the initial stages of the breach, command and defense centers were attacked and means of communication were cut off.

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Breaching the border fence with an IED

Infiltration on foot

Entering with pickups

counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Dedicated squads enter on motorcycles

Terrorists in the center of the city of Sderot 52 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Pickups with mounted machine guns

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Disconnecting communication and command lines

The ground invasion combined with a PPG from the air counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

ASSESSMENT Hamas’ preparation for the attack and invasion was evidenced in documents seized from arrested terrorists and the bodies of many other terrorists killed in Israel. Numerous documents were recovered from Hamas terrorists in the field. The documents were dated October 2022, meaning the attack plan was already prepared a year ago, but was only implemented in October 2023.

Designated documents for each kibbutz were found, with clear instructions to kill as many people as possible, to take hostages and to await further instructions. In addition, there were instructions to secure Road 232 (the access road to most of the Gaza Envelope towns and kibbutzim.)

Hamas operational plan for Kibbutz Sa’ad

Map showing the location of Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz, Alumim, Sa’ad and Mefalsim kibbutzim 54 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Preparations and training for the attack were conducted over an extended period of time, and some of these were documented by Hamas, such as

paramotor training for the PPGs, used to insert heavilyarmed terrorists at the start of the attack.

Paramotor training counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Concurrent with the rocket fire and PPG infiltrations launched at the beginning of the attack, aerial operations were carried out to ‘blind’ the multiple observation devices stationed in front of the Gaza border, and to neutralize a number of tanks stationed along the border.

The main attack TTPs used for these missions were small armed COTS drones. Small, improvised bomblets, mostly based on improvised Hamas hand grenades, were dropped on the observation towers on which cameras and remotely-operated machine guns are mounted. The improvised grenade and its lever can be seen in the documentation.

An observation tower on the Gaza border with a remote-controlled machine gun 56 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

The lever can be seen after the improvised grenade is released over the tower from an armed drone

The grenade targets the facility's control system

Detonation and the disabling of the position counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Various other improvised bomblets were used to attack targets that included tanks and armored vehicles. Some of these payloads were based on

Improvised bomblets used to attack soldiers 58 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

different kinds of AT weapons, such as RPG-7 warheads or RPG-7 VR (tandem) warheads.

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

An AT tandem warhead-based bomblet used to target a tank

One of the larger UAVs was downed with its AT tandem warhead payload intact counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

As mentioned, the main effort was focused on moving the terrorists overland into Israel to carry out the attacks, an effort that necessitated crossing the defensive barrier established by Israel on the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The barrier was built as part of the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge (2014.) To address the threat of tunnels from Hamas, intended to invade the communities near the Gaza Strip and carry out terrorist attacks and abductions, in 2016, the defense establishment decided to build a concrete technological wall that would extend underground and above ground. In the construction of the barrier, emphasis was placed on the subterranean, because the threat of tunnels from Gaza was the main threat at the time. In December 2021, after three and a half years of work, construction of the barrier in the Gaza Strip

The barrier 60 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

was completed. The barrier along the border, which is about 65 km long, includes five complementary defense systems: an underground wall with technological detection means, an hourglass fence more than 6 meters high, and a system designed to counter aircraft, UAVs and other threats, a naval barrier that includes means to monitor intrusions from the sea and a remotely controlled weapons system, an array of radars and cameras for surveillance and locating tunnels, and combat rooms to prevent penetration from the Gaza Strip into the territory of the State of Israel. This is a complex obstacle from an engineering and technological point of view and it is the only one of its kind in the world. Professionals from Israel and around the world, mainly from Europe, were involved in its creation and installment.

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Perhaps precisely because the underground arena was so well secured, Hamas chose to attack above ground, with weapons such as armed UAVs, PPGs, and 4x4 vehicles. It was precisely the massive preparation for the more problematic threat that made the use of the simple threat so surprising.

Hamas’ plan to breach the border barrier incorporated simple TTPs, such as tractors and explosives, but also meticulous preparation for dealing with all parts of the barrier, including the assembly of unique IEDs for use in barrier breaching operations.

Tractors used to breach the barrier, October 7, 2023

Components of a Bangalore Torpedo-type charge marked “TORPED BANGALOR,” from a Hamas training video counteriedreport.com 61

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

The documentation of the preparation for the breaching attacks revealed the assembly of "engineering" teams dedicated to breaking through the barriers and creating entry points, using a variety of specialized equipment. In Hamas’ training preparations for the attack, the use of Bangalore

Hamas linear shaped charges to breach a wire fence 62 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Torpedo-type charges to create openings in wire fences, contact charges for breaching walls, linear shaped cutting charges for metal bar barriers, and even bridging devices to allow motorcycles to pass over concrete beams were evidenced.

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Initiation of the breaching IED counteriedreport.com 63

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Preparation of a large concrete and metal fence for breaching, using a detonating cord connector to initiate several points simultaneously

Linear shaped charges used to cut metal beams/posts 64 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Hamas “engineering” team with portable folding bridges, October 7, 2023

Portable folding bridges used to make the concrete wall obstacle passable for motorcycles counteriedreport.com

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

Breaching frames recovered in Israel after the October 7 attack

Weapons caught in Israel after 7th October 66 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

HAMAS TERROR TACTICS

The scores of terrorist squads that entered Israel brought with them numerous firearms, different RPG rockets, assorted fragmentation IEDs, anti-tank IEDs, breaching IEDs, and other special charges. The sources of the weapons included locally-produced improvised items – copies of standard weapons – as well as standard weapons of Iranian, Russian and North Korean production. The wide variety and quantities of different types of weapons, indicate a long-term and far more deadly attack was planned than the one they were able to carry out. The deadly Hamas attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, constitutes the worst terrorist attack in the history of the State of Israel, mainly because of the unprecedented number of lives lost in the brutal indiscriminate massacre of civilians of all ages in towns and kibbutzim, and the abduction of civilians of all ages to the Gaza Strip. It is clear the preparation for the operation took a lot of time; the attack plan was carefully prepared, well in advance, and its execution included a combination of sea, land and air attack TTPs. The preparations included the collection of extensive and detailed intelligence on the targets of the attack, the preparation of dedicated squads, professional training, and the development of specialized weapons to suit the needs of each activity. Hamas’ ability to surprise Israel in such a massive deadly attack points to a profound failure on the intelligence, defensive and operational levels. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash, Senior bomb technician and former deputy head of the Israeli police bomb disposal division, commanded bomb disposal units within the border guards and police during intense terrorist conflicts in Israel. Michael currently is the senior CIED analyst at TerrogenceGlobal, researches IED’s and authors the Terrogence Möbius C-IED reports analyzing and assessing global IED-related technical and tactical intelligence.

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RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

“PROTECTING STEEL FROM HORNETS”: RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES IN THE UKRAINIAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “You can change the world again, instead of protecting yourself from it.” (Julien Smith, in his book " The Flinch", first published in 2011)

espite the relative impact of explosive-laden drones in several theatres of war - Iraq, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Syria..., it appears that the mentioned threat is still somewhat underestimated by Western governments as a potential risk not only to internal security but also to deployed forces.

On the contrary, the evidence shows the first effective attempts of attacks with explosive-laden drones in Malian territory: both Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Wagner Group have utilized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in the last months of 2023.

Figure 1 – Pictures taken from explosive-laden drones in Mali, September-October 2023 (Source – X/Twitter) counteriedreport.com 69

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

In due line with the development of military loitering munitions, the quick technical evolution and tactical adoption of the VBIED based on first-person view (FPV) drones is making them much more resolute for the combat in Ukraine than those UAS dropping improvised munitions over lightly armored vehicles, open facilities, goods’ storage, trenches, and dismounted troops. So those referenced VBIED FPV UAS are showing themselves as dramatically effective over personnel protected by field fortifications, over moving targets, over communication means, over explosive weaponry launchers, and armored vehicles, including main battle tanks (MBTs).

Butterfly nets or energy? Seeking for tactical solutions against FPV VBIED UAS in Ukraine As previously analyzed in the article “Warfare Revolution in Ukraine: The Challenge from First Person View Drones” (see Counter IED Report, Autumn 2023 edition), the FPV UAS count on several characteristics that could make most of the potential countermeasures against them barely effective or even absolutely ineffective, as follows:

• Very high speed. • Relative protection against electromagnetic countermeasures. • Hard detection due to very low thermal/radar/ sound/visual signature. • High maneuverability. • Great ratio weight-payload. • Targeting accuracy. • … Early last November, three Russian handbooks/ manuals on best practices and procedures for protecting light vehicles, armored personnel carriers and MBTs from attacks by hostile FPV drones were distributed by pro-Russian social media sources. Those booklets were published by the Directorate of Armored Forces of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, and they were also later redistributed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For sure they are evidencing the high relevance of their potential effects against military vehicles to the Russian side of the conflict.

Figure 2 – Cover from Russian handbooks on vehicle protection against explosive-laden FPV UAS (Source – Telegram/VK) 70 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 3 – Recommended protection for armored cars/trucks against explosive-laden FPV UAS (Source – Telegram/VK)

The handbooks not only show the recommended allocation of protective means including separation distances and angles of inclination, but also indicate the requirements of material and supportive tools to do it by field units themselves. In addition to the physical barriers (as based on nets and slat armor), the referenced handbooks also provide relatively detailed instructions for the installation of electromagnetic countermeasures

against unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), as based on different jamming systems, as follows: • (In armored car/truck) LGSh-608, LGSh-609 (ЛГШ-608, ЛГШ-609,) for 860-886 / 902-928 MHz • (In armored personnel carrier/MBT) LGSh-689 (ЛГШ-689) acting over 860-886 / 902-928 MHz • KP "Breakwater" (КП «Волнорез» Volnorez) on 300-530 / 800-930 / 2300-2600 / 5700-5945 MHz bands

Figure 4 – Antennas for LGSh 608/609 (Left) and KP “Breakwater”/ ”Volnorez” (Center) jamming systems, plus a picture of a complete LGSh-689 ECM set (Right) also including antenna (Source – Telegram/VK) counteriedreport.com 71

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 5 – Allocation of protection/ECM antennas against explosive-laden FPV UAS for APC BTR-82A (Source – Telegram/VK) 72 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 6 – (Top) Allocation of physical protection against the effects from explosive-laden FPV UAS for MBT T-72B3M and (Bottom) emplacement of protective nets and C-UAS jammer´s antennas in T-80BVM model (Source – Telegram/VK) counteriedreport.com 73

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Threat from explosive-laden FPV drones: Vulnerability assessment on Russian armored vehicles As previously considered in past articles, FPV drones are posing a serious threat against ground targets mostly based on their impressive maneuverability / accuracy, their possibility of carrying anti-tank charges, their low detectability, and their relatively high survivability against C-UAS. But those capabilities would not be relevant if not exploiting the vulnerabilities of the potential targets… and the videos of FPV UAS attacks against armored vehicles clearly show tactics, techniques and procedures. With regard to main battle tanks of Russian design, the front part of the turret is highly protected against penetrating effects as derived from explosives, but the need to reduce total weight in benefit of mobility makes the rear part of the turret less wide than the front, so making it much more vulnerable. Additionally, the munitions are mostly stored in the turret sides, which greatly reduces the potential

survivability of the crew after a penetrating impact quite able to trigger a secondary detonation. In most of the Russian tanks, the “Korzhina” autoloader stores ready propellant in a vertical position, with only the tank’s road wheels partially protecting it. Any penetrating impact in the sides above the road wheels is likely to detonate the referenced propellant… Latest Russian MBT versions such as T-90M are relatively reducing those risks with munition propellant disposition, although the resistance of the gun mantlet ( the metal shield around the gun itself) still poses a vulnerable point to penetrating impact! In fact, the design of Russian MBTs shows a high vulnerability for penetration and detonation just behind the rear part of the turret. Ukrainian forces are fully (and effectively) aware of it! Some of the drones’ explosive attacks are also conducted against the engine compartment just over the engine air intake grille, which leads to fire after impact in such a low-protected area. In fact, similarly vulnerable engine exhausts are also present in the

Figure 7 – Armor comparison between front/rear side of T-90C and T-80U MBT turrets (Source – www.btvt.narod.ru) 74 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 8 – Example of allocation of munitions inside a Russian MBT turret (Source – www.mlbpark.donga.com) rear part of the T-64/T-80 MBT series. It is different for the T-72/T-90 series, in which the exhausts are emplaced at the left side of the tank. Nonetheless, and whilst not causing greater damage, a detonation against the rear part of any armored vehicle will seriously affect its mobility, which reduces its tactical combat capability and makes it extremely vulnerable to subsequent attacks. With regard to the observed attacks from the front, they are effective when accurately striking the driver’s hatch or the joining portion of the turret ring, which are the weakest parts of the vehicle’s front area. Of course,

any open hatch always poses a great opportunity for an explosive-laden drone to exploit! Alternate targeted areas could be focused on optics/ telemetry systems or even against the armament of the armored vehicles. If main battle tanks are relatively vulnerable to the attacks from explosive-laden FPV UAS, just try to imagine how that potential threat could be for other kinds of less protected military vehicles such as surface-to-air missile systems, self-propelled howitzers, communication vehicles, multiple launcher rocket systems…

Figure 9 – Capture from a video showing an explosive-laden FPV drone attack on a tank (Source – https://t.me/s/escadrone) counteriedreport.com 75

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Protecting from FPV UAS: "Abundans cautela non nocet” (one can never be too careful)… Are you sure? As also users of most of the Russian military vehicles, the Ukrainian forces are experts in their potential vulnerabilities. If we add the technical knowledge of the real-time vision of the target by the FPV drones’ pilots, plus that they could be skillful enough to target the exact spot they wish to impact, the equation result is quite clear. In some of the videos, we could observe how the operator sometimes is circling around the tank before swooping in to target the turret rear or the area estimated as the most profitable to effectively strike. In the last months, different protective countermeasures (conventional or improvised ones) against the potential threat from explosive-laden drones by Russian units have been evidenced in Ukraine, as follows: • Top metallic slat armor sets (also informally called "cope cages", "emotional support cages" or "BBQ grills [мангали]"), which were initially equipped over some T-80M and T-90 series MBTs against Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles (without real effectiveness) from late 2021. • Side slat armor. • Surrounding welded nets installed on top, rear, and sides. • Side metallic grating and/or nets to protect the lower turret. • Extra metallic grills over driver’s and commander’s hatches. • Metallic grating protecting engine, radiator and/or exhausts. • Additional armor plates for turrets, sides, and rear. • Explosive reactive armor (e.g. Kontakt-1, Kontakt-5, Relikt, Monolith, Malachit…) elements. • Sandbags. • Wood trunks. • Additional improvised and purpose-designed armor. • Counter unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) Jammers. • …

76 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

Figure 10 – Latest version of Russian T-80BVM main battle tank as presented in September 2023 (Source – www.mil.in.ua)

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 11 – Protections against explosive-laden drones in Ukraine (Source – www.vk.com/milinfolive, www.en.defence-ua.com) But not only the military vehicles are currently being fitted with protective countermeasures against explosive-laden first-person view drones: other facilities such as artillery positions, trenches, bunkers and hangars… have been also covered with nets, cages, and mats in the aim of reducing the potential vulnerability from those kinds of attacks.

The overall initial assessment of the potential impact of these physical protection countermeasures from the effects of explosive-laden UAS is not that optimistic, as follows: • Due to the added weight and size, they could affect the mobility and maneuverability of the vehicle.

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RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

Figure 12 – Capture from the video of a FPV UAS VBIED impacting over a vehicle equipped with jammer (Source – X/Twitter) • Some of them are directly restricting the potential possibilities and reaction time of the crew in escaping from the vehicle after an accident or attack. • They sometimes limit the angles and movement of the different weapons. • They are increasing the need for maintenance along with the logistic signature of the units. • And finally, those countermeasures could be avoided by a skilled pilot of the FPV drone… With regard to the referenced Russian initiatives in electromagnetic warfare equipment to face the threat from FPV UAS, and partially due to the effective development of Ukrainian FPV drones’ supporting technologies and associated tactics / techniques / procedures, it looks like the jammers are not fully standardized, and maybe not working well enough. For example, some reports are pointing at a poor tactical performance and effectiveness of the recently issued Volnorez (KP "Breakwater", КП «Волнорез») inhibition system with its two omnidirectional antennas… They are being partially substituted by the “Sania” (Сания) system as developed and produced by 3MX company. It is specifically designed to counter FPV drones by working in the suppression mode only when those are detected, and, it is said to be capable of detecting passive detection of radio frequency signals, identifying and neutralizing, even with the vehicle on the move.

78 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

In the case of being a tank, never underestimate the smallest (flying) enemy! Just considering that pro-Russian forces are also progressively increasing their capabilities regarding the use of explosive-laden drones against armored vehicles, the imminent adoption of similar protective countermeasures is expected from the Ukrainian side. Although the persistence of some threat analysts, and other less-expert personnel in considering the potential effects of explosive-laden FPV UAS as not relevant against main battle tanks, that threat is absolutely realistic for the combatant factions in Ukraine and, even if only one of each twenty attacks could be fully or partially successful, those lost twenty drones are incredibly cost-efficient as compared with the average cost of a MBT… Nonetheless, we should admit that the development of countering FPV UAS measures must improve with the aim of increased effectiveness. And remember that almost every fully or partially effective weapon, development, and associated tactics appearing on the Internet are extremely likely to be copied by other violent extremist organizations around the world.

“Every man is a shelter for himself in the desert.” (Mladen Đorďević in his book "Miraž" first published in 2021)

RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE TACTICAL THREAT BY EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES

REFERENCES • C-IED

CoE

“Technical

Report

IV/2017

Unconventional Weaponization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems”, May 2017 • Counter IED Report, Autumn 2022 edition “Flying Alone: Tactical Evolution of ExplosiveLaden Drones in the Ukrainian Conflict” • C-IED

CoE

“Non-State

Actors´

Tactics

Techniques and Procedures Updates” products (from February 2022 on) • C-IED CoE S157/2023 Report “Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) for First Person View (FPV) drones in Ukraine”, July 2023. • Counter IED Report, Autumn 2023 edition “Warfare Revolution in Ukraine: the Challenge from First Person View drones” • C-IED

CoE

improvised

S216/2023 passive

Report

“Russian

protection / mitigation

measures on airplanes against explosive-laden drones”, September 2023. • C-IED CoE S007/2024 Report “Tactical changes as derived from the threat by explosive-laden FPV drones in Ukraine”, January 2024. • www.sprotyvg7.com.ua • X (former Twitter) • Telegram • VKontakte VK (ВКонтакте) • www.3mx-trade.ru/sania

Disclaimer This article does not represent the opinion of any national or multinational organisation; its whole content should only be considered as the opinion of the author. As all the information has been obtained from open sources, potential mistakes could have been made during the research process. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections and inputs to the author; they will be highly appreciated.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016 and currently holds the post of Chief of Attack the Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his background has been mainly based on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and other C-IED courses. His operational assignments include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3), the Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda.

E-mail: jrufas@ciedcoe.org counteriedreport.com 79

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 1 – Infographic on some of the Palestinian militias (Source – www.iswnews.com)

GOLIATH’S SON AGAINST DAVID: EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTPs) AGAINST ISRAEL By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “Take a chance and risk it all or play it safe and suffer defeat.” (Pittacus Lore, in his book " I am Number Four", first published in 2010)

n Saturday 7th October 2023, and under the selfgiven name of “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” ( ) several Palestinian militias conducted coordinated armed assaults on the boundary walls/fences, attacks over military posts and towns, and launched rockets and missiles, along with explosive-laden drones against Israeli targets near the border with Gaza Strip. Those referred militias were (along with other smaller groups) listed as follows: • Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas organization) • Saraya Al Quds Brigades (Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization)

• Nasser Salam al-Deen Brigades (Popular Resistance Committees) • Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades-Nidal al-Amoudi (AMB-NA) Fatah • Palestinian National Resistance Brigades (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) • Mujahideen Brigades (Palestinian Mujahideen Movement) • Omar al-Qasim National Resistance Brigades • Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (Popular Front for Palestine Liberation)

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EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Lessons from Ukraine? Use of explosive-laden drones during the attacks During the attacks, the Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades (the armed wing of HAMAS) were employing drones to drop an improvised munition based on an anti-tank rocket tandem warhead over armored vehicles (mostly main battle tanks such as Merkava IV). The munition is based on the design of the Russian PG-7R warhead from the rocket-propelled grenade system PG-7VR (or the Bulgarian PG-7VT version), a munition fitted with a tandem double high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) charge, which allows it to be used against heavily armored vehicles including those fitted with rolled homogenous armor (RHM) and/or explosive reactive armor (ERA) and buildings/ protective works (e.g. reinforced concrete, brick walls, log-and-earth…).

Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (HAMAS) has progressively developed several indigenous versions of tandem anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades, as follows: • “Tandem 85 version 1” model (2014), based on low-effective anti-tank PG-7V rounds which have been modified with the addition of a second smaller improvised HEAT charge in front. • “Tandem 85 version 2” model (2017), as fitted with a more effective secondary improvised HEAT charge attached to PG-7V warhead. • “Al-Yaseem” model (2023), a fully indigenous improvised munition as produced in Gaza.

Figure 2 – Captures from a video (Source – https://t.me/qassambrigades)

Figure 3 – Improvised munition “Tandem 85 version 1” in 2014 (Source – Ruptly, www.alqassam.ps) 82 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 4 – Al-Qassam Brigades´ improvised munition “Tandem 85 version 2”in 2017 (Source - Ruptly, Twitter)

Figure 5 – Captures from a video showing improvised munition “Al-Yaseem” (Source - https://alqassam.ps/arabic/)

Figure 6 – “Al-Yaseem” rocket propelled grenade shown during a parade in Central Gaza on July 19th 2023 (Source - APS) counteriedreport.com 83

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 7 – Pictures from Iranian munitions as taken during IQDEX2019 in March 2019 (Source - APS)

Figure 8 – Pictures from an expo during Iran's Defense Industry Day on August 23rd 2023 (Source - APS) It is relevant to highlight that “Al-Yaseem” grenades are almost identical to an Iranianmade model developed from Russian PG-7VR design. After that first video, several other videos and pictures showing the same kind of improvised munitions have been published.

84 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

The shown drones are DJI MATRICE 600 PRO models as modified with a homemade release system designed for dropping the referred kind of improvised munitions: Hamas could obtain that model of drone as seized (or downed and repaired) from Israeli security forces or most probably smuggled from Egypt in the aim of avoiding Israeli blockade.

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 9 – Pictures and video captures showing drones loaded with improvised munitions as based on warheads from tandem anti-tank rocket propelled grenades (Source – Twitter/X, Telegram) The first evidenced consequence of that kind of attack with tandem munitions dropped by drones was the manufacture (by maintenance / repair units) and emplacement of improvised top-attack protection visors (slat armor) over some Merkava IV MBTs during the waiting time for preparation of the offensive. The unmanned aircraft system (UAS) unit of Al-Qassam Brigades of HAMAS has also recently

shown videos in which they were training and testing the DJI MATRICE 600 PRO drones with improvised munitions based on Russian 85mm PG-7 warheads from PG-7V rocket-propelled grenade systems (the referred video is geolocated at a training range sited about 800m northwest from the Mosque of Sultan Helmi Saqr in Rafah, which is about 8 Km away from the Egyptian border).

Figure 10 – Capture from Saqr UAS Unit of Al-Qassam Brigades video showing trials with improvised munition based on PG-7V anti-tank grenades (Source - https://alqassam.ps/arabic/) counteriedreport.com 85

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 11 – Video captures showing drones dropping manipulated hand grenades (Source – Twitter/X, Telegram)

Figure 12 – Video captures showing drones dropping manipulated hand grenades (Source – Telegram) The PG-7 warhead requires manipulation of the fuze to be able to detonate by impact after being dropped by the drone: instructional videos on it are easily available through open sources. Modified hand grenades (based on copies of M26, M26A2 and MKII models) were also thrown over Israeli surveillance and defense towers, along with other ones over communications antenna sites. Among the variety of hand grenades used by the Al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, we could identify some Russian designs (F1, RGD-5), Iranian models (“Crown”/Model 1 or copies of USA MKII design), and Palestinian designs (based Figure 13 – Hamas-produced hand grenade as based on M26 A2 model on USA M26 and Israeli M26 A2 models). (Source – Twitter/X)

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EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 14 – Improvised munitions made from Hamas-produced hand grenade as based on M26 A2 model (Source – Twitter/X)

Figure 15 – Captures from a video published by Al-Nasser Salam al-Deen Brigades (Source – Telegram)

Other videos show improvised munitions based on bodies from indigenously produced copies of M26 A2 hand grenades, which are fitted with a tail fin and a homemade point detonating impact fuze. After considering the style and height of the flight, the marking/grids in the control panel, the relatively low payload, and the accurate flight until almost touching the targets, it looks like the used drone could be from the DJI MAVIC or PHANTOM series.

Not only HAMAS-related units but Al-Nasser Salam al-Deen Brigades (Popular Resistance Committees) were using improvised munitions dropped by a drone. The improvised munition seems to be a modified mortar grenade or some sort of homemade munition based on warheads of the “Nasser” series of local improvised rockets. The model of the hexacopter is not identifiable, but it looks like it is manufactured with a mixture of homemade and commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) components.

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EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Al-Qassam Brigades have utilized a new design for UAS vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) called “Zouari”. Along with this, several models of locally produced explosive-laden “Shahab” drones, based on the design of the Iranian military “Ababil-2”, were also used in attacks on Israeli targets.

Another homemade model of fixed-wing drone with twin rotor engines were also used by Al-Nasser Salam al-Deen Brigades against Israeli targets: it is named “AQ”.

Figure 16 – Capture from Hamas video showing “Zouari” drone (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/)

Figure 17 – Capture from a video showing “Shahab” drone (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/)

Figure 18 – Information on explosive-laden drones by Al-Nasser Salam al-Deen Brigades (Source – Telegram) 88 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

A new model of locally made explosive-laden drone was also shown by Saraya Al Quds Brigades (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) as taking part in the

attacks against Israeli territory: the UAS is named as “Sayyad”.

Figure 19 – Capture from a video published by Saraya al-Quds Brigades (Source – Telegram)

Anger was not only coming from heaven but also from earth. Along with the usually issued models, Al-Qassam Brigades showed some new designs for improvised rockets in the videos of attacks against Israel.

The “Rajum” short-range rocket system consists of improvised 114mm (4.5 inches) rockets and towed 3x5 15-tube launchers.

Figure 20 – Video captures showing “Rajum” rocket system (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/) counteriedreport.com 89

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Several first-generation 9K32M «Strela-2M» / SA-7b «Grail Mod.1» man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) were employed by using improvised batteries in substitution of the regular (but not available or operative yet) 9B17 thermal battery of the system.

Videos from Al-Qassam Brigades also included information about the improvised rocket-based air defense system called "Mubar-1", which is used against low-flying targets: the rockets seem to be equipped with programmable electronic fuzes (apparently based on COTS electronics).

Figure 21 – Captures from Al-Qassam Brigades´ video showing improvised batteries for MANPADS (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/)

Figure 22 – Captures from a video showing MUBAR-1 air defense system (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/) 90 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Several videos were distributed showing the tactics, techniques and procedures for breaking the Israeli border defenses with the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the combat engineers from Al-Qassam Brigades have also been breaching the wall and fence with the use of improvised explosive devices.

The breaching tools were based on man-portable foldable homemade metallic frames filled with explosives, connected with a detonating cord, and initiated by pyrotechnical delay devices.

Figure 23 – Captures from the video showing use of breaching IEDs (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/) counteriedreport.com 91

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Al-Qassam Brigades are also using an anti-tank handheld improvised explosive device which is based on a modification of the warhead of the “Al-Yassem 105” adding an improvised delay fuze. In some of the attacks (see video captures below), the referred improvised munition was firstly used to neutralize the “TROPHY MV” active protection system as a countermeasure for armored vehicles against

anti-tank missiles and rockets. Once TROPHY MV was defeated, the attackers fired a secondary “Al-Yassem 105” tandem anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade against the tank. However, the threat from Palestinian militias is not only limited to land. The naval commandos of Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades showed the locally made “Al-Asif” remote-controlled underwater vehicle-borne IED.

Figure 24 – Video captures of anti-tank IED by Al-Qassam Brigades (Source – Telegram) 92 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

EVOLVING PALESTINIAN MILITIAS’ TTPs AGAINST ISRAEL

Figure 25 – Video captures of “AL-ASIF” explosive-laden underwater vehicle by Al-Qassam Brigades (Source – https://alqassam.ps/arabic/)

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To conclude… The latest attacks on Israeli territory by Palestinian militias are evidencing their relative improvement in weaponry development along with potential external support: the confluence of similar designs to Iranian weapon systems along with the relatively poor quality of manufacture could indicate technological support from Iran. The attacks as conducted by Palestinian militias are also showing evidence of an extremely high level of planning and preparation, along with an impressive accumulation of weaponry and materials, which could most probably exceed the capabilities and skills of the Palestinian militias by themselves. Someone could even imagine a potential influence of the widely online distributed Ukrainian TTPs against the pro-Russian forces in Palestinian TTPs, with special reference to: • The use of explosive-laden drones • The fight against armored vehicles • The exploitation of visual propaganda through social media. In a similar manner, and due to the widespread dissemination of propaganda, videos and images via the Internet, the above-mentioned tactics, techniques and procedures that were used in the Palestinian militias' attack on Israel (and in their subsequent defensive role against Israeli forces) are likely to be copied in other theatres of operations and by violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Accordingly, there is a high risk of weapon designs and tactics, techniques and procedures being imitated by VEOs around the world, regardless of their aims and ideological beliefs. ■

“You either learn to play hardball or you become the ball.” (Crystal Woods, in her book "Write like no one is reading 2" first published in 2015)

REFERENCES • C-IED CoE “Technical Report IV/2017 Unconventional Weaponization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems”, May 2017 • C-IED CoE – Non-state actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures updates, 2022-2023. • C-IED CoE – Report “Improvised batteries for MANPADS”, December 2016.

94 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2023/24

• C-IED CoE – Report “Use of explosive-laden drones and other improvised explosive devices by Palestinian militias in the attacks against Israel from Gaza Strip”, November 2023. • https://t.me/qassambrigades (currently not accessible after banning on October 15th, 2023). • https://t.me/QudsNen • https://calibreobscura.substack.com • https://vk.com/ibnyatim • https://twitter.com/islamistagenda • https://twitter.com/IranDefense • https://twitter.com/Mahyar3138 • https://twitter.com/IranObserver0 • https://alqassam.ps/arabic/ • https://t.me/PalestineResist • www.almanar.com.lb • https://t.me/kataebabuali

E-mail: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

Counter-IED Report Winter 2023-24