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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

Counter-IED Report Winter 2021/22

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO HOLISTICALLY APPROACH INSTABILITY & INSECURITY LONE ACTOR TERRORISM: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RISKS AND THREATS? ISSUES RELATED TO ESTABLISHING CAUSES BEHIND TERRORIST ATTACKS: THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS – CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER? THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY EXPLAINED: THE IMPORTANCE OF BLAST TRIALS AND CRITICAL PERFORMANCE TESTING DRONE DELIVERED IEDS – HOW PREPARED IS THE WORLD? I&W NOTE: MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS NOW APPEARING EAGLES IN PIGEON’S CLOTHING: USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ THE BLINDNESS OF THE WEST: OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

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CONTENTS

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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO HOLISTICALLY APPROACH INSTABILITY & INSECURITY By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

COUNTER TERROR EXPO 2022

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RISKS AND THREATS? By Dr Jonathan Kenyon, National Specialist Lead within the Interventions Services Counter-Terrorism Team for Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), Dr Jens Binder, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Nottingham Trent University and Dr Christopher Baker-Beall, Senior Lecturer in Crisis and Disaster Management at Bournemouth University’s Disaster Management Centre

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JOINT CIVIL & DOD CBRN SYMPOSIUM AND TECHNOLOGY SHOWCASE 2022

ISSUES RELATED TO ESTABLISHING CAUSES BEHIND TERRORIST ATTACKS: THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM By Dr David Lowe, Leeds Law School at Leeds Beckett University

EUROSATORY 2022

DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS – CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER? By Vincent Deery, Sales and Marketing Director at 3DX-Ray Ltd

MILIPOL ASIA-PACIFIC 2022

THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED By Frederic Maio Programme Manager and staff of Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY EXPLAINED: THE IMPORTANCE OF BLAST TRIALS AND CRITICAL PERFORMANCE TESTING By Joe English, Lead EOD Engineer and Product Manager for NP Aerospace and Siti Pareti, formerly Counter-Explosive Ordnance Adviser, UK Defence and Security Exports, Department for International Trade

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DEFENSE & SECURITY 2022

DRONE DELIVERED IEDs – HOW PREPARED IS THE WORLD? By Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran

I&W NOTE: MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS NOW APPEARING By Robert J. Bunker and David A. Kuhn, C/O Futures, LLC

EAGLES IN PIGEON’S CLOTHING: USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

THE BLINDNESS OF THE WEST: OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report

021 like 2020 was defined by the Covid-19 pandemic. In early January this year the total number of global cases stood at more than 303 million including some 5.48 million deaths. The United States has recorded more than 835 thousand deaths and the United Kingdom more than 150 thousand. Of increasing concern globally is the exponential increase in the Covid-19 Omicron variant with numerous countries imposing new restrictions to contain the spread of this variant. Undoubtedly the major setback for the international community in 2021 was the implosion of Afghanistan following the rapid departure of Western Forces in August and the subsequent takeover of the country by the Taliban, which resulted in a complete national breakdown. The economy has collapsed, unemployment is nationwide, starvation is rife, and people have resorted to selling their children to buy food. Hospitals are unable to operate without the requisite medical supplies and schooling for children is at a virtual standstill as teachers have not been paid since August. All of this is a very far cry from the hopes and aspirations that the West had for the country during their occupation from 2001 until 2021 and to which they had devoted massive investment in terms of economic aid, military and technical assistance. The long running war exacted a terrible toll in the deaths and injuries of both the Afghan

currently in place. Ukraine has long been a source of tension between Russia and the West as the government in Ukraine moves politically ever closer to the West. An abiding fear of President Putin is the risk, as he sees it, of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. Having witnessed several other former members of the Soviet Union do this, it is likely that Putin regards this possibility as a red line. Recently Putin asked for a guarantee from the US White House that this would not happen – a guarantee that the White House is not is a position to honour. Other tensions with Moscow include the delay in certification of the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline to the West and the issue of migrants on the border between Belarus and Poland. In terms of international security, the US State Department issued on 16 December its Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 in which it states that terrorist groups remained “a persistent and pervasive threat worldwide”. Islamic State killed more people in 2020 than in any previous year and recently stated that the Covid pandemic resulted “From God’s wrath upon the West”. Senior Al-Qaeda officials remain in Iran and facilitate terrorist attacks from there. Its numerous affiliated networks continue to exploit under-governed spaces and conflict zones, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, and are among the most active and dangerous groups in the world. Iran has continued to provide

people and foreign militaries. Internationally, tensions have increased as Russia has massed troops along its border with Ukraine – estimates range of more than 100,000 combat troops

practical support to its sponsored militias, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas. Globally, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force remained the primary Iranian actors involved in supporting terrorist

counteriedreport.com

FOREWORD

recruitment, financing, and plots across Europe, Africa, Asia, and both Americas. Paul Amoroso of Assessed Mitigation Options consultancy in his thought-provoking article uses the visual example of a Tree of Instability and Insecurity to describe how an organisation operating within an IED environment can holistically address the IED threat. He uses the example of this Tree as a conceptual framework to show how the elements of strategic vision, operational plans, and tactical methods and actions can together constitute a holistic approach to an IED threat. Using the analogy of the Tree of Instability and Insecurity he outlines some of the root causes leading to failed or fragile states. These include poor governance, food insecurity, repressive security forces and unemployment. In such environments radical and violent extremist organisations can capitalise on and exploit these root causes for their own agendas. Such actions may result in an array of stability and security challenges that manifest themselves to include pervasive criminality, armed conflict, terrorism and the use of IEDs. He opines that a holistic approach to the problem of IEDs requires the three components of the Tree of Instability and Insecurity to be addressed – the roots – root causes of the problems, the trunk depicted as violent and extremist organisations and the branches – the manifestation of security and stability challenges.

US, the main religious cause has been the extremist Islamist cause as espoused by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The former’s ideology was responsible for the London Underground bombings in 2005 and the latter for the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017. Both terrorist groups wish to establish an Islamic Caliphate based on a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam and Sharia law. In relation to political causes the best- known example in the UK is that of Irish dissident republican groups and various manifestations of the IRA who seek a unified island of Ireland – north and south comprising the thirty-two counties and the end to British rule in the north. Of the assessed main causes for terrorism, the ideological rationale is the most challenging to define. The reason for this is the manifold professed ideological causes. The bizarre nature of these causes is exemplified by the so-called incel movement – a selfprofessed, involuntary celibate group of misogynistic males angry at the sexual revolution that has, in their view, resulted in promiscuous and manipulative females. The difficulty in defining a specific ideological cause results in the regular use of the term “unclear ideology” when describing a subject of interest. In an informative article on the emerging use of Mexican cartel drone delivered IED bomblets, Robert J. Bunker and David A. Kuhn, C/O Futures, LLC, describe the progression from single use – point IED detonation-

In his topical article Dr David Lowe of Leeds Law School examines issues behind the causes of terrorist attacks against the backdrop of the IED attack by Emad al-Swealmeen outside the Liverpool Women’s Hospital on 14 November last year. During the subsequent investigation, the regional Counter-Terrorist (CT) unit struggled to ascertain the cause behind the attack. AlSwealmeen was born Muslim but converted to Christianity in the UK where he was seeking asylum, but his application was rejected. Dr Lowe’s article examines the main causes behind terrorist attacks and the increasing difficulty for CT specialists to define the cause. The UK Terrorism Act 2000 states that a terrorist act occurs where the action or the threat of action is used for the purpose of advancing a religious, political, ideological, or racial cause. In terms of religious motivation, since the 9/11 2001 Al Qaeda attacks in the

drones to multi-use aerial bombardment drones during 2021. This emerging capability has been employed by one of the most dominant and operationally advanced cartels in the country, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). They describe four incidents demonstrating this emerging capability. In the first incident in March 2021, seven IED bomblets were seized by the security forces after a firefight with assumed CJNG gunmen. The bomblets represented the most sophisticated type seized to date. Certain features in the bomblets indicated that the makers are receiving skilled technical assistance during manufacture. In the second incident in September 2021 after an incident between the security forces and CJNG elements a significant cache of ordnance and associated equipment was seized including seventeen improvised aerial drone bomblets. Again, in November 2021 the Army seized a

12 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

FOREWORD

further cache of ordnance including seven IED bomblets. The final incident in September 2021 comprised a series of screen shots taken from a CJNG video posted on their social media. It shows a Mexican cartel drone engaging in an aerial bombardment operation. Such videos are designed to engender fear and a strong psychological effect on the local population engaged in supporting militias defending territory against CJNG encroachment. The authors foresee a technical evolution in CJNG aerial bomblet production, resulting in ever increasing sophistication and the danger that this trend is likely to spread to other cartels. In an instructive article, Vincent Deery of 3DX-Ray Ltd. examines the potential dangers faced by embassies and other diplomatic missions around the globe. Such missions can be highly vulnerable, given that they represent foreign territory situated in the heart of a sovereign state. Such diplomatic missions consist of more than just embassies. The UK for example maintains 85 embassy satellite offices and consulates in non-capital cities around the world. Such missions are responsible for their own security up to their physical perimeter. Beyond that, it is the responsibility of the host nation, which can have its own problems and challenges. The author describes the potential security weak link in all diplomatic missions – the postal system – which permits the possible entry of harmful

trials and other critical performance testing procedures on bomb disposal suits, which are the last line of defence against blast and fragmentation. Blast trials on NP Aerospace’s new 4030 ELITE bomb disposal suit against four internationally recognised scenarios are outlined. Blast can cause devastating effects on the human body in terms of rapidly increasing overpressure, fragmentation, heat, and flame. Bomb disposal suit manufacturers must be aware of these effects and accordingly undertake rigorous and extensive testing. Live explosive blast trials offer the most realistic way to replicate real life EOD or IEDD scenarios. In these trials, conducted in both the UK and the US, NP Aerospace uses scientifically sophisticated Anthropomorphic Test Devices or “crash test dummies” to assess the level of protection provided by the 4030 ELITE PPE against both C4 and PE4 plastic explosives. The 4030 ELITE suit provides substantial reduction in blast overpressure on the chest and ears and critical head injuries. Other performance tests cover fragmentation, spine protection, heat and flame protection, optical performance, buoyancy, and ergonomics. ■

substances or devices into the mission. He goes on to describe a screening product of 3DX-Ray Ltd., the AXIS™-CXi, cabinet-based x-ray screening system, which uses a colour differentiating screening process as used in airport baggage screening. This permits the operator to determine the shape and nature of the item being screened. Orange denotes organics such as explosives, blue shows metals such as firearms and IED components, green describes inorganics such as HME component materials, and finally grey defines the shape and form of the mail contents. The AXIS™-CXi x-ray screening system is mobile and user friendly and represents a key component in the security of global diplomatic missions. In a technically detailed article, Joe English of NP Aerospace and advanced EOD operator Siti Pareti of the British Army describe the crucial importance of blast

in Libya and, more latterly, Afghanistan in the running of the first United Nations humanitarian landmine clearance training programme – Operation Salam. The programme trained Afghan male refugees in landmine clearance techniques, and Afghan women and children in mine awareness and avoidance training. More recently he set up the Caribbean Search Centre in Kingston, Jamaica. The Centre is designed to train security forces across the Caribbean in modern search techniques. After retiring from the army he joined Cranfield University at Shrivenham, near Oxford, and

Rob Hyde-Bales biography During his career in the UK Royal Engineers, Rob Hyde-Bales was responsible for landmine clearance

undertook a research project on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence that examined ways to improve the sharing of IED threat information between the military and civilian organisations in hazardous areas.

counteriedreport.com 13

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HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO HOLISTICALLY APPROACH INSTABILITY & INSECURITY By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy.

OTTOM LINE UP FRONT

While many will acknowledge the rationale in approaching security challenges with an appropriately resourced strategy, implemented through various operational plans, and executed via various tactical methods, the requirement and challenge of synchronizing these effectively can be extremely difficult. These difficulties not only manifest themselves in delivery of practical measures to provide security by aligning strategic vision through operational concepts to tactical effects, but can also prove challenging for those involved in their development, implementation, and sustainment in conceptually aligning these three elements in terms of understanding how they fit together. Through the example of an organization attempting to effectively operate within an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat environment, the conceptual framework of the tree of instability and insecurity will be outlined as a means to illustrate both the reality of these challenges and how ideally, they may be aligned. This alignment of strategic vision, operational plans and tactical methods and actions, may be considered as a holistic approach. A holistic approach to an IED threat in a given operating environment, reveals many commonalities in addressing other security

issues faced by organisations required to operate within insecure and unstable operating environments. This paper proposes that when operating within an insecure and unstable operational environment, that considering the conceptual framework provided by the tree of instability and insecurity, may act as a means to appreciate the requirements of what the synchronization of efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels entails. It is intended that when such synchronization of efforts between the three levels is coupled with a broad threat spectrum approach, a holistic approach to instability and insecurity can be fostered.

INTRODUCTION When an organization is required to operate within an IED threat environment, various threat mitigation measures can be implemented to attempt to reduce the assessed threat to an acceptable level in line with the organization’s accepted risk threshold. Such counter IED efforts at the tactical level are typically time, capital, and resource intensive and if not appropriately implemented and supported can be of limited success. Two of the manifest challenges for organizations required to operate in an IED threat

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HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

environment are that the action counteraction cycle is not a race that can be easily won and secondly an overly IED focused approach can leave an organization exposed to other security threats within the operational environment. Considering the action counteraction cycle within counter IED, when an organization attempts to harden itself against IED attacks, whether such attacks are through direct intentional targeting or indirect unintentional proximity at the time of an attack, it typically involves massive investment of time, capital, and resources and one that is not guaranteed to succeed. One key lesson learned since, circa 2004 from western efforts to counter the use of IEDs, is that it is almost impossible to out armor an IED threat that is evolving. That is, the IED arms race is extremely time, capital, and resource intensive and often exhausting. Added to these challenges is that an IED with a large enough explosive charge or appropriately configured charge can be engineered to defeat all practical armored vehicles and reinforced structures. It is for these reasons that all counter IED efforts invested in need to fit the challenging criteria of being: • Simple for implementation, in often challenging operational environments, by practitioners with a wide array of training, education, skills and ability levels; • Agile and responsive enough to respond to the likely evolution in the IED threat which implicitly requires the ability to effectively monitor such threat evolution; • Realistic in terms of resources allocated to support its requirements from development through implementation to sustainment; • Timely and responsive in addressing and countering the use of IEDs, which is a complex and challenging endeavor, being notably labor intensive; however, it is essential that benefits of the investments made are seen to deliver results in terms of protection of personnel, equipment, assets, and interests in an acceptable and often relatively short time frame. Such time frames can be driven by political or project management cycles.

16 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

The requirement for a timely return on investment in terms of protection provided, requires the efforts employed to counter IEDs to be agile in that such efforts are altered as the threat evolves so as to remain responsive due to the action counteraction cycle i.e., the counter IED efforts being employed must evolve over time and remain threat aligned.

IEDs AS A TACTICAL SECURITY ISSUE Counter IED efforts implemented may be considered as effective, when an organization’s personnel, equipment, assets, and interests are protected against IED attack over a sustained period of time. In such situations, the IED ceases to be an effective weapons system for aggressors and a decrease in their use may result. While from a counter IED centric perspective, this may be considered success, it can often have simply resulted in a shift of the threat to a softer target or another attack vector. For example, if an element of a security force hardens itself to IED attack, i.e., decreases its vulnerability to IED attack, the aggressor often switches its targeting to a softer more vulnerable target set. Such softer targets could be other more vulnerable elements of the security forces or their allies, for example, elements of the security force’s support base within the community. In this case, from a counter IED perspective the IED problem has merely been transferred rather than actually addressed. In the case that counter IED efforts result in a notable reduction in IED use, or in a best-case scenario an abandonment of their use, it is highly unlikely that the aggressors will abandon their use of violence solely on the counter IED successes implemented against them. They will most likely switch to the use of another attack vector or weapons system to progress their agenda. This highlights that IEDs are best considered as a weapon system employed when the prevailing security situation permits their use. IEDs are the tactical manifestation of a security threat rooted in broader security issues present in the operational environment. It is these broader security issues that support the employment of IEDs. As such, since IEDs are a tactical security

HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

problem, the collective response to their employment is best considered to be counter IED, which is itself an amalgamation of tactical responses. A military analogy to this would be the employment of the vast array of anti-armor weapon systems, platforms, protection measures, countermeasures, planning, staffing and associated logistical support to counter enemy armor. This combination of efforts to counter enemy armor may be considered anti-armor capabilities. While such anti-armor capabilities are broad and multi-functional, they are all tactical. In the same sense counter IED is best viewed as the collective tactical responses to protect one's own personnel, equipment, assets, and interests against the use of IEDs.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT SUPPORTS IED USE When one considers IEDs as a weapon system employed by an aggressor to best suit their agenda, and counter IED the tactical responses to mitigate their effectiveness, the wider issues of a more holistic approach to address what facilitates or supports their use is raised. Such deeper contextual issues require an examination of and understanding of the wider operational environment. While IED use can arise within stable states and societies, typically in a sporadic nature, linked most often to criminal activity or standalone external terrorist attacks, widespread IED use is more common in fragile, fragmenting, or failed regions, states, or localities. It is necessary to understand the security issues and threats which arise in such fragile, fragmenting, or failed regions, states, or localities to have a more holistic approach to address the factors that facilitate or support IED use. This idea of the operating environment that facilitates or support IED use is one that lends itself to the concept of the prevailing security ecosystem. If one considers that certain conditions are necessary for IEDs to be employed within a given security ecosystem one may view such prevailing conditions to be the fertile ground that supports their development, sustainment, and potential growth.

IED USE – ONE OF MULTIPLE SECURITY ISSUES WITHIN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT The reality of the risk posed by IEDs to any organization operating in a fragile, fragmenting, or failed region, state, or locality, is that it is typically only one such security issue that they must contend with. A region, state, or locality that is fragile, fragmenting or failed typically arises when the local operational environment is one in which there is instability and insecurity. The local conditions which give rise to and facilitate instability and insecurity may be considered to be the root causes of security, and stability issues, and by extension development challenges in a given region, state, or locality. Such root causes include issues such as: • Poor governance • Energy scarcity • Food insecurity • Overpopulation • Repressive security forces • Joblessness • Geopolitics • Local factors e.g., tribal competition and clan dynamics When such roots of instability and insecurity are present radical and violent extremist organizations of many persuasions, from criminal enterprises to insurgency groups, to terrorist organizations may act in order to address these issues and or exploit them to their agendas. This in turn can manifest itself in a large array of stability and security issues which can include: • Criminality e.g., racketeering, narcotics trading • Human rights abuses • Smuggling of illicit material • Armed conflict • Terrorism • Cyber crime • Small arms and light weapons (SALW) threats • Human trafficking • • • •

Extortion IED use Banditry Warlordism

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HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

BROAD SPECTRUM SECURITY RESPONSES The threat posed by IEDs is typically one which is present alongside and interconnected to other local security issues. As such the response to IED use needs to account for these other connected issues and the inter-relationship between them. It is important that an organization when operating in an IED threat environment does not become too focused on the IED threat at the expense of addressing the other security threats it may face. Ideally, the security system employed, requires an agile approach in which parallel and complementary responses to the array of security threats it faces are in place. When an organization adopts such an agile approach involving parallel and complementary responses to the array of security issues it faces, it can be said to have a broad threat spectrum approach to its security. Such broad threat spectrum approaches to security will typically not be the responsibility of any one organization required to operate in a fragile, failing, or failed state, region, or locality, but typically a collective one, coordinated amongst allied organisations. Contending with and countering the radical and violent extremist organisations who exploit the conditions of instability and insecurity to their agenda requires a broadspectrum local authority and state response. Such broad-spectrum responses typically involve security forces, judicial system initiatives and often social services activities. These can take place under many guises and include inter alia counter radicalization and deradicalization programs, violent extremism prevention initiatives as well as COIN and counter terrorism efforts.

ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY Ideally when such a broad threat spectrum approach is implemented, the safety of an organization's personnel, equipment, assets, and interests should be adequately provided for in line with the organization's risk management system. However, the control measures implemented to mitigate such security threats will rarely act to address the root causes that act as driving factors of the instability and insecurity.

18 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Such root causes facilitate such security threats to exist and their associated attack vectors to be employed. To address the root causes of such insecure and unstable operational environments, typically require strategic initiatives and comprehensive approaches which address such driving factors. Such comprehensive approaches will typically require a combination of initiatives that are political, economic, social, as well as security in nature. Such strategic initiatives will be the responsibility of regional governing bodies, states, or international organisations to implement and sustain.

THE TREE OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY An analogy to frame the complexities of the use of IEDs and the associated threat mitigation responses is contained in the concept of the tree of instability and insecurity. The roots of this tree are the local factors that provide the fertile conditions for instability and insecurity to emerge. These are then reacted to or exploited by radical and violent extremist organisations that then employ various means and methods that subsequently manifest themselves as security threats. Radical and violent extremist organisations who exploit such conditions may be considered the conduit that connect these conditions to the manifestations of insecurity and stability. The various manifestations of instability and insecurity are often the most visible and pressing security issues for an organization when operating in such an unstable and insecure environment. These manifestations may be viewed as the branches of the security threats which they face. The linkage provided by radical and violent extremist organisations between the manifestations of instability and insecurity to the favourable conditions that allow them to exist, allows one to visualise this interrelationship as the tree of instability and insecurity, with radical and violent extremist organisations considered as the trunk of the tree.

CONCEPTUALISING A HOLISTIC APPROACH Any focus on one branch of the tree of instability and insecurity may involve cutting a branch from the tree and removing it; however, the tree will remain intact,

HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

TERRORISM SALW THREATS EXTORTION

ARMED CONFLICT

CYBER CRIME

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

IEDs SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT MATERIALS

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

CRIMINALITY

INSECURITY & INSTABILITY

LOCAL FACTORS

RADICAL & VEO OVERPOPULATOIN

POOR GOVERNANCE JOBLESSNESS

ENERGY SCARCITY FOOD INSECURITY

GEOPOLITICS

REPRESSIVE SF

exploiting instability and creating security threats can be a better approach. Such an approach in theory is more effective than focusing on removing the branches of instability and insecurity. However, addressing the trunk of the problem compared to the branches requires a greater commitment of time, capital and resources and can be an even longer term initiative which can again be fiscally exhausting and attritional on the commitment by those undertaking the task. In reality, even if enough time, effort, and resources are committed to countering the radical and extremist organisations who exploit instability and create insecurity, the roots of the tree remain intact. Thus, the tree can regrow over time. To prevent the regeneration and regrowth of the security threats it is

necessary to remove its roots. This again, is an even greater commitment of time, capital and resources and typically involves strategic level initiatives that address the root causes of fragile, fragmenting, and failed regions, states, and localities. This simple analogy has its limits in that it is likely that no one level of approach will work in reality i.e., simply focusing on tactical branches, operational trunks or strategic roots independently would likely be impractical and ineffective. For example, consider a fragile locality within which radical and violent extremist organizations use terrorism involving IEDs, small arms and light weapons and human rights abuses to exert their control and influence in the absence of proper governance and in opposition to repressive security

Diagram 1 – a visual representation of the tree of instability and insecurity.

and the branch will likely regenerate and regrow in time with no effect on the other branches or security issues. A more effective approach at the tactical level involves one that addresses all branches simultaneously in what we have called a broad spectrum security response. However, this is a time, capital and resource intensive approach and can typically exceed the time, capital, and resources available to an organisation. This in turn can exhaust, bankrupt or attritionally break the will and commitment of those countering such security issues. A higher level operational approach that attacks the trunk of the tree by targeting the radical and violent extremist organisations responsible for

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HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

forces all of which has exacerbated preexisting food insecurity. Starting from the top down in terms of the tree of instability and insecurity, it is unlikely that efforts to counter the use of IEDs, overmatch small arms and light weapons threats and attempt to implement human rights awareness and enforcement on the tactical level would be effective without certain operational level initiatives to attack, deter or degrade the capabilities of the radical and violent extremist organisations. Similarly, initiatives against the radical and violent extremist organizations would unlikely prove to be long term sustainable or effective without strategic level reform of the security forces. This is likely to involve amongst other things, security sector reform and implementation of appropriate governance and accountability mechanisms. The issues of poor governance and food insecurity are both significant in terms of their impact on stability and security. They require initiatives to address them that are often longterm and strategic in nature. Attempting a bottom-up approach from the roots of the tree of instability and insecurity, in which security sector reform, coupled with political and judicial reform along with agricultural development initiatives would be possible if the radical and violent extremist organisations were also countered, contained, or captured at the same time. It is also necessary, that as such strategic initiatives and

undertaking, requiring effective synchronization and political buy in for the commitment of the time, capital and resources required. However, when organizations are attempting to address instability and insecurity in a fragile, fragmented, or failed region, state, or locality, it may be prudent to remain mindful of what success may require. They may then attempt to work within their means envelope and in collaboration with acceptable partner organisations, by pooling resources, to attain as best they can, their desired ends, by implementing the most appropriate ways at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. ■

operational efforts are undertaken, that appropriate tactical actions and risk mitigation measures are implemented and sustained to create the secure and stable space for such initiatives and efforts to take place.

Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and is in the process of completing his dissertation for a MA in Strategic Studies and is working with the Small Arms Survey. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice and support in relation to weapons and explosive hazard risk mitigation. This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas. Linkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-60a63a42/

CONCLUSION In reality any holistic approach to addressing instability and insecurity in a fragile, fragmenting, or failed region, state, or locality will require simultaneous approaches at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This is equivalent to putting in place a strategy that has actions and initiatives properly resourced, coordinated and executed to simultaneously remove multiple branches, cut at the trunk, and dig out the roots most likely while under the watchful eye of local populace and the international community. This is not an easy

20 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping

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LONE ACTOR TERRORISM

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RISKS AND THREATS? By Dr Jonathan Kenyon, National Specialist Lead within the Interventions Services Counter-Terrorism Team for Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) Dr Jens Binder, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Nottingham Trent University Dr Christopher Baker-Beall, Senior Lecturer in Crisis and Disaster Management at Bournemouth University’s Disaster Management Centre

ERCEIVED THREAT AND SOURCES OF EVIDENCE

The actions of radicalised extremists have been recognised as a major threat to societies and have been linked to highly visible acts of violence and terrorism. A major point of debate has been the role of social connectedness in determining the level of threat posed by those who commit acts of terrorism. While networks and extremist organisations can supply resources and contribute to attack planning, so-called lone actors pose a different kind of threat due to the difficulties in detecting them and the potential for self-radicalisation via the Internet. Intense media attention has been paid to lone actor attacks in the Western world. Past cases include the murder of 77 people on the island of Utøya by Anders Breivik in 2011, whose plans also involved planting a home-made fertiliser bomb at the government headquarters in Oslo. Another example is Salman Abedi, described as a lone actor in some quarters due to his role as a single suicide-bomber, who detonated an improvised explosive device packed with shrapnel in a crowded foyer in the

22 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Manchester Arena in 2017. Incidents such as these have brought lone actor terrorism to the forefront of political debate, with counter-terrorism increasingly focused on uncovering how lone actors have been ‘radicalised’ and understanding their ‘pathways’ into terrorism to develop measures designed to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring. The modus operandi of terrorist attacks is known to have diversified and simplified over recent years, particularly with Daesh having employed its considerable online propaganda effort to inspire, rather than to direct, acts of terrorism in Western Europe. Our own recent work has been concerned with the empirical basis for claims and concepts surrounding lone actors and radicalisation. This includes a comprehensive systematic review of data-driven literature focusing on pathways into lone actor terrorism (Kenyon, Baker-Beall, & Binder, 2021), which locates and discusses more than 100 sources. We have further conducted an in-depth analysis of

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closed-source data on 235 convicted extremists in England and Wales (Kenyon, Binder, & Baker-Beall, 2021). Our main argument is that the same dynamics that give rise to lone actor terrorism may also impose constraints on the effectiveness of resulting actions. Self-radicalisation on the Internet can and does occur, and for those taking this pathway, it is often accompanied by poor social connections offline. At the same time, only a minority of convicted extremists in our data set had followed this pathway to radicalisation, and they were less likely to have taken on an active role such as an attacker or to have engaged in violent offences.

RELEVANCE OF THE INTERNET TO LONE ACTOR RADICALISATION PATHWAYS One of the key themes that emerged from our review of the literature on pathways to lone actor terrorism was the increasingly prominent role of the Internet. The Internet serves many functions and plays a complex role, analogous to the pervasive and varied online engagement within society. It is being used to support ideological or extremist debate, to advance the radicalisation process and as a means for engaging in operational and attack planning. There is some indication that lone actor terrorists are more likely to engage in online learning than their group-based counterparts, but in addition the Internet can provide a substitute network for lone actors, redefining what constitutes a social community given the general absence of face-to-face contacts. It has been suggested that the spate of lone actor terrorist incidents across Europe and the U.S. since 2011 can be partly explained by use of various online platforms for disseminating lone actor tactics. However, terrorist groups also reach out to potential lone actors by seducing, teaching and encouraging them to launch attacks within online forums, chatrooms and social media applications. As such, online behaviours are potential key signals for law enforcement agencies and security services that an individual is on a pathway to committing an act of lone actor terrorism.

Our analysis of closed-source data on convicted extremists provided further support for the important role of the Internet in lone actor radicalisation pathways. Within this study, the radicalisation pathway for each case was determined from detailed risk assessment reports. Cases were categorised based on whether individuals had predominantly radicalised online, offline or via a hybrid process combining sources of influence. Further comparisons led to the emergence of characteristic offender profiles within each radicalisation pathway group. When investigating the degree of social connectivity to extremists offline across pathway groups, a substantial proportion of lone actors was found for those who primarily radicalised online, whereas a strong majority of group-based actors were found for the other two pathway groups. It is worth noting, however, that from among 235 convicted extremists only 29 satisfied a strict definition of online radicalisation. This points to the relative scarcity of Internet-only and lone actor cases.

ANALYSIS OF PAST OFFENCES COMMITTED AND ROLE TAKEN From reviewing the empirical literature, some marked differences between lone actors and other types of terrorists can be reported. Lone actor terrorists have a significantly longer life span as terrorists than group-based actors, from their first preparatory behaviour to the time of their arrest. Lone actor terrorists are also found to generally select civilian or ‘soft’ targets, as opposed to government or military targets, due to their relative weakness compared to terrorist groups or organisations. The chances of a successful attack appear heightened when lower value targets and members of the public are chosen. Further, the relative weakness of lone actor terrorists is in part related to their choice of weapons. Globally, firearms are frequently chosen, followed closely by explosives. Several studies have suggested that lone actor weapon choice is largely governed by the tools they have at hand, which helps to explain the increase in vehicle and knife attacks in recent years,

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LONE ACTOR TERRORISM

particularly in the UK and across Europe. When considering target location, this is generally at the intersection of the lone actor’s daily routines, with the frequency of attacks decreasing as the distance from their home location increases. Regarding lethality, lone actor attacks are generally cruder, smaller scale and less lethal compared with group actors, although there are of course exceptions. Following our analysis of offences committed by convicted extremists in England and Wales, it was found that online radicalisation had led to non-violent offences in almost 80% of all cases. Individuals following this pathway were also less likely to take on the role of an attacker within the context of their offence compared to those who primarily radicalised offline. This pattern is closely related to the nature of the offence. Those who primarily radicalised online had the highest percentage of individuals who had committed extremist offences solely via the Internet (41%). Examples included being convicted for possession of terrorist materials, dissemination of terrorist materials and encouraging support for a proscribed organisation. Taken together, our own and previous work consistently highlights the role of opportunities. These largely determine the activities of lone actors and can also limit their effectiveness.

In our study of 235 convicted extremists in England and Wales, it was possible to include expert risk assessments by trained professionals, registered psychologists and qualified probation officers. Comparing these formal assessments across three pathway groups: online radicalisation, offline (inperson) radicalisation, and hybrid radicalisation which is a mixture of both, it was found that online radicalisation was associated with the lowest levels of engagement with an extremist group or cause, indicating that these individuals were typically less involved or identified with an extremist group or cause at the time of offending. Online radicalisation was also associated with the lowest levels of intent and capability to commit violent extremist offences. This contrasted with convicted extremists considered to have been radicalised through a hybrid route of both online and offline influences, who were assessed with the highest level of engagement and intent, and those radicalised primarily offline, assessed with the highest levels of capability to act. These findings highlight the important role played by offline, in-person contact with other extremists in strengthening involvement and deepening a sense of identity with an extremist group or cause, and higher levels of intent and capability of the individual to carry our harmful acts.

FUTURE ASSESSMENTS OF RISK BY PROFESSIONALS

CONCLUSIONS DRAWN

Many claims regarding the pathways taken by lone actor terrorists and in particular regarding the risk posed by these individuals are based on conceptually and methodologically questionable assumptions, largely borne out by a lack of data-driven research within the literature. Lone actors are generally characterised as socially isolated individuals who do not communicate with others before they plan, prepare and execute their acts of violence. Often, they have been portrayed as highly capable, largely undetectable and hard to disrupt. However recent studies have challenged many of these assumptions, with a clearer picture emerging that lone actor attacks are relatively infrequent and less deadly than attacks carried out by groups.

24 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

We conclude that the same dynamics that give rise to lone actor terrorism, namely the increased prominence of Internet use in extremist offending and online radicalisation, may also impose constraints on the effectiveness of resulting actions. To support this conclusion, the findings from our empirical study suggest that online influences alone do not often result in violent extremist offending. The process of radicalisation leading to violent extremist offending is complex and multi-faceted. It is important to counter popular notions of lone actor terrorists as main sources of threats to societal security. Neither the literature nor our own analysis provides strong support for this view. At the same time, it would be premature to conclude that lone actors or online radicalisation carry no substantial threat

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM

potential. The few individuals that are classed as violent and high risk in our data set may be disproportionately dangerous. A small number of highprofile cases of lone actor terrorism are known involving serious violent offences as a result of what is considered solitary online radicalisation. One example is the case of Roshonara Choudhry in the UK who stabbed her local MP Stephen Timms, ostensibly in response to his parliamentary vote in favour of the 2003 Iraq war. Focusing on convicted extremists in our analysis also means to exclude those who died during the commission of offences, or those never identified and/or apprehended by the police. It is also important to remember that lone actor terrorism is a global phenomenon. There is likely to be important variation in the types of attacks committed and weapons used depending on geographical region. What is certain is that the issue of online, offline (in-person) and hybrid forms of radicalisation, leading to both non-violent and violent extremist offending, continues to represent a threat to society. If we are to mount an effective response to this problem, then further study of the pathways taken by those convicted of extremist offences remains essential if further acts of terrorism or violent extremism are to be prevented. ■

REFERENCES Kenyon, J., Baker-Beall, C., and Binder, J. (2021). Lone-actor terrorism – A systematic literature review. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1892635 Kenyon, J., Binder, J., and Baker-Beall, C. (2021). Exploring the role of the Internet in radicalisation and offending of convicted extremists. Ministry of Justice Analytical Series. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ exploring-the-role-of-the-internet-in-radicalisation-andoffending-of-convicted-extremists

Disclaimer The opinions expressed within the article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions and views of HMPPS, Nottingham Trent University or Bournemouth University.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr Jonathan Kenyon is a BPS Chartered and HCPC Registered Psychologist. He currently works as a National Specialist Lead within the Interventions Services CounterTerrorism Team for Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). In 2020, he completed the Doctorate qualification in Forensic Psychology at Nottingham Trent University. His thesis was entitled The Role of the Internet in the Radicalisation Process and Offending of Individuals Convicted of Extremist Offences. Dr Jens Binder is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Nottingham Trent University. His research focuses on cybersecurity and safety, social media engagement and user wellbeing as well as cognitive factors in online communication. With his work, he pursues the two-fold aim of enabling the users of digital technologies to identify safety and security concerns that come with online activities and to help users develop the online literacy skills needed to have more positive online experiences. He draws on perspectives from cyberpsychology, cognitive psychology and HCI and uses predominantly quantitative methods. His work has been published in high profile journals including American Psychologist, Computers in Human Behavior, New Media & Society and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. He regularly supervises projects at PhD level and leads on a specialist Postgraduate degree in Cyberpsychology. Dr Christopher Baker-Beall is Senior Lecturer in Crisis and Disaster Management at Bournemouth University’s Disaster Management Centre. His research focuses on contemporary security issues, including counter-terrorism, counterradicalisation, foreign fighters and border security. His publications include The European Union’s Fight against Terrorism: Discourse, Policies, Identity (Manchester University Press, 2016).

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THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM

ISSUES RELATED TO ESTABLISHING CAUSES BEHIND TERRORIST ATTACKS: THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM By Dr David Lowe, Leeds Law School at Leeds Beckett University

n the 14th November 2021 Emad alSwealmeen was in a private hire taxi when the improvised explosive device (IED) he had made detonated in the vehicle outside the Women’s Hospital in Liverpool. Although the taxi driver escaped with minor injuries, as a result of the device activating and the subsequent fire in the vehicle, al-Swealmeen died. Al-Swealmeen was an asylum seeker having travelled to the UK from the Middle East in 2014, however the UK rejected his asylum claim. During the investigation the Northwest Counter-Terrorism Unit have struggled to establish the cause for this act of terrorism. Al-Swealmeen was a Muslim, but during his time in Liverpool he converted to Christianity and based on previous terrorist attacks, being a women’s hospital, the location where the IED detonated was not a target that one expected that would assist in establishing the cause behind the attack. At the time of writing the cause behind this attack has not been ascertained. This article examines the variety of causes to promote acts of terrorism, assessing the increasing difficulty counter-terrorism investigators face in determining what the cause is behind terrorist attacks.

THE CAUSE BEHIND TERRORIST ATTACKS Section 1(1)(c) of the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 states that a terrorist act occurs where the action or the threat of action is used for the purpose of advancing a religious, political, ideological or racial cause. Many other states have similar wording in their statutory definition of terrorism, for example Canada and Australia include a religious, political or ideological cause to promote an act of terrorism. In determining the cause behind terrorist attacks that have occurred over the last few years it has normally been ascertained within 24-48 hours, be it from a group that claim responsibility for the attack, the posting of an online manifesto by the perpetrator or from evidence that investigators have found following searches of premises controlled by the perpetrator or their electronic devices. The latter involves examining the devices to see what internet sites the perpetrator was looking at, who they were communicating with, what they were downloading and sharing on various forms of social media. This evidence will be added with physical evidence found at the search of the perpetrator’s premises such as memorabilia, books and other written communication, all of which helps in ascertaining the cause.

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THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM

The Remembrance Sunday car explosion outside Liverpool Women’s Hospital has been declared a terrorist attack, though police have said the motive remains unclear. (Photo credit: centralrecorder.com)

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CAUSES Since the 2001 Al Qaeda attack on the US in New York and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia the only religious cause we have become familiar with is the Islamist cause. The two main terrorist organisations that have carried out attacks to promote their Islamist religious cause are Al Qaeda (for example the London 2005 attacks on the Underground and Tavistock Square) and Islamic State (for example the 2017 Westminster Bridge, and Manchester Arena attacks). In essence these groups want to end western state hegemony, overthrow liberal democracies, have a global Islamic caliphate that follows their very narrow interpretation of Wahhabi fundamentalist Sunni Islam in the strict application of Sharia law. In relation to religious causes, they do not only apply solely to Islamism, but it can also apply to any attack carried out 28 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

in the name of a religious cause. An example would be an IED attack on an abortion clinic by Christian fundamentalists because this goes against their religion. Regarding political causes, the most familiar political cause is those carried out by nationalist groups. In the UK the 1968-1998 Irish Troubles are a good example where dissident republican groups such as the former Provisional IRA, Continuity IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army were fighting for the reunification of Ireland’s 32 counties and the end of British governance in Northern Ireland. On the other side of this conflict were the loyalist groups like the Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom Fighters who want to maintain the state of Northern Ireland and remain part of the UK with a degree of governance from the UK’s Westminster

THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM

government. While the 1998 Good Friday Agreement saw the Provisional IRA and the loyalist groups end their violence, terrorist activity by dissident republican groups including the New IRA along with Continuity IRA and the INLA (these two groups did not sign up to the Good Friday Agreement) has continued, albeit to a far less scale of violence when compared to the Troubles. This is not unique to the UK. In Turkey the Kurdistan Workers Party are still continuing armed conflict with the Turkish government that originally were fighting for an independent Kurdish state. Since the 1990s they want autonomy and increased rights for Kurds in Turkey, similar to that which the Spanish Basque group ETA and its political wing, Batasuna, secured for the Basque region with the Spanish government in 2018 following their violent campaign. Another political cause behind acts of terrorism is related to the extreme far-right, the neo-Nazis, where the UK has proscribed nine neo-Nazi groups (two of which are alternative names for the group National Action) and Canada has banned four groups as terrorist organisations and James Mason, who wrote ‘Siege’, a book that inspires neo-Nazis to violence, as a terrorist entity. In the UK an extreme far-right attack could come under a racial cause. Globally there have been a number of neo-Nazi inspired attacks that include Brevik in Norway in 2011 where he killed 77 people, Tarrant in New Zealand in 2019 where he killed 51 people and, in the UK, where Thomas Mair killed the Member of Parliament Jo Cox in 2016. The main tenet of the neo-Nazi ideology is the promotion of white supremacy making it a racist ideology that is also antiSemitic, anti-Marxist, and believes in the violent overthrow of liberal democracies (that they see as Jewish controlled). The followers of the neo-Nazi movement are moving from a nationalist focus and are becoming more international as seen with groups like Atomwaffen and Sonnenkrieg Division. When Tarrant was carrying out his attack in Christchurch he ran a live Facebook feed, where in the comments on Facebook he was being encouraged by neo-Nazis globally. 1

Another political cause that is give a rising cause for concern is the extreme far-left, but to date there have been no attacks that have been found to be carried out in western states under this cause.

IDEOLOGICAL CAUSES In relation to terrorist attacks that are carried out under a religious or political cause, it is easier to ascertain this is the cause compared to ideological causes that cover a wide spectrum of ideologies. In November 2021 the UK the Home Office released the figures for the referrals of persons vulnerable to being drawn towards terrorism under the Prevent strategy for the year up to March 2021 where of the 688 cases referred to the Channel programme1 46% (317) were related to the extreme far-right, 22% (154) related to Islamist radicalisation, with nearly a third, 30% (205) related to, ‘…those with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’. It is an ideological cause that is more difficult for counter-terrorism investigators to determine and where you have a category like that in the UK’s Prevent strategy of ‘unclear ideology’ this shows how problematic this can be. What will be in common with the causes discussed above is in relation to a terrorist attack there will be the glorification or promotion of violence for the cause. An example of an ideological cause that is growing in popularity that has influenced attacks is the involuntary celibate movement, known as incel. Predominantly a misogynistic male movement consisting of men who struggle to start or maintain a relationship with women, incels are angry because they believe the sexual revolution made women more promiscuous and manipulative and that has been fuelled by feminism, the contraceptive pill and women’s involvement in politics. The incel ideology has its own unique terminology where ‘lookism’ means attractive people receive advantage and, where women only pursue attractive men that incels call ‘hypergamy’. They rank all racial groups by attractiveness where the

The Channel programme is part of the Prevent strategy where it has been assessed that the person needs assistance. Channel is a multi-agency approach that puts safeguarding measures in place to help the person return to mainstream society.

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THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM

most attractive white men and women are called ‘Chads’ and ‘Stacys’, attractive black men are referred to as ‘Tyrones’, attractive Asian men are ‘Changs’ and attractive Arabic men are ‘Chaddums’. However, driven by the incel ideology, attacks have occurred mainly in the US and Canada, that can be traced to 2014 in the US when Elliot Rodger stabbed three people and shot another three killing all six as well as injuring several others in May 2014 in Santa Barbara, California. Prior to the attack Rodger made a series of YouTube videos, the last one titled ‘Rodger’s Retribution’, which along with a rambling 141-page manifesto he posted espoused an extreme incel ideology. An example of how incel ideology can radicalise and influence individuals to commit violence is the Toronto van attack in 2018, where Alex Minassian was found guilty of 10 counts of murder and 16 counts of attempted murder after driving a van onto a crowded pavement in Toronto city centre. Claiming he was an incel, Minassian posted on Facebook:

Other ideological causes potentially glorify or promote violence can include environmental groups or animal welfare groups, but one must be very careful when assessing if these groups are used to advance their cause in terrorist related activity. For example, environmental issues are a genuine cause for concern for many and the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) was held in Glasgow in November 2021, so an environmental group’s ideology per se cannot be seen as a cause related to terrorism. However, if a certain group promotes violence and encourages attacks on people working in industries that environmental groups oppose, this could be a game changer in how the incident is investigated. Caution must be present, as once you get into ideological causes, it is not so clear cut if it is behind an act of terrorism. Even more difficult causes for investigators to identify are those classified as ‘unstable or unclear ideology’.

THE LIVERPOOL TERRORIST ATTACK

After being arrested, Minassian told police he was

This returns us to the terrorist incident in Liverpool at the Women’s Hospital on the 14th November 2021 and determining what the cause is behind the attack. This could be one that could come under an unstable or unclear ideology. As stated in the introduction, alSwealmeen was an asylum seeker having travelled

radicalised by other incels online. Among the latest violent incel inspired attacks, two occurred in May 2020. One in Chandale, Arizona, US where a 20-yearold male, Armando Marnandes, went on a shooting spree, targeting couples to express his anger over the fact that women rejected him. The second was in Toronto, Canada where a 17-year-old boy imbued with the violent incel ideology, killed a woman with a machete and was the first occasion an incel inspired killing was classified as a terrorist crime. In the UK when Jake Davison shot and killed five people before shooting himself in Plymouth, UK in August 2021, the term ‘incel’ became more widely known with the mainstream media asking if incel should be considered as an extremist ideology that inspires acts of terrorism. This incident was not investigated as a terrorist attack.

to the UK from the Middle East in 2014, however the UK rejected his asylum claim, and it was reported that he was appealing that decision in late 2020. He was a Muslim, but during his time in Liverpool he converted to Christianity and based on previous terrorist attacks, being a women’s hospital, the location where the IED detonated was not a target that one expected that would assist in establishing the cause behind the attack. What the investigators have looked at is the timing of the attack that was at 11.00 hours on Remembrance Sunday, where the UK remember the armed forces personnel who gave their lives in conflicts since World War One, and this is the time when all services around the country fall silent to remember the dead. At that time such a service was being held in Liverpool’s Anglican Cathedral a short distance away from the Women’s

‘…the incel revolution has already begun! We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys! All hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger.’

30 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

THE LIVERPOOL ATTACK CONUNDRUM

Hospital. In relation to the IED al-Swealmeen made and intended to use, it contained ball bearings. Those who have used similar devices normally suggests that the target they had in mind would have been one where there would be a large number of people to ensure that the detonation of the IED would have maximum impact. Whether it was the hospital or a Remembrance Service al-Swealmeen was targeting, with the taxi coming to a halt possibly causing a premature detonation killing al-Swealmeen, we may never know. These are lines of enquiries the investigating officers from the UK’s Northwest Counter-Terrorism Unit released that they were pursuing. Accepting this is pure speculation based on the facts that have been released by the investigation team, the motive behind al-Swealmeen’s actions could range from a religious cause to wanting revenge for his asylum application having failed. It is clearly a conundrum for the investigators in determining the cause and one that may never be ascertained, resulting in it being classified as an attack carried out under an unclear ideology.

CONCLUSION

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

In most terrorist attacks the cause the attack used to advance is determined quickly during an investigation and as stated most are carried out to advance either

Dr David Lowe is a retired police officer and is currently a senior

a religious or political cause. As covered in this article not all causes behind terrorist attacks are political or religious, they can be ideological. In relation to ideological one has to be careful in assessing if this is a cause and to assist in this, if the ideological cause is glorifying or promoting violence towards its cause then it may apply. In contemporary society other extremist causes maybe behind attacks, as seen in Canada and the US, the incel ideology appears to be gathering momentum where attacks to promote the incel cause have the potential to expand into other states. As seen in the Liverpool attack, some causes can be difficult to determine and could be classified under ‘unclear ideology’, the terrorist version of miscellaneous. While not ideal, it appears to be the most appropriate way to classify ideologies that are difficult to define. ■

research fellow at Leeds Law School, Leeds Beckett University researching terrorism and security, policing and criminal law. He has many publications in this area including his recent books ‘Prevent Strategy: Helping the Vulnerable being drawn towards Terrorism or Another Layer of State Surveillance?’, ‘Terrorism and State Surveillance of Communications’ and ‘Terrorism: Law and Policy’, all published by Routledge. Routledge will be publishing the 2nd edition of his book ‘Terrorism Law and Policy: A Comparative Study’ in early 2022. David is regularly requested to provide expert commentary to UK national and international mainstream media on issues related to his research areas and he provides an expert witness service.

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DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS – CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER? By Vincent Deery, Sales and Marketing Director at 3DX-Ray Ltd.

iplomatic missions around the world are incredibly vulnerable. By their very nature, they are the territory of a foreign power within the very heart of another sovereign state. But diplomatic missions do not just consist of the Embassies themselves. Often countries maintain one or more consulates and embassy offices in major cities around the host country. For instance, New York has 116 foreign missions in the city, primarily because it is the home of the UN headquarters and a global financial centre. But Los Angeles, which is not the site for any international intergovernmental organisations is still home to sixtysix foreign consular missions. Another example is UK, which in addition to its Embassies in the host nation’s capital, has four consulates in Nigeria, seven consulates in India, and no less than thirteen in the US. In total, the UK maintains eighty-five Embassy satellite offices and consulates in non-capital cities around the world. This pattern is mirrored by many of the richer nations.

safest countries on earth, was the scene of a mass shooting in 2019 which killed 51 people. In that case the perpetrator was a white supremacist, and the target was Moslems in local Mosques. What that incident shows is that nowhere can be considered completely safe from radical extremism, whether it is politically, religiously, and racially motivated. Circumstances can also change very rapidly and diplomatic missions from countries that would not normally consider themselves high priority targets for radicals, can very quickly find themselves as isolated islands in a sea of potentially dangerous political or religious unrest. As was the case back in 2005 when Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published twelve editorial cartoons that caused offence to some Muslims. In early 2006 protests around the world escalated into violence, resulting in attacks on Danish and other European diplomatic missions. One of the reasons they are so vulnerable is that diplomatic missions are only responsible for their own security up to their own perimeter. Outside of that, they are totally dependent on local security forces to ensure

All these embassies and missions are vulnerable to some degree or another. That risk varies greatly but nowhere can be considered risk free. After all, New Zealand which has always been considered one of the

their safety. And sometimes those local authorities might not be up to the job, are sympathetic to the cause of would-be aggressors or in the worst-case scenario are complicit with them.

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X-RAY MAIL SCREENING

Globally, attacks on diplomatic missions are by no means unusual. 2020 and 2021 were both unusually peaceful, there were only three attacks over both years: no prizes for guessing why. But not a year goes by without some sort of attack on a mission somewhere in the world and most are not against what you would regard as the usual suspects of USA, UK, France. Of the sixty-nine attacks on missions in the last ten years, only eight were against the US, four against French and one against UK missions. 2015 was a recent high point with seventeen separate attacks around the world on the diplomatic missions of fourteen different countries, resulting in twenty-one deaths and twenty-seven injured. 2016 saw the single, bloodiest incident of recent years, with the attack on the German consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, when a Taliban truck bomb killed three and injured one hundred and twenty. It is fair to say, that most Embassies, but not all, take their perimeter security as seriously as the local risk assessment dictates. The same cannot be said for many consulates and embassy offices, which are often in shared commercial premises and so rely on the building security for theirs. Most seem to rely on their relative obscurity, for their security. But one area of real concern for all diplomatic missions is the postal system. For terrorists and other bad actors wishing to do harm, postal and courier services represent a low risk, covert delivery system bypassing perimeter security, right into the heart of the mission. Most diplomatic missions will receive hundreds, if not thousands of letters and parcels each month. Delivered threats can include letters and parcels potentially containing explosive or incendiary devices. Other threats include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. These may come in the form of so-called “White powders” but may also be crystalline, oily, or waxy residues, or liquid substances. Therefore, it is key to ensure that all letters and packages, whether they are mailed or arrive by courier, go through the mailroom and that the mailroom is a fundamental part of the security system. Mailroom staff

34 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Cabinet-based x-ray screening system AXIS™-Cxi.

X-RAY MAIL SCREENING

need to be properly trained and equipped, and follow appropriate processes and procedures, such as those laid down in the UK CPNI’s PAS 97:2021 mail screening and security specification. Given the potential risks faced, X-Ray mail screening technology is a must for diplomatic missions. Many of the bigger high threat embassies will no doubt have conveyor x-ray line scanners of the sort that you see at airports. But not all diplomatic missions will have the threat level, space, or budget for systems of this type. There are plenty of cabinet style X-ray mail scanners on the market, but not all available cabinet systems provide adequate capability. Back in 2019 UK company 3DX-Ray, launched the AXIS™-CXi, a cabinet-based x-ray screening system that utilises the same colour differentiating image technology used in airport baggage screening and meets the requirements of the UK Mail Screening Test Piece (MSTP)1, part of the CPNI’s PAS 97. 3DX-Ray has recently sold two systems to the Diplomatic Protection Service of a Pacific rim nation. The AXIS™-CXi is a huge step forward in mail room scanning, as colour differentiated images enable operators to determine not just the shape, but the nature of the materials being scanned. Orange shows organics, such as explosives, chemicals, and drugs, as

A further major innovation is in the design itself. The AXIS™-CXi has an extra-large inspection chamber, whilst maintaining a small footprint. So, not only can it scan mail and parcels, but it can also scan bags up to and including aircraft cabin bags.

well as more innocent items such as foodstuffs. Blue shows metals, such as guns, knives, and potential IED components. Green shows inorganic materials like those used in some homemade explosives. Grey scale is used for recognition of shapes and the form of objects. This allows the operator, with very little training, to analyse items more accurately, quickly, and easily. This is a step change from many existing cabinet mail screening manufacturers who have relied on pseudo colourisation of images and powder detection algorithms to indicate to operators the potential of a threat – these tools do not have any independent standard accreditation or assessment, unlike the materials discrimination 3DX-Ray has introduced which is assessed according to the transport and aviation sector standards and specifically test 5 of the Mail Screening Test Piece.

https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/4e/09/

The system is mobile and aesthetically sympathetic, meaning that it can be used in entrances and lobbies in times of raised threat levels. The system has user-friendly touch screen controls, high image resolution and highly capable image processing software. What is certain is that the threat to diplomatic missions is ever present and is not going away. It only takes a seemingly harmless decision or comment by the home government, a corporation, media, or citizen, to offend the sensibilities of a foreign religious, political, ethnic or national group, to make diplomatic missions an “easy to get at target” for angry violent protests or terrorism. Whilst obviously you can only control what is within your control, one control you can have, is making sure that your diplomatic staff have the best possible protection from dangers that arrive in the post. ■

REFERENCES 1

UK Mail Screening Test Piece (MSTP), UK-Mail-Screening-Test-Piece-MSTP-A-Guide.pdf

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Vincent Deery is Sales and Marketing Director at 3DX-Ray Ltd.

counteriedreport.com 35

18 -20 MAY 2022 Sands Expo, Singapore

Incorporating

Commercial Security Asia

ASIA PACIFIC’S LEADING FULLY INTEGRATED SECURITY EVENT

Supporting Organisations

Organised By

THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED By Frederic Maio Programme Manager and staff of Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Abstract This article is informed on experiences and findings of the Geneva-based Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) which carried out a mission to Bata, Equatorial Guinea as part of a United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Quick Response Mechanism (QRM) in the aftermath of a series of explosions in the city. It describes how AMAT deployed an assessment team to determine the cause of the explosions and the opportunities and challenges rapid deployment created. Building on the key findings of the mission, this paper aims to provide a concrete example of the importance of the capability to respond quickly to an adverse event anywhere to identify, reduce and mitigate the risk of further explosions. More broadly, this article takes the example of the Equatorial Guinea blasts and subsequent QRM deployment to illustrate the benefits of putting in practice the internationally accepted standards reflected in the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)[1]. Acting on the concrete recommendations made, both during and after the mission, can, this article postulates, reduce the risks of future similar incidents as well as inform on longer-term actions to significantly increase the safety and security of a state’s national ammunition stockpile. [1]

https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG

NTRODUCTION

In the early hours of the 8th of March 2021, the head of the Geneva-based Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) received a phone call from UNODA’s headquarters in New York. A series of explosions had taken place in the city of Bata in Equatorial Guinea. The explosions occurred within the ammunition storage area at the Nkoa Ntoma military camp and killed at least 100 people, with 600 more injured. In addition, there was considerable infrastructure damage to the military camp, the storage area, and the surrounding buildings. The potential for the casualty numbers to rise from residual contamination, as well as the risk of further explosions, was high.

The Minister of State for Equatorial Guinea had requested immediate assistance from UNODA and its regional centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) . The key outcome of this request was that UNODA decided to trigger the UN SaferGuard Quick Response Mechanism (QRM), an instrument established to allow specialists’ rapid deployment to assist States in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, including in the aftermath of accidental explosions of ammunition. Although the risk of accidental explosions in ammunition storage areas can never be fully eliminated – even within the most well-developed militaries – the probability can be reduced and resulting negative consequences mitigated.[1] In the aftermath of an

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THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

explosion, it is vital to carry out a rapid assessment of the explosion site to understand what happened and why it happened, capturing lessons learned to prevent similar incidents in the future. Under QRM’s Terms of Reference “rapid” is defined as within 72 hours. Selecting and equipping the team, as well as all logistical planning for the deployment, started early the following day and turned out to be no mean feat: the one flight a week from Europe to Equatorial Guinea lands in Malabo, the country’s capital, on an island 250 kilometres from the site of the explosion in Bata on the mainland. That flight was leaving in 72 hours. For the QRM to live up to its expectations, it was crucial to respect the ‘quick’ part, which in turn meant that a lengthy list of administrative tasks had to be completed extremely rapidly - a list which was even longer and more complicated than usual due to public health measures in place for travelling during the Covid-19 pandemic. These included procuring special visas and carrying out the required PCR tests. With the teamwork of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNODA and AMAT, the necessary preparation was completed in time and the team could board their flight to Malabo. The team arrived in Bata five days after the incident, immediately travelling to the explosion site and starting the work required. The mission had four primary objectives: 1. To assist in determining the cause of the incident. 2. To identify further explosion risks through a rapid risk assessment on the ground. 3. To assist in reducing the risk of further explosion incidents through technical advice on risk reduction and mitigation measures. 4. To provide recommendations on follow-up technical support, including the coordination of bilateral offers of assistance from individual Member States, and potential further support from United Nations entities, including the Mine Action Service.

1 2

The assessment led to the identification of the sequence of events that occurred on 7 March 2021. Whilst a brush fire was the immediate cause of the explosive event, several underlying factors contributed to its occurrence and the magnitude of the consequences. These include civilian encroachment of the ammunition storage area, improper stockpile management practices, and lack of recognition of the risks posed by stockpiles of commercial explosives. Criticism of the government or the national armed forces’ practices is not the purpose of this article, rather the article aims to show what can be achieved when the international community can, and does, respond to a situation rapidly. The article begins with an explanation of the methodology used by the QRM team, followed by the explosive event analysis before detailing the challenges and gaps identified. It concludes with recommendations and lessons learned.

METHODOLOGY The team used the following methodologies to obtain insights into the cause of the 7 March explosion: Explosion site visits: The team immediately established communication and cooperation with Equatorial Guinea’s national authority, the armed forces and the UN Resident Coordinator. Having gained an understanding of which other actors were already operational in response, and in agreement with these parties, the team was deployed to the ammunition storage area at Nkoa Ntoma military camp for 11 consecutive days (13-23 March). The aim was to collect primary information on the cause of the accident in accordance with the IATG on Risk Management1 and Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation.2 The team assessed current practices pertaining to ammunition storage, safety, and security and built a picture of activities carried out at the blast site prior to, and at the time of, the incident. The team performed a

IATG 02.10 Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes; 02.20 Quantity and Separation Distances; 02.30 Licensing of Explosive Facilities; 02.40 Safeguarding of Explosive Facilities; and 02.50 Fire Safety IATG 11.10 Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation; 11.20 Ammunition Accident Investigation Methodology; and 11.30 EOD Clearance of Ammunition Storage Area Explosions

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THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Photo 1: Location of the Nkoa Ntoma military camp in the city of Bata. combination of activities including visual inspection, review of available regulations, witness interviews and discussions with relevant authorities in charge of the safety and security of the storage area and the barracks. These are presented in further detail below. Chemical analysis: During the mission, the assessment team benefited from collaboration with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, established by the Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva. A Swiss government-seconded Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) specialist to UNDAC was attached to the assessment team from day one, conducting crater analyses, explosive detection and blast damage estimates, as well as measuring the levels of radiation, toxicity and heavy metals around the blast site. Key stakeholder interviews: From 13th to 23th March, the assessment team conducted 34 interviews with local community representatives residing in the immediate surroundings of the Nkoa Ntoma military camp. The assessment team was careful to ensure that interviewees reflected the social makeup of the surrounding area, so at least 50% of the interviewees were women, some

accompanying small children who were also asked to provide any insights after parental permission was granted. Three adolescents were also talked to. In addition, the team spoke with 15 stakeholders from key authorities and responding agencies including members of the Equatorial Guinea Ministry of Defence and armed forces, international organisations operating in Equatorial Guinea, and the bilateral state agencies (from Cameroon, France, Israel, USA and Qatar) providing humanitarian and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support.

EXPLOSIVE EVENT ANALYSIS The information gathered by the assessment team made it possible to establish the course of events in the Nkoa Ntoma district of Bata (see Photo 1) on 7 March, entailing a fire, several powerful explosions at the ammunition storage area, and the aftermath. The first explosion, according to witnesses from the local community, was very powerful. It was followed by several others, all originating from the part of the military camp housing a storage area for commercial quarrying explosives and accessories, as well as from the central ammunition and weapons depot for the country's continental region (see Photo 2).

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THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Photo 2: Nkoa Ntoma military camp - aerial view of the ammunition depot (1) and the commercial explosives storage site (2) before the explosion on 7 March 2021. Based on the evidence gathered and other information available to the team, the assessment concluded that the sequence of explosive events began with the first explosion occurring at the commercial explosives’ storage site (see Photo 2). This conclusion is supported by the results of the crosschecking of information obtained from the Equatorial Guinean military, the analysis of satellite photos, and the results of the technical assessment of the postblast site carried out by the team. Witness testimony and physical evidence suggested a brush fire (of unknown origin) triggered the first set of explosions. The fire started to the north-west of plot 2 (see photo 2). The military firefighters dispatched to the site were unable to control the flames, which quickly reached a height of more than five metres. The fire spread rapidly towards a grouping of dozens of shipping containers due to the northerly wind, causing the commercial explosives stored inside the containers to mass-detonate.

40 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

The next explosions involved the regional ammunition depot on the other side of the perimeter wall (see Photo 2). This site consisted of three main storage buildings and two smaller warehouses, all constructed of reinforced concrete, and an enclosed metal hangar. The reinforced concrete buildings housed ammunition and weaponry. Due to lack of space, boxes of 105 mm shells and 120 mm mortar rounds were also stored in the hangar. The discovery of numerous weapons and ammunition, originating from the ammunition storage area, on the surface of the area where commercial explosives from public works companies were stored, is regarded as proof of the fact that the explosion of the military depot occurred after the explosion of the commercial explosives. If not, the weapons and ammunition would have been covered by the earth and debris from the explosion of the containers.

THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Graphical illustration of the simplified sequence of events:

Nkoa Ntoma military camp – aerial view of the ammunition depot (A) and the commercial explosives storage site (B) before the explosion on 7 March 2021.

IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES Civilian encroachment into the ammunition depot danger area at the Nkoa Ntoma military camp The general increase in population throughout Equatorial Guinea, as well as the migration to the cities in search of better living conditions, has led to an exponential growth in the population of the urban area of Bata. Between 2004 and 2021 the city’s population increased from 159,000 to 435,000 inhabitants. In 2004, the Nkoa Ntoma military camp was in the forest, whereas by 2016 it

had been absorbed by the city. Therefore, for security and safety reasons, the ammunition storage area must be relocated, and measures taken to prevent future encroachment within its danger area.

Improper stockpile management practices The post-explosion assessment showed that weapons and ammunition were stored in the same warehouses, and that within the warehouses small arms and

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THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Photos 3 and 4: Example of EOD clearance progress at Nkoa Ntoma military camp, March 13 and March 23 2001.

grenade launchers were loaded with ammunition. This practice exemplifies a critical safety non-compliance. In addition to these basic issues, there were several other shortcomings that suggest that the warehouse managers were not sufficiently trained on the good practice such as those detailed in the IATG and the Modular Small Arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC).3 The management of the skills of ammunition and weapons technicians must be monitored individually, and collectively, to ensure

IDENTIFIED CAPABILITIES AND GAPS

effective and efficient ammunition depots.

resulted in the area’s contamination with unexploded ammunition and explosives. This contamination will require the timely intervention of EOD technicians capable of conducting a thorough search for hidden items, removing the danger following a detailed analysis of the situation, and, where necessary, disposal by destruction in-situ.

operation

arms

and

Risks posed by commercial explosive stockpiles Discussions with the logistics officers in charge of the ammunition storage area at the Nkoa Ntoma military camp suggested that the provision of security for the explosives stored by civilian companies on the site, next to the depot, was not the responsibility for the military. This situation is even more surprising given that, by all accounts, the basic rules of security were not respected by these companies, and access to the site was not controlled.

EOD capabilities and needs According to the information from the discussions with Equatorial Guinea army officers, the force is not equipped with operational EOD capability, although several officers and NCOs have been trained abroad over the past decade, notably through the bilateral cooperation with France. The explosions at the Nkoa Ntoma camp site

Ammunition management capabilities and needs The assessment identified the technical, structural, and organisational capacity gaps which led to the 7 March explosion. The explosive event may have been prevented if the risks were properly understood and appreciated.

MOSAIC: Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium.

42 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Training and empowering of national experts in ammunition and explosives safety management is required. The security is equally important and calls for the development and implementation of adequate national standards and policies governing ammunition and explosives stockpiles at a national level. This should follow the training and upgraded technical management capacities.

Future location for weapons, ammunition and explosive materials The IATG approach the through life management of ammunition and explosives through an evidencebased, risk management approach. Weapons and ammunition, ammunition and explosives, detonators and explosives, and ammunition and certain other ammunition, have to be separated from one other in transport and storage. Safety distances from one stored energetic material to others must be calculated, and adhered to, to avoid a sympathetic mass detonation as experienced in Bata.

Training in ammunition safety and security management (short-term) This assessment also identifies the need for IATGcompliant training and mentoring of storekeepers, depot managers, ammunition inspectors and regulators in the management of ammunition and commercial explosives. The short-term goal of the training should be the identification and significant reduction of risks posed by ammunition and explosive materials. In particular, this could include immediate training for improving physical security and stockpile management practices, with a particular focus on accounting, firefighting and evacuation, safe storage, and access control.

Establishment of a continental ammunition storage area (medium-term) The assessment strongly suggests the building of a new ammunition and explosives storage area, away from the local population. The design and planning of the ammunition storage area should be guided by the IATG.

RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations below are based on the postincident assessment conducted by the QRM team as described above. They are based on technical advice and measures within international guidelines (IATG and MOSAIC) that govern safety and security activities and the management of stocks of ammunition, explosives and weapons under a state control. The implementation of these recommendations will significantly reduce the probability of risks materialising and mitigate their effects, should they occur, to reduce the chances, and effects, of incidents such as that of 7 March 2021.

EOD clearance (short-term) This assessment recommends the selection, training and equipping of an operational EOD capability for Equatorial Guinea to deal with the clean-up operation and call-outs. The current scenario underscores the need for the army to obtain the necessary technical skills, equipment, and mobility to establish two operational EOD teams in the country.

Development of national standards and legislation for ammunition and explosives (medium-term) Finally, the assessment supports the development of national standards to regulate the technical, operational, and logistical aspects of the management of stockpiles of ammunition and explosive materials, in line with the IATG, and compatible with other standards, conventions and agreements of Equatorial Guinea. The national standards, once approved, should guide the drafting of a legislation to govern the national authorities and ensure safe and secure management of weapons, ammunition and explosives, as well as keeping ammunition and explosives a safe distance from people and critical infrastructure. The role of commercial explosives in the 7 March events highlight the importance of effective oversight and quality control of commercial (quarrying) explosives and accessories, and of private companies. This is not particular to Equatorial Guinea: according to available information, globally about one

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THE BATA EXPLOSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

quarter of all accidental explosions at ammunition storage areas occur within non-state, privately owned facilities, and often result from extreme weather conditions and external fire, criminal activity, or improper handling.4 In the course of the development of national standards and legislation for ammunition and explosives management, the national government should include adequate provisions in the legislation for the oversight and quality control of commercial explosives and of private companies operating in the country.

CONCLUSION Whilst these recommendations are far reaching, it is the firm conclusion and belief of AMAT that what mattered the most in the follow-up is that the emergency request for international support was triggered immediately by the government of Equatorial Guinea, allowing for search and rescue operations to start and emergency aid to get to the casualties. In addition, the assessment team was granted full access on arrival, and able to immediately work on assessing the risk of further incidents. Whereas states like Equatorial Guinea may not have properly appreciated the risks posed by accumulating ammunition and explosives stockpiles, many states are increasingly aware of the risks and address them: taking up the IATG is the first step to a sustainable risk reduction. This article shows that the recommendations made by the assessment team included several risk reduction measures which can be put in practice fairly quickly and without significant financial resources, greatly increasing the safety and security of ammunition and, therefore, of the local population. The recognition that many states do not have the expertise, resources, or support to manage ammunition safely and securely is the reason why AMAT exists; to support and advise. It is the hope of AMAT that the QRM would be activated before, not after, an accidental explosion already having caused massive loss of life and material cost. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Frederic Maio joined GICHD in their Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) in June 2019. As Programme Manager, Frederic coordinates the implementation of AMAT’s activities in partnership with donor governments and local authorities. Prior to joining GICHD, Frederic worked in the field of humanitarian mine clearance and security sector reform. From 2007 to 2015, as an operations manager for Mines Advisory Group and Handicap International, Frederic oversaw ERW clearance programmes in Sudan, Vietnam, Cambodia and Afghanistan and directed emergency response ERW clearance operations in Gaza, Libya and Syria. More recently Frederic spent 3 years working with The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) as head of their Ramallah Office. Frederic studied in Geneva and Nottingham and holds a BA in Business Management and an MA in International Relations and Political Science.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-41.pdf

44 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

NTRODUCTION

Blast trials are a critical part of Bomb Disposal Suit Development. They are required by public safety standards such as the National Institute of Justice NĲ 0117.01 and are designed to ensure the suit’s ability to reduce the blast and fragmentation hazard. The collection of critical data on the blast’s effects on the body allows manufacturers and the wider industry to ensure that bomb disposal suits protect operators from long term damage and increase survivability. This data includes blast overpressure which is particularly damaging to the lungs and ears, and blast induced head injury. Bomb disposal suits are the last line of defence against blast and fragmentation therefore the

operator’s ability to conduct EOD tasks whilst in the suit must not be impeded. Visibility and movement can be significantly improved via suit design but also accessories such as cooling and communication systems. This article discusses manufacturers’ obligations in terms of blast trials and other performance testing covering ergonomics, impact, fragmentation and flammability and how new EOD suit design is having a positive impact on survivability. It includes results from recent blast trials on NP Aerospace’s new 4030 ELITE bomb suit to four internationally recognised scenarios, including the two most extreme tests (10kg PE4 @ 3m standing and 0.567kg C4 kneeling) and considers longer term future testing methods.

High speed footage of blast trials for four internationally recognised scenarios. counteriedreport.com 45

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

IMPACT OF BLAST Blast is a complex product of the detonation of an explosive device and its effects can be categorised into four groups. Primary blast refers to the effects of a rapid increase in pressure, particularly affecting body organs containing air, i.e. ears, lungs and gastrointestinal tract. Whilst primary blast can cause fatalities, there is also significant risk of debilitating physical injuries such as Blast Lung and also mental injuries. Secondary blast refers to fragmentation, both primary and secondary. Tertiary blast refers to the effects of the blast wind which results in displacement of the body as well as possible traumatic amputation. Quaternary blast refers to the effects of the heat and flame of the fireball. Manufacturers need to take into account all of these aspects and undertake rigorous and extensive testing. NĲ 0117.01 specifies a single blast trial 0.567kg C4 @0.6m kneeling. However, some manufacturers go beyond this. NP Aerospace tests against 4 scenarios: 0.567kg C4 @0.6m kneeling, 1kg PE4 @1m standing, 2kg PE4 @2m standing and 10kg PE4 @3m standing as each can affect the body differently.

for all scenarios according to the Bowen Curve significantly reducing the risk of lung injury.

BLAST TRIALS Live explosive Blast trials offer the best way to replicate as near to a real-life EOD or IEDD scenario as possible and much work has been done in this area. Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs) or ‘crash test dummies’ have become more scientific and informative alongside improvements made in automotive testing. The Millbrook ATD used in the 4030 ELITE blast trials was a Hybrid III 50th percentile male dummy with 16 internal sensors (3 accelerometers located at each Head, Chest and Pelvis, a 6-Axis Load Cell located at the Neck, and a deflection Displacement sensor located at the Chest) a further 4 external pressure sensors (located at each Left and Right Ear, Centre and Side Chest).

SURVIVABILITY AND THE BOWEN CURVE In order to standardise and compare testing, manufacturers use different methods of measuring data. The most common being Blast Overpressure reduction, where pressure sensors are placed both inside the suit (typically at the lung and ear) and compared to external reference sensors to calculate the suit’s effectiveness against the harmful effects of peak pressure. Blast overpressure can be plotted on the Bowen Curve, which offers a measure of the probability of survivability due to lung injury for operators wearing EOD Suits. This was established in the titled paper ‘Estimate of man’s tolerance to the direct effects of air pressure’. The advantage of the Bowen Curve is that it provides qualitative data which suit manufacturers can use as a starting point when conducting tests. In recent blast trials, our 4030 ELITE suit survivability rating exceeded 99%

46 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Hybrid III Anthropomorphic Test Device used in 4030 ELITE blast trials.

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

Firing set up for 10kg PE4 @3m standing. The ATDs are dressed in the EOD suit and set up in a kneeling or standing position facing the explosive – allowing to freely fall back when subjected to the force of the explosion. Different explosives are used according to the criteria being tested. In the case of the 4030 ELITE testing both C4 and PE4 plastic explosives were used. Blast testing is conducted at external laboratories or blast sites for large scale testing. In the case of the 4030 ELITE suit testing NP Aerospace used two test facilities, Oregon Ballistic Laboratories (OBL) in the US and Ordnance Test Solutions (OTS) and Phil Gotts Consulting in the UK.

DATA MEASURED The primary data gathered from blast trials includes pressure curve behind the suit at lung and ear, freefield pressure and head acceleration. A sudden increase and decrease in pressure can cause significant damage to an operator’s body, particularly air-filled organs such as the lung and ear. The ATD determines blast overpressure attenuating capability. Peak values of overpressure are measured at the chest and ear of the ATD. Percentage Reduction in Overpressure compares the measured pressure in the free field with that under the EOD Suit or Helmet.

Blast trials also monitor head acceleration. When subjected to blast wind the head may move backwards at a different rate to the torso in a rotational rather than linear motion, thus providing rotational acceleration. Head Injury Criterion has been devised to predict head injury for impact events and is calculated using the ATD tri-axis head accelerometers. This data is important in determining the probability of survivability against designated explosive charge weights but also can be used in aiding with initial triage and injury recovery programs.

BLAST TRIAL RESULTS Blast trials for the 4030 ELITE suit were undertaken in the UK and US. The following data is for the four scenarios performed in the UK. In each scenario two suits were used, facing towards the centrally placed explosive charge at the required standoff distance. Using two suits allows an average result to be calculated, accounting for any non-uniform blast distribution. Following the detonation and once the range is made safe - the first thing the manufacturer does is fully inspect the suit, checking that all components remain locked and secure on the ATD – focusing on the Helmet Retention System, Face Shield, Plate Buckles, Zips and Quick Release System. The Suit and Helmet

counteriedreport.com 47

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

Blast Scenario

% Reduction in Blast Overpressure at Chest

% Reduction in Blast Overpressure at Ear

0.567kg C4 @ 0.6m kneeling (NĲ 0117.01)

99%

99.7% to 99.8%

1kg PE4 @ 1m standing

94.5% to 97.1%

98.7% to 99.6%

2kg PE4 @ 2m standing

86% to 93.2%

97.3% to 98.0%

10kg PE4 @ 3m standing

87.7% to 93.1%

97.2% to 98.4%

are then removed checking that all fastenings continue to operate. The Inside of the Suit and ATD are examined to check there is no sign of damage or penetration which could injure an operator. NP Aerospace uses a polyolefin coverall witness suit under the EOD Suit to identify any ingress of heat and flame. On completion of the trial all data gathered from the ATD is analysed to ensure the suit has performed correctly, reducing blast overpressure to prevent injury to lungs and mitigate head injury. NĲ 0117.01 does not include measuring the blast effects on the body, through either blast overpressure reduction, comparison with the Bowen Curve or chest wall acceleration. The 4030 ELITE Bomb Suit provides the following percentage reduction in blast overpressure at the

so that levels of protection are layered with no ballistic windows. Higher levels of protection are focused on key areas of the body where the risk of operator damage is greater such as the chest.

Spine Protection Industry standards define that spine protection should attenuate loads transferred to the spine to below 4 kN to prevent long term injuries or disabilities.

Heat and Flame Protection Manufacturers use laboratory sample testing and live explosive range testing, where flash flames and heat from a live explosion are experienced to test heat and flame protection. The ATD has a polyolefin covering to

chest and ear compared to external pressure in four scenarios.

OTHER CRITICAL PERFORMANCE TESTING Blast trials should not be carried out in isolation. There are other significant performance tests undertaken by the manufacturer.

Fragmentation Ballistic testing is undertaken according to NĲ 0117.01 Standard and MIL-STD-662F, with tests against three different Fragment Simulating Projectiles (FSPs) as defined by MIL-DTL-46593B. .22 cal FSP (17gr) .30 cal FSP (44gr) .50 cal FSP (207gr). A V50 m/s performance is measured in key areas of the suit including, head, thorax, pelvis and legs. The 4030 ELITE Bomb Suit has been designed

48 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Flammability Testing with Anthropomorphic Test Device.

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

Buoyancy Testing with live operator. measure ingress of heat, flame and hot gases. Material coverings are also tested. In Thermal Testing the 4030 ELITE Bomb Suit is subjected to over 200 kilowatts for 25 seconds demonstrating that the flame-resistant protection is long enough for the operator to engage the Quick Release System in an emergency.

Ergonomics Ergonomic performance is an important part of testing as it has an impact on the operator’s ability to carry out Standard Operating Procedures. NĲ 0117.01 defines gross mobility movements such as arm and leg abduction and extension. Manufacturers design bomb disposal suits to achieve optimum mobility using a

Optical Performance Optical performance is a key part of testing as it focuses on situational awareness and therefore the operational effectiveness of the operator. Measuring Helmet Static Field of View and Visor optics such as distortion, luminous transmittance, haze resistance, refractive power and prismatic deviation in accordance with MIL-DTL and ASTM standards and ANSI/ASSE standards is an effective way of ensuring the operator’s field of view is not impeded when conducting EOD operations.

Buoyancy EOD suits need to stand up to a variety of scenarios on land and in water. We test our suits for positive buoyancy to allow the operator to swim in a controlled manner, tread water and float. All component parts are positively buoyant.

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variety of methods relating to material construction and armour design. The NP Aerospace 4030 ELITE suit introduces modular components which can be removed unaided by the operator allowing access in confined spaces, along with and removable, flexible hard armour. The NĲ standard also recommends that suits are available in 3 sizes (S,M,L). The 4030 ELITE bomb suit is available in 5 sizes (1 to 5) with the additional option to mix between sizes (e.g size 3 jacket matched with size 4 trouser). This versatility ensures all users are protected from 5th percentile females to 99th percentile males.

INNOVATIVE BLAST DESIGNS The effects of blast can be mitigated through effective product design. NP Aerospace has developed a unique patented blast attenuation system including a detachable, hinged three-piece telescopic plate. This allows the operator greater freedom of movement when operating in confined spaces such as vehicles. The top of the plate has a curved design to deflect blast away from the critical neck area and minimise the transmission of blast shockwave energy to the user’s torso. It was matched to the helmet aerodynamics to ensure the operator’s head moves back at same rate as the body, limiting neck injury. By introducing a modular approach to bomb disposal suit design with no fixed components, the operator can remove and reattach component parts unaided. Optical performance is critical for situational awareness. Visors differ according to manufacturer. NP Aerospace uses a glass faced visor rather than acrylic as it is harder to scratch and offers optimum ballistic performance. It also allows the inclusion of a battery powered heated demisting visor to prevent warm humid breath misting in cold hazardous environments. The demisting visor clears the screen of fog within 90 seconds on standard operation mode. Accessories such as communication and cooling systems are well suited to some EOD teams. In this instance, procurement teams must ensure suit

50 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Blast Deflection Collar.

Demisting visor for enhanced situational awareness.

BOMB SUIT SURVIVABILITY

interoperability. For example, the helmet must accommodate a headset and communication systems, including video and biometric tracking that are able to be integrated into the suit.

for the EOD community. In the future we could see simulated testing using computer modelling such as that being introduced into the vehicle armour world. However, this would require significant investment from the industry as a whole, particularly as bomb

FUTURE OF TESTING

disposal suits represent additional challenges due to the combination of materials, soft armour and hard armour. Current industry has provided a huge amount of data to work with and manufacturers are continually improving their testing expertise and processes which ultimately have an impact on product performance and operator safety. ■

The challenge with all performance testing is that it needs to be repeatable, consistent and widely adopted by the industry. The NĲ 0117.01 standard ensures a set of minimum performance criteria are met, however, some manufacturers go beyond this to demonstrate increased levels of survivability which add confidence

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Joe English - Lead EOD Engineer and Product Manager for NP Aerospace. Joe English joined NP Aerospace in 2010 as an engineering graduate from Coventry University and has played a key role in the development of NP Aerospace Bomb Disposal Suits and associated products having been promoted through the engineering department. He is external advisor to EOD communities globally including defence and security organisations in South America and SouthEast Asia delivering hands-on training. He is expert in product development, certification and testing against international standards and has worked closely with the UK MOD, the Department for International Trade and other international EOD and IEDD units, gathering end user insights which have shaped bomb suit safety standards. Joe is a joint patent holder and inventor for NP Aerospace Bomb Suit safety products including the Quick Release System and is joint author on the Development of a De-Mining Suit Test protocol

Siti Pareti - formerly CounterExplosive Ordnance Adviser, UK Defence and Security Exports, Department for International Trade. Siti Pareti is an advanced EOD operator with over 20 years’ experience in the British Army. Siti has completed numerous operational deployments including an EOD training team lead developing EOD tactics and procedures against a specific IED threat. Siti also assures EOD competency through the testing and evaluation of UK military EOD operators. Recently he was employed as a counter-explosive ordnance adviser for the Department for International Trade and appointed an executive committee member of the special interest group; Counter EO UK. He has significant commercial experience in product development including protective equipment blast testing and equipment enhancement through end user feedback. He has also engaged with numerous foreign militaries advising on EOD procedures and equipment.

(LWAG13, PASS 2014). Joe spent a year at NP Aerospace as a placement student whilst studying automotive engineering at Coventry University before joining the company in 2010.

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2022

IMPACT Exhibition and Convention Center, Bangkok, Thailand

NEW DATES

DRONE DELIVERED IEDs

Drone Attack Air Force Base Jammu. Source: Times of India.

DRONE DELIVERED IEDs – HOW PREPARED IS THE WORLD? By Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran

HE BACKGROUND

Over the last few years there have been many instances where in, not only military drones but even commercial drones, have been used by non-state players to deliver the required weaponry on desired targets with absolutely no risk to the perpetrators. It is reported that more than twenty-four planned or attempted terrorist attacks took place using aerial drones between 1994 and 2020. Drones were used extensively in Syria by Turkey against Syrian Government forces and by the Syrian rebel forces against the Russian Airbase at Khmeimim. Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels have been attacking Aramco refinery in the Saudi capital using bomb-laden drones. They reportedly also carried out an attack operation on

Abha International Airport with Qasef-2K drones. Azerbaĳan used Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions and Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which are armed with precision-guided smart munitions, among other weapons in its war with Armenia. ISIS flew over 300 drone missions in one month when the US-led coalition forces were closing in on Mosul, Iraq, in 2017. India witnessed a surprise attack using two commercial drones to deliver improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on an Indian Airforce base in Jammu, perpetrated by terrorists supported from across its border. While use of combat drones in the battlefield was very much anticipated, the use of commercial drones by terrorists which were otherwise used for logistics purposes came

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DRONE DELIVERED IEDs

Drone Carrying 5kg IED Shot down in J&K, India. Source: J&K Police. as a surprise to the security agencies across the world. Certainly, drones have enhanced the capabilities of terrorists many times to cause huge damage to security, economic, and other vital installations. This adds a new dimension to the security threats from terrorists. These commercial drones could also be used against the important personalities exposed in open and at public rallies. This new kind of threat got many nations to undertake speedy measures to develop anti drone systems.

THE JAMMU ATTACK The Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Jammu was attacked using two low-intensity IEDs, which were

Damage Drone Attack IAF Jammu. Source: Indian Air Force. 54 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Drone Attack Saudi Oil Field. Source: Times of India. allegedly dropped from two drones. It is perhaps the first time that suspected foreign-based terrorists have used unmanned aerial vehicles in an attack. Two lowintensity explosions were reported early Sunday morning in the technical area of the air force station. One caused minor damage to the roof of a building while the other exploded in an open area, there was no damage to any equipment. The aerial distance between Jammu airport and the international border is 14 kms. The forensic experts have reportedly confirmed in the air force station attack the use of a cocktail of explosive material, including RDX and Nitrate, in the two IEDs. One was bigger in size and was aimed at infrastructural damage. The other was

DRONE DELIVERED IEDs

Drone with payload. Source: ARES.

Drones Swarm. Source: US Army.

aimed at personnel with more splinters and ballbearings. A GPS drone, suspected to be a ‘Made in China’ product, was used in the attack and the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba terror outfit was suspected to have been behind the drone attack in what was the first instance of Pakistan-based terrorists deploying drones to strike vital installations in India.

which have the ability of providing standoffs, enabling terrorists to conduct remotely multiple attacks nearly simultaneously, and magnifying their overall effect. The increase in the capabilities, ease of access and ease of operation at low cost is making the drones weapons of choice for future terrorist attacks. In the last two decades, use of airborne drones by private individuals and commercial organisations increased rapidly, caused by, reduced motor size and enhanced power output and higher energy capacity of drone batteries. These factors enabled much smaller drones to be produced commercially at a significantly reduced cost. Terrorist groups worldwide are using aerial drones to conduct intelligence collection and delivery of arms, ammunition, IEDs, and chemical weapons. The number of non-state actors currently using aerial drones has increased each year. Terrorist organisations now have the technical ability to improvise explosives to be dropped from commercial drones. Over the years, they mastered the science of IED-making and some of their IEDs were so sophisticated that it would be very difficult to neutralise them. According to a report compiled by the Drone Industry Insights, the international drone market will grow to more than $42.8 billion by 2025. The Asian market has already overtaken North America as the largest regional drone market. India, which legalised drones in December 2018, will be by far the fastest-growing

EMERGENCE OF A NEW THREAT – DRONE DELIVERED IEDs New tactics and techniques are being developed leveraging drone technology for future terrorist attacks,

Anti Drone System India. Source: DRDO India.

commercial drone market, becoming the third largest commercial drone market in the world by 2025. This massive commercial investment has led to civilian drones becoming cheaper, easily accessible and

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DRONE DELIVERED IEDs

Drone Guard Systems. Source: ELTA. 56 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

DRONE DELIVERED IEDs

Autonomous-Drone Defence Dome System. Source: Grene Robotics. capable of carrying larger payloads. Paradoxically, for these very reasons, the UAVs have also become the greatest security risk. Widely available commercial quadcopters are now in the hands of every insurgency. The use of consumer drones is not limited to terrorists or insurgents but also drug cartels and organised criminals. Weaponised drones are also being used by cartels in Mexico and in an attempt to assassinate President Maduro in Venezuela. Drones operated by terrorists and other malicious groups represent a wide variety of risks for security, especially at facilities such as airports, vital infrastructure, sports arenas, military bases, and strategic assets, among others.

Responding to Drone-Swarm. Source: DRDO India.

DETECTION AND COUNTER MEASURES According to Thomas Pledger of the Association of US Army, increased drone-based threats, led to development of systems for detection and as counter measures. Drones over a certain weight could be mandated to be equipped with a radio transponder to enable tracking. Unfortunately, as with most trackers, these systems could easily be disabled. Detecting airborne drones could be carried out through: Radar, Optical Sensors, RF analysis and Acoustic sensors. Radar is the primary means of long-range detection which can occur at up to 3 km and within line of sight. Radar is capable of detecting low-flying and small drones. Most radar systems are incapable of differentiating between a bird and a small drone. Optical detection is the use of video cameras and computer algorithms to detect a drone. RF analysis monitors the RF spectrum and detects the signals by which drones are controlled. Acoustic sensors can be either one or multiple microphones that listen for the sound of the drone’s high-speed motors or the blades of the drone moving through the air. They are limited in noisy environments and have a range under 500 m. Thomas Pledger, enumerated several drone countermeasures and active defeat systems. The first layer of defeat for most

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commercially-purchased systems is built-in software limitations, such as geofencing for GPS-enabled drones. With geofencing, limits are placed on GPSenabled drones to prevent entering or use within restricted areas. RF jamming - communication between the drone and the pilot or GPS is disrupted. RF-jamming systems range in size, effectiveness and portability, from rifle-size jammers to those mounted on vehicles or buildings. In the physical countermeasures, the majority of options come in the form of a net. Nets create a larger contact area against a moving target and are thus more likely to entangle and disable an aerial drone’s rotating blades. Net guns range in size from a handheld flashlightshaped device, which shoots a 3m x 3m net with a range of 15 m, to a shoulder-fired net bazooka, with a range between 100 and 250 m. A majority of commercial off-the-shelf drones are capable of flying at altitudes up to 400 m at speed, making kinetic targeting difficult. An Indian firm - Grene Robotics developed a drone defence dome termed as ‘Indrajaal’ which can protect an area of 1000-2000 sq. km against threats from UAV’s, incoming weapons, loitering munitions and Low-RCS targets. Indrajaal’s design leverages a combination of 9-10 modern technologies powered by artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and robotics that is capable of

devastating capabilities for which India and the world, at this juncture, is ill-prepared according to one of India’s top army generals. ■

identifying, assessing, deciding, acting and evolving autonomously in real-time.

working as Chief CW Inspector 1997-2004 with the ‘Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)’, The Netherlands, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2013. Led teams of international professionals on many verification missions to various member countries, to verify the inventory of Chemical Weapons and monitor their destruction. Presently, Chief Consultant with ‘CBRNe Secure India’ a ‘forum and a knowledge centre’ for bringing awareness in the general public, government and security entities on the threats arising from the use of CBRNe material and their disastrous consequences A prolific writer and speaker, participated in various international and domestic conferences on CBRN Security, Disaster Management and Counter Explosive Issues and writes articles for professional journals worldwide on these subjects.

CONCLUSION The proliferation of drones in the hands of non-state actors and insurgents is at an alarming scale and is considered as an aerial IED in future conflicts. The rapid improvements in drone technology and its increasing capabilities will provide terrorist groups with multiple new avenues to sow fear. The best defence against the hostile use of this technology is to employ regulatory countermeasures, which can restrict the capabilities of off-the-shelf civilian drones and limit the ability of malicious groups to acquire and fly drones for sinister purposes. The traditional terrorist armed with an AK-47 or wearing a suicide vest is passé. His new avatar in the form of a small drone has far more

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran [B E (Civil), M Sc (Defence Studies), M B A (HR)] Commissioned into the Corps of Combat Engineers. A Civil Engineer, and Security Professional, with 45 years of rich experience in the field of Combat Engineering, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNe) Defence, Security and Disaster Management and Counter-IED Operations. Is a qualified CBRN and Counter-IED Professional. Is a former Member International Civil Service while

MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

his short I&W (Indications & Warning) Note is meant to provide a ‘heads up’ concerning the recent appearance of drone IED bomblets in the Mexican crime wars and their early utilization by the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) – one of the most dominant and operationally advanced cartels in the country. In the recent book Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs (SWJ–El Centro Anthology, Oct. 2021), we discussed the initial shift from single use (point IED detonation) drones in 2017 to multi-use (aerial bombardment) drones in 2021. Some confusion and debate existed concerning the potentials of such a shift when it was first reported in various news outlets. These reports began to circulate concerning the 20 April 2021 Aguililla, Michoacán incident in which two police officers were injured by a weaponized drone. The use of potential IED bomblets was also mentioned related to a 4 May 2021 Tepalcatepec, Michoacán incident as well as later nonspecific incidents in which villagers were being targeted and terrorized by CJNG drone aerial

capability could not be properly vetted or, in some instances, the items were clearly not Mexican cartel related hardware. Even now, it is still unclear whether the Aguililla and Tepalcatepec incidents were point IED detonation or aerial bombardment drone attacks. What has since been confirmed, however, is that CJNG is now deploying IED bomblets on consumer drones. Four incidents (i.e., data points) – from Peribán, Mazamitla, Tecalitlán, and Tepalcatepec – are briefly highlighted to provide some basic information and imagery related to this emerging Mexican cartel capability:

bombardments. The reports could not be initially substantiated, however, because the sourcing and images being attributed to the incidents/aerial bombardment

National Guard and Army personnel. The cartel gunmen (presumably CJNG) fled the scene and left behind the abandoned truck which was secured by Mexican authorities.

Peribán, Michoacán (2 March 2021) The imagery originated in an official SSP Michoacán tweet related to a seized truck containing 4 assault rifles (AK, other series), 38 magazines, numerous small arms rounds, and the 7 IED bomblets (simply designated as generic explosive devices). A limited firefight had taken place in the vicinity of Peribán between the occupants of the truck and Mexican

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MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

Image 1: 7 IED Bomblets Seized in Peribán. Source: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública del Estado de Michoacán (SSP Michoacán). The seven bomblets that are shown in Image 1 represent the most sophisticated improvised drone release munitions that have been encountered during any seizure to date. The main bodies appear to be constructed using a cast iron alloy, the fragmentation section lines of which were cast into the sleeves during production. The irregularities and offsets in the fragmentation patterns of these bomblets do not indicate that any machining process was used other than general finishing. The format of these fragmentation bodies bears a passing resemblance to the type of cylindrical fragmentation sleeve that is found in certain European

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stake mines and a close resemblance to the Chilean Metalnor defensive hand grenade that is shown in Photograph: P-1 and may have been patterned after it. These improvised fragmentation sleeves, however, are slightly narrower in diameter, greater in length, and with the fragment sizes varying in alternate rows. If these bomblets contain a high-explosive payload, as is believed to be the case, the format of each of these seven would be unusually hazardous to ground personnel within a wide casualty radius of the point of detonation. Attached to five of the seven bomblet bodies are split (key) rings that are positioned at the C/G (center of

MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

Improvised fragmentation sleeves.

Fin assemblies are fabricated from 4mm high-density corrugated polypropylene sheet.

gravity) balance point and attached with nylon tie straps around the bomblet. These rings would be attached to a release mechanism (one or more) on the drone. One very interesting component of these bomblets is the format of the fin assemblies. They are fabricated from 4mm high-density corrugated polypropylene sheet. A sample of this type of material is shown in Photographs: P-2 and P-2A. This material is comparable in weight to corrugated cardboard, but is significantly stronger and is waterproof. The fin assemblies have been attached to the bodies using a moldable epoxy. The C/G location on these bomblets indicates that there is no additional structural metal under the epoxy where the fin sections are attached to the bodies. The reader will note that the fin assemblies on the seized bomblets in the photograph vary in color from translucent to white and black. This type of corrugated polypropylene is widely available in groups of small sheets and in a variety of colors. It is possible that the makers are using this as a color coding to identify either the payload, the type of fuzing, or both. The color coding may also represent different grades of high-explosives indicating that these bomblets could be prototypes that have been prepared for performance testing. Certain features pertaining to the bomblet bodies, and particularly the improvised fin assemblies, indicate that the makers are receiving skilled technical assistance during production.

Mazamitla, Jalisco (9 September 2021) The imagery was released on Ejército Mexicano (SEDENA; Mexican Army) and Fiscalía General de la República (FGR) social media. An incident took place in the 15th Military Zone between Mexican army (SEDENA) and National Guard (Guardia Nacional) personnel and Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación forces near Mazamitla. As an outcome of the engagement, 6 vehicles, 4 improvised mortars, 37 IEDs, 3 helmets, 2-3 tactical vests, a possible base plate and a machine gun mount, and a number of small arms rounds were seized. While much of the interest in the incident has focused on the CJNG improvised mortars seized by Mexican authorities (as well as improvised mortar rounds – designated as generic IEDs), the existence of IED bomblets in the weapons cache recovered (See Rows 1 & 3 in Image 2) has been pretty much overlooked. The assumption has been that all of the munitions seized are simply improvised mortar rounds. The front and rear row of improvised IED munitions in Image No. 2 have been identified as aerial drone bomblets. The rear row of bomblets has been assembled using two different methods of body construction. Thirteen of the seventeen units appear to have bodies fabricated from threaded water pipe nipples and pipe caps in two different sizes: 1-1/4” and 1-inch diameters (or their metric equivalents). The four bodies at the far left have not presently been identified. The bomblets in this rear row are in various stages of assembly; some without pipe caps and some without

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Image 2: Numerous IED Bomblets (Rows 1 & 3) and Mortar Shells (Row 2) Seized in Mazamitla. Source: Fiscalía General de la República (FGR).

fin sections. It appears that the makers are using an ample amount of Teflon tape on the pipe threads to

forces securing a large weapons and munitions cache attributed to the CJNG (given where it was

achieve a smooth engagement during assembly, and possibly to weather-proof the joints. The six bomblets in the front row appear to be fully assembled. The reader will note that the majority of fin assemblies on both rows of bomblets appear to have significant damage. It is very possible that all of the bomblets in the front and rear rows are being used in repetitive tests; and that the fin assemblies have been salvaged several times for reuse. This would also indicate that the type of testing most likely involves payload/detonator performance, as any accuracy testing would require the fins to be free of aerodynamic flaws.

discovered). The imagery was released by SEDENA to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in a ‘for public distribution’ notification. It was part of a larger seizure including “four 2x16 sticks of emulsion explosives, 7 IEDs, 19 tactical vests, 1,123 rounds of ammunition, 1 AK-47 rifle, 27 helmets, 11 clips (mags), and 350 link pieces for a 50-cal rifle.” [1] Once again, the IED bomblets were designated as ‘generic IEDs’ in both the Spanish and English reports pertaining to the seizure. The bomblets in Image 3 appear to be constructed of one-inch diameter water threaded pipe nipples (or the closest metric pipe equivalent: 32 mm). The pipe sections are sealed on both ends for confinement. The forward section is sealed with a threaded conventional pipe cap that is shown in the enhanced close-up photograph below the main image. The fuze section

Tecalitlán, Jalisco (2 November 2021) This incident took place in Tecalitlán and resulted in patrolling Secretaría de Defensa Nacional (SEDENA)

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MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

Image 3: 7 IED Bomblets and 4 Sticks of Emulsion Explosives Seized in Tecalitlán. Source: Secretaría de Defensa Nacional (SEDENA).

that is mounted on the pipe cap is likely to be an improvised contact detonating fuze; however, beyond that, nothing can be positively determined from the photograph. The fin sections are rather unique, as they appear to

particular devices may be somewhat limited due to size, the physiological effect from a surprise attack, or repetitive attacks, could be quite substantial.[2]

be constructed from light weight mechanical tubing sections that have been cut longitudinally and positioned back-to-back on their apex of their circumference. They have also been inserted into a pre-cut metal component that is attached to the main body. This component, while not positively identified, may be an aluminum fence post cap that was modified for the purpose. The body assemblies have been wrapped in some type of plastic sheet, possibly to waterproof the fuze sections. There is also a chain (double-loop wire formed) that is visible over one of the bomblet fin sections (bottom of the image) that is likely to be the stand-off link for attachment to a drone pylon. It does not outwardly appear that the bomblets are designed to fragmentate; however, there may be internal attributes within the bodies that are not apparent. While the destructive force of these

The final incident is not a drone IED bomblets seizure by Mexican security forces, but rather screen shots taken from a Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación video posted on their social media. It represents the first known posting of a Mexican cartel drone engaging in an aerial bombardment operation. The incident took place in Tepalcatepec and can be considered a propaganda/psychological operations (PSYOPS) video directed at the inhabitants of the region – linked to local militias and the Cárteles Unidos – who are defending against ongoing CJNG offensives seeking territorial control over the local villages and towns. The video portrays the aerial bombardment of a targeted building and is somewhat reminiscent of Islamic State propaganda videos from the 2015-2017 period in Iraq and Syria (although those were usually focused on opposing troop formations and AFVs).

Tepalcatepec, Michoacán (22 September 2021)

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MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

Image 4: Drone Video Screen Shots of a Targeted Building in Tepalcatepec. Source: Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (Social Media).

CONCLUSION Derived from our understanding of past terrorist and criminal armed group evolutionary weaponry patterns of use, three phases of CJNG IED bomblet development – with expected overlaps – will likely ensue. The initial phase was briefly based on artisanal machine tooled bomblets (imagery not provided in this I&W Note) filled with explosives. These initial bomblets, of which possibly two versions exist dating back to spring 2021, were too time consuming to create and required a certain level of metal working skills and tooling. The second phase – which Images 1-3 pertain to – represents an attempt by CJNG to create IED bomblets more quickly from local materials at hand, using defensive (fragmentation) grenade bodies, pipe-

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bomb/cardboard like casings, and emulsion explosives in pipe-casings and waterproof wraps mated to stabilization fins. While more primitive looking than phase one bomblets, they are more practical in their design and functioning. The expectation is that many diverse IED bomblet forms will be encountered as CJNG weaponeers work out how best to create these munitions. The third phase of IED bomblet development will likely see the utilization of military grade rifle grenades (20-40mm … M203, GP-30s series, et al.) which have had their arming safety features bypassed. They will be secured to a plastic, metal, or even wooden, tail fin assembly for stabilization purposes and will likely follow the pattern of earlier Islamic State progression, though no direct interactions – technology transference

MEXICAN CARTEL DRONE IED BOMBLETS

– between that terrorist group and the Mexican cartels (specifically CJNG) exists.[3] If or when this phase is reached, it will signify that the cartels are beginning to shift from experimental (entrepreneurial) drone aerial bombardment utilization into more institutionalized use patterns. The danger of this ‘firebreak’ being crossed is that then drone weaponization can more quickly spread to additional CJNG operational units as well as other opposing cartels in Mexico. ■

ENDNOTES [1] “Mexico: IEDs, Commercial Explosives Discovered

in Cache.” TRIP wire. 3 November 2021. [2] See the ‘Image Documentation and IED Body

Segment Scan’ in Robert J. Bunker and David A. Kuhn, “CJNG Drone IED Bomblets Seized by SEDENA in Tecalitlán, Jalisco.” C/O Futures Cartel Research Note Series. Claremont: 11 November 2021: 1-7. [3] A similar process is taking place with CJNG’s approach to IED bomblet release mechanisms carried by their drones.

FURTHER READING Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Eds., Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs. Bloomington: Xlibris 2021: 1-302.

Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and David A. Kuhn, “Use of Weaponized Consumer Drones in Mexican Crime War.” Counter-IED Report. Winter 2020/21: 69-77.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Robert J. Bunker is the Director of Research and Analysis of C/O Futures, LLC (www.cofutures.net) and a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro. An international security and counterterrorism professional, he was Futurist in Residence at the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, VA, Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and has taught at Claremont Graduate University, the University of Southern California, and with other universities. Dr. Bunker holds degrees in the fields of history, anthropologygeography, social science, behavioral science, government, and political science and has trained extensively in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. He has delivered hundreds of presentations – including U.S. congressional testimony – with well over 500 publications across various fields and formats. Email: docbunker@cofutures.net David A. Kuhn is an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC (www.cofutures.net) and is a frequent Small Wars Journal-El Centro contributor. He is a subject matter expert in analysis, technical instruction, and terrorism response training related to stand off weaponry (MANPADS, threat, interdiction, aircraft survivability, et. al), infantry weapons, small arms, IED/ VBIEDs, WMD, and other threat and allied use technologies. He is presently the principal of VTAC Training Solutions and has career-long experience in supporting governmental operations and corporate initiatives in the fields of homeland security, vulnerability assessment, technical operations, and project management, with additional focus and expertise in areas involving facility threat/risk assessments, underwater operations, and varied engineering technologies.

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USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

EAGLES IN PIGEON’S CLOTHING: USE OF EXPLOSIVELADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “Friends may come and go, but enemies accumulate. (Jayne Ann Krentz in her book "In Too Deep" first published in 2010)

s a final result from the Parliamentary elections as held in Iraq on October 10th 2021, the “Sadrist Movement” strongly consolidated their winning, while the “Fatah Alliance” (in fact composed of the most relevant groups1 of Popular Mobilization Forces or “Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi”) passed from 48 to 17 representatives.

One of the first consequences of that loss of political influence by the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq was the promotion and conduct of street demonstrations against the Iraqi government on 5th November 2021, where participants were complaining of a potential fraud in the elections.

Figure 1: Posters against Iraqi Prime Minister, early November 2021. (Source – www.washingtoninstitute.org, Al-Jazeera) 1

The Badr Organisation, the Al-Sadiqoun Bloc (the political wing of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, AAH), Kata'ib Hezbollah, and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali.

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USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

As soon as the protests reached the International Area of Baghdad, security forces reacted causing injuries to several persons, along with killing one protestor. Telegram accounts connected to Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hezbollah (KH) blamed Prime Minister Kadhimi (along with military commanders Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi and Hamid al-Zuhairi) for the violence against protestors: it was reinforced by the public declarations of the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, who directly blamed and threatened the Prime Minister… A second order effect coming from the increase of verbal and propagandistic pressure on the Iraqi government by Shia militias was evidenced during the night on November 7th 2021, when the residence of the Prime Minister was struck by two explosive-laden quadcopter drones.

QUADCOPTERS, BOMBS, AND… EVEN MINISTERS After threatening Iraqi authorities, Shia militias were suspected of directly targeting them through drones fitted with explosive loads… (see Figure 2). It was not the first time that kind of improvised munition was seen in Baghdad, as Iraqi officials online showed images of a seized unmanned aircraft system (UAS) quadcopter in Baghdad on July 1st 2021; it was fitted with an improvised munition, and downed in the area surrounding the U.S. Embassy inside the “Green Zone” in Baghdad. Same model of drone (with very minor variations in components) was shot down in Baghdad area again by United States of America air defense systems during the night of 05 July 2021, although no improvised munition was reported this time (see Figure 3).

Figure 2: Pictures from an improvised munition dropped by drones on November 7th 2021 in Baghdad. (Source – Twitter)

Figure 3: Quadcopters downed on July 2nd & 5th 2021 in Baghdad. (Source: Sabereen News/Telegram & Twitter ) counteriedreport.com

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

It is remarkable that both drones as used in July 2021 were fitted with self-destruction devices composed of a main charge of plastic explosive protected by latex gloves, in which an electric detonator was embedded. Regarding the switch, two different versions of it seem to have been utilized: one connected to the control box of the drone, and the other one clearly activated by an electronic timer (see Figure 4). The use of similar quadcopters was reported on March 4th 2021 twice: first in Erbil, and then flying

over the residence of the Prime Minister in Baghdad. Same model of drone carrying a partially different improvised munition was found in Baghdad on July 23rd 2020 over a rooftop (see Figure 5). But the very first time for that kind of drone to be reported was in Quneitra, Syria in September 2019. In fact, the referred type of quadcopter is a mixture of commercial and military-looking components, although the whole model has not been identified as any previously known model.

Figure 4: Self-destruction devices, Baghdad July 2021. (Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYZ4WxhixUY/Twitter)

Figure 5: Quadcopter & improvised munition, Al-Jadiriya, Baghdad, 23 July 2020. (Source: Twitter) 68 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

Figure 6: Drone downed in Erbil, Kurdish region of Iraq. (Source: Kurdish Region's Directorate General of Counter Terrorism)

DEVELOPING PERSIAN RECIPES IN IRAQ Three unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) detonated against a house in Bragh town on the outskirts of Erbil City, while a fourth one fell on Mount Tarin nearby, and two more hit the village of Goraspan. Iraqi officials reported that the drones were showing marked sentences in Arabic language (translated into "Peace be upon you, oh Jamal of Iraq", “In the name of God, Qassem al-Jabbarin”, “Owner of time” and “Oh Zahra”) (see Figure 6). Due to the negative identification with previously known models, it was named as “IRN-16” by United States of America’s Technical Intelligence sources. The first of that kind of explosive-laden drones as reported in Iraq detonated against the roof of a hangar in Ain al Assad airbase, sited in Al-Anbar governorate, on May 8th 2021: The remains collected from the UAS (carbon fiber, glass fiber, one-torque engine, fragmentation charge, electronic components…) were not identifiable as any already known model of

loitering munition, although the serial number sticker and design were compatible with Iranian manufacture. Another complete sample of the referred drone was allegedly found by Kurdish counter-terrorism forces on May 11th 2021, which allowed the warhead to be technically analyzed: its overall design and fragmentation addition was a very similar design to the warhead from USA-named “IRN-05” or Houthinamed “WA’AED” loitering munition, which is clearly coming from an Iranian design…(see Figure 7). With regards to the drone’s characteristics, there is a potential antecedent. Iraqi Armed Forces publicly announced the development of a version of “Yaseer” UAS modified as a loitering munition, along with a family of one-torque engines for those UAS in 2015. In fact, the “IRN-16” UAS used in 2021 attacks are not too similar in design to “Yaseer”, but Houthi rebels have recently shown a new model of loitering munition, which is called as “KHATIF” (see Figure 8).

counteriedreport.com

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

Figure 7: Houthi “WA´AED” loitering munition. (Source: https://cdn.cnn.com/)

Figure 8: Houthi UAS named as “KHATIF” (Source: https://laptrinhx.com/)

COPYING SMALL MILITARY LOITERING MUNITION DESIGNS? It was on June 16th 2021 when two UAS were shot down around Baghdad: one near Rasheed Camp, and another one in Kartan area of Baghdad City.

70 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

That same model was also identified in an attack taking place one week before, when two drones fitted with explosive warheads struck the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC) inside Victory Base Complex in Baghdad: one detonated against the roof,

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

Figure 9: UAS & warhead, Baghdad 16 June 2021. (Source: Iraqi Security Media Cell/Twitter) while the second one did not function and the third one was shot down (see Figure 9). In principle, this drone has no equivalence with any previously known model, although the manufacturer of that UAS seems to try to copy external details and to imitate the typical shape common to several designs of

… AND THE FIRST OF THE HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE CAME!

military loitering munitions, (examples could be seen as follows): • (China) “BG-201”, “RAINBOW CH-901”, “CH-991”, “HIGHL-FRF90”, “TX” or “CRUISE DRAGON 10” models. • (Turkey) STM “ALPAGU”. • (United States of America) RAYTHEON “BLOCK 1 COYOTE” or AEROVIRONMENT “SWITCHBLADE 300”, “SWITCHBLADE 600” or “BLACKWING” loitering munitions.

Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see Figure 10). The collected remains and explosive damage over the base were reported as compatible with a model similar to the “SAMAD-2” type as previously used by Houthi groups in the Arabian Peninsula. Along with the previously shown attacks with explosive laden drones in Iraq, there are several attacks in which the used model was not clearly reported or pictured, as follows: • (16 April 2021, Ain Al-Assad airbase, Al-Anbar governorate) Three UAS • (28 April 2021, Balad airbase, Yethrib, Saladin directorate) One drone • (06 June 2021, Ain Al-Assad airbase, Al-Anbar governorate) Two UAS • (14 June 2021, Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad governorate) One drone

But the main difference with those models is that they have six foldable wings (allowing them to be fired from cylindrical launchers) while the UAS found in Iraq have four fixed wings and hooks in the belly allowing them to be launched by railed catapults.

In fact, the first reported attack with an explosive-laden drone took place at Erbil International Airport in the Kurdish Region of Iraq on April 14th 2021: the device struck over a hangar allegedly used by USA Central

counteriedreport.com

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

Figure 10: Remains from the drone attacking Erbil airport in April 2021. (Source: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org) • (21 June 2021, near Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad governorate) One UAS • (06 July 2021, USA base area of Erbil International Airport, Erbil, Kurdish Region) Three drones. Although the attribution of the attacks was not clearly evidenced in most of the cases, the series of attacks with explosive-laden UAS were taking place simultaneously with direct threats and indirect fire attacks by Shia militias.

CORPUS DELICTI: WHO WAS BEHIND THE ATTACKS?

dedicated to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) tasks, but not directly as weaponized UAS (e.g. “Yaseer”, “Basir-1” or “Oghab-1” models). We could identify four different models of weaponized drones as used by Shia Militias (Popular Mobilization Forces PMF) in Iraq (see Figure 11): • Quadcopter fitted with improvised munitions. • “IRN-16”. • Small loitering munition. • The one similar to “SAMAD-2” UAS.

Based on open-source reports, at least four Iraqi militias have demonstrated UAS capabilities: • Badr Brigades • Kata’ib Hezbollah • Kataib Jund al Iman • Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba

On June 26th 2021, a military parade showing the armament of PMF was conducted at Camp Ashraf/ Abu Muntadhar al-Muhammadawi Camp in the Iraqi province of Diyala (see Figure 12). Kataib Hezbollah controlled units of PMF exclusively paraded the drones: Istikharabat (Intelligence Directorate) and Qeyadat Amaliyat al-Jazeera (al-

Nonetheless, most of the drone models as shown by Shia militias are based on Iranian designs (sometimes after reverse engineering from captured US drones)

Jazeera Operations Command). On June 29th, 2021, Qeyadat Amaliyat al-Jazeera shared a video showing all the UAS through an associated Telegram account, accompanied by a song

72 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

with the lyrics: “… this is the son of Kataib [Hezbollah]”. The vehicles transporting the drones, including a similar model to “SAMAD-2” were moving inside the PMF Brigades No 45, 46 and 47, which are exclusively composed by members of Kataib Hezbollah: a high profile account associated to Kataib Hezbollah published a photograph of the parade with the caption: “… the al-Jazeera Operational Command, 45, 46 and 47 [PMF brigades] in the parade”: Thus the Iranian origin of the UAS is more or less clear, while Kataib Hezbollah is estimated as the most probable actor regarding the attack over Erbil international Airport on April 14th 2021.

Figure 11: Areas of use of the different models of explosive-laden drones. (Source: Own production)

Figure 12: PMF Military parade, 26 June 2021. (Source: Media Office PMF/Handout via REUTERS) counteriedreport.com

USE OF EXPLOSIVE-LADEN DRONES BY SHIA MILITIAS IN IRAQ

Regarding the “IRN-16” model, and after analysing the sentences in Arabic language as marked over the body and wings of those UAS used in Erbil on June 26th 2021: • "Peace be upon you, oh Jamal of Iraq" – it is a slogan previously used in allusion to Abu Mahdi alMuhandis, the Deputy Head of the People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF), who was killed in January 2020 along with the former commander of Iraqi al-Quds, Qassem Suleimani. • “In the name of God, Qassem al-Jabbarin” – “Qassem al-Jabbarin“ is a faction of Kataib Hezbollah which has claimed several attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq. As an initial assessment, it looks like the use of “IRN16” could be attributed to militias from PMF, most probably also directly associated with Kataib Hezbollah. ■

• • • • •

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYZ4WxhixUY Telegram – Sabereen News https://www.iraq-alghad.com https://www.washingtoninstitute.org https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/Documents/ Reports/20FEBslides.pdf • Twitter • https://english.iswnews.com • SANA NEWS

Disclaimer This article would never represent the opinion of any national or multinational organization, so its whole content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. As the whole information has been obtained from open sources, potential mistakes could have been made during the research process. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections, and inputs to the author; it would be highly appreciated.

“Η καλύτερη εκδίκηση είναι να μην μοιάζεις τον εχθρό σου 2” (Marcus Aurelius in his book "Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτὸν" (Meditations), written between 170 and 180)

REFERENCES • C-IED

CoE

Unconventional

“Technical

Report

Weaponization

IV/2017

Unmanned

Aircraft Systems”, dated 18 May 2017 • C-IED

CoE

S144-2020

“Threat Analysis

Weaponized drone in Baghdad IRQ 23 July 2020”, dated 28 July 2020 • C-IED CoE “Threat Networks´ Tactics Techniques & Procedures Update June-July 2021” • C-IED CoE S186-2021 “Threat Analysis - Use of Explosives-laden Drones by Shia Militias in Iraq during 2021”, dated 27 July 2021 • C-IED CoE “Threat Networks´ Tactics Techniques & Procedures Update July 2021” • C-IED CoE “Threat Networks’ Tactics Techniques & Procedures Update September-November 2021” • https://youtu.be/gIbZU0n82Fg 2

“The best revenge is not to be like your enemy.”

74 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016, and currently holding a post of Chief of Attack the Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his background has been mainly based on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and other C-IED courses. His operational assignments include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3), Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda. Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Figure 1: U.S. Marines filling sandbags in Afghanistan on December 1st 2001. (Source: Jim Hollander | Reuters)

THE BLINDNESS OF THE WEST: OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “Where there is power, there is resistance.” (Michel Foucault in his book "The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction" first published in 1976)

n February 2020, the United States of America (USA) and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, aka Taliban) signed a sort of peace deal (excluding Afghan government from it) in Doha (Qatar), in which USA committed to withdraw military personnel from Afghanistan by May 2021. It was subject to the Taliban upholding its commitments to reduce violence, to

was also assumed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. Most probably, in an attempt to gain terrain before potential negotiations after a cease-fire, or even maybe in an intentional way to exclusively take the whole power for themselves, the Taliban started a terrorist and military offensive in May 2021, including

achieve an inclusive multilateral government, and cut ties with terrorists. Accordingly, and in April 2021, the USA government announced a full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021, which

assassination of key governmental actors. By August 11th 2021, USA officials estimated the falling of the Afghan government in 90 days: Kabul fell along with the Afghan government four days later…

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TALIBAN SIEGING SANDCASTLES: ASHRAF GHANI’S MATTERS WITH LEADERSHIP Last August, and regarding Afghanistan, President Biden declared: "The truth is: This did unfold more quickly than we anticipated. So what happened? Afghanistan’s political leaders gave up and fled the country. The Afghan military gave up, sometimes without trying to fight… American troops cannot and should not be fighting the war, and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves…". In principle, it was quite surprising that about 300,000 well-equipped (mostly by USA) governmental security forces’ troops were shamefully defeated by an estimated no more than 80,000 Taliban. Especially if we do comparatively consider that it took the Mujahideen three years to oust former socialist Afghan president Muhammad Najibullah after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989…(see Figure 2). Analysts have argued several factors potentially confluent in the lack of resistance from Afghan governmental forces, as follows: • As Afghan security forces were financially and militarily dependent on the USA, they were demoralized once knowing of US withdrawal. • Lack of sustainability of Afghan forces, based on a deficient logistical planning and conduct. • Almost absolute dependence on Intelligence and Close Air Support from the USA by Afghan forces for their own operations. • Corruption inside Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) made real numbers of troops be far away from the officially declared 352,000 members for receiving resources (e.g. reality could be closer to about 254,000 or even effectively less). • Relative lack of purpose for combat, and commitment with national defense from Afghan units (maybe except for Special Forces). On the other hand, the proud reluctance of the former Afghan government in accepting their lack of selfcapabilities from the perspective of their comfortable dependence on the USA, along with the governmental negotiating posture with Taliban from an inconsistent refusal to give in, made those Taliban not to consider the Afghan government as a relevant actor in the final

76 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

bilateral peace talks with USA… It was always suspected, the resistance against the Taliban-USA negotiation from several departments of the former government of Afghanistan, which was extremely (and comfortably) dependent on American funds and support. But one of the best propaganda campaigns against the legitimacy, the honesty, and the commitment to peace of the Afghan rulers in 2020 was not developed by the Taliban, but by the government itself: • The Intra-Afghan peace negotiations between teams from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban started on September 12th 2020 in Doha, continuing during October and November. • On November 2nd 2020, there was a complex attack (small arms fire, explosives) against the Kabul university compound. • Taliban officials condemned the attack in several statements, denying any responsibility over it. • A DAESH in Khorasan Wilayat (ISKP) claim denying responsibility for the Kabul University attack (and attributing it to Taliban) was circulated by some progovernment Afghan accounts (but it was not shown by DAESH official media agencies such as Amaq News or Nashir, and then confirmed as fake). • There were official claims of the attack as conducted by ISKP (DAESH Central Media Office, Amaq News…) even including names/pictures of some of the attackers. • Afghan First Vice President Amrullah Saleh directly blamed Taliban for the attack. • Once the corpses were removed, Afghan officials showed to journalists the room in which some students and two of the attackers were killed. There was a flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan stained with blood on a window along with a hand script on the wall (“Long live Emirate”). • That flag was located covering several impacts from bullets and shrapnel (death by detonation and firing?), while the scripting was written in clear gaps between impacts (…?). • Then a crude video of alleged DAESH members wearing police equipment was distributed by progovernmental sites: they were directly blaming Taliban for the attacks…

OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Figure 2: Estimation of military equipment seized by Taliban from Afghan forces. (Source: New York Times/Sunday Times) counteriedreport.com 77

OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Figure 3: Pictures from Kabul University´s attack & the fake video of ISKP about it. (Source: Twitter)

TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: THE ONLY THING NECESSARY FOR THE TRIUMPH OF EVIL IS THAT GOOD MEN DO NOTHING… Taliban propaganda has been focused in both local and international target audiences almost from their very beginning: the first known website of the Taliban (“Homepage of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” in Arabic language) was created during their previous ruling over the country and maintained after the American invasion. But it was 2006 when they created a website in Pashto-language called as “The Voice of Jihad” (jihad ghag) or “al-Emarah”, which has also had Dari, Urdu, Arabic and English versions later. Although some

changes in the access (e.g. alemarh.com, alemarah.org, alemara.org, shahamat-urdu.com, shahamat.org, shahamat-english.com, shahamat-arabic.com, shahamatfarsi.com, shahamat.info, alsomod-iea.info, islam-iea.com, shahamat-movie.com, alemarahislam.com, alemarahiea.net…), in the design, and even in the instability in access, “al-Emarah” website family has persisted until 2022 with a similar aspect and aim… In fact, the currently official website of the governing Islamic Emirate of Afghanistanis https://alemarahenglish.af/. But the official website has not been the only source of Taliban propaganda: Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Al Qaeda-related forums, APPs, Google tools, video-sharing platforms, audio-sharing sites, picture-sharing social

Figure 4: Captures from a former website of IEA & the APP “alemarah 3.0.1”. (Source: www.yumpu.com & https://apk-dl.com) 78 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

media…and a lot of them have survived on the internet for years, being able to spread Taliban propaganda. Regarding the digital magazines, periodicals and newsletters produced by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, there are huge numbers of different publications which have been released, as follows: Al Somood, Srak, Tora Bora Magazine, Shahamat, In Fight, Elham, Murchal, Mesaq-i-Esaar, Ihsas, Resalat, Zamir, Hittin, Wahdat, Nawa-I Afghan Jihad, Likwal’ Hewad, and Khabroon. There is an evidenced smartly planned and integrated strategy behind the Taliban use of propaganda aiming to shape the Afghan information environment: it has been effectively synergetic with the evolution of their military, political and social steps during past years. Each single tactical advance has been exploited as a new propaganda victory and an indicator of the imminent retake of power in Afghanistan, through systematically reporting, celebrating, and amplifying it in every official and unofficial platform: that has had a cumulative and exponential effect over all target audiences inside and outside Afghanistan. Along with the advances in territorial control, some information activities have been derived to facilitate the integration of the population focusing on security, inclusion, amnesty, and good governance. But the internal target audience of the Taliban has not been forgotten: several messages have been sent to their members in a parallel effort of celebrating victories over governmental forces, convincing them about the goodness/need of talks/negotiations, and guiding them to moderation and support to the population in stability, prosperity, and security. One of the most effective tools has been the patient infiltration of Taliban elements inside the governmental structures (“green on green” soft approach?), with expected overlapping effects from the infiltrated individuals: • They are human sensors in benefit of providing timely information to the Taliban apparatus (e.g. in the case of a military unit, they could report about moral status of forces, real manning, logistical matters, battle order, capabilities...)

• They are influence tools through influencing actions and spreading messages to target audience. • They are sentiment advisors in the aim of evaluating and assessing the effects resulting from Taliban actions and propaganda. • They could even be potential “fighters behind enemy lines” … And we should not forget the use of violence and assertiveness aiming to show their power and determination, and even to intimidate adversaries. In summary, the Taliban have mostly been using four different types of generic influence initiatives: • Media-based audio-visual activities (e.g. radio broadcast, digital publications, audio/video files, photo reports…) • Physical audio-visual activities (e.g. leaflets, printed publications, public written advertisement, public voice messages…) • In-person influence activities (e.g. information patrols, religious events, public punishments, community engagement, humanitarian aid distribution…) • Violence signals (e.g. countering crime, countering terrorism, resolution against opponents…) Accordingly, the synergetic strategic narratives behind Taliban influence activities during preceding years seemed to consist of: • Capability (showing their military force as effective, professional, well equipped, and disciplined) • Defense of population (against airstrikes, night raids and missiles from Coalition and Afghan forces) • Patriotism (showing them as the only ones determined in the aim of a safe, unified and independent Afghanistan) • Governability (Taliban as able to provide education, security, public works, healthcare…) • Commitment with peace (in comparison with bad practices from Afghan authorities and USA) • Consistency with Afghan tradition and culture • Corruption and ineffectiveness of the government (as mercenary puppets of USA!)

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Figure 5: Captures from the video of IEA military parade held on September 1st 2021. (Source: Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA)) In fact, the Taliban media apparatus was extremely active just before and during their offensive in 2021, when their media network published almost 40,000 pieces of propaganda in different languages (Pashto, Dari, Arabic, English, and Urdu). In 2021, the message about an amnesty campaign after Taliban retaking the power was highly spread and potentially contributive to members of Afghan

80 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

National Security and Defense Forces being defeated or surrendering. Once the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has prevailed in all Afghanistan, it is when the role of their media apparatus is more relevant than ever before. As the Taliban were not effectively planning nor considering how to rule the country after victory, they will need the essential contribution from an intense and

OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

effective information/influence strategy. This will be aiming to gain multinational recognition/support, to recover external funds for reconstruction and humanitarian aid, to show political viability and legitimacy, to make the population (relatively) content, to

Late December 2021, Taliban propaganda media showed a picture taken from training facilities of the Special Forces of the General Directorate of Intelligence GDI (former National Directorate of Security NDS): a painted advertisement was showing

retain the support of their fighters, to attract investments, to retain Taliban’s unity, to show no apparent relationship with terrorist groups, to counter the threat from ISKP… It is not going to be an easy business for sure!

a message translatable as “Martyrdom is key for success.” Maybe the Taliban should review their policy regarding information strategy in the specific support to their potential image that they are countering terrorism or, at least, not having links with terrorist groups…

MARTYRDOM, COUNTERTERRORISM & TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: MORIAMUS, VIVENDUM EST 1 After the Taliban’s victory, and just after the exit of American forces from Afghanistan, was held the first military parade in celebration of that on September 1st 2021 in Kandahar province. The event was broadcasted through the Afghan official TV channel (Radio Television Afghanistan RTA), as well as shown in videos produced by Al-Hĳrat Media Agency and distributed by IEA official accounts and websites. The parade was opened by a martyrdom-seeker’s squad carrying the IEA flag, and the followed by a truck transporting command and victim operated IEDs and a vehicle-borne IED, plus improvised rocket assisted munitions… so IEDs were exposed as one of the most representative weapon systems of the Taliban.

HEY TALIBAN, HOW ARE THINGS LOOKING FROM THE GOVERNMENTAL SIDE? No underestimation should have happened with those “Middle-Age-looking” fighters who have been defeating empires century after century. Again (and again), the apparently clever West has not been able to read and really understand foreign human terrain outside America or Europe… Unfortunately, the patiently smart and effective information strategy from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was not identified or (at least) estimated by Allied or national Intelligence agencies/services in its real development and potential further relevance.

Figure 6: Moral-enhancement graffiti inside a GDI base, December 2021: (Source – Twitter/IEA GDI 2) 1 2

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan/General Directorate of Intelligence. “Let us die, since we must live”.

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OBSERVATIONS FROM TALIBAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

In fact, the former Afghan government was an indirect but essential contributor to the success of the Taliban propaganda´s effects. Additionally, the improvised retreat of foreign troops from Afghanistan reinforced the Taliban-estimated

Disclaimer

image of Allied cowardice based on our “excessive” protection with armor and combat support against an opponent with obsolete and poor military means… but free from fear and proud of their honor and bravery! But the conquest of Afghanistan was a mere (although fundamental) first step to final victory, so the real challenge for Taliban faction is currently incoming: how to pass from insurgency to counter insurgency? How to manage propaganda in the aim of hiding own mistakes, internally calming themselves, surviving economic restrictions, convincing population, retaining supporters, and highlighting own success? ■

from open sources, potential mistakes could have been made during the research process. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections, and inputs to the author; it would be highly appreciated.

This article would never represent the opinion of any national or multinational organization, so its whole content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. As the whole information has been obtained

“When one with honeyed words but evil mind persuades the mob, great woes befall the state.” (Euripides in his book "Orestes", written in 408)

REFERENCES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from

• https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2021/486

the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was

• https://www.wilsoncenter.org

commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as

• https://www.longwarjournal.org

Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016,

• https://asia.nikkei.com/

and currently holding a post of Chief of Attack the

• https://www.mei.edu

Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his

• https://www.ctc.usma.edu

background has been mainly based on Explosive

• Telegram

Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and

• https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267995566 • Taliban Social Media accounts • Rocket Chat - https://chat.techahven.to/... • Archive.org • https://www.wired.co.uk/article/taliban-propagandanews-afghanistan

C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and

• https://extrac.io/

other C-IED courses. His operational assignments

• https://icct.nl/publication/the-public-relations-of-

include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3),

the-taliban-then-and-now/ • https://www.dw.com

82 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2021/22

Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda.

Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

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