Counter-IED Report, Summer 2012

Counter-IED report Summer 2012

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED ADOPTING A MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION APPROACH COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES SMART RESPONSIVE JAMMING FOR MILITARY VEHICLE AND CONVOY PROTECTION

CONTENTS

Counter-IED report Summer 2012

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED ADOPTING A MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION APPROACH COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES SMART RESPONSIVE JAMMING FOR MILITARY VEHICLE AND CONVOY PROTECTION

CONTENTS

Counter-IED report Published by Delta Business Media Limited 3rd floor 207 Regent Street

3 WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED

By Vitor Felisberto, PRT OF3 (army), C-IED Centre of Excellence

6 COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES: ADOPTING A MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION APPROACH

By Dr Franco Fiore, Principal Scientist, Directorate of Production, NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency and Mrs Agata Szydelko, Principal Business Manager, Directorate Sponsor Account – NATO & Nations, NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency

12 COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

By Jim Blackburn, Project Officer C-IED, European Defence Agency

15 SMART RESPONSIVE JAMMING FOR MILITARY VEHICLE AND CONVOY PROTECTION AGAINST RC-IED ATTACKS

By Dr Torben Brack, Werner Lachenmaier and Dr Hubert Piontek, Cassidian

20 A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED- ENERGY SYSTEMS

By Directed Energy Division, Electromagnetic and Sensor Systems Department, Naval Surface Warfare Center

25 COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

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By Captain David F Eisler, US Army Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

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WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED The future challenges of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) policies will determine the effectiveness in combating IED systems. Combining the three strategies of ‘defeat the device’, ‘attack the network’ and ‘prepare the force’ will provide a better approach for countering this threat, which will continue to evolve and remain the weapon of choice for insurgents.

By Vitor Felisberto, PRT OF3 (army) C-IED Centre of Excellence

Photo above: Members of 63 Squadron (Queens Colour Squadron) RAF Regiment use metal detectors to check for IEDs.

The fight against IEDs is now a major concern not only in Afghanistan, where nearly 21,000 IEDs were found last year, but also across the rest of the world, where an average of 650 IEDs are found each month. IEDs are inexpensive and easy to fabricate compared with other, more sophisticated systems, and are thus the weapon of choice for insurgents.

The physical and psychological effects of such devices on military forces as well as on civilians are significant.

Preparing operational forces to face this threat by increasing the skills of military personnel is a mandatory step towards developing a national policy to defeat the use of IED devices. Military Search, Route Clearance, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and other units will always be on the front lines of the battle against those who are determined to develop and deploy IEDs, and new technology is needed to help

these operational forces prevent, detect or defeat the threat with the minimal number of casualties. The development of such technology is possible only through cooperation between military organisations and industry, especially considering military budget cuts. ‘Share and Pool’ and ‘Smart Defence’ concepts are currently under development; sharing information and pooling resources may provide a cost-effective solution without compromising operational requirements.

However, the IED threat can only be defeated if there is a shared mindset among the international community.

Defeating the device on its own won’t be enough. Information needs to be shared among the countries that face this reality to create and adopt the right approach to counter the IED system. Attacking the IED network requires the cooperation of all actors and agencies. Identifying possible targets (the financers, IED counteriedreport.com

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WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED

A Buffalo vehicle equipped with a rummaging arm.

makers, emplacers) as well as the related activities that contribute to the IED network is critical, and creating this offensive mindset will help to develop a better understanding of the system and consequently combat the threat. The efforts should not be exclusively from military forces; an inter-agency effort is required, with all internal security agencies integrated to create the

necessary environment within which to fight the networks established to deliver the IED threat.

The loop will be closed if these national agencies share their information globally.

Changes in enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) require changes in the actions of friendly forces (FFs) as well. The migration of knowledge is easy, as demonstrated by the similarity of IED events around the world, and is facilitated by the many social networks on the Internet. FFs must therefore keep up to date with new techniques, find ways to be protected against them and, most importantly, be ready to respond to attacks. However, as already mentioned, defeating the device, though important, is just the beginning of a much larger process – attack the network to defeat the IED system. Troops therefore need the appropriate equipment and means to perform their tasks, which requires industry collaboration in order to develop the necessary new technologies.

A Dragon Runner Bomb Disposal Robot.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

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INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE SHARED AMONG THE COUNTRIES THAT FACE THIS REALITY TO CREATE AND ADOPT THE RIGHT APPROACH TO COUNTER THE IED SYSTEM

Another important area to consider is the exploitation of IED components. It should be mandatory that all nations develop this capability, not only because it is the first step in supporting ‘attack the network’ operations, but also because it is the only way to support national and in-theatre training activities. By gaining knowledge about enemy TTPs, we can adapt our own doctrine and practice to exploit their weaknesses. The levels of exploitation will differ according to the final information provided, however evidence collected on the ground is vital to develop reliable counter-products that will contribute to the success of future operations.

C-IED policy is the result of the efforts of many agencies, both civilian and military, that together can provide viable solutions to fighting the IED system. This requires the complete cooperation, coordination and diverse skills of the different actors and communities within this international environment. The nations involved therefore need to develop their skills based on NATO doctrine, filling any gaps with educational programmes and the latest equipment. The challenge for industry will be to cooperate with armed forces to create better solutions to existing problems, providing military forces with the appropriate equipment and sufficient means to combat insurgent activity in an environment where the funds to do so are decreasing every fiscal period.

The IED threat will not end after NATO leaves Afghanistan. Across the globe, IEDs will remain the weapon of choice, and the asymmetric threat they pose challenges conventional doctrine and requires special skills. Although attacking the networks is the best way to minimise the threat, the first answers must be found on the ground by the operational and logistical troops who are challenged daily by the ‘creative’ skills of those who are determined to put obstacles in their way. Their work

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WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE FUTURE OF C-IED

must therefore be compensated with an international mindset that provides better solutions to the problem. The reduction of budgets should not be seen as the end of technology development, but rather as the beginning of a new era of cooperation between the C-IED community and industry. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Vitor Felisberto graduated from the Portuguese Military Academy in 1999. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as part of the Defeat the Device Branch in July 2011. Previous roles include Platoon and Company Commander at various Portuguese army engineering units, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Commander and Army Engineering School Instructor. He is a graduate of the Captain career course and attended the Staff course at the Portuguese Armed Forces General Staff School in 2009. Additional courses include CBRN, EOD at the Spanish EOD School, Combat Engineer, Surveillance and Counter Surveillance. His operational assignments include FYROM, Angola and Lebanon twice. He has been awarded with various national and international honour medals. He is married to Sonia and has one son.

A soldier of the Afghan National Army (ANA) investigates a possible improvised explosive device (IED) during a road search.

THE REDUCTION OF BUDGETS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THE END OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, BUT RATHER AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE C-IED COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRY

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COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

SECTION HEADING

COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES:

ADOPTING A MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION APPROACH The NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) is performing a number of activities in support of the counterimprovised explosive device (C-IED) fight, assisting International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations and research & development, and carrying out unbiased field-testing of emerging technologies on behalf of the NATO HQ Emerging Security Challenges Division.

By Dr Franco Fiore Principal Scientist Directorate of Production, NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency and Mrs Agata Szydelko Principal Business Manager Directorate Sponsor Account – NATO & Nations NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency Photo above: X-ray hand-luggage scanner image.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

The NC3A’s proactive approach to the preparation and establishment of multinational collaboration in C-IED builds on the Agency’s extensive experience in providing technical, acquisition and executive support for multinational projects. The NATO Secretary General’s call for smart defence for connected forces initiatives and the multinational cooperation approach to the IED battle encouraged NC3A to work closer with the C-IED Task Force, the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) and the Defense Investment Division at NATO HQ. Strengthening this cooperation allowed for the collective input of the nations with respect to the ongoing projects in the C-IED area to identify

common requirements and provide a framework for multinational collaboration aimed at achieving interoperability and standardisation of C-IED assets.

The cost-saving aspect comes as a value-added for the nations and can be achieved mainly through joint acquisitions employing economies of scale.

Being inexpensive yet effective, IEDs continue to be insurgents’ weapons of choice against indigenous and coalition troops in Afghanistan. Suicide and IED attacks have caused more civilian casualties than any other tactic. Although such attacks have been directed mainly against Afghan or foreign security forces, they are often carried out in areas frequented by civilians. Though there is

COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

no silver bullet for countering every kind of hand-made bomb, technologies are available that are designed to detect them or to prevent them from being detonated.

NC3A, soon to become, along with other NATO agencies, part of the new NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCI Agency), can be considered NATO’s leading body in C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) technologies analysis and procurement in support of the IED fight.

Actively engaged in this area since early 2005, NC3A has deployed to the ISAF various types of sensors and technologies to support the daily activities of Force Protection, enhancing the security of ISAF installations and convoys against IED attack, and enabling ISAF personnel to perform their operational tasks in a safer environment.

JAMMERS AGAINST REMOTELY CONTROLLED IEDs

One of the most widely used IEDs is activated remotely. The remote controller could be anything from a personnel mobile radio, a keyless car entry, or from a child’s toy. To date, the most effective tool against remotely activated IEDs is the so-called radio frequency jammer. Ideally, every military vehicle should be equipped with a jammer in the same way that all vehicles are now equipped with a system against Chemical, Biological, radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threat.

There are two kinds of jammer: active and reactive. The active jammer is a broadband device that is used to constantly jam a wide range of frequencies (given a fixed amount of power available, the wider the frequency one is trying to jam, the less range one will have). The reactive jammer, instead, is designed to detect and identify threat

A vehicle-screening system operator at Kandahar Airbase entry control point.

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COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

Post-IED attack.

... JAMMERS ARE CRITICAL TO SAVING LIVES, YET THEY ARE ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE EQUATION ‌

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

signals in the area of interest and then jam only the suspected signals. Jammers are usually mounted on one or more vehicles, depending on the size and the speed of the convoy they need to protect, as well as the number of frequencies to be jammed. They are critical to saving lives, protecting not only convoys but also entry control points, yet are only a small part of the equation. Training is the best defence against IEDs. NATO therefore provides C-IED training to troops as they prepare to deploy, and ISAF supports further training in Afghanistan once troops have arrived.

The main drawback of an active jammer is related to the radio-frequency management, because an active device often interferes with reactive jammers operated by friendly forces in a given area, as well as with both military and civilian communications. NC3A has recently fielded an ECM capability to the ISAF and is continuing to look at ways to avoand is ready to rapidly support radiofrequency deconfliction activities as they arise.

STAND-OFF DETECTION OF EXPLOSIVES

Another threat to soldiers on the ground, but even more so to civilians, as we all too frequently hear in news reports, are attacks perpetrated by suicide bombers.

While popular with insurgents due to their high visibility and broad impact on international communities and public opinion, especially when targeted at civilians, suicide attacks are the most difficult to detect.

Technology can greatly help in identifying potential suicide bombers. In addition to the standard metal detectors employed at gates and checkpoints, millimetre waves, X-ray and other standoff detection sensors like radar technology can play an important role in detecting items hidden under clothes, especially organic materials like explosives or metal used in wiring the IED before it is placed in a suicide vest. NC3A has therefore been analysing new technologies in this area, and possible combinations of these. Working from requirements down to fielding of capability, the steps

COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

undertaken to analyse a technology and its use in an operational environment consist of identification of the technology, research and development (including simulation), NATO trials and exercise execution, followed by testing in an operational environment like Afghanistan.

The results of NC3A’s unbiased analysis can then be shared with all NATO nations and used as needed, for example to write consistent technical requirements for C-IED assets procurement and fielding.

AIRPORT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING OF POTENTIAL THREATS

Airport security checkpoints could employ more sophisticated technologies to counter the IED threat, especially from suicide bombers, IEDs hidden in luggage, ceramic weapons and other types of weapons and IEDs that metal detectors and normal hand-luggage screening sensors may not always detect. However, one of the reasons these types of technologies are not widely employed is the lead-time to get a

person cleared. There thus needs to be a balance between the screening time, the threat level expected, and the threat detection threshold to be achieved. Using a multisensory approach (parallel usage of sensors for screening a person) may lower the screening time, simultaneously increasing the probability of detection of a potential IED. NC3A has recently been engaged in these activities and is working in support of the NATO HQ Counter Terrorism Technology Section under the Emerging Security Challenges Division.

Making use of the experience gained in Afghanistan while installing several screening sensors at ISAF checkpoints, NC3A, in collaboration with industry and academia, will be looking at fusing the results from different sensors such as X-ray backscatter, millimetre waves, radioactive material detection and video processing, the latter to identify recognisable signs of a potential threat in the behaviour of a person (psychological profiling). The main goal will be to lower the detection threshold without

An IED detected by an X-ray luggage scanner.

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COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

An X-ray backscatter image of a vehicle with a person hidden under the back seats.

... WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SMART DEFENCE PROJECT PROPOSAL DATABASE, THE C-IED RELATED PROJECTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE BENEFITED FROM MUCH GREATER VISIBILITY ACROSS THE ALLIANCE …

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

increasing the screening time. This could be achieved by better utilisation of the time a person is sitting in a queue, for example to carry out additional screening, possibly in a passive way.

The task is challenging, but can be achieved. After some analysis and simulation, followed by laboratory testing, the goal is to execute a live demonstration on real targets (airport checkpoint) by mid-2013.

A MULTINATIONAL APPROACH TO C-IED PROCUREMENT

Whether the technologies are already there or still need to be developed or enhanced, at some point they have to be procured and implemented so that they can be used. A very positive aspect enabling the NATO multinational cooperation efforts in the C-IED area is the institutionalised and coordinated approach through established structures and mechanisms, including the C-IED Task Force led by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the Defence Against Terrorism Program of Work (DAT POW) led by CNAD or the C-IED Materiel Roadmap. Over the past two years there has been also a much better understanding of the support that the NATO Agencies (NAMSA or NC3A) can provide in the preparation and execution of multinational projects. Moreover,

with the establishment of the Smart Defence Project Proposal database, the C-IED related projects that were included in the database benefited from much greater visibility across the Alliance.

A great challenge for the multinational projects in the C-IED area is the nations’ reserved approach towards sharing sensitive data related to C-IED. At the same time, there still seems to be a general underestimation of the significance, duration and effort required in the preparation stage of establishing a multinational project. In reality, already in the preparation and pre-acquisition stage, the nations should be able to establish a collaboration platform that would enable information sharing and exchange as well as allow for consensus building. These indispensable preparatory activities include requirements identification and synchronisation, identification of interoperability requirements, coordination with NATO stakeholders or impartial assessment and evaluation of the industrial solutions. While complex and time-consuming, these activities allow for proper scoping of a project in a collaborative NATO environment.

In December 2011, NC3A developed the ‘Comprehensive C4ISR Approach to Smart Defence: 24 Months Report on Lessons Learned in C4ISR Multinational Cooperation Development For Connected Forces’. The report is based on practical experience across 20 projects, including those supported in regional context and those performed in coordination with the EU through the NATO-EU Capability Group. It shows that projects supported by a synergy of lead nation and NATO executive agent support have progressed more rapidly and efficiently, with guaranteed interoperability, and – perhaps most importantly – at a lower long-term cost to nations. Furthermore, the conclusions of the report clearly demonstrate that in the case of multinational collaboration, there is a critical need for the executive

COUNTER-IED TECHNOLOGIES, TRENDS AND CAPABILITIES

support function within the project office, allowing for consensus building and providing unbiased advice, in addition to the usual requirements for technical and acquisition support. Last but not least, extensive effort is required for the preparation and pre-acquisition stage of the project, with the benefit of the extended duration of the project execution.

The bottom line is that the knowledge and expertise required for establishment and execution of multinational projects as well as C-IED subject matter and acquisition expertise are available within NATO, and that it is now up to the nations to decide on how it can best be used to address their national requirements in the area of C-IED in the multinational context. â–

Vehicular jammers against remotely controlled IED.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Franco Fiore is the NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) counterterrorism and C-IED focal point. As head of the Capability Area Team 5, Sensor Group, he supervises 15 personnel. Dr Fiore was formerly with the Italian Army Corps of Engineers (EW and Communications), from which he retired in 2004. He spent four years in the US serving at the NATO Medium Extended Air Defense System Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) as a sensor simulation engineer, and joined NC3A in January 2005. Since then he has been working on a number of counterterrorism and C-IED projects. He is responsible for the Agency’s C-IED portfolio and has delivered C-IED capabilities for ISAF, and support for ACT and ACO in their counter-terrorism and C-IED activities, as well as for the NATO HQ Counter Terrorism Technology Section under the Emerging Security Challenges Division. He has a Masters degree in computer engineering, a PhD in telecommunications and electronics, and a PRINCE 2 Project Management qualification. His numerous papers, technical notes and articles on counter-terrorism and C-IED have been published in both newspapers and magazines.

Mrs Agata Szydelko, Principal Business Manager in the Directorate Sponsor Account NATO and Nations (DSA NN) within the NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) is responsible for the strategic planning, cooperation development and business assurance of multinational projects and bilateral cooperation with the nations in the area of C4ISR. Her professional experience as NC3A Senior Contracting Officer includes the execution of high-volume NATO C4ISR acquisitions, also in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Moreover, as International Business Manager for national industry she was in charge of the supply of IT systems to commercial and military customers.

Disclaimer: Any opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the NC3A, NATO and the NATO nations, but remain solely those of the author(s). counteriedreport.com

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COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

SECTION HEADING

COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED) remains a high priority in Afghanistan, meaning C-IED training and research into new detection technologies are vital. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has therefore been developing a number of one-off catalytic courses to enhance the capabilities of its member states.

By Jim Blackburn, Project Officer C-IED European Defence Agency

Photos above: Interior and exterior of the EDA’s C-IED laboratory.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the greatest cause of casualties on current operations and are responsible for around 70 per cent of all coalition deaths in Afghanistan,1 accounting for more deaths and injuries than all other reasons combined. It is difficult to get precise figures, but the number of soldiers wounded is significantly higher than those killed.2 Not only does this menace affect our own forces, but also those whom it is our duty to protect.

According to figures published by Human Rights Watch, over the last three years the civilian population has suffered somewhere between 2.8 and 4.2 times the number of casualties of coalition forces.3 While the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is a NATO-led mission, the interest for the European Defence Agency (EDA) is clear: of its 26 participating member states,4 24 are ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). It is therefore clear that countering IEDs (C-IED) represents a high priority for EDA member states.

However, the conflict in Afghanistan is not the only motivation. Western powers now have strong military forces with technologically advanced capabilities such as aircraft carriers, main battle tanks and fast fighter jets that play an essential role in deterring future state-on-state aggression. Therefore, adversaries do not try to meet strength with strength, but rather will try to bypass strength to attack weaknesses in an asymmetric fashion.

Asymmetric attacks look to defeat the will of their opponent rather than seeking military victory on a battlefield. These attacks are targeted at: the soldiers fighting the battle in order to demoralise them; their homeland populations to sap their will to continue; and the local population to convince them that the attacker is stronger and more capable than the defender. It is felt by many that these tactics spell out the next generation of warfare, beyond Afghanistan.5 The IED displays a far lower level of technology when compared to more conventional forms of warfare, such as

COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

attack helicopters or armoured vehicles, but is nevertheless effective as a tool.

While sophisticated weapons platforms are excellent when pitched against each other, when looking to defeat a much lower technology level, speaking to people, understanding local culture and topography, and persuasion are much more powerful tools. Significant scientific effort continues to search for automated techniques for detecting IEDs; however, it is clear that currently the majority of those found are done so in much more human ways, such as being ‘turned in’ by locals, or simply being seen.

To try to address the challenges presented by IEDs, it has been necessary to define exactly what is meant by C-IED. The process was started in 2007 when accepted doctrine from NATO stated that countering IEDs consisted of six key operational areas: 1. Detect 2. Mitigate 3. Neutralise 4. Exploit 5. Predict 6. Prevent.6 In an EDA context, a group of willing member states and experts set out to analyse exactly what each of these disciplines meant and to break them down into military capabilities, arriving at those that were specifically considered to be in the C-IED envelope. For example, predicting an IED attack involves intelligence gathering, all sources intelligence fusion, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). A number of distinct capabilities necessary for C-IED were deduced before those felt to be general military skills were deleted.

So while all sources intelligence fusion is key to a C-IED fight, it is similarly crucial in almost any military campaign and was therefore not specifically within the scope of C-IED. As a result, the capabilities below were published as forming a C-IED capability: 1. Military search 2. IED exploitation 3. Route clearance 4. Tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) 5. Improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) 6. Mitigation 7. Detection

8. Counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW).7 Each was then addressed across all of the defence lines of development (DLODs) using the multinationally accepted DOTMLPFI schematic8 to see how EDA participating member states could have their capabilities enhanced.

Seven of the eight capabilities have since been addressed by participating member states.9 In the most part it was felt that the provision of catalytic training to spread understanding was the most appropriate method of assisting member states. The intention was not to train a number of individuals, but to train key personnel who then return home and develop the capabilities. The EDA has therefore organised a succession of oneoff catalytic courses.

Participants are briefed on a C-IED training course.

A solider tackles an IED on and EDAorganised training course.

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COUNTER-IED TRAINING AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

A multinational team on a C-IED search training course.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

In military search, a five-year programme under Italian leadership was begun and so far three courses have taken place, each covering different aspects, while two more are planned.

Under an Irish lead, a course in ground sign awareness has run and a combat tracking course is planned. Again under an Irish lead, two specialist IEDD courses have been run and a multinational exercise is being conducted in Austria in June 2012.

In the area of detection, a five-stage process in identifying potential research and technology programmes was initiated: 1. Two scientific studies into state-ofthe art detection techniques and a terahertz detection technology survey; 2. A workshop to define IED scenarios; 3. Engineering analysis to match the scenarios to possible detection technologies; 4. Results of the analysis briefed to industry, who then contributed their views; 5. Final results to be used to suggest research programmes to member states in a possible joint programme.

For route clearance, again under an Italian lead, a process of concept development and evaluation (CD&E) is in progress, examining the next generation of route clearance capability.

Finally, the EDA has developed a Level-2 exploitation capability that has been deployed in Kabul under a French lead and is providing a valued contribution to the operation, acting as a demonstrator for all EDA member states.

In conclusion, over the last five years the EDA has analysed how to develop C-IED capabilities across the EU countries’ armed forces. With the member states leading the way, a number of programmes based across the spectrum of the DLODs capability development have been implemented.

Countering IEDs is a highly successful example of the Agency’s ability to draw together relevant stakeholders and coordinate action on pressing issues. ■

NOTES 1. Source: icasualties.org. In 2010, of 499 total coalition force deaths in Afghanistan, 368 were from IEDs (74 per cent), and in 2011, of 418 total coalition force deaths in Afghanistan, 252 were from IEDs (60 per cent).

2. In the British Forces, 414 soldiers were killed in the Afghanistan conflict up to 18 May 2012, whereas 562 were listed as serious casualties and 1,894 were admitted to field hospitals as being injured in action (UK Ministry of Defence statistics).

3. Year – Afghan coalition casualties from icasualties.org/ANAMA Annual Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2009, 2010 and 2011: 2009 – 521/1,630; 2010 – 499/2,080; 2011 – 418/1,167.

4. All EU member states except Denmark participate in the EDA. 5. For more on asymmetry, see Colonel (Retd) Thomas X Hammes (US Marine Corps), The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, 2006.

6. NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.15.

Jim Blackburn has been the EDA’s Project Officer CIED for five years. He has a Masters degree in explosives ordnance engineering, and served 21 years in the British Army, working in many fields including ammunition, explosives and bomb disposal. He is happily married and feels his most important role is as a father of four.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Other research and technology programmes in the EDA have addressed armours and a new helmet to mitigate the effects of IEDs. In TTPs, a lessons identified workshop was run in Sweden in 2010, and has been continued by the NATO-accredited C-IED Centre of Excellence in Spain and become an annual event.

7. EDA document ‘Guidelines for Developing a National CIED Capability’, noted by the EDA Steering Board in Capabilities Formation in spring 2009.

8. DOTMLPFI Training,

–

Doctrine,

Materiel,

Organisation,

Logistics,

Personnel,

Facilities and Interoperability.

9. Understandable

security

concerns

restricted progress on CREW.

have

SECTION RC-IED JAMMING HEADING

SMART RESPONSIVE JAMMING FOR MILITARY VEHICLE AND CONVOY PROTECTION AGAINST RC-IED ATTACKS Terrorists and paramilitary organisations, especially in asymmetric warfare situations, increasingly attack their targets using self-made bombs that are triggered by a shooter via radio communication equipment from hidden places. Cassidian, the defence and security division of EADS has developed a new-generation Convoy Protection Jammer that significantly enhances the protection of vehicle convoys against attacks by radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RC-IEDs). The newly developed protection system uses the ultra-fast SMART Responsive Jamming technology developed by Cassidian to detect, classify and block radio signals in the 20 MHz to 6 GHz frequency range.

By Dr Torben Brack, Werner Lachenmaier, and Dr Hubert Piontek, Cassidian

INTRODUCTION

In asymmetric scenarios the, militarily speaking, weaker side avoids its adversary’s strengths by surprise hit-and-run tactics instead of open battle. The targets are police or military forces patrols, VIP convoys and events like state visits or festivities involving VIPs. This implies the use of simple devices of maximum impact while simultaneously maintaining mobility and camouflage. RC-IEDs are thus the weapon of choice. Typical triggers are amateur radios, garage door openers, toy remote controls, personal mobile radios, mobile phones (GSM, 3G, 4G, CDMA, Thuraya, Inmarsat), wireless local area network (WLAN) and many more. In general, the trigger devices are cheap, small and readily available, which means an attacker can hit almost everywhere and almost everybody.

Taking all this into account, it is clear that any countermeasure must be highly flexible, comprehensive and accurate.

The newly developed Cassidian Convoy Protection Jammer uses the company’s ultra-fast SMART Responsive Jamming technology to substantially enhance protection

compared with conventional systems.

It detects and classifies radio signals in the 20 MHz to 6 GHz frequency range used to detonate roadside bombs. After detection and classification, it transmits real-time jamming signals, which precisely match the hostile frequency band, thus interrupting the connection between shooter and bomb.

For successful jamming, a number of parameters need to be taken into account. The geometrical setup is of course the main concern. The relative distance of the shooter to the bomb compared with the distance of the jammer to the bomb is the main relation.

For responsive jammers, the distance of the shooter to the jammer is also of concern, since the jammer needs to receive the shooter’s signal.

JAMMING TECHNIQUES Barrage Jamming

The traditional approach to RC-IED jamming is barrage jamming. A barrage jammer uses a broadband noise or sweep signal to jam all desired frequency bands over a predefined frequency range. This approach requires large amounts of radio frequency (RF) power, which is counteriedreport.com

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RC-IED JAMMING

mostly wasted in unoccupied frequency ranges because no information about the current frequency occupancy is known.

Very large power amplifiers are therefore required, resulting in a necessarily exorbitant amount of primary electrical and cooling power, as well as large and heavy systems. Barrage jamming is, however, effective against specific narrowband targets, in very high load scenarios, and for very weak signals that are difficult to detect robustly.

Responsive Jamming Scenario Shooter.

Jamming techniques.

To mitigate the disadvantage of wasting energy in unoccupied frequency bands, responsive jamming introduces a receiver into the jamming system. This allows the gathering of information about the current frequency occupancy, and concentrating the available RF power only on detected signals. Therefore, with limited RF power even high-powered narrowband signals can be effectively countered.

The main disadvantage of this technology is that most receivers are not able to robustly detect low probability of interception (LPI) signals, which are used for triggering RC-IEDs. Where a suitable receiver is available, this leads to a very high load on the jammer system in densely populated frequency bands, and a number of potentially dangerous signals may remain un-countered due to this overload. Overload situations may occur during large parts of the mission, especially in urban areas.

Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming

Communication Window disabled.

The latest Cassidian SMART Responsive Jamming system combines the advantages of both barrage and responsive jamming in one highly effective jamming technique. Both are supported simultaneously or sequentially during each mission, enabling Cassidian SMART Responsive Jammers to autonomously respond to different signal scenarios in an appropriate and most effective way. A large number of wave forms are available to enhance the jammer’s efficiency against the specific modulations of diverse threats.

Own Communication Communication Window enabled.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

An essential requirement for new jamming systems is the possibility of

RC-IED JAMMING

communication while the jamming system is active. Though many systems allow the programming of communication windows, due to the harmonics and inter-modulation products generated by these systems the windows are dangerously wide. Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming technology enables the user to operate in-band communication equipment, providing communication windows within the jammer’s own band.

Interoperability

Cassidian SMART Responsive Jamming systems provide interoperability with other jamming systems – both cooperative and non-cooperative.

Cooperative jamming systems do not interfere with other jammers’ receivers, which can be achieved, for example, by synchronised ‘look-through periods’ (periodically repeated times during which the jammers are in receive mode).

Non-cooperative jamming systems,

for example all traditional barrage jammer systems, do not care about other jammers’ receivers. Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming systems autonomously adapt to such situations by detecting which bands suffer from interference, and switching to a proactive jamming mode for those bands. As soon as the disturbance vanishes, the full responsive functionality is restored within a couple of microseconds.

Cassidian’s Vehicle Protection Jammer onboard a German Army type ‘Wolf’ vehicle.

CORE EQUIPMENT Receiver Exciter Unit (REU)

At the core of all Cassidian SMART Responsive Jamming systems is the Receiver Exciter Unit (REU). The REU employs the latest state-of-the-art field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology, enabling it to process data at the required speed. Having the complete core of the jammer as a software-defined system means it can be updated for future needs.

Key features of the REU are: counteriedreport.com

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RC-IED JAMMING

‘Wolf’ with direction finding antenna.

• Frequency Coverage ◦◦20 MHz to 3,600 MHz, with extension up to 6,000 MHz supported (optional) ◦◦Up to 1 GHz instantaneous bandwidth (6 channels each with 170 MHz) ◦◦Each channel ‘tunable’ during operation, providing ‘scanning’ capability ◦◦Multiple REUs can be used in a single system to enhance instantaneous coverage • Threat Detection Capability ◦◦Analysis of 9,000 GHz of bandwidth per second ◦◦Detects and classifies over 350 million potential threats per second ◦◦Determines up to 3.5 million targets per second • Jamming Capability (based on 80% duty cycle) ◦◦Analysis of 2,000 GHz of bandwidth per second ◦◦Detects and classifies over 83 million potential threats per second ◦◦Counters up to 750,000 targets per second.

VPJ-R4 Jamming Unit

Cassidian’s VPJ-R4 jamming unit combines a four-channel REU with a set of power amplifiers into a compact 105 litres air-cooled jamming system.

Its main application is military vehicle protection. Its compact size and modest primary power requirements allow for the easy integration of the SMART Responsive Jamming unit, together with a set of antennas, into all kinds of vehicles.

For this application, the covered frequency range is 20 MHz to 2,200 MHz. The integral REU employs four channels with an instantaneous coverage of 170 MHz each. This yields an analysis performance of more than 1,300 GHz per second, and detection and classification of more than 55 million target signals per second. The jamming unit is capable of countering up to 500,000 signals per second. While producing up to 400 W of RF power, the primary power is limited to typically 750 W (maximum 1 kW). A comparable barrage jamming system would require up to 10 kW of primary power.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

OPERATIONAL USE Vehicle Protection Against RC-IEDs

Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming systems are used mainly to protect vehicles against roadside RC-IEDs while driving in a convoy. This application requires an omni-directional antenna pattern to protect the vehicle on all sides.

Cassidian’s systems significantly enlarge the protected area compared to traditional barrage jammers while avoiding the risks of purely responsive jammers. SMART Responsive Jamming systems therefore protect not only the vehicle carrying the jammer, but also those in front of and behind it.

Protection for EOD Personnel

EOD missions require soldiers to approach RC-IEDs on foot. Using highgain directional antennas, EOD missions can be supported by vehicle-mounted jammers, providing an extra layer of protection for the personnel recovering the RC-IED. The same setup can be used for the protection of foot patrols in hostile territory, who are usually only protected by low-power portable jammers.

Jamming of Communication Links in Tactical Scenarios (ECM/EA)

Well-known tactical jamming applications, for example jamming of hostile communication links that have been reconnoitred beforehand, are also supported by Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming systems. In such scenarios, high-gain directional antennas are used.

Reconnaissance and Threat Analysis for Civil and Military Uses (ESM/ES)

The integrated receiver in Cassidian’s SMART Responsive Jamming systems means they can be used for reconnaissance missions. Specifically for organisations operating RC-IED jammers, they are capable of recording the complete observed spectrum for later analysis, the outcome of which yields a clear picture of the threats that need to be countered. The receiver thus plays an essential part in optimising the jammers’ mission parameters.

Civil Convoy Protection

Cassidian’s Convoy Protection Jammer (CPJ Compact-R) is a very high-

RC-IED JAMMING

power SMART Responsive Jamming system integrated within a highquality vehicle. In contrast to military scenarios, there is less a priori knowledge in civil applications and an even broader range of possible trigger devices. Civil CPJ systems are usually used in urban areas with dense signal backgrounds due to the existing infrastructure, such as mobile phone networks. The CPJ Compact-R covers the frequency range from 20 MHz to 6,000 MHz without any frequency discontinuities.

To achieve a maximum protection range, it includes a camouflaged, sophisticated high-gain antenna array connected to a power amplifier system rated at 1,250 W. It is capable of operating in a temperature range of –25°C to +55°C. The power required for operating the jamming equipment is drawn directly from the vehicle’s engine, eliminating additional power generators.

The CPJ Compact-R is based on two REUs with six channels each, allowing it to detect and classify more than 138 million signals per second, and counter up to 1.5 million signals per second. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr Hubert Piontek Education: University Ulm, Faculty for Engineering and Computer Science, Dr rer. nat.

Professional Experience: at Cassidian since 2007 • Development Engineer • Systems Engineer Jammer Systems • Product Manager Jammer Systems

Convoy Protection Jammer (CPJ Compact-R).

Mr Werner Lachenmaier Education: Advanced Technical College Communications Engineering Professional Experience: • Member of EDAS Technical Training Department for EW Systems • Project Manager Jammer Projects • Director Sales, COMMS Jamming Dr Torben Brack Education: University Kaiserslautern, Microelectronic Systems Design Research Group, Dr-Ing. Professional Experience: at Cassidian since 2007 • Development Engineer UAV and Jammer Equipment • Systems Engineer Jammer Equipment • Product Manager Jammer Equipment. counteriedreport.com

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A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS

SECTION HEADING

A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS While the capabilities mentioned here are not yet available to warfighters, researchers believe they have uncovered the key to next-generation DE systems leading to the miniaturisation of directedenergy (DE) devices.

By Directed Energy Division, Electromagnetic and Sensor Systems Department, Naval Surface Warfare Center

NEXT-GENERATION DE SYSTEMS MUST YIELD A HIGH PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS AND BE INHERENTLY SAFE TO OPERATE

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Imagine an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit on a routine scouting patrol deep in the notorious ‘Triangle of Death’ south of Baghdad, where marines, sailors and soldiers frequently find themselves exposed to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Fortunately, this newly outfitted unit is equipped with the latest unmanned, mobile, remote-controlled radio frequency (RF) transmitter used as a directedenergy weapon (DEW). The integrated system provides comprehensive IED prediction, detection, prevention and neutralisation capabilities. Lightweight, pocket-sized transmitters carried by each warfighter constantly communicate sensor intelligence, key vital signs, critical conditions and location telemetry to a geostationary satellite (GEOSAT).

This intercepts, collects and retransmits intelligence and situational awareness data simultaneously to any command post in the world and to each member of the unit on patrol. Highly efficient, miniature switch-mode RF amplifiers with high-power density (small size and weight with high-power output) enable these visions of future capabilities as their systems’ transmitter backbone.

To civilians, the miniaturisation of modern wireless (electromagnetic) devices is considered a mere convenience or luxury; for example, Blackberries, mobile phones and highspeed wireless network connections.

To the next-generation warfighter, miniaturised, wireless, directed-energy (DE) systems open the door to the realisation of a whole new set of effective and efficient wireless modalities. And while the capabilities mentioned in the above scenario are not yet available to warfighters, researchers believe they have uncovered the key to nextgeneration DE systems leading to the miniaturisation of DE devices.

NEXT-GENERATION DE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

At the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), key system requirements for effective next-generation DE systems are being researched and developed for applications to counter IEDs, to detect explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), neutralise explosives and predict threat locations. Next-generation DE systems must yield a high probability of mission success and be inherently safe to operate. By design, they must minimise or eliminate the risk of hostile attack or collateral damage, especially during screening missions. Considering the DEW example above, practical next-generation DE systems must be physically characterised by: • Low mass (weight) • Small size (volume) • High-power output with respect to

A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS

size or high-power density • High efficiency for extended mission use • Minimised prime power and cooling support • Portability • Mobility • Configurability.

They must also ensure a high probability of mission effectiveness. The DEW must be easily transportable and agile, adapting to the immediate, local military mission requirements in various warfighting environments. Additionally, DE systems must be mechanically robust and able to withstand the shock and vibration of combat missions in rough and rugged environments. The key requirement – efficiency – fundamentally facilitates all required characteristics, including mass and size.

MOVING BEYOND REQUIREMENTS

Researchers at NSWCDD are leading the way towards realising small, lightweight RF transmitters using high-power, solid-state switch-mode amplifiers, theoretically 100 per cent efficient. These practical switch-mode amplifier realisations are at least 1/100 the volume and weight of any commercially available linear solid-state amplifier of comparable power output.

The challenges included assessing what type of active amplifier device and operation would provide the greatest power density (power output per unit volume and mass) with its necessary auxiliary systems, such as prime power generation and cooling of waste heat.

Such a device also needed to provide sufficient output power based on required standoff range and IED system-coupling efficiency, while also maintaining a manageable-sized, easily transportable system. Researchers initially considered tube-based systems, but these require large, heavy, direct current (DC) power supplies, and typically 40 per cent of the input power is dissipated in heat, which negates any possibility of miniaturisation.

Upon a practical review of amplifierclass operations and suitable active amplifier devices, however, research pointed to contemporary switch-mode amplifier schemes (Class-E and Class-F) using solid-state technology – such

as the high-electron mobility transistor (HEMT) – as satisfying the highpower density and abusive mechanical requirements for expected worst-case transportation and operation in a rugged environment. To significantly impact reduction of size and weight, practical, high-efficiency thresholds were defined for next-generation DE systems at 90 per cent and greater. The key technology enabler to realise amplifier high efficiency in high-power amplifiers up to 60 kW was found in exploiting contemporary switch-mode amplifier architecture with efficient power combining. Particularly, switch-mode schemes in Class-E and Class-F operation as solid-state, activehybrid planar topology designs were found to be necessary and sufficient for DE applications. These analyses led to a novel Class-E RF switch-mode amplifier design. A Class-E RF switch-mode amplifier can theoretically operate at 100 per cent efficiency. For every input watt supplied, an RF output watt is produced.

The conductors and dielectric substrate of the hybrid planar load network and the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) transistor all exhibit some small degree of power loss, suggesting an estimated practically realised efficiency of 90 per cent.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NASA/ NOAA) Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-P (GOES-P) launching from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, aboard a Delta IV rocket procured by Boeing Launch Services on 4 March 2010. Built by Boeing Space and Intelligence Systems, GOES-P will provide NOAA and NASA scientists with data to support weather, solar and space operations, and will enable future scientific improvements in weather prediction and remote sensing.

It will also provide data on global climate changes and capability for search and rescue.

DE SYSTEMS MUST BE MECHANICALLY ROBUST AND ABLE TO WITHSTAND THE SHOCK AND VIBRATION OF COMBAT MISSIONS IN ROUGH AND RUGGED ENVIRONMENTS

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A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS

081107-N-1120L-072 RAMADI, Iraq.

Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRVs) assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 7’s convoy security element are secured following an escort mission from a forward operating base. The Cougartype JERRVs are employed by coalition forces for escort and logistics missions, and to protect personnel from IEDs. NMCB 7 is deployed to US Forces Central Command to provide contingency construction support to coalition forces in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

(US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B Lavender/ Released)

CLASS-E SWITCH-MODE AMPLIFIER THEORY DEVELOPMENT BEGAN IN THE US DURING THE 1960s, WITH DETAILS PUBLISHED IN 1975, ALTHOUGH SOME EARLIER REPORTS WERE PUBLISHED IN RUSSIA

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Moreover, the amplifier under research consisted of a novel microwave load network operating with high-power output at ultra-high frequency (UHF).

This research led to the state of the art in Class-E designs leading by hundreds of watts, several hundred megahertz in frequency, and roughly 10 percentage points in efficiency. A common, solidstate, high-power amplifier design technique sums the phase and amplitude of smaller amplifier units to the large values required for DE systems. A practical hardware limitation exists that limits the theoretically infinite number of fixed RF output power units to a finite number. Approximately 60-kW RF output power sets the boundary as the largest hardware realisation. By applying spatial power combining in the propagating medium, phased-array antennas can be employed with constructive wave interference in the air that would allow sufficient RF power densities on target, based on the number of elements in the array. This technique eliminates the traditional hardware necessary to power combine the smaller-power amplifier elements, realising a much simplified DE system with enhanced power density in the transmitter, and reduced mass and volume.

The key to ultra-high efficiency in a switch-mode amplifier, such as Class-E or Class-F, is found in zero-voltage switching (ZVS). Here, the load network is not only designed to be resonant at and around a particular desired switching frequency, it must simultaneously act to force the voltage across the switch to be zero when current flows and when

it switches off; hence, theory suggests that no power is dissipated because the product of current through, and voltage across, the switch is zero. It is this aspect of the design that makes the job of switch-mode amplifier realisation difficult. Of course, in practice a small voltage exists for a very short time during the switching action, resulting in a small amount of input power being dissipated in heat. This theoretical description also assumes that all components are ideal (ie, no impedance to current flow exists in the switch when turned on). All realistic switches exhibit finite impedance when turned on, which does dissipate some wasted energy, but again this is very small in modern HEMT devices using the ZVS technique.

Class-E switch-mode amplifier theory development began in the US during the 1960s, with details published in 1975, although some earlier reports were published in Russia. Lumped element electrical components (RF choke inductors and metal film capacitors) were initially used in lower frequency (3 to 30 MHz) prototypes. As engineers attempted higher frequency designs in the very high frequency (VHF) range, solid-state transistor switch parasitic intrinsic and packaging elements found inside the transistor began to be used as some of the key components necessary for ZVS. These parasitic elements included stray capacitance caused by differences of potential between parts inside the transistor and inductance caused by bond wire length that is used to connect the transistor to accessible terminals in its packaging. At microwave frequencies, these parasitic elements become sensitive, invoking unintended significant changes to load networks designed to operate with the transistors.

Intrinsic elements include drain-tosource breakdown voltage capability and peak current capability. As the need for higher frequency operation and higher power increased, constraints of key transistor parameters became difficult to produce in traditional silicon technology: • High instantaneous transient (peak) current capability through the transistor • Moderate breakdown potential across the transistor • Low output capacitance.

A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS

Only within the past few years have transistor manufacturers produced COTS transistors that meet the required capabilities necessary to operate in switch mode for microwave frequencies and high-power output. Selection is still somewhat limited for designers.

New transistor technology known as gallium nitride (GaN) HEMTs – using state-of-the-art manufacturing processes with GaN on silicon carbide materials – now facilitates Class-E highpower amplifier (100 W) designs at ultrahigh frequencies. The design process for switch-mode amplifiers is radically different than for linear amplifiers, so engineers have tended to continue using linear amplifier design techniques due to familiarity, rather than advance to the switch-mode designs. Today, the Class-E and Class-F unit power output (greater than 100 W) capability and upper frequency limitation is based on a lack of available HEMTs with the necessary parameter capabilities.

Most recently, transistor manufacturers have limited their investment in the Class-E amplifier solid-state switch market due to no commercial market mandate. An assortment of presently available HEMTs provides a lowpower capability in terms of 1- to 10-W output power for Class-E amplifiers in the mobile phone market. The need remains to continue advancements in commercially manufactured HEMTs with key capabilities necessary to realise larger unit power output, from hundreds of watts to a thousand watts, for practical implementation in DE systems.

POSSIBLE MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS Directed-Energy Weapon Systems

Expanding on the vision of the nextgeneration DEW system mentioned at the beginning of this article, further imagine that EOD scouts detect a laser fluorescence signature of C4 high explosive and chlorine outgasses in the vicinity of an abandoned vehicle 2 kilometres north of their current position. An electronic support measure (ESM) team on board an approaching clearing vehicle initiates RF jamming and electromagnetic surveillance procedures. Electronic specialists also scan the area with ground-surface differential thermography – particularly to detect possible buried IEDs and

EFPs or their tiny command wires, crush wires, or pressure plates – while clearing a pathway to the abandoned roadside vehicle.

Upon arrival at a 500-metre safe distance, the EOD specialists command the RF transmitter’s robotic platform, also equipped with sensitive gamma-ray planar and computed tomography (CT) imaging to navigate towards and around the vehicle, interrogating every possible hiding place. It discloses an IED in the fuel tank. The specialist lifts the transmitter safety arming and commands the remote transmitter to radiate a prescribed dose of RF energy directed at a carefully chosen component of the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) system. Without entering the vehicle, the advanced screening system detects and defuses the deadly IED buried within the rusty, metal vehicle chassis. Within minutes, the suspected VBIED threat is entirely neutralised, with absolutely no wounded warfighters or casualties.

MOBILE AD-HOC WIRELESS NETWORK (MANET)

Beyond IED detection and neutralisation, imagine an expeditionary unit on patrol, with each member equipped with an RF transceiver about the size and weight of a cigarette packet with an ultra-efficient switch-mode amplifier. The miniature transceiver constantly communicates sensor intelligence, key vital signs, critical conditions and location telemetry to a GEOSAT. This small switchmode amplifier has the necessary output power to reach an altitude of 35,786 kilometres, where the GEOSAT intercepts, collects and retransmits this intelligence and situational awareness data to any command post in the world, and to each member of the unit on patrol

US Army soldiers attached to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, patrol and search for weapons or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during a clearing mission.

...WITHIN MINUTES, THE SUSPECTED VBIED THREAT IS ENTIRELY NEUTRALISED, WITH ABSOLUTELY NO WOUNDED WARFIGHTERS OR CASUALTIES...

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A FUNDAMENTAL KEY TO NEXT-GENERATION DIRECTED-ENERGY SYSTEMS

mass and volume, accompanied with high efficiency, creates a welcome trickle-down effect. Low-profile, small, lightweight DE systems mean: • Less vulnerability to attack • Greater mobility and manoeuvrability • Simplified logistics with fewer fuelsupply demands • Less impact on the environment.

080102-N-1132M-006 Sheik Sa’id, Iraq.

US Army soldiers attached to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, patrol and search for weapons or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during a clearing mission.

(US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Sean Mulligan/Released)

simultaneously. The expeditionary unit, spread out over a wide area with large interspacing, shares the situational awareness and intelligence data of each other at the speed of light. Thus, near real-time worldwide communications with ubiquitous secure access from the battlefield is possible in a multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) architecture. The same system could provide a soldier-tosoldier MANET. Next-generation switch-mode RF amplifier designs could also optimise payload weight and volume on board new communication satellites while supplying higher power density and making efficient use of the solar-power supply budget. Improved switch-mode amplifier power output, when combined with enhanced antenna design, would minimise earth-station antenna size requirements. The recently launched NASA/NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-P (GOES-P) illustrated here demonstrates an example of the latest antenna technology.

LOOKING FORWARD

Miniaturising next-generation DE systems opens up a whole new world of applications to support warfighters in ways unimaginable just a few years ago. Reduction of transmitter 24

Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Clandestine operations, too, could be executed with greater ease and simplified logistics support. In the case of MIMO MANETs, miniaturised highpower density transmitters could further expand capabilities for warfighters, enabling them to carry high-power transmitters to communicate with satellites or other supporting platforms.

The satellite industry itself could benefit from miniaturised switch-mode amplifiers with much higher power density microwave transmitters, resulting in reduced payload mass and volume; this also reduces earth-station antenna gain and size requirements.

CONCLUSION

NSWCDD is meeting the demanding requirements of next-generation DE systems with Class-E RF transmitter switch-mode amplifiers designed to operate at ultra-high efficiency, greater than 90 per cent. Having discovered the key to next-generation DE systems, researchers at NSWCDD are focusing on the urgent need to counter IED systems with small, lightweight, highly efficient transmitters that use switchmode amplifiers. Considering the multiplicity of additional applications, all advancements made in amplifier counter-IED applications can be transferred to other applications in the future. Accordingly, while the capabilities suggested in this article might seem somewhat far-fetched, in reality they are realisable in the near term. It is projected that NSWCDD will soon have its first 250-W UHF amplifier unit prototype ready. These units will fit in the palm of an averagesized adult’s hand and can be power combined to the level necessary for platform and mission requirements.

A fully realised, fieldable DEW system prototype is possible in just a few years. ■

COUNTER-IED STRATEGY SECTION IN MODERN HEADING WAR

COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR Billions of dollars have been spent in the name of saving lives, yet the true cause of the problem and its origins remains largely ignored, leaving out the crucial role played by population-centric counterinsurgency operations.

By Captain David F Eisler, US Army

In the years since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little has changed in the realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) strategy. The military is always searching for better vehicles and equipment to defeat what are, at their core, homemade devices made for a fraction of the cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has primarily focused on developing new ways to mitigate the effects of an IED blast rather than trying to prevent it from occurring.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Photo above: US Army SPC Glenn Escano, right, speaks with an Iraqi police officer while conducting a sweep for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the Baghdad-Diyala Highway in Baghdad.

(1LT Josh Risher, US Army)

When elements of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment arrived in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, in July 2010, they faced an area of operations that had seen constantly increasing IED activity for several years in the same spots along Highway 1, an important manoeuvre corridor running from Kandahar City to Kabul. Casualties quickly mounted as IEDs with large net explosive weights detonated on convoys and route clearance vehicles, destroying even the largest of their kind. The insurgents achieved the propaganda victory they sought by obliterating American ‘tanks’, and security forces were scrambling to stop the bleeding and to maintain freedom of movement.

Initial C-IED plans sought to facilitate the relief in place between two Romanian

battalions conducting operations along the highway. Conceived as a means to deter enemy IED emplacement, the plan was simple – flood the engagement areas with security forces, occupy established checkpoints, and maintain near-constant surveillance to interdict any attempted insurgent activity on the most dangerous sections of the road.

A combined arms approach integrated route clearance platoons with organic manoeuvre units to patrol the highway.

IED activity decreased rapidly despite insurgent attempts to exploit the seams of units’ battle spaces and emplace IEDs in the least-patrolled and least-overseen areas.

The mission was considered a success. The Romanian battalions were able to conduct their transfer of authority, and overall insurgent IED activity on the previously lethal sections of the road remained mostly low or ineffective, even during the usual summer fighting surge in southern Afghanistan. The presence of security forces along the highway decreased in favour of operations in other areas, and the IED threat was believed to be mostly pacified.

Yet, the IEDs never really went away. A few months later, in the period leading up to the provincial elections in September, new engagement areas were steadily appearing just outside the previously established boundaries of the first operation. By November, the same sections of the road had re-emerged as counteriedreport.com

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COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

US Army soldiers train for IED detection in Baghdad.

(1LT Josh Risher, US Army)

the most dangerous routes in the area of operations as over 1,500 pounds of homemade explosives detonated in the course of only a few days. With the arrival of spring in 2011, IED activity resumed in the same areas it had taken place during the previous three years. Initial suppression operations had succeeded in temporarily relieving the pressure, but failed to address the true source of the IED problem – the pervading influence and support of a homegrown local insurgency.

SECURITY AND INFLUENCE

The first step for any counterinsurgent is to secure the population against the intimidation and influence of the insurgency. Doctrine (and conventional wisdom) argues that the surest way to accomplish this is by establishing a persistent partnership with local security forces, and by living among the population. Conducting weekly visits and key leader engagements with local elders and officials may provide insights into governance and development issues, but they achieve few lasting effects unless the people feel safe.

Because both sides of a modern asymmetric conflict must continuously vie for the support of the local population, the counterinsurgent can develop a baseline security assessment of an area by tracking reports of insurgent activity against civilians. In this case, distinguishing between active anticivilian and passive anti-civilian activity is critical. Active anti-civilian activity can include intimidation, forced taxation, and isolation through the emplacement of mine or IED obstacle belts that limit the population’s freedom of movement.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

Clearly, counterinsurgents cannot engage in such activity because it would lead to a complete loss of popular support and bring a swift end to their efforts.

Insurgents, on the other hand, may use these tactics to increase their control and influence in a given area. Popular support need not be given happily, but it must be at a level to ensure that the influence of government security forces and the people’s desire for economic and essential services aid never outweigh their fear of insurgent retribution or punishment. As an example, there have been cases in which the Taliban senior leadership replaced insurgent commanders because they were thought to have been too harsh on local civilians and therefore a threat to the insurgency’s popular support.1 The most successful insurgent commanders know to use intimidation only when necessary to maintain their control of the people.

Consequently, areas experiencing limited insurgent intimidation are more likely to be insurgent-dominated support zones than areas with higher numbers of reports, especially in places with a significant International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence.

In this regard, the term ‘freedom of influence’ is introduced in order to more precisely define the variable that the insurgents use to control the population.

Whereas freedom of movement describes the ability of a manoeuvre element to project combat power at a chosen time, space and purpose, freedom of influence reflects the capability of the insurgent or counterinsurgent to engage with, and directly affect, the local population’s attitudes, opinions and perceptions.

In the situation described earlier, although ISAF and ANSF security forces were able to maintain their freedom of movement by conducting disruption and interdiction operations along Highway 1, the insurgents held their freedom of influence on the population in the surrounding villages. This led to a continuously accessible support zone just outside the operational boundaries and focus of friendly security patrols.

The early positive effects they achieved did not translate into lasting security gains, leaving the next rotation of units open to the same dangers as before.

COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

MEASURING SUCCESS

In a field replete with numbers, statistics, metrics and assessments, defining a true measure of success for C-IED operations and strategy is difficult. The standard model tends to weigh heavily the number of IEDs found and cleared by security forces against the number that detonate. The underlying assumption is that an increased percentage of IEDs found and cleared means that insurgent forces are less effective with their IED emplacements, and that friendly forces have adapted to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Further analysis looks at the rate at which the percentage of cleared IEDs increases or decreases, which measures how quickly friendly forces are adapting to changes in insurgent tactics (or, conversely, how slowly the insurgents are changing their tactics to match the counterinsurgents’ countermeasures).

Another way of looking at the problem is to assess the effectiveness of IED detonations by determining how many IED strikes damage vehicles or cause casualties. However, most of these methods are better for identifying contested areas rather than assessing a district’s overall security, because IED activity will typically mirror any increased presence of security forces.

Additional methodologies of quantitative and qualitative data analysis attempt to track overall security trends at both a provincial and district level.

Unfortunately, most of these are defined in terms of counterinsurgent activity rather than that of the civilian population.

For example, a ‘route status matrix’ provides commanders with a graphical depiction of freedom of movement on primary and secondary roads based on recent IED activity (normally an aggregate set against ISAF and ANSF patrols) as well as deliberate clearance operations conducted by engineers and route clearance platoons. However, this matrix does not consider freedom of movement of local traffic, which could present a vastly different picture if an insurgent has decided not to limit the security forces’ freedom of movement, but rather to maintain his own freedom of influence by placing obstacle belts between the population and the roads.

The metric perhaps least reminiscent of classic and modern counterinsurgency

doctrine is tracking the number of highvalued individuals (HVIs) killed or captured in raids or direct attacks. Those classified as HVIs are normally senior insurgent military commanders or shadow government leaders with influence within the Taliban. They are rarely, if ever, lowlevel insurgents actually conducting the attacks. Such individuals are considered expendable and easily replaceable.

Yet over the last few years, insurgent networks have grown increasingly larger and more interconnected. Finding an irreplaceable leader or personality has proven nearly impossible. Little quantitative data exists to support the hypothesis that HVI targeting operations have any measurable long-term effect on levels of insurgent activity; their operations may slow down or even cease after they lose a key leader or explosives expert, but it is only a matter of time before the void is filled and operations resume. Treating the symptoms does not cure the disease.

However, one metric may effectively measure security gains in the Afghan counterinsurgency conflict and modern asymmetric conflict in general, particularly at the local or district level – IEDs turned in or reported by civilians. In these instances, a local national provides unsolicited information to ISAF or ANSF forces that leads to the discovery of an IED or its components. Care must be taken to distinguish an unsolicited tip from that of a paid informant or source. While an informant may provide potentially reliable information, there have been cases of sources intentionally emplacing weapons or explosive materials themselves and then leading security forces to the cache site simply to collect a monetary reward.

The importance of an IED turned in by a civilian comes from the direct interaction between that individual and representatives of the government, particularly if the device is turned in to the Afghan National Army, police or local governance centres. A local population willing to point out the locations of explosive materials could indicate security gains in that area, especially if the area already has a high level of insurgent IED activity. The more the people feel that the government can protect them and provide better stability than the insurgents, the greater the stake they have in their own security

… AREAS EXPERIENCING LIMITED INSURGENT INTIMIDATION ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE INSURGENTDOMINATED SUPPORT ZONES …

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COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

An Iraqi police officer bags evidence while participating in an IED exploitation search during a two-week training course run by Task Force Nassir at Combat Outpost Cashe North, Iraq.

(SGT Shawnon Lott, US Army)

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

against insurgent intimidation. Similar developments led to the beginning of the highly successful Sunni Awakening and the Sons of Iraq programme in late 2006, as well as the onset of the Afghan Local Police programme in 2010.

The most successful C-IED operations nest within counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. They do not focus on the devices themselves, but on the population. A company-sized element that moves into villages adjacent to a primary IED engagement area and remains there for an extended period, habitually interacting with the villagers and conducting key leader engagements, should begin to see security gains in the form of local national tips and turnins. In some cases, a lack of available manoeuvre units can limit combat power for such operations, forcing commanders to attempt to cover large areas and reducing the number of possible engagements with the people. However, in the end, a continuous presence somewhere is better than a fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin to believe that the security will be lasting and not just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence and turn against the insurgency.2 An area with a large ISAF presence, and consequently an increased amount of violent activity, but with no increase in IEDs turned in is cause for concern.

Villages with a higher number of turnins likely feel more connected to their government and security forces, and are more willing to take a direct stand against the insurgency. Conversely, low turn-in areas may fear intimidation and retaliation for assisting security forces and would rather hold their tongue and remain isolated than fight back. In this case, the insurgent influence in the area is probably strong enough that the people fear the repercussions of cooperating with the government more than they seek its protection. Special attention should be paid to IED events within a short distance of a village, since the villagers likely knew something about the device and its emplacement, but were too afraid to say anything. These events are far too common and must be countered by comprehensive counterinsurgency operations.

Each explosive detonation against ISAF or ANSF is a psychological victory

for the insurgency, demonstrating the weakness of the government and its inability to provide security and stability for its people. The government must convince the people, especially their influential community and religious leaders, that the insurgency poses the greater threat to their villages and people.

All too often, the sporadic presence of security forces in an area leads to a rapid spike of activity in response, conditioning the people to associate the government with increased violence.

To actively engage the population and garner support against the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must overcome this mindset.

Separating the people from the influence of their government is one of the primary objectives for an insurgency in order to maintain its influence over the population free from outside intervention. Afghanistan expert Seth Jones notes that ‘by threatening the population, the insurgents give individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain from cooperating with the indigenous government and external actors’.3 Successful counterinsurgency operations must aim to defeat this insurgent influence.

The first step in that process is security; a population can never have faith in its government if it is not trusted to provide even basic protection. A periodic presence will not suffice, since the insurgents can (and usually do) wait until a patrol has left the area to aggressively counter any positive relations and reclaim their control of the people. Only persistent security during the initial stages of operations can set the conditions to tip the balance of support in favour of the government and away from the insurgents.

SEPARATING THE INSURGENT, ATTACKING THE NETWORK

Successfully securing the population will lead to the separation of the insurgent, as the insurgency requires the support of the people to survive. One of the key advances in modern counterinsurgency has been the application of biometric and forensic intelligence to catch an elusive enemy capable of blending in with the population. Biometric enrolments have become part of campaign plans, and the addition of law enforcement personnel

COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

and trained explosive ordnance disposal technicians has provided units with increasingly more information about the construction and origins of IEDs through their detailed post-blast analysis.

Separately, biometrics and post-blast analysis each provide invaluable intelligence unavailable to previous generations of counterinsurgents, but their benefits become even more evident when combined.

Conducting independent biometric enrolments is an excellent way to build a database of citizens, but by itself does not separate the insurgent from the population except in certain rare cases.4 Similarly, comprehensive postblast analysis provides a wealth of information about IED construction and composition, often including fingerprints and other biometric data found at the scene of an event, but ends short of positive identification. Although latent fingerprints can be matched to others found in different events, they provide little information about the actual person emplacing or constructing the devices.

When biometrics and post-blast analysis merge, they have the capability to truly separate the insurgent. Fingerprints recovered from IED materials in one

area can be linked to a specific person enrolled somewhere else, painting a more detailed picture of the device’s origin and defining the insurgent network more clearly. Such success depends on training units treating each IED event not as an impediment to manoeuvre that they need to breach or clear, but as a legitimate crime scene with valuable forensic evidence available to catch the perpetrator and identify his supplier.

Education for indigenous and coalition security forces as well as the local population is paramount to understanding how both biometrics and post-blast analysis can be used to isolate the insurgents from innocents, identifying those who act against the interests of the people and the government. A robust biometrics and forensics programme should be at the forefront of any ‘attack the network’ strategy because it can link explosive events to their locations on the battlefield and potentially provide the identity of those responsible. Developing a picture of these low-level insurgent networks is the key to understanding the origins of the explosive devices and identifying the supply chains that support them.

Ultimately, the true goal of biometrics

A US marine uses a portable two-way radio to call in a IED during a training exercise at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan.

(CPL Michael Augusto, US Marine Corps)

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COUNTER-IED STRATEGY IN MODERN WAR

... A LOCAL POPULATION WILLING TO POINT OUT THE LOCATIONS OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS COULD INDICATE SECURITY GAINS IN THAT AREA …

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain David F Eisler, US Army, was the leader of the counter-IED cell for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Zabul, Afghanistan (OEF X-XI). He previously deployed with the regiment to Diyala, Iraq, in 2008. He holds a BA from Cornell University.

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Counter-IED report, Summer 2012

and forensics is to develop the rule of law through the host nation government and judicial system. Evidence collected from explosive materials or post-blast analysis can help to convict criminals in local courts. Warrants and arrests are the direct result of a concerted effort by ground units in partnership with indigenous security forces to conduct a thorough investigation of an event rather than clearing the scene and moving on to the next objective. The gratification may not be as instant as catching an insurgent in the act, but the long-term effects are considerably more beneficial.

Despite the potential advantages of quickly enrolling an entire population into a biometrics database, care must be taken to ensure that indigenous security forces take the lead in all biometrics operations to avoid the perception of continuous foreign intervention and the systematic cataloguing of local citizens.

More direct action on the part of ISAF forces runs the risk of aggravating the very population they mean to protect, while host nation forces can build relationships with the local civilians while conducting a legitimate census. This has the added benefit of engaging many communities that traditionally do not see a regular ANSF presence. Although biometrics collection is an important element of C-IED strategy, it should not come at the expense of alienating the people.

Attacking the network through a concerted evidence and biometrics collection effort is an integral aspect of C-IED strategy, yet it must complement rather than substitute for counterinsurgency operations.

Understanding the difference between actively targeting insurgent nodes and indirectly eroding their support and influence through the population is important. While analysing insurgent TTP and attack methods will certainly provide valuable information to ground units conducting operations, it does not eliminate the source of the threat. A constantly evolving game of spy-versusspy only circumvents the issue, showing no signs of ending as both insurgent and counterinsurgent vie for the tactical upper hand.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Military strategy in Afghanistan has scarcely changed since the early days of

hunting the Taliban in 2001. Even today, we place more emphasis and attention on targeting operations designed to crumble insurgent networks than on populationcentric counterinsurgency. IEDs are considered a lamentable byproduct of the insurgents’ general unwillingness to engage in direct action. Technological advances continue to flow into theatre to guard against increasingly sophisticated and dangerous threats that, despite the new technology, continue to injure and kill soldiers and civilians.

Both of these methods – targeting and technology – are essentially defensive and reactive in nature. Even operations against Taliban leaders and facilitators seek to reduce insurgent capability to conduct attacks, their success measured in complicated slides, graphs and charts arranged in whatever way best represents progress. IEDs are simply the weapon of choice to support the insurgents’ political cause, facilitating consolidation of power and influence from within the population.

Although C-IED strategy is a microcosm of counterinsurgency, our intelligence and operations groups sometimes treat it as a separate function, preferring to develop new methods to defeat the device (or its intended effects) rather than understand it. The tools needed to effectively neutralise IEDs as a battlefield threat will not be found in technological systems or equipment, nor in killing insurgent leaders, but rather in building relationships with the people who have become the battleground for all modern military conflicts. Their silence speaks as loudly as the next explosion. ■

NOTES 1.

Anand Gopal, ‘The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar’, New America Foundation, November 2010, p 27.

2. See, for example, the Canadian’s experience in Kandahar in 2009: Carl Forsberg, ‘The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar’, The Institute for the Study of War, December 2009, p 52.

3.

Seth

G

Jones,

Afghanistan:

Counterinsurgency

RAND

in

Counterinsurgency

Study – Volume 4, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA), 2008, pp 49–50.

4.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory

and

Practice,

Praeger

Security

International (Santa Barbara, CA), 1964, p 82. (CPL Michael Augusto, US Marine Corps).

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