Counter-IED Report Autumn 2020 - preview edition

ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

Counter-IED Report Autumn 2020

MANCHESTER ARENA BOMBING: MAIN LESSONS THAT HAVE BEEN LEARNT INDICATORS AND WARNINGS REGARDING THREAT NETWORKS NEW CHALLENGES, NEW ROBOT. INTRODUCING AUNAV.NEO DEVELOPMENT OF A HUMANOID ROBOT FOR BOMB DISPOSAL OPERATIONS CABLE CUTTERâ„¢ 3 (CC3) SYSTEM FOR C-IED OPERATIONS INDIVIDUAL ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (IECM) IMPROVISED CHEMICAL DEVICES - THE CHALLENGES UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE DISPOSAL: CHALLENGES IN THE CONFLICT ZONE SUICIDE USE OF EXPLOSIVES IN WATER ENVIRONMENT 10 YEARS ON STAGE OF THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Behind every successful mission there’s a TALONŽ Since 2000, TALON robots have completed more than 80,000 counter-IED missions. Now on its fifth generation, TALON 5 is the first Interoperability Profile (IOP) fielded robotic system that has successfully gone through Army Test and Evaluation Command testing. www.QinetiQ.com Robots@us.QinetiQ.com

REPORT CONTRIBUTORS

Counter-IED Report Published by Delta Business Media Limited 3rd floor, 207 Regent Street London, W1B 3HH United Kingdom

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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS

IFC QINETIQ INC. 4 - 5 GARRETT METAL DETECTORS 7

ICOR TECHNOLOGY

9

AUNAV BY EVERIS ADS

11

L3HARRIS

12

NOVO DIGITAL RADIOGRAPHY

13 FOREWORD

By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report 16

VIDISCO LTD

16

DYNITEC GMBH

17

23

MANCHESTER ARENA BOMBING: MAIN LESSONS THAT HAVE BEEN LEARNT

By Dr David Lowe, Senior Research Fellow, Leeds Beckett University Law School

6

INDICATORS AND WARNINGS REGARDING THREAT NETWORKS… SO WHAT THE WHAT?

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

COUNTER-IED REPORT, Autumn 2020

SMART, STRONG, AFFORDABLE

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS

30 8th ANNUAL EOD/IED & COUNTERMINE SYMPOSIUM 31

38

NEW CHALLENGES, NEW ROBOT. INTRODUCING AUNAV.NEO

By Rafael Jiménez Sánchez, Senior EOD Advisor at aunav, by everis ADS

52

CABLE CUTTER™ 3 (CC3) SYSTEM FOR C-IED OPERATIONS AND LOW-PROFILE MISSIONS

By DynITEC GmbH

54

DSEI JAPAN 2021

55

INDIVIDUAL ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (IECM)

By Edward McCaul, Product Line Manager for Electronic Counter Measures at Thales UK

63

IMPROVISED CHEMICAL DEVICES THE CHALLENGES

By Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran

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DEVELOPMENT OF A HUMANOID ROBOT FOR BOMB DISPOSAL OPERATIONS

By Dr. Edwin A. Bundy, Senior Program Manager for the U.S. Department of Defense at the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO)

COUNTER-IED REPORT, Autumn 2020

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS

70

DEMINING AND EOD SEMINAR

71

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE DISPOSAL: CHALLENGES IN THE CONFLICT ZONE

By Ashwani Gupta

75

WE WILL SHARE GRAVE AT THE SEA: SUICIDE USE OF EXPLOSIVES IN WATER ENVIRONMENT

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

82 CBRNe SUMMIT USA & CBRNe SUMMIT EUROPE 83

10 YEARS ON STAGE OF THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

By Lieutenant Colonel Alexander HUGYAR, Head of Education and Training Department, NATO EOD Centre of Excellence

91

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD

By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report

T

he Improvised Explosive Device (IED) remains to this day the favoured weapon in the arsenals of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals around the globe. It was of particular concern to the West during the past two decades in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria during combat operations, but also to the security forces in India, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and other parts of the world where it continues to kill and maim on a devastating scale. Its attraction rests on its versatility - a combination of being inexpensive and uncomplicated to construct using commercial explosives, existing military ordnance or home-made explosives that can be made using commercially available ingredients. The device may, inter alia, be victim operated, delivered by a suicide bomber, command detonated or triggered by a timer.

The advent of UAVs also allows it to be delivered by air.

On 7 July 2005 in London four Islamist terrorist suicide bombers detonated three IEDs based on homemade explosives, in this case TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide, on London Underground trains and a fourth aboard a bus in Tavistock Square. The bombs killed 52 people plus the four bombers and injured more than 700. This was the first Islamist suicide attack in the UK and the biggest terrorist death toll since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 near Lockerbie.

Nearly 12 years later, at 2233 hrs on Monday 22 May 2017, a Libyan Islamist suicide bomber, Salman Abedi, detonated an IED based on TATP explosives encased with shrapnel – nuts, bolts, and screws to maximise death and injuries. Abedi transported the bomb in a rucksack to the City Room area just outside the Manchester Arena and its detonation was timed in order to attack maximum numbers of men, women

and children who were concert goers, waiting family members and merchandise sellers involved with the concert of singer Ariana Grande. The explosion killed 22 people including many children plus Abedi. More than 100 people were physically injured and many more suffered psychological and emotional trauma. It was clear that Salman Abedi had not been operating alone in the preparation of this attack and in August this year his brother Hashem Abedi having been extradited from Libya was sentenced at the Old Bailey to a custodial sentence of at least 55 years before consideration for parole.

In his article Dr David Lowe, a senior research fellow at Leeds Beckett University Law School examines the Arena bombing and considers resultant reports by Lord Kerslake and David Anderson QC. Lord Kerslake examines the response of the emergency services – ambulance, police, and fire – to the disaster and the question of emergency communications. David Anderson considers what was known about the Abedi brothers before the bombing and assessments and associated decisions made by the police and security services on them. Dr Lowe examines the emergency services’ response to the Manchester Arena bombing by considering the points raised in the Kerslake Report focusing on the actions of the police, ambulance and fire services following the attack and emergency communications. The article assesses what lessons were learnt. It also examines the conduct of the investigation by the Greater Manchester Police, assisted by the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Units and, regarding intelligence on Salman Abedi, the findings in the 2017 Anderson Report. Two key areas of concern counteriedreport.com

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FOREWORD

were identified in the Kerslake Report. Firstly, and most critically the question of coordination and standard operating procedures and secondly communications between the emergency services. On 9 September, a Public Inquiry commissioned by the Home Secretary began to investigate the circumstances surrounding how the 22 people who were killed in the blast died.

Other issues will be investigated that include, inter alia: • Details of the Arena and in place security arrangements • The “planning and preparation” for the attack carried out by the Abedi brothers • The response of the emergency services • The IED explosion and its effects • The background and radicalisation of the Abedi brothers • Whether or not the attack could have been prevented.

Moving on from Dr Lowe’s article, in his report Lord Kerslake points out that the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) did not reach the scene of the bombing for two hours after the explosion. This compares with an average response time of less than six minutes. A confused situation was exacerbated by the complete failure of the National Mutual Aid Telephony system provided by Vodafone. Indeed, a restricted service was not up and running until four and a half hours after the explosion. Lord Kerslake opines that there was not a single reason, nor one individual that caused the failure of the GMFRS to respond adequately to the attack, but rather a combination of poor communications and poor procedures. He advises that the GMFRS will need to reflect on the wider issues it raises for their operational culture and approach to multi-agency working.

The fact that the fundamental requirements for effective multi-agency coordination, standard operating procedures and reliable communications, were not adequately in place at the time of the bombing is a matter for grave concern. The United Kingdom has had to deal with armed terrorists and IEDs since the early 1970s on a multi-agency basis. As long ago as January 2016, Mike Penning, a Home Office minister, called for 14 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Autumn 2020

the emergency services in England to handle 999 calls from a shared control room to improve 999 emergency calls response times. Mr Penning said: “It simply doesn’t make sense for emergency services to have different premises, different back offices and different IT systems when their work is so closely related, and they often share the same boundaries.” There is little doubt that had such a response regime been in place in Manchester in 2017, events after the explosion would have unfolded very differently.

In his article retired Spanish Colonel Rafael Jiménez Sanchez, EOD advisor for aunav robots of everis ADS describes recent developments in the field of robots with specific application to Counter-IED operations. Aunav robots were originally designed to disarm VBIEDs constructed by Spanish terrorists. He describes the development over the past five years of the aunav.NEO and the aunav.NEO HD robots. These are medium weight EOD/Counter-IED/CBRN robots designed to meet the demanding requirements of first responders and military operations. They have a unique and cuttingedge variable geometry traction system that enables the remotely controlled robot to increase or reduce its width to operate in confined spaces such as aircraft or trains. They also incorporate self-control technology that maintains robot stability whilst operating in any terrain.

The robots incorporate the following high specification features: variable geometry traction, a lifting capacity and weight monitoring sensor, bespoke tools, automatic platform stability, plug and play accessories, easy transportation/man portable, versatile operator control unit and a broad range of accessories.

Dr Edwin A Bundy is a Senior Program Manager for the US DoD Combating Terrorism Technical Office (CTTSO) and describes a very fruitful collaborative development programme between CTTSO and the Robotic Systems Technology Branch at NASA. The aim of this programme is to develop a humanoid robot capable of performing bomb disposal and IED defeat tasks normally undertaken by bomb disposal technicians who rely heavily on existing robots to perform these tasks. Whilst such robots have proved to be invaluable in protecting these technicians, Dr Bundy opines that technology in this field has advanced

FOREWORD

significantly and that current C-IED robots lack true autonomy - the capability to perform contextual decision-making or operate by themselves. Modern state of the art robots used in industry or medicine for example are now able to assist,or in some cases, replace the operator. The CTTSO/NASA robotics partnership began in late 2017 and building on the success of an original NASA humanoid robot called Valkyrie, the partnership in conjunction with the bomb disposal community has been seeking to develop a humanoid robot for bomb disposal operations. In FY 20/21 it is planned to design and develop the next generation human robot platform specifically targeting EOD task requirements. Hopefully, the deployment of a human robot for bomb disposal will be possible in the next five years assuming the requisite funding.

Edward McCaul of Electronic Counter Measures at Thales UK describes how Individual Electronic Counter Measures (IECM) are transforming the ability of the military and security services to greatly enhance their level of personal protection against the ubiquitous Radio Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) by providing individuals their own personal ECM – IECM. Advances in signal processing and battery technology have allowed man portable ECM equipment to continually reduce in size. IECM are not limited to the specialist user with applications ranging from VIP close protection and peace keeping through to police use and bomb disposal.

The primary purpose of an ECM system is to defeat the signal from the RCIED trigger mechanism and to prevent it from being processed by the threat receiver.

It should be remembered that the main purpose of deploying ECM systems is to enable the user to conduct an operational task that is not necessarily related to defeating the RCIED. The author demonstrates how the provision of IECM to each member of a military foot patrol in a potentially hostile environment affords a greater degree of ECM protection than that provided by one member of the patrol equipped with traditional manpack ECM equipment. Continually evolving threats from RCIEDs require dynamic technical solutions and the IECM are a critical component in these solutions.

Ashwani Gupta, a former senior fellow of a New Delhi based Defence Think Tank provides an insight into

the challenges posed by the disposal of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in India today. He points out that the presence of UXO is inevitable in areas of military firing and weapon development ranges. In addition to hazard to life, such ordnance maybe used by terrorist groups to manufacture IEDs. He describes three examples of UXO clearance in which EOD disposal teams used initiative and technical expertise to complete the tasks. The first involved the modification of a Remotely Operated Vehicle to extract a buried 120 mm mortar round from the ground near buildings and a road. The second example explains the difficulties of UXO clearance in a desert with extremely high ambient temperatures and undulating ground whilst wearing bomb disposal suits.

The answers here were specially modified battery packs to power the suits’ cooling systems and long handle shovels to clear surface UXO. Finally, he describes a situation that involved the modification of a TCV to transport an 81 mm mortar round to a safe disposal area. Such examples clearly illustrate the everyday hazards and challenges faced by UXO disposal teams in India and the way in which they overcome them. ■

Rob Hyde-Bales biography During his career in the UK Royal Engineers, Rob Hyde-Bales was responsible for landmine clearance in Libya and, more latterly, Afghanistan in the running of the first United Nations humanitarian landmine clearance training programme – Operation Salam. The programme trained Afghan male refugees in landmine clearance techniques, and Afghan women and children in mine awareness and avoidance training. More recently he set up the Caribbean Search Centre in Kingston, Jamaica. The Centre is designed to train security forces across the Caribbean in modern search techniques. After retiring from the army he joined Cranfield University at Shrivenham, near Oxford, and undertook a research project on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence that examined ways to improve the sharing of IED threat information between the military and civilian organisations in hazardous areas. counteriedreport.com

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