CPR Summer 2017 (XVII, 2)

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW

After the Sewol ferry tragedy, could impeachment help heal?

—Spotlight on Korea, p. 21 Volume XVII, No. 2

Also inside: Exclusive interview with Manal al-Sharif, activist for women’s right to drive in Saudi Arabia, p. 28.

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Masthead & Editor’s Note

Editor-in-Chief Publisher Design Editor Marketing Director Art Editors Lead Web Editor Managing Editors

Copy Chief

Matthew Zipf Anamaria Lopez Theresa Yang Huhe Yan Michelle Huang Charly Voelkel Poorvi Bellur Amanda Kam Dimitrius Keeler Shambhavi Tiwari Karen Yuan Maggie Toner

Senior Editors

Vivian Casillas Audrey DeGuerrera Brian Gao Belle Harris Melissa Ho Jahan Nanji Sheena Qiao Bani Sapra Nina Zweig

Copy Editors

Sahana Narayanan Song Rhee

Where do we find ourselves? It is Emerson who asks and Emerson who answers: In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight. . . . All things swim and glitter.

“Experience” is not an essay about politics, but it reflects well our political age. We find it hard, as Emerson notes, to hold the present in focus, and harder still to tell whence we came. This is, of course, the work before us: Though all things shift and swim and glitter, the journalist is he who still attempts to freeze them for study.

In this magazine, you will find seven such attempts, covering regions from South Korea to Saudi Arabia. Our writers examine the stairs below us, and speculate about the stairs above—all with the belief that through writing we might learn where we are. *** Placing politics aside for a moment, I’d like to announce that Anamaria Lopez will take over as editor in chief in the fall. As the current publisher and EIC, respectively, Ana and I have led the editorial board over the past year, and I am proud of our board’s collective work to grow the magazine. Since January, we have expanded our print run, launched new events, built an online presence, organized a staff of web columnists, and made CPR known on campus. As the academic year closes, I would like not only to reflect on that growth but also to thank all those involved, including 2016’s editor in chief Asha Banerjee and publisher Sophie Wilkowske.

Enjoy the magazine, and until next year.

—Matthew Zipf, Editor in Chief

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to their authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Columbia Political Review, of CIRCA, or of Columbia University.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW 4: Demonetization in India Modi makes money political, in the most literal sense.

by Akshiti Vats 8: Self-deportation in the Trump Era How has emigration changed since the new president took office?

by Benjamin Sachs 12: Referendum paradox How Puerto Rico’s June referendum perpetuates colonialism.

by Giovanni E. Pagán

Published by CIRCA

Summer 2017 Volume XVII, No. 2

16: THAAD missile crisis How a new defense system in South Korea has riled China.

by Mi Yeon Kim 21: Impeachment as healing South Korea’s national psyche after the Sewol ferry tragedy.

by Hannah Cho 24: Foreign fighters A group of foreign fighters works alongside NATO in Syria.

by Matthew Petti 28: Interview with Manal al-Sharif The politics of driving in Saudi Arabia.

by Céline Bacha

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NARENDRA MODI’S BET: DEMONETIZE INDIA Akshiti Vats On November 8, 2016, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, made a very unexpected and impactful announcement: there would be a demonetization of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes that was effective immediately. Indian citizens had until December 31 of that year to exchange their old notes for new ones. This decision came as the result of a collaboration between the Reserve Bank Of India (RBI) and the Indian government, but there were

whispers that the demonetization occurred without the approval of the RBI. The immediate aftermath was disastrous in many ways, with very long queues forming at local banks as people desperately tried to exchange their money so that life could return to some semblance of order and calm.

There are many who are convinced that the demonetization was an orchestrated move to win political popularity for the current incumbent, as it was announced just months before the state elections in Uttar Pradesh. If the move was in

fact politically motivated, it was a success. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), one of India’s two major central political parties and the one to which the current prime minister belongs, achieved a sweeping victory in the state elections. This was a significant win not just in terms of the numbers, but in its long term implications—the BJP has not been in power in Uttar Pradesh, the most populated state in India, for many years.

India is a country that has seen more than its fair share of corruption. The previous political party in

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 05 power finished its reign embroiled in multiple, well-documented scams: inferior construction and objectionable arrangements during the 2010 Commonwealth Games, siphoning of government funds on various occasions, and misallocation of mining and telecom spectrum rights are just a few of their most-publicized misdeeds. In fact, most bureaucratic processes were expedited by bribes to lazy officials. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, rode to power on a strong anti-corruption campaign, promising a clean and efficient government. In the three years that have passed since his powerful victory, the Indian public has been hoping for a validation of the campaign’s message of anti-corruption.

In the light of the anti-corruption messages that the Modi government regularly puts forward, the most profound effect of the demonetization has perhaps been the way in which it has won the support the common man, referred to as the aam aadmi in Hindi. The notion has arisen among the public that there is finally someone powerful on their side, taking definitive action by waging war against corruption. In several random interviews conducted with people from lower socio-economic backgrounds in Northern India, a recurring theme has emerged: the burgeoning hope that a significant reduction in cor-

ruption will occur in the near future.

For the first time in the 70 years since India’s independence, we have seen a large-scale, profoundly impactful political decision undertaken with the aim of fighting corruption.

While public opinion towards the move to eradicate corruption is generally favorable, many experts and officials feel otherwise, and their viewpoint is warranted. Official reports say that only 10 percent of Indian black money is stored in the form of cash—most is in the form of land or gold or stashed in bank accounts on foreign shores. Though about 85 percent of the old notes in circulation have been recovered, the impact that cash recovery has had on corruption is yet to be seen. There are some who say that,

while the recovery of actual black money may have been low, demonetization has brought many structural changes that promise to cut down on corruption significantly. All of the individuals who came to banks hoping to convert large amounts of notes have landed under the scrutiny

of the Income Tax Department. Due to the introduction of new notes, all large cash transactions in the future will have to either be cut down or simply not undertaken.

The biggest complaint critics of demonetization have brought forward is the severe inconvenience born by the common man, an inconvenience exacerbated by the fact that India is a country that operates largely on cash; approximately 90 percent of the Indian economy is cash relia n t and all small businesses operate on cash. India, in fact, has the highest levels of cash circulation in the world—12 percent of its GDP works on cash. Around 80 percent of the labor force operates in the informal sector of the economy, which comprises 40 percent of the GDP. Such employees are all paid in cash—cash that has now become void.

Servants working in households, laborers of all sorts in cities, smaller towns, and villages, farmhands—they all faced severe disruptions when they suddenly stopped receiving salaries, compensated with empty promises of money that was sure to come soon. The demonetization announcement brought the economy to a grinding halt. Everyday transactions were significantly reduced, as people panicked and rushed to ART BY MICHELLE HUANG

06 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW their nearest bank to collect the new notes in the sanctioned amounts.

And there were queues. There can be no denying the hours and hours for which people were forced to wait under the burning sun. Richer people managed to secure short-cuts, in the form of paying others, who desperately needed the money themselves, a minuscule amount of new cash in order to stand in the line and collect their money.

The short-term economic repercussions of the move have been resoundingly negative. Demonetization took a heavy toll on the stock markets, and there was a large dip in the occurrences of the economy. Fast moving consumer good (FMCG) companies like Unilever, which hold a very sizable market share in most household products, reported their biggest losses in decades in the quarter following demonetization. Films flopped at the box office, and, for once, it was not terrible filmmaking that caused such losses. But Christine Lagarde, the chief of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has recently stated that the economy’s performance in the months following November 8, 2016, can be traced in the shape of a V on a graph—there has been a steady rise after the dreadful fall.

The chairman of the State Bank of India, Arundhati Bhattacharya, has confirmed that this rise aligns with the workings of her bank, today the largest bank in India.

However, there are many longterm benefits that have come from this shocking situation. Since the announcement, there has been a rise in electronic payments and debit card usage and an obvious decline in

the dependence on cash. Lower-income households have opened bank accounts for themselves in order to store their money. The government has implemented various schemes to ensure this smooth transition. A key component to all of these schemes is the Aadhaar card, an identification

out of their comfort zones and, in the long run, will be advantageous in several ways. On the other hand, however, this very high cost of cash means that we cannot understate the severity of the trouble people must have had getting their hands on new money.

We will only begin to understand the true repercussions of this move in the decades to come. Several different kinds of economic analyses of demonetization have been put forward, some positive, some negative. Many are convinced that the move will ultimately be beneficial because it will prevent further black market transactions and pathways. There is also no way to understand the cause for the demonetization—it could have been a popularity play or a decision driven by the genuine desire to eradicate corruption. There are also many looming questions about the implementation of demonetization. There is no denying, however, that the move was a very powerful political statement. This is Narendra Modi’s way of telling Indians, and the world, that change is coming, and it is coming fast. The only question to answer now is whether India will be able to pay the price of such haste.

We will only begin to understand the true repercussions of this move in the decades to come. pin in the form of a 12-digit long, unique number, assigned on the basis of biometric data and demographic information. While the figures vary, news report claim that at least 90 percent of Indians now have Aadhaar cards. By way of these cards, the government has set up various new programs such as the Aadhaar Payment app, which allows people to pay one another using simply the payer and payee’s Aadhaar numbers. The government does not charge a transaction fee; the app offers a very simple and functional new way for transactions to take place. The setup of bank accounts under the prominent government, and their linkage to the Aadhaar card, allows the government to make direct transfers into people’s bank accounts and eliminates many costly middlemen. In short, demonetization has been a good way to help a cash-dependent society become more digitized.

The cost of cash is extremely high for Indians, even when compared to lesser developed countries like Kenya and Nigeria. ATM access in India is very limited, as most villages do not have ATMs. This drastic change, therefore, has forced people

Akshiti Vats is a freshman at Columbia College from Mumbai, India, potentially majoring in Economics or Psychology. She is a member of CU Dhoom, a Bollywood dance team, and loves giving tours with the URC. She is also deeply passionate about chocolate and Jane the Virgin. She can be reached via email at av2732@columbia.edu.

LUMBIA O C E H T N I JO EVIEW POLITICAL R LINE VISIT US ON RG CPREVIEW.O TISTS, SEEKING AR NERS G I S E D D N A WRITERS,

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SELF-DEPORTATION IN THE TRUMP ERA Benjamin Sachs It’s January 23, 2012. Four men stand on a stage in Tampa, Florida, debating the future of the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants currently residing within the United States. One of them, a wellgroomed businessman sweating a bit under the lights, utters a word that will profoundly alter the American dialogue on immigration: self-deportation. He characterizes the concept as an ostensibly more humane alternative to the old-fashioned method of rounding up illegal aliens and shipping them back from whence they came. Make it next to impossible for them to work in this country, he explains, and illegal immigrants will leave the country of their own volition in order to seek work elsewhere. The idea is met by scattered laughter and even a few groans from the Floridian audience. Hearing it for the first time, they consider it farfetched, especially juxtaposed against the hard-line immigration stance that often prevails over leniency in the Republican party.

The businessman, Mitt Romney, would go on to win the party nomination but lose in the general election, never getting to see his concept play out in the political world. However, the next Republican presidential nominee, also a businessman— albeit less well-groomed—went on

to win the presidency. He supports the idea as well.

Self-deportation relies on the premise that the federal government can materially worsen illegal immigrants’ quality of life in the United States. Briefly setting aside the ethical and moral ramifications of such a policy, let’s first examine the question logistically. The obvious first step in making life more difficult for illegal immigrants is barring their ability to work. Though it is already against the law to knowingly hire undocumented workers, longstanding lax enforcement has created an almost de facto acceptance of the practice. Part of this hands-off stance may be due to simple economics; it’s bad business to lay off millions of workers overnight.

Richard Hanus, a practicing immigration lawyer since 1990, explained that—for all the United States’ tough talk on enforcement— the country’s current immigration policy is a far cry from zero tolerance.

“If the United States were really serious about deporting every illegal immigrant,” he says, “it would invest billions to expand by a factor of thirty, the immigration court system along with the immigration agent and prosecutor workforce, and it would pass much harsher regulations cracking down on employers who hire illegal immigrants.”

What would happen, however, if this attitude were to change?

In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. While it gave amnesty to illegal aliens who had been living in the United States for an extended period of time, the law also attempted to disincentivize illegal immigration by preventing undocumented workers from finding employment—similar to the principle underlying self-deportation. As a result of the act, employees were required to show verification of legal status by filling out an I-9 form with the federal government. However, even the I-9 is far from an airtight, zero-tolerance policy. Documentation can be faked, and employers aren’t particularly inclined to turn away viable workers. The result is the United States’ complicated, seemingly contradictory attitude towards illegal immigration. Tough rhetoric and ICE raids convey the problem as pest control: a seemingly impossible task of forcefully removing 11 million individuals. However, when it comes to employment, our enforcement system is little more than a mutually beneficial agreement to look the other way.

Trump has proposed eliminating undocumented labor once and for all by mandating the national use of e-Verify, a program operated by the Department of Homeland Security that compares employees’ I-9 forms against federal records. This action could make it considerably

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 09 more difficult for illegal immigrants to find employment. On the other hand, the technological arms race is still playing out. E-Verify could very well be the next I-9: a bureaucratic non-entity in enforcing the law. Hanus argues that, even if this system is implemented, undocumented immigrants would find ways to adapt.

“Sole proprietors, those who start their own business, would largely be unaffected. Some jobs pay cash, off the books.

Because, in the end,” Hanus tells me, “illegal immigrants are unlikely to self-deport.” As a rule, they come to this country to lay down roots, to create a better future for their children.

However, even this may soon be in jeopardy.

In August 2015, the Trump campaign released a six-page position paper listing a spate of policies that would effectively end illegal immigration. The proposals focused mostly on enforcement, including significantly increasing the number of ICE officers, defunding sanctuary cities, deporting all criminal aliens, and, most strikingly, ending birthright citizenship (also known as jus soli, Latin for “right of the soil”). This means that children born on U.S. soil to illegal aliens will no longer be guaranteed citizenship. Whether the Trump administration will actually pursue this, or if it was merely empty campaign rhetoric for his anti-immigration base, remains to be seen. Furthermore, such a policy directly contradicts the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-

risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States…” Ending birthright citizenship would thus most likely require a new constitutional amendment, which requires the approval of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and the ratification of said amendment by three-quarters of the states.

Indeed, the sheer amount of support

their children, undocumented aliens would likely still make their way to the United States for the same reason they do now: the prospect of a better life, especially for future generations. Creating more obstacles to citizenship would only further hamper immigrant families’ assimilation into the United States.

A few conservative politicians have come under fire in recent years for using the term “anchor babies” to refer to the children of illegal immigrants born in the United States.

This attitude towards first-generation immigrants that such rhetoric suggests reflects a growing nativist attitude, especially among Trump’s populist base. Enacting policy rooted in such anti-immigrant ideology/nativist sentiment would send a strong message, especially within a country that often prides itself as a land of opportunity.

In addition, Trump has expressed ambivalence about Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the Obama administration policy that granted temporary, renewable amnesty to undocumented aliens who entered the country as minors. Trump vowed to terminate the program during his campaign, though it remains to be seen whether he will fulfill this promise. Ending DACA, like ending birthright citizenship, likely won’t provide impetus for illegal immigrants to self-deport, especially as the policy applies only to longstanding, law-abiding residents who grew up in the United States. In the campaign for self-deportation—or, at the very least, in its ability to ensure worsening con-

Creating more obstacles to citizenship would only further hamper immigrant families’ assimilation into the U.S. needed makes such an action unlikely to happen anytime soon. But, while there is some legal ambiguity, those who argue for eliminating or restricting jus soli without modifying the Constitution arguably read the Fourteenth Amendment quite narrowly. If such bill were passed by the Republican-controlled Congress and signed into law by Trump, it would certainly face an uphill battle in the courts.

It is worth noting that unfettered jus soli is not a universal practice. In fact, most countries, including all of Europe, impose at least some additional citizenship requirements for children of non-citizens.

Some might argue that automatic birthright citizenship is a motivating factor for undocumented aliens seeking a better life for their progeny to emigrate. However, there is no clear evidence that suggests revoking jus soli would deter illegal immigration. Citizenship, after all, is but one component of the coveted American Dream. Even without the allure of guaranteed citizenship for

10 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW ditions for present and future undocumented immigrants—the federal government wields incredible power.

For good reason, too. Immigration is, by and large, a national issue— one that ought to be debated and discussed by all Americans, not just those in places where illegal immigrants are concentrated. However, in practice, local and state governments play a large role in enacting federal policies and interacting with undocumented aliens.

Many locales have vowed to defy federal immigration enforcement, declaring themselves “sanctuary cities.” In response, the Trump administration has flexed its power over the purse, repeatedly threatening to withhold federal funds from these cities. Mississippi recently be-

came the first state to expressly forbid enforcement to assist with enforcesanctuary cities within its borders, ment. Only a few dozen police with a few other states contemplat- departments have yet taken the DHS ing legislation

to that effect. During his first week in office, Trump issued an executive order intended to strengthen local and national cooperation vis-àvis immigration enforcement. Under section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security can deputize volunteering state and local law

up on the offer, though that number could significantly increase during Trump’s presidency.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 11 The tension between federal authority

a n d state and local autonomy may have a tremendous effect on the political reality of self-deportation. Despite the federal government’s outsized power in dictating immigration policy, the actual enactment of said policy will depend, in part, on the shifting power dynamic within local governments. Self-deportation, ultimately, is a policy that depends less on the letter of the law than on the de facto environment it creates for undocumented immigrants. Sanctuary cities ART BY MICHELLE HUANG

and resistant state governments— whether by preventing ICE raids or, as in Chicago, facilitating access to education—can create a better environment for

undocumented immigrants and their families. That power alone, though in contention, could be enough to oppose self-deportation.

The Trump administration may never actively and openly pursue self-deportation. It may instead devote all its resources to force: increasing funding for ICE, expanding 287(g), and building a wall along the Mexican border. It may, though unlikely, look to the left for a compromise, offering amnesty and a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who have resided in this country for an extended period of time. It may stall on the issue altogether, unable to unite the fractured Republican lawmakers in Congress. If the executive branch does pursue self-deportation, however, it seems unlikely to succeed as intended. Even if local and constitutional resistance is minimal, the mere idea of 11 million undocumented immigrants electing to leave the country seems far-fetched.

The policy would only double down on the country’s current immigration double-bind, in which undocumented immigrants are officially condemned while tacitly permitted to participate in the workforce. Self-deportation would only cement undocumented immigrants’ second-class status while ignoring any possible

beneficial solution.

If lawmakers can recognize the futility of attempting to remove, by force or not, the undocumented immigrant population within the United States, perhaps the reform dialogue can focus on how best to incorporate these immigrants into our economy and society. The young undocumented immigrants who gained temporary relief from deportation under DACA earned significantly higher wages, paid more taxes in turn, and purchased their first cars and homes. More importantly, DACA allowed over 750,000 immigrants the safety of knowing that, for at least two more years, the country in which they grew up would remain their home.

Ultimately, it could be argued that self-deportation is less about finding a pragmatic, efficient method for reducing the number of illegal immigrants than about causing ostracism and punishment. The enforcement policies of self-deportation accomplish little more than the preservation of a fragile yet oppressive status quo by keeping millions in lower-quality, lower-paying jobs, and turning local police departments into disturbingly dystopian deportation task forces—all while convincing 11 million Americans that they fundamentally do not belong.

Benjy Sachs is a freshman at Columbia College studying English and computer science. He is involved in Young Storytellers, a mentorship program that encourages students to engage and embrace their creativity. His favorite thing about New York City is halal food. He can be reached via email at bds2133@columbia.edu.

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PUERTO RICO PARADOX: COLONIALISM & VOTING Giovanni E. Pagán During the last two weeks of the 2016 gubernatorial race in Puerto Rico, then-candidate Ricardo Roselló of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (NPP) pulled out all the stops.

With his lead in the polls narrowing, he rallied his base by focusing his message on the promise of statehood for Puerto Rico. All of a sudden, the economic problems and the impending austerity measures vanished, there was no need for solid economic proposals to solve the crisis, and the 118 years of US disdain towards the island were forgotten. Campaign signs promising $10 billion worth of federal aid flooded the streets and Roselló swore to be the last governor of the Estado Libre Asociado (Commonwealth) of Puerto Rico.

The political history of Puerto Rico has had no shortage of farfetched promises. Although promising statehood may have won Roselló the election, he will have a tougher time trying to convince the federal government.

No Commonwealth, No Vote Shortly after the 2016 election, Roselló vowed to use $2.5 million, allocated in the 2014 Federal Appropriations Act, to arrange another consultation on the political status of the island. On February 3,

2017, the governor signed Law 7 of 2017, better known as “Law for the Immediate Decolonization of Puerto Rico,” which was approved by a party line vote. The Puerto Rican Electoral Commission was then entrusted with the responsibility of organizing a status referendum to take place on June 11 of this year. Unlike the first four status referenda in 1967, 1993, 1998, and 2012, which included the option to retain the current Commonwealth status, the proposed referendum would present a choice between only statehood or sovereignty.

The decision to omit the Commonwealth option from the June 11 vote stirred controversy from the very beginning, as the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), the main opposition party, branded it as anti-democratic.

Despite the necessity of inclusive legislation for solving the status issue, the NPP did not devote more than a week to discussion to the Immediate Decolonization bill. It also did not look to include the opposition in the process. Many PDP leaders saw the referendum as a political ploy to drive a wedge between that party’s fragile coalition joining pro-Commonwealth and pro-sovereignty voters. This one-sided approach to the status issue might have seemed like bold politics at first, but now it is increasingly looking like a massive miscalculation from those pushing for statehood.

Despite the electoral victory

that the governor’s party achieved in November, questions linger regarding the validity of this referendum.

For one, some argue that his 41.7 percent vote-total in the election— the lowest for any governor in Puerto Rico’s history—did not constitute a mandate for a status consultation but was instead the consequence of discontentedness towards the previous government’s handling of the economic crisis.

Others argue that the status issue is not a priority at this particular moment, since the economic crisis is having a much greater impact on the lives of Puerto Ricans. With this crisis looming, attempting another revision to the status quo seems futile in the grand scheme of things.

Even if the general population were to agree on a status change, the conditions for statehood would not be acceptable to the US federal government, especially with the Republican Party in control of the White House and both houses of Congress.

While sovereignty, which still has not reached the same levels of mass appeal as statehood has, would still require initial support from the federal government. To surmount the crisis and join the community of nations, Puerto Rico would need to restructure its debt, stimulate the economy, and secure some sort of citizenship pact with the US. More importantly, the omission of the Commonwealth option

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 13 from the status referendum had been broadly criticized by public figures in both Puerto Rico and the United States. Not only has the consultation been branded as anti-democratic in nature, but, more importantly from the US perspective, statehood is by no means an option that the United States is willing to offer. However, Roselló and his pro-statehood allies have argued that the 2012 referendum, which produced a 52 to 48 percent result against the status quo, was sufficient justification to omit the Commonwealth status as an option.

Despite its advocating for statehood, the NPP chose to ignore warnings about the referendum process from the same federal officials that would have a say in allowing Puerto Rican statehood.

On April 5, the Roselló administration’s hubris finally caught up with it when eight Republican senators expressed concerns about the referendum process in a letter to US Attorney General Jeff Sessions. In an uncharacteristic alignment with right-wing American senators, a significant faction of the Popular Democratic Party advocated that no consideration be given to the more than 500,000 Puerto Ricans that support the current Commonwealth status.

Following declarations to counter the eight Republican senators from the Resident Commissioner Jennifer González—the non-voting member that “represents” the island in Congress—the Justice Department stepped in to deliver what the Popular Democratic Party argues is

the death blow to the June 11 referendum.

On April 13, the Justice Department stated that, as the current legislation stands, “multiple considerations preclude it from notifying Congress that it approves of the plebiscite and obligating funds.” Furthermore, beyond affirming the Trump Administration’s support for the current Commonwealth status, the department even threw the pro-status quo faction a bone. By affirming that “Puerto Rico has an unconditional statutory right to birthright citizenship,” the Justice Department allayed fears that the Trump administration may move to revoke the 1917 Jones Act that extended birthright citizenship to Puerto Ricans. In sum, it made explicit the Trump administration’s intention of maintaining the status quo in Puerto Rico.

Even if a majority of citizens does oppose the current status, at-

government and the possibility of a binding result, an effective decolonization process is irresponsible; while the Roselló administration’s irresolute response to the Justice Department accentuates the inability of the island’s domestic government to have any meaningful impact in the decolonization discussion.

The Unbreakable Status Quo Since the United States acquired Puerto Rico through the 1898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, the status issue has been at the center of Puerto Rico’s political discussions. Annexation was initially the goal among political elites, but opposition quickly grew as it became evident that the United States had no interest in incorporating Puerto Rico as a state. In the decades that followed, the Union Party, which sought to include all status options in one party, dominated politics until the Great Depression. The economic consequences suffered by the island quickly gave rise to the Nationalist Party and the Popular Democratic Party, both of which sought to establish Puerto Rico as a sovereign nation despite different programmatic approaches.

In 1952, following the United Nations’ push for decolonization, Puerto Rico was allowed a degree of home-rule under its Commonwealth status. Yet, although Puerto Rico was allowed to craft its domestic laws, it still remains classified under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution, which grants Congress dis-

Annexation was initially the goal among political elites, but opposition quickly grew as it became evident that the United States had no interest in incorporating Puerto Rico as a state. tempting to eliminate it as an option without federal approval has proven to be a mistake. If anything, the political musings of the pro-statehood Roselló administration may have actually given new life to the Commonwealth status. Although the current status has been discredited by the ongoing economic crisis, without the explicit backing of the federal

14 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW cretionary power over the island. Although the UN removed the island from the list of colonial territories, Puerto Rico continues to exist in a de jure political limbo. Puerto Rico cannot engage directly with other countries or belong to any international institutions, but neither has it received any indication that a path for statehood will ever be made available.

Until 1991, Puerto Rico, as a democratic and economic enclave in the ideological trenches of the Cold War, proved a clear asset to the United States. The new millennium has

n o t d o n e Puerto Rico any favors: the current debt crisis has not only made decolonization—whether by statehood or by sovereignty— more costly than ever, but has also made it less politically feasible due to the polarization in US politics.

Paradoxically, the debt crisis has actually entrenched the current status quo. In the context of sovereign debt restructuring, Puerto Rico has been denied access to international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, which provides ART BY CHARLOTTE VOELKEL

a means of acquiring liquidity. Furthermore, the island’s colonial status precludes it from benefiting from federal economic stabilizers or accessing the bankruptcy protections available to a municipality under Title IX of the federal bankruptcy code.

This lack of viable solutions has further entrenched the island’s colonial status by way of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), approved last June This bipartisan legislation, installed a federally-sanctioned Fiscal Control Board with the authority to set

Puerto Rico’s budgets and dictate economic policy. With a $73 billion worth of debt still to pay, and the Control Board the only available alternative to restructuring that debt, the Commonwealth status seems likely to remain unchanged for the time being.

With the Justice Department’s

recent comments against the referendum, the decolonization process has suffered a political blow that highlights the historical and economic obstacles that have made colonialism so tenable in Puerto Rico.

The Imperative of Inclusive Decolonization By pushing a divisive process of decolonization with rather dubious political objectives, the Roselló administration is effectively entrenching the colonial status it had pledged to end. This will not only make future decolonization efforts more difficult but may also cost the ad-

ministrat i o n further d o w n the line, as it seeks to impose a series of unpopular austerity measures.

In light of the letter from the Justice Department, the status consult’s future has come into question. If no changes are made to the referendum, the local government will be forced to use its own funds to conduct a status ref-

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 15 erendum with the choice between statehood and sovereignty—a move which would make the referendum broadly unpopular. Given the current debt crisis, devoting money to a consultation would be seen as diversion of vital funds from more important causes, such as healthcare and education.

On the other hand, an agreement to include the Commonwealth status on the ballot, could also have potentially adverse effects. To begin with, the referendum would not be a binding consultation of the Puerto Rican people. Much like the last referendum, it would be nothing more than a state-sponsored poll on the issue.

In 2012, 44.3 percent of people favored statehood, 28.1 percent favored any form of sovereignty, be it free association or independence, and 27.6 percent left their ballot blank as a protest vote in favor of Puerto Rico’s remaining a Commonwealth. If all political groupings contest the upcoming referendum, similar results are likely - meaning that statehood would gain a simple majority but would struggle to receive a convincing absolute majority with more voters in favor of the Commonwealth and sovereignty options combined.

A divided vote would allow the United States, once again, to ignore the referendum, just as it did in 2012. Using the justification that no binding federal action will be undertaken until Puerto Ricans reach a consensus, the Trump administration could furnish another rubber stamp for the United States’ neglect of Puerto Rico.

Recent developments seem to point to a likely boycott and perhaps even a cancellation of the referendum. With the Roselló administra-

ticulated the conditions for any of the decolonization options available.

The power and information asymmetry between the United States and Puerto Rico is too severe for the people of Puerto Rico to effectively determine their future.

For quite some time, the concept of a Constitutional Assembly for the purposes of decolonization has been discussed. The Assembly would gather political leaders, experts, and citizens in an inclusive process to codify each status option, would consult the federal government about each option, and would eventually produce a binding referendum. The Popular Democratic Party included this idea in its platform in 2012 but never put forth any significant efforts to make the Assembly a reality. While the New Progressive Party, in its frenzied pursuit of statehood has outright ignored this option to push their agenda.

As both parties continue to clash over Puerto Rico’s path forward, an inclusive decolonization process remains out of reach. Until all factions decide to come to the table and negotiate, colonialism will be increasingly entrenched after each referendum.

Until 1991, Puerto Rico, as a democratic and economic enclave in the ideological trenches of the Cold War, proved a clear asset to the United States.

The new millennium has not done Puerto Rico any favors.

tion adjusting for amendments to the Immediate Decolonization Act to include the territorial Commonwealth status, the Puerto Rican Independence Party and the Popular Democratic Party have vowed to boycott the referendum. With low turnout expected and an increasingly illegitimate status consult, a cancellation of the June 11 referendum, could well be in the cards if the Justice Department opts to restrict funding. This would be a marked defeat for the Roselló administration. Considering the context of the economic crisis, this scenario would perpetuate the notion that the status issue is a secondary priority.

With no clear domestic consensus regarding the future of Puerto Ri- Giovanni is a junior at Columbia Colco’s political status, institutionalized lege majoring in Political Science, and dialogue is imperative for an even- starting next year he will be completing tual solution to the island’s colonial a Master’s in Public Administration situation. Today, too much depends at Columbia’s School for International on the United States. As of now, the Affairs. He is from San Juan, Puerto United States would rather maintain Rico and is an advocate for Puerto RiPuerto Rico as a colonial territory can sovereignty. He can be reached via than add a new state or sponsor a email at gep2115@columbia.edu. sovereign Puerto Rican state. Moreover, the United States has not ar-

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MISSILE DEFENSE: CHINA AND THE U.S. IN KOREA Mi Yeon Kim It is a tale as old as time: North Korea, yet again, tests its nth missile, South Korea augments its security under the aegis of the United States, and China raises its eyebrows over US involvement while keeping a wary eye on North Korea. As this is how the story goes, it should come as no surprise that South Korea and the United States have cooperated to upgrade South Korea’s defense systems to counter threats from Pyongyang, which has this year tested two nuclear weapons and about 30 ballistic missiles.

The deployment of South Korea’s latest defense system however, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an anti-ballistics missile system designed by the United States, has created unprecedented political uproar on all sides.

Internationally, the most vociferous opposition has come from China. It is curious that Beijing, as a foreign power, is aggressively intervening in South Korea’s national security concerns and is penalizing South Korea for acting against its interest. So far, Beijing has banned imports of Korean products and halted tour groups to Korea. The Lotte Group, a Korean conglomerate that approved a land-swap deal with the Korean government that would allow THAAD to be installed in Seongju, has been

the target of economic retaliation by Chinese authorities, as well as Chinese consumers who have protested in front of Korean stores and boycotted their products.

This is not to say that the United States has been passively watching from the sidelines. With the United State’s backing, the deployment of THAAD has been accelerated, occurring several months earlier than anticipated. Although Commander General Vincent Brooks initially estimated THAAD’s deployment sometime in the summer of 2017, some of the system’s components have already arrived in Korea—just one day after North Korea test-fired four ballistic missiles. Additionally, President Donald Trump has recently suggested that the United States would act unilaterally to “solve” the North Korean problem should China fail to do so.

The big question then is, why?

Why is China mad about THAAD while the United States is mad for THAAD? Broadly speaking, this is a power struggle between the United States and China for influence in Northeast Asia. Historically, Korea has often been the battleground for major powers due to its strategic geographical location. However, in order to answer why this particular military defense system update has triggered a serious diplomatic standoff, we must look at the unique political situation in both South Korea and abroad.

Domestically, South Korea is still recovering from a bizarre scandal that led to the impeachment of former-President Park Geun-Hye. Hence, an argument can be made that both China and the United States are capitalizing on South Korea’s special elections. Naturally, relations with China and the United States are dominating debates in the South Korean presidential campaign, as leading candidates clash over their stances on the deployment of THAAD. With the ousting of former-President Geun-Hye, whose administration agreed to deploy THAAD, South Korea must review the debate over THAAD’s necessity and effectiveness in protecting the country. The monetary costs of this system and the ramifications of harming relations with one of South Korea’s biggest trade partners—China—is at the forefront of the debate.

Come voting time, South Korean citizens must seriously consider how any new administration will balance South Korea’s military interests with those of the United States and with its economic relationship with China. Internationally, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has quickened the pace of nuclear missile testing, raising tensions on the peninsula.

Additionally, the election of American President Donald Trump has rapidly transformed US foreign relations in regards to China and Russia, undoubtedly impacting the geopolit-

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 17 ical landscape throughout Northeast Asia.

What is THAAD? The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is an anti-ballistic missile system designed by the US defense company Lockheed Martin, which shoots down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, two types of weapons that North Korea claims to possess. Currently, South Korea is equipped with the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system, which has an operational range of 20-35 kilometers and can only intercept shortrange missiles. THAAD, in contrast, has an operational range of 200 kilometers and an altitude of 150 kilometers. South Korea has thus far chosen to install only one THAAD battery in Seongju, whose radius of protection does not include the capital city of Seoul. According to the National Defense Ministry, the full system would cost around $1.24 billion, though the Ministry does not specify the number of batteries to be installed.

Each THAAD system is comprised of five main components: radars, interceptors, a fire control unit and communications support equipment, and a launcher. The radar detects enemy missiles and relays the information to command and control. Those manning the system then instruct the launch of an interceptor, which destroys the incoming missile in its terminal phase of flight. This system relies solely on a hit-to-kill technology, or kinetic energy, to destroy the incoming missile.

South Korea’s favorability rating toward various nations (0 = least favorable; 10 = most favorable). Graph by the Asia Institute for Policy Studies. to THAAD’s implementation, sus- The implication, therefore, is that picious that the United States has THAAD is actually aimed at Chisupported the system’s construction nese intercontinental ballistic misin order to monitor China’s mili- siles (ICBMs), undermining China’s tary movements. Indeed, part of the deterrence capability and tipping the THAAD system requires the instal- balance of power in the region in falation of an AN/TPY-2 X-Band ra- vor of the United States. However, dar, which China worries might be Chinese ICBM launchers are beyond used as a long-detection range to the maximum interceptor range of survey Chinese military actions and THAAD. Furthermore, the radar in gain valuable information about the South Korea will be set up in “termiposition and makeup of its strategic nal” rather than “look” mode. Shiftmilitary apparatus. However, this ing configurations requires a comopposition is questionable because plete software change and five hours two AN/TPY-2 radars with better ca- to switch modes, which would be a pabilities have already been installed dangerous move should an immediin Japan and Taiwan, but China has ate threat from North Korea materistaged a much stronger opposition to alize. the deployment of THAAD in South From a military viewpoint, it Korea. Furthermore, Michael Elle- is clear that THAAD is not a direct men, a missile-defense expert at the and serious threat to China’s military International Institute for Strategic strategy. So why has China voiced Studies, insists that, even though the such strong opposition? The real reaTHAAD radar in South Korea could son lies in what THAAD symbolizes. detect Chinese missiles, the advan- To begin, China opposes any attempt tage would be “quite marginal.”

by Washington to encircle and limit A second objection is that its sphere of influence. Furthermore, THAAD, which is designed to in- South Korea’s decision to deploy tercept short- and middle-range bal- THAAD demonstrates the strengthTHAAD’s Not What China Likes listic missiles, would be ineffective ening of the US alliance network in because Seoul is incredibly close to Northeast Asia and highlights China’s Chinese officials have objected North Korean missile launchers. failure to remove South Korea from

18 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW America’s security orbit. THAAD also symbolizes Seoul’s reaffirmation of Washington as its primary security ally, rather than Beijing. Perhaps of even greater concern is that THAAD could symbolize the beginning of a trilateral se-

curity alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Although South Korean and Japanese relations have long been mired in divisive disputes stemming from Japan’s war crimes against its former colony, Japan’s recent apology for

its exploitation of Chinese women forced into sexual slavery in World War II suggests warming relations.

Such an alliance would significantly undermine China’s regional ambitions and its competition with the United States.

The Geopolitical Situation: The China-US Summit, Syria, and South Korean Elections The

controversy surrounding THAAD cannot be understood without looking at the international geopolitical landscape.

Most notably, with Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States, w e

have w i t nessed the repositioning of America’s strategic alliance with China and Russia. However, the details of the new president’s foreign policy stances are still unclear and even contradictory. Just re-

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 19 cently, for example, we have seen a deviation from his “America First” policy in the military action undertaken against the Assad regime in Syria in response to an alleged chemical attack. Curiously, Trump’s decision to authorize a missile strike on a Syrian government airfield coincides with the highly anticipated summit between China and the United States. Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy stances will prove important for both his allies and his adversaries, who may interpret this as a sign of flexibility, incoherence, or even unreliability. In relation to THAAD, Trump’s shift could be a worrying sign for China, which will not welcome such aggressive American interventionism in Northeast Asia. South Korea also has reason to be worried, as an aggressive American presence could further sour Sino-Korean relations and, in a more serious scenario, incite more belligerency from North Korea. On the other hand, South Korea may also be unable to further rely on American security should the Trump administration revert to its “America first” policy and abruptly change its stance on security priorities in the region.

Domestically, South Korea will welcome a new president on May 9th, 2017, since a corruption scandal involving family-run conglomerates (Chaebol in Korean) led to the impeachment of former-President Park Geun-Hye. The deployment of THAAD has become a critical election issue, on which China and the United States are most likely capitalizing. Indeed, North Korea’s recent missile test could not have been more opportune as a justification for the deployment of American missile defense systems months ahead of schedule—before the decision could ART BY MICHELLE HUANG

From a military viewpoint, it is clear that THAAD is not a direct and serious threat to China’s military strategy. So why has China voiced such strong opposition? The real reason lies in what THAAD symbolizes. be logistically reversed by the results of the upcoming election. Additionally, China’s economic retaliation against South Korea for the deployment of THAAD is most likely China’s attempt to shape South Korea’s strategic choices and undermine the US-Korean alliance. However, China’s retaliation is increasingly seen as the geostrategic bullying of Seoul. As a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Ministry affirmed, “A neighboring country can have its own position about the USFK’s (United States Forces Korea) deployment of THAAD, but it should not try to exert influence on our security policies.”

Nonetheless, Park’s unilateral decision to deploy THAAD is now open to debate, as leading candidates are split in their opinion of its deployment. Members of the conservative New Frontiers Party (NFP) largely agree with Park’s THAAD decision, though it is clear that the issue is proving increasingly more divisive. Moon Jae-in of the Together Democratic Party (TDP) has said that he would review the terms of the system’s implementation but was careful not to promise anything.

Meanwhile, Ahn Cheol-Soo of the People’s Party (PP) has firmly established his opposition to THAAD and has even called for a public referen-

dum against it.

However, rather than argue about South Korea’s security alliance with the United States or its economic relationship with China, South Koreans should focus on the necessity of THAAD for its security, budgetary priorities, and, more importantly the threat that North Korean missiles pose. As of now, North Korea’s missile testing has accelerated, which should cause alarm for the United States, China, and South Korea. According to data published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, there are no signs of North Korea slowing its tests, a report stating, “There is a 43 percent chance of North Korean WMD activity taking place in the next 14 days. There is a 62 percent chance of a North Korean WMD activity in the next 30 days.” Additionally, the North Korean regime has also come under scrutiny following the murder of Kim Jong-Nam, the current leader’s older half-brother, who had been considered the heir-apparent until he was exiled from North Korea. This raises further concerns regarding the stability of Kim Jong-Un’s regime and its effects on global security.

South Korean Perspective of THAAD Deployment

20 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW Understanding South Korean perspectives on THAAD is important, as the nation’s presidential candidates seek to satisfy the voters’ opinions. Currently, South Koreans are visibly divided over the deployment of THAAD. The most significant political opposition to the system has come from Seongju county, where THAAD will be installed and where citizens voice fears about environmental safety and the fact that Seongju will now be the first target of a North Korean missile strike.

A public opinion survey conducted by the Asian Institute of Policy Studies in March of 2017 reveals interesting results about which countries the South Korean public favors and which it does not. As expected, China’s favorability among Koreans has dropped significantly by more than a full point.

This shows a sharp contrast between the warm relations China and Korea enjoyed under former President Park. There has also been a dip in US favorability among South Koreans recently, explained by the fact that Koreans have typically shown resentment when great powers fight over the Korean Peninsula or interfere in its domestic issues. Most interestingly, at the moment Koreans express more favorability towards Japan than towards China. Japan has consistently been South Korea’s least favorite neighbor, with the exception of North Korea. This could be a cause of concern for China, who will not favor warming relations between the

US, Japan, and South Korea.

China’s Strategy to Overturn THAAD: Will it Work?

It is very unlikely that South Korea will reverse the joint decision

Beijing would interpret the reversal as an economic and diplomatic success in its policies and develop false expectations for shaping future foreign policy on the peninsula. Backtracking would also encourage China to continue its use of punitive tactics for keeping South Korea in line with its interests, worsening relationships between China, South Korea, and the United States.

Such a result would be a major setback, especially in the face of Pyongyang’s growing belligerence. Furthermore, a reversal would send a signal to Washington that South Korea is not committed to its security alliance with the United States. Thus, rather than forcing an ultimatum on South Korea for deploying THAAD, countries should cooperate in order to tackle North Korea’s nuclear threat, a threat which is, after all, at the heart of the issue.

As expected, China’s favorability among Koreans has dropped significantly, by more than a full point. This shows a sharp contrast between the warm relations China and Korea enjoyed under former President Park. made with the United States to deploy THAAD. Logistically speaking, parts of the system have already arrived, beginning in March of this year. More importantly, consistent statements made by both American and Korean military officials affirming the deployment of THAAD and even suggesting an acceleration in its deployment strongly suggest that neither South Korean political party has the intention to change course, even if a progressive candidate should be elected president. Indeed, Victor Cha, senior adviser and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has stated “I don’t think THAAD deployment will change unless a new administration in South Korea—even a progressive one—thinks little of providing for the country’s national defense.”

Furthermore, if Seoul were to backtrack on the THAAD decision, such a move would send undesirable signals to Beijing and Washington.

Mi Yeon Kim is a junior in the dual programme between SciencesPo Paris and Columbia University. She is majoring in Political Science with a minor in East Asian studies, and is a board member of the Pre-Law Society.

She also enjoys traveling, cooking and practicing martial arts. She can be contacted at mk3689@columbia.edu

Find more coverage of South Korean politics online, at our new website, cpreview.org.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 21

AFTER SEWOL, IMPEACHMENT MEANS HEALING Hannah Cho The scandal broke in October.

Government employees and a friend of the president, Choi Soon-sil, had extorted upwards of 77.4 billion Won (774 million USD) from Korean conglomerates, like Samsung and Hyundai. The absurdity of the whole affair centered around the relationship between President Park Geunhye and Soon-sil. The latter, despite having no official government position or authorization, had enjoyed access to confidential information, had edited Park’s speeches and had her ear, allegedly using this special influence over the President to shape policy. The allegations against Soonsil were numerous, diverse and some quite bizarre: from money laundering, to coercing the prestigious Ewha Woman’s University into admitting her daughter, to having companies like Samsung pay for her daughter’s equestrian education (including an $830,000 horse named Vladimir) in Germany. The media immediately began drawing comparisons between Park’s Soon-sil and Tsarina Alexandra’s Rasputin.

The public was shocked, then humiliated, and, finally, outraged.

As with any large-scale political scandal that implicates government offi-

cials and the most-esteemed business owners, the blunt force of impact initially left the national psyche paralyzed. By the end of the month, President Park’s approval rating stood at a dismal 5%.

Over the following months, top government aides, University officials, and the vice-president and heir of Samsung were all arrested. Protests drew at first tens of thousands and then millions of citizens, most of them demanding Park’s resignation.

By December, the impeachment proceedings had been set in motion, and, on March 10, 2017, Park was successfully impeached by a unanimous vote. The atmosphere in the capital was triumphant, relieved, exhausted. Less than two weeks after Park’s impeachment, MV Sewol—the ferry that had sunk three years prior, killing nearly 300, mostly high-school students to the horror of the entire nation—was finally brought to the surface. The national psyche, though far from content, seemed to finally be mending.

Where does South Korea stand now, with a former President in detention awaiting trial, an interim president, and elections set for the second week of May? In a sense, the impeachment, which has been hailed as a ‘triumph of democracy,’ can be seen not as an episode of fracturing

but as an experience through which the national psyche might heal.

Looking at these political changes in context reveals an undercurrent of disillusionment that has been several years in the making—a disillusionment which was formed, at least in part, by the Sewol ferry tragedy.

To say that a shipwreck could be extraordinarily traumatic to a nation’s psyche seems a stretch, even for the least skeptical. But that is indeed what happened in April 2014 when the MV Sewol sunk off the coast of the mainland. The details of this calamity were so particular, so troubling—the teenaged victims, the captain abandoning ship, the absent President, the manhunts, resignations, and suicides—that they created a perfect storm, so affecting that, one could argue, it continues to shape the public even today.

Recent events, such as the death of revered Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej last October or the election of President Trump, provide a more complete picture of how events can visibly impact a national psyche, a prevailing mood cast across the country. However, dramatic events do not always have such an effect on a nation; it takes a particularity in the event to resonate deeply with a people and their national identity.

Sewol did strike such a nerve for many Koreans. This profound disturbance came down to a combination of factors: the death of hundreds of high schoolers, the clumsy rescue operation, and the preventability of the accident by proper regulation.

Of the 325 eleventh-graders on the ferry, only 75 survived. According to reports that emerged after the incident, the captain had ordered the students over the loudspeaker: “Don’t move from your seats!” The

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students hadn’t moved, either out of obedience or out of a lack of proper safety protocol to follow. The captain and several crew members, however, fled the ship. By never issuing an evacuation order, they left hundreds of schoolchildren to die. The children’s final texts to their parents still haunt the Web. The rescue operation was even more uncoordinated: the first alert of an emergency came not from the crew but from a passenger, a boy who made the call on his cellphone. The Coast Guard lacked the personnel and divers to conduct a proper rescue mission. The President was missing for seven hours after the sinking was reported. The stories from the rescue team of screaming passengers trapped inside, of the boat being too far listed, and the cellphone records from sixteen- and seventeen-year olds to their mothers and fathers are haunting. The authorities on the ART BY MICHELLE HUANG

boat, in the Blue House, and in the Coast Guard ultimately failed to protect those children that day. Two days after the disaster, the vice-principal of the Danwon High School, where many of the deceased attended school, committed suicide. The note he left behind expressed shame and guilt for having survived the shipwreck, for failing to protect his students, and for his role in planning the field trip, the reason the students were on the ferry.

The ferry, it was later revealed, had been overloaded nearly to twice its capacity; the cargo had been improperly secured, possibly shifting the balance of the boat; and the boat itself, originally purchased in Japan by the Korean Cheonghaejin Marine Company, had been illegally redeveloped to fit more passengers. The public struggled to make meaning of so much senseless death and the conditions of capitalist greed that had

caused such disaster.

The nation assumed a collective blame, a phenomenon perhaps related to the concept of woori (“us”); in the Korean language “us” is used in place of personal pronouns like “my,” so “my family” becomes “our family.”

A mood that could only be described as depression took hold of the nation. Research attempting to quantify this depression tracked suicide and depression-related keywords on Twitter, finding that even after the initial spike had relented, frequencies remained higher than the baseline for months after the disaster. One paper concluded that “both those directly affected and the general public still suffer from the effects of this traumatic event and its aftermath.”

The Korea Development Index’s Monthly Economic Trends report for the month following the sinking notes: “Private consumption-related indicators, including

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 23 retail sales index, weakened due to negative influences brought by the Sewol ferry tragedy.” In other words, no one was buying. As more specificities emerged and the text messages that parents had received from their drowning children were published, it seemed absurd to go shopping.

There is a strong tendency in South Korean politics for public apologies, proclamations of shame, and subsequent resignations. Though they may provide shortterm public appeasement, these acts do little in the long-term process of reconciliation. Despite the Prime Minister’s resignation, the manhunt for the owner of Chonghaejin Marine Co, who was eventually found dead, the arrest of his family members, and the ferry captain’s 36-year jail sentence, the national mood remained deeply troubled. The most powerful attempt to move forward came in the form of yellow ribbons, tied first across the gate of Danwon High School. The ribbons crept onto social media and were shared widely across the web. Outside City Hall in Seoul stands a memorial, strewn in yellow ribbons, dedicated to the Sewol victims.

For the last three years, the site of the sinking has been a space of competition and conflict between civil advocates of the victims’ families and political groups with various agendas. It has also become a place of unending mourning for the families of the nine victims whose bodies still have not been found.

The family of one victim asked if the rescue response would have been different had the high schoolers been

from bourgeois city of Gangnam, where political and corporate elite are concentrated, rather than from proletarian Ansan. The question was a fair one, given Korea’s deep class divisions, marked both by envy and true rancor towards those born with a “gold spoon” over a “dirt spoon.”

take control is symptomatic of a larger problem of inadequate training and protocol.

Centering the public reaction to Park’s scandal within the framework of Sewol allows a different view of the protests and impeachment—not as an abrupt rupture within Korean society but more as a form of reconciliation for the national psyche.

Activism invigorated a former despair; the physical recovery of the boat and the political rejection of Park provided a long-awaited sense of accomplishment and perhaps, finally, progress.

Though the end of Park’s presidency has provided relief to this trauma, it is but the beginning. Koreans must bear in mind that Park, Soon-sil, and all those implicated in this scandal are but manifestations of a broader disease in society. Whoever wins the next election, likely to be from the liberal opposition party, must focus his or her attention on combating corruption and exceptionalism towards the political and corporate elite and on improving safety regulations and response mechanisms. Only then will Korea’s national psyche be able to truly move forward from Sewol, with the security of knowing such a calamity will never happen again.

Koreans must bear in mind that Park, Soon-sil, and all those implicated in this scandal are but manifestations of a broader disease in society.

In looking at this tension, we can understand the attitude towards the fault-lines of Korea’s modern society that this wreck has revealed: cultural struggles of reconciling traditional values with the pace of economic and social change in the last few decades; class divides breeding resentment; the paradox of an advanced economy with the corruption of another era.

Public safety had been a part of Park’s presidential campaign in 2012, and yet, once more, one of the most advanced economies in the world had acted incompetently when faced with a preventable disaster. In fact, through rampant corruption (of which the 2016-2017 political scandal would later reveal the full extent), lax security procedures, and disorganized response mechanisms, Korea’s ruling establishment had inadvertently engineered the Sewol disaster. Once again, public safety—what should be a fundamental concern—was hugely, horrifically compromised. The initial absence of President Park and the lack of accountability in the rescue were early signs of her ineptitude as a leader.

The hesitation of other authorities to

Hannah Cho is a sophomore in Columbia College majoring in comparative literature. In her spare time, she shares her photographs and writing on www.pomeloseed.com. She grew up in Singapore, Seoul, and Shanghai. She can be reached via email at hannah. cho@columbia.edu.

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA Matthew Petti After five years of a multi-faceted civil war in Syria, estimates of the number dead as of March 17, 2017 range from 320,000 to 450,000, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; of the five million individuals who have fled the country, about 800,000 are seeking asylum in Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, bizarrely enough, thousands of Americans and Europeans have migrated in the opposite direction, choosing to involve themselves in a brutal war for a variety of reasons, including ideological and personal ones.

Many of the foreign ideologues and adventure-seekers are personae non gratae in their home countries, no longer welcome there. For obvious reasons, Western governments are not enthusiastic about their citizens joining the self-declared Islamic State (IS) and other militant groups.

For example, Mohimanul Alam Bhuiya, a former student at Columbia University’s School of General Studies, traveled to Syria in order to fight for IS in June of 2014. Despite his public repentance only five months later, this former Columbia student is now serving a decades-long prison sentence.

However, in one area of Syria, foreign fighters are working alongside American and NATO special forces.

The People’s Protection Unit (YPG) is a militia operating in northern Syria, affiliated with neither the government of Bashar al-Assad, or the

“Free Syrian Army” seeking to overthrow him, although it has worked with both sides in the past. Instead, the YPG is part of a political project called the Democratic Federation of West Kurdistan and North Syria, more commonly known as Rojava, the Kurdish word for West. Rojava and the YPG have attracted foreigners for a variety of reasons: some have ethnic connections to or humanitarian sympathies with the Kurdish people, others are motivated by anarchist or socialist ideals, and still others are seeking adventure—perhaps for the wrong reasons.

Rojava is organized along the lines of an ideology called “democratic confederalism,” which calls for decentralized governance, direct democracy, religious freedom, ethnic pluralism, and gender equality.

These ideas are generally attractive to a Western audience, but hold specific sway for anti-capitalist leftists, such as anthropologist David Graeber, who sees Rojava as an experiment of the anarchist ideals that he supports. Robert Rênas Amos, a West Virginian who served in a YPG unit called the Chai Boys, says that, while democratic confederalism is similar to anarchism, anarchists should not mistake it for a carbon copy.

At least in theory, Rojava’s army is organized as democratically as is possible in a military context. It has officially been merged into an alliance called the Syrian Democratic Forces but it remains the largest force in northern Syria; there are both local and international battalions, though foreigners are allowed to integrate with local units. Most famously, it

boasts an all-female guerrilla force, called the Women’s Defense Unit.

For obvious reasons, these armed women are an eye-catching symbol of Rojava and the YPG. However, Dilar Dirik, a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge active in Kurdish movements, writes in Al Jazeera that those who focus exclusively on these images, “cheapen a legitimate struggle by projecting their bizarre orientalist fantasies on it—and oversimplify the reasons motivating Kurdish women to join the fight.”

The arming of women is only one part of the ongoing reorganization of society in northern Syria. ARA News reports that laws against female genital mutilation and polygamy are starting to take effect, and workers’ cooperatives and gender-balanced local councils have also been established across Rojava. Activist Enzan Munzur claimed that over 4,000 cooperative communes had been established by February 2017, covering 70 percent of the villages in Rojava.

While he has expressed some discomfort over the political suppression of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party, Robert Amos, the aforementioned West Virginian fighter, is enthusiastic about democratic confederalism as a whole. “This particularly type of communalism,” he says, “seems to work very well in that environment,” adding that his skepticism was reduced after seeing cooperation between Arabs and Kurds and many victories by the YPG. To understand these social changes, we must look a few hundred miles north and a few decades into the past, to Turkey in the 1970s.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 25 Kurds, like other ethnic minorities in Turkey, have faced oppression since the fall of the Ottoman dynasty. As Cold War intrigue and escalating street violence between leftists and right-wingers weakened the Turkish government, a group of students led

by Abdüllah “Apo” Öcalan founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978, a group which seeks equal rights and self-determination for Turkey’s Kurdish population. In the decades since its founding, this group has been waging guerrilla warfare, though several ceasefires have punctuated the fighting.

The Syrian government, for its part, pursued a two-faced policy towards these national aspirations. In order to weaken its northern neighbor, Syria armed and trained the PKK between 1984 and 1998, according to NOW Media. At the same time, the Syrian government used the results of a 1962 census, deemed “arbitrary” by Human Rights Watch, to strip thousands of Kurds of their citizenship. By providing Arabic-only schooling and encouraging the movement of Arab settlers into traditionally Kurdish lands, Syria attempted to assimilate its Kurdish areas.

In the early 2000s, following the cessation of Syrian support and the arrest of founder Apo Öcalan, the PKK experienced a period of decline, which resulted in infighting and desperation—and, ultimately, a change in perspective. According to pro-PKK sources, Öcalan underwent an ideological shift in prison, inspired by the anarchist writer Murray Bookchin, and abandoned Marxist-Leninist nationalism. In reality, it is likely that the PKK was inspired by the popularity of the Zapatista rebels in Mexico and seeking more foreign

support. Either way, the PKK officially adopted democratic confederalism in 2005.

Rojava emerged with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. A group called the Democratic Union Party, organized along pro-PKK lines, had been operating underground since a 2004 soccer riot turned uprising had occurred in Qamishli. On July 20, 2012, the Party announced the formation of the YPG, which then “liberated” cities across Syrian Kurdistan over the next few days. According to Rûdaw News, the Syrian military evacuated the area without a fight.

The result was the declaration of Rojava as a self-ruled region.

Western praise for Rojava, however, coincided with the rise of IS. During its initial conquests in June 2014, the terror group surrounded Şengal, the homeland of the Êzîdî religious minority in Iraq. Declaring the Êzîdî faith heretical, IS attempted to wipe it out completely. New York Times reporter Rukmini Callimachi reported atrocities, ranging from kidnappings and mass murder to violent, systematic sexual abuse of Êzîdî women.

After neither Iraq’s central government nor Iraqi Kurdish forces were able to prevent the genocide, the YPG and PKK intervened. They broke the siege on Şengal, freeing thousands of survivors.

Amos, who fought for the YPG for six months in 2015, cites the Battle of Şengal as his primary motivation for volunteering. He was a graduate student conducting field research in Jerusalem when he first heard of the atrocities committed by IS. “I wasn’t sure if it was real.

But then my skepticism was proven wrong when I saw the images com-

ing out of Şengal,” he tells me in a phone interview, “Every evening, every morning, I’d listen to BBC, wondering what’s going to happen next.

Then I heard about the YPG [that] came across the border, and basically saved these people that were up in the mountains.”

Amos soon contacted Jordan Matson, the first American to publicly travel in Rojava, though Amos claims that there was one earlier volunteer who never went public. Matson was a retired Marine who had decided to enlist in the YPG and had founded a Facebook page to facilitate foreign fighters, called the Lions of Rojava. Many of these early foreign fighters were military veterans, but Amos was not among them.

Amos claims that the majority of foreign volunteers at the time, like himself, were motivated by humanitarianism rather than ideology, although he has also interacted with a large number of anarchists from the United States and Europe.

Guy, one such anarchist who traveled to Rojava in the summer of 2016, also cites a battle, the Battle of Sinjar, as a primary motivation for his joining. Guy was always interested in what he calls “internationalism,” and he had been exposed to organizers from a variety of global anti-capitalist movements, from Mexico to Nigeria, through his participation the Occupy Wallstreet movement.

Guy began to follow Rojava and the YPG on the Internet and was especially awed hearing about the Battle of Sinjar; he tells me in an interview while on leave in New York that “it was like a Warsaw Uprising that was successful.”

Guy also gave an interview to the Village Voice in June 2016 before successfully traveling to Rojava that

26 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW summer. He is vague with me about his exact role, although he acknowledges participating in both the unarmed Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) and the armed YPG. Guy adopted the nom de guerre of Bakûr Debs, after the American socialist leader Eugene Debs, who ran for president multiple times, once while serving time in prison for sedition during World War I. He tells me an inverse version of Amos’s story, that although humanitarian and ex-military fighters were common in the international ranks, the majority was composed of anti-capitalist leftists. This difference could mean that the YPG changed over the few months separating the tours of these two men.

Americans and Europeans are not the only foreigners fighting for the YPG. During the siege of Kobanê, in which the YPG and a few smaller, local militias defended a city from IS between September 2014 and March 2015, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented about 2,000 deaths. Many of those killed were Iranian and Turkish nationals.

Some of these

casualties were no doubt ethnic Kurds from those respective countries, which both have large Kurdish-speaking minorities. Amos suspects that the most experienced YPG fighters are veterans of the insurgencies in Turkey and Iran. Guy even recalls interacting with English-speakART BY MICHELLE HUANG

ing, diaspora Kurds during his basic training. Kurds in the YPG are not foreign fighters in the sense that Amos or Guy are, but they do return home with connections, ideology, and training.

Indeed, a few non-Kurds from Iran, with motivations just as varied as those of the Americans and Syrians, have now joined the YPG. Amos affectionately remembers his friend “heval [comrade] Ariel Pythagoras,” the nom de guerre of Hossein Karimi, an Iranian who was killed in May 2015 fighting alongside Amos in the Battle of Serekaniye. Amos says that Ariel, like himself, was motivated largely by humanitarianism. The troops of Iranian foreign fighters did, however, include many avowed leftists among their ranks; Guy mentions fighting alongside an Iranian Marxist.

Leftists from Turkey, another country with a large Kurdish minority, led the wave of explicitly anti-capitalist volunteers. Founded by Turkish leftists, the Birleşik Özgürlük Güçleri (United Freedom Forces) joined the defenders of

Kobanê in December 2014. They were followed by other left-wing militias organized along lines of nationality, such as the Bob Crow Brigade, named for a British communist union organizer, and Reconstrucción Comunista (Communist Reconstruction) from Spain. Guy’s comparisons between the YPG and the international defense of the Second Spanish Republic and 1936 are fitting; Reconstrucción Comunista actually flies the flag of the Republic.

Guy tells me the shift towards a leftist narrative in the international brigades was a deliberate decision by YPG leadership, prompted by some of the problems brought on by the growing international brigades. One was that the humanitarian volunteers, for all their good intentions, were beginning to drown out the explicit political aims of the Rojava movement. Because there was less need for experienced veterans over time, the YPG began to focus on recruiting ideological believers instead.

“Especially now in the current climate, there’s sort of the great polarization. And they want everyone to know which side they stand on,” Guy says. “I think they’re firmly doing that in public opinion. The narrative is quickly changing from ex-military to leftists.”

Within this narrative, there is room for difference of opinion; the YPG will accept recruits “even if you just vaguely believe in democratic confederalism—you don’t have to be a revolutionary leftist,” according to Guy. Amos even tells me of friendly debates between self-described “Marxist-Leninists” and a Russian anarchist volunteer.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 27 Another problem was more sinister. Guy explains that a basic level of ideological screening helps to ensure the emotional stability of recruits. He alludes to “well-documented” incidents involving vigilantes and adventure-seekers, although he will not get into specifics. Amos tells me about some occurrences: one fighter declared himself an officer and tried to fight a Kurdish general, while another threw a tantrum and fired his gun over a lack of fast food. He explains that part of the problem arose from cultural and linguistic barriers, as Kurdish officers could not tell when Americans were acting “off.”

“There were some people that came that didn’t get weeded out,” Amos warns me. “People that you probably wouldn’t want to sleep next to.” Michael Enright, a British actor who joined the YPG, was considered such a threat by his fellow fighters that some of them singled him out to the New York Times, and Jordan Matson even publicly begged authorities on Facebook to remove him.

On the other hand, Guy and Amos emphasize that the majority of volunteers were well-intentioned.

While Guy is wary of “the young man finding himself routine sorta thing,” he does believe that his participation in the YPG was personally beneficial. “When you join a military and you fight for something, it ingrains it in you for the rest of your life,” he explains, “and it helps build ties to people and movements.”

Although Amos denies being very politically affected by Rojava, it is not so apparent that this is true.

He cites writings from the PKK founder Apo Öcalan—but with a little skepticism. He also acknowl-

edges a newfound respect for his comrades, although he thinks that their ideals can be a little unrealistic: “Anyone who has a fear of communism or anarchy should be completely unalarmed by this group, because they’re not really like that at all.”

On September 2, 2016, Amos heckled former Vice President Joe Biden at a campaign rally. He complained about an American “betrayal” of the YPG and US complicity in Turkey’s war against the Kurds.

Afterwards, Amos formed a group called the American Veterans of the Kurdish Armed Forces, in order to lobby the US government in support of Rojava. Thanks to its foreign volunteers, the democratic confederalist movement now has connections overseas.

While no Americans have been prosecuted for joining the YPG, the US government is not thrilled about its citizens participating. In a press briefing in October 2014, State Department official Jen Psaki told reporters that the US government discourages anyone from fighting for the YPG, even though she is not aware of any law doing so. The PKK itself remains listed as a terrorist organization. And an American veteran of the YPG who asked not to be named recalls that he was once interrogated by Homeland Security officials.

Other Western countries have prosecuted their citizens for joining the YPG. Amir Taaki, a Bitcoin coder and self-described anarchist from Britain, told Wired in March 2017 about the months of legal troubles he has faced since his return. Others have even been imprisoned, such as the Kurdish-British teenager Silhan Özçilek. She was found guilty of

terrorism-related offenses on November 20, 2015, and has been sentenced to 21 months imprisonment.

Amos was banned from Jordan and Israel for his troubles, although he does not seem to regret his choices.

The seriousness of these incidents strongly contrasts with the story of PissPigGranddad. The communist-themed Twitter meme page, also called LENIN_LOVER69, suddenly surprised its fans when the administrator, Brace Belden, posted a selfie from Syria on October 23, 2016. Ever since, he has posted a downright bizarre combination of serious political content and crass humor. Unsurprisingly, this has attracted a lot of attention. Rolling Stone eventually published his story, and Jake Gyllenhall’s production company announced that it would write a movie based on the article.

According to the Washington Post, Belden now plans to leave Rojava. This is partly because of the participation of US special forces on the front lines near Raqqa, the capital of IS; Belden considers these troops an affront to Rojava’s socialist credentials. But, perhaps more importantly, Belden has a mission in the United States—to stop the “fucking bullshit” movie about him from being produced.

Matthew Petti is a sophomore at Columbia College majoring in Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies. A native speaker of Persian, Matthew previously studied international relations and cognitive science at the Johns Hopkins University before transferring to Columbia, and hopes to specialize in relations between Iran and the Arab world.

Reach him via email at mp3572@ columbia.edu.

28 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW

MANAL AL-SHARIF AND THE POLITICS OF DRIVING Céline Bacha Manal al-Sharif is a Saudi Arabian activist globally renowned for her campaign to grant women the right to drive in Saudi Arabia. Céline Bacha interviewed her for the magazine to learn more about how her activism intersects with politics, religion, and economics.

Céline Bacha: Why the guardianship system?

Manal al-Sharif: Back in history, before this government started, there was a tribal system, and it was always a patriarchy. You go to the chief, and he’ll go to the king. However, when the government started to build offices, they stayed under this system of patriarchy, and were therefore only for men. So, women are assigned guardians, and this man talks on your behalf: signing papers, getting IDs—you name it.

CB: So initially, it was a matter of convenience?

MS: This system started in order to make women’s lives easier in a world that was run by men. Initially, it was more convenient. The problem is that instead of being merely convenient, it became compulsory. Now, every woman can only do her work through a guardian. Nothing can be

done without his permission. I have to get his permission to get an ID, to go to school…It went in the wrong direction. As a result of this system, we have fraud, abuse, and identity theft: women are kept from their inheritances. The government is aware of this, but they lock the statistics away.

CB: Why does the government continue to keep this system in place?

MS: It is more convenient for the government that one party takes care of the whole family—this way they don’t have to open up more offices that would work on behalf of women. Women and children know that if you want to do any procedure, you cannot. Everything says “women and children.” Women in the ‘70s in the UK—it was very similar.

The treatment of women in Europe changed when they went out and worked during the war. Their treatment changed when they made their own income. The whole thing is economic. When they go outside and work, they will make demands.

CB: Do you think this is possible in a country where the women are not allowed to work?

MS: The government is going through war and they went through all their savings. They are completely drained. The oil prices are rock bottom now, and they cannot afford

having women, half of the workforce, left untapped. In fact, when Bill Clinton visited for the Economic Health Forum, they asked him when Saudi Arabia will become an economic power. And he noticed that the women were not in the room, but held in the back. He answered, “When the women are no longer in the back.” Indeed, as long as women are in the backseat, and are not driving their own lives, the country will be kept on the wrong side of things.

No country can afford only having 11% of women in the workforce.

Look at how much that is wasting!

Most of these women are highly educated, but do not have jobs. That will change. The country cannot afford it anymore.

CB: So this is possible, but do you think the guardianship system has integrated itself into the mentalities of women? Do you think they would be less willing to get jobs?

MS: Most women want to work.

All of the men refused to take cashier jobs. And this opened the door. All women applied, including women with college degrees—because they don’t have options, they will work anywhere as long as it is a job and you can make your own salary. But this system is hard for everyone in Saudi Arabia. Imagine you are a man and your unmarried sister who still lives in the house goes to you for money—then what is left of your salary?

You have to take care of your entire household, a whole family of women dependent on you. Men get excited about women working. The problem is that they do not want mixed environments. They want women to work in female-only jobs.

CB: Why is that?

MS: It is the culture. They do not want women to mix with other

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 29 men. A lot of my girlfriends wear the niqab when they go to work, and they do not do so in their private lives at all because their husbands can be so jealous and do not want other men to see their wives’ faces. But things are changing. More and more women are uncovering their faces.

The problem is that women are mature, and they want to be independent and they want to be respected, but the men are not prepared for this reality. There is a certain conflict because these men do not understand what’s going on. They are left out of the equation. Their mothers, their society, did not prepare them.

CB: So, do women receive the same education as men, but are they merely separated?

MS: Men simply have more options for education. Girls don’t. For example, none of the government schools teach engineering, of any kind, and they won’t teach women.

A lot of girls want to, but they can’t.

We have to go abroad for options.

CB: Out of all the tools of oppression that are used against women, why did you think that the question of driving is the most important one?

MS: Oh, definitely not. I never thought the most important thing was to drive. I was always writing, petitioning management about discrimination in the company that I worked for. The driving campaign is the one that came to life by itself, interestingly because I was sent to jail.

For me, driving is very symbolic. If you talk about injustice and discrimination against women in the legal system, in the house, these are things that you cannot see, the public cannot see this—you have to physically be in the courtroom, or in this house.

If you see a woman in the street, or a female cashier, that is symbolic for

ending the discrimination against me as a woman. It’s really symbolic.

But it is not the top. The top is the guardianship, which makes the government and the society treat women like children. They are not allowed to do anything by themselves, including driving. Also, driving gives women mobility to be able to work, to be independent, and simply to not have to have another man in the house. I was a single mom. I could afford a driver, but I didn’t want a man living in my house, alone with my son, living with me in my house. You have to take care of him, give him food and everything. I did not want that.

I didn’t want a man who would drive my son. So for Saudi women, driving is symbolic. Once you talk about driving with them, everyone pays attention.

CB: So would you say that this form of protest was effective because it is the most visible?

MS: Exactly. Imagine, if a woman can go out and drive, she can do anything.

CB: So driving should be considered a first step of sorts?

MS: It is. It takes so much for women to convince other women to go to court, to complain and document physical abuse. It takes so much courage to do that. Women don’t believe that they can do this.

With driving it is the same—it takes so much to convince them to go off and drive. I am creating a fund to help female students abroad learn how to drive, so when they come back to Saudi Arabia, they will be empowered to drive. That will bring big change; a woman with a driver’s license is empowered.

CB: And what is the underlying goal beneath all of these actions?

MS: I want to piss them off.

They have to change the way they treat women in this country. If you want something, that will not happen unless you take action. You can use social media as much as you want, you can create as much noise as you want, but unless people are in the street taking an action, nothing will change. Do you know that Qatar was the last country in the world that issued women licenses? Do you know how women were issues these licenses? They would go out, drive, and get arrested, and once they were released they went back and drove.

They could not care less. These stories weren’t documented, they would spread by word of mouth. Those women would care less and less and went out to drive every single day.

And the government just gave up and gave them licenses because it was too much trouble. In Saudi Arabia, we can do this. You can force the government to take action.

CB: But things are changing now, are they not?

MS: I think that I will not stop until there is a Saudi license given to women…[the government] said that they sent women in Olympics, so we should give them a break [and stop demanding equality]. They said that they put women in the Shura, but those women did not create any change for us. They said that they put women in the municipal election, but it has zero power. They cannot even approve their own budget. Half of the municipal election has to be appointed, the other has to be voted for, but this other half has to be approved by the government! But most activists get rejected from elections, so this is not real change. Even seeing a woman as a cashier is a huge change to me because it creates social change to see a woman in the public sphere.

30 // SUMMER 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW Women are always blocked from the public sphere. This is huge change for me because men have to respect these women who are working there.

They have to respect that they exist and they are working, and they serve men and women. So when women in the ministry of finance appointed women to work in the customs in the airport, I was excited.

CB: That seems like a very significant step, is it not?

MS: It is because now you can see women in the public space, not behind doors.

CB: And this visibility must generate change.

MS: In colleges, we have male and female professors.

Except the females not allowed to teach boys, but male professors can teach both. But he can only teach girls by being watched through a TV. CB: That has terrible implications, that the female teacher has too much a potential to be sexualized and that male students would not be able to learn?

MS: Yes, yes, of course.

CB: Taking all of these issues into consideration, your form of protest is fascinating. At the time when you decided to take action, to go out and drive, what was your train of thought?

Was it calculated? Did you suddenly think that you needed to do something so you got up and drove?

MS: It piled up. The frustration was always there. I got really empowered when I got my driver’s license and I had a car, but I could never drive it! I had a lot of circumstances and incidents that really humiliated ART BY CHARLOTTE VOELKEL

me when I went back to Saudi Arabia. And I thought, I have my driver’s license, and I have my car, and I’ve had enough. The Arab Spring was going on, and I saw that the Egyptians called for a day of action. And I thought, this is easy. We can do this. There is no actual law barring women from driving, and that helps too. I am not breaking the law, so they can’t put me in jail. I’m creating social change. I’m actually helping the government. They keep saying that society is not ready, so I’m helping them “get society ready.” How do you even measure this?…When you see someone doing something it becomes so easy to do it, if you never witnessed it, it’s only up to your imagination. And people are enemies of what they don’t know.

So when I drove, I was leading as an example to show that now you can drive. No one stopped me the first time, but they kept on threatening me with jail. And the girls were terrified. So I decided to drive again, and this time I’ll drive by a police car to see the reaction. And the reaction was great. He stopped me, and they let me go. They could not put me in jail. This is our victory. Girls can go out and drive. When they sent secret police to my house and they arrested me at 2 a.m., the government thought no one would know. But I made sure that the world would know.

CB: How could you do that?

MS: I talked to a woman who posted it, and the world knew about it. And I called my sister-in-law so that it could be tweeted. I needed people to know I was in jail. These things are very important because it brought attention from world media, and especially from Saudi society. It was interesting because I had my public profile, and I had pictures of me with my son and people were mad, asking how you could arrest a mother. It all fell together. This was the perfect timing, the whole world was talking about it, and that creates so much pressure on the government. And it brought attention to the movement.

CB: That’s amazing. But tell me, if there is no law preventing women from driving, why don’t they drive? Do they not issue women’s driver’s licenses?

What is it?

MS: The ministry of interior refuses to issue driver’s licenses to women. And there is a power system of hierarchy that prevents executive orders allowing women to be issues driver’s licenses.

CB: You’ve experienced many different cultures, and surely you take notice of the status of women. And in the US, there is an assumption that by wearing hijab, Muslim women are participating in auto-oppression, that they are acting according to a patriarchal system. Is this a naive assumption?

MS: If you look at orthodox individuals, monks, nuns—this is something that they choose. For shaving their heads, and eating vegetarian, can you say they are oppressed? My friends who cover their faces, who are very independent and people ask if they chose this, and they say, “Yes, I did choose this as a way of life. No one is pushing me.” I respect that

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SUMMER 2017 // 31 someone can choose a way; it was her own choice. I would not accept if it were put on her as a social constraint.

In Saudi Arabia, there is a law that forces you to cover your head. And in school, you have to cover your face.

I do not accept this because there is no choice involved. It’s all about freedom of choice. I think it’s all about acceptance of differences and of different beliefs.

I support preventing the veil in Europe. For me, the face is the identity. If you sit down with them and talk with them about so many things in Islam, the veil is just one thing.

And one of the things about living in a country where there are security concerns is that you can lose your identity. Even in Islam, there is nothing [in al-Qur’an] about the veil.

The text does not decree that Muslim women be veiled—the problem is the interpretation really changed.

They say education is powerful, but it is also destructive at the same time.

If the education is done in a way that doesn’t encourage critical thinking, and claims one absolute truth, it is destructive and brainwashing. A good education gives you access to all opinions—it is constructive. I think Muslims suffer from destructive education because they only give one opinion that needs to be accepted.

CB: But do you not think that this is conducted, in some form, in the US as well?

MS: It happens everywhere. People are lazy. There is no search for the truth. People are too busy; it is too much work to watch a different news outlet. And it is very sad because you have freedom of speech and access to information, but you choose not to use it.

CB: Could you see it as people in general participating in auto-oppres-

sion by becoming so engulfed into one opinion? And you can become imprisoned in this way by refusing to see the opinion of your others.

MS: Exactly. People say that Trump is a disaster. I say, “great!”

We need a disaster in order to force people to listen to the poor and the working class. People from their ivory towers dismissed these people as stupid. However, the person who is educated is the one who is supposed to listen, to create a dialogue with them. They chose Trump, and now you are in trouble. Believe me, this will create change. Now, you will see more dialogue, more change more people speaking up. This is really good. The Women’s March would not have happened if not for Trump.

CB: I think women could have been more willing to give up certain freedoms if they were not being so explicitly oppressed.

MS: People take things for granted: their freedom, their rights.

When they are confronted with a huge disaster like the refugee crisis, they don’t understand it because they have not been in any kind of stressful conditions to understand this crisis.

So this is good change. It is not bad change at all.

CB: There seems to be some form of oppression of women in every culture. Almost everywhere you go, women still face many problems. What do you think can be done about women being sexualized and dissuaded from taking higher positions if these are phenomena that permeate cultural boundaries?

MS: Everything follows the financial industry. Instead of objectifying women, implement rules that prevent this. For example, do not sexualize women to advertise a product.

Instead, invest in women. Invest in women’s education and training, so

that they can contribute in a meaningful way—it’s a win-win solution.

CB: Yes, an investment in women is an investment in the future. People always regard Islam as if there is something intrinsic in it that cause women’s oppression. Do you think there is something specific to religion, or Islam, or our interpretations, that contribute to this problem? This seems to be a common assumption.

MS: The problem with religion is that it is used as a tool to oppress people. This is when it becomes a problem. When political Islam was used by the government, it allowed them to do anything they want by simply issuing a fatwa. The fatwa works in favor of the government, and based on the fatwa, they create an order. When they banned women from driving, they used the fatwa.

The problem with religion is when it is used to justify injustice. That’s the real problem. People around the world have cultures and rituals that bring them together and bring peace.

It is a problem when you don’t accept the other or use it to profess only one truth. There are 1.2 billion Muslims around the world, but it is the aggressive minority that is the loudest.

There are a lot of Muslims around the world doing amazing things, but they are not getting the same attention.

Celine Bacha is a freshman at Columbia College majoring in Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies.

She volunteers for various organizations in the Middle East that work with women, refugees, and disabled people. She is very interested in finding an intersection between the “West” and the “East” that fuels productive discourse. She can be reached via email at: cb3009@columbia.edu.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW