Spring 2015 Issue

Close, But No Cigar

CPR

vol. xv no. 1

columbia political review

The Future of CubanAmerican Relations Plus Inside: Does criminalizing genocide denial unacceptably limit free speech?........p. 8 Lessons we can learn from Ebola in West Africa...................p. 16 read more at cpreview.org

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Editor’s Note

Volume XV, no. 1

masthead: Editor-in-Chief Publisher Managing Editors

David Blackman Brian Chung Asha Banerjee Sophie Wilkowske

Web Editor

Mengzhou Jiang

Senior Editors

Nora Bailin Amanda Kam Yeye Kysar Omeed Maghzian Antonia Miller Andrew Pasquier Shambhavi Tiwari Amar Zaidi

Art and Design Editor Copy Chief Assistant Copy Editors

Lucy Jakub Sofi Sinozich Dominique Jones Peter Kalicki Haley Zovikian

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t is with pride and pleasure that I can present to you the first issue of the fifteenth volume of the Columbia Political Review. Perhaps it is fitting that we should devote the pages of this issue to historical issues in celebration of a decade and a half of publishing, or perhaps our current focus on the past merely betrays the uncertainty of the future at a time when, all around the world, the state of politics seems to be in flux.

In our cover story, Ankeet Ball traces the history of Cuban-American relations from colonial trade to Cold War embargo, and finally to where Obama’s new policies might take us. Will the new momentum of normalized relations overcome a half-century of icy rivalry, or will North America’s past dictate its future?

Our focus on the persistence of historical problems continues with Andrew Khanarian’s discussion of free speech in the context of the Armenian Genocide, reminding us that discussion of the past can help chart the way for a peaceful future. This lesson is taken up by Gi Jae Han in an exploration of the geopolitical ramifications of Japan’s reticence to acknowledge the shameful pieces of its own history, namely the coercion and abuse of “comfort women” during the Second World War. In each case, how we respond to history dictates our path for the future; dealing with the most difficult of historical issues is essential to our political present.

Also in this issue, Monica Carty explores the lessons we can learn from our more recent past, demonstrating that the Ebola outbreak in West Africa exposed systemic flaws in the World Health Organization and exploring possible remedies. Additionally, Nadine Fattaleh discusses the history of Jordan’s energy policy and its future, while Sophia Kang finds hope for Korean Reunification in spite of historical division. Finally, our briefing focuses on the rise of the ultra-right in France, which recalls the past specter of European fascism; hopefully, history is not fated to repeat itself.

These stories are a glimpse of how Columbia students are engaging with the past, bringing it to life in the present, and contributing to the dialogue that shapes our future. We at CPR hope that you enjoy reading them, and that perhaps they will inspire you to rethink your own past in an effort to reimagine the future.

Artists:

CPRegards, David Blackman Editor-in-Chief

Evan Haubner pp 9, 16, 18 Lucy Jakub pp 19, 22, 23, cover Amelia Edwards pp 25, 26

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed herein belong to their authors and do not necessarily

reflect those of the Columbia Political Review, of CIRCA, or of Columbia University.

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SPRING.2015 table of contents Features

Cover Story

8 Denial on Trial

Does Criminalizing Genocide Denial Unacceptably Limit Free Speech?

12 Close, But No Cigar The Future of

Cuban-American Relations

By Andrew Khanarian

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WHO’s Responsible?

Lessons We Can Learn from Ebola in West Africa

By Ankeet Ball

By Monica Carty 19

An Uncomfortable Past Korea, Japan, China, and the Specter of WWII

By Gi Jae Han 22

Slick Dealings Jordan Should Not Rely on Israel for Its Energy Needs

By Nadine Fattaleh 25

Seoul Mates The Prospects for Korean Unification

By Sophia Kang

Briefing: Europe 4 Charge of the Right Brigade Islamophobia and the

Right Wing in France

By The Numbers: 154: Turkey’s ranking in free speech out of 179

by Reporters Without Borders

200,000:

Number of “comfort women” in Japanese military brothels during the Second World War

$1,126,000,000,000: Estimated

economic loss in Cuba over the past 50 years as a result of the US embargo

9,589: Deaths from Ebola in West Africa 20%: Percent of Jordanian budget spent on energy subsidies

$30,000,000,000: Amount of money spent annually for defense by South Korea

75%: Proportion of emergency response

personnel laid off by the WHO in Africa as a result of budget cuts

By Yeye Keysar

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Charge of the Right Brigade Islamophobia and the Right Wing in France

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uropean countries have traditionally had political parties that range from the very liberal to the very conservative, stretching further in both directions than, say, the two political parties in the United States. Historically, the more conservative parties remained firmly on the fringes of society and did not gained much power politically. The recent changes in the ethnic distribution of European population, mainly due to a massive influx of immigration, have popularized the furthest-right parties, most of which have an aggressive anti-immigration stance.

The Schengen Area currently encompasses twenty-six European countries that do not require documentation for travelers to pass between them. When it was established during the 1980s, only ten countries were party to the agreement, but since then, it has grown significantly, especially since the establishment of the European Union. This agreement was an embodiment of the attitude emerging in Europe during this time: immigration was tiered, with immigrants from fellow European countries being perceived as more desirable than immigrants from non-European countries.

In 2014, the majority of non-European residents in European countries originated from Turkey, with over 1.98 million immigrants, and from Morocco with 1.38 million immigrants. Both countries have predominantly Muslim populations: 99.8% of Turkey’s population is registered as Muslim, and 99% of Morocco’s population self-identify as Muslim. Thus immigrants from non-European countries, already traditionally stigmatized in soci-

ety, are predominantly Muslim.

They tend to live in poorer neighborhoods with a higher crime rate, and thus gain a negative reputation among non-immigrant Europeans.

Even the children of immigrants are subject to the same discrimination and marginalization.

Recently, a series of terrorist attacks, most notably the shooting rampage at the Charlie Hebdo publishing office in Paris on January 7, and threats throughout Europe,

By Yeye Keysar proval rating was at nineteen percent, but after his reaction to the attacks, it rose to forty percent. Some of that increase can be attributed to the inevitable increase in patriotism and solidarity after attacks of that nature, but Hollande’s heightened visibility at the scene of the attacks and his willingness to unite political parties in a show of opposition to the attacks was very well received by the French people.

After the attack at Charlie Hebdo, the French left embraced patriotism in a way that is typically unusual for the more liberal French parties. The French flag was omnipresent during memorials and rallies, and the tragedy provided a bridge between political parties. One of the more salient ways in which the French political parties joined in solidarity with international leaders was through a rally in which French and world leaders marched against terrorism and in honor of the victims of the shooting.

Marine Le Pen, however, the leader of the National Front Party, was one of the few leaders who was notably not invited to the rally. She has long espoused anti-Islamist rhetoric on behalf of her far-right party, and has thus enjoyed limited political success as many French voters find her too extreme. In an interview with the BBC, she made a now notorious comparison of Muslims praying on the streets of Paris to Nazis occupying France, terming them both an illegal occupation.

Le Pen denies accusations that she is an Islamophobe or a racist, but nonetheless contends that France needs to drastically reduce immigration. In February 2015, she cited figures that France currently receives two hundred thousand

“If the 2017 elections were held today, Marine Le Pen would be the next French president, and the National Front Party would come to greater power than it has ever wielded before.”

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attributed to radicalized Islam, have contributed significantly to anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the more right-leaning European political parties. This shift has disturbed the political balance of many European countries and empowered their right-wing parties, with the possibilities for several long-reaching political repercussions, which differ by specific country. Specifically, we can look to France, a country with one of the highest populations in Europe.

France has been the European country most radically affected by the surge in anti-Muslim sentiment, primarily due to the attacks against Charlie Hebdo which occurred in the heart of Paris. François Hollande, the French president, has up until now been largely unpopular and regarded as a weak leader: before the attacks in Paris, his ap-

columbia political review :: spring 2015

Europe’s Far Right

briefing

NORWAY The Progress Party has 29/169 seats in parliament.

SWEDEN The Sweden Democrats have 49/200 seats in parliament.

Did you know: Oslo shooter Anders Behring Breivik supported them.

BELGIUM SWITZERLAND The New Flemish Alliace The Swiss People’s Party has 33/150 seats in parlia52/200 seats in parliament ment.

Did you know: It prompted controversy when it ran an antiimmigration ad in 2007 showing white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Switzerland, with the slogan “to create security.”

FRANCE The National Front holds only 2 parliament seats but recieved 13.6% of the popular vote in 2012.

Did you know: Party members, including infamous founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, have questioned whether the Holocaust was as bad as is represented, and have defended the Nazi occupation of France.

THE SCHENGEN AREA is a

project of the European Union, comprising 26 countries (in dark blue.)

These countries have open borders to each other, but very strong borders with non-members. Countries in gold are due to join. Countries in light blue are part of the Area but not the EU, and the UK is in the EU but not the Area.

AUSTRIA The Freedom Party holds 40/183 seats in parliament Did you know: It was subject to sanctions from the EU in early 2000s for legitimizing the far right in Europe.

TURKEY The Nationalist Movement Party has 53/550 seats in parliament.

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columbia political review :: spring 2015

briefing immigrants a year, and she seeks to reduce that number to ten thousand a year. She justified her position by claiming that six million people in France are unemployed, while ten million live in poverty, and wondered the following about immigrants: “Do we just put them in ghettoes or particular neighborhoods where we’re basically handing them over to gangs or the mafia?” Le Pen directly linked, in her reasoning, the high immigration levels to immigrants living in poverty, which she in turn linked to a heightened crime rate. Not only does she advocate the drastic curtailment of immigration, she also suggests a policy in which France deport foreign nationals who are unemployed or who are found guilty of a crime.

Le Pen appeals particularly to rural French voters, and she took advantage of that base after the shooting by touring “la France profonde,” or “the real France,” after she was not invited to the rally that Hollande held with other world leaders in Paris. She rallied instead in Beaucaire, a small city in the south of France in which her party had historically been successful in elections. She and the other members of the National Front Party criticized Paris for being where the corruption in the country originated, and thus it was particularly fitting for her to rally instead in the French rural areas.

In the presidential elections, Marine Le Pen and other members of the National Front Party have secured a proportion of the votes, but they have so far not been successful on a national scale. In polling before the shooting, Le Pen showed an unprecedented lead in the 2017 presidential elections, with approval ratings between twenty-eight and thirty percent, depending on the other candidates in the election.

In the same polls, Hollande’s pro-

jections were between sixteen and seventeen percent. Although his approval ratings have increased since the shooting, they are not expected to remain at the same levels, since the increase was mainly a product of his strong, patriotic response to it, one which he is already shying away from.

If the 2017 elections were held today, Marine Le Pen would be the next French president, and the National Front Party would come to greater power than it has ever wielded before. Le Pen is certainly not the most radical member of her party, and is instead one of the most electable ones in that she is more leftist than many of her Na-

an economies, has recently been under significant pressure, especially from the countries in the European Union that are requiring bailouts from their economic partners. As these other countries weaken the Euro, the more traditionally prosperous European countries suffer economically. As Professor Robert Jervis of the Columbia University Political Science department told CPR, the European Union has for a time been in “economic distress.”

In France, for example, the unemployment rate has been steadily rising since 2008, when it was at 7.2 percent, and as of November 2014 it was at 10.5 percent, almost twice that of the United States at the same time. This high unemployment rate recalls Le Pen’s proposed strategy of deporting all foreign nationals who are unemployed in a bid to improve the economy and lower the unemployment rate.

Le Pen claims that along with an economic danger, Muslim immigration also presents a threat both to national and world security, and to the very foundations of French culture. The attack at Charlie Hebdo seems to support her argument as Le Pen alleged that Europe, and especially France, has been unwilling to recognize publicly the dangers of Islam because of “political correctness and fear,” even though “behind terrorism is only a means of Islamic fundamentalism [and] behind terrorism is an ideology which developed in our land, in our cities and the rest of the world.” Le Pen alleged that the movement was in some part developed in France, and thus she claims that France has a responsibility to put an end to it.

The attack at Charlie Hebdo was ostensibly a fundamentalist Muslim attempt to attack the freedom of speech that allowed the magazine to publish images of Prophet Muhammad’s face. This is a freedom

“Much of the anti-Muslim sentiment felt in France and throughout Europe is an attack on povery and crime rather than being based on religious biases”

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tional Front colleagues. Aymeric Chauprade, a member of the European Parliament for the National Front Party, was filmed alleging that “France is at war against Muslims.” Even Le Pen took issue with his statements and publicly distanced herself from them, being sure to point only to radical Islam as a problem for France, a point that seems disingenuous given her likening of Muslims peaceably praying on the streets of Paris to the Nazi occupation of France, however. No matter how much Le Pen tries to moderate her views in preparation for a national presidential race, her victory would be not just for her, but also for her whole party, and the political discourse would shift drastically to the xenophobic right.

France, like many other Europe-

columbia political review :: spring 2015 of speech that Le Pen cites as being a basic tenet of democracy and a value that French culture holds very dear. When Marine Le Pen was invited to speak at the Oxford Union, students outside protested her vocally, calling her a “fascist,” a “racist,” and “Islamophobic.” Le Pen countered by saying: “I am deeply attached to the notion of democracy but I am not sure they are, because my freedom of speech, in fact, freedom of speech, is one of the great values that we must uphold.” She said this in reference to students who opposed her invitation to the Oxford Union, but her thinking also contains a wider message: democracy rests on freedom of speech, and any who oppose it are opposed to a democratic government. This is a particularly resonant message after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, which was targeted for exercising its freedom of speech with a radical message.

By arguing that other political leaders are not willing to condemn radical Islam because of “political correctness and fear,” Le Pen astutely depicts herself as the politician who can preserve the rights and safety of the French people from the cowardice of the politicians in Paris.

She appeals to the French suburban people and seeing as she was not invited to the massive rally President Hollande organized in Paris, she furthered her image as the politician of the people. Her image is of one who will stand for the best interests of France, and will not be cowed by requirements of political correctness. In May 2014, Le Pen claimed that the National Front Party’s “objective is to block all ideas and projects that are anti-Europe and against our objectives.” She declared her party “the representatives of France [who will] defend France and tell [the French people] the things as they are.” Through her rhetoric, Le Pen implied that voting for her is a simple act of patriotism, since her

party stands for the rights of the French people.

She still, however, counters all claims that European Muslims are being scapegoated, and instead claims that all measures she proposes are solely for economic purposes, and that she holds no bias against the Islamic faith or its devotees. Anti-Muslim sentiment, which she exploits, is nonetheless palpable throughout Europe and in rhetoric emerging from Le Pen’s party, and the massive spread of ISIS has contributed to that. There is a hysteria as ISIS fighters spread videos of increasingly brutal murders and as they take over even more land. Stories of brutalities within ISIS-controlled territories spread, along with tales of Europeans, some as young as schoolchildren, traveling to join the Islamic State.

Anti-Muslim sentiment has spread for years throughout the more conservative political movements of Europe, and the recent rash of terrorist shootings in France and Denmark, along with the mass reporting of the brutality of ISIS, has brought these sentiments to international attention. The emergence and popularization of these movements is a troubling sign for Europe, in which millions of Muslim immigrants live. It is especially concerning when politicians disguise their speech as not being xenophobic or racist, but rather as being solely about economics or indisputable fact. When Le Pen argues that it would be better for the economy to deport thousands of Muslim immigrants, she is bolstering her argument in a way that appeals to a wider audience than just those who admit they are biased against Muslim immigrants. Giving her argument alarming mainstream traction that insinuates it into moderate political dialogue.

The developments in the farright political movements in Europe, particularly the National Front Party in France, are changing

briefing every day, and thus it is difficult to make predictions about what will occur in the coming months. It is undeniable that terrorist attacks and the increasingly high-profile violence wrought by ISIS have a significant effect on increasing the anti-Muslim sentiment felt throughout these parties, but millions of moderate Muslims around the world have condemned these extremist attacks and even died fighting against them, and yet the religion as a whole continues to be widely vilified.

What it is possible to say more definitively, however, is that these far-right movements pose a danger not just to Muslims, but also to all of democratic society. Marine Le Pen is right when she says that freedom of speech is a tenet of democracy, and she is certainly entitled to exercise her right to it. What she neglects to mention, however, is that democracy also hinges on a freedom of religion, and that denying that freedom is just as deadly as denying the freedom of speech.

Moderate Muslims around the world are judged as belonging to a religion that has become so perverted by fundamentalism and radicalism as to be unrecognizable from the moderate faith they practice, and they are forced to defend their beliefs. This is not a fight against Islam or Muslims, but rather a fight against hate and its violent potential, whether that hate is presented as Islamic fundamentalism or as xenophobic political movements.• Yeye Kysar is a junior majoring in English and Political Science with a pre-law focus. Along with being an editor for the Columbia Political Review, she is also a senior officer on the Columbia Undergraduate Scholars’ Program Alliance and an editor on the Columbia Undergraduate Law Review. Her main academic and legal interests are global women’s rights as a subset of humanitarian law.

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Denial on Trial

Does criminalizing genocide denial unacceptably limit free speech?

A

By Andrew Khanarian

hundred years ago this April 24th some 300 Ottoman Armenian intellectuals stood uneasily in the courtyard of Constantinople’s Central Prison on a calm Bosphorus night. Recovering from earlier Easter festivities, many had been soundly sleeping when abruptly summoned by Turkish authorities and transported to the prison. Unbeknownst to them, the next day would be the beginning of the end for Ottoman Armenians. The sinister plot to follow consisted of repeated episodes of Armenian communities being uprooted, exiled, and massacred. These scenes made up in brutality and efficacy what they lacked in variety–by 1918, the Armenian presence in Ottoman Turkey had been all but eliminated.

The Armenian Genocide– as these events would later be known–is a lasting source of contention between Armenians and Turks. Armenians actively remember the Meds Yeghern and some use the historical event to bolster legal claims against the successor state of Ottoman Turkey. On the other hand, the modern Turkish state actively ignores these grimmer portions of its earlier history, leveraging its substantial geopolitical clout to cloud the historical record documenting the horrific crimes that occurred within its borders. Bolstered by this state-sponsored campaign of denial, Turks and non-Turks within and outside of Turkey routinely deny the Armenian Genocide. Some European nations have enacted new laws or interpreted existing laws to criminalize denial of the Armenian Genocide. A conviction under one of these laws is currently being challenged before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Perinçek

v. Switzerland, reviving the debate as to whether denial of the Armenian Genocide can and should be criminalized.

The facts of this particular case are not complicated. Doğu Perinçek, a Turkish politician, participated in several conferences in Switzerland, at which he stated that the Armenian Genocide was an “international lie.”

Based upon a criminal complaint,

genocide. It is important to note that while the state of Turkey intervened as a third-party in the initial ECHR proceeding and presented evidence favorable to its position, Armenia was not a party initially. (Armenia has since intervened as a third-party before the case was appealed to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR.) There exists substantial evidence against this second finding of the lower court on the Armenian Genocide. This evidence includes a wealth of primary source documentation as well as subsequent analysis, for example, the study conducted by the International Center for Transitional Justice affirming the correct usage of the term genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention. But even if a statute criminalizing Armenian Genocide denial met the lower court’s specificity standards and the court properly considered the full range of evidence available describing and classifying the Armenian Genocide, such a development would only begin a robust inquiry into whether laws criminalizing genocide denial are consistent with freedom of expression in democratic societies.

In the United States, where a wider range of speech is protected than in Europe, it is very easy to begin any discussion on freedom of speech with a presumption that speech should be protected unless it can be shown that it creates some harm to society. But this mode of analysis can prove challenging because harm is difficult to measure, and even once measured, it is difficult to weigh against the speaker’s presumed innate freedom of speech. Moreover, this approach fails to justify the protections a nation provides controversial speakers in the first place. Therefore, a more

“Bolstered by [a] statesponsored campaign of denial, Turks and nonTurks within and outside of Turkey routinely deny the Armenian Genocide.”

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Perinçek was found guilty of racial discrimination within the meaning of the Swiss criminal code. Perinçek subsequently appealed his conviction on the basis that it infringed upon his freedom of expression as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The lower chamber of the ECHR objected to the conviction on several grounds. I will note two of the most noteworthy objections here, and leave the remaining objections to a more extensive analysis of the court’s opinion.

First, the lower chamber correctly noted that the Swiss statute in question was a broad statute that banned “discrimination...denigration or defamation” of a race, but did not single out genocide denial as a specific crime. Second, the court found in its opinion, that there was a lack of consensus on the question of whether the events of 1915 constituted a

columbia political review :: spring 2015 sound analysis requires a brief discussion of the theory underlying freedom of speech. After establishing this brief theoretical foundation, I will discuss how laws criminalizing Armenian Genocide denial affect the public’s memory of the historical event, and then discuss how such laws affect the development of a nation’s capacity to cogently counter future extreme speech. I will ultimately question the legitimacy and prudence of laws criminalizing genocide denial.

Advocates of criminalizing genocide denial have a persuasive argument at their disposal, especially when freedom of speech is viewed using the “classical model” of free speech. The “classical model,” as Columbia President Lee Bollinger explains, envisions speech as a means to “arrive at as close an approxima-

tion of the truth as we can.” This argument is not new–it found its way into John Stuart Mill’s 19th century writing as well as into several prominent 20th century US Supreme Court opinions–and it carries substantial weight in the American First Amendment community of scholarship. If the ultimate goal of public discourse is to achieve truth, it is not difficult for proponents of genocide denial laws to then argue that denying proven truths adds little value to public discussion. Considering further the degree such speech can be offensive and racially provocative, one can easily fashion a rudimentary argument that the right to such speech is outweighed by its negative effects on society. This argument makes a tenuous logical leap, however, establishing a dangerous precedent, and requiring a critical assumption.

features First, it equates denying proven truths that offend certain minority groups with racial hatred or even incitement. It is certainly imaginable that many who seek to stir racial hatred against Armenians also deny the Armenian Genocide, just as many neo-Nazis deny the Holocaust.

But many of the Turks who deny the Armenian Genocide are victims of a biased and nationalistic educational curriculum in Turkey that is reinforced by strict speech laws. Secondly, this process of placing certain provable truths beyond the reach of debate can easily be abused by politicians seeking to dampen discussion of controversial subjects. Thirdly, this argument assumes that truth is a binary function and that once truth is determined (e.g. through an adjudication of a court), its pursuit is complete. However, the truth can exist in variety of forms. As John Stuart Mill argues in On Liberty, “collision[s] with error” invigorate the pursuit of truth. Similarly, denial of the Armenian Genocide adds life to a century-old event that is too easily forgotten by inviting affirmative speech. Said in the converse, laws criminalizing genocide denial merely suppress falsity–they do not further enunciate the truth.

This last angle of attack–that truth is invigorated by its cohabitation with error–is strengthened by the arguable assertion that the memory of past genocides,which can often serve as a catalyst for future preventative action in democratic societies, requires a particularly lively presence among a democracy’s ultimate decision-makers. Hitler’s perverse memory of the Armenian Genocide is illustrative of this point.

In carrying out his exterminations some two decades later, he famously stated on the eve of his Polish invasion, “Who...speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Hitler was emboldened by the world’s ignorance of past genocides and similarly hoped to cover up his own genocidal schemes. While contemporaneous historians, most notably Raphael Lemkin (the creator of the term “genocide”), were aware of the atrocity through historical sourc9

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columbia political review :: spring 2015

es, a sufficiently robust knowledge of the Armenian Genocide did not exist among the general public and allowed Hitler to act with impunity.

While substantial progress has been made in educating the public about the Armenian Genocide, the public’s memory of the genocide needs to be more salient in order to influence future policymakers. Merely relegating the official narrative to a nation’s law books is not sufficient for this task.

The benefits of lively speech are compounded by the fact that societies that actively remember the Armenian Genocide are more effective antidotes to Turkish denial than a single statute. “Person-to-person contact” is the most effective means at changing Turkey’s policy on the Armenian Genocide, explained Professor David Phillips, director of Peace-building and Human Rights Program at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. Unlike laws, a multitude of citizens provide a multitude of opportunities to nudge the Turkish public’s narrative towards recognition of the genocide.

While laws can articulate official state positions, Professor Phillips states that the Armenian Genocide is a “political issue” and will only be accepted if a “critical mass” forms in the general public.

While extensive European discussion on the Armenian Genocide is an effective tool for conveying authentic history to the Turkish Republic, freedom of speech in Europe is also the means to transform the opinions of Turks residing in Europe.

Convergence on the history requires “breathing room,” explains Phillips, in order to allow the incremental steps that will bring Turks and Armenians closer. If only unequivocal affirmation of the Armenian Genocide was allowed, moderate Turks who have not yet accepted the Armenian Genocide will be forced to withdraw from public discussion, and their opinions will remain outside the reach of effective persuasion.

Europe’s responsibility for providing the space for this dialogue is increased by the lack of a correspond-

ing space in Turkish society. One could argue, however, that many deniers of the Armenian Genocide, like Perinçek, do not travel to Europe in order to engage in meaningful dialogue but instead aim to inflame racial tensions. Perinçek’s speech, for example, was delivered in Lausanne, the same city where the treaty ending the Ottoman-European conflict was signed, effectively reneging on previous promises of an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. While this point is most likely well founded, there are two strong rebuttals that can be offered. First, the extreme views expressed by these individuals, at the very least, can be of value in identifying the origins of such speech.

Bollinger explains in The Tolerant Society that extreme speech can serve as a “thermometer” for society seeking to diagnose and cure prob-

whose peace efforts were subjected to torturous political maneuverings, particularly in Ankara, has taken this step back from the role of a facilitator of dialogue.

It is important to emphasize that the opening of space for dialogue in Europe does not absolve Turkey of its abysmal free speech record; hopefully the former will facilitate the latter. Turkey’s pursuit of the current case before the ECHR is somewhat laughable considering that it was ranked 154th nations for press freedom by Reporters Without Borders in 2013. Professor Phillips explains, if Turkey was serious about freedom of speech it would stop jailing people who speak out on the Armenian Genocide under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Phillips further explains that Turkey could unilaterally open its border with Armenia in order to directly facilitate dialogue with Armenians. Even if President Erdoğan of Turkey lacked the political vision for such an undertaking, the free interactions Turks have in Europe and bring back to Turkey will only add pressure on the Turkish government from within. While Erdoğan firmly denies the Armenian Genocide, Phillips believes that President Erdogan’s impressive “bravado” fundamentally comes from a position of insecurity. While possibly resistant to external pressure, he is not immune from the tension growing under his rule.

The preceding discussion offers an argument for why European laws suppressing genocide denial harm the memories they aim to protect as well as the societies that the victims and perpetrators come from.

However, the benefits of extreme speech extend beyond the narrative it hopes to discredit and the communities it angers, and helps strengthen the tools European nations employ to combat future extreme speech at home. Societies have two primary tools for combating extreme speech directed towards minorities: directly outlawing the speech or employing firm counter-speech which simultaneously discredits the extreme

“Laws criminalizing genocide denial merely suppress falsity–they do not further enunciate the truth.”

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lematic elements. Without deniers of the Armenian genocide, it would, for example, be harder to determine the extent to which such speech is natively grown or internationally exported. Furthermore, it can help in the allocation of resources in combating extreme speech. Second, society serving as a forum for speech is not inconsistent with Europe’s longstanding role as a facilitator of diplomatic dialogue. Switzerland–a party in this case–played a leading role in facilitating dialogue between Armenians and Turks in the first decade of the 21st foundation for the groundbreaking, though contested (and now defunct), Armenian-Turkish Protocols. However, Switzerland has seemingly exchanged its role as a bold facilitator of dialogue to a mild suppressor of speech. While this possibly casts doubt on the sincerity of the Swiss reconciliation efforts, it could also explain why a nation

columbia political review :: spring 2015 speech while supporting the victims of such discourse. Simply outlawing extreme speech–such as genocide denial–reduces the necessity to produce counter-speech and allows this critical societal aspect to atrophy.

Consider how societies respond to murder. The vast majority of murders, while horrific, get less than three minutes on the nightly news.

Societies do not condemn these individual acts (which are arguably graver than the majority of hate speech) because they know the perpetrators will face institutionalized justice. Similarly, placing the responsibility of rejecting genocide denial in the hands of judges removes the burden from civil society, and accordingly allows its voice to grow mute.

Suppressing genocide denial does not merely inhibit an alternative means of responding to extreme speech; it also inhibits the more effective means of countering extreme speech. This is not an obvious statement, for there are strong arguments in favor of legal remedies over counter-speech. The state is the pinnacle of power in a society and has a vast amount of coercive means at its disposal to influence behavior. Furthermore, legal institutions in a functioning democratic society could be considered more impartial than various elements of civil society and provide a consistent process for adjudicating abuses. But a robust civil society can offer an effective response to extremist speech. The firmness of counter-speech can be seen in the example of Holocaust denial in America. While not outlawed, such speech is so strongly objected to that it can end careers and spur instantaneous apologies.

Counter-speech is also preferential because it utilizes many more elements of society than a single judge and makes the speaker’s isolation in their extreme opinions all the more apparent. Furthermore, societal responses to extreme speech do not give a preferred victim status to extreme speakers, unlike laws criminalizing extreme speech. Such a mantel gives

the speaker a sense of righteousness that gives their extreme speech more legitimacy. Societal counter-speech also provides a more nuanced approach to extreme speech, allowing societies to provide a greater range of responses than the punishments dealt out by a court. Societal counter-discourse also can quickly adapt to rapidly changing speech in a variety of changing circumstances.

Most importantly, a strong societal response, more so than a judge, is capable of responding to extreme speech while offering solidarity with alienated minority groups. This societal capacity is critical for a European community currently wrestling with the consequences of deep ethnic and religious tensions.The consequences of not developing the capac-

features such speech is advantageous, there is an added benefit of having societies counter offensive speech that cuts across ethnic or religious lines.

Counter-speech puts aggrieved parties in contact—albeit heated contact—and that can serve as a basis for future discourse instead of allowing animosities to seethe in silence.

Despite the dissonance that ensues from such speech, real conversations can arise from the smoldering remnants of these tirades and tantrums.

The issue of criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide is not solely pertinent to two feuding communities, but to the European community as a whole. The predicted benefits of free speech, which often exists solely in the form of academic conjecture, take the form of political potential.

This issue also illustrates how speech ironically can simultaneously scar and bind discussants together, including the speakers and the society as a whole. Moreover, the role of countering extreme speech can help mobilize larger societies that may too easily place extreme speech directed towards minorities in its peripheral vision. In this regard, allowing extreme speech strengthens a much needed capacity of society. It is understandable for the descendants of victims to question why they should endure offensive speech to aid the progress of the societies they live in.

But looking back from a century on, it may be a small price to pay for a better society for all.•

“Suppressing genocide denial…inhibits more effective means of countering extreme speech.” ity for counter-discourse cannot be more apparent in Europe. Currently, Europe has seen a wave of violence against media outlets by individuals who claim they are avenging blasphemous speech, perhaps most notably the attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015. Attacks on media outlets shine a spotlight on the issue of how to respond to possibly offensive speech that is somewhat pertinent to public discussion and does not pose an immediate threat to public order. On one hand, silencing the speaker limits their ability to offer social commentary. On the other hand, permitting such speech allows for religious and ethnic minorities to be subjected to offensive speech that can lead to feelings of marginalization. This question has no easy answer, and I do not attempt to provide one. However, robust societal counter-speech is part of the solution. Without repeating the aforementioned arguments for why

Andrew Khanarian is a current senior in Columbia College studying applied mathematics and physics, but has a strong desire to pursue a career in law. He participates in Columbia University College Republicans and Columbia International Relations Council and Association.

Andrew enjoys following the politics of the Middle East and the South Caucasus as well as the dockets of United States appellate courts. In his free time, Andrew can be found on a squash court or listening to country music. He can be reached at agk2135@columbia.edu.

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Close, But No Cigar

cover story

Expert Opinions

The Future of Cuban-American Relations

“Poorly designed sanctions tend to be easily circumvented: even with the embargo in place, the U.S. is Cuba’s fifth largest trading partner, a position it has held since 2007 (helped by the decision of U.S. President George W. Bush to authorize the sale of agricultural products in 2003). Further, the fact that Europe and Asia have not joined America’s embargo means that any U.S. firm with the right finance and transport infrastructure can easily navigate around the restrictions.” -- Jennifer M. Harris, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former member of the US State Dept. Policy Planning Staff

“Set aside for the moment whether it’s really possible for a dictatorship and a democracy to have normal relations, since normality implies a common norm. As a Cuban who has lived in the United States all of his adult life, the question for me is what normalization will mean for the nearly one million Cubans who reside in this country. . .For us, whatever happens in Cuba in the future will have happened too late. Too many lives have been lost, too many families have been torn apart.”

-- Gustavo Perez Firmat, Columbia professor and Cuba expert

“As I have repeatedly affirmed, both Cuba and the United States should learn the art of civilized coexistence based on respect for differences between our governments, and on cooperation in areas of common interest that may contribute to tackling the challenges facing the hemisphere and the world.

However, no one should expect that to achieve that Cuba would renounce its ideals of independence and social justice or abandon any of our principles, or give in an inch in the defense of our national sovereignty.” -- Raul Castro, President of Cuba

“The fantasy that U.S. policies and actions can reshape another country has been with us for far too long. The ability of the United States to change any country’s internal economy or politics is extraordinarily limited, as our most recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show, yet again.” -- Gordan Adams, IR Professor at American University 12

columbia political review :: spring 2015

Student Analysis: Cuban- American Relations Throughout History

By Ankeet Ball

T

en years ago, hardly anyone would have been able to predict that a new era of relations between Cuba and the United States would start with Netflix. And yet, last month’s expansion of the American on-demand streaming service into Cuba signified the first step of a brighter future between two old North American rivals. For the better part of the 20th century, the bitterly strained relations between Cuba and the United States constituted the prime regional rivalry in North America. The December 2014 normalization of relations between the two nations looks to usher in a new age of economic and diplomatic prosperity.

Despite receiving conservative backlash for his actions, Barack Obama, by reestablishing diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States, has taken long overdue steps to bolster a potentially crucial regional ally.

Those familiar with the timeline of American history will be well aware of the supporting role Cuba has played in its course; even before either of the two nations were independent from their imperial counterparts, they had intertwined interests through colonial trade.

Though the United States gained independence from British rule in 1776, Cuba still remained under the rule of Spain. As the early days of the American republic rolled on, leaders of the United States often considered the tiny island off the coast of Florida as a potential addition to the burgeoning union.

Spanish influence in the Caribbean began to wane in the early 19th century, and the American government’s ties with Cuba grew stronger, at one point soaking up more than 80 percent of Cuban exports.

Cuban rebels began to actively resist Spanish imperial rule, and the

United States eventually intervened in Cuba’s War of Independence (known as the Spanish-American War in the United States) at the turn of the 19th century. Cuba became a fully independent nation after the United States lifted its imposed post-war military regime in 1902.

A long period of economic partnership continued to exist between the United States and Cuba into the 20th century, where the United States acted as Cuba’s chief trading partner for crops, especially sugar.

Cuba would experience frequent periods of civil unrest, which the United States would never hesitate to help quell. After General Fulgencio Batista rose to power in 1933,

cover story “going red” and becoming a Soviet ally, and attempted to take swift action to counter the Castro regime.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy armed a brigade of CIA-backed Batista Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime.

The infamous “Bay of Pigs” invasion failed as Castro squashed the American-backed rebels within three short days. Within days of the invasion, President Kennedy enacted an exhaustive economic embargo on Cuba, completely restricting travel and trade between the two nations. This embargo had devastating economic effects for Cuba, whose economy was still tightly linked to American interests. Normal citizens were now subject to a market dictated by the Castro regime, in which inflation skyrocketed and necessary goods were often scarce.

The defining moment of Cuban-American relations thus far occurred shortly after the imposition of President Kennedy’s embargo, when Cuba allowed the Soviet Union to build a nuclear missile base on the island in 1962. After the discovery of the base through US satellite photos, President Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba.

With the world on the brink of a nuclear war, the United States negotiated with the USSR to defuse the situation. After a tense thirteen-day stalemate, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba and to withdraw American nuclear missiles from military establishments in Europe if the Soviet Union would withdraw its base in Cuba.

The coming decades of Cuban-American relations were not defined by a singular event like the Cuban Missile Crisis, but a series of actions by the United States to welcome Cuban refugees who were fleeing the bleak economic conditions on the island. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 allowed Cuban refugees to apply for US citizenship a year after arrival.

Though the United States took active steps to welcome those fleeing Cuba with open arms, it also

“The Cuban embargo represents an outdated policy still clinging to the fringes of the longended Cold War.” the United States and Cuba enjoyed an age of close cooperation. Near the end of Batista’s reign, after the end of World War II, another rebellion emerged, led by a young charismatic revolutionary by the name of Fidel Castro. The United States chose not to assist the Batista regime, even going so far as to block weapon shipments to Batista forces. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower officially recognized Castro’s rebels in 1959 after they had conquered Batista and seized power in Cuba.

As a Marxist-Leninist and a fervent Cuban nationalist, Fidel Castro despised the perceived hegemonic shadow that he saw the United States cast over Cuba. Castro immediately began to nationalize Cuba and sever relations with the United States. Foreign assets were promptly seized, taxes were hiked on American imports, and trade deals with the Soviet Union were established. The United States noted the growing threat of Cuba

13

columbia political review :: spring 2015

cover story tightened the Cuban embargo through the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, which stated in no uncertain terms that the embargo would not be slackened until Fidel Castro was removed from office and his totalitarian regime lifted on the island in favor of a free and democratic government. Under the administration of President Bill Clinton, five Cuban counterintelligence officers in the United States were charged with conspiracy and espionage after they were found to be agents of Castro. The “Cuban Five” remained in US custody until after 2010.

In 2008, Fidel Castro yielded to a long illness and retired from the presidency of Cuba, handing the reins over to his brother, Raúl Castro. President Barack Obama, seeking an opportunity to esae relations with Cuba, took action in 2009 to lift travel and money transfer restrictions for Cuban-Americans with valid purposes. Later in 2009, a US government subcontractor, Alan Gross, was arrested for the distribution of electronics and sentenced to fifteen years in Cuban internment.

President Obama did not stop at easing travel restrictions; truly seeking a new future for Cuban-American relations, Obama and Castro headed clandestine talks between US and Cuban officials for eighteen months, with negotiations taking place in Canada and Vatican City under the guidance of Pope Francis. On December 17, 2014, Presidents Obama and Castro announced the restoration of full diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba following the swap of Alan Gross and another US Intelligence Officer, and the remaining three incarcerated members of the Cuban Five.

And thus, with this recent normalization, the United States and Cuba have ended a half-century of latent (and at times direct) hostility. Now that diplomatic relations have been restored, the United States must look towards a future of cultural, political, and economic coexistence with the existing Castro regime, which, though not as extreme as Fidel’s, remains a communist regime.

Transitioning the United States

Interests Section in Havana, currently administered by the Swiss government, back into an American embassy would show confidence in the newfound diplomatic relationship between the United States and Cuba, but there is perhaps another action that can be taken by the United States to show a true promise of partnership to Cuba: forfeiting control of Guantánamo Bay and the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp. The United States originally occupied Guantánamo Bay during the Cuban War of Independence, and retained control over the Bay through a clause in the Cuban-American Treaty of 1903, whilst admitting Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty over the area. Cubans have detested American presence in Guantánamo Bay and see the United States’ continued control of the area as a direct violation of national sovereignty. Barack Obama promised during his 2008 election for the presidency that he would shut down the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp – by doing so now, he can still fulfill one of his original campaign promises while illustrat-

Timeline of Cuba-US Relations Cuban-American Treaty of 1903 allows Cuba to lease land to US, notably the Guantanamo Bay area.

CUBAN REVOLUTION 1952-1957 Dictatorial President Fulgencio Batista overthrown by rebels, headed by Fidel Castro.

Feb - Kennedy’s embargo Oct - Cuban Missile Crisis, US nuclear blockade of Cuba Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966

1903... 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 ...

Bay of Pigs Failed CIA-backed invasion of Cuba by Cuban anti-revolutionaries

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Feb 6, 1962 JFK buys 1,200 handrolled Cuban cigars hours before the trade embargo goes into effect

columbia political review :: spring 2015 ing to Cuba a profound American respect for Cuban sovereignty.

The cogs are in motion for a complete restoration of a public relationship between Cuba and the United States, which will surely complement the promise of a renewed economic relationship in North America. American businesses are finally free of penalization from expanding into Cuba– Netflix’s move into Cuba did not represent so much a wise business move (it is estimated that only 5% of Cubans have access to broadband internet) as a sign of things to come.

The United States must build on the momentum of normalization and work towards a complete lift of its half-century embargo of Cuba.

Cuban economists estimate that the embargo has resulted in a loss of approximately $1.126 trillion over the last fifty years, a staggering economic loss that has drastically lowered the quality of living for Cubans and the Cuban diaspora alike. President Obama, despite his successes with normalization, cannot end the embargo without an

cover story

act of Congress, and therefore must rally the majority Republican Congress to pass bills to lift all travel restrictions on Americans traveling to Cuba as well as to lift the embargo.

The Cuban embargo represents an outdated policy still clinging to the fringes of the long-ended Cold War. Its continued existence is a violation of the inherent American principle of free enterprise, and the American government’s interference in the method of free enterprise is downright hypocritical to American values. Both the United States and Cuba stand to benefit greatly from the restoration of diplomatic relations and enhanced channels of trade. In the embargo era, China has replaced the United States as Cuba’s top trading partner, now responsible for 18 percent of Cuban imports and 30 percent of Cuban exports – by ending the embargo, not only will the United States restore a historically effective trading partner, but will also renew a North American diplomatic bloc in the face of a shifting network of power relationships by potentially displacing China as Cuba’s

chief economic partner.

Though the future looks brighter for Cuban-American relations than ever before, there is still much work to be done to fully realize the potential of a new North American partnership. The Obama administration leapfrogged the partnership forward, and Netflix has taken a small baby step. What remains to be seen is how large the leap the US Congress is willing to take in order to truly bring an end to the most tense North American rivalry of the 20th century. • Hailing from New Jersey, Ankeet Ball, a Junior in Columbia College, is majoring in Economics-Political Science with a concentration in American Studies. He is an aspiring appellant lawyer and wishes to eventually enter into politics and public service. If you’re looking for Ankeet, he can be found on a stage, performing for a Columbia theatrical production, or crying in a fetal position because he can never physically meet Abraham Lincoln.

You can reach him at: ab3755@columbia.edu

Obama lifted travel/ money restrictians for Cuban-Americans Clinton expands the US trade embargo

1999 ...

Fidel Castro retires

December 17 “normalization”

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Beyoncé and Jay-Z go on vacation to Havana, prompting heightened scrutiny of the official US travel ban

Netflix service extended to Cuba

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columbia political review :: spring 2015

features

WHO’s Responsible?

Lessons we can learn from Ebola in West Africa

“S

topping the Ebola outbreak was not about the lack of science,” said Jeff Schlegelmilch,a managing director at the Earth Institute’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University. As an epidemiologist, Schlegelmilch has been working on the Earth Institute’s effort to combat Ebola’s most recent and deadly outbreak, which, thankfully, seems to be finally coming to an end. The week of February 8, the West African countries hit hardest by the epidemic reported 79 cases, down from an average of 500 cases per week in December 2014. The Center for Disease Control report from February 22 shows that there have been 23,694 cases of and 9,589 deaths from Ebola in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, the three countries with the most casualties. Now, international health organizations must ask themselves why this has been the worst Ebola outbreak since the disease’s discovery.

Much of the media frenzy surrounding the Ebola epidemic in West Africa has been a product of intense focus on the grotesque symptoms of the disease. The media has also fixated on the chaos that ensued in the most deeply affected countries. Reports have described hospitals overrun with Ebola patients, with other important aspects of medical caregiving such as maternal healthcare and AIDS treatment left unattended, and dead bodies abandoned out of fear of contamination in the streets of Freetown, Liberia. This coverage has unfortunately failed to call attention to the many factors that contributed to Ebola’s rapid spread, including the weak 16

By Monica Carty initial response to the disease. While many organizations were quick to react to the outbreak, the premier international health organization, the World Health Organization (WHO), lagged in its response. It has been repeatedly suggested that the WHO is in need of wide-ranging reforms, and its inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic has only made the need for such reform increasingly clear.

The WHO was founded in 1945 by a United Nations conference vote to establish an international health organization. By 1948, enough countries had ratified the WHO’s constitution in order for it to take effect.

That same year, the first World Health Assembly was held in Geneva, Switzerland, which is still home to the organization’s headquarters.

Currently, the WHO has 194 member states, making it an interna-

tional agency with one of the highest memberships; however, the WHO has changed dramatically since it was founded nearly seven decades ago. Originally, the organization was focused on consensus building and limited technical interventions. After the 1970s, the WHO shifted its mission to carry out more comprehensive health care, designing policies and programs not only to treat diseases, but also to address the socioeconomic determinants of health status. This approach to health care, however, covers an incredibly wide range of issues, including programs targeted at specific populations and disease prevention programs that range from heart disease to alcoholism.

As a result of its wide coverage and varied responsibilities, the WHO’s organizational structure is quite decentralized. The World Health Assembly is the governing body of the WHO, and each of the 194 member states gets one vote, regardless of population size or geopolitical influence.

The Assembly meets just once yearly, and this is doubtlessly one of the reasons why the WHO is slow to act on health emergencies. During its annual meeting, the Assembly elects a 31 member executive board, which in turn nominates a Director General, the head of the WHO. This nomination process has been criticized for lack of transparency because it is closed to the public. Following a nomination, the Director General must be confirmed by the Assembly, but no nominee has ever been denied the position. The Director General can serve up to three five-year terms and exerts enormous administrative

columbia political review :: spring 2015 power. Most key decisions—including appointments to other leadership positions and budget proposals—are not subject to review by the Executive Board or the Assembly.

While the Assembly, the Executive Board, and the Director General all work out of the WHO headquarters in Geneva, there are also six regional offices that have their own bureaucratic structures. These bodies include Africa, the Americas, the Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South-East Asia, and the Western Pacific. Each office has a regional committee which functions much like the Executive Board of the Central Office, electing regional directors to lead for five-year terms. The offices both implement projects directed by Geneva and formulate their own policies within their specific regions. This semi-autonomous structure often causes a disjunction between the regional offices and WHO headquarters that can result in poorly coordinated efforts and responses to health crises.

In hindsight, the WHO’s slow response to Ebola likely made the outbreak worse than it could have been. On March 23, 2014, the WHO was notified of the first Ebola case in West Africa. At this point the appearance of Ebola, while of grave concern, did not warn of the large-scale epidemic that it would become. Prior to this outbreak, the largest Ebola epidemic was in Uganda, when there were 425 cases of the disease reported from October 2000 to January 2001. At the end of last May, the Director General, Dr. Margaret Chan, made her annual address to the WHO Assembly, in which she barely mentioned the growing number of Ebola cases. By June 15, 2014, the number of cases reported in West Africa had reached more than 100. Just one week later, an additional 100 new cases had been documented. This rapid growth continued steadily, while the WHO did not make any announcements that indicated the severity of the outbreak.

On August 8, 2014, 139 days af-

ter learning of the first Ebola case in West Africa, the WHO finally declared the epidemic a “public health emergency of international concern.”

According to the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), however, this call to arms was not strong enough. On September 2, 2014, MSF International President Dr. Joanne Liu delivered a speech to the United Nations in a special briefing organized by the office of the UN Secretary General and the WHO. “Leaders are failing to come to grips with this transnational threat,” she said. “The WHO announcement on August 8th that epidemic consti-

features year. Furthermore, Director General Dr. Chan has expressed support for a more democratic decision making process, a move that may reduce the WHO’s ability to act swiftly, especially in sending funds and personnel to address emergency outbreaks.

Nils Daulaire, a former American representative on the Executive Board, said in a New York Times article, “[Chan] has very assiduously promoted the idea that it is member states of WHO that are the owners and decision makers in a fundamental way.” In this vein, the headquarters in Geneva delegated most of the WHO’s responsibility to the Africa regional office in its early response to Ebola. Dr. Chan and other leaders at the WHO headquarters sent aid and experts, but left the coordination of the on-the-ground response to the regional office.

Another issue that has become more evident during the fight against Ebola is the WHO’s budgetary woes. Currently, the WHO is $102 million short of its funding goal to combat the epidemic until June 2015. In fact, the WHO’s funding troubles started long before the recent Ebola outbreak. One source of the problem is the WHO’s budgetary structure, which has two separate branches. One share of the budget is comprised of the mandatory contributions from each member state, called “assessed contributions,” and the allocation of these funds is left to the discretion of the Director General. The other share of the budget consists of voluntary contributions from individual governments, non-governmental foundations, and other organisations. Unlike the assessed contributions, voluntary contributions are earmarked for specific programs, with donors determining their funding priorities. Thus even though the WHO may receive huge sums of money in donations, it is often unable to divert these funds to projects based upon current needs or emergencies. Furthermore, while the assessed contributions have remained unchanged for decades, the WHO’s ever-expanding scope has

“Like other UN organizations, the WHO is large and slow moving due to its immense bureaucratic structure, and this makes rapid responses to diseases like Ebola almost impossible.” tuted a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ has not led to decisive action, and states have essentially joined a global coalition of inaction.” The two doctors who discovered Ebola decades ago, Jeremy Farrar and Peter Piot, expressed similar concerns in an editorial published in the New England Journal of Medicine. “Ebola has reached the point where it could establish itself as an endemic infection because of a highly inadequate and late global response,” they wrote. As the premier international health organization in the world, the WHO was expected to be a leader in the response to the Ebola crisis, yet initially it failed to do so.

Like other UN organizations, the WHO is large and slow moving due to its immense bureaucratic structure, and this makes rapid responses to diseases like Ebola almost impossible. The WHO Assembly does not come together often enough to discuss pressing global health issues, as it is only required to meet once a

17

features necessitated a greater reliance on voluntary contributions, causing increased inflexibility in the budget.

The size of the WHO budget has also been reduced in recent years, prompting cuts to departments and funds that would have been incredibly helpful in addressing the Ebola epidemic. The African Regional Office’s budget for epidemic preparedness and response was more than halved over five years, decreasing from $26 million in 2010-11 to $11 million for 201415. Nine of twelve emergency response personnel for the African office were laid off. The WHO was forced to let go of their team of cultural anthropologists, which likely impeded the effectiveness of the on-the-ground Ebola response. But even as the WHO’s budget has declined, the amount of money invested worldwide in all health-related activities is estimated to have risen from $5.6 billion in 1990 to $26.8 billion in 2010. In the context of the Ebola epidemic, Schlegelmilch believes that the WHO’s smaller budget had far reaching consequences. “It was the lack of people, the lack of access, the lack of managing politics, that were direct results of the cuts that were made,” he said.

The WHO’s funding shortfall is by no means an indicator of diminished interest in addressing global health problems. Rather it is that the WHO, which was one of the only organizations of its kind when it was established in 1948, is today part of a vast community of global health organizations. Now, the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Oxfam International, and MSF are some of the larger players in the global health arena. Recently, many international health organizations that are better funded and less bureaucratic than the WHO have proved instrumental in combating West Africa’s Ebola epidemic.

While necessary for an effective response to the Ebola epidemic, working effectively with smaller organizations can be a challenge for 18

columbia political review :: spring 2015

a large organization like the WHO. Anne Lui, a Program Manager for Health Systems Development at the Earth Institute, observed that the WHO was hesitant to partner with smaller organizations treating Ebola patients in Guinea. “The international pressure probably did cause a little bit of skepticism in terms of who was coming in,” she said. The WHO’s hesitancy to work with outside organizations is not entirely self-serving: “They also feel like they have a responsibility in-country,” Lui said.

“There are all of these organizations coming in; who are the right ones to work with?” In fact, the WHO’s delayed cooperation may have been an attempt to filter out the organizations that were not effective or helpful to their efforts. Although the WHO has good intentions, it needs to change in order to improve its performance.

This fact has been recognized within the organization, and in January 2015, Dr. Chan proposed the most sweeping set of reforms in WHO history. The planned changes would allow the WHO to execute more effective on-the-ground response to health crises as they arise. The changes would also establish a $100 million emergency fund, and a team of doctors, nurses, and other medical

personnel, to be deployed in case of a crisis. The WHO Executive Board has unanimously approved of these reforms. In order to take full effect, however, the WHO assembly will have to vote on the reform measures during its annual meeting this coming May. While many agree that these reforms are necessary, whether they will actually be implemented is uncertain, as the WHO has been in a similar position before and still failed to enact change. After the 2009 swine flu epidemic, which revealed many of the same weaknesses in the WHO, structural reforms were proposed and yet none were put into place.

This does not mean that the WHO cannot be an incredibly effective organization. In 1958, the WHO began a worldwide initiative to eradicate smallpox, which proved successful in 1977. But today, now that the global health sphere is saturated with a variety of organizations, the WHO needs to rebrand itself. Lui and Schlegelmilch both agree that the WHO has an opportunity to remodel itself as an international coordinator, synchronizing the efforts of organizations with the same goals. As Lui notes from her experience working in Guinea, this is a role that the WHO has started to take on during the Ebola epidemic. “When I first went there in October, they were the office that hosted all the meetings for the partner [organizations], so that’s a step,” she said. But the WHO needs to take even larger steps if it wants to stay relevant and continue to effectively act on its mission to improve health worldwide. As Schlegelmilch says, “If WHO doesn’t have that coordination capability and it doesn’t invest in disaster logistics, then the science is just a series of publications.”• Monica Carty is a senior in Columbia College majoring in Sustainable Development. She is interested in the politics of global health and other international development issues. She is can be reached at mkc2145@columbia.edu.

columbia political review :: spring 2015

features

An Uncomfortable Past Korea, Japan, and China face the specter of WW2

By Gi Jae Han

A

lthough South Korean president Park Geun-Hye was elected into office as a conservative candidate, she has been taking radical steps in diplomacy. Since 1992, when South Korea established official diplomatic relations with China, all newly inaugurated presidents have visited the United States, Japan, and China in that order; however, President Park flatly ignored this tradition, visiting the U.S. for her first trip abroad, but skipping Japan in favor of China. She so far has met with Chinese President Xi Jinping a total of six times while completely snubbing Japan.

Pundits list South Korea’s close economic ties with China and need for China’s cooperation in dealing with North Korea as possible reasons for this unprecedented closeness. But another factor unrelated to the economy or security is likely prompting this intimacy—namely, the two countries’ strong sense of solidarity as victims of Japanese imperialism.

Beginning in 2013, the tension between South Korea and Japan over unresolved historical controversies has risen, culminating in the suspension of dialogue between the highest-level leaders. Ezra Vogel, a Harvard scholar of the region characterized Korea-Japan relations as at their worst since the end of World War II. He pinpointed the “comfort women” issue as the core of the problem. The term “comfort women” refers to women, mostly Koreans, who worked in warfront brothels under duress and deception by Japanese military during World War II. The current Japanese government disputes this account.

China is using this dispute to its own advantage, going on a charm offensive by portraying itself as a similar victim of Japan’s war crimes and supporting Koreans’ anger towards the Japanese government’s revisionist attitude. The most vivid

illustration of China’s strategy is the speech Chinese president Xi Jinping delivered at Seoul National University during his visit to South Korea in July 2014, where he reminded the audience that both China and South Korea are victims of “barbarous wars of aggression” perpetrated by “Japanese militarists,” and that the two countries had “shared suffering and helped each other with sweat and blood.”

The series of meetings held between Xi and Park under this air of sympathy over historical issues was enough to suggest the possibility that “history alliance”—an alliance based on a shared sense of historical character—is being formed between China and South Korea. While other historical controversies could also play a role in dividing Japan and Korea, as Vogel pointed out, the major trigger seems to be the “comfort women” issue.

“Comfort women” is a euphemism used to refer to women forced to serve as sexual slaves for Japanese soldiers on as early as the 1930s. Although the precise number is unclear, historians estimate up to 200,000 comfort women were active throughout the war period, with 80-90 percent of them Korean.

Although the existence of this horrendous wartime practice had been generally kept quiet for about a half century after the war, the silence began breaking down in the 1990s.

A milestone testimony by Kim HakSun in 1991 promoted the issue to the international stage, giving “momentum leading to [many] investigations by historians, scholars, the Korean government, or women’s groups in the civil sector” on the issue, according to historian Bang-Soon L. Yoon.

Like the Abe administration, past Japanese governments were reluctant to acknowledge responsibility in forcing these women to work in military brothels; however, in 1993,

“confronted with overwhelming evidence,” Japan officially apologized for these “comfort stations.” In August 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei made the following remark: “The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women [...] The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.”

Even an apology from the top government spokesperson, however, failed to bring about reconciliation.

The main problem is that different Japanese governments led by different prime ministers hold radically different views on the issue.

One of the most prominent revisionists of the comfort women issue is none other than Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. During his first premiership in March 2007, he angered his East Asian neighbors by making a 19

features Cabinet decision stating that “there is no evidence to prove there was coercion” of comfort women. Last September, during his campaign for the LDP’s presidential position, Abe also promised party members that the Kono statement would be reviewed.

Unsurprisingly then, as soon as he was reinstituted to the premiership in December 2012, the controversy was rekindled. On December 27, 2012, only a day after Abe took office, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide was caught equivocating over a reporter’s question as to whether Abe would uphold the Kono Statement, saying, “Rather than being about whether we follow the [Kono] statement or not .... Our basic understanding is that it is desirable for studies by academics and historians, both Japanese and foreign, to be considered.” In short, it seems the Cabinet’s view that the comfort women controversy is still an open-ended one, to the dismay of Koreans.

Similar attempts at downplaying the atrocity of the comfort women issue continued. On May 27, 2013, in a press conference, Suga made it clear that the Abe administration still intended to “respect” the Cabinet decision that declared there was no documentary evidence for forced recruitment of comfort women. In June 2014, a Japanese governmental panel conducted a study on the origin of the Kono Statement in an attempt to suggest that the content of the apology was a result of political pressure from South Korea and not that of impartial historical inquiry.

While the panel concluded that factual matters were not distorted, the sheer suggestion of South Korean government’s involvement nevertheless implied factual doubt.

President Park has openly expressed frustration over Japan’s failure to admit this particular historical issue. Though her hard-line policy against Japan may just be an attempt to bolster domestic popularity, regardless it is true that her foreign policy has so far sacrificed Korea-Japan relations for a fuller resolution of this historical controversy.

Even before her inauguration, she demonstrated her willingness to treat the issue seriously. Amid rising 20

columbia political review :: spring 2015 concern that the Abe administration might revise the Kono Statement, then president-elect Park set up a meeting with Kono himself, now a retired politician, to discuss future Korea-Japan relations, thus sending a clear signal to the Japanese government that the issue would be treated seriously during her presidency.

When the Japanese government began to threaten the validity of the milestone apology, Park took her country’s ire to the international stage, bringing up the issue during a bilateral summit with President Obama in May 2013. In November of the same year, in an interview with the BBC, she singled out the comfort women issue as the crucial impediment to having a talk with Abe. Describing the victims as “women who have spent their blossoming years in hardship and suffering,” she said, “If Japan continues to stick to the same historical perceptions and repeat its past comments, then what purpose would a summit serve? Perhaps it would be better not to have one.”

Over the same period, the public view of Japan in South Korea has severely deteriorated. According to Seoul-based Asan Research Institute, in October 2013 South Korean public rated Japan as unlikable as North Korea, with both countries receiving a rating of 2.46 on a scale from 0-10. For February and March of 2014, Japan’s rating (2.2 and 2.3) was lower than that of North Korea (2.6 and 2.7). Asan also reported that in March 2014 Prime Minister Abe was more disliked by the South Kore-

1.11 to the notorious dictator’s 1.27.

China, although never a formal colony of Japan, suffered seriously from Japanese aggression. As a victim of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping has begun to actively criticize the Abe administration’s revisionist attitude towards major historical controversies, a policy that could further widen the distance between South Korea and Japan, and even between South Korea and the U.S. Chinese officials have made it clear that they regard the comfort women issue as a “heinous crime against humanity committed by Japanese militarism against people in victimized Asian countries” that stands on “iron-clad evidence.” It is not surprising that many Koreans would think they have found a strong ally in this historical controversy when the top spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry commented, “Japan should [...] seriously reflect on history and draw a lesson from it. Only by doing so can Japan get along with its Asian neighbors.”

More importantly, China’s verbal support is followed by actions.

Last June, China officially applied to UNESCO to register its archives on comfort women as world documentary heritage. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese government was furious and asked China to withdraw the application, but China ignored their request. This move sparked debates in South Korea, involving high-level government officials, as to whether it too should make a similar applica-

an public than Kim Jong-Un, scoring

tion. China thus seems not an aloof

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columbia political review :: spring 2015 supporter in comfort women issue but an avid agent helping push Japan into a corner.

Asan Research Institute’s country favorability poll suggests that China’s “charm offensive” is working to make China more popular among South Koreans. From 2013 to 2014, China gradually yet visibly improved its favorable image among the South Korean public. The U.S. has remained the most popular country for the same period, but the gap between the two countries’ favorability no longer seems insurmountable. In 2014, the favorability rating for the U.S. ranged from 5.5 to 6.0 while China’s ranged from 4.6 to 5.3.

Certainly, many factors have to be considered in explaining China’s increasing popularity. For example, the Chinese government under Xi has been more willing to reprimand North Korea than at any other time. At the same time, however, it is undeniable that the comfort women issue played a significant role.

The United States could be the biggest loser in this conflict over history between South Korea and Japan. The trilateral alliance among the United States, Japan, and South Korea has been a permanent feature in post-WWII East Asian politics. A byproduct of the Cold War, the alliance has adapted to new political realities—most notably the North Korean nuclear crisis—to prolong itself. A total of about 65,000 US troops are still stationed in both countries mainly for that purpose.

However, in US policymakers’ mind, the trilateral alliance can also be thought of as, borrowing from President Obama’s words, the upholder of “regional peace and security” generally. It is a check against a radical upending of the regional status quo represented by China’s meteoric rise. In other words, the alliance is a key to America’s success in the “Pivot to Asia” policy, which aims to secure “continued American leadership” in Asia-Pacific “well into this century.”

A new regional order led by China stands opposed to this vision, and in May 2014, at Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building

Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi Jinping claimed that Asian problems should be “solved by Asians themselves” and urged Asian countries to “completely abandon old security concepts.”

Also, China proposed to establish an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a regional Chinese version of the World Bank, where the United States is not invited.

Against this background, an issue that estranges South Korea and Japan and catalyzes the formation of an alliance between China and South Korea should be alarming to the United States. Continuation of the current trend may end up fracturing the US-led political reality in the region.

It seems that the US government is aware of this problem. It is doing

cruited, conscripted and dragooned” to “serve in military brothels.”

Michael Honda, a Japanese-American Congressman, argues that the federal government should take a more aggressive stance by officially endorsing HR 121, passed in 2007 under his leadership. The resolution calls on the Japanese government to formally “acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility for its Imperial Armed Force’s coercion of young women into sexual slavery” and “refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the comfort women never occurred.”

While a more forceful American policy is sure to cause discontent in Japan, the U.S. would find it difficult to leave the possibility of losing one of its “linchpin” allies, South Korea, to China over an issue on which there is almost a unanimous agreement from the international community and scholars.

Now the whole region is waiting for what Prime Minister Abe has to say on August 15 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the war’s end. Focus is on how his so-called “Abe statement” will address the comfort women issue, and Japan’s war crimes in general. With a majority of the Japanese public supporting the idea of including general apologetic comments within the statement, according to a recent poll conducted by Japan’s Asahi Shinbum, it is unclear how far Abe will go in acknowledging Japan’s responsibility. The tone of this speech will largely determine whether the comfort women issue will continue to grow in its potential to reshape the entire East Asian political order. •

“In March 2014, Prime Minister Abe was more disliked by the South Korean public than Kim Jong-Un.” its part to resolve the controversy surrounding the comfort women issue by reprimanding Japan. In April 2014, President Obama defined the issue as a “deplorable” and “egregious” violation of human rights. The State Department’s official take on the issue is that Japan should “address this issue in a matter that promotes healing and facilitates better relations with neighboring states.”

However, it is evident that such rebukes have been too mild to affect the Abe administration’s position. Despite the occasional public announcement that the Kono Statement would not be revised after all, the current Japanese government’s fundamental view has not changed. For example, as late as February 2015, the Japanese Foreign Ministry asked the publishing company McGraw-Hill to “correct grave errors and descriptions that conflict with our nation” on the issue of comfort women. The textbook writes that approximately 200,000 women were “forcibly re-

Gi Jae Han is a senior in Columbia College, majoring in Political Science and minoring in East Asian History.

A native of Seoul, South Korea, he is a board member of a Columbia chapter of Liberty in North Korea, a human rights activist group, and a writer for Tech for Korea, an online news media introducing startups in South Korea. He can be reached at: hgj723@gmail.com.

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Slick Dealings

Jordan should not rely on Israel for its energy needs

By Nadine Fattaleh

S

urrounded by the largest oil reserves in the world, and the most politically unstable regimes of the 21st century, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan finds itself in a rather peculiar situation in more ways than one. Politically, Jordan is known to be a moderate country with a Western-allied ruling family that has withstood the wave of protests known as the Arab Spring. Jordan is also a resource-scarce country that relies on hydrocarbon imports from its neighbors, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to supply 95 percent of its energy needs. While the region has been dealing with invasions

by Western forces, the overthrow of autocratic regimes, and extremely violent manifestations of Islamic political ambitions, Jordan’s main problem remains energy scarcity.

In a world where national borders no longer serve to insulate domestic from international affairs, regional events of the past decade, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS have largely shaped and remodeled Jordan’s relationships to its neighbors, especially in relation to energy ties. While Jordan continues to consolidate the Hashemite

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political rule over the country, and to assert its stable position amidst regional conflict, it is also necessary to consider key aspects of the economy like energy security, and to move towards a more self-sufficient electricity and fuel economy.

Historically, Jordan’s political inclinations have largely been shaped by its energy needs. For example, in 1979, Jordan’s King Hussein allied himself with Saddam Hussein’s regime and enjoyed significant economic support and a desperately-needed discount on its oil supplies. These Jordanian-Iraqi relations obligated King Hussein to side with Iraq in his invasion of Iran in the 1980s, as well as his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It can be argued that Hussein’s backing of Baghdad was motivated by factors other than energy: countering the threat of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1980, and salvaging public opinion for a monarchy that was struggling to remain in power in 1990. Regardless of whether its motivation was or wasn’t oil, Jordan’s backing of Iraq provided only a short term solution to its energy needs. The US-backed invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime led to the loss of sizable oil subsidies from

Iraq, putting Jordan in a vulnerable situation with respect to energy needs.

King Abdullah of Jordan, who inherited the throne from his father in 1999, also inherited his legacy of energy vulnerability. Throughout his regime, Abdullah, who lost the historically reliable source of energy from Iraq, sought to diversify the country’s energy sources. His quest for energy security was aided by the construction of the Arab Gas Pipeline, which helped facilitate gas exports from Egypt to Jordan, as well as to Syria and Lebanon. The Arab Gas Pipeline allowed Jordan to rely on Egyptian gas for 80 percent of its electricity generation needs. But this over-reliance on gas from Egypt proved to be a grave mistake, as the country would learn in 2011. The Arab Spring, which brought down the Mubarak regime that January, created large disturbances in gas exports.

The popular uprisings in Egypt, in addition to terrorist attacks on the Arab Gas Pipeline reduced gas exports to Jordan by about 65 percent, adding an additional cost of $1 billion to the Jordanian energy budget.

Jordan’s vulnerability as a result of external events coincided with

columbia political review :: spring 2015 internal economic turmoil. The popular uprisings in Egypt came at a particularly inconvenient time for the Jordanian government, which was facing pressure to reduce energy subsidies to its people in order to acquire a $2 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund.

Energy subsidies have cost the Jordanian government about one fifth of its annual budget. Despite the large impact they have had on the government’s spending, energy subsidies are the most prominent safety net policies supporting impoverished communities in Jordan. With about 20 percent of its population living below the poverty line, defined as less than $1.25 a day, the subsidy cut remains one of the most challenging reforms the government has dealt with to date. The cuts to energy subsidies subjected the government to public criticism at a time when the Arab Spring spread fears of a popular uprising and a revolt against the monarchy. In November 2012, when the subsidy cut was announced at the beginning of the winter, thousands took the streets of Amman to protest the reform.

King Abdullah has managed to overcome the largest uprisings in the wake of the Arab Spring in Amman, and continues to deal with questions of energy security today. The civil war in Syria, which has been ongoing for the past three years, poses a particular problem for Jordan that puts further stress on resource needs.

Currently, Jordan is the only country

with borders open to Syrian refugees, after Lebanon announced that it was closing its borders in November 2014.

Jordan has absorbed more than 3 million refugees in three waves over the years, the first bringing in Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, the second bringing in Iraqi refugees in the early 2000s, and now the third bringing about 1 million Syrians into Jordan’s borders. There is historical and growing resentment towards refugee communities in Jordan; many Jordanians argue that resource scarcities are exacerbated by large influxes of Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians among other refugees. The government is placed in a difficult position of having to deal with the infrastructural and resource needs of its refugee populations while providing concessions for the host community of Jordanians who feel alienated by increased attention and funding directed at refugees.

With rising stress on energy resources in the country, Jordan has been looking for alternatives to solve its shortages. The country has taken an unprecedented step by signing a gas deal with Israel in October 2014.

The 15 year deal to buy 1.6 trillion cubic feet of gas for $15 billion from Israel’s offshore Tamar and Leviathan reservoirs by 2017 will reduce Jordan’s annual energy bill by an estimated $1.4 billion a year. The deal, which is being referred to as a “pipeline for peace” in Israel, is controversial given Jordan’s relationship with Israel. Jordan signed a peace treaty

features with Israel in 1994, becoming the second Arab country, after Egypt, to normalize its relationship with the regional neighbor. In addition to defining the borders between the two countries, the clauses of the peace treaty address the issue of sharing natural resources. Despite a decade of bilateral economic relations with Israel, this is the first major deal of resource trade between the two countries.

The deal was met with enormous public disapproval from Jordanian civil society. This is expected and understandable considering that 50 percent of the population is of Palestinian origin or descent, and bitterness about the Israeli occupation of Palestine persists. The deal is viewed as a step toward the normalization of relations between Jordan and Israel, though no concessions on the Israeli side are made. There have been several protests organized

by Jordanian groups, including environmentalists and engineers. There is also disapproval of the deal from within government ranks. Yahya Mohammad Al Saud, a member of the Jordanian parliament and president of the parliamentary committee on Palestine, emphatically remarked: “The Jordanian [people are] not willing to accept this agreement. I will return to riding on a donkey and heating my house with wood before I would consider taking gas from Israel.”

This deal is particularly striking for many reasons. First, it can be ar-

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features gued that most of the negotiations between the involved parties, including the Jordanian government, the Israeli government and members of the US State Department were conducted behind closed doors and kept hidden away from the eyes of the public. In addition, the deal was signed a month after Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza during the Summer of 2014. The operation killed 2100 Palestinians, mostly civilians, destroyed 17,000 homes and left a quarter of Gaza’s 1.2 million inhabitants displaced. The deal is thus extremely insensitive to the opinion of Palestinians, and shows the regime’s general disregard for public opinion and willingness to isolate its people.

Putting aside public reception of the deal, it is important to consider the geopolitical implications of Jordan’s decision to import gas from Israel. Beyond providing discounted energy, this deal also guarantees Jordan an Israeli commitment to security vis-a-vis Washington. The deal promises Jordan all forms of protection, whether it be economic, political or otherwise, in an unstable time when its domestic economy struggles, the fate of Syria and Iraq is unknown, and the threat of ISIS persists.

The deal also has important implications for Israel’s position in the region. Despite some criticism, Israel has viewed the deal as an extremely important step in forming major economic ties with its neighbors.

Situated in a region with abundant resources, Israel never dreamed of consolidating its economic position through energy exports. But now that Egypt, which not only supplied gas to Jordan, but also to most of the region through the Arab Gas Pipeline, is out of the question, and with a growing dependence on gas as opposed to oil, Israel is offered an unprecedented opportunity to become self-sufficient in energy production and to lead energy exports in the region.

Additionally, the Tamar and Leviathan Gas reservoirs are located in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of Haifa, just kilometers away

from two gas reservoirs off the shore of Gaza. The two Gaza Marine reservoirs, discovered in 1999, contain 1.4 trillion cubic feet of gas that are owned by the Palestinian authority according to a 1994 agreement. After Hamas’ rise to power in 2007 however, the naval restrictions imposed as part of Israel’s siege on Gaza reduced offshore access. The US State Department, in an effort to foster peace in the region, hosted a series of negotiations addressing the Palestinian Authority’s rights to drill, explore, and export gas; however, these negotiations have failed to result in the Palestinian production of gas. As a result, the West Bank and the occupied Palestinian territories remain

the region in the coming fifteen years, making the decision to rely on Israeli energy a big gamble on Jordan’s part.

There is no denying that the Jordanian government is in an extremely challenging situation. It seems that the external events of the region have unraveled in Jordan, a country that does not have the resource capacity to even support its internal deficiencies. As the region enters into stages of continuing violence and uncertainty, Jordan must look towards internal sources of energy, making it more politically independent from its neighbors. Historical events show that over-reliance on one source of energy creates a situation that is susceptible to instability, and falling into the same historical mistakes by signing a gas deal with Israel is not the solution. Beyond all the political controversies relating to the current deal, and the way it undermines efforts to broker an agreement for a fair situation for Palestinians, Jordan should listen to the will of its people when making economic choices. In addition to the potential of producing liquefied natural gas internally, energy options for Jordan include the possibility of exploring nuclear power or renewable energy.

Jordan’s nuclear program is already under examination, with two operational 1000 megawatt power plants to be operational by 2025. There is less work done on renewables, however the mostly desert climate of the country makes solar energy a viable alternative option. Whatever path Jordan decides to pursue to secure its future energy needs, the plans must be inclusive of the general public who are the primary stakeholders in the economic situation relating to energy.•

“Historically, Jordan’s political inclinations have largely been shaped by its energy needs.”

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dependent on Israeli gas. Instead of attempting to empower the Palestinian territories to produce their own energy, the gas deal between Jordan and Israel undermines Palestinian efforts at economic independence and further isolates any opportunity for the Palestinian Authority to exploit its gas resources.

Lastly, despite the economic benefits of the deal, importing gas from Israel does not solve Jordan’s question of energy security. The Jordanian Ministry of Energy has claimed that the deal will diversify Jordan’s energy sources; however, given the projected import capacity, it is likely that Jordan will rely on Israel more than it had previously relied on Egypt for gas. Additionally, The fifteen year timeline of the deal is very long, especially considering the volatility of relations between Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. In fact, the deal already came under threat immediately after the agreement in October 2014. In November, Jordan took the unprecedented step of recalling its ambassador after clashes in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa mosque.

There is no guarantee of stability in

N. Fattaleh, CC’17, is a Sustainable Development and Economics major. She is Palestinian-Jordanian and is interested in questions of energy, resources, and sustainability as they to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

She can be reached at: nf2337@columbia.edu.

columbia political review :: spring 2015

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Seoul Mates

The prospects for Korean reunification

By Sophia Kang

I

ndependence from Japanese colonial rule was short lived in August, 1945 when a month later the 38th Parallel was drawn between the two Koreas. In the subsequent years, the two Koreas formed two very different social structures, shifting from a time of war to a shaky period of truce. Seventy years have passed since the division of Korea and the Northern regime has now reached its third successor, Kim Jong-Un. Many believed that the young leader Kim Jong-Un would not be able to hold together the isolated, poverty stricken, and economically stagnated North Korea. Until last year, talks about an imminent reunification were prevalent in South Korea, attested by South Korean

President Park Geun-hye’s emphasis on reunification in her 2014 New Year’s press conference. She was not alone in her anticipation. A number of analysts inside and outside the nation also asserted that Kim Jong-Un would lead the brittle regime to its end. Bruce Bennet, a senior defense analyst at RAND, argued that “there is a reasonable probability that North Korean totalitarianism will end in the foreseeable future.” Despite all the buzz of an imminent fall, North Korea stands to this day, ironically to the relief of many countries in the region. However, it is for the benefit of all Koreans and the international community that the two Koreas be unified.

The end goal for North Korea, like

any other state, is the preservation of the current regime. It threatens countries about war and devastation yet chooses concession if its needs— usually aid requests—are met. The truth is, unless North Korea poses a real threat, no one—the United States, China, Japan or even South Korea—actually wants North Korea to crumble. In her op-ed to the New York Times, Sue Mi Terry, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asia Institute, states that its neighbors respond to North Korea under “a policy of soft containment,” triggered by the “fear that its demise would be too destabilizing” for the region. China does not want a surge of refugees on its border, nor does it want increased US military presence in the area to secure the region on behalf of South Korea. ROK to this day has still referred its Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the United States military and hosts over 28,000 American troops. Japan and the United States, which perhaps hold the smallest stake in Korean Reunification, have no reason to want an additional drastic change in the already volatile politics in the region triggered by China’s rise; the nations choose to live with DPRK rather than induce regime change. Most recently, in 2012 the Obama administration agreed to give DPRK 240,000 metric tons of food supplies in exchange for DPRK allowing its nuclear facilities to be examined by international inspectors. United States policy towards North Korea has been forged based on immediate reactions to North Korea with no long-term initiative or plan to change the status quo towards reunification. This tendency is evident when examining how the Obama administration responded to North Korea’s recent Sony hack. This was not the first time North Korea has launched an attack on the United States or its allies; nonetheless, the administration decided to place heavy sanctions on North Korea after the Sony attack. The hacking violat25

features ed the freedom of expression, a right held dearly in the United States, but the attack was more about the international reputation of the United States. These sanctions were a onetime punitive measure, and were not part of any long-term vision for Korean reunification.

Most importantly, both the South Korean government and the public do not want to be reunified, at least not now. Despite President Park Geun-hye’s hopeful 2014 speech detailing how Korea will hit a “jackpot” with reunification, both the government and the public know that reunification will not be beneficial to South Korea in the short-run. Currently the GDP of the South is said to be 80 times that of the North. The cost of developing and aiding North Korea would become a heavy burden for South Korean taxpayers and could stifle the economy. The case of Korean reunification based on familial sentiments is becoming increasingly diffused as the older generation dissipates and memories fade. A vague outlook of unguaranteed future prosperity will not be enough to motivate the population, especially the younger generation, towards actively supporting reunification. According to a 2013 poll by the think tank Youido Institute, sponsored by Korea’s conservative and current majority party, the Saenuri Party, a little over a half of Korea’s college students believe that reunification is necessary. People on either side of the debate increasingly quote economic rather than historical or sentimental reasons for their opinions.

So why did Park Geun-hye talk so much about reunification in her speech? The government has not had a consistent plan for reunification, and such plans have not emerged until recently. In fact, in a special interview by Hankyoreh, a leading news outlet in Korea, critics called Park Geun-hye out as rash and sensationalist. She could have wanted to divert national attention from internal issues or to appease her main constituents, the older generation who support the cause of reunification.

Most importantly, though, she may have thought that reunification might not be something that South Korea could choose but rather something that was forced as the North Korean 26

columbia political review :: spring 2015 government loses its grip. Whatever her thoughts were, there is reason for South Korea and the nearby regional powers to start thinking seriously and planning for the repercussions of Korean reunification. Without a social, economic and international safety net for South Korea in the case of a sudden fall of North Korea, the country might never be able to recover from ensuing social unrest and economic crises.

Even though Kim Jong-Un seems to have solidified his rule, it is difficult to know what is going on inside the opaque workings of the country.

North Korea has been marred with severe poverty, famine, natural disasters and plagues. People who have escaped have testified to a change in how the public views the ruling party and an increase in vocalized dissidence and dissatisfaction inside the nation. According to a NK news’ refugee insight interview series, most of the 11 defectors believe that the regime will fall sometime in the next decade. There is some evidence of information flow into North Korea through popular South Korean dra-

mas which have been smuggled into the country and convey images of economic prosperity and democratic values.

North Korea is more isolated than ever with the imposition of heavy sanctions and China’s conscious distancing from the Kim regime as its own international reputation and economic ties with South Korea grow.

Ever since North Korea has pursued its nuclear development program the United States and the United Nations have been imposing strict sanctions on the country, including UN sanctions that penalize North Korean banking, travel and trade. Moreover, in the 2013 UN Security Council vote to implement these sanctions, China helped the United States draft the sanctions resolution and agreed to it, showing that China is starting to distance itself from DPRK. South Korea has also been imposing its toughest round of restrictions against North Korean aid, banning any type of trade, travel or investments into North Korea following the May 2010 Cheonan sinking, when a South Korea Navy ship was allegedly attacked

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columbia political review :: spring 2015 by the North. Kim Jong-Un’s execution of his uncle Jang Sung-Taek— who was Kim Jong-Il’s main envoy to China and was interested in economic reform—and Kim Jong-Un’s decision to visit Russia before China this year indicates the growing rift between China and the North.

For South Korea, reunification can be a breakthrough for its economy since there is a limit to how much the country can expand with such a small home market and lack of resources, while it is constrained by security issues and military spending and blocked to the north. According to Sue Mi Terry, Seoul currently allocates $30 billion dollars to military spending every year, and reunification could end South Korea’s universal conscription and shrink its military personnel from 680,000 to 500,000. Through reunification, South Korea will gain a larger market, natural resources, and a larger population, contributing to its national strength. It will also gain direct access to Eurasia and the opportunity to participate in land-based trade. In a 2009 report, Goldman Sachs states that a unified Korea could trump the GDP of France, Germany and Japan within 30 to 40 years.

Without proper preparation however, the Korean economy might just evaporate before it even has a chance to explore its possibilities.

Another equally important and often neglected reason to support reunification is the massive human rights problems of the North. Although the secrecy of the nation prevents the international community from seeing much of the situation in North Korea, it is no secret that the North Korean regime is the perpetrator of numerous human rights violations, and that many inside the nation live in terrible conditions.

According to Human Rights Watch, between 80,000 and 120,000 people are imprisoned in North Korea’s forced labor camps. The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry’s report on North Korea revealed the devastating conditions of the country. 84 percent of North Korean households had “borderline” or “poor” levels of food consumption in 2013 even as Kim Jong-Un spent $645,800,000

on luxury goods in 2012. Members of North Korea’s political establishment could likely be sent to the International Court of Justice if the regime ends, thus gradual reunification is not a viable option for the South Korean public.

South Korea must start to prepare for reunification. With the right precautions, the possibilities that reunification will open are immeasurable.

First, South Korea needs a long-term, bipartisan and consistent plan for reunification that provides social safety nets for possible social unrest and ensuing value conflicts after reunification. It also requires economic precautions, plans and funds to provide for the massive cost of reunification.

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specified some of the

and Russia have never been its allies.

In the possible case of reunification, and in the subsequent process of maintaining security, securing borders and requesting help, there is an ample opportunity for miscommunication and disagreement. A weakened Korea might be dominated politically or economically by another country. South Korea and other relevant nations should have a mutual agreement on what procedures they would follow in the possible case of reunification, and what limits should be set on intervention. Most importantly though, Korea must lead this process of agreement, and in the case of the collapse of DPRK it must be prepared to lead the process of stabilization and reunification.

Time is limited in Korea to prepare for reunification. The North Korean regime may fall unexpectedly and the cost of reunification will only grow as the two Koreas remain separated. Regional politics in East Asia are changing drastically, and it is questionable if Korea could afford such a major setback at a time when its strongest neighbor, China, seems to be accelerating towards regional hegemony. The growing distance between North Korea and China signals that today might be ripe for China’s help in the reunification process, while if the North Korean regime does not fall or reunification does not happen in the next few decades, the concept of a single Korea might just fade into history. It is questionable whether the younger Koreans just a few generations into the future, who no longer have ties to the North or any surviving memories of a unified Korea, would even consider reunification as a national agenda. If the two Koreas remain split for another fifty or a hundred years, they may permanently view themselves as two separate nations.•

“ South Korea must be willing to play an active and leading role in the process of reunification and juggle the interests of its neighbors.” safety nets that ROK must start to build in his article for The National Interest. Some administrative works might be to “consider such questions as property ownerships, status of foreign contracts, treatment of human rights criminals, amnesty provision and more.” Most of all, the plans should not be subject to the tendency of South Korean policies to be undone and newly forged every time the president changes. South Korea must be willing to play an active and leading role in the process of reunification and juggle the interests of its neighbors. Unlike Germany, who had its long term allies in the Western European nations when it was unified, South Korea has no true friends in the region. It might have United States as its ally, but the extent to which the United States can intervene in the Korean peninsula without threatening China is limited. The South Korean public still remembers Japan’s brutal colonial rule less than a century ago, and communist China

Sophia Kang is a sophomore at Columbia College potentially majoring Political Science and Mathematics.

She spent the first half of her life in New Jersey and the other half in Ansan, Korea. She is interested in economic development and conflict resolution. She can be reached at: sk3815@columbia.edu.

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