JCPAR Global Affairs

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

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Equitable Futures in Global Affairs Congressman Gregory Meeks When I announced my candidacy for chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late 2020, I said I would be guided by a simple principle: the understanding that our foreign policy is inseparable from domestic justice. That conviction was shaped by two of my mentors, the late former Representatives Charlie Rangel and Donald Payne Sr., who understood that the fight for justice does not end at our borders. They believed America’s credibility abroad depends on how faithfully we pursue justice at home.

At the time, I wrote: “America cannot inspire leadership and change without moral authority. The American story - of a nation that fought itself free from colonial rule and established that all men are created equal - is the story that first positioned America to become the global champion for liberty and democracy. But that story is also checkered – of a nation founded on the genocide of Native Americans, made prosperous through the labor of my enslaved ancestors... and struggles still to deliver equality and justice for all.”

Throughout my time in Congress, I’ve worked to bend America’s foreign policy to its strength, ensuring it is guided by our foundational principles and draws from the tremendous source of talent and diversity unique to the United States.

One of my first acts as chairman was to address the lack of diversity at the State Department. In the first comprehensive legislation authorizing the State Department in nearly twenty years, we enacted reforms to strengthen recruitment and remove structural barriers to advancement into senior leadership. A diplomatic corps that reflects America’s diversity is not symbolic. It strengthens decision making, challenges groupthink, and reduces strategic blind spots.

That’s why this past year, despite efforts by Republicans to undercut work on diversity, I fought to preserve the Rangel, Payne, and related fellowship programs that serve as pipelines for the next generation of American diplomats and development professionals. Representation in foreign policy is not identity politics, it’s smart statecraft.

I’ve also committed to ensuring U.S. diplomats engage with parts of the world that have historically been on the backburner to move those regions, especially Latin America and Africa, onto the front burner. Our relationships with these regions shouldn’t be viewed solely through the lens of “great power competition.” Engagement must be rooted in partnership, mutual growth, and democratic values.

It is also strategic. Take Africa, for example, which is the youngest and fastest growing continent. We have centuries of ties between our people, who both prosper when African and American democracies thrive.

That’s why I supported the reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), noting we need to remove barriers to trade between the US and Africa to promote true two-way economic partnership through trade and investment. AGOA was not conceived as a geopolitical counterweight to any other country. As visionary colleagues like Charlie Rangel recognized when initiating it 25 years ago, AGOA was a way to offer a hand of friendship to Africa and forge a path for greater prosperity through economic growth.

I also advanced legislation in 2024 requiring the President to convene the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit every two years, institutionalizing structured, regular engagement at the highest levels. Durable partnerships require consistency and respect, not episodic attention.

Across the Western Hemisphere, I’ve prioritized expanding political inclusion and economic opportunity for Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Latino, and Afro-Indigenous communities disproportionately affected by poverty violence, climate disasters, and political exclusion. Working with Alcee L. Hastings and John Lewis, I helped secure appropriations

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directing the State Department to strengthen initiatives that promote racial equity and combat discrimination. John’s leadership on the appropriations committee was instrumental in securing the funding.

During the presidency of Alvaro Uribe’s sustained U.S. Congressional engagement helped encourage the appointment of Colombia’s first Afro-Colombian cabinet minister and brought long overdue attention to the marginalized Pacific coast. Inclusive governance strengthens democratic institutions and enhances regional stability.

Unfortunately, much of this progress has faced headwinds. The Trump Administration’s termination of initiatives such as Prosper Africa, reductions in refugee and visa pathways, and deep cuts to foreign assistance signal a retreat from sustained partnership. U.S. foreign policy has gone from constructive engagement to transactional and extractive neo-colonialism.

The greatest misunderstanding in U.S. foreign policy – and certainly in this administration - is the belief that America’s power comes from its military dominance or isolationist bluster. History teaches otherwise. America’s power is in its example, in its ability to lead coalitions of allies grounded in democracy, human rights, and shared responsibility. The world is too small and interconnected to go it alone.

Restoring U.S. leadership requires repairing the damage of the Trump Administration and advancing a vision for foreign policy that plays to our strengths. That vision must center on democratic inclusion, economic partnership, and principled engagement. It must recognize that supporting marginalized communities abroad reinforces our democratic resilience here at home. And while the story of America has often been one of “two steps forward, one step back,” we have always worked to bend the moral arc of the universe towards justice.

That work must go on.

and is a senior member of the Financial Services Committee. A former Queens assistant district attorney and state assemblymember, Meeks has shaped key financial reforms and championed economic equity, global cooperation, and inclusive growth. He has secured major investments in transportation, housing, and economic development across his district, while advancing policies that expand opportunity and strengthen communities at home and abroad.

U.S. foreign policy has gone from constructive engagement to transactional and extractive neo-colonialism.

Congressman Gregory Weldon Meeks is an American lawyer and politician proudly serving the constituents of New York’s Fifth Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

First elected in 1998, he now serves as Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

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Building in an Age of Destruction Dr. Amara C. Enyia JD More than 50 years ago, the Honorable Chairman Fred Hampton of the Illinois Black Panther Party said, “Nothing is more important than stopping fascism, because fascism will stop us all”. He and other freedom fighters were clear about the threats of fascism, capitalism, and imperialism, and, like so many of our ancestors, sounded the alarm. Our ancestors offered clarity and conviction about what and who we are in fact fighting for.

This is the time for world-building. The age of destruction requires builders, not spectators. The ravages of imperialism require not just geopolitical realignment, but a realignment of values. No longer is profit supreme. No longer are people mere subjects to be exploited by the powerful. No longer can cruelty lead. No longer can Black people turn a blind eye to the ravages of imperialism on our people inside and outside of the United States. We must care. We must lead with moral clarity, and we must lead with a fundamental belief in our collective right to live and thrive, wherever we are on the planet.

It was El Hajj Malik El-Shabazz (Malcolm X) who, with a clear Pan Africanist, Black internationalist politic, warned us about the limitations of fighting for “civil rights” under US law and asserted that we must fight for human rights. He said that we must internationalize our struggle by aligning with freedom movements in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Our forebears understood that our fight is not just a fight within the United States, and that in fact, a civil rights-only approach is insufficient. They knew that our consciousness must expand to Black people around the world if we are to truly take on the heart of injustice and oppression. They understood that capitalism and imperialism imperil the entire planet.

Black people must collectively determine whether we are willing to stand on generations of principle that called out injustice anywhere as a threat to justice everywhere. The United States is now witnessing

what happens when the veil between US foreign and domestic policy is removed - the raw and unfiltered face of imperialism. We are witnessing the merging of the police and the military as ICE goes on rampages across American cities detaining and sometimes killing citizens and non-citizens alike.

Millions are suffering under an affordability crisis, including lack of access to housing. At the same time, trillions of dollars are being allocated to the “Department of War” to fund the United States war machine, arm-twisting other countries, exploiting their resources, and in more recent cases, kidnapping sovereign heads of state, as evidenced by the US’s most recent entry into war with Iran.

Some who complained that the Black left was “too radical”, “too disruptive”, and should be satisfied with inches of progress, are now wringing their hands in dismay as we watch those inches being rolled back by miles and the integrationist dream disintegrate in the fire of lawsuits against DEI programs, more than 300,000 Black women knocked out of the workforce, a lagging economy for the working class, and massive healthcare debt with no healthcare access.

As our worlds become increasingly connected, we are able to see the impacts of US imperialism not just on Black people at home, but our people abroad. We must pay attention when US interests undergird missile attacks in Nigeria. When the US engages in regime-change operations by assassinating the heads of state of other countries.

We cannot turn away from the images of children exploited in mines for critical minerals in Democratic Republic of Congo. We cannot ignore Haitians languishing in a failed state, caused in part by a USled overthrow of the first Haitian president to demand reparations from France. We cannot ignore the agreements that proffer “aid” in one hand, and exploitative access to African country’s natural resources in the other.

None of these imperialist exploits will make our communities any

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safer. None of this will result in our thriving. None of these exploits will create jobs, safety, or security for us and our loved ones. The only beneficiaries of the US imperial order are oligarchs and the technofeudalist class who themselves recognize the beast they have created globally and are therefore constructing their own “doomsday” bunkers.

It is our job to connect the dots between what is happening locally, nationally and internationally, and the material conditions of our day to day lives and to more intentionally connect with Black people around the world who are also rising up against the current oppressive “rules-based order” that has left them collectively impoverished and oppressed.

Do we desire to be a part of the world-destroying imperialist project?

Or do we want to be on the side of humanity? After all, what we are facing is a crisis of humanity. Black people have always shown and demonstrated a commitment to the cause of humanity. Now is the time for us to lean into that lineage. If we care about the future, we must set about building life-affirming systems and structures, connecting our people across the diaspora and acknowledging our shared destiny.

This means that we must, in the lineage of our ancestors Assata Shakur, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Patrice Lumumba, Winnie Mandela, Claudia Jones, and so many others, get clear about what we are up against. Integration and assimilation into a failing project is not an option, but joining with our people around the world for a human rights cause is our only way through the crisis to a better outcome, a better world on the other side; the world that we will build.

Dr. Amara C. Enyia JD, is a strategist working at the local, national and international level in the realm of public policy, advocacy and organizing. She serves as Co-Executive Director for the Movement for Black Lives, as Senior Fellow and Senior Director of Global Initiatives at the Institute on Race, Power, and Political Economy at The New School in New York City, and leads the transnational advocacy project,

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Global Black. Dr. Enyia also chairs the International Civil Society Working Group for the United Nations Permanent Forum on People of African Descent and the Global Economic Systems, Institutions, and Policy Working Group, a group of economists and global economists working on issues of monetary sovereignty, debt, and transformation of economic systems and frameworks.

No longer can Black people turn a blind eye to the ravages of imperialism on our people inside and outside of the United States.

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Amplifying Black Perspectives: Spotlight on Global Affairs Which of the following best describes the impact of the Trump Administration’s immigration policies on Black communities?

More than 85% of respondents indicated that President Trump’s immigration policies have worsened the lives of Black Americans.

Unsure

8%

President Trump’s immigration policies have not affected the lives of Black Americans

6%

President Trump’s immigration policies have worsened the lives of Black Americans

86%

President Trump’s immigration policies have improved the lives of Black Americans President Trump’s immigration policies have not affected the lives of Black Americans President Trump’s immigration policies have worsened the lives of Black Americans Unsure

DATA SOURCE: THE CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH AMPLIFYING BLACK PERSPECTIVES DATA PROJECT. RESULTS ARE BASED ON ANALYSIS OF AN ONLINE SURVEY OF 187 BLACK-IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS CONDUCTED BETWEEN JANUARY 14 – 30, 2026.

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U.S.- Africa Economic Relations Policy Landscape The relationship between the United States and Sub-Saharan African nations has evolved significantly over the past seven decades, shaped by decolonization, humanitarian initiatives, and economic partnership. In 1958, the U.S. Department of State established the Bureau of African Affairs, formalizing diplomatic engagement with the continent for the first time. The decolonization of African states reaches its zenith in 1960, dubbed the “Year of Africa”, when 17 nations gained independence from colonial power. The continent’s underwent transformations demanded a new posture from Washington. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to coordinate foreign economic assistance, laying the institutional groundwork for decades of U.S.-Africa engagement. These early initiatives reflected a recognition that newly independent African states would be critical global partners for the United States.

The turn of the century marked a fundamental shift in U.S.-Africa economic relations, moving beyond traditional aid models toward trade-based partnership. Signed into law by President Clinton in 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provided eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to American markets for thousands of products, from agricultural goods to textiles and manufactured items. By creating economic incentives for African nations to pursue market-based reforms, improve governance, and protect workers’ rights, AGOA facilitated the AGOA Acceleration Act to extend the program through 2015 and reinforce America’s commitment to African economic development. As global competition for influence in Africa intensifies, AGOA remains a critical tool for deepening U.S.-Africa commercial ties. However, advocates continue to fight for the program’s renewal and expansion, arguing that sustained investment in African trade capacity, infrastructure, and manufacturing will be essential for building equitable economic partnerships that benefit both American and African communities.

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Today, U.S.-Africa economic relations stand at a crossroads. In 2024, USAID managed more than $35 billion in appropriations, but on January 27, 2025, President Trump ordered a funding freeze for all USAID programming and operations were ceased on July 1, 2025, and over 80% of programs were canceled. Then, in September 2025, AGOA expired, later receiving a one-year extension until December 2026, but the long-term future of the legislation remains unclear. The stakes of renewal are high: U.S. goods and services trade with Africa totaled an estimated $104.9 billion in 2024 and an estimated $83.4 billion in 2025. AGOA has supported hundreds of thousands of African jobs and anchored trade relationships that benefit American businesses. With China, the European Union, and Gulf states deepening their commercial and diplomatic footprints across the continent, the United States faces a pivotal choice about the depth and consistency of its engagement. Sustained investment in African trade capacity, infrastructure, and manufacturing will be essential for building equitable economic partnerships that benefit both American and African communities. The legislative decisions made next will shape the trajectory of U.S.-Africa relations for the decades ahead.

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Timeline August 20, 1958 The U.S. Department of State established the Bureau of African Affairs, formalizing American diplomatic engagement with the continent.

November 3, 1962 President John F. Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to coordinate economic foreign assistance programs.

1960 The “Year of Africa” saw seventeen African nations gain independence from colonial powers, fundamentally reshaping the continent’s political landscape.

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May 18, 2000 President Bill Clinton signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) into law, establishing preferential trade access for eligible sub-Saharan African countries.

October 2, 1986 Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over presidential veto, imposing sanctions on South Africa until the release of Nelson Mandela and establishment of a timeline to end apartheid.

Spring 1978 President Jimmy Carter became the first sitting U.S. president to make an official state visit to sub-Saharan Africa, meeting with leaders in Nigeria and Liberia.

January 23, 2004 President George W. Bush established the Millennium Challenge Corporation to combat global poverty through economic growth initiatives, with thirty-two African nations eligible for funding.

July 9, 2002 The Organization of African Unity merged with the African Economic Community to form the African Union, creating a stronger continental body.

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July 1, 2025 USAID operations cease, with about 80% of programs cancelled following the funding freeze.

July 12, 2004 The AGOA Acceleration Act extended the trade program through 2015.

November 28, 2012 The U.S. launched the Doing Business in Africa campaign to promote commercial ties.

November 4, 2008 Barack Obama, son of a Kenyan, became the first African American president of the United States.

August 4-6, 2014 The first U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit convened in Washington, D.C., with President Obama announcing $20 billion in investments for energy projects alongside commitments to gender equality, global health, youth development, food security, and climate resilience.

June 30, 2013 President Barack Obama launched the Power Africa initiative to expand electricity access across sub-Saharan Africa.

September 30, 2025 AGOA expired; a oneyear extension was later approved with a new expiration date of December 31, 2026.

January 27, 2025 The Trump Administration froze USAID funding and placed over 50% of the staff on leave.

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Civil Rights Leadership and the Future of American Diplomacy Asha Castleberry Hernandez and Christopher Shell, PhD The United States’ global role is in flux. President Donald Trump’s insurgent presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2024 are often discussed primarily in terms of their divisive domestic consequences.

Yet, they have also coincided with an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. This shift has taken the form of a renewed emphasis on military primacy in the Western Hemisphere reminiscent of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and the embrace of naked military aggression, the imposition of visa bans disproportionately affecting racialized nations, skepticism toward long-standing alliances, and a broader retreat from multilateral institutions.

For many Black intellectuals and activists, the struggle for democratic rights domestically was inseparable from global questions of empire, colonialism, racial hierarchy, and human rights. From the early twentieth century onward, African American political thought consistently treated domestic racial justice and international order as interconnected rather than disparate domains. This tradition is best illustrated by the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, whose leadership within the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) reflected a broader intellectual commitment to linking Jim Crow to global imperialism. Du Bois argued that colonial domination and military adventurism abroad were extensions of the same racial hierarchies structuring inequality at home. His critique of the U.S. occupation of Haiti, for example, made this connection explicit, framing foreign intervention and the coercive practices developed abroad as inevitably reverberating domestically. In this tradition, African American political thought has long understood U.S. foreign

policy not as peripheral to domestic well-being, but as central to the nation’s democratic legitimacy.i This position, however, became increasingly tenuous due to Cold War politics. Du Bois was ultimately forced out of the NAACP amid accusations of insufficient anti-communism, and the organization retreated from its more forceful critiques of colonialism as domestic anti-communist repression intensified—often disproportionately targeting African American intellectuals. Yet even amid Cold War repression and attacks on figures such as Du Bois and many others for their anti-colonial activism, the acceleration of the civil rights movement in the 1960s did not mark a retreat from the international arena.

Leading civil rights leaders such as Malcolm X and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., exemplified this approach. While best known for their leadership in the domestic civil rights movement, both articulated political visions that extended well beyond U.S. borders. Malcolm X, for his part, linked the African American struggle to anti-colonial movements such as the Mau Mau in Kenya, and was vocal in his critique of the West’s role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s democratically elected leader. King’s public denunciation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam was born out of a concern that resources in the war effort could otherwise be used to support America’s most vulnerable populations. ii Like Du Bois before him, King understood the war in Vietnam in explicitly decolonial terms. He argued that U.S. military intervention not only endangered the lives of the nation’s most vulnerable communities,

i SEE ZACHARIAH MAMPILLLY, “THE DU BOIS DOCTRINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY,” SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2022; CRYSTAL EDDINS, “W.E.B. DU BOIS, HAITI, AND US IMPERIALISM,” BLACK PERSPECTIVES, JANUARY 28, 2020; ROBERT VITALIS, WHITE WORLD ORDER, BLACK POLITICS: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015). ii MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. “BEYOND VIETNAM”, STANFORD: MLK JR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTE, APRIL 4, 1967.

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particularly racial minorities and the poor, but also diverted resources away from addressing social inequality at home.iii For King, militarism abroad represented both a misallocation of national priorities and a continuation of the imperial logic that earlier generations of African American thinkers had long opposed.

By the post-1965 era, these intellectual traditions increasingly entered national political debate through electoral politics. Jesse Jackson, emerging from the same civil rights milieu as King, carried this global outlook into his 1980s presidential campaigns. Jackson did not shy away from engaging directly with international actors or challenging U.S. foreign policy orthodoxy. He practiced what became known as “citizen diplomacy,” engaging in peace negotiations, hostage releases, and dialogue with leaders Washington viewed as adversaries.

During his first campaign, Jackson traveled to Cuba, met directly with the communist government’s leader, Fidel Castro, and successfully negotiated the release of 22 American prisoners. While critics portrayed this as an endorsement of communism, they framed the efforts as humanitarian diplomacy, insisting that dialogue was necessary even with adversaries. He also met with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, including Yasser Arafat, at a time when the U.S. government refused formal contact. Jackson sought to distinguish Palestinian self-determination from extremist violence and situated the issue within broader struggles against racism and colonial domination.iv Consistent with earlier Black internationalist thought, Jackson also criticized expanding defense budgets and security commitments.

Rather than isolationism—a term often applied to those who question the general direction of U.S. foreign policy—this critique reflected a belief that excessive militarization fostered waste, enabled perpetual war, and disproportionately harmed racialized populations both at home and abroad while crowding out investment in domestic well-being.v

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In the late twentieth century, African American foreign policy thinking increasingly moved from grassroots and academic circles and into formal policymaking institutions. Figures such as Ron Dellums and Barbara Lee, both shaped by the Civil Rights Movement, carried these perspectives directly into Congress. While Jackson and others operated largely through informal channels, Dellums—elected to Congress in 1970—emerged as a leading progressive voice willing to challenge entrenched foreign policy consensus from within the legislative branch.

Opposition to the Vietnam War was not Dellums’s sole focus. He also questioned Cold War alliances justified by anti-communism, most notably U.S. support for apartheid South Africa. Responding to appeals from Black South African organizations such as the African National Congress, Dellums introduced legislation in 1972 calling for comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime.

At the time, Washington viewed South Africa as a strategic bulwark against Soviet influence in southern Africa, a position that required tolerating systemic human rights abuses. Dellums’s efforts directly challenged this logic.vi Although initially unsuccessful, Dellums’s legislative campaign opened sustained debate in Congress over U.S. policy toward South Africa, contributing to the eventual passage of comprehensive anti-apartheid sanctions in the 1980s as domestic and international opinion shifted.

This tradition of principled dissent by African American thought leaders, steeped in the Black freedom struggle, carried forward into the post-Cold War era. Following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, Congress passed two authorizations for the use of military force in support of then-President George W. Bush’s “war on terror.”

The 2001 AUMF granted the president the authority to wage war against any nation, organization, or individual deemed responsible for the 9/11 attacks, while the 2002 AUMF authorized the invasion of Iraq and removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power.

While both measures passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, Barbara Lee, someone who worked with the Black Panthers in the

IBID. SEE GERALD M. BOYD, JACKSON BACK IN U.S. FROM CUBA WITH PRISONERS SET FREE BY CASTRO, THE NEW YORK TIMES, JUNE 29, 1984;“JESSE JACKSON, ADVOCATING TALKS WITH P.L.O., MEETS CRITICS IN ISRAEL, THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25, 1979.

ANTONIO DE LOERA-BRUST, “JESSE JACKSON’S AMERICA FIRST” COMPACT, DECEMBER 9, 2024.

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and the expansive Global War on Terror underscored the risks she identified.

The legacy of African American civil rights leaders as foreign policy thinkers is particularly salient in the present moment.

1960s and 70s, used this moment to advocate for a more measured and judicious response—one that might have prevented larger problems down the road.

Lee was labeled “a traitor” for her dissent—a charge frequently directed at those who critiqued the U.S. foreign policy status quo. Yet her opposition was not rooted in a lack of political will, but rather in a deep concern that the AUMF eroded congressional war powers and lacked clear geographic or temporal limits. In hindsight, her warning was prescient. In the years since, the AUMF has been controversially interpreted to justify a wide range of military operations far beyond its original scope.vii Although Lee was not immediately successful in curbing presidential authority, her dissent created space for debate at a pivotal moment. The subsequent failures in Iraq and Afghanistan

The legacy of African American civil rights leaders as foreign policy thinkers is particularly salient in the present moment. At a time of ballooning defense budgets, renewed saber-rattling, and intensified debates over U.S. global leadership, this tradition offers critical insight.

As policymakers grapple with defining the United States’ role in the twenty-first century, the African American intellectual tradition continues to provide frameworks for understanding how the country might reduce harm abroad while more fully realizing the democratic principles it claims to uphold.

Systemic Challenges in American Diplomacy A future administration will likely inherit a diplomatic system significantly weakened during the Trump administration. Although ambassadorial confirmations are now proceeding gradually, the United States continues to lag behind China—its principal strategic competitor—in global diplomatic representation. As a result, U.S. leadership remains absent or downgraded across too many bilateral and multilateral engagements. A similar pattern emerged during the first Trump administration, when diminished diplomatic presence caused the United States to miss key opportunities to engage partners and secure competitive advantages alongside the international community.

Compounding this problem, the administration significantly diminished critical offices within the Department of State and effectively dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

At State, offices responsible for human rights, humanitarian assistance, and migration—including the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations—were hollowed out or eliminated. The most consequential example remains the dismantling of USAID itself.

CHRISTOPHER SHELL, “LESSONS FROM CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS MEMBERS’ LEADERSHIP IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AUGUST 21, 2025.

SEE “SHE WAS HE ONLY MEMBER OF CONGRESS TO VOTE AGAINST WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. SOME CALLED HER A TRAITOR.” THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 17, 2021; ANDREW LANHAM, “WHEN WEB DU BOIS WAS “UN-AMERICAN,” BOSTON REVIEW, JANUARY 13, 2017.

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While the administration has recently committed roughly two billion dollars to humanitarian assistance, this funding neither resolves the government’s underlying institutional weaknesses nor reflects a comprehensive global strategy. Instead, assistance has been selectively directed toward regions aligned with the administration’s transactional peace initiatives.

Finally, the United States withdrew from more than sixty international organizations, further disengaging from the global community at a time when cooperation on international norms, information sharing, and intelligence coordination is increasingly essential. This retrenchment has weakened the U.S. capacity to address transnational challenges ranging from terrorism and health security to emerging issues such as artificial intelligence.

Policy Recommendations: Institutionalize Civil Rights Leadership in American Diplomacy The United States should more deliberately integrate civil rights leaders into its diplomatic toolkit. Historically, African American civil rights figures have exercised moral authority and global credibility that often exceeded that of formal diplomats, particularly in the Global South. Their lived experience confronting the noxious effects of racial hierarchy and inequality gives them a unique standing in international discussions on human rights, sovereignty, and justice.

Future administrations should consider appointing respected civil rights leaders as special envoys or senior advisors to advance U.S. engagement on priority global issues, including peace negotiations, humanitarian access, hostage recovery, post-conflict reconciliation, trade and investment, and education initiatives. These appointments would not replace the professional diplomatic corps but complement it by expanding the United States’ ability to engage moral, religious, and civil society networks abroad.

Leverage Congressional and Civil Society Channels Even in the absence of full executive buy-in, meaningful engagement with Congress is still possible. The legislative branch—particularly the Congressional Black Caucus—can play a central role by inviting civil

The United States should more deliberately integrate civil rights leaders into its diplomatic toolkit.

rights leaders to participate in congressional delegations (CODELS), including them in meetings with visiting foreign leaders, partnering with HBCU international affairs programs, and formalizing engagement with organizations such as the NAACP to inform legislative approaches to pressing foreign policy challenges.

Congress could also develop a program modeled on subnational diplomacy, building on the growing role of state and local officials in international engagement. In recent years, governors have increasingly represented U.S. interests abroad, attending global forums and engaging directly with international institutions. For example, Governor Wes Moore has engaged in trade discussions in Southeast Asia in response to President Trump’s global tariff policies. These efforts demonstrate how subnational actors can supplement traditional diplomacy. Within this framework, Congress could extend similar opportunities to civil rights leaders by inviting them to participate in CODELs, foreign leader visits to the Capitol, and international parliamentary exchanges.

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Launch a White House Task Force A future administration should launch a White House task force.

The task force’s major objectives should include executing a comprehensive U.S. global engagement plan, supporting impactful legislative work, and managing a robust interagency process. To maximize its effectiveness, the task force could be formally linked to existing initiatives, such as the White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, ultimately linking domestic priorities to U.S. foreign policy strategies.

Implement U.S. Civil Rights Global Engagement The task force will need to create a comprehensive U.S. engagement plan. The plan should prioritize global engagement in the Global South, specifically in the Western Hemisphere and Africa. The task force should consider leading a future apology tour and humanitarian observation visits with influential stakeholders. Additionally, the task force will need to revive U.S. global leadership within international organizations and consider rejoining key treaties.

For example, the task force should appoint a civil rights leader with significant authority to represent the United States at the United Nations Human Rights Council and establish a White House Special Envoy on Racial Justice position with clear authority. The task force should also engage with international organizations representing African descendants of states. In addition, the task force must promote an effective messaging platform by coordinating public communications, ensuring consistent messaging across agencies, and advancing strategic messaging through new media outlets.

Legislative Affairs The task force should establish a legislative and policy platform that prioritizes the Global South by advancing critical initiatives, including Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for the Haitian community, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the reauthorization of PEPFAR. It should also advocate for targeted policy approaches to address the flow of illegally sourced weapons from the U.S. throughout the region and to expand U.S. engagement in emerging areas such as artificial intelligence and digital diplomacy.

In parallel, a future administration should establish a dedicated human rights task force and appoint a presidential envoy for global human rights. This role should be filled by a respected civil rights leader or influential advocate who can elevate U.S. credibility on human rights issues. Together, these efforts would help re-center U.S. foreign policy on addressing the most pressing challenges in the Global South. As geopolitical competition intensifies, restoring principled engagement and cultivating new partnerships, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa, will be essential to rebuilding American leadership.

Interagency Coordination The task force should establish a U.S. government-wide interagency process by working closely with relevant departments and agencies.

As an initial step, this process should conduct a rapid assessment of the effects of diminished American global leadership, with particular attention to the Global South and Europe.

If launched within the first 100 days of a future administration, the task force is likely to operate within a weakened diplomatic system, which could constrain coordination and implementation. These conditions may complicate efforts to build an effective interagency process. For this reason, the task force should initially rely more heavily on partnerships with the private sector and civil society to maximize its impact. Alternatively, the administration may consider formally launching the task force after the first 100-day period, once core diplomatic functions have been stabilized.

Conclusion At moments of deep precarity in global order, African American political thought has repeatedly offered a roadmap grounded in restraint, moral clarity, and an insistence that domestic democracy and U.S. foreign policy are intertwined. From Du Bois’s critique of imperial intervention, to Malcolm X and King’s condemnation of militarism, to the principled dissent of figures such as Jesse Jackson, Ron Dellums, and Barbara Lee, this tradition has consistently warned that unchecked power abroad corrodes democratic legitimacy at home.

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Today, the United States confronts a weakened diplomatic apparatus, eroded credibility, and an overreliance on coercive tools in a multipolar world that increasingly depends on legitimacy, partnership, and moral authority. Reintegrating civil rights leadership into American diplomacy is a strategic necessity. These leaders bring global credibility, transnational networks, and a lived understanding of how inequality and domination undermine stability—insights that are urgently needed as Washington seeks to rebuild trust, particularly in the Global South.

As policymakers debate the future of U.S. leadership in a rapidly changing international order, the African American intellectual tradition offers not nostalgia, but guidance; a vision of American statecraft that privileges restraint over dominance, dialogue over isolation, and democratic principle over expedience. Reclaiming this tradition may be essential to restoring U.S. diplomacy itself.

Asha Castleberry-Hernandez is a U.S. national security and foreign policy expert. She is currently a Senior Fellow at Diplomatic Courier. She was recently appointed to serve as Chairwoman of Congressman George Latimer’s (NY-16) Foreign Affairs Task Force. Asha is a former Biden-Harris presidential appointee at the U.S. Department of State and the author of the book Why National Security Matters. She is an Army Veteran.

Christopher Shell, PhD, is a fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His work examines the domestic aspects of U.S. foreign policy, specifically exploring how American communities view foreign policy challenges and the material and economic impacts of an interventionist approach. He also focuses on U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere, with particular emphasis on Haiti and the wider Caribbean.

A trained historian, Christopher received his BA from Howard University and his PhD from Michigan State University.

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References 1. Mampilly, Z. (2022). The Du Bois Doctrine. Foreign Affairs, 101(5). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/web-du-boisdoctrine-race-america-century# 2. Eddins, C. (2020, January 28). W.E.B. Du Bois, Haiti, and US Imperialism. Black Perspectives. https://www.aaihs.org/w-e-bdu-bois-haiti-and-us-imperialism/ 3. Vitalis, R. (2015). White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relation. Cornell University Press https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801456695/ white-world-order-black-power-politics/ 4. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute. (n.d.). Beyond Vietnam | The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute. Sanford. Retrieved April 19, 2026, from https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/beyond-vietnam 5. Boyd, G. M. (1984, June 29). Jackson Back in U.S. From Cuba with Prisoners set free by Castro. The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/1984/06/29/world/jackson-back-in-us-fromcuba-with-prisoners-set-free-by-castro.html 6. Jesse Jackson, Advocating Talks With P.L.O., Meets Critics in Israel. (1979). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/1979/09/25/archives/jesse-jackson-advocating-talks-withplo-meets-critics-in-israel.html 7. de Loera-Brust, A. (2024). Jesse Jackson’s America First. Compact. https://www.compactmag.com/article/jesse-jacksons-americafirst/ 8. Shell, C. (2025, August 21). Lessons from Congressional Black Caucus Members’ Leadership in U.S. Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment. org/research/2025/08/lessons-from-congressional-blackcaucus-members-leadership-in-us-foreign-policy 9. Brockell, G. (2021, August 17). She was the only member of Congress to vote against war in Afghanistan. Some called her a traitor. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ history/2021/08/17/barbara-lee-afghanistan-vote/ 10. Lanham, A. (2017, January 13). When W. E. B. Du Bois Was “UnAmerican.” Boston Review. https://www.bostonreview.net/ articles/when-civil-rights-were-un-american/

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After AGOA: Building Sustainable Infrastructure for U.S.-Africa Trade Dr. Shanelle Chambers Haile Imagine a group of cities connected by bridges. For many years, one major city invested in reliable bridges to smaller, less-connected cities. Those bridges mattered because they enabled trade and movement, even if access was conditional and governed by the major city’s rules.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) functioned much like those early bridges. The United States was an early mover in offering preferential market access to African economies, when alternatives were few and far between. That early investment mattered. But early movers do not remain central by default. Today, African countries have diversified trade partnerships and deepened regional integration. For these countries, access to the U.S. market has become one trade route among many, and that route is at risk of non-renewal.1 When AGOA expired in September 2025, it marked the end of a distinct phase in U.S.-Africa trade policy. AGOA’s expiration has prompted congressional deliberation as well as transnational advocacy for its renewal. The United States faces a broader strategic question: how to remain an economically credible partner in a continent where governments now have diversified trade and financing alternatives, and in a multipolar trade environment, episodic preference renewal carries less leverage than institutional reliability.

At its peak, AGOA expanded duty-free access to the U.S. market for more than 6,800 products from eligible sub-Saharan African countries, 2 adding jobs to the labor market and facilitating billions of dollars in trade across multiple sectors.

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This brief examines AGOA’s implementation patterns and suggests a successor framework that addresses three structural measures that can improve efficiency, productive capacity, and flexibility: (1) extended time horizons and revised core conditions that support long-term investment planning; (2) alignment with Africa’s regional integration agenda, including the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and the continent’s regional economic communities (RECs); and (3) systematic engagement with networks of stakeholders (e.g., diaspora investors, organizations, and RECs) capable of shaping norms and strengthening commercial relationships over time. These elements are mutually reinforcing. Together, they represent the infrastructure required to translate market access into durable, inclusive economic partnerships between the United States and Africa in a changing global trade landscape.

A Brief History of AGOA As a founding member of the World Trade Organization, the U.S. adheres to globally accepted multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, including the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) and a bilateral agreement with Morocco. AGOA expanded upon the 1974 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which excluded textiles and apparel and allowed discretionary suspension of product eligibility. The GSP also provided the U.S. government with unclear criteria for suspending the duty-free status of items that interfere with U.S. industries in response to advocacy from U.S. groups. While GSP introduced duty-free access, its discretionary structure created uncertainty for long-term investors. AGOA attempted to address these gaps but retained many of the same vulnerabilities.

AGOA was built on the GSP but expanded access to textiles, apparel, and footwear, sectors that were previously excluded. Initially, 34 countries qualified; as of 2025, 32 remained eligible, with roughly

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a dozen countries losing and some regaining eligibility over a 20+ year period. Under AGOA, eligibility depends on defined governance criteria, including market liberalization, rule of law, and worker rights, criteria set largely in Washington and subject to annual review.

Subsequently, what began as a broader trade bridge ultimately became a fragile one.

Implementation: Concentrated Benefits and Structural Constraints Since its enactment in 2000, AGOA has expanded overall trade between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries, and has been credited with creating over 300,000 jobs in eligible countries.

Total trade increased significantly in the early 2000s, peaking in the late 2000s before declining alongside global commodity prices.3 Yet these headlines obscure a more structural pattern: benefits have remained highly concentrated across countries and sectors.

A small number of countries have accounted for the majority of AGOA exports. For example, Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola (see Table 1) accounted for ~71% of U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa in 2023.

Additionally, much of this trade has been driven by petroleum and other extractive commodities rather than diversified manufacturing.

While the apparel provisions of AGOA supported industrial expansion in countries such as Lesotho and Kenya, participation in these sectors has remained limited and uneven across the continent.

AGOA’s utilization challenges also reflect a more technical reality.

Trade compliance specialists have observed that many African exports to the United States (e.g., raw commodities such as cocoa and many minerals) are already exempt from customs duties or enter duty-free under other tariff provisions.4 In such cases, firms do not have to or have little incentive to claim AGOA preferences.

The program’s transformative potential, therefore, lies not in primary commodities but in potentially higher value-added sectors such as textiles and light manufacturing, where preferential access can meaningfully alter cost structures.

Table 1: Geographical Concentration of Sub-Saharan Africa Imports to the U.S.

Sub-Saharan Africa Imports to the United States, In Billions $USD, 2023 Top U.S. Import Destinations South Africa

$14

Nigeria

$5.7

Ghana

$1.7

Angola

$1.2

Côte d’Ivoire

$0.9

Source: 2024 AGOA Biennial Report This concentration reflects one of many structural constraints embedded in the program’s design. Another constraint is reliance on unilateral preferences that are renewed in periodic cycles, which can limit long-term planning horizons. The uncertainty limits firms’ ability to make capital-intensive manufacturing investments, which can deter deeper integration into U.S.-linked value chains.

Additionally, rules of origin requirements, while intended to encourage local value addition, have imposed compliance burdens that are particularly costly for smaller economies. Restrictions on fabric sourcing and local content thresholds can prevent firms from participating in regional production networks. In practice, this has limited the development of integrated African value chains and reinforced a model in which production remains nationally siloed rather than regionally coordinated.

Finally, AGOA’s framework was not designed to align with newer, continent-wide integration efforts such as the AfCFTA. As African governments move toward harmonizing trade rules and strengthening regional value chains, the absence of full regional cumulation under AGOA creates friction between U.S. preferences and Africa’s own economic integration agenda.

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These constraints do not negate AGOA’s impact. The program has indeed generated employment, expanded export earnings, and signaled the U.S.’s commitment to economic partnership. However, its design has tended to reinforce commodity dependence and geographically concentrated manufacturing rather than broad-based diversification. As such, the next iteration of AGOA must address the existing structural limitations if it is to support deeper economic transformation.

As other experts have noted, AGOA’s uneven impact “should be a reminder to African countries to expand and diversify the countries and regions to which they export.”5 His observation underscores a broader structural reality: African states are no longer dependent on a single market. For the United States, this implies that a successor framework must offer more than conditional access and instead consider structures that increase reliability and economic sustainability.

Three-Pillar Framework: Expanding Parameters and Time Horizons, Partnering with Regional Institutions, and Leveraging Stakeholders In a recent discussion on AGOA, a historian of African Diasporas and U.S. statecraft1 recently pointed out that AGOA was designed in a geopolitical environment in which preferential market access alone carried substantial leverage.i In today’s more competitive landscape, the effectiveness of U.S. trade policy depends less on access itself and more on the institutional reliability of its implementation.

Reform will therefore require sequencing, institutional coordination, and political discipline. A successor framework should focus on three implementation priorities: predictability, regional alignment, and network activation.

Restructuring AGOA’s Rules Capital-intensive manufacturing requires multi-year planning horizons, but AGOA’s periodic renewals and annual reviews actively undermine them. Investors need predictable policy environments to commit i

Interview with Chritopher Shell, American Statecraft Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2026).

Initially set to expire in 2008; renewed four more times until its expiry in September 2025.

ii

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resources, strengthen value chains, train workforces, and achieve scale. AGOA’s periodic renewals and annual country eligibility reviews created uncertainty, deterring long-term capital deployment, particularly in sectors that require substantial upfront investment.ii This builds on 2023 recommendations from members of the U.S. Congress to extend AGOA while also modifying its rules of origin, signaling a U.S. commitment to sustained partnerships across the African continent. Longer time horizons would also allow for a more meaningful assessment of policy impacts and adaptive management based on evidence rather than political cycles.

Pauses and periods of re-authorization should be paired with transition support mechanisms. For example, countries facing potential suspension due to eligibility concerns would receive technical assistance and clear benchmarks for reinstatement, reducing the immediate repercussions for workers and firms. This approach maintains accountability while protecting vulnerable populations from abrupt policy changes.

In terms of rules of origin, a recent UNCTAD assessment of AGOA highlights the misalignment between existing rules of origin and contemporary production structures, noting that lower value-added thresholds and expanded regional cumulation could improve utilization of a successor trade agreement without undermining the integrity of a product’s stated origin. For example, a shirt manufactured in Kenya using Tanzanian cotton and Ethiopian thread should qualify for U.S. market access under a regionalized approach. AGOA’s rules of origin (ROO) could be retained but modernized to reflect contemporary production realities and Africa’s regional integration trajectory. Rather than eliminating ROO outright, a successor framework with a lower value-added threshold (from the current 35% to a more realistic range, e.g., 25–30%) and updated valuation methodologies to reduce unnecessary compliance burdens.

2. Formal Partnership with Africa’s Regional Economic Communities Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are uniquely positioned to reduce the economic and administrative burdens firms face when operating across borders. These burdens extend beyond

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If the United States seeks to remain a preferred economic partner on the African continent, it must reinforce the bridge rather than simply repaint it. tariffs and include inconsistent regulatory standards, fragmented customs procedures, limited market information, and weak contract enforcement mechanisms. By coordinating trade rules, harmonizing standards, and facilitating communication among member states, RECs can lower compliance costs and reduce uncertainty for firms seeking to operate across the region. Sustained institutional coordination through RECs can strengthen firm-level capabilities and accelerate the development of integrated regional value chains in ways that one-time preference programs cannot.

The AU’s more recently signed AfCFTA represents Africa’s clearest strategic choice to help amplify AGOA and turbocharge regional integration. In this way, AGOA’s successor and the AFCFTA’s agenda, which includes a tripartite agreement across the secretariat, the African Development Bank Group, and Africa50, would be synchronized for greater efficiency. The AU is well positioned to shape an agenda for strong, sustainable regional value chains through the AfCFTA, most tangibly by advocating for flexible rules of origin,

as summarized above. Full cumulation could be extended across all AfCFTA member states, allowing producers to source inputs regionally while still qualifying for preferential access. This approach would align with AfCFTA’s focus on supporting regional industrial upgrading and strengthening Africa’s integrated production networks.

Experts have described a focus on Rules of Origin as “the perfect sandbox for AfCFTA to help shape AGOA’s agenda and guidelines,” 4 an entry point for the U.S. to formalize institutional engagement as a trade partner on the continent. No less critical, this framework could also be extended to increase trade in services such as fintech and professional sectors, where the U.S. comparative advantage aligns with Africa’s emerging growth areas under AfCFTA’s services and digital trade protocols.

In this new framework, RECs would be treated as true institutional partners in trade architecture, rather than peripheral actors in U.S.–Africa trade engagement. The strongest predictor of adoption was whether the innovation was embedded within an existing communications infrastructure.6 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has an established free trade area that aims to boost regional integration and has already adopted a common external tariff. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) provides technical assistance for trade of goods (including rules of origin), services, and investment. These examples are not exceptions. Embedding AGOA within existing AfCFTA and REC communications infrastructure can help drive measurable shifts toward diversifying trade to and across a broader set of African economies.

3. Systematic Engagement with Institutional Networks Institutional intermediaries can reduce transaction costs (i.e., the informational, administrative, and enforcement burdens firms face beyond tariffs) by mitigating information asymmetries, facilitating compliance, and enabling trust-based enforcement through repeated interaction. Formal coordination among U.S. agencies, RECs, and diaspora-led investment groups can help streamline regulations, strengthen firm-level capabilities, and make cross-border investment easier to execute. These mechanisms are catalysts, amplifying market access and effectiveness.

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Finally, development finance tools should be aligned with trade reform.

For example, targeted risk-sharing instruments through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation could support small and medium enterprises as they integrate into regional value chains.

Financial instruments must be paired with governance safeguards and measurable performance standards to mitigate fiduciary risk, however.

Implementation will determine whether reform translates into diversification or remains symbolic. Tariff preferences can open doors, but institutional coordination sustains trade flows.

Limitations to Implementation Redesigning AGOA along these lines would not be without trade-offs.

Any successor framework must contend with political, administrative, and economic constraints on both sides of the Atlantic.

First, expanding regional cumulation and lowering rules-of-origin thresholds would raise concerns among some U.S. producers about import sensitivity and competitive displacement. While AGOA’s overall trade volume remains modest relative to total U.S. imports, specific sectors, such as apparel, have historically triggered domestic political scrutiny. Policymakers would need to pair any liberalization of origin rules with transparent monitoring mechanisms and safeguard provisions to maintain congressional support.

Second, lengthening authorization timelines to provide predictability may encounter resistance in Congress within the current political environment. Currently, periodic renewal is often viewed as leverage to enforce governance and labor standards. A longer-term framework may require clearly defined review benchmarks tied to eligibility criteria rather than discretionary, short-cycle reauthorization debates to ensure approval. Predictability and accountability are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they can be structured together.

Third, expanding the role of diaspora-backed financing vehicles or development finance tools would require coordination across agencies, including the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Treasury. Such instruments also carry oversight and fiduciary risk. Without strong governance safeguards, intermediary

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capital flows could become vulnerable to political patronage or misallocation. Institutional capacity building would be needed to accompany financial innovation.

Finally, alignment with Africa’s RECs presents both opportunity and complexity. Supporting regional value chains implies harmonizing customs procedures, verification systems, and compliance standards across multiple jurisdictions. Many African governments continue to face administrative and fiscal constraints that limit rapid implementation. U.S. policy must therefore balance ambition with realism and prioritize phased reforms.

These challenges underscore that market access alone cannot carry the weight of structural transformation. A successor framework must be designed as an institutional architecture, not merely as tariff preferences.

Conclusion AGOA was conceived when preferential access to the U.S. market was itself a powerful incentive. In today’s multipolar trade environment, marked by intensified competition from China, the European Union, and Gulf states, market access alone is no longer sufficient to anchor a long-term partnership.

For twenty-five years, AGOA has functioned as a bridge: a structure connecting African producers to the U.S. market through conditional tariff preferences above and beyond existing broader agreements.

But the durability of that bridge has always depended on the strength of its predictability, regional integration, and institutional trust. Where those supports were thin, trade remained concentrated and fragile.

Where they were stronger, value chains deepened.

If the United States seeks to remain a preferred economic partner on the African continent, it must reinforce the bridge rather than simply repaint it. That means extending authorization timelines to provide structural stability, aligning rules of origin with regional integration under AfCFTA, and activating diaspora and institutional stakeholder networks to channel investment beyond extractive sectors.

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The question before Congress goes beyond renewing AGOA. Instead, this is a moment to redesign AGOA for a continent whose economic leverage and strategic options are expanding. A modernized framework must prioritize regional value chains over narrow commodity exports, institutional reliability over episodic conditionality, and coordinated capital over fragmented preference programs.

Trade preferences can open a pathway. But a durable bridge requires load-bearing architecture: stable rules, aligned incentives, and credible long-term commitments. If the next iteration of AGOA is built on those principles, it can support not just the flow of goods but also a deeper, more balanced economic partnership in the decades ahead.

recent_trends_us_services_trade_2023_annual_report Carnegie Africa Program. (2026, April 22). Springing Forward: Relaunching the Africa Technology Policy Tracker. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/ carnegie-africa-program-newsletter/springing-forward-relaunchingthe-africa-technology-policy-tracker Obadare, E. (2026, April 27). The Political Education of Peter Obi | Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-politicaleducation-of-peter-obi DellaVigna, S., Kim, W., & Linos, E. (2024). Bottlenecks for Evidence Adoption. Journal of Political Economy, 132(8). https://www.journals. uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/729447

Dr. Shanelle Chambers Haile, is a management consultant in McKinsey & Company’s Boston office, primarily serving social and public sector clients. Prior to McKinsey, she spent six years with the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Africa Bureau, serving as a Country Development Officer and later as a Strategic Advisor. Beyond her professional career, Shanelle holds several fellowship and leadership appointments. As a Policy Outreach Fellow for the American Sociological Association, she partners with the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation on topics pertaining to global affairs and inclusive economic growth, applying equity frameworks to social policies and practices.

References Executive Office of the President. (2026). African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). United States Trade Representative. https:// ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/ african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): FAQ. (n.d.). [Legislation].

Congress.Gov. Retrieved April 30, 2026, from https://www.congress. gov/crs-product/IF11232 Johanson, D. S., Rhonda K. Schmidtlein, Kearns, J. E., Stayin, R. J., & Karpel, A. A. (2023). Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2023 Annual Report. United States International Trade Commission. https:// www.usitc.gov/publications/industry_econ_analysis_332/2023/

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