U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century, by Abraham M. Denmark (chapter 3)

U.S.

STRATEGY

IN THE

ASIAN

CENTURY Empowering Allies and Partners ABRAHAM M. DENMARK

3

EMPOWERING US ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

History is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.

—JAMES MATTIS, FORMER US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

S

trategic trends currently under way in Asia will alter the fundamental power dynamics of the region, threaten its long-term stability and prosperity, and drive greater demand for American power. Yet the availability of this power will be relatively circumscribed by domestic economic and budgetary forces and diminished by the rise of other Indo-Paci c powers.

Several scholars and former senior American o cials have written about the catastrophes that would result from the loss of American power in the world.1 Although this analysis is instructive in highlighting the importance of American power in the preservation of a liberal international system, the improbability of a complete American withdrawal from the Indo-Paci c requires considerations of more realistic scenarios.

Scholars have often examined the so-called patron’s dilemma, which deals with the question of how a major power (or “patron”)

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can best provide security to its allies without becoming trapped in unwanted con icts. The dilemma is that strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment but improve deterrence against attack, whereas a weaker commitment reduces the potential for entrapment but diminishes the deterrent e ect of the overall relationship. As described by the scholars Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, great power patrons primarily make such decisions on the basis of the extent to which their leaders believe that they and their ally share common security interests, and whether the patron believes that its client has su cient military capabilities to deter its main adversary without the patron’s assistance.2 Therefore, if the United States remains engaged in the region but is not able to convince its allies and partners to play a greater strategic role, three broad scenarios are possible.

The rst scenario is ever-expanding unilateralism. Washington could choose to continue the robust investments needed to unilaterally address the many security challenges facing the Indo-Paci c.

Without substantial contributions or adjustments from its allies and partners, its basing structure and logistical infrastructure will become increasingly costly, and vulnerable. The Indo-Paci c will likely require a signi cant portion of American defense spending and deployments, which would likely have the dual e ect of expanding budget de cits while reducing the American military presence (and increasing strategic risk) in other parts of the world.

The second scenario is a diminished role. Isolationist sentiments within the United States have gained ascendance in many circles in Washington, and threaten to substantially limit the ability of the United States to address challenges and maintain power in the Indo-Paci c. The likely result would be weakened con dence in the reliability of American commitments, diminished stability and prosperity in the Indo-Paci c, a gradual fading of American leadership on several issues of strategic importance, and a weakened liberal order. This will tacitly leave other issues to the whims of an anarchic international system or another power looking for a strategic

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vacuum to ll—namely, China. A Sinocentric Asia would operate in a fashion that would be highly problematic for the United States.

Established rules and norms, like freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of disputes, would be pushed to the wayside in the face of Beijing’s preferences. The region would become more corrupt and less democratic, and it would be consumed with intraregional tension.

And the third scenario is hollow leadership. It is possible that the United States can continue to rhetorically expand its regional commitments but fail to provide the necessary resources to do so.

Indeed, great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic interventions in far-o regions because of the refusal of their leaders to accept losses in their state’s relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery.3 Allies and partners, as well as adversaries, will be fully aware of the expanding gaps in America’s rhetoric and its capabilities and will likely react accordingly. The result would probably be little di erent than if the United States were open about accepting a diminished regional role. Con dence in American power would be diminished, regional stability and prosperity would be threatened, and the liberal order would be weakened in the face of a rising and increasingly ambitious China.

To e ectively address these challenges and preserve the stability and prosperity that the regional order has enabled for the past several decades, the United States must adjust its strategies and policies toward the Indo-Paci c. To counteract changes to the regional balance of power and China’s exceptionalist objectives, the United States should enhance its own geopolitical strength and empower its allies to contribute more to the health and success of a twentyrst-century regional liberal order—a de facto arrangement of primus inter pares. At the same time, the United States should focus its energies, and those of its allies and partners, on preserving the key principles that have made the liberal order so bene cial for its own interests and for the entire Indo-Paci c.

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This chapter proposes a framework for the United States to buttress its own power, while at the same time approaching its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Paci c as geopolitical platforms for cooperation and the coordination of e orts across all aspects of national power in order to address shared challenges and build a twenty- rst-century regional liberal order.

SHAPING THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY REGIONAL ORDER It is reasonable for the United States to seek to preserve the gains that the existing regional order has brought. However, sustaining the old order is insu cient; it must nd a way to also evolve that order to re ect geopolitical realities. As convincingly argued by Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “International a airs experts cannot resign themselves to simply critiquing the seared remains of the liberal order. . . . The task at hand is formidable: a twenty- rst-century vision of liberal order, advanced through an American strategy that properly couples foreign policy objectives with material and political resources.”4 Although most American strategists appropriately focus on strategies and investments to sustain and advance American power in the region, far less analysis has been devoted to strategies for building and harnessing the power of US allies and partners themselves. Yet to give this latter aspect of US Indo-Paci c strategy greater attention would not diminish American power and in uence in the region itself. It is US allies, after all, that have enabled and supported America’s leadership in the Indo-Paci c for decades.

America cannot do this alone. As its allies and partners in the Indo-Paci c rise in geopolitical power, the United States has an opportunity to harness the power of like-minded nations to evolve the regional system in a way that sustains and strengthens the key attributes of the past. This chapter describes such a strategy, arguing

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that, instead of ignoring or attempting to reverse these strategic trends, the United States should build and employ the tremendous geopolitical power of its allies and partners in order to shape the future direction of the Indo-Paci c order in a way conducive to America’s interests and those of its allies and partners.

Each US ally and partner has its own unique history, strategic culture, interests, threat perceptions, and ambitions. Each alliance and partnership will likewise require unique approaches and arrangements that re ect these di erences. Nevertheless, they also have a vital unifying commonality: the United States. American interests require that each alliance and partnership exhibits some degree of continuity across various issues. To this end, the United States should work with its Indo-Paci c allies and partners to develop a shared vision for the twenty- rst-century liberal order of the Indo-Paci c.

DEVELOPING A SHARED VISION FOR REGIONAL ORDER Either out of fear or ambition, America’s allies and partners require a positive vision for the future, and a strong argument about how working with the United States will help them realize their own national objectives.5 As such, a critical aspect of an initiative by the United States to enable its allies and partners is to build a common vision for the future of Asia. Although the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Paci c” is potentially a good start, the contours of this strategy remain unclear and require further elucidation.

This chapter proposes a positive vision whereby the United States should work with its allies and partners to enhance the power of America and that of its friends, and work collaboratively to strengthen and evolve the regional order to sustain the key liberal principles of the postwar order that enabled the region’s stability and prosperity.

“With insight and urgency, Abraham M. Denmark draws on his years in the Pentagon to describe how the United States can successfully adapt to rapid technological change and dramatic geopolitical evolution in the Indo-Pacific.

U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century is a must-read for anyone interested in how the United States can sustain its leadership in the world’s most important region.”

—ASH CARTER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE “Denmark’s book is a timely reminder of how critical alliances and partnerships are to the United States, a fact only reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic. He draws on nearly two decades of experience working on the Indo-Pacific region inside and outside of government, delivering a country-by-country exploration of the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical importance to the United States and an actionable blueprint for our future strategy.”

—CONGRESSWOMAN JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT, AND CEO OF THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS “Denmark has written the playbook for the post-coronavirus world. Cooperation with allies and friends will become essential to balance China, which is determined to emerge from the virus in a stronger strategic position. This is where we start.”

—RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE “At a time of profound geopolitical change and increasing competition in the Indo-Pacific, Denmark offers a compelling strategy for protecting vital U.S. economic and security interests in the region: Use all of the instruments of our power—diplomatic, economic, military, and ‘soft’—to engage and empower our regional allies and partners to shore up the foundations of the regional order.

This insightful book is a must-read for scholars and practitioners alike.”

—MICHÈLE FLOURNOY, FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY “Denmark has delivered a timely and impactful study of how the United States can further its purposes in Asia through deeper engagements with allies and partners.

Deeply researched and clearly argued, this well-conceived book arrives at a critical juncture when American strategy in the region is under fundamental review.”

—KURT M. CAMPBELL, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

ABRAHAM M. DENMARK is the director of the Asia Program and a senior fellow at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, for which he received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

WOODROW WILSON CENTER SERIES

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS / NEW YORK cup.columbia.edu Cover design: Noah Arlow. Cover image: Alamy

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