IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
AGE OF PUNISHMENT DETENTION, DEPORTATION, AND BORDER CONTROL
DAVID C. BROTHERTON PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS
EDITED BY AND
1. introduction Immigration Policy in an Age of Punishment philip kretsedemas, umass boston david C. brotherton, john jay college, cuny
Over the past several decades, the U.S. government has increased its immigration enforcement powers to unprecedented levels. Annual deportations exceeded historic highs in the early 1990s, when they climbed above forty thousand per year.1 But this was just the beginning of an escalation that has continued unabated to this day. U.S. deportations exceeded 300,000 per year by the end of the George W. Bush presidency and climbed even further—to over 400,000 per year—under the Obama administration.2 These statistics do not even account for border enforcement actions, which used to make up the lion’s share of U.S. immigration enforcement actions.3 The escalation of deportations has been matched by enforcement practices that have created a new class of criminalized noncitizens. The war on drugs, which used to be the focus of federal law enforcement, has been joined by what seems to be a new “war” on noncitizens. Over the past two decades, immigration-related offenses—mostly for legal status violations—have become a growing share of federal convictions. In recent years, prosecutions for immigration violations actually exceeded—and are now on par with—arrests for drug convictions.4 As a result, Latinos have overtaken non-Latino blacks as the largest segment of the federal prison population.5 And since the early 2000s, hundreds of state and local governments throughout the United States have enacted their own
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enforcement-oriented immigration laws and signed on to enforcement partnerships with the federal government.6 Although these trends can be explained in light of a policy history that is specific to the United States, they are not unique to the country by any means. The national obsession with controlling immigration and securing borders has become a global phenomenon. There are striking continuities running through complaints about unwanted Roma migrants in Slovenia, unwanted Turkish migrants in Greece, unwanted flows of West and Central African migrants in South Africa, and the tide of anti-immigrant sentiment that contributed to the UK’s Brexit vote as well as the electoral victory of Donald Trump in the United States.7 The title of this book offers one way of thinking about the scale of these transformations. The punitive public culture that has come to define immigration policy can be understood as the emblematic feature of an age, a zeitgeist of the times. The idea of an age of punishment suggests a transformation on a scale that is much broader than a punitive turn in immigration policy. Immigration laws have not just become tougher; there has been a paradigm shift in the workings of the global migration regime. In order to come to grips with this transformation, it is necessary to look beyond the social fact of mass deportations and consider the broader changes that help explain why mass deportations and massive spending on border control can be rendered legible as a reasonable response to the challenges posed by international migration and that highly political construction known as “border security.” To begin with, the present-day migration regime is distinguished by its global scale. The migration flows of the current era are more fluid and circular than they were in the early twentieth century.8 They are shaped by social networks and economic forces that do not operate simply on a national or an international scale—in other words, being limited to interactions between a “sending” and a “receiving” nation.9 Moreover, the quotidian subject of the current migration regime is now the guest worker, not the permanent settler. The United States, for example, is still admitting more international migrants than any other nation on earth, but the vast majority of these new entrants are now issued temporary visas.10 And although many other nation- states are still attached to the narrative that they are “nations of immigration,” permanent settlement is increasingly viewed as a long-term expense, contributing to the national fiscal deficit.11 It would appear that arguments about the impracticality of replacement migration as a solution to the growing fiscal burden of aging populations have given way to migration schemes that supplement the national economy through their productivity and temporality. As some scholars have observed, the ideal migrant for many Western industrialized nations is skilled, is in the prime of his or her life, has few attachments (i.e., is unmarried or has no children), and has plans to return home—or go elsewhere—before he or she
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reaches retirement age.12 One example of such a migrant is the legal resident who is deported for a minor criminal infraction and, on repatriation, loses the right to Social Security despite having paid into the system for years. Another example is the high-skilled guest worker who spends a decade or more shifting from one temporary visa to another, living under the constant threat of deportation (and leaving the country before this threat is realized). These examples illustrate how deportation can be used to police and shape the behaviors of an expendable noncitizen population. This situation, in which the “integration” of noncitizens is conditioned by their expendability and in which even the most “desirable” mi grants are not spared from the hazards of legal precarity, also provides a good introduction into how neoliberal economic priorities have changed the way that immigration works today. The neoliberal restructuring project was first implemented in the nations of the global North and was extended to developmentalist policies that have been applied to the nations of the global South.13 Among other things, this restructuring project has been concerned with shrinking social welfare expenditures, incorporating a business model of fiscal management into the public sector, and boosting supply-side growth strategies that reduce restrictions on the flow of investment capital and make labor markets more flexible and amenable to the needs of entrepreneurs. One consequence of these transformations is that the costs and benefits of all things are assessed on an increasingly restricted time frame and according to how well individuals can adapt to their immediate circumstances. Welfare assistance becomes geared toward putting people immediately back to work—even if this means placing them in low-wage jobs that keep them trapped in a cycle of welfare recidivism.14 Economic restructuring in the industrialized West has also created a new stratum of precarious labor that is temporary, non-benefited, low paying, and typified by freelance or work-from-home arrangements. These labor market conditions, which are experienced by citizens and noncitizens alike, have been accompanied by a new kind of legal precarity that is specific to noncitizens. The rise of visa admittances and the growth of the unauthorized migrant population coincide with the shift toward labor market casualization and the escalation of public sector downsizing from the 1980s onward.15 It may seem ironic that this drive to reduce public expenditures and control the “fiscal burden” of the noncitizen population has culminated in the largest publicly funded immigration enforcement apparatus in modern history (both in the United States and transnationally).16 This is an area of study that needs to be much better incorporated into work on the political economy of security; however, David Harvey’s analysis of neoliberalism offers some helpful insights.17 Harvey insists that neoliberalism has, on balance, been more concerned with devising coercive strategies for capital accumulation than with the utopian goal
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of creating an “open society” (which entails the free flow of migrant labor, among other things). Harvey, along with other scholars of neoliberalism, also notes that neoliberal capitalism is distinguished by its reliance on a more proactive and interventionist mode of state regulation.18 Although neoliberal restructuring is geared toward downsizing public spending and social ser vices for lower-income populations, it also channels unprecedented levels of public resources into statecorporate partnerships and securitization strategies, which are used to expand the reach of market forces. The end result is a unilaterally structured market economy that is backed by the authority of a strong state. As it concerns immigration policy, this means that migrants can be recruited in large numbers while also being policed by a state-funded enforcement apparatus that removes noncitizens who are deemed unproductive or deleterious to economic growth. But the means– ends rationality guiding this process is also prone to excess and cruelty, and it’s not unusual for the goal of securitizing migration flows to clash with the relentless drive for maximizing profit and productivity. This is one reason why get-tough immigration policies are often blamed for undermining the economic benefits of immigration. But as many immigration scholars have pointed out, get-tough enforcement practices have evolved from the same paradigm of economic growth that has been guiding immigration policy for the past several decades. Kitty Calavita has traced this relationship between immigration enforcement and pro-growth immigration policies to the 1940s, focusing on the first temporary labor arrangement brokered by the U.S. and Mexican governments. Her groundbreaking account of the Bracero program treats immigration enforcement as a strategy for regulating legal flows of temporary migrant labor and the flows of undocumented migration that grew alongside them.19 Calavita explains how border enforcement operations of the Bracero era were adapted to fluctuations in the labor market supply of migrant workers, with removals increasing when there was a perceived surplus of laborers, and removals decreasing during periods of employer demand for this labor. Katherine Donato and Douglas Massey offer another insight into the way employers can benefit from get-tough enforcement.20 Their research on the outcomes of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986) has shown that “employer sanctions,” intended to discourage the hiring of unauthorized migrants, actually enhanced the control of employers over these workers, without effecting a decline in the numbers of these migrant workers. In contrast, King, Massoglia, and Uggen have argued that unemployment rates of native-born citizens have more to do with immigration enforcement trends than with the size of the surplus noncitizen population, suggesting that native workers, not employers, are the primary beneficiaries of these practices.21
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Nicholas De Genova has provided a different explanation, which suggests that it is too limiting to think about deportation as a “reward” for native workers, a “benefit” for employers, or even a punishment for “bad” immigrants.22 De Genova’s work focuses on the mechanics of deportability (the real but unactualized potential to be deported) and not just on the sociopolitical fact of deportation (i.e., the tally of those who are actually deported). He argues that deportations exert a disciplinary pressure on the “good” immigrants who are still living and working in the host nation, reminding them of their potential to be deported. Other scholars have offered complementary explanations of how immigration enforcement is used as a public theater to send signals to a broader citizen and noncitizen audience.23 But it is worth emphasizing that deportability describes a regimen that is more concerned with managing the subjectivity of the migrant than it is with managing public opinion. Consistent with a Foucauldian understanding of disciplinary power, the aim is to cultivate a new (more productive, self-regulating) kind of person. Jonathan Inda offers a supporting analysis when he explains how immigration enforcement inculcates a prudential mind-set in the migrant, which is intended to encourage law-abiding behavior but can also discourage the migrant from exercising his or her legal rights (e.g., choosing not to participate in a vote for a union bargaining unit or press complaints about workplace safety violations).24 Whereas earlier theories explained how immigration enforcement adapts to the ebb and flow of labor market demands or political pressures (including moral panics25), theories of deportation as a disciplinary regimen describe a mode of coercion that acts on its subjects continuously—because its aim is the transformation of subjectivity itself. David Brotherton and Luis Barrios offer another insight into these enforcement priorities with their description of immigration policy as a case of social bulimia.26 The bulimic’s anxious relationship to food offers a template for thinking about the mainstream policy discourse on immigration, which appears to simultaneously want and fear migrants—and which controls the thing it wants with a politics of fear. Tanya Golash-Boza has also explained how these anxieties are epitomized by the treatment of black and brown racial minorities, who make up the overwhelming majority of the deportation caseload in the United States (and in many other nations).27 These observations offer insights into how the rational– disciplinary imperatives of immigration policy can spiral into the nativistic racism theorized by Robert Chang or the Latino threat discourse examined by Leo Chavez.28 Under the grip of these impulses, the punitive excesses of neoliberal disciplinarity can become detached from the goal of cultivating orderly and compliant subjectivities and be overtaken by a generalized fear of the alien, which tilts in the direction of population control and mass expulsion.29 As a result, the disciplinary imperatives
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of the contemporary migration regime can careen back and forth between moments of racist xenophobia and a quieter, “more rational” kind of racism that creates stratified employment niches of “white,” “black,” and “brown” jobs—as documented by Roger Waldinger and Lisa Catanzarite.30
PROBLEMATIZING THE AGE OF PUNISHMENT The prior discussion touched on several key factors identified by critical research on immigration enforcement—the regulation of migrant labor markets, neoliberal growth strategies, the deepening links between criminal and immigration enforcement, tactics of discipline and control, and racism and nativism—and offered some insights into how they interlock within our present- day age of punishment. This list of factors is not exhaustive by any means, and we do not pretend to have arrived at a definitive explanation. Our modest aim has been only to introduce a number of issues that will be explored in greater depth by the book’s authors and to provide a context for understanding how the themes of their chapters interrelate. This book can also be read as an update on all the issues that were examined in the earlier book we coedited, Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today, published in 2008.31 Although a number of important works on immigration enforcement had been published before Keeping Out the Other (some of which we have already cited), to our knowledge it was the first book-length compilation of its kind to be published since the United States enacted the 1996 immigration reform laws.32 In the vein of publications that are self- consciously burdened by the mantle of being “the first,” Keeping Out the Other offered an urgent report from the field—which ended up being an account of immigration enforcement in the final years of the George W. Bush administration. Immigration Policy in an Age of Punishment offers up another urgent report, in this case focusing on the final years of the Obama administration. The timeliness of this book is underscored by the election of Donald Trump, which has made the immigration debate a headline issue for public discussion, both in the United States and globally. The electoral victory of Donald Trump—when viewed in tandem with the Brexit vote—appears to signal a political sea change on a transnational scale. The U.S.-UK alliance was a driving force behind the acceleration of economic globalization from the mid-twentieth century onward.33 The rise of popular nationalism in both of these nations may not signal the end of globalization, but it does at the very least signal a new defensive posture in which globalization is increasingly viewed as a “threat to the West” by growing sectors of the electorate.34
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Although our work on this book was started before the election of Donald Trump, we realize that its contents will be read in light of the immigration politics of the Trump era. This is why we think it is impor tant to provide a discussion of how to read our analysis of late- Obama- era immigration policy with an eye toward the emerging immigration policy agenda of the Trump administration.
IMMIGRATION POLICY FROM THE OBAMA TO TRUMP ERA: WHAT HAS (AND HAS NOT) CHANGED? It may seem odd to describe this book as documenting Obama-era policy when almost half of its contents are focused on national contexts besides that of the United States. Nevertheless, “the Obama era” works as a broad description of a global policy paradigm, for the same reason that we can speculate on the global significance of the Trump presidency. Both eras are described by immigration policy priorities that are articulated with an agenda for market-based growth, global and domestic security, and international diplomacy, all of which are used by the U.S. government to influence the policy agendas of other nations as well as international and transnational governing bodies. This account does, admittedly, offer a U.S.- centric perspective on the global policy terrain, the assumption being that the United States is a global agenda setter—for immigration policy in particular. But the global attention given to the U.S. 2016 presidential race does lend credence to the “agenda setter” thesis. Where else but in the United States could the results of a national election spark protests across the global North and South?35 The scale of this reaction indicates that multitudes across the world see a relationship between the changing tide of U.S. politics and the fortunes of their nations. The electoral victory of Donald Trump sent a message that something had fundamentally changed. If the world’s leading immigration nation appears to have lost faith in its own national mythology on immigration, what does this portend for the global migration regime? Keeping this context in mind, the main message this book sets out to deliver about the Obama era is a cautionary one. We should resist the temptation to treat the Obama era as a golden age of progressive immigration policies. The draconian overtones of Trump- era immigration policy—epitomized by its controversial travel ban targeting Arab Muslim nationals—certainly invite this way of framing things.36 But the differences in Obama- and Trump- era policies, which are not inconsequential by any means, also operate within a continuum. At the time of this writing, the Trump administration has distinguished itself, most apparently, in the overall scale of its enforcement actions. As of May 2017, arrests by Immigration and Customs Enforcement were up by 37.6 percent over
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arrest rates during the same period in 2016.37 Immigration judges are also issuing deportation orders more frequently. As of May 2017, the proportion of deportation hearings ending in a final order of deportation was approximately 10 percent higher than the year-end average for 2016.38 These enforcement trends are consistent with the objectives laid out by the executive orders on immigration that were issued by president Trump in January 2017.39 Of special significance is the order titled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which expands the discretionary authority of immigration enforcement to arrest and detain noncitizens that had been routinely exempted from the Obama administration’s enforcement priorities.40 These developments have led some observers to speculate that the major change introduced by Trump-era enforcement priorities has to do with “who” is at risk of deportation rather than “how many” are being deported.41 This change in enforcement practice undermines the idea that there are such things as “protected categories” of noncitizens, creating a situation in which almost any noncitizen can imagine themselves a candidate for deportation— irrespective of whether they have broken a law or had a run-in with immigration enforcement. As De Genova (and several other immigration scholars)42 have explained, the impact of immigration enforcement should be viewed in light of this potential to be deported, which shapes the behavior of the vast majority of noncitizens who are never brought before an immigration court. But if we accept these arguments, it becomes more apparent how the features that appear to distinguish Trump-era immigration enforcement underscore its continuity with the enforcement strategies that precede it. It is important to keep in mind that theories of deportability and neoliberal prudentialism (among others) were developed over a decade before the election of Donald Trump, to explain an enforcement stratagem that can be traced at least as far back as the Clinton era (though as Calavita’s research indicates, its germinal features were present in the Bracero era43). This is why the unprecedented toughness of Trump’s immigration agenda can be understood as operating within a “normal” that has been cultivated by the past several decades of U.S. immigration policy. Even the intensification of immigration enforcement under the Trump administration can be understood as a “normal” feature of a linear escalation that has unfolded from the 1990s onward, whereby the enforcement actions of each new administration outpace those of its predecessors. But ironically, deportation rates have been sluggish under the first few months of the Trump administration, despite its record high arrest rates. The Trump administration has actually deported 12 percent fewer noncitizens in its first one hundred days than were deported by the same time in 2016.44 This is partly because the deportation case load of the immigration court system is very backlogged, a collateral effect of its massively expanded size.45 The inability of the Trump
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administration to accelerate deportation rates has also been compounded by its failure to get many of its immigration priorities funded in the May 2017 federal budget (including construction of the border wall, expansion of detention beds, and a hiring increase for immigration enforcement and border patrol agents).46 But it is even more telling that Trump administration officials have played down the scale of their enforcement agenda by insisting that they are not carrying out a mass deportation program47—which begs the question of how exactly one distinguishes a mass deportation program from a major increase in immigration enforcement actions (also considering that the annual rate of enforcement actions that we take as “normal” today exceeds the scale of “mass deportation” programs, like Operation Wetback, which Trump touted on the campaign trail48). These statements illustrate how the Trump administration is simultaneously attempting to position itself as tougher on immigration than the Obama administration, and also operating within the normal rule of law. But as we explained above, this is not only rhetoric. The Trump administration has been able to channel its get-tough enforcement agenda through programs, policy levers, and executive powers crafted by prior administrations because there are real continuities in the way immigration enforcement has been used by all of these administrations. For example, although one of Trump’s executive orders terminated the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) that was initiated by the Obama administration, it replaced PEP with the more aggressive Secure Communities enforcement program that had been initiated by the George W. Bush administration (and was active through most of Obama’s tenure as president).49 The Trump administration has also created incentives for local police to enforce federal immigration laws by reviving the 287(g) program, authorized by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) that was enacted under the Clinton administration.50 Trump’s maneuvers on Obama-era protections for undocumented migrant youth offer more insights into the balance his administration is trying to strike between “continuity” and “change.” In a surprising departure from his campaign trail rhetoric, President Trump initially decided not to terminate the Deferred Action Childhood Arrivals program created by President Obama, which grants qualified undocumented migrant youth an indefinite reprieve from deportation.51 At the same time, the Trump administration underscored its enforcement priorities by escalating the deportation of DACA recipients facing criminal allegations (increasing DACA revocations for criminal reasons by 25 percent during the first few months of 2017).52 In September 2017, Trump made a radical about-face, and announced his intentions to terminate the DACA program—appearing to have returned to his campaign trail stance on the program.53 But days after this announcement, he
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began holding meetings with Democrats to explore legislative possibilities for granting DACA recipients a permanent status contingent on immigration enforcement targets being met.54 At the time of this writing, it is unclear whether a deal has been reached, and it seems likely that there will be more surprise developments in store for DACA recipients in the months ahead. The Trump administration’s position on H-1B work visa holders has been characterized by a similar fluidity. H-1B is another program that Trump promised to eliminate on the campaign trail.55 Thus far, the administration has decided to let the program stand, but it has used discretionary authority to end the expedited review of H-1B visa applications—a decision that effectively reduces H-1B admissions—and has drawn criticism from the business community accordingly.56 The willingness of the Trump administration to frustrate employer demands for guest workers may lend more credibility to its economic nationalism, which has been amplified by an April 2017 executive order titled “Buy America and Hire American.”57 However, the executive order does not create any new programs or procedures for vetting work visa applicants. It only affirms the Trump administration’s commitment to protecting U.S. jobs, using existing legal channels, and has been assessed by many analysts as being little more than a symbolic politics, comparable to Trump’s use of the bully pulpit to shame multinationals into bringing jobs back to the United States.58 But a few weeks after issuing this Executive Order, the Trump administration managed to get Indian- owned infotech corporations to commit to hiring more U.S. workers, after accelerating its investigations into abuses of the work visa system.59 These developments seem to confirm the predictions of earlier reports, which speculated that Trump-era restrictions on the H-1B labor supply would mainly impact foreign- owned corporations rather than U.S. firms.60 The end result for H-1B visa recipients, however, is similar to that for DACA recipients. In both cases, noncitizens are being reminded of their precarious legal status while being given the impression that they still have a shot at gaining a secure status. The possibility of removal (or visa nonrenewal), conditioned by the right combination of incentives, sets the stage for an extralegal mode of power that encourages the subject to let go of an expectation of guaranteed rights and adapt to the prerogatives of a sovereign decision maker (which could be an immigration officer, an employer, or any person with the authority to set in motion a process that leads the subject to be charged with a deportable violation). This exercise of power has arguably always been a feature of U.S. immigration law and can be traced to the plenary power principle, which was first clarified in the late nineteenth century.61 Neoliberal governing priorities, which are distrustful of binding legal agreements, give this mode of power more room to operate. This may also be why
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temporary legal status has become the new normal for migrants today. Noncitizens today often spend ten years or more living under a probationary status (as quasi-stateless people) before their application for permanent status is accepted, and a great many have adjusted to a life that is permanently defined by legal precarity. Meanwhile, the neoliberal push to marketize almost every aspect of social life has produced a similar weakening of social, political, and civil rights for citizens.62 The Trump administration may be exercising this mode of power in a more freewheeling way than have prior administrations, but it is also exploiting a discretionary authority that has been cultivated and expanded by these same governing administrations. The chapters in this book provide many examples of how Obama- era policies fostered the same kind of legal precarity and vulnerability previously described.
ORGAN IZATION OF THE BOOK The prior discussion mapped the policy and political context for the book’s contents, using the analysis of neoliberalism as a connecting thread. All of the book’s contributors problematize the current age of punishment in a way that is broadly consistent with this analysis. But it would be misleading to suggest that the arguments of all the contributors can be assimilated into a single theoretical framework. The diversity of arguments presented by the contributors highlights another goal of the book: to introduce the reader to a burgeoning academic literature. The mere existence of these differences speaks to the maturation of the field of critical immigration-enforcement studies. Since Keeping Out the Other was published, several immigration- enforcement texts have been published, each providing an important perspective into the workings of the deportation- detention apparatus—and some of which have been edited by contributors to this volume.63 Over the past decade, critical research on immigration enforcement has also made inroads into the academic mainstream, and once again, the books and journal articles produced by the contributors to this volume have played a role in this process.64 So it is important to note that the chapters in this book do not just cover dif ferent policy topic areas; they also present the reader with an argument and a treatment of theory that is more or less unique to the research history, intellectual influences, and (inter)disciplinary orientation of each contributor. The book is organized into two sections. The first section provides a broad overview of the issues defining immigration enforcement and immigration policy across several national contexts. The second section takes a more focused look at the destructive effects of deportation on migrant communities through case studies that deploy an ethnographic research methodology.
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mmigration Policy in the Age of Punishment takes a critical, interdisciplinary, and transnational look at current issues surrounding immigration enforcement. Contributors connect neoliberal governance, global labor markets, and the national obsession with securing borders to explain critical research and theory on immigration enforcement, documenting the continuities between presidential administrations and across countries from many perspectives. The book recasts deportation, detention, and border-control policies in the U.S. and worldwide in terms of a decades-long “age of punishment.” “This timely volume takes sharp aim at institutions that continue to marginalize the vulnerable, and, in doing so, it makes important advances for Studies in Transgression. Toward that end, an impressive roster of international contributors demonstrates the global implications of border—and social—control.” MICHAEL WELCH, Rutgers University and University of Buenos Aires
“Immigration Policy in the Age of Punishment identifies the sharp edges of Western efforts to make life difficult for migrants. Importantly, it does so in part by doing what many books fail to do: expanding its gaze away from a narrow concern about the boundaries of nation-states. Reaching into fields as disparate as geography and sociology, these essays will begin to define the field of critical immigration enforcement studies.” CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver
“This innovative book captures the changing nature of global migration and immigration policies, critiquing and contextualizing them for readers. Theoretically rich, Immigration Policy in the Age of Punishment is one of the more thorough efforts to draw important connections between mainstream aspects of U.S. criminal justice— such as hyper-incarceration and the self-reinforcing, self-fulfilling ‘tough on crime’ approaches—and the criminalization of immigration.” DAVID ANDROFF, Arizona State University
DAVID C. BROTHERTON is professor of sociology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate Center, City University of New York. His Columbia University Press books include The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation: Street Politics and the Transformation of a New York Gang (2004); Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today (2008); and Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile (2011). PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS is associate professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. He is the author of The Immigration Crucible (2012, Columbia University Press) and Migrants and Race in the U.S. (2013). STUDIES IN TRANSGRESSION Cover design: Jordan Wannemacher Cover image: ©sbk_20d pictures/Getty Images
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