Global Corporate Governance, by Donald H. Chew (introduction)

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ntil fairly recently, European companies were producing handsome stock returns, and companies in emerging markets were doing even better. Much of the explanation had to do with the economic cycle. After seeing their sales and profits fall during the worldwide recession at the start of this decade, European and Latin American and Asian companies all began to benefit from the general improvements in the global economy. But another, perhaps equally important, part of the story was the gradual strengthening of their corporate governance systems—a movement that, having been launched in the United States and the U.K. in the 1990s, has begun to go global.

Why should governance matter? The short answer is that effective governance—the set of controls on and incentives driving top management that come from outside as well as inside the firm—helps provide the assurance that investors need to commit their capital. And if this is true when buying stocks in one’s own country, it is likely to be even more important when investing in companies in other countries, where information may be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited.

Of course, such concerns about information and legal protection clearly have not prevented all investors from buying securities issued outside their homelands. In the last 30 years, the dollar amount of cross-border stock and bond transactions by U.S. investors has jumped from about 6 of U.S. GDP to more than 350. And the massive cross-border capital flows, together with steady increases in global trade and production, have led some economists to make a number of bold predictions. Some capital markets theorists, for example, have suggested that investors everywhere will eventually end up holding the same “world market portfolio,” with a proportional representation of all economies with traded assets. Macroeconomists have speculated that national investment and consumption levels will no longer be limited by national income and savings, since foreign capital should be readily available to make up

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any shortfalls. And corporate finance specialists have theorized that comparably profitable companies operating in the same industry but based in different countries will have similar capital and ownership structures, and roughly the same costs of capital and market values.

The reality, however, is that we continue to see significant cross-country differences in investment, financing, and internal governance structures. Much of this variation can be attributed to differences among countries in external corporate governance features—in the political, legal, and regulatory environments that help determine the vigor and effectiveness of the market for corporate control, and the degree of protection afforded outside (including foreign) providers of capital. But along with these country-level differences in external governance mechanisms, there is also considerable variation among companies in the design and effectiveness of internal governance systems—that is, in ownership and capital structures, payout policies, management incentives, and the degree of commitment to monitoring by boards of directors.

This book has two main messages. One is the fairly standard prescription that, in countries offering limited legal and regulatory protection for investors, policymakers can attract portfolio investors as well as direct foreign investment by strengthening the external features of their governance systems—their legal and regulatory frameworks, and the institutions that monitor corporate performance. And given the current conditions in today’s global capital markets, this message has relevance for developed as well as emerging economies. The second message—perhaps more surprising—is that even in countries with limited external governance mechanisms, individual companies can take matters into their own hands in two ways: (1) by listing on overseas exchanges and thereby “borrowing”—at least to some degree—the strengths of a stronger governance regime; and (2) by buttressing their own internal governance systems with, for example, greater use of independent directors, a more effective dialogue with the investment community, and stronger management incentives.

This book consists of 15 chapters on aspects of international corporate governance that were previously published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. The chapters are divided into four sections. Those that make up Part I, under the rubric “Governance, Markets, and Law,” provide an overview of general corporate governance issues, along with a discussion of the relative importance of markets and laws in shaping how governance systems have evolved.

The chapters in Part II provide insights into questions like the following: Can strong internal corporate governance systems counteract the negative effects on cost of capital and value in national regimes that offer limited protection for minority investors? And what kinds of companies seek to strengthen their internal governance systems? Part III consists of a series of chapters examining ownership and governance structures in specific countries, including Korea, France, Italy, and India. The fourth and final part contains three chapters that

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focus on the economic role of “active investors,” significant owners such as LBO funds and some institutional investors that attempt to influence or participate directly in corporate strategic and financial decision-making.

We now provide a brief overview of the chapters in each of the four parts.

Part I: Governance, Markets, and Law In January 2005, René Stulz, then President of the American Finance Association, devoted his presidential speech to the AFA to “The Limits of Financial Globalization.” In the edited version of his talk that opens this book, Stulz begins by citing recent research suggesting that (1) investors continue to hold disproportionately large percentages of domestic securities in their portfolios (at the end of 2004, U.S. investors were holding only about a fourth of the “foreign” securities needed to form a global portfolio); (2) national investment and consumption continue to depend mainly on local savings and income; and (3) corporate ownership structures remain more concentrated, and capital structures more highly leveraged, in countries that offer less protection to outside investors.

In trying to explain the persistence of these cross-country differences in investment and financing, Stulz focuses on two kinds of governance problems, or what he refers to as the “twin agency problems.” One is the tendency of controlling shareholders (said to be found in most listed companies outside the U.S. and the U.K.) to transfer value from the other (“minority”) shareholders to themselves through self-dealing of various kinds. The other problem, which complicates and compounds the first, is the tendency of governments to expropriate wealth from all shareholders, controlling and minority.

To manage these problems, especially in countries with less investorfriendly legal and regulatory regimes, the controlling shareholders typically “co-invest” with outside minority investors by retaining large equity stakes. As Stulz argues, such co-investment is needed to reassure outsider investors that the interests of the controlling shareholders are largely consistent with their own, and that the insiders will attempt to shield outsiders from the depredations of the state. And when such companies need additional outside funding, instead of raising new equity, they show an unusually strong preference for debt—which preserves their concentration of ownership.

But if such co-investment improves the terms on which outsiders provide capital, it also has a big downside: The concentrated ownership and higher leverage mean that such companies are sacrificing the much larger risk-bearing capacity, and much lower cost of equity, that comes with having a large diversified shareholder base; and given the limits of their insiders’ wealth, the companies are far more likely to pass up promising growth opportunities for lack of funding.

The twin problems can also have more subtle side effects. For example, a company operating under a confiscatory regime may find that, by increasing

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“transparency” for minority holders, it exposes the firm to further state expropriation and so reduces value. And in a similarly pessimistic note, Stulz mentions his own research that shows the difficulty for even well-governed companies to achieve high governance ratings from third-party agencies when the firms are based in countries with weak governance systems.

But for all his skepticism about the accomplishments of globalization, Stulz ends by repeating the predictions he and other economists made years ago. Both governments and the private enterprises within their jurisdictions have strong motives for finding more effective ways to manage the twin agency problems; and, “when they do,” as Stulz says in closing, “the citizens of developing and developed nations alike will benefit from increasingly global financial markets.”

In “The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance,” Harvard law and economics scholar Mark Roe begins by observing that the ownership and governance structure of the large American corporation—with its dispersed shareholders, a board of directors that defers to the CEO, and a powerful, centralized management—is usually seen as a natural economic outcome of technological requirements for large-scale enterprises and substantial amounts of outside capital, most of which had to come from well-diversified shareholders. Roe, however, qualifies this story, arguing that U.S. corporate ownership structures are mainly the result of political forces that have restricted the size and activities of U.S. commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. Populist fears of concentrated economic power, interest-group maneuvering, and a federalist American political structure have all had a role in pressuring Congress to fragment U.S. financial institutions and limit their ability to own stock and participate in corporate governance.

In “International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?” Frank Easterbrook responds to Roe’s argument by attributing current differences in international corporate ownership and governance systems mainly to differences in the efficiency of capital markets, and not to differences in corporate law. Law, in Easterbrook’s view, is largely a response to or an output of this process, not an input. In countries like the United States and the U.K. where financial markets are more efficient and there are few restrictions on cross-border cash flows, there is both less law and greater investor protection.

Moreover, Easterbrook argues that the effect of law on corporate governance and ownership is “far less pronounced” in America than in Europe and Japan. Restrictions on U.S. banks aside, corporate law in the United States is “enabling,” allowing individuals considerable freedom in organizing, managing, and financing companies. By contrast, corporate law in Europe and Japan is described as “much more ‘directory.’ ” And there is a straightforward explanation for this difference: When capital markets are efficient, the valuation process works better, which in turn provides investors with stronger assur-

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ances of fairness. When markets are less efficient, some substitute must be found—law, perhaps, or the valuation procedures of banks.

For this reason, then, banks play larger corporate governance roles in nations with less extensive capital markets—and corporate law is more restrictive. But with the current problems faced by banks and credit markets, as Easterbrook’s thesis would also suggest, the United States and the U.K. are now clearly headed for more restrictive regulatory constraints, particularly on the risk-taking activity of financial institutions. As liquidity has dried up in many markets and prices appear to have become “disconnected” from fundamentals, U.S. and U.K. government officials have intervened heavily to correct what many (if not most) observers take to be a market failure. The extent, as well as the permanence, of such intervention, as Easterbrook’s argument also suggests, is likely to depend on how quickly market confidence and liquidity are restored. The longer it takes for liquidity to return and markets to function normally, the more extensive and far-reaching the process of reregulation is likely to be—and with long-run effects that are not easy to predict.

In “Explaining Differences in the Quality of Governance among Companies: Evidence from Emerging Markets,” Art Durnev and Han Kim provide a clear, and remarkably simple, answer to the question: What will cause governments and companies to upgrade their governance systems? In summarizing the fi ndings of their study of nearly 900 companies in 27 emergingmarket countries, Durnev and Kim report, first of all, a surprisingly large variation in the quality of corporate governance practices within the same country, with the greatest variation in countries that provide the least investor protection. They proceed to show that companies with the highest corporate governance and disclosure ratings appear to have the most investment opportunities and the greatest need for external fi nancing—an association that is clearest in countries with the weakest safeguards for investors. Thus, the push for better governance appears strongest in companies with the greatest demand for outside capital—and the worse the country’s reputation for protecting minority shareholders, the greater the demand by investors for effective internal governance.

Part II: Cross-Country Evidence on Governance Effectiveness and the Cost of Capital In “Control Premiums and the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Systems,” Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales use the control premiums paid in large block sales to assess the quality of corporate governance systems (with large premiums interpreted as evidence of higher costs in removing inefficient management teams and hence less effective governance systems). The authors report significant variation in such premiums, with countries like the United

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States and the U.K. showing premiums of less than 10 while premiums for countries like Brazil run in excess of 60. The authors also use these measures to determine which institutions or mechanisms tend to be more effective in helping minority shareholders limit the expropriation of wealth by insider or controlling shareholders. Notable among such institutional variables are better accounting standards and effective legal protection of minority shareholders (both in terms of the laws on the books and their enforcement). At the same time, the authors also emphasize the importance of a number of extralegal factors, including more intense product market competition, diff usion of an independent press, and a high rate of tax compliance.

In “Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital,” René Stulz begins by noting that international financial markets have become progressively more integrated—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed and developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons. First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the United States) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital.

In addition to reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm’s equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio.

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In “Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis,” Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales begin by noting that, during the 1980s and much of the 1990s, bank-centered, relationship-based economic systems were held up as an alternative (and in some respects superior) form of capitalism to the arm’s-length, market-based, Anglo-Saxon systems of the United States and the U.K. But the weaknesses of such bank-reliant systems were clearly exposed by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. This chapter attempts to explain both the heavy reliance of emerging economies on such relation-based systems and the vulnerability of such systems when attempting to manage large capital inflows.

According to Rajan and Zingales, relationship-based systems work well in environments where contracts are poorly enforced and reliable information and capital are scarce. In such a setting, relationships effectively substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But problems arise in such economies when capital becomes too plentiful, particularly when they open their markets to foreign inflows and effectively become “hybrid” economies (part relationship-based, part market-based).

The downside of relationship-based systems is their suppression of the price system and the signals it provides. Without the reliable price signals provided by market-based systems, relationship-based systems are more than usually prone to overinvestment when faced with large capital inflows, which in turn leads to capital flight (because investors have few contractual safeguards), plummeting currencies and asset prices, and recession. Thus, the contact between the two systems creates a fragile hybrid that, while mutually beneficial to relationship borrowers and arm’s-length investors in normal times, is excessively vulnerable to shocks.

The authors suggest that while there may be some short-term benefits for emerging economies from reverting to pure relationship-based systems, in the long run such economies will be held back unless they develop the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of arm’s-length systems. The current crisis may be an opportune moment for developing economies to begin to make the transition between systems and encourage the formation and growth of capital markets.

Part III: Country-Specific Evidence on Ownership and Governance Structure Our next five chapters provide insights into five different national governance systems—those of India, Italy, Korea, the U.K., Germany, and France.

In “Corporate Governance in India,” Rajesh Chakrabarti, William Megginson, and Pradeep Yadav note that the Indian corporate governance system has both supported and held back India’s ascent to the top ranks of the world’s economies. While on paper the country’s legal system provides some of the

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best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem, with overburdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model, with significant pyramiding and evidence of tunneling activity that transfers cash flow and value from minority to controlling shareholders.

But for all its shortcomings, Indian corporate governance has taken major steps toward becoming a system capable of inspiring confidence among institutional and, increasingly, foreign investors. The Securities and Exchange Board of India, established as part of the comprehensive economic reforms launched in 1991, has made considerable progress in becoming a rigorous regulatory regime that helps ensure transparency and fair practice. And the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, now functions with enough efficiency and transparency to be generating the thirdlargest number of trades in the world, just behind the NASDAQ and NYSE. Among more recent changes, the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley-type measures in 2004—which include protections for minority shareholders in family- or “promoter”-led businesses—has contributed to recent increases in institutional and foreign stock ownership. And while family- and governmentcontrolled business groups continue to be the rule, India has also seen the rise of successful companies like Infosys that are free of the influence of a dominant family or group and have made the individual shareholder their central governance focus.

In “The Financial and Economic Lessons of Italy’s Privatization Program,” William Megginson and Dario Scannapieco summarize the accomplishments and disappointments of Italy’s privatization program, assessing its impact on Italian capital markets, and offering lessons for other countries embarking on new privatization programs. Since 1994 the Italian government has sold equity stakes in some 75 large state enterprises, in the process raising over $125 billion—more than any other country during the same period. This chapter also describes the share issuance methods used by the government to execute several massive offerings, including the largest IPO in history.

The principal benefits of Italian privatization have been dramatic increases in the size and efficiency of Italy’s stock markets and in the safety and stability of its banking system. Despite such improvements, privatization has failed to bring about the increased competition in key industries and lower prices for consumers that its planners originally envisioned. And based on this experience, the authors offer a number of lessons for government planners.

Perhaps most important, privatization is likely to yield decisive benefits only if the divestment program is properly designed and sequenced. Governments should begin by privatizing state-owned banks and other financial institutions, and as quickly as economically and politically feasible. Especially in less-developed economies, commercial banks are for many companies both the

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only suppliers of credit and the only effective source of market discipline— which helps explain why results have often been disastrous when governments have retained control of banks while privatizing other industries. Privatizing governments should also emphasize privatizations accomplished through share issuances rather than asset sales, with the aim of developing liquid and efficient stock markets and promoting effective corporate governance.

In “Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis,” Han Kim and Woochan Kim start by noting that in the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost more than half its value against the dollar and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were familycontrolled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through “tunneling” activities and other means.

The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The governmentengineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol—the so-called big deals that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business—turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37 at the end of 2006, up from just 13 ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol.

The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies, (2) large corporations run by professional management, and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies—notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards—have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO—the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange, as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett—are held up as a model of best practice.

At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there remain many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that resist such reforms.

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Aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement but also in reversing some of the previous gains.

Most disturbing is the current push to allow American-style anti-takeover devices that, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control.

In “The Ownership Structure, Governance, and Performance of French Companies: Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance,” Péter Harbula cites the important role of foreign institutional investors in spurring governance reform and performance improvements. While acknowledging the importance of such external market forces, Harbula’s study also reinforces the critical importance of “co-investment” by insiders by showing that the performance of French companies improves as the percentage equity stakes of insiders increase. But this relationship holds only up to a point: Once the stakes rise above about 40, performance begins to fall off, with the implication that insiders are entrenched and so in a position to take advantage of minority holders.

Harbula’s results thus appear to suggest that, at least for companies without huge capital requirements, there may be an optimal level of insider ownership, in the range of 25–40. What’s more, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is now a growing body of evidence that insider ownership plays a similar role in many large U.S. public companies. Harbula’s findings are remarkably similar to those of recent studies of U.S. family-owned companies, as well as to the findings of a series of studies of U.S. publicly traded companies by John McConnell and Henri Servaes. And in a study called “The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the U.S.,” Cliff Holderness reports that after “hand collecting” data on the insider ownership of a random sample of 375 U.S. public companies, he found that 96 of the companies had blockholders that in aggregate owned 39 of their total common stock. Thus, in the United States, as in France and elsewhere—and for all the specializing and delegating that goes on in modern economies—it may still pay to have large owners minding the shop.

In “Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and France,” Julian Franks and Colin Mayer note that the U.K. corporate ownership and governance system, like its U.S. counterpart, can be characterized as an outsider system with a large number of public corporations, widely dispersed ownership (though with growing concentrations of institutional shareholdings), and well-developed takeover markets. By contrast, the much smaller number and proportion of publicly traded German and French corporations are governed by insider systems—those in which the founding families, banks, or other companies have controlling interests and in which outside shareholders are not able to exert much control.

The different patterns of ownership in the U.K. and in France and Germany give rise to different incentives and corporate control mechanisms. Con-

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centrated ownership would seem to encourage longer-term relationships between the company and its investors. But, while perhaps better suited to some corporate activities with longer-term payoffs, concentrated ownership could also lead to costly delays in undertaking necessary corrective action, particularly if the owners receive “private” benefits from owning and running a business. And, although widely dispersed ownership may increase the likelihood that corrective action will be sought prematurely (as outsiders rush to sell their shares in response to a temporary downturn), the presence of well-diversified public owners may also be more appropriate for riskier ventures requiring large amounts of new capital investment.

Thus, concentrated ownership, while having the potential to reduce information costs and to strengthen incentives to maximize value, can also impose costs in two ways: (1) by forcing managers and other insiders to bear excessive company-specific risks that could be transferred to well-diversified outsiders; and (2) by allowing insiders to capture private benefits at the expense of outsiders.

Part IV: The Role of Active Investors Finance scholars have produced little evidence of the effectiveness of direct attempts by institutional shareholders to improve corporate performance. What studies we have—focused mainly on the activities of U.S. pension funds—show no clear effect on shareholder returns. But, as discussed by the panelists in the “London Business School Roundtable on Shareholder Activism in the U.K.,” a recent study of shareholder activism in the U.K. looks promising.

The subject of the study is a “Focus Fund,” launched in 1998 by the U.K. investment firm Hermes, whose aim is to identify underperforming companies, propose changes to their managements and boards, and—in contrast to the practices of the best-known U.S. shareholder activists—work mainly “behind the scenes” with the companies to bring about those changes. In keeping with the more private nature of U.K. activism, which reflects in part the fewer restrictions on communication between companies and their investors than in the United States, the study’s method of investigation is also notably different from the methods used in studies of U.S. investors. Four academics were allowed to examine Hermes’ records of its “engagements” with companies, including letters, recordings, and transcripts of telephone conversations, and the staff ’s personal notes and recollections.

Using this information, the researchers show that the Fund has been remarkably successful in bringing about three kinds of proposed changes: replacements of CEOs and Chairmen, changes in investment and financial policies (mainly increased payouts and more disciplined capital spending), and restructurings (typically leading to greater corporate focus). Of equal importance,

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the study also shows that the market reaction to the announcement of such changes has been significantly positive and that the cumulative effect of these positive reactions accounts for as much as 90 of the Fund’s impressive “alpha” or market out-performance over its eight-year life.

As Michael Jensen has argued, the rise of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the United States during the 1980s can be viewed as the reemergence of “active investors” there—the modern-day counterparts of the J. P. Morgans of the turn of the twentieth century, who held positions and sat on the boards of U.S. companies. And particularly in the last decade, the U.S. LBO movement has spread to Europe—and, indeed, become a global movement.

In “Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect,” Mike Wright, Luc Renneboog, Tomas Simons, and Louise Scholes begin by pointing out that in 2005, buyouts accounted for half of all mergerand-acquisitions activity (as measured by value) in the U.K. And as in the U.S. during the 1980s, the greatest numbers of U.K. buyouts in recent years have been in management- and investor-led acquisitions of divisions of large corporations.

In continental Europe, by contrast, the largest fraction of deals has involved the purchase of family-owned private businesses. But in recent years, increased pressure for shareholder value in countries like France, the Netherlands, and even Germany has led to a growing number of buyouts of divisions of listed companies. Like the U.K., continental Europe has also seen a small but growing number of purchases of entire public companies (known as private-to-public transactions, or PTPs), including the largest-ever buyout in Europe, the 13 billion purchase in 2008 of the Danish corporation TDC. Finally, in “Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force in Corporate Finance,” Shams Butt, Anil Shivdasani, Carsten Stendevad, and Ann Wyman note that sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have emerged among the most important players in global financial markets. SWFs have shown a wide range of investment objectives, along with continually evolving time horizons and risk appetites. For example, some SWFs have become increasingly active in corporate acquisitions and other strategic transactions. Though many of these funds prefer to invest in debt or noncontrolling equity positions, a small but growing number are seeking substantial minority and controlling equity stakes.

SWFs have also recently become major participants in the financial institutions and alternative investment industries, with several high-profi le investments in well-known private equity firms and financial ser vices companies. In certain corporate transactions, their longer time horizons and willingness to employ larger percentages of equity have made them attractive alternatives to established private equity.

At the same time, however, the rising prominence and perceived lack of transparency of SWFs have raised concerns among governments and other mar-

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ket participants in countries where companies have been targeted for investment.

For this reason, companies intent on obtaining funding from or investing with SWFs are advised to prepare for media and regulatory scrutiny, particularly if a transaction is perceived to involve a country’s strategic or security interests. Government policymakers are urged to balance the perceived threats of SWFs against their potential benefits, particularly their ability to provide a stabilizing source of global liquidity in the current economic environment.