Boaz Ganor's Conclusion to GLOBAL ALERT

GLOBAL ALERT

The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism

and the Challenge to the

Liberal Democratic World

BOAZ GANOR

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written in an effort to elaborate a broader understanding of the rationale behind modern Islamist terrorism. It has striven to do so by combining an analysis of modern terrorism strategy with an analysis of the doctrines of fundamentalist Islam, and by revealing how the two are embodied in Middle Eastern Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations. The test cases chosen to illustrate this—Hamas and Hezbollah—present a distinct model of Islamist hybrid terrorism (one Sunni and the other Shi’ite). The book has also shed light on two fundamental misconceptions of the rationale behind modern Islamist terrorism. The first conceives of Islamist terrorist organizations as irrational actors and views suicide attacks, the hallmark of many fundamentalist Islamist terrorist organizations, as evidence of the irrationality of these organizations’ leaders and activists. The second conceives of Islamist terrorist organizations as rational actors, but holds that their cost-benefit considerations, motivations, incentives, and behavior have a Western rationale. Those who hold this misconception believe that the cost-benefit calculations of the leaders and activists of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations are similar to their own; they therefore assume that these terrorist organizations will not perpetrate a given act because (under similar circumstances) neither would they.

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To redress these misconceptions, Global Alert proposes acknowledging that Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations are rational actors, while realizing that their rational judgments are subjective—that is, the rationality of their policies and behavior is in the eye of the beholder. In other words, terrorist organizations and their leaders use a system of rational concerns to analyze the costs and benefits of alternative modi operandi; ultimately, they choose the alternative most beneficial to them, based on their subjective worldview. Understanding the calculus of these terrorist organizations is the key to formulating an effective policy for confronting Islamist-jihadist terrorism as a whole, and hybrid terrorism in particular. The book proposes a classification of the considerations and goals underlying the actions of modern terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist-jihadist organizations in particular, which distinguishes root motives from instrumental motives, and these from strategic and concrete operational interests. In this way, it explains the tension between the ideological and religious aspirations and the immediate and longer-term operational considerations that inform a terrorist organization’s decision-making processes. An analysis of the variety and hierarchy of a terrorist organization’s goals, and recognition of the harmony and tension among them, is essential to understanding that organization’s modus operandi, to assessing its expected behavior in light of internal and external changes and developments, and to formulating an effective strategy for confronting it. Counter-terrorism experts and states that confront terrorism must understand the generic rationale behind modern terrorism, as well as the subjective rationale of each and every one of their specific terrorist rivals; they must also be able to parse their rivals’ decision-making processes, so as to understand the leverage that may be brought to bear on them. Counter-terrorism experts must classify the goals and motives of terrorist organizations, and avoid confusing ideological and religious root motivations with the instrumental motivations derived from momentary needs and mutable constraints—even when the latter are portrayed by a terrorist organization as being its fundamental motivations. It is the practice of terrorist organizations to deliberately misrepresent their motives, with the intention of deceiving local and international public opinion and appropriating a moderate mien. Such a classification should

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be used in devising a strategy for coping with terrorism, which will simultaneously reduce terrorists’ operational capability and neutralize the factors that motivate their attacks. In this context, the book elucidates the fundamental principles underlying modern terrorist strategies, while exposing the interconnectedness among terrorist organizations, the media, and public opinion. It is this that determines a terrorist organization’s weaknesses and strengths and governs its decision to deploy a given type of terrorist attack, be it conventional, suicidal, or unconventional (CBRN).

Global Alert challenges the belief of many Western researchers and decision makers that democracy is a panacea, a magic solution to the problems of fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. It explains that the spiritual, military, and administrative leaders of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations see democracy as a means of promoting their own interests. For them, liberal democratic values are a state’s “soft underbelly,” which they exploit to the detriment of the state. The vulnerability of liberal democracy does not warrant its abandonment in the struggle to stem terrorism; neither should that struggle dictate the adoption of an alternative form of government. However, one of the keys to resolving the “liberal-democratic dilemma” of fighting terrorism is to first recognize that liberal democracy is vulnerable to exploitation by Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, and to use this recognition to create a complex system of checks and balances that will obviate such exploitation. Awareness of the tension between effective counter-terrorism strategies and liberal democratic values is the first step toward finding a golden mean that will enable liberal democracies to preserve their fundamental values while successfully fighting terrorism.

States must identify the mechanisms and behaviors that will enable them to honor their commitment to defending their citizens without sacrificing their core values. Ignoring the inherent tension between these two commitments may be damaging, and may even cost human lives. Yet unbridled counter-terrorism efforts that trammel liberal democratic values threaten to delegitimize those who employ them.

In this context, Global Alert pinpoints certain anachronisms and lacunae in international humanitarian law, which hamper its use in fighting terrorism. The book illustrates this with an extensive discussion of the dilemma of

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proportionality—a dilemma exacerbated by the tendency of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations to deliberately embed operatives and installations in a crowded civilian population so as to force the rival state to risk inflicting extensive human casualties and property damage if it tries to oppose them. The book proposes a unique conceptual model, which may help to solve the liberal democratic dilemma of proportionality in counter-terrorism operations.

Another facet of the liberal-democratic dilemma in the war on terrorism is that posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, which simultaneously employ pseudo-legitimate social welfare and political mechanisms and illegitimate and illegal terrorist and military mechanisms. The hybrid model is not unique to Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, however; it is particularly prevalent among organizations that derive from extremist Islamic movements, and among Islamist terrorist organizations that establish welfare and charitable foundations and political parties as a “front” for their terrorist activity. Global Alert cites Hamas and Hezbollah, which have become entrenched in the Palestinian and Lebanese political arenas, respectively, and which have made territorial gains, as distinct exemplars of the hybrid terrorist organization. Hamas and Hezbollah are likely to become “role models” for Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere—like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) in Indonesia, jihadist groups in Egypt, separatist groups in Chechnya, and the local branches of al-Qaeda in North Africa (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), Iraq (the Islamic State of Iraq), and Syria (the al-Nusra Front)—that aspire to translate their terrorist activity into electoral gains and augment their internal and international status. Western decision makers must therefore realize that hybrid terrorist organizations are more dangerous than terrorist organizations that are not involved in political or social-welfare activities. Terrorist organizations that operate in pseudolegitimate social and political spheres do not warrant any legitimacy; in fact, operative and ethical guidelines should be developed to prohibit terrorist organizations from infiltrating the political and social-welfare arenas, unless they renounce and actually desist from terrorist activity themselves, and cease assisting other terrorist entities.

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On the basis of this analysis, Global Alert determines that Islamistjihadist terrorism is a “learning endeavor,” with terrorist organizations ever on a learning curve. They adapt to the behavior of rival regimes, identify the vulnerabilities and limitations imposed by those regimes’ values, and adjust their modus operandi accordingly. Counter-terrorism experts and states that confront terrorism must therefore win the “learning competition” with terrorist organizations. Just as terrorist organizations learn the vulnerabilities of the states they oppose, so must Western states learn the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. At the same time, these states must learn to recognize their own soft underbelly and weaknesses.

To effectively cope with Islamist-jihadist terrorism, it is first necessary to understand its fundamentalist underpinnings. Appeasement is no solution to the problem of Islamist-jihadist terrorism—and in fact may be very dangerous. At the same time, however, it is important not to demonize Islam as the ultimate motivator of radicalization processes that lead to violence and terrorism. Doing so is an oversimplification of the situation, and only alienates moderate Muslims who should take part in the fight against the extremist terrorism that threatens the liberal democracy from which they, too, benefit.

It is also necessary to recognize the dynamic, elusive nature of modern terrorism, which is simultaneously active in multiple spheres. Only a complex local, federal, and international network, in which various agencies cooperate to meet the criminal, military, political, economic, and public relations challenges posed by terrorist organizations, will guarantee effective multidimensional counter-terrorism policy. Focusing on any one of these dimensions exclusively will hamper the overall effort to successfully counter terrorism. Yet to facilitate sophisticated cooperation and establish the necessary, shared international mechanisms and methods, it is first imperative to arrive at one internationally consensual definition of terrorism. To date, the lack of such an agreed-upon definition has stymied attempts to address the multiple facets of modern terrorism and the varied layers of the hybrid terrorist organization, in particular.

For counter-terrorism efforts to be effective, terrorism must be fought operationally, in the media, and through legal methods. The military and the police must wage an operational campaign to diminish, if not utterly defeat,

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the capabilities of terrorist organizations by drying up their monetary resources, disrupting their recruitment efforts, destroying their weapons, foiling their training routines, and thwarting their plans and preparations.

At the same time, a media-propaganda campaign must be waged to foil the efforts of terrorist organizations to win hearts and minds, gain international legitimacy, and instill fear in target populations. Unlike a terrorist organization, a state confronting terrorism is at a fundamental disadvantage in facing the terrorist organization’s population of origin, its own population, and world public opinion. Usually, it is easier for a terrorist organization to stir up hatred of an enemy state—through da’wa and by insinuating itself into its population of origin, effectively forcing the enemy state to harm that population in its counter-terrorism efforts—than it is for a state to use the media to lessen hatred and enmity or assuage the fears and anxieties stirred up in its own population by continuous encounters with terrorism.

Furthermore, it is difficult for a state targeted by terrorism to contradict the image of the underdog that its terrorist enemy builds for itself in the international and, particularly, the Western-liberal media, with its implication of an asymmetrical struggle between David and Goliath. As the purported Goliath, the state is stymied in its justified need to employ effective counter-terrorism measures, because these (may) cause collateral damage, even if limited. This difficulty is exacerbated by terrorist organizations’ readiness to create a fictitious but convincing picture of their “plight”: by inflating the number of civilian victims of counter-terrorism efforts, blaming the besieged state for using forbidden means and methods, and entering into alliances with human rights and other associations that support the “underdog.” These actions have the effect of delegitimizing the besieged state, whose own counter-propaganda campaign must hew to a rigid commitment to proven facts. Clarifying these facts to get at the truth can take so long that by the time the state’s facts have been assembled, the terrorist organization’s message has come to dominate the media, rendering the state’s message irrelevant and anachronistic.

Lastly, states that battle terrorism must fastidiously preserve the legal legitimacy of liberal democracy even as they undermine any terrorist attempt to exploit it. Decision makers must remember that terrorist

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organizations tether international laws and tribunals to their fight against the enemy state, portraying any attempt to fight terrorism as illegitimate, illegal, and based on “war crimes.” Terrorism’s “lawfare” requires the beleaguered state to exercise extreme caution, and studiously avoid the legal traps laid for it by its terrorist rivals.

In this context, it is interesting to quote Ismail Hania, the most prominent “internal” leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In a recent statement, Hania in effect described Hamas’s strategy for fighting Israel: It is of course well known that experience teaches that to realize the project of national liberation, we must combine struggle with political and diplomatic efforts, such that the political efforts are no less important than the military efforts, and in fact each complements the other. . . . We call on all Palestinian forces, organizations and people to join ranks in confronting the dangers of negotiations with the enemy or any possible agreement with the enemy, and to formulate a national Palestinian strategy that will include any and all means—including armed struggle, popular resistance, political and diplomatic opposition, propaganda, a public and legal fight, and an academic boycott—and will be deployed in all regional and international arenas. . . . We call on human rights organizations, on civil society, and international liberal organizations to denounce the Zionist blockade of Gaza. . . . We call on anyone who can do so to file a legal suit in international criminal court against the Israeli occupation, for war crimes against our helpless nation.1

In summary, effectively coping with Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general, and hybrid terrorism in particular, requires liberal democratic states to formulate a doctrine founded on the following eight principles: 1. Gaining thorough familiarity with the rationale of enemy terrorist organizations: their ideology, motivations (distinguishing between root causes and instrumental motivations), goals, cost-benefit calculations, and decisionmaking processes, including how they address conflicts, rivalries, and competition within their leadership, and the external and internal influences on them.

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2. Identifying possible failures in understanding terrorism as a whole and Islamist terrorism in particular, which may be the “fault” of deliberate deception by terrorist organizations and their supporters. It is therefore necessary to precisely identify and define the enemy, remembering that although a terrorist organization may be the immediate enemy, it may be backed by a fundamentalist ideology of violence, which motivates the terrorist activity of multiple activists and organizations worldwide. For example, states should guard against failing to understand the enemy’s rationale, and confusing the enemy’s instrumental motivations with its root causes.

3. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democracy in confronting the liberal-democratic and the democratic-governance dilemmas. The liberal-democratic dilemma requires a state to strike a delicate balance between preserving its fundamental liberal democratic underpinnings while efficiently confronting terrorism. The democraticgovernance dilemma reflects the tension between a liberal democratic state’s ability to govern and retain legitimacy in the face of protracted terrorism, given that the leaders of a Western liberal society can continue to rule only if they ensure the safety of their citizens—even when this requires using means that may impede civil rights or contradict liberal democratic values.

4. Striving to achieve the broadest possible consensus, spanning religions and cultures, regarding the illegitimacy of terrorism. International consensus must be based on an objective, consensual definition of terrorism, which treats its methods as illegitimate under all circumstances—even when they are meant to achieve goals that its perpetrators and supporters perceive as justified. The greatest impediment to this principle is political correctness—that is, the use of lip service and appeasement in an attempt not to arouse the wrath of states, organizations, and individuals that identify with the political goals of the terrorist organization.

5. Distinguishing between the gross cynical exploitation that Islamistjihadist terrorist organizations and their spiritual leaders make of religious motivations and extremist interpretations of the necessity of violence against “heretics,” and a religious radicalism marked by devoutness and precise adherence to the commandments of Islam, that is divorced from the use of or incitement to violence. This requires recognizing radicalization

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processes, identifying the stages of escalation, and knowing when the line has been crossed between legitimate Islamic religious orthodoxy and dangerously violent Islamist-jihadist extremism.

6. Realizing the unique danger posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, and failing to grant legitimacy to organizations that are involved in pseudolegitimate political, religious, educational, or economic activities. No artificial distinction should be made among the military, political, and da’wa components of a terrorist organization. Moreover, terrorist organizations must not be allowed to engage in political, religious, and social welfare activities unless they cease initiating, planning, perpetrating, or inciting to terrorism. Similarly, an organization’s right to participate in elections should be conditional on its proven renunciation of terrorism.

7. Formulating an effective doctrine for fighting terrorism in general and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular, which simultaneously addresses terrorist organizations’ underlying motivations and operational capabilities. States must recognize the tension, and sometimes the contradiction, between motivations and capabilities, which can cause a “boomerang effect.” That is, counter-terrorism measures that effectively target an organization’s capabilities can paradoxically increase its motivation to carry out terrorist attacks. Effective counter-terrorism doctrine requires finding an appropriate balance, allowing for proactive military and security activities to thwart a terrorist organization’s capabilities without fueling its desire to perpetrate retaliatory or “revenge” attacks.

8. Formulating a counter-terrorism doctrine that encompasses operative, media-propaganda, and legal efforts. Only if a state is simultaneously victorious in all three arenas may it effectively stymie, or perhaps even defeat, terrorist organizations.

In summary, it is not impossible to effectively fight modern terrorism overall, and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular. However, doing so does require that Western liberal democracies employ critical self-examination, precise and unbiased identification of the terrorist enemy, and understanding of that enemy’s subjective rationale.

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