Boaz Ganor's Introduction to GLOBAL ALERT

GLOBAL ALERT

The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism

and the Challenge to the

Liberal Democratic World

BOAZ GANOR

INTRODUCTION

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its challenges. Barely over half a century ago, the international community grappled with fascism; less than half that time ago, it seemed that communism would be the scourge to end all scourges.

The formation, dismantling, and re-formation of nations and nation-blocs of the past century and a half have been accompanied by changes in the way wars are fought, and in where and how they are fought. Although terrorism is not a modern phenomenon, it has in the modern age continued to don and slough off various incarnations: from state terrorization of civilian populations during World War II, through the anti-colonial campaigns of the Viet Minh and EOKA, to the anarchistic and nationalistic terrorism of the Red Brigades, IRA, and PLO. Recent years have seen an increase in the religious-ideological terrorism of Islamist-jihadists, whose manipulation of supportive civilian populations so as to wield violence against other civilians whom they regard as infidels represents a “perfecting” of modern terrorist strategies. Islamist-jihadist terrorism—a plague that has spread to almost every corner of the world—creates painful dilemmas for the peoples and decision makers who confront it. Its rapid, shape-shifting advance has sometimes confounded efforts to comprehend its origins, motives, and aims.

Its sophistication in exploiting liberal values poses challenges and difficulties for the Western world, and for liberal democratic states in general, in O EAC H AG E

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attaining effective and balanced counter-terrorism policies. It is this gap in the understanding of Islamist-jihadist terrorism, as an offshoot and development of modern terrorism, that Global Alert wishes to bridge.

Chapter 1 begins the work of bridging the gap in understanding current trends and challenges in countering Islamist terrorism by providing a historical perspective on modern terrorism, as opposed to traditional warfare.

It proposes a definition of terrorism, which takes into account the difficulty that the international community has so far had in reaching consensus on such a definition. It also reviews the reaction of today’s terrorists—Islamist terrorists among them—to liberal democracy, including their warped interpretation of modern liberal democratic governance and attempts to undermine it to achieve their aims.

Chapter 2 expands on terrorism’s exploitation of liberal democracy and explains the main dilemmas that this generates for the liberal democratic state plagued by terrorism. The chapter also describes the tango danced by terrorism and the liberal, free media, and explains how terrorist organizations “spin” their actions to send different messages to different target audiences.

The tension created by the effort to devise efficient counter-terrorism strategies while preserving liberal democratic values gives rise to yet another dilemma, that of the proportionality of the response to terrorism. Chapter 3 addresses the conundrum of proportionality by first taking up the thread of analysis presented in chapter 1, this time in light of international humanitarian law. Developed to provide a frame of reference—and liability—for the excesses and atrocities of twentieth-century war, international humanitarian law now struggles to define and address the infractions against it committed by terrorists. Chapter 3 proposes a solution to this dilemma, beginning with a redefinition of state and non-state actors, combatants and non-combatants. The chapter presents and thoroughly explicates a unique equation for assessing and planning proportional responses to terrorist acts, for use by civilian and military decision makers—even in the field.

Chapter 4 tackles what is usually a less conspicuous aspect of the terrorist threat: state support for terrorism. It parses this support into its ideological, financial, and military components, and explains the advantages and disadvantages to both the terrorist organization and the state sponsor of

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terrorism in maintaining a state/non-state relationship. Iran, which supports Hezbollah and other Islamist terrorist organizations, is presented as a case in point.

It takes no great leap for a terrorist organization to go from accepting state sponsorship and its attendant obligations to wielding political power as part of a state apparatus, even as it continues to affect policy and politics by deploying political violence. The metamorphosis from “classic” to “hybrid” terrorist organization is explored fully in chapter 5. The chapter first explains how a “hybrid terrorist organization” thrives simultaneously in the social-welfare, political, and military spheres, then illustrates this explanation with an analysis of Hezbollah and Hamas, two consummate hybrid organizations, and shows how these and other similar terrorist organizations utilize statecraft to expand their sphere of influence, without relinquishing terrorism.

Once a terrorist organization has begun to function as a political entity, however, it must also grapple with the constraints and considerations that it has heretofore manipulated. As chapter 6 reveals, the hybrid terrorist organization cannot forever exploit liberal democracy and governance without also being “tainted” by them. In exploring the increasingly sophisticated interaction between liberal democracy and modern terrorism, and between specific liberal democracies and Islamist hybrid terrorist entities, chapter 6 asks whether liberal democracy is the solution to the problem of terrorism—and if so, why and how. The chapter concludes with a review of recent U.S. counter-terrorism strategy as a possible response to the motivations and capabilities of increasingly complex terrorist organizations.

Chapter 7, at the heart of the book, explains the rationale that motivates terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist terrorist organizations in particular, and that fuels their determination to preserve their operative capability. Far from being irrational or depraved, terrorists are rational actors who employ cost-benefit calculations in determining when and how to exert their influence. Though incongruous to the West, their considerations are sometimes marked by an internal logic that emanates from their ideology and goals. This chapter and chapter 8 present an in-depth analysis of the root and instrumental causes and goals underlying Islamist terrorism.

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To understand Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general, and the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in particular, it behooves Western decision makers steeped in liberal democratic values to take a step back and begin to view the impetus for terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists themselves.

Chapter 9 demonstrates the rationale behind terrorism by explicating why and under what circumstances a terrorist organization may choose to use a given tactic. This chapter promotes a greater understanding of the rational cost-benefit calculus of the modern Islamist terrorist organization, which is so very necessary to decision makers who are charged with keeping their states safe from terrorism. It also stresses that terrorist organizations are learning organizations, which constantly adapt to changes “on the ground” in a race against their state rivals to retain primacy.

Hamas is an evolving example of this, as indicated by the timely explication in chapter 10. Hamas typifies both hybrid and Islamist terrorism, and has proven to be unparalleled in its flexible adjustment to a volatile region— and to counter-terrorism measures. The chapter describes Hamas’s root and instrumental goals, methods, and decision-making processes, and elucidates the challenges it faces as it tries to both persevere in its armed resistance— the impetus for its founding—and to govern. The chapter also examines how Hamas has been affected by the Arab Spring revolutions, the infiltration of radically extreme Islamist-jihadist elements into the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, and Israel’s real-time responses to its vulnerabilities. In a canny twist, the chapter concludes with the observation that Hamas, too, now faces dilemmas of governance, no less than does its nemesis, Israel.

Chapter 11, which concludes the book, summarizes its main arguments and presents concrete recommendations, based on lessons learned.

Global Alert provides a fresh perspective on an entrenched problem, one that the twenty-first century has inherited from the twentieth century, and that shows no sign of abating. By revealing the fundamental building blocks of the terrorist organization, as well as the rationale behind Islamist terrorism, the book offers theorists, scholars, and decision makers an opportunity to truly understand what is currently a pressing threat to Middle Eastern stability and international security. Any attempt to curtail, if not vanquish, this threat must begin with just such an understanding.

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Viewed in the context of modern terrorism, and particularly in light of recent terrorist events in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Africa, Islamist terrorism cannot help but be seen as a problem that has exceeded the geographic boundaries of the Middle East. While this book is founded on the extensive experience of the State of Israel in countering both nationalist and Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, its perspective is applicable. Israel is a laboratory in which counter-terrorism efforts have been honed through painful trial and error.

Thus, although a first glance may not uncover the relationship between centralized hybrid terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah and the penny-ante groups and offshoots of a decentralized (and, some claim, devolving) Al-Qaeda Central, a closer look reveals that global and local jihadist terrorism is increasingly following in the footsteps of “classic” Middle Eastern terrorism. In the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, this has been borne out by the growing involvement of al-Qaeda offshoots and followers in local politics—either directly or via Salafist front organizations and parties—in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. As the adage states, “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”

Global Alert makes no predictions, but asks the reader to take a closer look.

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