Nuclear North Korea Revised and Updated Edition (foreword and preface)

VICTOR D. CHA AND DAVID C. KANG FOREWORD BY STEPHAN HAGGARD

+ A D E B ATE O N E N G A G E M E NT STR ATE G I E S REVISE D AN D U PDATE D E DITON

FOREWORD STEPHAN HAGGARD

When Nuclear North Korea first appeared in 2003, it quickly became a touchstone for all subsequent academic and policy writing on the North Korean nuclear crisis. To be sure, one reason was simply timing. The book was published in 2003, just as the so-called second nuclear crisis—now fifteen years old and counting—was first breaking. Another reason for the book’s success was its unusual format. With two well-known scholars of the region thinking out loud about their differences, the book read like a classic Oxford debate. Although no punches were pulled on either side, the authors were not only civil but sought to reconcile elements of their contending approaches in a way that remains relevant to this day.

But the real reason for the book’s resonance was that it captured a series of enduring puzzles, not only about how to deal with North Korea but how we should deal with a succession of troublesome adversaries, from Cuba to Iran and Myanmar. Can such states be deterred, or do we somehow need to do more? Are sanctions or engagement more likely to work in achieving our foreign policy objectives? Can such regimes be counted on to act rationally, or are their behavior and preferences likely to be out of the ordinary?

To be sure, much water has flowed under the bridge since the first edition of this book appeared. Caught off guard by the surprisingly aggressive response to its hardline strategy, the first Bush administration was constrained to pursue multilateral talks in a six-party format organized by China. The administration miscalculated how such talks would unfold, however, believing that they would provide a venue for the five parties—the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia—to reach common

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positions and tactics for disarming the regime. In fact, the Bush administration faced pushback not only from China and Russia but from its South Korean ally as well, as the Roh Moo Hyun administration continued the engagement approach pioneered by Kim Dae Jung.

In the second Bush administration, under the leadership of Condoleezza Rice at the State Department, the United States gradually shifted ground toward a more serious effort to negotiate a settlement. Evaluations of the success of the Six Party Talks in their heyday—in the Joint Statement of September 2005 and in the roadmaps negotiated and partly implemented in 2007–2008— are still debated to this day. But for complex reasons that involve factors on both sides, the Six Party Talks broke down in 2008 and have remained dormant since.

Proof that this was not simply a matter of partisan differences in approach were quick in coming. Barack Obama had run on a platform of engaging adversaries, and he hinted at the prospects of doing the same with North Korea. The love was unrequited, as the North Koreans undertook a satellite launch and a second nuclear test in the spring of 2009. The sequence of events around the second nuclear test set a pattern that has persisted to this day of missile and/or nuclear tests, gradually tightening multilateral and bilateral sanctions, further provocations, and only the most tenuous periods of calm.

The Obama administration’s strategy, called “strategic patience,” was a classic exercise in coercive diplomacy, simultaneously seeking to increase pressure via sanctions while holding out the promise of negotiations. The results were limited at best. Particularly after the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, the new regime under Kim Jong-un accelerated the missile and nuclear testing regime, with dozens of missile tests, four additional nuclear tests, and steadily increasing technical capabilities on both fronts.

The Trump administration quickly promised an end to strategic patience, but equally quickly found itself pinned by quite similar constraints: a cautious China, an equally cautious South Korea, limited or risky military options, a leaky sanctions regime,

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and an innovative—even entrepreneurial—target. The one true departure of the Trump presidency—beyond the President’s erratic tweets on the issue—was a greater willingness to deploy secondary sanctions in the pressure campaign and to hint at the possibility, however remote, of military action. As of this writing in late 2017, however, Trump’s strategy has yielded no more results than his predecessor’s.

Yet despite these developments, the central issues raised by the book are perennial. I outline three of them raised in the book and the new conclusion and one that has come powerfully into view: the central role played by China. First, can such regimes be effectively deterred? Ironically, it is Kang—with his preference for engagement—who has more faith in extended deterrence.

He notes that despite recurrent tensions, the Korean peninsula has remained surprisingly stable and is likely to continue to be so.

No matter what capabilities the North Koreans manage to acquire, the fundamental fact is that the overwhelming military power of the United States, Japan, and Korea can deter them. Cha1, by contrast, is less sanguine, noting that the possibility that North Korea could miscalculate and seek to preempt remains high, and precisely because of the regime’s continuing vulnerability.

Moreover, new concerns might be raised in addition to those recited by Cha. These include the emboldening effect of nuclear weapons, arguably visible in the two conventional attacks against the South in 2010, and the risk that the U.S.–South Korea alliance might weaken as North Korea develops a credible ability to strike the U.S. mainland.

The second enduring debate centers on the logic of sanctions and engagement. Cha is not a “hard” hawk who disdains negotiation— to the contrary. Nonetheless, he offers a spirited defense of coercive diplomacy. He believes that engagement is largely unrequited and pressure is necessary to change the North Korean calculus.

Kang, by contrast, argues that what Cha calls “hawk engagement” is anything but; at best it sends mixed signals, at worst it is a fig leaf for what the North Koreans have repeatedly labeled the “hostile intent” of the United States.

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Kang argues for bigger, bolder moves: offering a nonaggression pact, economic engagement that would have transformative effects, and a push for negotiations without preconditions.

To say that this debate is alive and well today is an understatement. While the American mood has drifted toward ever-more expansive sanctions, even Trump’s secretaries of state and defense repeatedly signaled a willingness to negotiate during the administration’s first year.

Third, and at perhaps the deepest level, the debate raises the question of how we understand the underlying political logic of regimes like the North Korean one. Kang interprets their behavior in surprisingly realist terms: as a weak country rationally seeking to deter a much more powerful opposing coalition. Cha—and the book—does not burrow as deeply into the domestic political economy of North Korea as I think is needed. In our book Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea, Marcus Noland and I see a much more problematic national security state, with limited interests in economic reform or opening as we understand and an increasingly hardwired commitment to the weapons program. Indeed, North Korea has formally signaled as much in the so-called byungjin line promising simultaneous pursuit of the weapons program and economic reconstruction. Are such hard targets immune not only from sanctions but from inducements as well? Have we entered a terrain on which the bargaining space has shrunk to zero?

Finally, it is impossible to avoid the tremendous changes that have occurred since 2003 in the sheer political and economic heft of China. The views of the two authors differ subtly in this regard as well, with Cha seeing China as pivotal and Kang doubtful of our ability to outsource the problem. Views of China in the United States generally run from the skeptical to the more skeptical.

However, I think the Chinese view of North Korea is undergoing a subtle shift, visible most clearly in the willingness to move from sanctions on the WMD program to sanctions on the country’s commercial trade. Such a policy would have been unthinkable in 2003, when this book first appeared. But the conclusions to be

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drawn from it are by no means obvious. To think that China is going to allow the regime to collapse is a fantasy; they will always act as a lender of last resort if called on to do so. The implications of this fact are far-reaching, however, as they place even greater urgency on exploiting China’s move by being more aggressive in outlining a concrete and serious proposal for negotiations. If this book reaches any conclusion, it is that regime change or a magical decision by Kim Jong-un to abandon his signature weapons program is fanciful.

I close, unfortunately, on two pessimistic notes. In his conclusion, David Kang argues that North Korea is not a problem to be solved. By that he means that it has to be treated as a real country and people, not as a Rubik’s Cube to be deftly manipulated into place by outsiders. I completely share this sentiment, but I also believe that North Korea is not a problem to be solved in a second sense: that it is quite possible that the status quo may simply persist and that the “solution” is nothing more than what we are already doing: deterring, containing, limiting the damage. Yet there is also unfortunately room for pessimism of another sort: that the United States, as much as North Korea, is becoming the primary locus of risk. Make no mistake, this is not an argument for moral equivalence. I have spent much of my North Korea career detailing the depredations the regime has imposed on its people, both with respect to food and in the inevitable refugee problems such regimes create.2 Nothing would make me happier than for this regime to be consigned to the dustbin of history.

But at this juncture, my concerns for the stability of the peninsula center as much on rash action emanating from Washington as Pyongyang, perhaps a testament to the frustration that the study of North Korea—and trying to formulate policy toward it—inevitably brings.

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PREFACE TO THE 2018 EDITION

It is bittersweet that we are publishing a second edition of this book. On the one hand, we are proud to have written a work of lasting impact, and it never would have occurred to either one of us back in 2003 that we could have had some influence on scholarship and policy regarding North Korea. Yet it is also clearly a tragedy that we are still in a position to have to deal with a North Korea that resolutely remains a threat to the region and the world. We would both be far happier to have seen peaceful change in North Korea that would have rendered this book irrelevant.

Unfortunately, that future has not yet arrived, and so this book is still necessary. We have chosen not to change the main text.

This is because the fundamental arguments still hold, and the basic debate about whether to engage or contain North Korea is still the main issue in scholarly and policymaking circles, both in Asia and the West. We have added only one new substantive chapter, a concluding chapter written by David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha, reflecting on the state of affairs regarding North Korea these fifteen years later.

In the years since this book was first published, both authors have been deeply involved in writing and speaking about North Korea, mentoring an exciting group of young scholars who are rapidly becoming influential on their own, and being involved in policy either peripherally or centrally. We are both older and grayer but hopefully a little bit wiser.

For this revised and updated edition, we would particularly like to thank Stephan Haggard, who has generously agreed to write a foreword. Stephan has been an intellectual colleague throughout both our careers, and he has set the intellectual standard for

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scholarship and collegiality as well as being an all-around great guy. We are grateful to him. We would also like to thank our editor at Columbia University Press, Caelyn Cobb, for ably shepherding the entire process. And finally, we would like to thank our wives, who have endured far too many dinners dominated by discussion about North Korea, seen far too many media interviews with us talking about North Korea, and heard far too many phone conversations about North Korea. They have been, and still remain, a constant source of encouragement, advice, and support.

David C. Kang Victor D. Cha March 2018

“[Cha and Kang’s] contribution is important for its frank discussion of the possibility of a nuclear attack and their presentation of potential courses of action.”

—New York Times

“[A] crisp, smart book.”

—Michael O’Hanlon, Chronicle of Higher Education

“A penetrating analysis of what is probably the world’s most dangerous trouble spot.”

—Gordon G. Chang, Asian Review of Books

“A delight to read.”

—Rüdiger Frank, Pacific Affairs

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Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang’s Nuclear North Korea, first published in 2003, is a landmark in the ongoing debate about whether to engage or contain North Korea. Coming from different perspectives— Kang believes the threat has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is skeptical and advocates harsher measures, though both believe that some form of engagement is necessary— the authors together present authoritative analysis of a lasting crisis. They assess recent and current approaches to sanctions and engagement and provide a functional framework for constructive policy.

With a new chapter on the way forward for the international community in light of continued tensions, Nuclear North Korea remains an essential guide to Korean affairs.

DAVID C. KANG is Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations, Business, and East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California, where he is also director of the Korean Studies Institute and the Center for International Studies. His most recent book is American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century (2017).

C O L U M B I A U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S N E W Y O R K cup.columbia.edu

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PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

STEPHAN HAGGARD is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies, director of the Korea-Pacific Program, and distinguished professor of political science at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego. His books include Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea (2017).

C O NTE M P O R A RY A S I A I N TH E W O R L D

VICTOR D. CHA is D. S. Song–Korea Foundation Endowed Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is senior adviser and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and was director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007. His books include The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (2012).