Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada Research Executive Summary Series Vol. 3, No. 1

By Sheila Ellwood Daphne Rixon

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

Contents 1. Overview 2. Introduction

1. Overview Few studies examine how different organisational arrangements affect accountability for financial and performance issues. We examine stakeholder accountability for public services by examining the workplace injuries systems in the UK and Canada.

The UK system is a largely uncoordinated arrangement of government provision through the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and compulsory private insurance. In Canada, the stand-alone Workers Compensation Boards (WCBs) administer a compensation system on a no fault basis and levy a fee from employers.

3. Research design 3.1 Stakeholder identification 3.2 Data sources

4. Stakeholder information requirements 5. Performance accountability 5.1 Commercial organisations – ELCI 5.2 Government – DWP 5.3 Stand alone agencies – Canadian WCBs 5.4 UK and Canadian comparisons

6. Implications

This research study consisted of stakeholder interviews and documentary analysis in Canada and the UK. The primary stakeholders of the DWP industrial injuries benefit system; the commercial companies providing employers’ liability schemes and the Canadian WCBs differ markedly. While all three arrangements have primary stakeholders that include (injured) workers, the government either in a regulatory or funding role and the employees of the administering organisations, the importance of other stakeholders such as employers, investors, taxpayers, lawyers and healthcare providers varies considerably.

The comparative study provides an insight into performance accountability to stakeholders in different organisational settings. We found that stand alone agencies can facilitate stakeholder accountability whereas current government provision tends to rely on political accountability. Plurality of provision of public services is increasingly common but we argue policy management across a plurality of providers requires considerable planning and control including the use of multiple simultaneous performance measures.

2. Introduction Workers’ compensation schemes are established to ensure that workers who are injured during the course of their employment receive compensation for lost wages and medical benefits. Workplace injuries’ compensation accounts typically for between 1% and 3% of payroll costs.

7. Conclusion In Canada, workers’ compensation benefits are administered by government agencies, Workers Compensation Boards (WCBs), these are self-financed through a mandatory, no-fault, collective liability system that is compulsory for employers and workers.

Employers pay a compulsory premium based on the nature of the employment.

Under the Canadian system, injured workers do not have the option to sue their employer. Benefits include wage loss replacement, health care and rehabilitation.

There is no compensation for pain and suffering. Workers’ compensation insurance represents a significant component of the Canadian economy; the annual workers’ compensation insurance premiums are estimated at over $6 billion.

1 | Research Executive Summaries Series

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

In the UK an injured worker can claim under two systems, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) funded by central government, and under Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insurance (ELCI) by suing their employer. IIDB is available for injuries covered by the scheme whether employers’ liability is established and pursued or not. ELCI schemes provide for full loss of earnings, health care as well as an amount for pain and suffering. Under ELCI, injured workers must sue their employer (the firm) for damages through litigation and must demonstrate negligence on the part of the employers.

Unlike ELCI, entitlement to IIDB does not require the employee to establish fault, but benefits are limited to a maximum amount depending on the percentage of disablement. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimates that the combined cost of ELCI and IIDB is between £1.4 billion and £1.8 billion.

also multiple stakeholders often with no common investor focus. Stakeholder theory attempts to identify different factions within a society to whom an organisation may have some responsibility.

Organisations have competing constituencies or stakeholders – clients, taxpayers, employees, and managers – who place multiple and conflicting demands on the organisation.

Consequently, each group defines performance in terms of its particular interests and priorities. Often trade-offs are necessary in order to balance inconsistent and conflicting needs. One of the major challenges faced by public sector organisations relates to responding to the conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders. This problem is exacerbated when services operate across organisational boundaries. The differing

organisational arrangements for workplace injuries give rise to significant differences in stakeholders and their relative power and influence.

Back to Contents 3. Research design 3.1 Stakeholder identification To be able to undertake a stakeholder analysis it is necessary to have a mechanism for identifying the relevant stakeholder groups. We distinguish primary stakeholders (where there is a high level of interdependence) and secondary stakeholders who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but are not essential for its survival. Several stakeholders are common under the different organisational arrangements for industrial injuries in the UK and Canada (Table 1).

Table 1 Stakeholder typology for industrial injury systems We examine stakeholder accountability for performance under these different organisational arrangements. Commercial accountability is generally accepted as served by corporate performance measured in financial terms. Shareholder value models (for example economic value added) have become popular which emphasize the primacy of the shareholder above other stakeholders and seek to enhance shareholder wealth. However, public sector accountability requires governments to answer publicly for resources entrusted to them. There are many facets of this accountability (probity and legality, process, performance, programme and policy accountability), but

Stakeholders Employers-funders Shareholders Workers-customers Government-funder Government-regulator OFT/FSA-regulator Employees Lawyers Taxpayers Health care providers

United Kingdom DWP S P P

P P

Canada Ins Co P P P

WCB P

P P P P S

P

P

P S P

P primary stakeholder S secondary stakeholder

Research Executive Summaries Series | 2

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

Stakeholders groups for whom the system was developed to serve are crucial to the organisation’s survival (be that organisation a stand-alone agency or part of a government department) and are classified as primary stakeholders. The primary/secondary grouping may change under the differing organisational arrangements. For example, employers are primary stakeholders in the UK’s ELCI schemes and in the Canadian WCBs, but are secondary in the UK’s IIDB payment system administered by DWP. Healthcare providers are primary stakeholders in the Canadian arrangements but their influence may be too slight to feature as a stakeholder in the UK IIDB arrangements.

Lawyers feature in the UK ELCI system, but do not feature in IIDB and the Canadian system which operate on a no fault basis. Even where stakeholder categorizations as primary/secondary are consistent the role or relative power of the stakeholder could vary between countries and/or organisational arrangements. For example, the government is primary as a regulator in the Canadian system, but is primary as the funder in the UK system. It could also be argued that healthcare service providers are an essential component of the Canadian system and should therefore be considered as primary stakeholders. The importance of the various stakeholder groupings and how they are managed has implications for performance management and accountability.

3 | Research Executive Summaries Series

3.2 Data sources The primary research comprised documentary analysis and interviews with stakeholders in the UK and Canada (Table 2).

Table 2 Interviewee organisations Interviewee organisations Department of Work and Pensions – Budget Forecasts – Employers’ Liability Review Team – Strategy, Planning and Policy Directorate – Industrial Injuries Policy Unit Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Trades Union Congress (TUC) British Insurance Brokers Association (BIBA) Association of British Insurers (ABI) Federation of Small Business Confederation of British Industry (CBI)/IIAC Treasury Board, Government of Newfoundland Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission – Newfoundland Carpenters’ Union of Newfoundland and Labrador Nurse’s Union of Newfoundland and Labrador Workers’ Advisor (Newfoundland and Labrador) Health Care Association of Newfoundland and Labrador Canadian Federation of Independent Business Chamber of Commerce (Newfoundland and Labrador)

Code UKG1 UKG2 UK G3 UKG4 UKG5 UKTU4 UKI5 UKI6 UKB7 UKB8 CANG8 CANG9 CANTU10 CANTU11 CANTU12 CANB13 CANB14 CANB15

Legend: UK (United Kingdom); CAN (Canada); G (Government Department/Organisation); TU (Trade Union); B (Business/Employer Organisation); I (Insurance Organisation).

The interviews were undertaken between September 2003 and June 2004. After identifying the differing stakeholders of the industrial injuries systems in UK and Canada we sought to clarify their information needs. These stakes and information requirements were then used as a basis to provide an insight into how accountability differs under organisational arrangements, draw out deficiencies of existing systems and suggest how performance accountability and management could develop.

Back to Contents

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

4. Stakeholder information requirements Stakeholder interviews were undertaken to clarify stakes and information needs. Stakeholders have differing information needs, even where information needs are common, this information is likely to be used for very different purposes. Table 3 shows the primary stakeholders common to industrial injuries schemes in the UK and Canada and their respective stakes and hypothesized accountability criteria.

Table 3 Stakeholders and their stakes Accountability criteria

Stakeholder Government

Stake • Adherence to legislation • Insurance coverage for employees and employers • Minimize financial impact on other programmes • Improve safety

Canada • Funding position • Average premium rate • Wage replacement rate • Administration costs

UK IIDB • Level and availability of benefit • Reduce administration costs

UK ELCI • Availability of cover • Efficient market

Employers

• Minimise premiums • Reduce injuries • Prompt return to work

• Funding position • Average premium rate • Administration costs

• Availability of benefits

• Link risk to premiums • Funding position • Reduce legal costs

Workers

• Maintain adequate level

• Maximise wage

• Maximize benefit • Injury frequency • Reduce time to first

• Maximize wage

• • • • Employees

of benefits Long-term viability of WCB system Rehabilitation and return to work Improved safety Retention and extension of fault system ELCI

• Viability of organisation • Training • Employment conditions • •

and wages Compliance with legislation Professional standards

•

replacement rate Injury frequency Prompt and effective health care Time to first payment

• • • •

Funding position Training days Average wages Client satisfaction

• •

payment

• Training days • Average wages • Client satisfaction

•

replacement rate Injury frequency Increase fines for non insurance Time to first payment

• • • •

Funding position Training days Average wages Client satisfaction

• •

Lawyers and insurance co. investors excluded above but feature strongly in the ELCI system in the UK.

Research Executive Summaries Series | 4

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

Government/taxpayers/employers are interested in reducing costs in order to lower the cost of the service, while unions want lower administration costs in an effort to maintain or increase worker benefits. Similarly, employers are interested in comparative information regarding the assessment premium rates of other insurance companies/jurisdictions whereas unions are more concerned about comparability of benefits paid. Beneficiaries (injured workers) do not have sufficient power to influence performance reporting. However, these stakeholders tend to be represented by trade unions and worker associations that can significantly influence government reporting.

Likewise, other primary stakeholder groups: employers and insurance companies can influence performance reporting through the collective associations.

Back to Contents 5. Performance accountability The primary mechanism for accountability is the annual report but management of performance for stakeholders requires strategic planning and wider information on which to monitor performance.

5.1 Commercial organisations-ELCI Most employers in the UK are required by law to insure against liability for injury or disease to their employees arising out of their employment (public sector organisations are exempt from the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969). Employers’ Liability insurance is based on the concept of establishing fault (employer negligence) through the courts. Employers are required to carry a minimum of £5 million in liability insurance coverage. EL insurance provides coverage to employers for the cost of compensating employees for injuries and diseases that can be attributed to their employment. Liability insurance is paid only when the employer has been determined by the courts to be legally liable for the accident/disease. Insurers provide employers’ liability coverage, (as well as other insurance services).The Financial Services Authority maintains a register of authorized insurers but there is a paucity of information and monitoring of ELCI schemes. The insurance firms do not account and report on employers’ liability insurance separately.

Lack of information led to a crisis in ELCI in 2002 that was largely unanticipated.

During 2002 and 2003, the EL system came under intense scrutiny and pressure as employer premiums escalated at a very rapid pace. Figure 1 on the next page shows the high percentage increases in insurance premiums in each of the three years from 2000/01 to 2002/03 with average increases in 2002/03 premiums of over 90 per cent for employers’ liability cover.

5 | Research Executive Summaries Series

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

‘There is absolutely no guidance as to what good health and safety records are for both small businesses and the insurers.

It is hard to measure what a good health and safety record is.’ UKB7.

Figure 1 Percentage increases in premiums by single premium type 140 120 % increase

100 80

‘Business favours insurance but arbitration rather than adversarial. To have a levy would be seen as another tax to shelter the incompetent.’ UKB8.

60 40 20 0 Employers liability

Public liability

Motor 2000/01

Employers expressed concern not only about the significant premium increases, but also about availability of insurance coverage. The business press carried numerous articles protesting about high premiums (with increases up to 400%) or even inability to obtain cover at all.

Stakeholders generally identified the same underlying causes – high injury incidence rates, high claims costs including legal costs and poor investment returns which were exacerbated by bundling of insurance packages. However we found, the stakeholders inevitably had different perspectives on the way forward. The Government regarded the system as ‘unbroken’.

‘The market is still working. In order for government policy to work, there has to be an effective EL market. DWP and OFT are of the view that there are sufficient players, they can meet demand and prices appear to reflect economic cost – there

Property 2001/02

Other 2002/03

are no super-profits. Bundling is a problem but it is useful to encourage insurance providers.’ UKG2.

Modest changes were introduced (eg. notification periods for renewals) and the removal of small business from the requirements. The Government’s role is seen as one of direction and leadership.

Workers and their representatives sought the retention of a ‘fault’ system, and felt employers should pay the cost of poor health and safety through their premiums.

Employers’ views were mixed. Smaller businesses sought exemptions from legislation and reductions in costs of awards. Large businesses were concerned to increase incentives for employers to improve health and safety standards and improve linkages between prevention, rehabilitation and compensation. The need for a better understanding of health and safety practices was identified by a small business representative.

The insurance industry was keen to remove ‘long tail’ industrial diseases from ELCI and reduce legal costs. They were interested in investigating a no fault system. Both the business and the insurance industry stakeholders were concerned to reduce the compensation culture and the high legal costs but the power of the legal profession was seen as a barrier to reform.

5.2 Government – DWP In line with other UK government departments DWP reports using Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) were introduced into UK government departments in the late 1990s. RAB, through the Summary of Resource Out turn provides the link to budgetary accounting and further analysis provides a link between the cost of the services provided and output measures. Public Service Agreements set out the key objectives of government departments while Service Delivery Agreements introduced in 2000 set out lower level input targets/milestones.

Research Executive Summaries Series | 6

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

The DWP and Health and Safety Executive each publish an annual report and a supplementary report. The DWP expenditures on industrial injuries disablement benefit (IIDB) are included as a one line item under Objective 4 of the Expenditure Tables, ‘Improve rights and opportunities for disabled people in a fair and inclusive society’. The IIDB are estimated at £776 million for 2003/4. This expenditure represents only 0.073% of the total annual expenditures of the Department (£105,488 million).

Since the DWP is the largest government department and is responsible for the administration of several significant programmes, performance results pertaining to industrial injuries are not highlighted as a separate section, but rather are consolidated with all other social programme information. The statistics for the IIDB are included within the working age section of the DWP’s Report. In addition to the DWP report, the Department also compiles statistics specifically for industrial injuries and prescribed diseases. The statistics are published on the DWP website on a quarterly basis, they include five years data along with results by quarter for the current and immediately preceding years. The DWP’s statistical reporting is primarily demographic in nature and does not include data regarding performance outcomes such as duration, rehabilitation and return to work results. The report provides a reconciliation of the 12 targets included in the 2000 Spending Review. Of the ten targets,the following three targets related to workplace injuries were established: 1. reduce the number of working days lost from work related injuries by 15% per 100,000 workers compared to the average for 1999-2000 2. reduce the incidence rate of fatal and major injury accidents by 5% per 100,000 workers compared to the average for 1999-2000 3. reduce the incidence of work-related ill-health by 10% for 100,000 workers compared to the average for 1999-2000.

The HSE supplementary report provides information on the organisation’s progress in meeting its targets and objectives. For each target/objective, the report includes a baseline and commentary on its progress and performance results on the HSE’s major programmes.

The overall picture is one of disjointed responsibility. The Secretary of State has overall responsibility for all work and pension matters as well as public expenditure issues. The Minister of State for Work has responsibility for Industrial Injuries and the Health and Safety Executive. Three other Ministers have responsibilities for the other aspects of the DWP. Similarly, responsibility and accountability for workplace injuries in the UK is spread amongst a wide array of organisations. Consequently, comprehensive performance information is not readily available.

7 | Research Executive Summaries Series

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

There is minimal reporting on industrial injuries per se but service agreements and resource accounting have provided a basis for performance management to Government. All three of the 2000 PSA targets could be characterized as performance outcome measures. They are key indicators that can be employed to monitor initiatives designed to reduce workplace accidents and illnesses.

However UK information on industrial injuries is fragmented.

For example, the HSE is accountable for prevention programmes and compliance with occupational health and safety legislation. The HSE maintains statistics on the number of injuries, types of injuries, and industry. However, these statistics are gathered from a number of different sources.

The DWP maintains statistics on injured workers who apply for IIDB, but the DWP data represents only a small proportion of the overall costs. The most significant costs related to workplace injuries are claims paid by insurance companies. The insurance companies have exclusive control over information on claims made under EL insurance and they are not required to disclose this information.

Consequently, it is impossible to obtain a clear picture of the total injury costs by type of accident or industry. The HSE appears to have demographic data on the number of injuries, while injury cost information is divided between the DWP and insurance companies. This is further complicated by the fact that only DWP benefits are disclosed.

5.3 Stand alone agencies – Canadian WCBs In Canada, reporting is conducted nationally through the umbrella Association of Workers Compensation Boards of Canada and provincially through the Annual Reports of each WCB jurisdiction. Each WCB is governed by provincial/territorial legislation and all WCBs must report to their respective local governments. There is no national WCB legislation. WCBs adhere to the standards established by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. In addition, regulatory provincial requirements are outlined, for example, Newfoundland WCB is subject to the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission Act, the Auditor General Act, Office of the Comptroller General and the Department of Labour regulations. WCBs also from a voluntary perspective may comply with most of the practices identified by the AWCBC Financial Reporting Comparability Committee.

The AWCBC collects key statistical data from each of the ten Canadian provinces and two Territories each year. In 2000 a total of 74 different statistical measures are published in the Annual Reports of the various WCBs. We reviewed these statistical measures. Of the 30 statistical measures provided by the AWCBC, we classified only ten as non-financial measures. 14 of the 30 (47%) could be classified as outcome PMs. While it is recognized that some of the financial measures serve as inputs into calculating

some of the non-financial measures, many of the financial measures do not provide meaningful comparative referents since they are expressed in absolute dollars and consequently do not facilitate comparison amongst regions of vastly different sizes.

Furthermore the compilation of specific statistics is too patchy to facilitate national or regional comparisons. Key PMs are not reported on a national basis.

The Newfoundland WCB supplements the formal information provided through its annual report, strategic plan and key statistical measures, with semi-annual ‘round table’ meetings with its stakeholders. Key stakeholder groups are invited to attend a full day session that is conducted by chief executive officer, chair of the board of directors and senior management. These ‘round table’ meetings solicit input from stakeholders on plans and provide an opportunity for stakeholder groups to raise concerns on behalf of their constituents.

5.4 UK and Canadian comparisons There are areas of commonality but distinct differences. Five common categories of statistics are provided by Canada and the UK: prevention, injury statistics, number of new claims, cause of accident and demographic data.

The DWP reports provide primarily financial data, process statistics and demographic information rather than performance outcomes. Moreover, the DWP reports focus on consumption of resources by client category,

Research Executive Summaries Series | 8

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

administration costs, staffing levels, number of claimants (by region, disease), diagnosis by disability range, by gender, by age range, by industry and by occupation. However, the SDA does monitor progress against important outcome targets. While some of the Annual Reports of the Canadian WCBs place considerable emphasis on process, financial and demographic data, the national comparative PMs compiled by the AWCBC include a greater proportion of outcome measures which reflect efficiency and effectiveness.

However this data is often voluntary and not audited. Overall, both the Canadian and UK measures tend to focus more on financial and process data rather than performance outcomes. There is much greater political accountability in the UK in terms of achieving government targets. The UK also has broad key indicators such as reduction in number of lost time days and reduction in number of fatalities Unlike the UK, the Canadian WCBs tend to focus on historical trends, rather than future estimates. The DWP provides three years actual results along with three years estimated costs/volume for most of its statistical measures. Staffing levels and assessment diagnosis are two of the UK measures that are not compiled on a national basis in Canada. The UK HSE and the Canadian Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Divisions of the various jurisdictions are quite similar in their focus on the provision of information regarding work-related injuries and diseases.

The differing nature of performance accountability to stakeholders is highlighted in Table 4 by the performance measures that are specific to organisational arrangements within the two countries.

Table 4 Key performance measures provided to stakeholders Performance measures DWP Premiums Funding position Wage replacement rate Injury frequency Duration Return to work success rate Time from injury to first payment Client satisfaction Health care expenditures Claims costs

9 | Research Executive Summaries Series

N Y Y N N N N N Y

Provided to stakeholders ELCI CANADA N Y Y N Y N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N Y

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

UK tends to concentrate on identifying where government money was spent and includes benefit payments by type of assessment, average weekly amount and by prescribed diseases. On the other hand, Canada measures the financial stability of the system (percentage of funded liabilities, investment statistics) information that is not compiled in the UK. Canada also has several quality and outcome statistics that are not compiled in the UK eg. return to work statistics and customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction. In the UK, there is a paucity of information available to stakeholders of insurance companies providing the ELCI schemes, this is presumably due to the primary stakeholder of insurance companies (ie. the investor) is not concerned with information on industrial injuries per se but the overall performance of the company. There is no central source of information related to workplace injuries paid through ELCI schemes. Rather, each employer would be aware of only their own firms’ claims, but as a group would not be privy to information regarding the industry or the UK at large.

The funder groups (government and employers) are lacking key information regarding duration, return to work success rates and consolidated claims costs (IIDB and ELCI schemes). The Association of British Insurers referred to the UK as a ‘data poor country’. Information is also lacking on IIDB ‘unfunded liabilities’. The lack of transparency in relation to unfunded liabilities (eg. pensions) is common in the UK public sector.

In the UK, service agreements permit strong political accountability but there is a danger that targets are overlooked for this relatively small ‘benefit’ in a very large complex department with the responsibility to deliver several major social programmes. Workplace injuries tend not to have a high profile within the DWP. As a DWP budget forecaster observed: ‘We are accountable through Parliamentary questions by MPs –there’s not a huge lot on industrial injuries’ UKG1.

On the other hand, industrial injuries have a much higher profile in Canada where WCBs’ sole purpose relates to workplace injuries.

Back to Contents 6. Implications The analysis of stakeholder needs and information provided has shown marked variation in performance accountability for industrial injuries and cast light on management strategies for performance accountability to stakeholders. The Canadian WCBs provide more performance information to meet stakeholder needs on a voluntary basis.

Canada has high focus on return to work and rehabilitation whereas these initiatives are only now becoming important in the UK. Consequently, Canada has many more PMs reporting on duration, propensity to receive long-term disability benefits and return to work success rates. This would seem to be a consequence of no direct stakeholder incentive between employers and industrial injuries benefit.

The dual nature of administering industrial injuries in the UK compared to a single agency system in Canada results in fragmented information since the ELCI companies are not obliged to disclose their claims related data. In the UK RAB and PSAs has introduced greater output or outcome performance measurement and strong political accountability. However, workplace injuries is a good example of where several different bodies each with stakeholders of differing weight need to work together if the workplace injuries ‘programme’ is to succeed. At present a ‘programme’ as such does not exist but there are plans/targets both in terms of reduction in workplace accidents and, more recently, in vocational rehabilitation.

The reduction in workplace injuries requires a string of measures that cross organisational boundaries. Appropriate practices should be encouraged and monitored through good practice guides and legislation but also by providing commercial incentives by linking premiums to workplace risk with the cost of workplace accidents being borne by the ‘instigator’ including many currently, hidden costs borne by society as a whole.

Vocational rehabilitation requires still wider collaboration embracing employers, insurance companies, government (with direct responsibility for IIDB) and healthcare providers. Holding inter agency collaborators to account for results is seen to be central to the current trend toward accountability for results. Multi agencies with multiple constituencies some of which do not necessarily have a public

Research Executive Summaries Series | 10

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

ethos require clear responsibilities to be set and multiple simultaneous performance indices (MSPIs). Thus we envisage a system of policy targets linked to risk based employer contributions; health and safety training, rehabilitation measures etc. The work undertaken in this study to identify different stakeholder interests and current reporting mechanisms may form a basis for establishing a comprehensive approach to performance management of workplace injuries. Such a framework together with MSPIs requires further research but could be used potentially to monitor programme elements along a continuum to achieve the programme objectives of accident reduction and vocational rehabilitation.

Back to Contents 7. Conclusion The use of stand alone government agencies as in Canada facilitates more visible performance accountability to stakeholders. The funding position is highlighted, premiums more closely reflect industry risk and outcome measures are more widely used. However, accountability to stakeholders (other than the Minister of Labour) is undertaken on a voluntary basis in Canada. The voluntary approach to stakeholder participation appears to lead to weak targets and less reliable information. Nevertheless Canada has a high focus on return to work and rehabilitation whereas these initiatives are only now becoming important in the UK. Direct government provision of industrial injuries benefits enables strong political accountability on public expenditure through RAB and public service agreements in the UK, but there are deficiencies in outcome measures concerning rehabilitation and return to work. The provision of industrial injuries payments through commercial insurance companies permits a vast area of workplace injury cost in the UK to be hidden and to receive little strategic oversight. ELCI schemes and NHS expenditure on workplace injuries are largely unknown and even spending on industrial injuries benefit is to some extent lost in comparison to other large benefit payments. In the UK the multi organisational arrangements and their multiple stakeholders make performance management complex. Reductions in workplace injuries and improvements in vocational rehabilitation would benefit from a programme approach to performance accountability (with multiple simultaneous performance indicators) that spans the different bodies.

Back to Contents

11 | Research Executive Summaries Series

Research Executive Summaries Series Performance accountability to stakeholders: workplace injuries in the UK and Canada

Copyright © CIMA 2006 First published in 2006 by: The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 26 Chapter Street London SW1P 4NP Printed in Great Britain The publishers of this document consider that it is a worthwhile contribution to discussion, without necessarily sharing the views expressed which are those of the authors.

No responsibility for loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any material in this publication can be accepted by the author or publishers.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, method or device, electronic (whether now or hereafter known or developed), mechanical, photocopying, recorded or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Translation requests should be submitted to CIMA.

ISSN 1744 – 7038 (online) ISSN 1744 – 702X (Print)

Researcher contact details: Researchers Professor Sheila Ellwood University of Bristol Department of Accounting and Finance 8 Woodland Road Bristol BS8 1TN UK Daphne Rixon Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission Newfoundland St John’s Canada

Research Executive Summaries Series | 12

CIMA, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, represents members and supports the wider financial management and business community. Its key activities relate to business strategy, information strategy and financial strategy. Its focus is to qualify students, to support both members and employers and to protect the public interest.

The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 26 Chapter Street London SW1P 4NP T. +44 (0)20 7663 5441 F. +44 (0)20 7663 5442 E. technical.services@cimaglobal.com www.cimaglobal.com

TE041V0107