Typhoon Haiyan Relief: A Critical Filipina/o Perspective

Typhoon Haiyan Relief: A Critical Filipina/o Perspective

Courtesy of Critical Filipina & Filipino Studies Collective

Typhoon Haiyan Relief: A Critical Filipina/o Perspective Forming on November 3, 2013 and finally dissipating on November 11, Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) has gone on record as the most powerful tropical cyclone to ever make landfall. In its wake, Haiyan has affected almost 13 million people in 44 provinces, 539 municipalities, and 56 cities in the Philippines according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. More than four million people have been displaced, with over 70% of those affected in the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Giumara, Iloilo, and Negros. As of November 18, 2013, 4,200 people were reported deceased; 12,501 people, injured; and 1,186 people, missing.

Written by members of the Critical Filipino and Filipina Studies Collective (CFFSC), the following statements are intended to highlight the man-made conditions that have set the stage for the catastrophic damage wrought by Typhoon Haiyan and to provide critical perspectives on the politics of aid and relief efforts. This is the first of a series of pamphlets that the CFFSC will be producing in the coming weeks.

I. THE “MAN-MADE” ASPECTS OF “NATURAL” DISASTERS

Tragedy associated with natural disasters is facilitated by political and socioeconomic conditions that disproportionately impact already vulnerable populations.

The emphasis on the “‘natural’ dimension of catastrophic events” shifts attention away from the role of the Philippine government in facilitating the vulnerability of poor populations (Gaillard, Liamzon & Villanueva, 2007). Among the people most impacted by natural disaster are the “landless” or those who are displaced by gover nment-enabled economic disruption of local economies. In search of economic and food security, they are forced to migrate to densely populated areas, many of which are geographically susceptible to typhoons.

The Philippine government has long promoted large-scale mining, logging and other enterprises that have major environmental impacts.

The lack of government environmental regulation that allows deforestation and illegal logging has made certain areas of the Philippines more susceptible to disasters which are in turn worsened by global climate change.

Less than a year ago, the Southern Philippines was ravaged by Typhoon Pablo and scientific observers link the flash floods that wiped out many areas to the mining and logging operations that exacerbated the geographic vulnerability of the land (Holden, 2013).

Philippine elected officials often serve their private interests as opposed to the larger public interest.

This has become especially apparent with the recent “pork barrel” scam. This scandal revealed a large portion of taxpayer money in the Philippines were channeled away from public projects including

disaster prevention, national development, and social services and into the private pockets of a few corrupt politicians - including President Aquino himself (see: http://bulatlat.com/main/tag/pork-barrel-scam/).

II. THE POLITICS OF RELIEF AND AID

Large relief organizations partner with businesses and leave local communities out of aid-decision making.

For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross partnered with Wal-Mart to facilitate aid relief (Klein, 2007). This is known as the “privatization of aid” because it reflects the government’s renouncement of its responsibility to protect the public from disasters. Instead it leaves the decisions about and work on aid to outside agencies and business.

“Trickle-down imperialism,” as anthropologist Mark Schuller (2012) puts it, is one way of thinking about the privatization of aid.

Schuller argues that the privatization of aid has the effect of cutting off the participation of local communities in relief efforts and thereby undermines the efficacy of aid distribution (see pp. 180-187).

Privatization of aid is a kind of “imperialism” because aid decisions get determined by big relief organizations and multinational corporations (often based in the West) rather than people directly affected by catastrophes.

At the same time, some groups, like Gawad Kalinga, a prominent Philippine-based non-governmental organization (NGO) currently engaged in relief efforts believe that “Poverty is not an economic problem, but a behavioral one.” Hence it is highly unlikely that this group wlll actively engage poor communities in decisions about aid (see http://www.gk1world.com/ whatispoverty).

Typhoon Haiyan Relief: A Critical Filipina/o Perspective Large relief organizations do not often have the relationships critical to responding to disaster relief in adequate and efficient ways.

The Red Cross (and arguably other large relief organizations) is too big to properly function (Salmon, 2012). Most Red Cross volunteers do not have disaster-relief experience and are ill-equipped to respond to disasters promptly and effectively. Further, the Red Cross is mostly concerned with bureaucratic management. Many donations will likely be spent on the logistical infrastructure of the Red Cross.

Less often do donations go to organizations that deal with “disasters” every day of the year (i.e., those who regularly work with the communities that are affected by the disaster). Journalist and author Jonathan Katz (2012) points out that “[l]ike most NGOs, the Red Cross takes the money it can't immediately spend, sticks it in its bank account, and watches interest accrue. Some of that will get spent on future disasters.

Some won't. Some organizations cap donations when they exceed what might reasonably be used in the near term.”

Some examples: in 2010, Doctors Without Borders halted Haiti earthquake relief fundraising efforts when they reached 30 million euro. On the other hand, however, the American Red Cross alone continued accepting donations until its coffers reached $486 million. Katz notes that “as of the second anniversary of the quake in January 2012, only two-thirds of that total had even been contracted to be spent.”

III. COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES

WHILE QUICK AID IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO MEET IMMEDIATE AND DIRE NEEDS, IT MUST BE GUIDED BY A GREATER VISION OF SHIFTING FROM RELIEF AND REHABILITATION TO A COMPREHENSIVE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PRE-EXISTING MAN-MADE CONDITIONS THAT ENABLED THE SCOPE OF DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY HAIYAN.

With these points in mind, we support the relief and rehabilitation efforts of the National Alliance for Filipino Concerns (NAFCON).

While there are many important organizations who are providing important and direct aid that is needed in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, we support the community-based relief efforts of NAFCON. Established in 2003, NAFCON has responded to the various natural and man-made disasters that have plagued the Philippines by sending relief to and working directly with community efforts in the country.

At present, NAFCON has members in over 23 cities throughout the United States coordinating to protect the rights and welfare of Filipinos. As such, this broad based coalition has been active in directly supporting the immediate needs of those affected by Typhoon Haiyan as well as organizing campaigns toward a vision of global Filipino/as living in environmental, economic, and social justice. 100% of all proceeds received by NAFCON is sent to credible and trusted partner organizations in the Philippines to ensure that direct aid, relief, and rehabilitation reaches affected people and communities.

For more information and to provide your support, please visit: http://nafconusa.org/ http://taskforcehaiyan.org/

We believe it is imperative that disaster relief and efforts be defined by:

! Attention to the needs of already disenfranchised Filipino/a communities. ! Support that directly goes to the communities in need. ! Fast and timely distribution of resources through partnerships with local organizations that know the areas most affected. ! Transparency and accountability. ! The active participation of affected communities in decision-making processes.

REFERENCES/ RESOURCES

Jean-Christophe Gaillard, Catherine C. Liamzon & Jessica D. Villanueva. (2007).

‘Natural’ Disaster? A Retrospect into the Causes of the Late-2004 Typhoon Disaster in Eastern Luzon, Philippines. Environmental Hazards, 7(4), 257-270.

William N. Holden. 2013. “Neoliberal Mining amid El Niño Induced Drought in the Philippines,” Journal of Geography and Geology, 5(1).

Jonathan Katz. (2012). The Coca-Cola of Disaster Relief. Available at http:// gawker.com/5958176/the-coca+cola-of-disaster-relief-whats-the-red-cross-reallydoing-for-hurricane-sandy.

Naomi Klein. (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books/ Henry Holt Press.

Felix Salmon. (2012). The problem with Red Cross. Available at http:// blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/11/12/the-problem-with-the-red-cross/.

Mark Schuller. (2012). Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.