MFLU December 2025 by BridgeTowerMediaDigital

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DECEMBER 2025 Vol. XXXVI, No. 12

Domestic violence bills part of 2026 legislative focus

Supporting youth who are victims of sex trafficking. Page 3 Three bills would help DV victims. Page 4 Va. court finds wife abandoned marriage. Page 7

The Daily Record file photo

Several domestic violence bills that would support victims are expected to be given a look during the 2026 General Assembly session that begins in January.

Table of Contents Vol. XXXVI, No. 12 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law 200 St. Paul Place Suite 2480 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Main Number: 443.524.8100 Suzanne E. Fischer-Huettner Managing Director Sameer Rao Editor Patrick Brannan Managing Editor Contributing Writers Hope Keller Ian Round Maryland Family Law (ISSN 2373-7255) is published monthly (12 issues per year) by Bridgetower Media, 200 Saint Paul Place Suite 2480, Baltimore, MD 21202. The standard Digital+Print subscription is $399 per year. Periodicals postage paid at BALTIMORE, MD 21233-9998, and additional entry offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Maryland Family Law Update Subscription Services, PO Box 494, LINCOLNSHIRE, IL 60069-0494 To order a subscription go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/ maryland-family-law/subscribe/ or call 800-437-0916 or by email: support@bridgetowerhelp.com. To renew. change your address or to temporarily stop service. go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/maryland-family-law/ manage-account-fc/ or call 800-437-0916 or by email support@bridgetowerhelp.com. Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they affect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by The Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.

Advocacy: Supporting youth who 3 Child are victims of sex trafficking. Story: Three bills would help 4 Cover domestic violence victims.

7 In the News:

Dells donate billions to fund ‘Trump Accounts’ Billionaires pledged $6.25 billion to fund 25 million ‘Trump Accounts’ for children as part of President Donald Trump’s tax and spending legislation.

8 Monthly Memo

One spouse is enough, Vatican tells Catholics … NJ high court rules shaken baby syndrome testimony unreliable and inadmissible … Court finds error in determination of husband’s income … Court erred in not following prenuptial agreement … Court dismissed RICO claims stemming from family law dispute … Court reverses divorce clarification and adjusted ruling.

9 Family Law Digest 11 Full Text Unreported Opinions 90 Case Index 91 Topic Index

©2025 The Daily Record Company, all rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the express written permission of the publisher. The laws of every jurisdiction may differ, and the facts are capable of many interpretations. The contents of this publication are not to be construed as legal advice and should not be acted upon without consulting an attorney. Letters selected for publication are subject to editing. Letters from litigants in pending cases or their representatives will not be accepted for publication until after their cases have been finally decided. Address letters and comments to Editor, Maryland Family Law Update, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Maryland Family Law Update and The Daily Record Company are owned by Bridgetower Media.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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Child Advocacy

Supporting youth who are victims of sex trafficking According to a Department of Justice report title Child Sex Trafficking in the United States, “Federal prosecutions of child-only sex trafficking cases increased 17% from 2019 to 2020, and children made up 69% of victims in newly charged sex trafficking cases in 2020 with victim ages ranging from 4 to 17 years old when they were exploited.” “In 2021, 66% of the victims of federal trafficking were minors.” The vulnerabilities of foster youth make them at higher risk to become victims of child sex trafficking. Jane is a 14-year-old youth in foster care who is placed in a group home. Jane’s father is deceased, and her mother is unable to care for her due to the demands of caring for another child and the level of treatment Jane’s mental health conditions require. Jane has been enticed by a slightly older youth to leave the group home after hours on multiple occasions in violation of the group home rules and introduced to “friends” who welcome Jane into their group. Initially, the leader of this group treated Jane well, but ultimately, preying on her feeling of indebtedness to the leader, she is persuaded to engage in sex acts for money, for which she is arrested. One of the many tragedies seen by attorneys who work in the Child In Need of Assistance practice is the sex trafficking of minors in foster care. Children and young adults involved in the CINA system are especially vulnerable to becoming victims of sex trafficking due to their experiences of abuse and neglect, being separate from and without the protection and support of a family, and experiencing TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

JOAN

LITTLE

Child Advocacy educational, mental health, and housing instability. Emily Selig in a report about foster youth in sex trafficking wrote, “an estimated 100,000 minors are trafficked for sex in the United States each year. The majority of these victims are either currently or were formerly housed in the foster care system.” In Maryland, at the time of the first report of being trafficked, 70% of alleged victims had prior involvement with Maryland’s child welfare system, 50% had child welfare involvement in the year prior, and 26% were currently in the child welfare system. Maryland is particularly susceptible to trafficking because of its accessibility to a port, major highways with rest stops, and international airports. In 2024, Maryland enacted the “Safe Harbor Navigator Grant Program” to “increas[e] the State’s capacity to respond to youth sex trafficking and labor trafficking.” This law provides for trafficked youth to be treated as victims, not criminals, and be provided services which are “victim-centered and trauma-informed.” This law will especially benefit youth in foster care by allowing them to remain in their foster home, attend school, and benefit from therapeutic support, rather than being incarcerated for prostitution or other related crimes such as trespassing and theft. The provision of services such as medical care, therapeutic programs, housing, and even legal services does not necessarily prevent all trafficking, but those services can provide a youth with a

sense of strength and support for a youth and may possibly reduce the likelihood of youth being trapped in the unforgiving world of trafficking. Once criminal charges against Jane were dropped, she returned to her foster home and was provided with and engaged in various support services, including weekly therapy, educational support, and medical care. In addition, Jane accepted the guidance of a one-on-one mentor, who remained with her all day and protected her from the possible return of her “friends” who could have attempted to pressure her back into trafficking. Jane’s case demonstrates a certain degree of success in that she is no longer being trafficked, but there is still much more that needs to be done to combat sex trafficking. First, there must be trained personnel who can communicate between agencies to identify and provide services to the young victims. Second, affordable housing and employment must be available to youth aging out of the foster care system. Third, a comprehensive safe harbor program must be fully implemented to ensure that the necessary medical, therapeutic and legal services are provided to all victims to support their exit from the trafficking world. To fully combat sex trafficking, the public must become aware not only of the wrongdoers, but also acknowledge that there are vulnerable victims, and engage in advocacy to assist these vulnerable youth who have fallen prey to sex trafficking. Joan Little is a Chief Attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Cover Story

Three bills would help victims of domestic violence By Hope Keller Special to The Daily Record

Three bills championed by the Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence will be introduced in the upcoming General Assembly session. All three are in line with the Annapolis-based organization’s mission of reducing the occurrence and impact of intimate partner violence.

Protective orders The first, two-part bill would double the amount of time between hearings for a temporary protective order and a final protective order, from seven to 14 days. Laure Ruth, public policy director for MNADV, said domestic violence survivors often need more than a week before they are ready for a permanent protective order hearing. “In the time after a survivor goes to seek a temporary protective order, they’ve got a lot going on,” Ruth said. “They may be seeking medical care for themselves, mental health care for themselves or children; they may be trying to relocate to a hidden address, they may be trying to find a lawyer, they may be trying to gather evidence. And they’re in a trauma state when all that is going on.” The bill also would allow a judge to order an abuser to pay their victim for financial loss. “The example I use is, if he breaks down my front door, he should pay to have it rebuilt or replaced,” Ruth said, adding that judges in Maryland now don’t go beyond relief that is explicit in the statute. Input from advocates and attorneys attending the annual Partners for Justice Conference in May prompted her to push for the measure, Ruth said. “I asked the advocates and lawyers in the room: If you could change anything legislatively, what would you change? And these were the two big4

THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO

Marla Zide is the founding partner of the Side Law Group in Glen Burnie and Cambridge.

gest asks from the advocates and the lawyers who do this work,” Ruth said. Sen. Sara Love (D-Montgomery), one of the bill’s sponsors, noted that pro bono attorneys, who often represent domestic violence survivors, do

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

not work full time on those cases. “If you have a part-time lawyer and you have such an incredibly short window, it just compounds the problem,” Love said. Family law attorney Marla Zide TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Cover Story had a different take on the measure. “The concern that I have is that you cannot get financial relief in a temporary, only in a final,” said Zide, founding partner of the Zide Law Group in Glen Burnie and Cambridge. “I think it would delay potentially the finality of it, which could then put somebody in a pretty significant financial (bind).”

Coerced debt The second measure is designed to help domestic violence survivors address debt incurred in their name by an intimate partner. “Coerced debt is a huge problem in domestic violence because it’s part of (abusers’) power and control dynamic,” Ruth said, explaining that abusive partners often open credit card accounts or loans in their victim’s name or coerce the victim into taking on debt they would not otherwise have incurred. “That leads to financial insecurity, which is one of the leading reasons survivors stay in or return to an abusive relationship,” continued Ruth, who said studies have shown that nearly 75% of domestic violence survivors report being a victim of coercive debt. Ruth described a “pathway” that allows a survivor to prove to a creditor that a debt was coerced, which then allows the creditor to go after the person who incurred it. “Essentially, we’re trying to balance the interests between leaving a survivor with so much debt that they really can never move forward, but not making the creditor be left holding the bag,” Ruth said. Deena Hausner, director of the House of Ruth Maryland Domestic Violence Legal Clinic, hailed the measure, which is being sponsored by Del. Lesley Lopez (D-Montgomery). “This is a potentially really important piece of legislation,” Hausner said, explaining that coerced debt can prevent survivors from being able to apply for housing and other loans. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO

Deena Hausner is director of the House of Ruth Maryland Domestic Violence Legal Clinic.

“It’s kind of like this cloud that follows them around and is very hard to get out from under,” Hausner said.

Firearms collection The third bill, the Family and Law Enforcement Protection Act, addresses law enforcement’s follow-through on collecting guns that are ordered surrendered at a protective order hearing. Under Maryland law, all respondents must turn in any guns once a final protective order is issued, but enforcement varies by jurisdiction, Ruth said. “This is an effort to provide standardized process across the state for how law enforcement should actually effectuate that gun surrender,” Ruth said, noting that Marylanders to Prevent Gun Violence was the primary

advocacy group behind the proposed legislation, which is sponsored by Sen. Shelly Hettleman (D-Baltimore County) and Del. Sandy Bartlett (D-Anne Arundel). Hettleman emphasized that the measure sought to protect law enforcement. “Oftentimes these kinds of cases are extremely dangerous, both to the person being abused as well as to law enforcement,” she said. “That’s why we titled (the bill) the way we did.” Hausner welcomed the measure. “Just the degree of the coercive control that an abusive partner can exercise by threatening with a firearm is enormous,” Hausner said. “A lot of us want to see some more effective mechanism for removing the firearms, and I think this is another step in the right direction.”

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the News

Dells donate $6.25 billion to encourage families to claim ‘Trump Accounts’ By Thalia Beaty Associated Press

NEW YORK — Billionaires Michael and Susan Dell pledged $6.25 billion Tuesday to provide 25 million American children under 10 an incentive to claim the new investment accounts for children created as part of President Donald Trump’s tax and spending legislation. The historic gift has little precedent, with few single charitable commitments in the past 25 years exceeding $1 billion, much less multiple billions. Announced on GivingTuesday, the Dells believe it’s the largest single private commitment made to U.S. children. Its structure is also unusual. Essentially, it builds on the “ Trump Accounts “ program, where the U.S. Department of the Treasury will deposit $1,000 into investment accounts set up by Treasury for American children born between Jan. 1, 2025 and Dec. 31, 2028. The Dells’ gift will use the “Trump Accounts” infrastructure to give $250 to each qualified child under 10. “We believe that if every child can see a future worth saving for, this program will build something far greater than an account. It will build hope and opportunity and prosperity for generations to come,” said Michael Dell, the founder and CEO of Dell Technologies whose estimated net worth is $148 billion, according to Forbes. Though the “Trump Accounts” became law as part of the president’s signature legislation in July, the Dells say the accounts will not launch until July 4, 2026. Michael Dell said they wanted to mark the 250th anniversary of U.S. independence. “We want these kids to know that not only do their families care, but their communities care, their government, their country cares about them,” said Susan Dell. “And we’re all rooting for them to have a wonderful future, a bright future, 6

AP Photo/Frank Franklin II

Michael and Susan Dell pose for photographs Nov. 26, 2025, in New York.

and that that’s available to them.” Under the new law, “Trump Accounts” are available to any American child under 18 with a Social Security number and their families can fund the accounts, which must be invested in an index fund that tracks the overall stock market. When the children turn 18, they can withdraw the funds to put toward their education, to buy a home or to start a business. The Dells will put money into the accounts of children 10 and younger who live in ZIP codes with a median family income of $150,000 or less and who won’t get the $1,000 seed money from the Treasury. The Dells hope their gift will encourage families to claim the accounts and deposit more money into it, even small amounts, so it will grow over time along with the stock market. President Trump plans to celebrate the commitment later on Tuesday and a White House spokesperson Kush Desai said the Dell’s gift will be the first of many new pledges to fund the accounts. “The One Big Beautiful Bill’s Trump Accounts are a revolutionary investment by the federal government into the next generation of American children,” Desai said. “It’s also President Trump’s call to action for American businesses and philanthropists to do their part, too.”

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

“It’s hard to give effective dollars away at scale, particularly to the country’s neediest kids in a way that you have confidence that those dollars are going to compound with the upside of the U.S. economy,” Brad Gerstner, a venture capitalist, who advocated for the passage of this legislation. “And so, this is a unique platform that’s being created by the government that I think can unlock major giving.” Gerstner is also the founder of Invest America Charitable Foundation, which is supporting the Treasury in launching the accounts. He said the goal of the accounts is to give young people funds to jump start their lives but also to help them benefit from the growth of the U.S. economy through investing in stocks. “Fundamentally, we need to include everybody in the upside of the American experiment. Otherwise, it won’t last. And so, at its core, we think it can re-energize people’s belief in free market, capitalist democracy,” Gerstner said of the accounts. About 58% of U.S. households held stocks or bonds in 2022, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, though the wealthiest 1% owned almost half the value of stocks in that same year and the bottom 50% owned about 1% of stocks. In 2024, about 13% of children and young people in the U.S. lived in poverty, according to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and experts link the high child poverty rates to the lack of social supports for new parents, like paid parental leave. While the funds in the Trump Accounts may help young adults whose families or employers can contribute to them over time, they won’t immediately help to diminish childhood poverty. Cuts to Medicaid, food stamps and child care that were also included in the spending package are likely to reduce the support children from low-income families receive. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the News

Va. court finds that wife abandoned the marriage Bridgetower Media Newswires

RICHMOND, VA -- Where the parties began living in separate houses, the wife had a very minor role in caring for husband during his terminal illness and wife began a separate romantic and sexual relationship mere months after separating from husband and maintained that relationship for years through his death, the circuit court’s finding that she abandoned the marriage was affirmed.

Background Sue Anderson Teel and Gene “Bull” Teel Sue and Bull married in 1988 and had no children. They never divorced. In March 2022, Bull died testate of what Sue described as “farmer’s lung.” In his will, Bull declared that he “ha[d] been separated [from Sue] for many years” and that “she willfully deserted the marriage and abandoned [him] and the desertion and abandonment ha[d] continued throughout [his] lifetime.” Accordingly, the will “ma[d]e no provision for” her and bequeathed Bull’s entire estate to his brother, William, who later qualified as the estate’s executor. In March 2023, Sue filed a complaint to determine her elective share of the augmented estate. William opposed Sue receiving an elective share, claiming that she had abandoned the marriage. Following a bench trial, the trial court found for William.

Analysis There was ample evidence that Sue intended to abandon the normal indicia of the couple’s marriage— and that she retained that intent through Bull’s death. The couple stopped living together and began living in separate houses. There was evidence that they saw each other TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

infrequently and generally only to accomplish some particular task, such as exchanging the dogs. And the testimony indicated that Sue had, at best, a very minor role in caring for Bull during his terminal illness that was no greater than many of his friends and family members. Most importantly, Sue began a separate romantic and sexual relationship mere months after separating from Bull and maintained that relationship for years through Bull’s death. Several witnesses testified that Sue’s relationship with Brown caused Bull great pain. Bull’s feeling of abandonment, as expressed in his will, corroborates that testimony. And Sue admitted that she and Bull had never discussed or agreed that they would be free to date other people outside the marriage. Further, she touted her relationship with Brown on social media for the world to see. The factfinder could easily conclude that Sue’s decision to move out of the marital home, begin a long-term romantic relationship with Brown, sharply reduce her contact with Bull and promote her connection with Brown to the world—when viewed together— demonstrated an intent to terminate the “normal indicia” of her marriage to Bull. Sue’s testimony does not compel a different result. For one thing, the trial court was not required to credit Sue’s testimony. But even if the court had credited Sue’s testimony, Sue made clear that she did not intend to get back together with Bull and had left him the ultimate decision of whether to pursue a divorce. The factfinder could view the couple’s continued comingling of finances and Sue’s testimony that she “didn’t see a need to be divorced” as simply a matter of convenience.

The fact that Sue and Bull never got legally divorced, referenced heavily throughout Sue’s brief, cannot be dispositive of whether she had abandoned the marriage under Code § 64.2-308.14(E). After all, that code section can only apply where there has been no divorce. Moreover, to the extent the parties’ financial comingling and health insurance arrangements constituted “financial support,” the caselaw does not indicate that any lingering support, no matter how minimal or vestigial, precludes a finding of abandonment if all other indicia of the marital relationship have collapsed. Here, there is abundant evidence that Sue’s conduct demonstrated a “termination of the normal indicia of a marital relationship combined with an intent to abandon the marital relationship.” Similarly, the record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that, after the 2016 separation, Sue stopped caring for Bull “in the typical marital sense.” As Sue herself testified, she and Bull “went back to being friends” after the separation, suggesting a reversion to a pre-marital state. Once Sue left the marital home, she and Bull never talked of getting back together. Within months she was in a romantic relationship with another man—and Sue observed that she and Bull “seemed to get along” better as friends. Affirmed. Teel v. Teel, Record No. 005325-3, Nov. 18, 2025. CAV (Friedman). From the Circuit Court of Montgomery County (Turk). Dennis P. Brumberg (John R. Langley; BWLaw PLC, on briefs), for appellant. Kyle McNew (H. Gregory Campbell; John S. Huntington; MichieHamlett PLLC; Campbell & Ackerman; Huntington, Huntington & Huntington, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-329. 9 pp.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the News

Monthly Memo One spouse is enough, Vatican tells Catholics VATICAN CITY — Happily ever after doesn’t require any complicated maths, the Vatican said on Tuesday — for Catholics, one spouse is enough. In a new decree approved by Pope Leo, the Vatican’s top doctrinal office told the world’s 1.4 billion Catholics they should seek to marry one spouse for life and should not have multiple sexual relationships. Criticizing the practice of polygamy in Africa, including among members of the Church, the Vatican reiterated that it believes marriage is a lifelong commitment between one man and one woman. The decree, which did not discuss same-sex relationships, focused on what it called the “richness and fruitfulness” of traditional marriage. It encouraged Catholics to find one spouse and become committed to them. Associated Press

NJ high court rules shaken baby syndrome testimony unreliable and inadmissible New Jersey’s highest court ruled Thursday that expert testimony about shaken baby syndrome is scientifically unreliable and inadmissible in two upcoming trials, a decision that comes as the long-held medical diagnoses have come under increased scrutiny. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome, which is also known as abusive head trauma, is not generally accepted within the “biomechanical community” and is therefore not “sufficiently reliable” for admission at the trials. The 6-1 ruling deals with the trials of two men facing charges in separate cases, where the young victims showed symptoms that have come to be associated with shaken baby syndrome. Associated Press

Court finds error in determination of husband’s income COLUMBIA, SC — The family court erred in finding Husband’s income to be $18,289, awarding rehabilitative alimony to Wife, crediting Wife for the children’s prop-

erty, and failing to apportion their child’s medical expenses pro rata. We affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Wife appealed the family court’s order of divorce and order partially granting her motion for reconsideration. Among other things, Wife argued the family court erred in setting Husband’s monthly income at $18,289 for purposes of setting child support and alimony when Husband stipulated to a monthly income of $18,901.22 at trial. We agreed. Husband and Wife stipulated at trial that Husband’s gross monthly income for 2021 was $18,901.22; however, Husband explained he did not expect to earn the same salary in 2022 because his employer is now fully staffed and he would work fewer overtime hours. The family court found Husband’s income to be $18,289, the same amount Husband listed on his financial declaration filed just before trial in June of 2022. Bridgetower Media Newswire

Court erred in not following prenuptial agreement DETROIT, MI — Where a divorce judgment awarded the plaintiff-wife spousal support and divided the parties’ property in a manner that was different than the distribution contemplated in the parties’ prenuptial agreement, the trial court erred as a matter of law by disregarding the agreement after determining that it was valid and enforceable. Vacated and remanded. “Defendant-husband, Roy Clyde Moore, Jr., appeals as of right the July 11, 2023 judgment of divorce. The judgment awarded plaintiff-wife, Lori Ann Moore, spousal support and divided the parties’ property in a manner that was different than the distribution contemplated in the parties’ prenuptial agreement (PNA). On appeal, defendant-husband argues the trial court failed to enforce the plain, unambiguous language of the PNA when dividing the parties’ property, and the spousal-support award impoverished him. We hold the trial court erred as a matter of law by disregarding the PNA after determining it was a valid and enforceable agreement. We vacate both the property award and spousal-support award and remand for further proceedings.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Bridgetower Media Newswire

Court dismisses RICO claims stemming from family law dispute MINNEAPOLIS, MN — Legal Assistance of Dakota County represented a man’s ex-wife in a family law proceeding and secured a favorable judgment for her. The man claimed a RICO violation alleging collusion among defense attorneys and state officials, which a federal court has dismissed. Steve Ybarra and his ex-wife were married in 2015. They have two minor children. Michelle Ybarra petitioned for divorce. She received temporary sole legal and physical custody of the children in 2024. The divorce was granted in July 2025. Michelle Ybarra was represented by Legal Assistance of Dakota County. Steve Ybarra, pro se, filed a lawsuit against parties including Legal Assistance of Dakota County; attorneys; state district court judges David Lutz, Tanya O’Brien and Dannia Edwards; as well as Attorney General Keith Ellison and Assistant Attorney General Jeff Timmerman. Bridgetower Media Newswire

Court reverses divorce clarification and adjusted ruling DETROIT, MI — Where a defendant moved to clarify the terms of a divorce judgment, the trial court’s decision to grant that motion must be reversed because the trial court did not merely clarify the terms of the judgment of divorce but changed its previous ruling, which impacted the parties’ substantive rights. “Plaintiff/counterdefendant and defendant/counterplaintiff divorced in April 2021. At that time, defendant had a lawsuit pending involving an automobile accident in which he suffered personal injuries. The judgment of divorce provided that the parties would equally divide the proceeds of that lawsuit. Defendant was successful in the personal-injury action and received a favorable verdict. In January 2022, defendant agreed to accept a settlement that was substantially smaller than the verdict (though still significant) to avoid the uncertainty of further litigation. Bridgetower Media Newswire TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Family Law Digest NICCOLE M. NEFF V. MARK D. NEFF Monetary award; 401(k); withdrawals No. 1812, September Term 2023 Argued before: Nazarian, Reed, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Nazarian, J. Filed: Oct. 30, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s denial of wife’s request for a monetary award based on a differential between her individual 401(k) retirement account and that of her husband. The trial court erred in valuing wife’s 401(k) account and in grounding its decision on an erroneous finding that she had made post-separation withdrawals that dissipated marital funds.

ANDREW J. PATCH V. PAMELA T. PATCH Alimony; marital settlement agreement; arbitration No. 1436, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Zic, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Sharer, J. Filed: Oct. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Howard County Circuit Court’s order that husband breached the alimony paragraph of the parties’ martial settlement agreement, its award to wife of $11,608.81 in attorney’s fees and its order that husband provide comprehensive financial documentation to wife within 30 days. Because the martial settlement agreement required arbitration of alimony disputes, the circuit court erred in adjudicating the alleged breach of the alimony provision.

IVAN O. HARDNETT V. SHAMEENA FELIX Child support; current income; evidence No. 0016, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Ripken, Eyler, Deborah (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Ripken, J. Filed: Oct. 21, 2025

BONNIE YVETTE HOCHMAN ROTHELL V. DANNY L. ROTHELL Indefinite alimony; marital property; attorney’s fees No. 2381, September Term 2023 Argued before: Albright, Kehoe, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Kehoe, J. Filed: Oct. 7, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Charles County Circuit Court’s indefinite alimony to husband, equal division of marital property and attorney’s fees to husband. The trial court erred in awarding indefinite alimony by failing to consider certain factors under Family Law Article § 11-106(b) and by failing to make the requisite findings under FL § 11-106(c). Due to the interrelated nature of alimony, division of marital property and attorney’s fee awards, the court must vacate all awards and remand for reconsideration.

ROBERT J. MCCUTCHEON III V. SUSAN T. MCCUTCHEON Arbitration; vacate; alimony No. 773, September Term 2024 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Leahy, Hotten (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J. Filed: Oct. 1, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s order vacating an arbitration decision resolving the parties’ dispute over alimony. Considering the extremely wide deference afforded to the arbitrator’s decision, the circuit court erred in setting aside the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator improperly discredited an expert witness’s testimony. Such argument goes to the correctness of the arbitration award, not to the scope of the arbitrator’s authority.

The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s child support determination. Because the court’s finding regarding mother’s current income was not supported by suitable documentary evidence, the finding was clearly erroneous. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Family Law Digest HANH NGO V. DUC NGUYEN Custody; modification; change in circumstances No. 1048, September Term 2024 Argued before: Beachley, Zic, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Harrell, J. Filed: Sept. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of mother’s motion for modification of custody. The court’s determination that there had been no material change in circumstances as to warrant a change in custody is supported by the record.

SHARENE TURNER V. RAMON TURNER Martial home; separation; Crawford credits No. 1072, September Term 2024 Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Beachley, J. Filed: Sept. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court remanded the case to the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court to determine whether wife was entitled to “Crawford credits” for payments she made related to the marital home during the period of separation prior to divorce.

CHARLES HAMMANN III V. EMILY J. HAMMANN Income; child support; evidence No. 1149, September Term 2024 Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Beachley, J. Filed: Sept. 23, 2025

DOLLY M. SINGH V. RANDEEP SINGH Legal and physical custody; change; visitation No. 100, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Arthur, Getty (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: Sept. 22, 2025 The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s modification of legal custody and physical custody of the parties’ minor child. Beginning in March 2024, the parents were no longer successful in transferring the child from the mother’s care to the father’s care, resulting in father having no visitation with the child for more than six months. There is no question that completely discontinuing visitation with one parent did not serve the child’s best interests.

SPENCER NELSON V. JENNIFER NELSON Family home; personal property; factors No. 2229, September Term 2024 Argued before: Friedman, Tang, Kehoe (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Tang, J. Filed: Sept. 16, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Charles County Circuit Court’s amended judgment of absolute divorce as to the use and possession of the family home and family use personal property. The court failed to determine which tangible property within the home qualified as family use personal property under FL § 8-207(a). And its ruling did not reflect consideration of the factors under FL § 8208(b) in awarding use and possession of the family home and family use personal property.

The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order reducing father’s child support obligation to $496 per month. The trial court abused its discretion by relying on Ms. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 that reflected her 2023 income instead of the affidavit provided by Ms. Hammann’s employer that verified that she would earn a minimum of $250,000 in 2024.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Monetary award; 401(k); withdrawals

Niccole M. Neff v. Mark D. Neff No. 1812, September Term 2023 Argued before: Nazarian, Reed, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Nazarian, J. Filed: Oct. 30, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s denial of wife’s request for a monetary award based on a differential between her individual 401(k) retirement account and that of her husband. The trial court erred in valuing wife’s 401(k) account and in grounding its decision on an erroneous finding that she had made post-separation withdrawals that dissipated marital funds.

Niccole M. Neff (“Wife”) challenges a decision by the Circuit Court for Frederick County, as part of a judgment of absolute divorce, denying her request for a monetary award based on a differential between her individual 401(k) retirement account and that of her husband, Mark D. Neff (“Husband”). Because the trial court erred in valuing Wife’s 401(k) account and in grounding its decision on a finding that she had made post-separation withdrawals that dissipated marital funds, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND

Wife and Husband were married on June 24, 1995, separated in June 2018, and filed for divorce in December 2018. They have one child (“Child”), who was born in 2007. The parties, while represented by counsel, resolved child custody issues and operated under a pendente lite order after September 2019. Wife and Child remained in the marital residence throughout the divorce proceedings, which were delayed in part because of COVID-related matters, including court scheduling. Disputes remained over crossclaims for dissipation of marital assets as well as alimony, child support, health care coverage, use and possession of the marital home, certain marital property including retirement accounts, and monetary awards. In particular, Wife sought a monetary award to equalize marital funds in their respective 401(k) accounts. She argued that the court TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. should order “QDRO roll-over orders,” “using June 29, 2023 as the valuation date, with each party paying for any Survivor Annuity benefit they chose from their share of the pension money.” The contested issues were litigated in a merits trial that extended over seven days spread over seven months: November 29-30, 2022; December 1, 2022; March 30-31, 2023; and June 26-27, 2023. Shortly before the trial began, the parties filed a Joint Statement, as required by Maryland Rule 9-207, that identified Wife’s Accenture 401(k) and Husband’s American Funds 401(k) as marital property. They differed on the value of the Accenture account: Husband asserted that it was worth $800,000 and Wife stated only “TBD.” Based on testimony and documentary evidence, the circuit court made the following findings and orders and embodied them in a judgment of absolute divorce: Marital Residence. Wife’s use and possession of the marital residence was continued pending sale of the property through a court-appointed trustee, no later than October 1, 2023. Costs and net proceeds from the sale were to be divided evenly, with the parties to split “the costs of the mortgage and utilities until settlement” evenly. Husband was ordered to continue making monthly mortgage payments, to “be credited dollar for dollar toward his monthly support obligation.” Sale of Marital Vehicles/Monetary Award. Husband’s sale of two marital vehicles yielded net receipts that Wife was entitled to share equally, and the court ordered a monetary award to Wife of $13,138 to be paid from Husband’s share of the marital residence sale proceeds. Pension. Wife was granted a one-half interest, on an “as, if, when basis” basis, to the marital portion of Husband’s AIG pension. Child Support. Husband was ordered to maintain health and dental coverage for Child and to pay monthly child support in the amount of $1,003 until he turned 18 and graduated from high school. Alimony. Husband was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,750 for 24 months beginning October 1, 2023. Lite Payments. Husband was ordered to continue making payments under the Pendente Lite Order dated September 12, 2019, until September 30, 2023. Wife does not dispute these aspects of the judgment. Instead, she challenges the court’s decision to deny her request for a monetary award to equalize the marital 0F

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property that each spouse accrued but held separately in their individual 401(k) accounts. In ruling from the bench, the court expressed the view that Wife had withdrawn money from her account wrongfully: Next is the Accenture [401(k)] – which is now, according to the parties, worth, $547.02 [sic]. It is undisputed that [Wife] withdrew monies from this account, which in 2018 had a value of approximately $800,000. These monies were not repaid, and the loan was converted to a withdrawal, on which defendant had to pay tax and probably a penalty. [Wife] traced generally these funds going to different accounts before landing in PNC in three different accounts there. [Wife] says that when you open an account at PNC, they automatically give you three accounts. That is not true. I’ve opened a number of accounts at PNC and other banks, they will let you open whatever accounts you choose, but there is nothing automatic about a number of accounts. Indeed this is not the only time that [Wife] was not truthful in her testimony. She equivocated heavily about her alcohol use, eventually blaming it on her marriage. And she denies using or abusing pills. Court finds this to be untruthful. She had admitted in the past to being an alcoholic per the testimony herein, but says she got treatment and is better. The Court finds she is not in AA. and finds pursuant to the testimony that she is still drinking. Further, her testimony was contradictory to that of her sister, who was part of the family intervention. Her sister testified not only to her alcohol use and abuse, but also her abuse of pills. These are examples of concerns the Court has regarding [Wife’s] testimony. The largest concern that the Court has wrestled with in considering its opinion is whether, and if so, to what extent, the defendant has a disability. Watching her these many days of trial, I was ready to buy into the fact that she has a disability. It seemed patently obvious in watching her. However, I wanted to emphasize . . . her testimony about visiting her husband’s apartment. And her testimony was stunning. . . . [Wife’s] entire demeanor at that time during trial changed. She no longer had the jerky movements of her hands or head, her speech was clear, her thoughts lucid. Speaking for myself, I was stunned. ... This calls into question for the Court her entire disability. To support this question, a read of the lengthy social security opinion which denied SSDI claim [sic] also questions the extent of her disability. It also causes the Court to disbelieve her testimony as it relates to her maneuvering these accounts and the purpose, therefor[.] Just in short, I’ve had a very difficult time with [Wife’s] testimony. 12

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The Court specifically has reviewed and considered all of the factors for monetary award set forth in Family Law 8-205(b). The marital property was identified by the parties in the joint 9-207 statement . . . . Unless otherwise stated in this opinion, the value of each piece of marital property is as listed in the joint 9-207. The parties did not actually argue over the value in each one, but they did argue over what happened to monies and things like that. (Emphasis added.) The court compared the values of Husband’s American Funds 401(k) account with the values of Wife’s Accenture 401(k) account, both when this divorce proceeding commenced in December 2018 and on the trial date in June 2023, and explained that it was not making a monetary award based on that differential because of Wife’s wrongful withdrawals from her account: Now the Court has looked at the American Funds, which are [Husband’s] and finds that their [current] value to be $883,463. And compared it to the Accenture account, which has a current value of $547,002. Court finds that had [Wife] not wrongfully removed these monies from the account, and based on her questionable testimony, finds that the value of her Accenture account should have been relatively equal to the American Funds. Therefore, the Court does not grant any monetary award to [Husband] from [Wife’s] Accenture 401(k) and does not grant any monetary award to [Wife] from [Husband’s] American Funds [Plan] 401(k) as . . . they should be equal and that the amounts removed would amount to dissipation of funds. (Emphasis added.) Consistent with those findings, the written judgment states that the court declined to equalize these accounts through a monetary award: ORDERED, that there shall be no monetary award to [Husband] from [Wife’s] Accenture retirement account, specifically identified as Item #10 on the parties Joint Statement of Marital and Non-Marital Property entered November 28, 2022 (hereinafter, “Joint Statement”). It shall be [Wife’s] sole and separate property; and it is further, ORDERED, that there shall be no monetary award to [Wife] from [Husband’s] American Funds Plan retirement account, specifically identified as Item #9 on the Joint Statement. It shall be [Husband’s] sole and separate property[. 2] Wife moved to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 2-534, arguing, among other things, that there was no evidence that she had withdrawn money from the Accenture account wrongfully: the Court erred in merely allowing each to keep their own [401(k) account balance] by holding that they [are] “equivalent”. The wife’s plan is worth $547,000.00 and she had withdrawn $40,000.00 for a total marital value of $587,000.00, whereas the husband’s account is worth $883,463.00 plus the $50,000.00 he had TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

withdrawn [for living expenses], for a total marital value of 933,463.00. No evidence was presented that she had withdrawn any money other than the $40,000.00, the Court can take Judicial notice of the 2022 losses in the stock market, which were demonstrated by the most recent statement showing a $35,000.00 loss in that Quarter. To allow each to merely “keep their own” results in the husband retaining $173,231.50 more than the wife. This does not equate to an equitable division [of] these assets, especially considering the fact that the Court divided all other assets equally. After a hearing, the court denied Wife’s motion and entered judgment on October 18, 2023. Wife noted a timely appeal. DISCUSSION

Although phrased as two questions, Wife seeks on appeal to challenge one of the circuit court’s decisions in this divorce case: the court’s decision to treat her Accenture 401(k) as having had roughly the same value previously as Husband’s American Funds account had at trial and denying her any monetary award in connection with the latter. 3 In addition to defending the circuit court’s valuation and division decisions, Husband asks us to dismiss the appeal because Wife “has failed to comply procedurally with requirements for briefing” by filing an informal brief without permission and failing “to provide the record extract of this case, including . . . the required hearing transcripts for this matter on which her brief relies heavily[.]” Wife didn’t need permission to file an informal brief, though, and we decline to dismiss the appeal; to the extent there are any briefing and record concerns, we’ll address them in the course of analyzing the merits. When an action is tried without a jury, we review the judgment based on both the law and the evidence, mindful that we must “give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). We “accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings.” Boemio v. Boemio, 414 Md. 118, 124 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although a “trial court . . . is entitled to ‘accept—or reject—all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness[,]’” when “the order being reviewed involves an interpretation or application of Maryland statutory or case law, our review is de novo.’” Goicochea v. Goicochea, 256 Md. App. 329, 340 (2022) (cleaned up). Section 8-201(e)(1) of the Family Law Article defines “marital property” as “the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” Md. Code (1999, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-201(e) (1) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). “Thus, ‘[p]roperty acquired by a party up to the date of the divorce, even though the parties are separated, is marital property.’” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 349 (2013) (citation omitted). Marital property does not include property “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.” FL § 8-201(e) (3). “Although the law does not require a court to divide 2F

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marital property equally between parties, the division of such property must be fair and equitable.” Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 105 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To achieve that result, a trial court may grant a monetary award to correct any inequality created by the way in which property acquired during the marriage happened to be titled.” Id. (citation omitted). See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 349 (1995). “The monetary award is thus an addition to and not a substitution for a legal division of the property accumulated during marriage, according to title. It is intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion of that property.” Id. (quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 339 (1982)). When one spouse requests a monetary award, the trial court evaluates its decision through a three-step process. Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 279 (2021). First, the court categorizes any disputed property as marital or non-marital. Id.; see FL § 8-201(e). Second, the court determines the value of each item of marital property. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 279; see FL § 8-204(a)(1). And third, the court decides whether division of marital property according to title would be inequitable, and if so, “may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 519–20 (2008) (cleaned up); see FL § 8-205(a)–(b). During that last step, the court must consider the factors set forth in FL § 8-205(b). Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 280. We review the court’s ultimate decision to grant or deny a monetary award for abuse of discretion. Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 354 (2025). “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” Id. at 388 (cleaned up). In deciding whether to make a monetary award or how much, courts may consider allegations that one spouse dissipated marital property. “The doctrine of dissipation is aimed at the nefarious purpose of one spouse’s spending for his or her own personal advantage so as to compromise the other spouse in terms of the ultimate distribution of marital assets.” Goicochea, 256 Md. App. at 350–51 (cleaned up); Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643 (2011) (citation omitted). Dissipation turns on whether the challenger proves that the dissipating spouse spent money inappropriately for purposes unrelated to the marriage: [P]roperty disposed of before commencement of the trial under most circumstances cannot be marital property.” That said, it “would clearly be against the Legislature’s stated public policy to permit one spouse to squander marital property and render it impossible to make an equitable award of property.” A party who has expended marital assets in this way can be found to have dissipated them. Dissipation may be found when a spouse expends marital funds for their own benefit “for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time where the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.” It also may be found 4F

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where the alleged dissipator expended marital funds for a principal purpose other than “‘reducing the amount of funds that would be available for equitable distribution at the time of the divorce.’”. ... The dissipation claimant has the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion. After establishing a prima facie dissipation case, the burden shifts to the alleged dissipator to show that their expenditures were appropriate. “‘What matters is not that one spouse has, post-separation, expended some of the marital assets, what is critically important is the purpose behind the expenditure.’” After the alleged dissipator provides evidence that the expenditure was appropriate, it is up to the circuit court to determine whether the dissipation claimant has proven that the alleged dissipator did indeed dissipate marital assets. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. A dissipation claimant may establish prima facie dissipation through proof that the alleged dissipator withdrew sizable funds from bank accounts in their control. But even in those cases, a spouse still retains the right to transfer their own property, even if it leaves the spouse with no means of supporting their family, so long as the spouse does so in good faith and without the intention of avoiding divorce consequences. Ultimately, the circuit court must decide whether the claimant met their burden. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 368–69 (citations omitted). When the court makes a factual finding that one spouse has dissipated marital property by using it for personal benefit, that conduct is “a fraud on marital rights” so that any dissipated assets are treated as “extant marital property . . . to be valued with the other existing marital property.” Goicochea, 256 Md. App. at 340 (cleaned up). Wife contends that the trial court’s denial of a monetary award resulted from its “mistake analyzing the evidence,” perhaps because of the way in which the case was tried in pieces over the course of seven months. She challenges the court’s predicate factual findings that the value of her Accenture 401(k) account was $800,000 in December 2018, “as stated in the Joint Statement,” and that she made postseparation withdrawals that dissipated marital funds in that account so that her Accenture 401(k) balance of $547,002 was treated as “equivalent” to the $883,463 balance in Husband’s American Funds 401(k). In support, Wife cites to her account statements as uncontested proof that her “Accenture 401k never had a balance near $800,000 and no money was ever taken from the account except a $40,000 withdrawal in 2017 to retain a lawyer.” Husband counters that the trial court did not err in predicating its valuation on the parties’ Joint Statement, in which he valued Wife’s Accenture account at $800,000 in December 2018, because Wife merely stated that the value was “TBD” then “failed to provide any assertion as to 14

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value” even after her counsel acknowledged Husband’s $800,000 valuation: [COUNSEL FOR WIFE]: On the next page of this [Joint Statement filed on November 28, 2022] it says that you have an Accenture plan. See number 10? [WIFE]: Uh-huh. [COUNSEL FOR WIFE]: A 401(k) with Accenture. And it says, under your column, the value of it is to be determined. They have you down at 800,000 on December 2018. Do you know the value of your Accenture plan, as of now? [WIFE]: It’s in the 500s now. It’s in the 500s because of – [COUNSEL FOR WIFE]: If I were to show you this document from Accenture – [COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND]: Is that current, counsel? [COUNSEL FOR WIFE]: This is October. ... Do you recognize that document? . . . [WIFE]: It’s . . . my 401(k). [COUNSEL FOR WIFE]: Okay. Can you look at that and tell the judge how much it was worth [last month,] in October of ’22? [WIFE]: $547,002. In Husband’s view, the trial court “gave due consideration to the evidence before it,” including the account values “at different periods in time from the parties’ separation,” before ultimately finding that Wife “did not fully explain the change in value in the account nor could she explain or justify her expenditures with the money[.]” In particular, Husband points to Wife’s conduct: since separation, her questionable claims of disability, and her non-employment (Apx.019-021), her actions causing [Husband] to be denied access to the former marital home (Apx. 025), and the fact that her boyfriend resided primarily at the marital home (Apx. 027). Therefore, even assuming that there was any error at all as to the exact dollar value of [Wife’s] accounts, such error was harmless, as during the multiple days of trial, she had ample opportunity to dispute the evidence presented to the trial court by [Husband], through both her testimony and physical/documentary evidence, which she failed to do. In fact, with respect to [Wife’s] financial statement, the lower court stated, “phew—it appeared to be more fiction than real.” We review factual findings on both the value and dissipation of marital property under the clearly erroneous standard. Omayaka, 417 Md. at 652 (citation omitted); Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 413 (2019). We examine the record in the light most favorable to Husband, as the prevailing party, to determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial court’s findings. See Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 354; Omayaka, 417 Md. at 652-53. In this instance, there wasn’t, and the court erred in finding dissipation from Wife’s Accenture account based on Husband’s unsupported suggestions. In Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372 (2019), we held that “[w]here the parties disagreed on the value of” the wife’s oneTheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

sixteenth interest in undeveloped land in war-torn Somalia, and she testified “that the property had no value,” the circuit court “erred in accepting Husband’s bald assertion of value provided in the Joint Statement, which was unsupported by any reasoning regarding how he arrived at that result.” Id. at 412, 414. Likewise, in a instructively analogous decision that we cited in Abdullahi, the court in Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), recognized that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when there is no evidence in the record supporting its decision to assign a particular value to a marital asset[,]” and held that a trial court abused its discretion by accepting a wife’s valuation of her husband’s 401(k) account where she presented no evidence to support that value. Id. at 917. Here, as in Abdullahi and Thompson, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that “[i]t is undisputed that [Wife] withdrew monies from this account, which in 2018 had a value of approximately $800,000.” We see three flaws in the court’s conclusion. First, as a threshold matter, Wife did dispute Husband’s proffered value of “$800,000 as of December 2018.” After Wife contested Husband’s valuation by asserting in her column of their Joint Statement that the balance was “TBD,” both she and Husband presented a number of her Accenture account statements containing post-separation balances and transactions since January 1, 2019. These statements were admitted into evidence without objection. In her written closing argument, Wife cited those documents and to her testimony as proof that the value of her Accenture 401(k) at that time was $547,002. This record refutes the trial court’s conclusion that “[t]he parties did not actually argue over the value” for this item of marital property listed in the Joint Statement. Second, there was no evidence that the value of Wife’s Accenture 401(k) had ever reached $800,000, either in December 2018 when this divorce proceeding began or at any other time. According to Wife’s unchallenged account statements, proffered by both parties and admitted without objection, her balances were as follows:

January 1, 2019 January 1, 2020 January 1, 2021 March 31, 2021 July 1, 2022 September 30, 2022

$496,158.66 $505,848.44 $585,900.05 $603,121.43 $582,004.10 $547,002.79

These account statements, albeit not a complete set covering each quarter of the post-separation period, reveal that when this divorce proceeding began in December 2018, Wife’s Accenture balance was less than $500,000, not $800,000. There is no evidence that Wife’s 401(k) balance had ever approached $800,000. To the contrary, the Accenture account statements document market gains and losses throughout the post-separation period, including a third quarter 2022 loss of $35,981.72 immediately preceding this trial, as well as an overall growth of $50,844.13 from the outset of the divorce proceedings in December 2018. According to these TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

statements, the highest balance was $603,121.43 on March 31, 2021, nearly $200,000 short of $800,000. Likewise, the third error in the trial court’s factual findings is that there was no evidence Wife made post-separation withdrawals from her Accenture 401(k). Although Wife admitted withdrawing all the funds in a joint account at Ally Bank and selling Accenture stock to pay for legal fees, she insisted that she had not made any post-separation withdrawals from her Accenture 401(k). The only withdrawal shown on any of her 401(k) account statements is $40,050 on November 17, 2017, which the court recognized was made “to retain counsel” and “was not dissipation.” Here, as in Abdullahi and Thompson, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s valuation and dissipation findings. In its bench ruling, the court credited Husband’s entry in the Joint Statement at face value, even treating it as unchallenged, despite Wife’s contradictory entry on the 9-207 statement that this value was “TBD” and her itemized account statements revealing values much lower. Although the court was entitled to reject her testimony based on its negative views of Wife’s credibility, it did not explain why it also rejected the uncontroverted information in the Accenture statements in favor of Husband’s bald valuation in the Joint Statement, for which Husband had offered no supporting documentation. Because a 401(k) account is not the type of marital property that is difficult to value, Husband proffered no evidence to support his valuation in the Joint Statement, and the Accenture account statements were not challenged, the trial court erred in valuing Wife’s 401(k) at $800,000 in December 2018. Then, because the post-separation account statements didn’t identify any withdrawals, the trial court also erred in finding that Wife dissipated marital funds in her Accenture 401(k). The court’s findings that “[i]t is undisputed that [Wife] withdrew monies from this account” and that Wife “traced generally these funds going to different accounts before landing in PNC in three different accounts there” demonstrate that the court mistakenly may have treated Wife’s admitted withdrawals from the couple’s joint savings account at Ally Bank as withdrawals from her 401(k) account with Accenture. 6 Although the trial court cited Wife’s “questionable testimony,” it expressly predicated its $800,000 valuation on Husband’s unsupported assertion in the Joint Statement and its ultimate denial of a monetary award on its erroneous “find[ing] that had [Wife] not wrongly removed monies from the account, . . . the value of her Accenture account should have been relatively equal to the American Funds” account of Husband. Because the evidence does not support those factual findings, the trial court erred in valuing Wife’s Accenture 401(k) account, in finding that she dissipated marital property, in treating her Accenture account with $547,002 as having a balance “equivalent” to Husband’s $883,463 American Funds account balance, and in predicating its denial of Wife’s request for a monetary award on these erroneous findings. And because the court relied expressly on its valuation and dissipation findings in denying Wife’s request for a monetary award based on the 401(k) plans, these errors are not harmless. Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

For these reasons, we vacate affected portions of the judgment, starting with the denial of Wife’s request for a monetary award based on the $336,461 differential between the parties’ 401(k) accounts. And as a result of that decision, we vacate the interrelated alimony and child support awards and remand for review in light of the court’s reconsidered decision regarding the 401(k) accounts. See St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 198 (2016) (recognizing that “a court’s determinations as to alimony, child support, monetary awards, and counsel fees involve overlapping evaluations of the parties’ financial circumstances”); Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 400

(2002) (“The factors underlying alimony, a monetary award, and counsel fees are so interrelated that, when a trial court considers a claim for any one of them, it must weigh the award of any other.”); Freese v. Freese, 89 Md. App. 144, 155 (1991) (“Although the award of alimony as made does not constitute an abuse of discretion, we are vacating the alimony award since a change in the monetary award may affect a change in the alimony award.”); Sims, 266 Md. App. at 390 (recognizing that “where we vacate—as we did here—a monetary award, alimony, or child support, we shall also vacate the attorneys’ fees award”).

JUDGMENT OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE ENTERED OCTOBER 18, 2023 BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY VACATED IN PART AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

FOOTNOTES

We note that [u]nder Rule 9-207(a), “[w]hen a monetary award or other relief pursuant to [F.L.] § 8-205 is an issue, the parties shall file a joint statement listing all property owned by one or both of them.” The form statement provided by the rule permits the parties to designate which property they agree is marital property, which property they agree is not marital property (including property “excluded by valid agreement”), and property whose marital character is disputed. See Md. Rule 9-207(b). The form statement also allows each party to assert his or her view as to title, fair market value, and any liens or encumbrances upon each item of property. Id. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 528 (2008).

Although Husband had another 401(k) account, those funds were not marital property, so Wife does not challenge the court’s order “that there shall be no monetary award to [Wife] from [Husband’s] Fidelity Retirement Account, specifically identified as Item #27 on the parties’ Joint Statement, and it shall be [Husband’s] sole and separate property[.]”

Wife stated the Questions Presented as follows: Whether the circuit court erred and/or abused its discretion ruling that the appellants [sic] 401k account should be considered to be equal to Appellants [sic] 401k account. Whether the circuit court erred and/or abused its discretion ruling that appellant had dissipated her 401k Account[.] Husband reframed Wife’s questions as follows: Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by finding that Appellant’s 401K account “should be considered equal to” [Appellee’s] 401K account. . . . Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by finding that Appellant had dissipated her 401K account.

Under Maryland Rule 8-502(a)(9) and this Court’s Administrative Order dated December 19, 2022, the option to file an informal brief is available for family law appeals where, as here, the appellant is self-represented. Because “[i]nformal briefing in the Appellate Court is intended to provide meaningful review of issues raised by self-represented parties without requiring compliance with the technical requirements of Rules 8-501 through 8-504[,]” we may only “dismiss[] an appeal pursuant to Rule 8-602 for a reason other than failure to comply with” those rules. See Md. Rule 8-502, Committee Note. Because these parties filed supporting material from the record, and the pleadings, transcripts, and compiled appeal volumes are available through MDEC, we are satisfied that the full record is accessible to the parties and this Court.

FL § 8-205 provides in pertinent part: Grant of award. — (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, after the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property, the court may . . . grant a monetary award . . . as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded. (2) The court may transfer ownership of an interest in: (i) a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties; . . . .

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(b) Factors in determining amount and method of payment or terms of transfer. — The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award . . . after considering each of the following factors: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. (C) Award reduced to judgment. — The court may reduce to a judgment any monetary award made under this section, to the extent that any part of the award is due and owing. 6

Because our review is limited to the findings and reasoning by the trial court, we express no opinion about the impact, if any, that Wife’s withdrawals from the Ally account might have on her request for a monetary award based on the marital property in the parties’ respective 401(k) accounts.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Alimony; marital settlement agreement; arbitration

Andrew J. Patch v. Pamela T. Patch No. 1436, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Zic, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Sharer, J. Filed: Oct. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Howard County Circuit Court’s order that husband breached the alimony paragraph of the parties’ martial settlement agreement, its award to wife of $11,608.81 in attorney’s fees and its order that husband provide comprehensive financial documentation to wife within 30 days. Because the martial settlement agreement required arbitration of alimony disputes, the circuit court erred in adjudicating the alleged breach of the alimony provision.

In this appeal, we shall hold that the circuit court erred in partly adjudicating an alimony dispute when the parties previously agreed to mandatory arbitration of such disputes. Andrew Patch (“Husband”) appeals from an order entered in the Circuit Court for Howard County following the court’s finding that Husband had breached the parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”), awarded attorney’s fees to the appellee, Pamela Patch (“Wife”), and ordered Husband to provide financial documentation to Wife before proceeding to arbitration to resolve the remainder of the alimony dispute. Husband presents two issues on appeal,1 which we rephrase as follows: 1. Did the circuit court err in adjudicating an alleged breach of the MSA’s alimony provision? 2. Did the circuit court err in awarding attorney’s fees? For the following reasons, we answer both questions in the affirmative, and therefore vacate the following: the circuit court’s breach finding, document production order, and attorney’s fee award. We shall remand with instructions for the circuit court to compel arbitration without making any findings on the merits of the alimony dispute. BACKGROUND

A. The Marital Settlement Agreement Husband and Wife married in February 1987 and 18

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. separated in July 2017. They executed the MSA in August 2020, and the circuit court incorporated, but did not merge, the MSA into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce in December 2020. The MSA contains a detailed alimony framework. Paragraph 4.D. requires that Husband pay Wife monthly alimony, with the amount subject to reduction if Husband’s “earned compensation”2 decreases involuntarily by twenty-five percent or more. Should such a reduction occur, “Husband’s alimony obligation shall reduce by the same percentage as the percentage decrease in Husband’s ‘earned compensation.’” The MSA continues: Any reduction pursuant to this provision, however, shall be subject to subsequent increase or further decrease based upon review as set forth herein. Following a reduction event, Husband’s “earned compensation” shall be reviewed quarterly and his alimony obligation shall be quarterly adjusted . . . . Said adjustment shall be made within thirty (30) days of Husband presenting to Wife complete documentation of his earned compensation for the prior quarter, with said reduction or increase to remain effective until the next quarterly review. B. The Mandatory Arbitration Clause – Paragraph 4.D. of the MSA Paragraph 4.D. of the MSA contains a mandatory arbitration provision for alimony disputes: In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of any reduction or increase to Husband’s required alimony payment under the terms of this Agreement for any given period, such issue shall be arbitrated by the Honorable Diane O. Leasure (Ret.), pursuant to the Maryland Arbitration Act. (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 4.D. outlines the scope of the arbitration: “Any such Arbitration shall be conducted solely for the purpose of resolving any dispute between the parties concerning effectuating the express terms hereof relating to the amount and payment of alimony.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Paragraph 4.D. describes the discovery process available in arbitration: “In the event of such arbitration, the parties shall each be entitled to utilize all of the discovery procedures then provided in the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

C. Husband’s Income Reductions, Bankruptcy, and Communications with Wife In 2023, Husband experienced significant income reductions. The firm administrator of Husband’s law firm reduced Husband’s biweekly draw by fifty percent in August 2023, by another fifty percent in October 2023, and to $600 biweekly in November 2023, “just enough to cover [Husband’s] benefits and Social Security taxes.” According to the firm administrator’s testimony before the magistrate judge in circuit court, the firm administrator made each decision unilaterally and Husband did not request the reductions. Husband also filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy during this time period. Each time Husband’s income decreased in April, August, October, and November 2023, he sent Wife an email with his alimony calculation and attached an earnings statement. As for the lack of responses to those emails, Husband testified as follows: “[Wife] didn’t respond at all. She never raised any kind of objection to the calculation or the amount of alimony. There was no verbal or written response to her objecting to what I was doing.” D. The Contempt Petition and Hearing Before the Magistrate In November 2023, through counsel, Wife filed a Petition for Contempt and for Other Relief, alleging Husband had unilaterally reduced his alimony payments without providing complete documentation. The petition requested that the circuit court find Husband in contempt of the judgment of absolute divorce, incarcerate Husband, find that Husband breached the MSA, enforce the MSA by establishing an alimony arrearage due to Wife, and award Wife attorney’s fees. Husband moved to dismiss, relying on the arbitration provisions on the MSA. As an exhibit to the motion, Husband’s counsel attached a letter sent to Wife’s counsel requesting a withdrawal of the contempt petition because the MSA required arbitration to resolve “any dispute between the parties concerning effectuating the express terms hereof related to the amount and payment of alimony.” Following a hearing in February 2024, the magistrate issued a Report and Recommendations in May 2024. The magistrate recommended denying the contempt petition, finding “ample reason” for the decrease in Husband’s alimony payments. Indeed, the magistrate noted that Husband had “filed for bankruptcy and his stream of income has decreased.” The magistrate concluded that the parties had “reached an impasse” as to “the appropriate portion of alimony to be paid[,]” and thus arbitration was required under the “plain language of the” MSA. E. The Exceptions Hearing and the Circuit Court’s Ruling Wife filed exceptions to the magistrate’s Report. After a hearing in July 2024, the court ruled that Husband had breached Paragraph 4.D. of the MSA (the alimony paragraph detailed above), denied the contempt petition, awarded Wife $11,608.81 in attorney’s fees, and ordered Husband to provide comprehensive financial documentation to Wife within thirty days. This timely appeal followed. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

STANDARD OF REVIEW “The interpretation of a contract . . . is a question of law, subject to de novo review by an appellate court.” 4900 Park Heights Ave. LLC v. Cromwell Retail 1, LLC, 246 Md. App. 1, 19 (2020) (quoting Erie Ins. Exch. v. Est. of Reeside, 200 Md. App. 453, 461 (2011)). See also Petitto v. Petitto, 147 Md. App. 280, 299 (2002) (applying contract interpretation principles to marital settlement agreement). We interpret contracts under “the objective theory of contract interpretation.” Credible Behav. Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 Md. 380, 393 (2019). “Under this approach, the primary goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties in entering the agreement and to interpret ‘the contract in a manner consistent with that intent.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Ocean Petroleum, Co., Inc. v. Yanek, 416 Md. 74, 88 (2010)). “The trial court’s conclusion as to whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration is a conclusion of law, which we review de novo.” Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 422 (2005). When the parties dispute the scope of an arbitration provision, “the resolution of that issue is for the court.” Bloch v. Bloch, 115 Md. App. 368, 375 (1997). “All doubts, however, are to be resolved in favor of submitting the dispute to arbitration.”Id. DISCUSSION

A. The Circuit Court Erred by Adjudicating Breach When the Parties Agreed to Mandatory Arbitration Husband argues that the circuit court erred in adjudicating his alleged breach of the alimony provision in the MSA because the MSA requires arbitration of alimony disputes. “When an arbitration agreement exists, or is alleged to exist, the court’s jurisdiction may properly be invoked in two limited contexts; that is, to compel arbitration or to stay it.” Bloch, 115 Md. App. at 374. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (“MUAA”) “expresses the legislative policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinebaugh, 374 Md. 631, 641 (2003). See also Md. Code, CTS. & JUD. PROC. (“CJP”) § 3-201 through 3-234 (codification of the MUAA). CJP § 3-206(a) provides that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes “is valid and enforceable, and is irrevocable[.]” Moreover, CJP § 3-210 prohibits the court from inquiring into the merits of a claim when deciding whether arbitration is the proper forum for a dispute: An order for arbitration shall not be refused or an arbitration proceeding stayed: (1) On the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides; or (2) Because a valid basis for the claim sought to be arbitrated has not been shown. See also Gannett Fleming, Inc. v. Corman Constr., Inc., 243 Md. App. 376, 390 (2019) (recognizing that when “granting or denying petitions to stay or compel arbitration, courts should not delve into the merits, bona fides or factual basis of the claim to be arbitrated”). Indeed, our decision is limited to determining whether the arbitration clause applies. The arbitration clause before us is unambiguous and its scope is broad. Paragraph 4.D. of the MSA requires arbitration “[i]n the event the parties are unable to reach an Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

agreement as to the amount of any reduction or increase to Husband’s required alimony payment under the terms of this Agreement for any given period[.]” Moreover, the same Paragraph outlines the scope of the arbitration: to resolve “any dispute between the parties concerning effectuating the express terms hereof relating to the amount and payment of alimony.”3 (Emphasis added.) The arbitration clause thus encompasses disputes about how to implement and apply the MSA’s alimony provisions, including what documentation Husband must provide, whether he provided adequate documentation, and whether his alimony reductions complied with Paragraph 4.D. Significantly, the MSA arbitration provision is mandatory. The parties agreed that if they cannot reach an agreement on alimony adjustments, “such issue shall be arbitrated[.]” See, e.g., Dunham v. Univ. of Md. Med. Ctr., 237 Md. App. 628, 655 (2018) (reasoning that “the word ‘shall’ denotes mandatory action”). Here, the parties disagreed on the appropriate alimony amount. Husband believed his reduced income entitled him to pay less alimony. Wife disagreed, demanded substantial arrearage, and filed a petition for contempt. Wife’s counsel told the magistrate: “We’re looking for the Court to determine the arrears, to order them reduced to judgment[.]” Wife argues that Husband’s failure to provide sufficient financial documentation prevented the arbitration clause from being triggered. According to Wife, she could not “dispute” the alimony amount without proper financial documentation from Husband. This argument is unavailing for at least four relevant reasons. First, the argument implies a condition precedent that the parties did not agree to in the MSA. The arbitration clause requires arbitration “[i]n the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of any reduction or increase to Husband’s required alimony payment under the terms of this Agreement for any given period[.]” Nothing in the MSA conditions arbitration on Husband first providing documentation that Wife deems sufficient. Second, if Wife were correct that Husband must provide satisfactory documentation before arbitration becomes available, then she could unilaterally block arbitration by claiming documentation is incomplete. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the arbitration clause. Third, an alimony dispute exists. That is without question. Wife filed a contempt petition and claimed Husband owes

$67,378.93 in arrearages. Husband denied owing this amount. The parties fundamentally disagree about the amount of alimony Husband owes. The MSA requires the parties to arbitrate that dispute. Fourth, the MSA contemplates that discovery occurs within arbitration, not as a prerequisite to arbitration. The parties agreed: “In the event of such arbitration, the parties shall each be entitled to utilize all of the discovery procedures then provided in the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.” By finding that Husband had breached the MSA before compelling arbitration, the circuit court usurped the arbitrator’s authority under the MSA. In Bloch v. Bloch, we ruled that a circuit court erred in adjudicating an alimony dispute despite a mandatory arbitration clause. 115 Md. App. at 379-80. The Bloch Court explained that, even when an arbitration is “sparse,” it unambiguously expressed the parties’ intent to arbitrate, and thus the court erred in failing to enforce it. Id. at 379. Here, as in Bloch, the MSA unambiguously requires arbitration of alimony disputes. The circuit court should have determined that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that the alimony dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Then, the circuit court should have compelled arbitration without adjudicating Husband’s compliance with the alimony provision.4 B. The Attorney’s Fee Award Must Be Vacated The circuit court awarded Wife $11,608.81 in attorney’s fees based on its finding that Husband had breached the MSA. Because those fees related to Wife’s alimony claim, “and the court erred in hearing that claim, we shall vacate the award of counsel fees.” Bloch, 115 Md. App. at 380. Paragraph 17.A. requires that a party be “found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have breached” the MSA before fees may be awarded. When parties agree to mandatory arbitration of a dispute, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of that dispute. Bloch, 115 Md. App. at 374-75. Because the circuit court lacked competent jurisdiction to find Husband breached the alimony provisions of Paragraph 4.D., it also lacked authority to award fees under Paragraph 17.A. Whether fees are recoverable for disputes resolved through arbitration can be determined in the arbitration proceeding.

JUDGMENT VACATED AS TO THE BREACH FINDING, DOCUMENT PRODUCTION ORDER, AND ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS TO THE DENIAL OF THE CONTEMPT PETITION. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION WITHOUT MAKING ANY FINDINGS RELATED TO ALIMONY. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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FOOTNOTES

Husband is an attorney and was represented by counsel in circuit court. Wife was represented by counsel in circuit court and is represented by counsel on appeal in this Court. In his pro se brief filed in this Court, Husband phrases the issues as follows: 1.

Whether the Circuit Court erred in ordering arbitration of an alimony dispute to occur on terms that differ from those of the parties’ marital separation agreement, and which would require the arbitrator to violate the Maryland Arbitration Act.

Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that Appellant committed an unspecified breach of the Agreement and in making an associated award of legal fees to Appellee.

The MSA defines “earned compensation” to include “distributions, draws, wages, salary, bonuses, commissions, incentive pay, or other such form of compensation as paid by any entity for whom or through whom Husband provides services,” but excludes “any payments or income from or which is comprised of any interest or dividends earned on or directly traceable to Husband’s share of the marital assets as set forth in this Agreement.”

The arbitration clause does not conflict with Md. Code, FAM. LAW § 8-103. Paragraph 4.F. of the MSA provides as follows: In accordance with Section 8-103 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the parties agree that the provisions of this Paragraph with respect or relating to alimony, spousal support, and/or maintenance, are not and shall not be subject to any court modification. Wife accepts the terms of this Paragraph in lieu of any other provision or allowance for her support.

In case there were any doubt, Husband has not waived his right to arbitration. Bloch, 115 Md. App. at 377. Unlike Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 407-08 (1993), where both parties expressly waived arbitration of an alimony dispute, Husband here asserted his right to arbitration throughout the proceedings. He sent Wife’s counsel a letter requesting arbitration, moved to dismiss the contempt petition based on the arbitration clause, attached his letter requesting arbitration to the motion to dismiss as an exhibit, and repeatedly argued that arbitration was the proper forum to resolve the alimony dispute.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Child support; current income; evidence

Ivan O. Hardnett v. Shameena Felix No. 0016, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Ripken, Eyler, Deborah (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Ripken, J. Filed: Oct. 21, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s child support determination. Because the court’s finding regarding mother’s current income was not supported by suitable documentary evidence, the finding was clearly erroneous.

In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Shameena Felix (“Mother”), appellee, filed a complaint for custody, child support, and other relief against the father of her child, Ivan Hardnett (“Father”), appellant. Father filed a counter complaint, likewise seeking custody and child support. The parties resolved the issues of custody and access by consent. Following an evidentiary hearing on the unresolved issues, the court—based on the incomes at the time the counter complaint was filed—ordered Mother to pay Father child support retroactive to the date he filed the counter complaint and set a monthly amount to be paid toward the resulting arrearage. Additionally, because Mother testified that she was preparing to start a new job at a decreased income, the court determined there had been a change in circumstances from the time the complaint was filed. Using the anticipated reduced salary as Mother’s income, the court calculated a different child support amount and ordered Father to pay Mother the modified amount of child support beginning on a future date specified by the court. The court ordered that the modified child support amount which Father owed Mother would initially be set off against the arrearage which it found Mother owed Father until the arrearage was paid in full. Father appeals from the judgment posing a single issue: Whether the trial court erred in its child support determination. For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mother and Father share a daughter, now five years old. On October 30, 2023, Mother filed a complaint for custody, child support and other relief. Contemporaneous to her filing, she 22

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. submitted a financial statement reflecting gross monthly wages of $14,330.45. Mother did not amend this financial statement at any point during the pendency of this matter. Father answered the complaint and filed a counter complaint, seeking primary custody and child support retroactive to the date of his request. His financial statement reflected gross monthly wages of $8,500.00. The case was set for a hearing on the merits on December 16, 2024. On that date, the parties placed an agreement on the record regarding custody, agreeing to share joint legal custody and to share physical custody on an equal basis. The parties had not reached an agreement on the issue of child support; hence, the court took testimony on that issue. Mother testified that she has a master’s degree. For the three years prior to the hearing, she had been employed by USAA as a catastrophe specialist. That job was entirely remote; however, it required some travel if warranted by weather events. Tax documents that were entered into evidence showed that Mother earned $130,158 in 2022 and $160,190 in 2023. Her year-to-date earnings for 2024 were $175,895.46, which included overtime pay in excess of $58,000. Mother’s 2024 income was documented by paystubs from USAA. Two months prior to the hearing, Mother began looking for a new job “for [her] mental health” because “[t]he job [at USAA] was very, very demanding, and the environment was toxic.” Mother quit her job at USAA at the beginning of December 2024, approximately two weeks prior to the hearing. One week before the hearing, Mother accepted a position at Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”) as a property adjuster. Mother expected to commence work at that company two weeks following the hearing. She stated that “I got the offer a week ago. I start officially on the 30th.” Mother testified that her new job would be entirely remote with some travel opportunities. She also testified that she anticipated her base salary at her new job would be $90,000.00 per year; however, her income could fluctuate due to opportunities for overtime. Because Mother’s start date was not until December 30, 2024, she had received neither pay nor pay stubs from Erie. On the afternoon of the hearing, Mother’s counsel forwarded Father’s counsel the offer letter Mother had received from Erie a week earlier. The letter was not introduced into evidence. During cross-examination, Father’s counsel asked Mother: “And so you literally [came] into court today without a new financial statement, without one document showing your current income at Erie, and you’re asking us to accept that you decided voluntarily to reduce your income by literally [fifty] percent, correct?” Mother responded, “Whether you accept it or not, that’s what it is. Yes, sir.” Mother did not offer any documentation verifying her anticipated future income. 0F

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Father testified that he also has a master’s degree. He testified that he owned a business, Total Worksite Solutions, and his work for that company as a cleaning and remediation specialist resulted in an annual income of approximately $102,000.00. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an oral opinion from the bench. 2 With respect to child support, the court found that at the beginning of the case, Mother was working at USAA, where she was earning between $160,000.00 and $180,000.00 per year. The court also found that Mother had recently “elected to leave that position and move on to another job earning $90,000 per year.” The court noted that Mother’s new income differed from that which was listed on the financial statement that she submitted, and that therefore “[t]here’s been a change in circumstance. Her income has changed at this point.” As to the calculation of Mother’s income, the court observed that there was some implication of voluntary impoverishment on Mother’s part based upon Father’s counsel’s cross-examination of Mother which highlighted her reduction of income by half. The court stated: “Of course, if I make a finding that she voluntarily impoverished herself, then I have to impute her at minimum wage, which would be far less than the $90,000 that she indicates that she earns at this point in time.” The court indicated that Mother’s income could not be based on what she had made at USAA because “[s]he’s not at the same job, so we can’t take a figure from somewhere that she’s not working anymore.” As to the calculation of Father’s income, the court found that Father earned $102,000.00 annually and that his income remained the same throughout the case. The court determined that Mother owed Father past child support for the period between January 1, 2024 and November of 2024. There having been no child support order in place, the court calculated child support and determined that for this period, Mother owed Father $623.00 per month. As a result of that determination, the court set an arrearage sum for Mother at $6,853.00. However, due to the anticipated reduction in Mother’s income, the court also calculated a future child support order, determining that Father would owe Mother child support in the sum of $99.00 per month commencing in January of 2025. The court ordered Mother to pay the arrearage the court set at that same rate— $99.00 per month— which had the practical effect of negating both parties’ obligations to pay child support for a period exceeding five years. On January 11, 2025, the court entered a written order encompassing these rulings. Within ten days, Father moved to alter or amend the judgment. He argued that the court erred in calculating Mother’s income. He asserted that Mother’s testimony concerning her new employment was not corroborated by any documentary evidence. To the extent the court accepted Mother’s testimony regarding her new salary, Father asserted that the court erred by not finding that Mother had voluntarily impoverished herself. Father further argued that the court erred by calculating Mother’s child support arrearages based upon her 2023 income rather than her 2024 income. Mother opposed Father’s motion to alter or amend. She did not address the absence of documentation verifying her new salary, asserting only that the “testimony and exhibits regarding her employment” had been deemed credible by the circuit court. Mother argued that the evidence did not support a finding of voluntary impoverishment because her election to obtain new employment did not render her “without adequate resources” to support her child. While Mother acknowledged Father’s position TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

that the arrearages should have been calculated based on her 2024 income, she did not respond to that argument. On February 4, 2025, the court entered an order granting, in part, and denying, in part, Father’s motion to alter or amend. The court ruled that the argument that Mother “voluntar[ily] impoverished herself [wa]s not supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing.” The court granted Father’s request to amend the order to increase the amount of child support arrears owed by Mother to $9,152.00 based on Mother’s 2024 income. The court determined that Father’s obligation to make regular ongoing child support payments to Mother would commence “after such time as the arrears have been satisfied in full[.]” The court ordered that all other previous order provisions that were consistent with the amended order would remain in effect. On March 3, 2025, Father noted this timely appeal. DISCUSSION

A. Party Contentions Father contends that the circuit court erred in calculating Mother’s income based on her testimony alone without any verifying documentation. He further contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that Mother had not voluntarily impoverished herself. He asserts the court committed error when it applied incorrect law to its voluntary impoverishment analysis as the court incorrectly indicated that such a finding would have required the court to attribute income to Mother in the amount of minimum wage. Mother contends that there was evidence of her new income based on her testimony. As we understand her argument, she asserts that because she had not yet received pay from Erie, she could not have provided documentary evidence to verify her new income. She also asserts that Father likewise did not present any documentation to verify his income. Mother claims that the court was correct to conclude that Mother had not voluntarily impoverished herself because Mother was employed and there was not sufficient evidence adduced at the hearing to suggest she was underemployed or without sufficient resources to provide financial support to the parties’ child. B. Standard of Review Child support orders are ordinarily “within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 316 (2013). A trial court “can abuse its discretion when it makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise or upon factual contentions that are clearly erroneous.” Houser v. Houser, 262 Md. App. 473, 490 (2024), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592 (2025) (quoting Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 735 (2013)). When the child support order “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law,” this Court must determine “whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 316 (quoting Walker v. Grow, 170 Md. App. 255, 266 (2006)). C. Analysis “[P]arents have a legal obligation to support their children.” Houser, 262 Md. App. at 490. In recognition of that legal obligation, the General Assembly enacted child support guidelines, with the goal being that “a child should receive the same proportion of Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

parental income, and thereby enjoy the same standard of living, he or she would have experienced had the child’s parents remained together.” Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 315 (quoting Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. 318, 322 (1992)). Under the child support statute, “in any proceeding to establish or modify child support, whether pendente lite or permanent, the court shall use the child support guidelines[.]” Md. Code Ann., (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2024 Supp.) § 12-202(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). When calculating support under the guidelines, the circuit court must divide the obligation between parents “in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes.” FL § 12-204(a)(1). This necessarily means that “the central factual issue” for the circuit court to consider “is the actual adjusted income of each party.” Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 316 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 152 Md. App. 609, 615 (2003)) (internal quotation marks and further citation omitted). When a trial court makes an actual income determination, “[t]he court must verify the parents’ income statements ‘with documentation of both current and past actual income.’” Id. at 318 (quoting Walker, 170 Md. App. at 269, in turn quoting FL § 12203(b)(1)) (emphasis in original). FL section 12-203(b)(2) provides information regarding the types of documentation that may be suitable to verify a parent’s income. Walker, 170 Md. App. at 269. Suitable documentation of income “includes pay stubs, employer statements otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, or receipts and expenses if self-employed, and copies of each parent’s [three] most recent federal tax returns.” FL § 12-203(b)(2)(i). In addition, “[i]f a parent is self-employed or has received an increase or decrease in income of 20% or more in a [one]-year period within the past [three] years, the court may require that parent to provide copies of federal tax returns for the [five] most recent years.” FL § 12-203(b)(2)(ii). Although it is not necessary for parents to produce each of the documents listed in FL section 12-203(b)(2)(i) to verify their income, they must produce some form of suitable documentation from the list. Tanis v. Crocker, 110 Md. App. 559, 572 (1996) (noting that in establishing actual income, “a party to a child support case could produce any one, two or all” of the categories of documents listed in FL section 12-203(b)(2)(i)). This Court has noted that “[t] he clear intention of the legislature” in enacting the child support guidelines—which was to fulfill a mandate of establishing criteria and computation-based guidelines that result in consistent and equitable awards—“requires the trial court to consider actual income and expenses based on the evidence.” Ley v. Forman, 144 Md. App. 658, 669–70 (2002). Therefore, when determining parents’ actual income, “[t]he court must rely on the verifiable incomes of the parties, and failure to do so results in an inaccurate financial

picture.” Id. Here, in determining Mother’s past income, the circuit court verified Mother’s past income with “suitable documentation” in the form of her USAA pay stubs and her tax return. See Walker, 170 Md. App. at 269 (citing FL § 12-203(b)(2)(i)). However, the court did not verify Mother’s current income with any documentation. The only evidence in the record regarding Mother’s anticipated income at her new place of employment was her own testimony that she would be making $90,000.00 annually with opportunities for overtime income. Although there was testimony regarding the existence of an offer letter, the letter was not offered or admitted into evidence. As Mother had not commenced work for Erie at the time of the hearing, she indicated she had received no pay stubs which could verify her income. Because the court’s finding regarding Mother’s current income was not supported by suitable documentary evidence, the finding was clearly erroneous. 3 The court therefore abused its discretion in its ultimate child support determination because its determination was premised on a faulty factual contention. See Houser, 262 Md. App. at 490. We therefore must vacate the circuit court’s child support order. For guidance on remand, we note that the parties should provide to the trial court the categories of documents identified in FL section 12-203(b)(2)(i). In addition, because Father is selfemployed and Mother’s income may have decreased by more than 20% in a one-year period within the past three years, the trial court may consider requiring the parents to provide copies of federal tax returns for the five most recent years. See FL § 12-203(b)(2)(ii). Because we have vacated the circuit court’s child support order, we do not reach the issue of voluntary impoverishment. We note for guidance on remand that in a child support determination, imputed income is a concept “predicated on a finding of voluntary impoverishment.” St. Cyr v. St. Cyr., 228 Md. App. 163, 178 (2016) (internal citations omitted). This means that if a parent is found to be voluntarily impoverished based on the relevant factors, the trial court may then calculate child support based upon the voluntarily impoverished parent’s potential income. See id. at 178– 79. Potential income is “income attributed to a parent determined by the parent’s employment potential and probable earnings level based on, but not limited to, recent work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.” Id. at 179 (quoting FL § 12-201(l)). Should the court determine that a parent has a voluntarily impoverished income, the court should not attribute to the parent a minimum wage income unless the parent’s employment circumstances indicate that minimum wage is the parent’s “probable earnings level” based on the relevant factors. See id. 2F

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY VACATED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

Footnotes 1

In response to questions from the trial court, Mother noted that she was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, and that she was not seeing a counselor, psychologist, or psychiatrist. Mother had also noted that her work environment was fully remote.

The court did not offer counsel the opportunity to present argument.

We note that Father’s testimony regarding his income was likewise unverified.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Indefinite alimony; marital property; attorney’s fees

Bonnie Yvette Hochman Rothell v. Danny L. Rothell No. 2381, September Term 2023 Argued before: Albright, Kehoe, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Kehoe, J. Filed: Oct. 7, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Charles County Circuit Court’s indefinite alimony to husband, equal division of marital property and attorney’s fees to husband. The trial court erred in awarding indefinite alimony by failing to consider certain factors under Family Law Article § 11-106(b) and by failing to make the requisite findings under FL § 11-106(c). Due to the interrelated nature of alimony, division of marital property and attorney’s fee awards, the court must vacate all awards and remand for reconsideration.

This appeal arises from a Judgment of Absolute Divorce (“JAD”) entered on February 9, 2024 by the Circuit Court for Charles County, granting Appellant, Bonnie Yvette Hochman Rothell (“Ms. Hochman”), 1 an absolute divorce from Appellee, Danny L. Rothell (“Mr. Rothell”), on the grounds of a one-year separation. The trial in this case commenced on April 3, 2023, consumed eight days, and concluded on August 30, 2023. In the JAD, the trial court ordered, inter alia, that the majority of the marital property be sold and net proceeds equally divided between the parties, that Ms. Hochman pay Mr. Rothell indefinite alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 per month, and that Ms. Hochman pay $25,000.00 towards Mr. Rothell’s attorney’s fees. Ms. Hochman filed an appeal and presents the following questions for our review, which we have reordered: 1) Whether the trial court erred in its alimony award? 2) Whether the trial court erred when it equally divided all marital property? 3) Whether the trial court erred in awarding Appellee attorney[’]s fees? While we affirm the judgment of absolute divorce, we vacate the judgment granting indefinite alimony, equal division of marital property, and attorney’s fees, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

A. The Parties’ History The parties met in August of 1994. At the time, Ms. Hochman was an attorney and partner at a private law firm in Washington, D.C. and Mr. Rothell was on active duty in the United States Air Force (“USAF”), stationed in Washington, D.C. They married on September 8, 1995, and moved into their marital home, a farmhouse in Charles County. Ms. Hochman continued to commute to the law firm in Washington, D.C. for work. Meanwhile, Mr. Rothell was working as a media forensics expert in the USAF Office of Special Investigations located at the Bolling Air Force Base, just outside of Washington, D.C. Three children were born of the marriage. The parties’ first child, Foster, was born in October of 1997. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rothell was deployed to Korea. During his infancy, Ms. Hochman took Foster to work with her and hired an au pair for assistance. When Mr. Rothell returned from Korea, he began commuting to Linthicum, Maryland for work. The parties’ second child, Francesca, was born in October of 1999. By now Foster was in preschool, and Ms. Hochman was taking Francesca to work with her. Due to both parties working and commuting long distances,2 they were still enlisting the assistance of an au pair. After Francesca was born, Mr. Rothell resigned from the USAF, four years shy of a full-benefits retirement. His position upon resignation was Acting Laboratory Branch Chief in the Department of Defense Computer Forensics Lab. Mr. Rothell began working from home for Signalscape, a contractor with the federal government, earning $80,000 annually as the Chief of Media Forensics. However, Mr. Rothell quit Signalscape after a year and started his own forensics and media analysis business, Rothell Enterprises, in 2002. While the business was not profitable and more of an avocation, Ms. Hochman’s increasing salary allowed Mr. Rothell to continue the business until 2015. In October of 2005, the parties’ third child, Faith, was born. While Mr. Rothell worked from home, and sometimes Ms. Hochman worked from home, the parties continued to employ an au pair to assist with the children until 2008 when Faith began attending childcare full-time. Ms. Hochman continued practicing law and commuting to Washington, D.C., earning an average gross annual income of $450,000.00. Ms. Hochman’s salary allowed for the parties to live comfortably, yet they lived a relatively modest lifestyle. While the parties employed au pairs when the children were younger, the family handled their own household chores, such as cooking, cleaning, yardwork, and animal care,3 Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

rather than employing outside help. The parties did not own new, expensive vehicles or go on vacations excessively. However, the parties spent a significant amount of money on investments in real estate. During the marriage, the parties purchased 11 properties, worth an estimated $3.3 million, including two houses on the water, a coffee shop, vineyard, and winery. Mr. Rothell maintained the properties and tended to the family’s animals and gardens, while Ms. Hochman worked and provided financially for the family. In 2015, the parties purchased 200 acres and formed Purple Magnolia Vineyard and Winery LLC, where Mr. Rothell planned to become a vintner. After the purchase of the vineyard, Mr. Rothell’s alcohol consumption began to increase significantly4 and the parties began to experience difficulties in the marriage. According to Ms. Hochman, Mr. Rothell’s abuse of alcohol began in 2012, which is also when Mr. Rothell’s verbal and emotional abuse towards Ms. Hochman and the children became a daily occurrence.5 Prior to that, Mr. Rothell’s aggressive outbursts only transpired about once a month. However, Mr. Rothell’s consumption of alcohol and abuse escalated after 2015. During one incident on May 14, 2020, Ms. Hochman and the parties’ youngest daughter, Faith, fled the marital home in the early morning hours to take refuge from Mr. Rothell’s alcohol-fueled verbal and emotional abuse.6 Ms. Hochman and Faith stayed at their Cobb Island property, where Foster was residing, for the night. Ms. Hochman and the children returned to the marital home on May 16 to find the contents of the house thrown outside on the lawn and the inside of the house destroyed.7 Ms. Hochman and Faith stayed at the Cobb Island property for the summer, but returned to the family home in September 2020 when school started. Mr. Rothell alternated between the family home, the Bicknell Road property, and the vineyard property. During this period, there were several attempts at reconciliation and Ms. Hochman pleaded with Mr. Rothell to get help for his alcohol abuse. However, after Thanksgiving in November of 2021, the parties formally separated. B. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

Ms. Hochman filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce on August 23, 2022, and Mr. Rothell’s Counter-Complaint followed. Both parties filed amended complaints. Pending trial, Ms. Hochman continued to support Mr. Rothell financially and pay all the bills associated with the properties they owned. In her Complaint, Ms. Hochman sought an absolute divorce on the basis of cruelty, desertion and abandonment, as well as the parties having lived separate and apart, without interruption or cohabitation, in excess of 12 months. At the time of filing, only one of the parties’ children, Faith, was a minor, and Ms. Hochman requested custody of her, noting that “[t]his would also be consistent with the desires of the child, who considering her age, should have significant involvement in the custodial arrangement.” Ms. Hochman requested that the title of the family home and all personal property therein be transferred into her name, or in the alternative that she be granted use and possession of the family home and property. In support of her request, Ms. Hochman claimed that “[a]t 26

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acquisition, [she], from non-marital sources, contributed the entire down payment toward the purchase of the family home, and further, following its acquisition her income solely paid the mortgage and all other obligations and improvements relating to this home.” In addition, Ms. Hochman requested that all other property, both real and personal, be sold and proceeds distributed to her “to reflect her marital and non-marital contributions toward the acquisition of all said property.” Ms. Hochman points out in her Complaint that Mr. Rothell “is well educated and is fully capable of earning a significant income and being self-supporting. As a consequence, he should not be awarded any support from [Ms. Hochman].” Ms. Hochman also requested that Mr. Rothell make a reasonable contribution to her attorney’s fees and litigation costs. In his Complaint, Mr. Rothell sought an absolute divorce on the basis of cruelty of treatment, vicious conduct, constructive abandonment and desertion, as well as the parties having lived separate and apart, without interruption or cohabitation, in excess of 12 months. Mr. Rothell noted that Ms. Hochman “has engaged in excessively vicious conduct, endangering [his] safety, health, and happiness and has harassed and humiliated him in the presence of her family and friends and others, rendering continuation of the marital relationship impossible if [he] is to preserve his health, safety, and self-respect.” Mr. Rothell did not contest Ms. Hochman’s request for physical custody of Faith, and instead only requested joint legal custody and visitation. Mr. Rothell requested that he be awarded indefinite alimony, or in the alternative, rehabilitative alimony or reserved alimony. In support of his request, Mr. Rothell claimed: That by agreement of the parties, [Mr. Rothell] has been a stay-at-home parent for the past fifteen years with the mutual goal of promoting [Ms. Hochman’s] legal career. Through [Mr. Rothell’s] assistance, [Ms. Hochman] currently has obtained the status as “partner” in her law firm and is earning an income in the high “six-figures” while [Mr. Rothell] currently has no income. The respective standards of living are unconscionably disparate. Furthermore, Ms. Hochman is “fully capable of providing adequate support for [Mr. Rothell.]” In addition, Mr. Rothell requested: a monetary award in his favor as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties in the marital property; that the court order the sale of all real and personal property jointly owned by the parties and that the proceeds be distributed equitably; and that the court order Ms. Hochman to pay Mr. Rothell’s attorney’s fees and litigation costs, inter alia. The trial in this case commenced on April 3, 2023, consumed a total of eight days, and concluded on August 30, 2023. The parties’ daughters testified on behalf of their mother about their father’s alcohol consumption and his abuse towards the family. It was proffered that the parties’ son, Foster, would testify consistent with the daughters’ testimony. A friend of the family, Richard Sypher, also testified on behalf of Ms. Hochman that he observed some incidents of Mr. Rothell’s anger when he would drink alcohol. Testimony and reports TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

of two vocational experts and two financial experts were also admitted into evidence. On August 4, 2023, the parties rested their cases and were ordered to return on August 30, 2023, for closing arguments. On August 30, Ms. Hochman moved to reopen the case to admit a letter she received from her employer on August 17, notifying Ms. Hochman that she was being terminated from the law firm within a couple of weeks. Ms. Hochman argued that such development may impact the court’s ruling on an alimony award. The trial court denied the motion and suggested that Ms. Hochman could file a motion for modification later, if alimony was granted. After closing arguments, the presiding judge of the Circuit Court for Charles County gave an oral ruling, followed by the written judgment entered on February 9, 2024. Ms. Hochman was granted an absolute divorce from Mr. Rothell on the grounds of a one-year separation. While Ms. Hochman was granted use and possession of the family home and its contents until Faith graduated high school, the trial court ordered that the rest of the marital property (real estate, boats, tractors, equipment, personal property, etc.) be sold and net proceeds divided equally between the parties; that the bank accounts and retirement accounts be divided equally between the parties; that Ms. Hochman pay Mr. Rothell indefinite alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 per month; and that Ms. Hochman pay $25,000.00 towards Mr. Rothell’s attorney’s fees. Each party retained possession of their respective jewelry collections, their computers and electronics, and the vehicles they were currently driving. Ms. Hochman appealed the court’s judgment. Additional facts will be included in the discussion as they become relevant. II. DISCUSSION

The trial court erred in awarding indefinite alimony by failing to consider certain alimony factors under Family Law Article (“FL”) § 11-106(b) 8 and by failing to make the requisite findings under FL § 11-106(c), particularly the finding of unconscionably disparate standards of living. Therefore, we vacate the alimony award and remand the case for reconsideration. While we find no error in the trial court’s decision to distribute the marital property equally pursuant to FL § 8-205(b), the Court must vacate the trial court’s orders related to the marital property due to their interrelated nature to the alimony award. For similar reasons, we vacate the award for attorney’s fees and need not address the merits of that issue, as the trial court will have the opportunity to reconsider attorney’s fees on remand with alimony and marital property. A. Indefinite Alimony Ms. Hochman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Rothell indefinite alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 per month, “absent any finding of unconscionable disparity.” Moreover, Ms. Hochman claims that “the Judge disregarded [her] employment status and its division of marital assets when it rendered its decision.” In contrast, Mr. Rothell avers that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding indefinite alimony, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

highlighting that the court found that Ms. Hochman was employed at the close of trial and had the then current ability to pay alimony. In addition, the trial court explicitly noted in its ruling that it considered its previous decision to divide the marital property equally when it made its alimony award. Mr. Rothell does not address the issue of “unconscionable disparity” in his brief. 1. Family Law § 11-106 Indefinite or permanent alimony is “money that a court orders someone to pay regularly to his or her former spouse after the marriage has ended” for an indefinite period, that terminates upon the death of either spouse or remarriage of the payee. Alimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Alternatively, rehabilitative alimony is ordered for a limited period of time and “found necessary to assist a divorced person in acquiring the education or training required to find employment outside the home or to reenter the labor force.” Id. Since the enactment of the Alimony Act of 1980,9 Maryland courts have preferred rehabilitative alimony over indefinite alimony, emphasizing that the purpose of alimony is: not to provide a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently. Expressed otherwise, alimony’s purpose is to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting. The concept of alimony as life-long support enabling the dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of living has largely been superseded by the view that the dependent spouse should be required to become self-supporting, even though that might result in a reduced standard of living. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 387–88 (2002). Indefinite alimony is reserved for exceptional circumstances, Goicochea v. Goicochea, 256 Md. App. 329, 357 (2022); Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 527 (1987), and to “protect the spouse who is less financially secure from too harsh a life once single again.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 392. i. Family Law § 11-106(b) Before a court can award alimony, it must consider all of the factors listed in FL § 11-106(b). Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 98 (2004). The court does not need to articulate its reasoning for each factor; however, the record must clearly demonstrate that the court’s findings were based on a review of the factors. Id. at 98–99. The factors the court must consider are: (1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

(4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; (11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-106(b). After considering the aforementioned factors, the court may then decide to award rehabilitative or indefinite alimony. Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 100. ii. Family Law § 11-106(c) Family Law Article § 11-106(c) authorizes the court to award indefinite alimony only if it finds that: (1) “due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting”; or (2) “even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11106(c). The latter is at issue in the case before this Court here. To determine whether an unconscionable disparity in the parties’ standards of living exists, the court must “project forward in time to the point when the requesting spouse will have made maximum financial progress, and compare the relative standards of living of the parties at that future time.” K.B. v. D.B., 245 Md. App. 647, 669 (2020) (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 338 (2007)); see also Francz v. Francz, 157 Md. App. 676, 701 (2004) (“The comparison to be made is between [the payor’s] postdivorce standard of living and [the payee’s] post-divorce standard of living upon making as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as reasonably can be expected.”). Such assessment will involve an examination of the parties respective earning capacities, Id., and the court “may impute income to a party if that party is capable of earning more income than he or she is earning at the time of the divorce.” Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 121. 28

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However, the “mere difference in earnings of spouses, even if it is substantial, [. . .] does not automatically establish an ‘unconscionable disparity’ in standards of living.” Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 336 (2002). Similarly, a “great disparity” in the parties’ assets alone will not automatically qualify a spouse for indefinite alimony. Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 104. It is the “standards of living” that must be “fundamentally and entirely dissimilar.” Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 336. For the purposes of this analysis, “unconscionably disparate” is defined as “be[ing] so inferior, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the standard of living of the other as to be morally unacceptable and shocking to the court.” Id. at 338; see also Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 340 (“The disparity must be gross, so as to offend the conscience of the court if not ameliorated.”). Such determination is fact-specific and to be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the factors listed in FL § 11-106(b). Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 341; Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 338. The analysis requires “more than a numerical calculation[,]” as “[a] mathematical disparity, standing alone, does not mandate indefinite alimony—” it is the “factors [that] drive the analysis.” Bryant v. Bryant, 220 Md. App. 145, 160–61 (2014). 2. Standard of Review The standard of review for alimony awards involves several layers. While the “ultimate decision” to award alimony and its amount is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the factual findings underlying the court’s decision are reviewed for clear error. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 385 (2020) (citing Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 415 (2003)). For indefinite alimony awards, in particular: First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact as to questions such as what a party’s income is (referred to as “first-level” facts) and reverse them only if clearly erroneous. Second, while the question of whether the standards of living between spouses will be unconscionably disparate is a factual one as well, it is not a “first-level” fact[.] Bryant, 220 Md. App. at 160 (internal citations omitted). Whether an unconscionable disparity exists is a “secondlevel” fact that “rests upon the court’s first-level factual findings” relevant to the factors listed in FL § 11-106(b). Id. (quoting Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 337). In sum, “[a]s long as the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the ultimate decision is not arbitrary, we will affirm it, even if we might have reached a different result.” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 415. During our review, “[w]e may examine the record as a whole to see if the court’s findings were based on the mandated factors.” Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md. App. 249, 261 (1998); see also Kaplan, 248 Md. App. at 372 (“When it is unclear whether the trial court has considered the factors, we may examine the record as a whole to determine whether the court’s findings were based on the statutory factors.”). While the “court is required to give consideration to each of the factors[,]” it is not required to “mention specifically each factor, or announce each and every reason for its ultimate decision.” Crabill, 119 Md. App. at 261. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

3. Analysis The trial court did not make the requisite findings to award indefinite alimony. First, the trial court failed to make a finding whether Mr. Rothell was currently self-supporting, or alternatively, when he would become self-supporting and what income he would potentially earn at the time he became self-supporting. Second, the court failed to assess accurately the financial resources of the parties. The trial court found that Ms. Hochman would receive a payout. It is unclear whether this payout would be an anticipated bonus, as Ms. Hochman had received bonuses in the past or a severance package. In any event, the trial court did not assign a value to this payout, and it is, therefore, impossible to discern whether the trial court properly considered it. In addition, the trial court appears to have ignored Mr. Rothell’s tentative FL § 8-205 award for half of the marital property, approximately two million dollars in value, in order to make the necessary predictions of the parties’ future standards of living. Lastly, the trial court failed to make any findings regarding the projected post-divorce standards of living of the parties and whether they would be unconscionably disparate. i. Progress Toward Becoming Self-Supporting Although the trial court discussed several of the alimony factors listed in FL § 11-106(b), it failed to consider key factors necessary for an award of indefinite alimony. The trial court failed to make a finding whether Mr. Rothell was currently self-supporting, or alternatively, when he would become self-supporting and what income he would potentially earn at the time he became self-supporting. The trial court began its alimony assessment, starting with the first factor—Mr. Rothell’s ability to be wholly or partly selfsupporting: I do accept the testimony of the expert that [Mr. Rothell] is not employable in the same way he was in the year 2002 when he got out of the military. [. . .] So, I don’t believe that it is realistic for him to get a job that pays $70,000. I think at best he will make minimum wage but… and I think he will be able to work up from there because he is smart, [. . .] he has that background with the military. But starting off, unless he goes into a position dealing with wines, and there wasn’t any testimony that there were a lot of jobs in this area, and I am talking about the Charles County area, to do that, I don’t see him being able to earn as much. But he is able bodied, I certainly agree that the [sic] is able bodied. The trial court appears to find that Mr. Rothell has the ability to become either wholly or partly self-supporting and imputed an income of at least minimum wage on Mr. Rothell. A party is “self-supporting” when the “party’s income exceeds the party’s ‘reasonable’ expenses[.]” St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 186 (2016). A court determines the party’s “reasonable” expenses “based on all of the statutory alimony factors, including the standard of living established during the marriage.” Id. The trial court made no explicit findings related to Mr. Rothell’s expenses. 10 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

The first and second factors are intertwined for the purposes of our indefinite alimony analysis. When the trial court turned to the second factor—the time necessary for Mr. Rothell to gain sufficient education or training to find suitable employment—it found that: [. . . Mr. Rothell] has some training. But he would probably need more training in order to get brought up to date on the wine industry, if that [is] where he wants to work, which makes the most sense because that is what he spent the most of his time in the last ten years working on. However, the trial court did not explicitly find an exact time or a range of time that it would take for Mr. Rothell to gain sufficient education or training to enable him to find suitable employment. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-106(b) (2). The vocational reports entered into evidence estimate that Mr. Rothell could find employment within three to four months. However, employment at a minimum wage does not necessarily mean a person is “self-supporting.” See generally St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 186. More importantly, the trial court never made any findings as to when Mr. Rothell would have made as much progress towards becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, which is required to award indefinite alimony. We reiterate, while the court does not need to articulate each factor in FL § 11-106(b), there are specific findings that are required when awarding indefinite alimony under FL § 11-106(c)(2): In analyzing whether indefinite alimony should be granted under [FL] § 11-106(c)(2), it is of paramount importance to know what future income (of the dependent spouse) is being projected. [. . .] If a reviewing court is in the dark… as to what future income the trial judge thought the dependent spouse would have, the court is unable to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in the alimony ruling. Id. at 189–90 (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). The trial court in Brewer v. Brewer failed to find the time necessary for Mrs. Brewer to become self-supporting and the income that she would potentially earn at that time, and as a result this Court vacated the alimony award for indefinite alimony. 156 Md. App. at 98–101. Mr. Brewer argued, and we agreed, that: [T]he trial court failed to make any findings as to Mrs. Brewer’s current income, or as to when she might become self-supporting, or, as to whether, once that occurred, there would be an unconscionable disparity in living standards. After discussing the difficulties that a woman in her sixties would face in becoming “gainfully employed in a career,” the court noted that, at her age, Mrs. Brewer would have difficulty obtaining additional education and training. But it did not find that Mrs. Brewer had made as much progress toward becoming selfsupporting as can reasonably be expected. In fact, it opined only that she would not “imminently” become self-supporting without expressing any Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

view as to when that might be or what future income she might make or concluding that, at her age, full time employment for any significant period was not a reasonable expectation. As for the last point, the court seemed to suggest that, at her age, full time employment is not an option but then fails to make that finding. Id. at 101. Likewise, the trial court here failed to make a finding that Mr. Rothell was currently self-supporting or, alternatively, when he would become self-supporting and at what income he would be considered self-supporting. The trial court, at most, simply found that Mr. Rothell had the “ability” to be self-supporting. The trial court said that Mr. Rothell “at best[,] will make minimum wage” but that “he will be able to work up from there because he is smart[,]” however, the court never predicted at what income Mr. Rothell would be when he became self-supporting. See St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 193 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-106(c)(2) (“[T] he relevant point in time is when ‘the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming selfsupporting as can reasonably be expected[.]’”). This finding is essential to the standards of living comparison that is required prior to granting indefinite alimony. ii. The Financial Resources of Each Party The trial court refused to take into consideration Ms. Hochman’s impending termination from employment and Mr. Rothell’s tentative FL § 8-205 award for half of the marital property, in order to make the necessary predictions of the parties’ future standards of living. In combination with factor eleven, factor nine relates to the finances and potential standard of living of Ms. Hochman post-divorce that must be compared to that of Mr. Rothell for the purposes of the indefinite alimony analysis. On factor nine—Ms. Hochman’s ability to meet her own needs while meeting the needs of Mr. Rothell—the trial court noted: [T]here was testimony that there were years that Ms. [Hochman] made a million, and then as time has gone on, her income has gone down. And now it is $13,000 a month, but then there are some other, the way her agreement is set up with her firm, there may be some payouts to come later. So, deferred compensation, in other words. So, but I do believe she has an ability to pay the alimony, and that may change, we talked about that with the letter that was referred to at the beginning of the day, that that may be changing. The trial court stated that Ms. Hochman would receive “some payouts” but did not assign any value to those payouts. It is impossible to discern whether she would have the present ability to pay alimony without the value of these payouts. Without making any explicit findings on the factors, the trial court read for the record factor eleven and its subfactors—“[f]inancial needs and financial resources of the parties. All income, assets, including property that does not produce income. Any award made under [FL §] 8.205. And nature and amounts of financial obligations. The right of each party to retirement benefits.” The trial court commented on its prior award made under FL § 8-205: “once the parties sell the 30

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properties and divide the assets, it is going to be quite a bit of money, so I did take that into consideration in my decision, whether to award alimony.” The trial court then concluded its discussion of the FL § 11-106(b) factors. The trial court did not consider properly factors nine—the ability of the party from alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony— and eleven—the financial needs and financial resources of each party—when it awarded indefinite alimony. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 11-106(b)(9), (11). Under factor eleven, the court must consider, inter alia, any award made under FL § 8-205 regarding marital property. Id. The trial court divided the marital property equally and found that “if you get the properties and divide them in half, [. . .] each party is going to walk away with over a million dollars, and maybe more.” In addition, while the trial court did not mention this in its ruling, Ms. Hochman’s retirement assets at the time of trial equaled over two million dollars, according to the parties’ joint Maryland Rule 9-207 Statement, and Mr. Rothell was awarded fifty percent of Ms. Hochman’s retirement accounts. Also, under factor eleven the court must consider the financial resources—all income and assets—of each party, including the party seeking alimony, and “the issue of unconscionable disparity must be determined by projecting into the future, to a time of maximum productivity of the party seeking the award, and not be looking solely to the past.” Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 340. As a result of the trial court’s award, Mr. Rothell was “walking away” with over a million dollars in assets and at least another million dollars in retirement assets. Any disparity that may have previously existed between the parties due to income may have been mitigated by the distribution of marital property, which was equally divided. Thus, we are not convinced that the trial court properly considered its FL § 8-205 award or Mr. Rothell’s projected financial resources for the standards of living comparison that is required to be conducted when ordering indefinite alimony. Of course, the court must consider the financial resources and all income of the party from whom alimony is sought as well. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-106(b)(11). On the last day of trial, Ms. Hochman moved to reopen the case to admit a letter she received from her employer just two weeks prior, notifying Ms. Hochman that she was being terminated from the law firm within a couple of weeks, but the trial court denied the motion. “To make the necessary comparison [of the parties’ respective post-divorce standards of living], the court should project those standards for the future, based on all of the available evidence.” St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 189 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court stated that Ms. Hochman would receive a payout but did not assign a value to it. To determine whether the parties projected standards of living will be unconscionably disparate, we explained in St. Cyr v. St. Cyr: A comparison of the parties’ predicted future incomes is not the sole component of the comparison of future living standards, but it is necessary. [. . .] This Court will vacate an award and remand for reconsideration of the alimony issue if the record makes it unclear whether the trial court made TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

the necessary prediction and comparison of the parties’ incomes and living standards at the point of maximum rehabilitation. Id. at 189–90. Therefore, the trial court did not make the necessary predictions of the parties’ future standards of living. iii. Unconscionably Disparate Standards of Living The trial court failed to make any findings regarding the projected post-divorce standards of living of the parties and whether they would be unconscionably disparate. The trial court’s indefinite alimony ruling appears to be based on the fact that Ms. Hochman was the “breadwinner” for the duration of the twenty-seven year marriage and that, at the time of trial, she was making approximately $13,000 per month, while Mr. Rothell had not worked since 2002 and would only make, at best, minimum wage upon re-entry into the workforce. However, “proof of a disparity in gross income is not enough to show a disparity in standard of living.” Lee v. Andochick, 182 Md. App. 268, 290 (2008); see also Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 339–40 (the indefinite alimony award was vacated where trial court only considered income disparity and length of marriage). It is the “standards of living” that must be unconscionably disparate, not just income. “Standards of living” means “how well the respective parties can live based on their respective financial means.” St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 189. Whether a disparity in the standards of living is unconscionable “must be judged, to some extent, against the standard of living established by the parties while they were married.” Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md. App. 132, 147 (1999). Regarding the standard of living established during the parties’ marriage—the third factor—the trial court found: I agree with Ms. [Hochman] to a certain degree that they weren’t living high on the hog because there went [sic] a lot of extravagant vacations. They did go on vacations, as evidenced from the pictures. All their cars, they aren’t [. . .] really expensive. It’s all relative, [. . .] I think as far as the standard of living, you definitely were above average, living above average in the home that you had, in the pool, the cars, the vacations that you had, I think it was a little bit higher than average. Here, the trial court found that, while the parties lived an above average standard of living, they “weren’t living high on the hog[.]” They did not take “extravagant vacations” or drive “really expensive” cars. The parties spent most of their wealth on investments in real estate, which the trial court ordered sold and proceeds divided equally between the parties. In addition, nearly all of the parties’ personal property, with the exception of their individual cars, jewelry, and electronics, was ordered sold and proceeds divided equally. However, this is all that the trial court explicitly found regarding “standards of living.” Most significantly, nowhere in the trial court’s ruling was it explained how the standards of living of Ms. Hochman and Mr. Rothell would be “unconscionably disparate” without an award for indefinite alimony. The trial court commits error when it grants indefinite alimony “without explicitly discussing the disparity issue.” Lee, 182 Md. App. at 287 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

(citing Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 170 (2006)). While the court need not articulate each FL § 11-106(b) factor, it must “discuss how, in the court’s opinion, the living standards would be unconscionably disparate absent an award of indefinite alimony.” Id. at 288. Like our conclusion in Lee v. Andochick, “it would have been useful if the court had given us the benefit of its analysis as to how it arrived at the conclusion that, without an award of alimony, the parties’ respective standards of living would be unconscionably disparate.” Id. In conclusion, the trial court erred in ordering indefinite alimony. We vacate the alimony award and remand so the trial court may reconsider whether an award for alimony is appropriate and, if so, make the appropriate findings. In vacating the alimony award, we must also vacate the trial court’s orders regarding marital property and attorney’s fees. The court’s determination of alimony, monetary awards or property division, and counsel fees requires the same evaluation of the parties’ financial circumstances. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 198. “The factors underlying such awards are so interrelated that, when a trial court considers a claim for one of them, it must weigh the award of any other.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 105 (“Because we are vacating the court’s alimony award, we must also vacate its monetary award, as any significant change in alimony requires the court to reassess its monetary award.”). Although we are vacating the trial court’s award regarding the marital property, we will discuss the parties’ arguments on that issue as well to provide guidance to the trial court on remand. B. Equal Division of Marital Property Next, Ms. Hochman argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it equally divided all marital property, despite “overwhelming evidence” that “she should have been awarded a disproportionate and greater share of the marital estate.” Ms. Hochman asserts that the trial court erred by not properly evaluating the monetary and non-monetary contributions made by each party to the well-being of the family and by finding that the parties were equally at fault for the demise of the marriage. Mr. Rothell contests that the trial court did not err in equally dividing the marital property, as the court properly assessed the necessary factors pursuant to FL § 8-205(b). Additionally, Mr. Rothell argues that Ms. Hochman simply failed to persuade the trial court of her position. 1. Family Law § 8-205 “[W]hen a marriage is dissolved the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration being given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouses to the well-being of the family.” Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 506 (1993) (citations omitted). While “equitable” division of marital property is required, “equitable” does not necessarily mean “equal.” Id. at 508. Accordingly, trial courts should avoid “succumbing to the temptation to divide the marital property equally[.]” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 430 (quoting Alston, 331 Md. at 508) (internal brackets omitted). Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

There is a three step process for distributing marital property, which is governed by FL § 8-205. Hart, 169 Md. App. at 161. First, the court determines which property is marital property; second, the court determines the value of all marital property; and third, the court considers the various factors in FL § 8-205(b) before formulating its award. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 498–99 (1993). Marital Property is “any property, regardless of titling, that was acquired by one or both parties during the course of the marriage[,]” excluding “any property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by inheritance or gift, property excluded by valid agreement, or property that is directly traceable to nonmarital sources.” Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 281 (1993) (citing Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-201(e)). In determining how to divide the marital property “equitably,” the court turns to the FL § 8-205(b) factors for guidance: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-205(b). After consideration of the factors, the court will make an award. An award under FL § 8-205 may include a monetary award, a transfer of ownership of an interest in property specifically listed in FL § 8-205(a)(2),11 or both. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-205(a)(1). Because the court will not transfer ownership of personal or real property individually titled from one party to the other, except as provided in FL § 8-205(a)(2), a monetary award may be necessary to adjust the equities and rights of the parties, when division of marital property by title is inequitable. Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 227 (2000); see also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-202(a)(3).12 A monetary award is “intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion” of marital property. Id. (quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 32

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Md. App. 336, 339–40 (1982)). While consideration of the FL § 8-205(b) factors are mandatory, like the FL § 11-106(b) factors of alimony, the court need not “go through a detailed check list of the statutory factors, specifically referring to each, however beneficial such a procedure might be.” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 429 (citation omitted). In addition, although the factors are not prioritized in any particular way and the weighing or balancing of the factors is left to the discretion of the court, factor eight— how and when specific marital property was acquired and the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property—is given considerable weight. Alston, 331 Md. at 507. 2. Standard of Review Similar to alimony, we review the distribution of marital property and the grant of monetary awards “to ensure consideration of the enumerated statutory factors, and for abuse of discretion.” Hart, 169 Md. App. at 161–62. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the trial court is given wide deference in its division of marital property and monetary award. Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 463 (2021). However, the “court’s discretion is always tempered by the requirement that the court apply the correct legal standards.” Id. “[A] failure to consider the proper legal standard in reaching a decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 463–64 (quoting Matter of Dory, 244 Md. App. 177, 203 (2019)); see also Lemley v. Lemley, 102 Md. App. 266, 298 (1994) (“Unless the chancellor abuses that discretion or makes a ruling contrary to law, the chancellor’s decision must stand on any subsequent appeal.”). 3. Analysis Although we must vacate the trial court’s orders related to the marital property in this case because we vacate the alimony award, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in distributing the marital property equally. The trial court ordered that Ms. Hochman be awarded use and possession of the marital home and its contents “until such time as Faith graduates from high school[.]” 13 The money in thirteen bank accounts was ordered to be divided equally between the parties.14 Eleven real estate properties, along with the marital home upon Faith’s graduation, were ordered to be sold and net proceeds divided equally. Mr. Rothell was awarded 50% of Ms. Hochman’s five retirement accounts and Ms. Hochman was awarded 50% of Mr. Rothell’s two retirement accounts.15 The trial court ordered that the parties divide equally the cash value, if any, of Ms. Hochman’s two life insurance policies and Mr. Rothell’s one life insurance policy. The parties’ two boats were ordered to be sold and net proceeds to be divided equally. The parties were awarded ownership of the respective vehicles that they currently drove, and Ms. Hochman was awarded ownership of two additional vehicles for the benefit of the daughters, Faith and Francesca. However, the remaining vehicles, including a van and four tractors, were ordered to be sold and net proceeds divided equally. All personal property, and contents located at the marital home upon Faith’s graduation, were ordered to be sold and net proceeds divided equally. Each party retained TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

possession and ownership over their jewelry collections, computers, and electronics. Mr. Rothell retained his cameras and photography equipment, and Ms. Hochman was awarded the “Big Green Egg Barbeque.” The trial court did not make any monetary awards. i. Contributions to the Well-Being of the Family The trial court did not err in finding that all marital property was acquired during the marriage and that while Ms. Hochman was the sole monetary contributor to the family, Mr. Rothell contributed nonmonetarily to the family. In the trial court’s ruling on the distribution of marital property, it began considering the FL § 8-205(b) factors, starting with the first factor—monetary and nonmonetary contributions each party made to the well-being of the family—finding that: Ms. [Hochman] was the breadwinner, that she was contributing monetarily, most of the marriage, all of the income came from her. That Mr. Rothell wasn’t working from 2002, but then on a nonmonetary side, as his attorney noted, there were a lot of, I want to say chores, tasks, between all of the properties that the parties own, that he was working on. And I believe that was timeconsuming. The trial court later noted that there were several business ventures owned by the parties and found that while Ms. Hochman contributed money to those businesses, Mr. Rothell contributed his time to them. While Ms. Hochman “didn’t believe in [the businesses] after a while, [] she certainly was on board with writing the checks to support them.” As it related to the “well-being” of the family, the trial court also found that Mr. Rothell “started to have issues with [the] overuse of alcohol[,] [. . .] which was never dealt with[,]” when the parties started their winery venture. The trial court then discussed the parties’ contributions as it related to the children, finding that although Ms. Hochman was the “breadwinner,” she was still very involved in taking care of the children as well. Although Mr. Rothell had not worked since 2002 and stayed home primarily, the trial court did not find him to be a “traditional stay-at-home father.” However, the trial court noted, “I think Mr. Rothell was involved, and he was there, at the very least. They were not left alone, unsupervised. He was there to take care of the kids.” On factor two—the value of all property interests of each party—the trial court found that “[a]ll the properties were bought after the parties were married, and the values of them are in the [] joint statement.” The trial court also noted that, “there is a lot of property[,]” and if they are divided in half, “each party is going to walk away with over a million dollars, and maybe more.” Similarly, with respect to factor eight—how and when specific marital property was acquired and the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property—the trial court reiterated that all the properties “were bought during the marriage, and Mr. Rothell contributed nonmonetarily to the upkeep of these properties, while Ms. [Hochman] was paying for the properties with her income as the sole breadwinner.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In conclusion, the trial court found that Mr. Rothell made nonmonetary contributions to the well-being of the family in the chores and tasks he performed between the parties’ many real estate properties, and the fact that he was there to take care of the children when Ms. Hochman was working. Ms. Hochman asserts that the trial court erred in this finding and by not properly evaluating the monetary and non-monetary contributions made by each party to the well-being of the marriage. However, “[w]hen the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are not clearly erroneous.” Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. at 230. Here, Mr. Rothell testified that he took care of the family’s animals, which included dogs, cats, and horses. He maintained the fencing for the horses, the landscaping, the garden and orchard, the pool and hot tub, the house gutters and fireplaces, and was responsible for the removal of snow on the 700 foot driveway. Both daughters testified that their father shared in the responsibilities of caring for them, such as taking them to activities, doctors’ appointments, and cooking dinner. Pursuant to the discretionary standard of review that applies here, “we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result.” Id. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Mr. Rothell made nonmonetary contributions to the well-being of the family. ii. Circumstances that Contributed to the Estrangement We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the parties were equally at fault for the estrangement of the parties or for its overall decision to equally divide the marital property, as fault is but one factor to weigh among many when considering the equitable distribution of marital property. Regarding factor four—the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties—the trial court first found that Mr. Rothell was “feeling emasculated” in the relationship and he began to abuse alcohol, which resulted in the development of a “very toxic environment[.]” The trial court further explained: I think that not only [Mr. Rothell’s] use of alcohol, but this idea that he is not contributing, and he is not really a vital part of the household, is making the relationship deteriorate. [. . .] I think that both of you are at fault for the [. . .] demise[. ] I think that you both contributed to the estrangement of the parties[.] Additionally, the trial court called into question Ms. Hochman’s credibility as it related to her testimony that it was Mr. Rothell’s lack of contributions to the relationship and to the family that led to the estrangement of the parties: The pictures that are trying to be painted of Mr. Rothell basically being a do-nothing that is starting these businesses that aren’t going anywhere, are completely contradicted by these pictures and cards that paint a different picture. [. . .] [I]f from 2002 you disagree with him quitting his job, and not getting his retirement, why at that point do you stay in a relationship other than it is somehow working for you? Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

[. . .] [I]f he wasn’t contributing anything to the relationship, why did you not leave? The trial court then addressed Mr. Rothell’s alleged abuse towards Ms. Hochman and the family during the marriage as a circumstance that contributed to the estrangement of the parties. The trial court stated, because she was educated and had the financial ability, “there was an opportunity for [Ms. Hochman] to seek a way to get out of this relationship if it was in fact [] so horrible, and she didn’t take an opportunity to do that.” The trial court continued, stating that “there is no evidence that [Ms. Hochman] sought any kind of help for abuse, that she has ever told that to anyone else. There were no calls made to the police during these incidents.” The trial court pointed to the numerous photographs and greeting cards entered into evidence by defense counsel and suggested that the family appeared to be a happy one despite the alleged abuse. Concluding, the trial court found, “it is not making sense. [. . .] [T]hose things really don’t add up to me, [. . .] I don’t find Ms. [Hochman’s] testimony to be credible, given the letters, and the photographs, and the testimony.” While “due regard will be given to the trial judge’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses[,]” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 430, the trial court here appears to misunderstand the cycle of domestic violence and its potential psychological impact on victims of abuse. Our Supreme Court in Porter v. State succinctly explained this cycle in its opinion: The psychological impact of repeated intimate partner violence is referred to as battered spouse syndrome. [. . .] [T]he syndrome is a form of posttraumatic stress disorder, and, accordingly, [victims] in abusive relationships respond to the repeated abuse in a manner similar to others who have been repeatedly exposed to different kinds of trauma. They often experience cognitive confusion, high anxiety, and depression. Battered spouse syndrome is characterized by two main phenomena: a cycle of intimate partner violence and the development of learned helplessness. [There are] three phases in the cycle of violence: (1) the period of tension-building; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the period of lovingcontrition or absence of tension. [. . .] In cases where the abuse has reached dangerous proportions, the third phase is not readily visible, and although there is some lessening of the tension, the [victim] never feels out of danger. The second phenomena, learned helplessness, occurs when the victim learns that when [they] attempt[] to defend [themselves]— by reaching out to others or trying to leave—that [they] will be the victim of more severe violence. In response, [they] determine[] that the most effective short-term method of reducing incidents of violence is to be more subservient. Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 237 (2017) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). We highlight this to say that, to find a witness not credible is one thing, but to find that abuse did not occur because the victim did not leave the abuser or call the police is another, and the latter is clear error. 34

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Ms. Hochman argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that the parties were equally at fault for the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties and the demise of the marriage. While we adamantly disagree with the trial court’s commentary as it relates to the alleged abuse Ms. Hochman experienced and how she reacted to it, the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties are but one factor when considering the distribution of marital property. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-205(b). The factors “are not prioritized in any way,” and “weighing of the factors is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Alston, 331 Md. at 507. Even if the court found one spouse more at fault for the demise of the marriage, it is possible for the trial court to prioritize other factors and weigh those more heavily than fault. While “fault” is a factor that a judge will “consider as one of the facts and circumstances leading to the dissolution of the marriage or the estrangement of the parties[,]” it is not an “automatic bar to spousal support.” Freedenburg v. Freedenburg, 123 Md. App. 729, 745–46 (1998). Moreover, the court has a “responsibility to apply their sound discretion to all parties who appear before them, and to weigh the ‘fault’ as against the need and any countervailing equities of a party in need of support.” Id. As such, fault for the estrangement of the parties and demise of the marriage, in and of itself, would not automatically bar a spouse from receiving its equitable share of the marital property. The need for equity may outweigh any fault by a party. In sum, the “ultimate decision” regarding the distribution of marital property is reviewed under a discretionary standard and we may not reverse such decision “even if we might have reached a different result.” Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. at 230. The trial court here found that all marital property was acquired during the marriage and while Ms. Hochman was the sole monetary contributor to the family, Mr. Rothell contributed nonmonetarily to the family. We see no error in the trial court’s finding here. While we may disagree with the trial court’s finding as to the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its overall decision, as fault is but one factor to weigh among many when considering the equitable distribution of marital property. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in its FL § 8-205 award. Nonetheless, the trial court will have the opportunity to reconsider the distribution of marital property due to our previous conclusion to vacate the alimony award, as we must also vacate this FL § 8-205 award. Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 105 (“Because we are vacating the court’s alimony award, we must also vacate its monetary award, as any significant change in alimony requires the court to reassess its monetary award.”). C. Attorney’s Fees Lastly, Ms. Hochman argues that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Rothell attorney’s fees by failing to consider the requisite factors, such as “its other awards in rendering its determination, including its equal division of the marital assets, its alimony award, and its abject failure to address TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

[Mr. Rothell’s] child support obligation.” Furthermore, after such awards, Mr. Rothell was in “a far better financial position” than Ms. Hochman. Mr. Rothell counters that the trial court properly considered the financial needs and resources of the parties, including the court’s previous award determinations, and that he was justified in prosecuting his claims for alimony and marital property, as he was unemployed for most of the marriage and at the time of the divorce, while Ms. Hochman possessed a retirement account worth over two million dollars and was still employed at the time of the divorce. Again, due to the interrelated nature of alimony, division of marital property, and attorney’s fee awards, we vacate the award for attorney’s fees here as well. See K.B., 245 Md. App. at 688; see also Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 349 (“The counsel fee award also must be vacated on account of our vacating the alimony and monetary award judgments.”). Because the parties’ arguments here mirror those previously addressed, we need not address the merits of this issue. The trial court on remand will have another opportunity to consider awarding attorney’s fees, if appropriate. See Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 171 Md. App. 373, 386 (2006) (A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees “after considering the financial resources and financial needs of both parties and whether there was substantial justification for prosecuting or defending the proceedings.”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment granting indefinite alimony, equal division of marital property, and attorney’s fees, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the judgment of absolute divorce. We conclude that the trial court erred in its alimony award. The court did not make the requisite findings to grant indefinite alimony pursuant to FL § 11-106(c). Most importantly, the trial court failed to make any findings regarding the projected post-divorce standards of living of the parties and whether they would be unconscionably disparate. We vacate the alimony award and remand so the trial court may reconsider whether an award for alimony is appropriate and if so, to make the necessary findings. While we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it equally divided all marital property, we nonetheless must vacate the FL § 8-205 award and remand for reconsideration alongside the alimony award. Similarly, we vacate and remand the award for attorney’s fees as well. Due to the interrelated nature of alimony, division of marital property, and attorney’s fee awards, when we vacate one award, we must vacate all awards and remand for reconsideration. On remand, the trial court may choose to reopen the hearing to consider new evidence to determine the need for alimony and the ability to pay alimony.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY GRANTING INDEFINITE ALIMONY, EQUAL DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IS VACATED. JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE IS AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLEE.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

FOOTNOTES

Appellant was restored to her former name, Bonnie Yvette Hochman, and therefore, we will address her as “Ms. Hochman” in this opinion.

Mr. Rothell testified that the drive from the marital home to work in Linthicum was “at least an hour and a half” each way. The marital home to Washington D.C. was approximately a 40 minute drive.

The family had dogs, cats, horses, ducks, and chickens.

Francesca testified that her father’s alcohol consumption became a noticeable problem when she was in high school, stating: Yes, so probably [in] 2016 or so it started to get noticeably worse because he started trying to make his own wine and experimenting with how that process works, I think he starting to drink a bit more. I think [] around high school it would be two or three glasses of wine a night at least, and I think it got worse when I was in college.

Both Francesca and Faith testified as to some examples of abuse their mother experienced, explaining that their father would yell at their mother for hours; curse; call her by her mother’s name, meant as an insult; use derogatory terms for Jewish people; threaten her with violence; throw things at her; break things; slam doors; bang on tables; punch holes in the walls; get in her face or personal space; and shove her with his hands or his chest. The daughters acknowledged that alcohol was usually involved during these incidents. Faith noted, “I was concerned that my dad’s anger was inflamed by alcoholism.”

Ms. Hochman testified that on May 14, 2020, Mr. Rothell came home drunk, at about 10:00 p.m., and started an argument with Ms. Hochman and Faith. Faith went to her bathroom to get ready for bed, as Mr. Rothell yelled and threw things at Ms. Hochman. Ms. Hochman was concerned that Faith was going to have another seizure from the stress of the situation and went to console her in the bathroom, shutting the door behind her. Mr. Rothell continued to yell and threatened them that if they did not come out of the bathroom that he would come in and get them, pounding on the door so hard that he cracked the door. The incident lasted hours. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Faith called her sister, Francesca, who was staying the night at her boyfriend’s house at the time, to come pick Faith and their mother up. Ms. Hochman and Faith left the house wearing only their nighttime clothes, without any shoes or socks.

Ms. Hochman testified as to the condition of the house when she returned: It looked like we were robbed. Everything…there was like two rooms of stuff outside. There was stuff thrown all over the backyard. [. . .] So, furniture, baskets of clothes, books, the…the deck furniture was thrown from the deck onto the back lawn. Things that were supposed to be in the house were outside on the back lawn. The inside of the house was crazy. He had nailed shut the closet doors. He had taken doors off hinges. There was a photograph of our wedding in the toaster. There were photographs taken out of picture frames. The batteries…all electronics were disabled because…well, [] I’m not very good with electronics, so I guess that was so that Faith and I couldn’t use anything. Telephones weren’t working. The landlines were all not working because batteries were taken out. I couldn’t find my work laptop and I couldn’t find my cell phone. And, Faith couldn’t find her school issued laptop and she needed her laptop.

All statutory references are to the Family Law Article unless otherwise indicated.

After a multi-year study conducted by the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Alimony Act of 1980, which significantly revised Maryland’s alimony laws. Cruz v. Silva, 189 Md. App. 196, 213 (2009). Shortly after its passage in 1984, our Supreme Court noted that: The 1980 Alimony Act embodies a significant modification of the previous right to alimony for an indefinite period terminable upon the death of either spouse or the marriage of the recipient spouse. It allows equity courts to award alimony for a definite period of time after considering, among other things, both the monetary and nonmonetary contribution of the spouses, and any monetary award granted. Id. at 213–14 (quoting McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 344–45 (1984)).

10 Mr. Rothell’s Financial Statement listed his monthly expenses at $7,503.93. 11 Family Law Article § 8-205(a)(2), reads: (2) The court may transfer ownership of an interest in: a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties; subject to the consent of any lienholders, family use personal property, from one or both parties to either or both parties; and (iii) subject to the terms of any lien, real property jointly owned by the parties and used as the principal residence of the 36

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parties when they lived together, by: 1.

ordering the transfer of ownership of the real property or any interest of one of the parties in the real property to the other party if the party to whom the real property is transferred obtains the release of the other party from any lien against the real property;

authorizing one party to purchase the interest of the other party in the real property, in accordance with the terms and conditions ordered by the court; or

both. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-205(a)(2).

12 “Except as provided in FL § 8-205 of this subtitle, the court may not transfer the ownership of personal or real property from one party to the other.” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-202(a)(3). 13 When Faith testified at the trial on April 3, 2023, she was 17 years old and in the 11th grade. By the time the court made its ruling in the case on August 30, 2023, Faith was entering her senior year of high school. 14 Per the joint Maryland Rule 9-207 Statement concerning marital and non-marital property entered into evidence on April 3, 2023, the bank accounts had a total value minus any deductions of $6,130. 15 Per the joint Maryland Rule 9-207 Statement concerning marital and non-marital property entered into evidence on April 3, 2023, the total value of Ms. Hochman’s retirement accounts minus any liens, encumbrances, or debt was $2,227,647.29, and the total value of Mr. Rothell’s retirement accounts was $118,112.30.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Arbitration; vacate; alimony

Robert J. McCutcheon III v. Susan T. McCutcheon No. 773, September Term 2024 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Leahy, Hotten (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J. Filed: Oct. 1, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s order vacating an arbitration decision resolving the parties’ dispute over alimony. Considering the extremely wide deference afforded to the arbitrator’s decision, the circuit court erred in setting aside the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator improperly discredited an expert witness’s testimony. Such argument goes to the correctness of the arbitration award, not to the scope of the arbitrator’s authority.

Robert J. McCutcheon, III (“Husband”), and Susan T. McCutcheon (“Wife”), married in 1983. In 2021, they divorced. The parties entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated, but not merged, into the judgment of absolute divorce. The separation agreement included an arbitration clause governing potential disagreements about whether Husband would continue paying alimony to Wife upon his retirement. Husband announced his intent to retire in 2022 and sought to eliminate his alimony payments, which led to an arbitration hearing pursuant to the separation agreement. The arbitrator ruled that Husband’s alimony payments to Wife would reduce and then cease in late 2025. Wife filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Frederick County seeking to vacate the arbitral ruling. Following a hearing, the court granted Wife’s motion and set the matter for a trial. Husband now appeals, presenting two questions for our review, which we have slightly rephrased: 1. Did the circuit court err when it vacated the Arbitration Award? 2. If the circuit court did not err in vacating the Arbitration Award, should the matter be remanded for another arbitration pursuant to the parties’ Agreement? We hold that the circuit court erred in vacating the arbitration award. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the case with instructions to reinstate 38

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The Parties’ Divorce and the Points of Agreement Husband and Wife married on June 18, 1983. Husband spent his career working for McCutcheon Apple Products, Inc., a family-owned business, and became its president in 1984. Husband and Wife have three children, “all of whom are emancipated.” Wife was a homemaker and, at the time of the arbitration hearing, resided in the former family home in Frederick County. The parties separated in June 2017, and Husband subsequently filed for an absolute divorce. In 2021, the parties signed a separation agreement entitled, “Points of Agreement.” According to the Points of Agreement, Wife was to retain, among other things, the marital home in Gambrill as her sole and separate property; a condominium located in the State of Colorado after adjusting the equities in the marital property distribution by $125,000 in favor of Husband; a $500,000 Term Life Insurance policy on Husband’s life; “one half of the value of [Husband’s] interest in the McCutcheon Retirement Plan as of June 30, 2021 [approximately $4,039,050.49], less one half of the outstanding balance of [loan] ($9,576.62), less $125,000 (credit for his interest in the Colorado condo)”; and “[a]ll other bank and retirement accounts in [Wife’s] sole name.” The Points of Agreement included paragraph 11, which states: Alimony: Commencing and accounting from August 1, 2021, and due and payable on the first day of each month thereafter until the retirement funds are transferred from [Husband] to [Wife] pursuant to this Agreement, [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] as and for indefinite, modifiable alimony the sum of $7,500 per month. Thereafter, commencing and accounting on the first day of the month after the retirement assets have been transferred from [Husband] to [Wife], and due and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] as and for indefinite, modifiable alimony the sum of $5,000 per month. [Husband] represents that he anticipates retiring from employment at the end of 2022, and that at that time intends to seek modification or termination of alimony. [Wife] does not work. In the event [Husband] retires from all employment and has no income from any employment, within 90 days of such retirement, the parties shall attend mediation after exchanging financial TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

information to determine if a modification or termination of alimony is warranted. In the event the parties are unable to resolve the issue in mediation, the parties shall attend binding arbitration on the issue with a mutually agreeable arbitrator. The parties shall use, in the following order, the following arbitrators as available: Judge William Nicklas; Judge Diane Leasure; Judge Ann Harrington; or another mutually agreed upon arbitrator. The parties shall divide the costs of mediation and arbitration proportionate to their respective incomes at the time of mediation/ arbitration. Each party reserves the ability to make a claim for attorney’s fees relating to this issue at arbitration. (Emphasis added). On September 13, 2021, the circuit court entered the judgment of absolute divorce (“JAD”), which incorporated, but did not merge, the parties’ Points of Agreement. The Arbitration In October 2022, Husband retired and then filed a petition to terminate, or in the alternative, modify alimony. After the parties failed to reach an agreement through mediation, the dispute went to arbitration, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Points of Agreement. A two-day hearing was held before the arbitrator. 2 Husband testified that he had a heart attack in May 2022, underwent a multiple bypass surgery, and stopped working for McCutcheon Apple Products on October 31, 2022. Although Husband acknowledged having helped his new wife establish a new company, he denied that he had received any income from that business and testified that he did not anticipate doing any work for the business “[o] ther than casual consulting.” On cross-examination, Husband testified that he had initially planned for a cider production company and purchased various equipment, but that plan did not materialize. Meghan Custer, the new president of McCutcheon Apple Products, testified that the company did not pay Husband any compensation or wage after he left, except for the monthly installments of his bonus from the previous year. Wife testified that Husband had expressed his intent to retire on several occasions, but she did not believe that he was going to retire. Wife stated that although she received the marital home and a condominium as part of the divorce settlement, the marital home was “in need of a lot of repairs.” She also stated that she could not sell her properties because she was “very traumatized” by the divorce. Catherine Milstead, Wife’s therapist, testified as an expert in social work. She explained that Wife was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, exhibiting symptoms such as “having panic attacks[,]” “having inability to think and speak when she becomes anxious[,]” and “a lot of difficulty sleeping[.]” Wife also called Jason Topper, who, without objection, was accepted as an expert in financial advising, financial planning, and investment planning. Topper explained that he was given “details” of the parties’ financial situations, such as their financial statements, and “used those numbers to run projections as to the likelihood of success” in the 1F

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parties’ abilities to maintain their respective lifestyles. Topper estimated that Husband’s investments would yield an average annual return of 6.5%, or about 5.6% after a hypothetical “advisory fee” of 0.85% that he acknowledged “may or may not be a real fee[.]” Then, applying the “Monte Carlo analysis,” Topper concluded that Husband had a 93% “chance of success to be able to afford [his] lifestyle” with his investment assets while continuing to pay Wife $5,000 per month in alimony. Topper stated that Wife received “just shy of $2 [million]” in investable assets from the divorce. He estimated Wife’s annual investment return from her remaining assets as 5.2% and testified that,4 even with alimony, she only had a 57% “probability of success that she can reach age 90 and not run out of the money.” Topper explained that Wife’s likelihood of success was lower than Husband’s due to the cost of her lifestyle and the amount of assets she was drawing. When the arbitrator asked if this meant Wife could not afford her lifestyle even with alimony, Topper agreed, stating, “This says that it is not great with alimony, correct.” Topper testified that without alimony, Wife could run out of money by 2035. The Arbitrator’s Ruling Following the hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision, granting Husband’s petition in substantial part, lowering his monthly alimony payments from $5,000 to $2,500 beginning June 1, 2024, and terminating them completely with the final payment on December 1, 2025. At the outset of his decision, the arbitrator outlined the relevant “standard of review” as follows: 1. A material change in circumstance between the parties occurring since their Judgement of Absolute Divorce must exist as a prerequisite for any action by the trier of fact. 2. Family Law [Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 2020 Repl. Vol.) (“FL”) §] 11-105 is the statutory authority to terminate alimony. This can occur in the event of: a) death of either party; b) marriage of the recipient; or c) a finding that termination is necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result. 3. [FL] 11-107 governs the modification of the term and amount of alimony. [FL] 8-103 governs the modification of an agreement providing for alimony. 4. [FL] 11-110 allows the award of attorney’s fees in alimony cases. If attorney’s fees are to be awarded, the financial circumstances of each party, and the justification, vel non, of the prosecution and defense of the action must be considered. Then, after observing that the “pertinent underlying facts” were “hotly contested by the parties[,]” the arbitrator made the following findings of fact: 1) At the time of the signing of the Points of Agreement, and for all times thereafter, [Wife] was not employed, and was legitimately not seeking employment. [Husband] has made no contention that [Wife] should be employed either in a full or part time capacity. 2) The Points of Agreement signed by the parties in July, 2021 represented that [Husband] contemplated his retirement by stating that he “anticipates retiring from employment at the end of 2022.[”] 2F

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3) [Husband] suffered a heart attack in May, 2022 and underwent multiple bypass surgery at that time. 4) [Husband] retired from his employment at McCutcheon Apple Products, Inc. as of October 31, 2022. 5) [Husband] has not been employed by McCutcheon Apple Products, Inc. since October 31, 2022. 6) [Husband] has received no compensation from McCutcheon for any work performed since October 31, 2022, despite his having been consulted on several occasions by the company’s new president. 7) Payments to [Husband] by McCutcheon Apple Products, Inc. since October 31, 2022 were the amortization of [Husband’s] bonus declared during his employment in 2022 but was not received in a lump sum. These amortized payments ended in October, 2023. 7) [Husband’s] income outside of his pre-tax investment vehicles consists of his Social Security and a de minimus amount of interest from his after tax accounts. Based upon those findings, the arbitrator found a material change in circumstances, which, as he recognized, was a prerequisite “for any action by the trier of fact.” The arbitrator then reviewed the evidence that had been presented during the hearing. He made the following findings about the testimony given by Wife’s therapist: The therapist began seeing [Wife] on August 16, 2023, and did not see her again until late September. She testified that most of the sessions were to prepare [Wife] for the arbitration hearing. Her CV lists one year as a clinical social worker and three years as a “mental health therapist”. The primary red flag to her testimony was that despite her knowledge of [Wife’s] history of prior treatment, including inpatient care, she made no attempt to obtain [Wife’s] records of these prior treatments. Nor did she make any effort to determine any prior diagnosis, treatment or prognosis. Despite this lack of knowledge and only a handful of sessions with [Wife], this witness opined on a number of conditions as her diagnoses for which she would be treating [Wife]. It was not disputed that [Wife] suffers from anxiety and has symptoms that cause her great difficulty. However, the dearth of information upon which [Wife’s] therapist extrapolated her conclusions has rendered it most unhelpful to any decision to be made in this case. The arbitrator then addressed Topper’s testimony: [Topper’s] testimony was based upon a financial projection he generated by applying the financial information of each party to his financial planning program to determine [Wife’s] future needs and [Husband’s] future ability to pay alimony to meet those needs. His analysis concluded that without alimony [Wife] will deplete all her funds by her midseventies. Even with the payment of alimony for the next twenty-four years, she only has a slightly better than fifty per cent chance of reaching ninety without a depletion of her funds. He further concluded that [Husband] can not only continue to pay alimony at 40

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the present rate for that period of time, but he will actually increase his net worth while doing so. He opines that [Husband] has over a ninety per cent chance of attaining age ninety with his present funds being increased. The Arbiter has had experience with similar programs which project finances over a long period of time. As with any expert the basis of a conclusion must first be analyzed. For this type of financial projection, a number of assumptions need to be made to draw conclusions of this type. Long term financial projections are not inherently reliable because the assumptions cannot and do not account for the multitude of variables that life interjects the farther in time the projection extends. Although the program has a variable built in, it assumes that the investments will remain the same, that the rate of return of return on investments remains reasonably constant, that the market remains reasonably constant, and the health of the parties remains reasonably constant so that medical and related expenses not covered by Medicare, or any secondary insurer also not deplete the assets. Assumptions can be a good tool for planning purposes but must be regularly reevaluated to take into consideration the realities that life imposes on everyone. Mr. Topper’s projection calls for the depletion of [Husband’s] after-tax accounts within the next few years. He then projects regular substantial withdrawals from [Husband’s] pre-tax accounts to meet his alimony obligation. He cannot consider what other obligations [Husband] will have over that time because the information is not now available and will only become available at some future date. The report assumes that [Husband] will reallocate his pre-tax investments to minimize his taxable consequences, but that is still an assumption. The inherent problem with long term projections are simply the life variables that intervene as time passes and render the long-term analysis speculative at best. The arbitrator then addressed the other evidence he had considered in making his decision on alimony: The Arbiter has spent considerable time reviewing the numerous documents presented during the hearing and reviewing and considering the notes taken of the testimony. [Wife’s] testimony is at the same time compelling and deeply troubling. The parties were married for thirty-five years. She was primarily responsible for raising their children and still enjoys a close relationship with them despite the distance between their residences. Because of her faith, she still considers herself married, which she says keeps her from forming any other relationship. She had colon cancer in 2000 but is doing relatively well now. She testified that her principal problem is anxiety which has a number of manifestations including nightly panic attacks and trouble with concentration. Not only did [Husband] concede TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

that [Wife] is not able to be employed, but he also further conceded that the alimony provision in the Points of Agreement was proper based on the circumstances at that time. The concern with [Wife’s] situation is that, even with the payment of alimony, [Wife] has used approximately one third of the funds transferred to her in the divorce. A review of her financial documents reveals that [Wife] has not only failed to alter her lifestyle to adjust to her declining financial status, but she has actually increased her expenditures in some significant ways. She has numerous large repair projects for both of her residences. She bought a dog and assumed all the concomitant costs, i.e., training, boarding, and veterinary bills. She has added numerous personal services to her list of expenses. She also testified to the need for more major expenditures. Her home needs a new roof. It needs a new air conditioning unit, as well as a great deal of dry wall repairs and painting. She testified that many home repair projects done by [Husband] over the years now need repair. The overall cost for all these projects is prohibitive. She also had a large expenditure to repair the stairs at her Colorado condo. A review of [Wife’s] Financial Statement reveals a rise in her living expenses. Her mortgage increased by almost $1200 per month. She listed costs for electricity, a TV dish, Comcast, pest control, a housekeeper, and a security system, none of which appeared on her prior Financial Statement. She also duplicates many of these costs for her Colorado condo. Perhaps the financial alarm bells have not yet begun to ring because she still has a large sum in her pre-tax investment account. However, it is clear that she cannot sustain her lifestyle regardless of whether alimony is paid. The arbitrator continued: [Husband] first presented Meghan Custer who succeeded him as president of McCutcheon Apple Products, Inc. Ms. Custer’s testimony was primarily threefold. First, she verified that [Husband] retired as of October 31, 2022, despite [Wife’s] contention to the contrary. Second, she verified that no compensation has been paid to [Husband] since his retirement for any services rendered by him to the company. Lastly, she explained the amortization payments of the previous year’s bonus, both as to the payments themselves and the reason for their implementation. The conclusion that is drawn from this testimony is that [Husband’s] sole income currently is derived from Social Security. [Wife] contends that because [Husband] purchased equipment to produce hard cider and filed a corporate registration, that he is going to start a new business. Additionally, [Wife] asks me to assume that this business yet to be started will be successful and earn [Husband] a good income. However, a decision must be made based on current facts. To do otherwise is not inference, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

but speculation. Perhaps the key question to this matter is whether [Husband] is required to draw from his pre-tax accounts, thereby incurring the tax liability thereon, to satisfy his alimony obligation. To date he has withdrawn relatively little from these accounts. Further, the evidence shows that despite remarrying he has altered his lifestyle thereby reducing the need to draw from those accounts at this time. [Husband] argues that there is no requirement for him to begin liquidating those accounts now, and not for years to come under current tax regulations of such assets. He argues that based upon his current tax bracket, he would have to withdraw $7,100 to pay his alimony obligation and the tax due on the withdrawal. He argues that this results in a harsh and inequitable result. The Arbiter finds that both having to fully deplete his after-tax accounts then draw on his pretax accounts early, and at a greater amount than is needed to simply pay the alimony, results in a harsh and inequitable result. However, the analysis cannot end at this point. As previously stated, [Wife] has depleted approximately one third of her principal account despite the payment the receipt of alimony. This has occurred due to [Wife’s] failure to modify her lifestyle to accommodate her fixed income. Without alimony, and without a modification of her lifestyle, [Wife’s] funds will be totally depleted within a few years. Therefore, despite having found a harsh and inequitable result to [Husband] from the current alimony order, a similar result would occur to terminate alimony payments immediately. The arbitrator concluded his ruling as follows: Based upon the aforegoing, it is the decision of the Arbiter that [Husband’s] alimony shall terminate with his last payment being due December 1, 2025. This decision to terminate alimony extinguishes the indefinite alimony payments and requires him to continue alimony for a time to allow [Wife] to undertake the financial changes to accommodate her reduction in income. Further, pursuant to the testimony, she will begin receiving Social Security benefits during this time which will provide her with some support. Therefore, in addition to the decision to terminate [Husband’s] alimony, it is the decision of the Arbiter to modify alimony. [Husband] shall continue his current payment of $5[,]000 per month through May, 2024. Pursuant to [Wife’s] testimony, she will begin to receive her Social Security benefits by that time. Beginning June 1, 2024, and continuing until alimony is terminated pursuant to this decision, [Husband] shall pay unto [Wife], as alimony, the sum of $2,500 per month. The arbitrator also considered the parties’ relative abilities to pay attorneys’ fees and determined that Husband should pay Wife $5,000 toward her fees. T h e arbitrator determined that “fundamental fairness dictates that a division of the [arbitration] costs can only be made on Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

the relative net worth of each party.” On that basis, the arbitrator apportioned the costs of his services sixty per cent to Husband and forty per cent to Wife. 5 The Circuit Court Vacates Arbitration Award One month later, Wife filed in the Circuit Court for Frederick County a motion to modify or, in the alternative, vacate arbitration award. In the motion, Wife claimed that the arbitrator’s decision was “completely irrational” and the arbitrator “exceeded his authority.” Specifically, she argued that the arbitrator “exceeded his authority by interjecting his own personal opinion” even though such opinion was “completely contrary to the actual testimony of the financial expert witness, Jason Topper.” Husband filed an opposition, countering that “[a]n arbitrator . . . has discretion to reject a witness’[s] testimony that he does not find persuasive.” On May 15, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on Wife’s motion. At the end of the hearing, the court granted Wife’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, announcing: So I’ve reviewed the statutes. I’ve reviewed the case law submitted by counsel. I’ve reviewed the memos submitted by counsel. And I have reviewed Judge Nicklas’ decision. Again, judicial review of such a decision -- of the arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited, and, again, the party -- this would be Ms. McCutcheon -- seeking to set it aside has a heavy burden, and it’s a very narrow, narrow area. I, as the person who’s reviewing Judge Nicklas’ decision, have to give great deference to the decision of an arbitrator. And I am not permitted to speculate about his reasons for making an award and am required to assume that he acted appropriately. And I am, in this situation, giving Judge Nicklas great deference. He’s practiced for many years in Frederick County. He’s [an] experienced judge, and a very popular mediator, and he had the opportunity to hear these proceedings for two days last December. So I have given his decision, his opportunity to review the evidence, and his opinion very significant consideration. The arbitration section of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings states that the Court shall vacate the arbitration award if the arbitrator exceeds their powers. In this matter, Judge Nicklas stated in his position, on page 4: The arbiter has had experience with similar programs which project finances over a long period of time. As with any expert, the basis of a conclusion must first be analyzed. For this type of financial projection, a number of assessed -- of assumptions need to be made to draw conclusions of this type. He then goes on to say: Long-term financial projections are not inherently reliable, because the assumptions cannot and do not account for the multitude of variables that life interjects. The farther in time, the projection extends. 42

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And I want to emphasize that sentence. This is the point at which I believe Judge Nicklas exceeded his authority and substituted his personal opinion for that of the expert. The expert opined as to a particular thing or particular numbers at this mediation, and Judge Nicklas substituted his judgment by saying, first, that he has experience with similar programs; and then determining that they’re not inherently reliable. And I do not believe that that -- he substituted his personal opinion for the opinion of the expert. There’s no evidence in the record of the arbitration to support that. His statement is a correct statement. So while I believe that Judge Nicklas did accurately and correctly determine that a material change of circumstances had occurred, he also reviewed pertinent alimony statutes -- excuse me -- I’m misspeaking. I think that he substituted his own opinion for the expert’s opinion. And harkening to [Wife’s counsel’s] argument that he failed to consider the alimony factors in [FL §] 11-106,[ 6] he did consider different alimony factors, but he did not consider all the -- he considered different sections of CJP -- excuse me -- the Family Law Article. He considered -- he called it 11-105, but I believe it’s a typo and it would be 11-108, considered 11-107. He considered the modification statutes, and he considered the attorney’s fees, but I’m not addressing that here. He did not consider, frankly, the specific alimony factors in 11-106, vis-à-vis either party, and I don’t think he considered all the other factors that he mentioned, vis-à-vis either party. And again, I am giving him great deference. He has far more experience in Family Law than I do, but I do believe that he did exceed his authority. Therefore, I am going to vacate his arbitration award. And I would ask counsel, do you want me to just set this in for a trial, or make a referral to send you back to arbitration, or do you want to think about it? *** So I’m just going to set it in for trial. I think I’m going to send it --how long do you think you need? Because I believe they’ve complied with their agreement because they did go to the arbitration, I determined to vacate the arbitration award. I think that is satisfied. (Emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, the circuit court entered a written order, vacating the arbitral award. Four days after the order was entered, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration, but the circuit court denied the motion. Husband then noted this timely appeal. 5F

DISCUSSION

Parties’ Contentions Before this Court, Husband contends that the circuit court erred in vacating the arbitral award. In support of that contention, Husband asserts that the arbitrator did TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

not exceed his powers because the parties had “agreed to arbitrate the issue of modification or termination of alimony in the event they reached an impasse” over his obligation to pay alimony after retirement. He also argues that the arbitration award neither “manifestly disregard[ed] the law” nor was “completely irrational” because the arbitrator applied the appropriate statutory factors under FL § 11-106, soundly exercised his discretion in weighing witnesses’ testimony, and “carefully considered evidence” to avoid a “harsh and inequitable result” as required by FL § 11-108. In the alternative, Father argues that even if the circuit court properly vacated the arbitration award, the court erred in setting the matter in for trial because the parties’ agreement plainly contemplated that this dispute be referred to arbitration. In response, Wife reiterates that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by “substituting his own personal opinion for that of [her] expert witness,” namely Topper, “when he stated . . . that he has personal experience with similar financial programs and the programs are not inherently reliable[.]” Wife emphasizes that, whereas Topper’s Monte Carlo analysis took “into account thousands of different variables and scenarios with life and the market[,]” Husband “never provided any contrary evidence or testimony.” Wife also argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by “failing to consider the required factors set forth in [FL] § 11-106 and § 11-108[,]” and such failure demonstrates the arbitrator’s “manifest disregard for the law because the factors are a basic, fundamental step in the determination of any alimony case[.]” Wife further claims that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by relying on his “own personal opinion . . . when he examined [her] expenses” and “mistakenly calculat[ing] her expenses at the time of the parties’ divorce versus at the time of the [a]rbitration.” Finally, Wife argues that the circuit court had discretion to set the matter for a trial, rather than remanding the matter for further arbitration, as the Points of Agreement did not require otherwise. Legal Framework Section 3-224(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.) provides that the circuit court “shall vacate” an arbitration award if: (1) An award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for the postponement, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of § 3-213 of this subtitle, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement as described in § 3-206 of this subtitle, the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under § 3-208 of this subtitle, and the party did not participate in the arbitration TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

hearing without raising the objection. CJP § 3-224(b)(1)-(5) (emphasis added). Section 3-224(c), however, cautions that “[t]he court shall not vacate the award or refuse to confirm the award on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.” More specifically, for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, it must “objectively” appear in the record that the arbitrator did, in fact, overstep “that authority in some respect.” Gordon v. Lewis, 215 Md. App. 298, 312 (2013) (quoting Birkey Design Group, Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 113 Md. App. 261, 266-67 (2011)). In other words, the record must show that the arbitrator went beyond “the scope of the issues actually submitted to arbitration” in rendering a decision. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Maryland Transit Admin., 244 Md. App. 1, 15 (2019); see Birkey Design Group, Inc., 113 Md. App. at 266 (noting that an arbitrator would exceed his power if the arbitration award included attorneys’ fees where the underlying contract did not provide for such fees). When reviewing whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, the focus of our inquiry is “whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of the arbitrator’s authority[,]” Prince George’s Cnty. Police Civilian Emps. Ass’n v. Prince George’s Cnty., 447 Md. 180, 208 (2016), which comes “from the arbitration agreement itself,” MCR of America, Inc. v. Greene, 148 Md. App. 91, 111-12 (2002). In addition to the statutory grounds outlined in CJP § 3-224(b), Maryland common law allows courts to vacate an arbitration award if there is a “manifest disregard of the law” or “palpable mistake of law or fact . . . apparent on the face of the award.” Amalgamated Transit Union, 244 Md. App. at 15 (internal citations omitted). To be sure, “mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily furnish grounds for a court to vacate or to refuse enforcement of an arbitration award.” Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Prince George’s Educ. Ass’n, 309 Md. 85, 99 (1987). The Supreme Court of Maryland explained the meaning of “manifest disregard of the law” and “palpable mistake of law or fact” as follows: “Manifest” means “[c]lear; obvious; [or] unquestionable.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1106 (10th ed. 2014). “Palpable” means “[c]apable of being handled, touched, or felt; tangible[,]” or “[e] asily perceived; obvious.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1267 (4th ed. 2006). Discussing the standard as applied in federal courts, Thomas Oehmke, in his treatise on arbitration, states that, to succeed in a claim that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, the party challenging the award must show that the award is “based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling ” 4 Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, Oehmke Commercial Arbitration § 149:2, at 149-[4]4 (3d ed. 2017). WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Assocs., 460 Md. 244, 262-63 (2018). Put differently, for a court to set aside an arbitration award, the arbitrator’s errors of law or fact must be “so gross as to work manifest injustice,” Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 309 Md. at 103, and be “obvious,” Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

“clear[,] or unquestionable,” WSC/2005 LLC, 460 Md. at 263. The inquiry into whether the arbitrator’s award was legally or factually correct is entirely distinct from whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority. See Prince George’s Cnty. Police Civilian Emps. Ass’n, 447 Md. at 208; see also Downey v. Sharp, 428 Md. 249, 263 (2012) (observing that, for example, “an issue or matter resolved by an award may be rational and legally correct but the arbitrator, under the arbitration agreement, may have had no power or authority to resolve the particular issue”). We review the circuit court’s decision in this case without deference because the court’s “decision to grant or deny a petition to vacate . . . an arbitration award is a conclusion of law[.]” WSC/2005 LLC, 460 Md. at 253. However, when assessing the propriety of the arbitration award itself, we recognize that “[j]udicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited, and a party seeking to set it aside has a heavy burden.” Letke Sec. Contractors., Inc. v. United States Sur. Co., 191 Md. App. 462, 472 (2010). Indeed, “the standard of review of arbitral awards ‘is among the narrowest known to the law.’” Id. (quoting Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food & Com. Workers, Local Union No. 7, 886 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir.1989)). Analysis Applying the foregoing principles to the instant appeal, we conclude that the circuit court erred in vacating the arbitrator’s award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. As noted, paragraph 11 of the Points of Agreement plainly contemplated that the issue of modification or termination of alimony would be subject to arbitration: In the event [Husband] retires from all employment and has no income from any employment, within 90 days of such retirement, the parties shall attend mediation after exchanging financial information to determine if a modification or termination of alimony is warranted. In the event the parties are unable to resolve the issue in mediation, the parties shall attend binding arbitration on the issue with a mutually agreeable arbitrator. That, in our view, is precisely the issue the arbitrator decided in this case, and Wife does not claim otherwise. Because neither party disputes that the Points of Agreement are valid and legally binding, and because the arbitrator exercised the powers conferred by paragraph 11 of that agreement, we find that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers. Wife argues that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by “substitut[ing] his judgment” for Topper’s expert testimony, but we disagree. Such argument goes to the correctness of the arbitration award, not to the scope of the arbitrator’s authority. See MCR of America, Inc., 148 Md. App. at 111-12 (“[W]e note that . . . an ‘arbitrator [ ] derives his or her power from the arbitration agreement itself.’”). As the Supreme Court of Maryland recognized, our decisional law clearly “establishes a distinction between review of an arbitration award for correctness—as opposed to review of . . . whether the arbitrator exceed[s] the arbitrator’s authority.” Prince George’s Cnty. Police Civilian Emps. Ass’n, 447 Md. at 208. Just as an “arbitrator . . . may have had no power or 44

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authority” to issue an arbitration award regardless of whether the basis for that award was factually and legally correct, the arbitrator may have properly exercised his authority even if the award was based on an error. Downey, 428 Md. at 263. We also discern no “manifest disregard of the law” or “palpable mistake of . . . fact” warranting vacatur of the arbitration award here. Amalgamated Transit Union, 244 Md. App. at 15. Notably, when vacating the arbitrator’s decision, the circuit court judge made no mention of “manifest disregard of the law” or “palpable mistake,” only stating that she “believe[d] [the arbitrator] exceeded his authority and substituted his personal opinion for that of [Topper].” In any event, it is well-established that a “fact-finder has the discretion to decide which evidence to credit and which to reject.” Qun Lin v. Cruz, 247 Md. App. 606, 629 (2020) (quoting Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 136 (2000)); see also MCR of America, Inc., 148 Md. App. at 120 (noting that “an arbitrator’s fact finding and contract interpretation [are] accorded great deference”) (citations omitted). Similarly, as the trier of fact, the arbitrator was “free to disregard expert testimony and weigh the evidence in coming to a conclusion.” Yaffe v. Scarlett Place Residential Condo. Inc., 205 Md. App. 429, 452 (2012); see also Edsall v. Huffaker, 159 Md. App. 337, 342 (“A jury is not required to accept the testimony of an expert witness.”). Considering the extremely wide deference afforded to the arbitrator’s decision under our decisional law, the circuit court erred in setting aside the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator discredited Topper’s expert witness testimony. Furthermore, contrary to the circuit court’s finding, there was evidence in the record supporting the arbitrator’s view that the Monte Carlo analysis was not “inherently reliable.” During the arbitration, Topper acknowledged running his Monte Carlo analysis based on certain assumptions. For example, he stated that he did not “know all the aspects of [Husband’s] accounts” and yet added 0.85% of an “advisory fee” in estimating Husband’s investment return rate, while noting “that may or may not be a real fee[.]” In addition, although Husband testified that he took a mandatory minimum withdrawal from the IRA inherited from his father, Topper testified that his Monte Carlo analysis did not fully reflect this withdrawal: [ARBITRATOR]: Do you account for the fact that [Husband] is taking some withdrawals now because he has to because they are inherited from his father? [TOPPER]: Correct. So that would be a bit of an acceleration of the withdrawals. That’s not perfectly shown in here. [ARBITRATOR]: Okay. [TOPPER]: So there would be a bit of an acceleration for those. So that – it’s not a perfect reflection of that. [ARBITRATOR]: I got it. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit instructed, “Monte Carlo simulation is not inherently untestable: courts routinely admit statistical evidence, and we can gauge reliability by examining input values and requiring transparency from testifying experts.” Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 608 F.3d 284, 294 (2010) (footnote omitted). Here, the record shows that the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

arbitrator gauged the reliability of Topper’s testimony and Monte Carlo analysis, and we see no error that was “obvious,” “clear or unquestionable,” WSC/2005 LLC, 460 Md. at 263, or “so gross as to work manifest injustice,” Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 309 Md. at 103. Likewise, we remain unpersuaded by Mother’s argument that the arbitrator “exceeded his authority by failing to consider all of the required factors set forth in [FL] § 11106” or “by failing to make a factual analysis as required by [FL] § 11-108[.]” In support of her argument, Mother emphasizes that the arbitrator’s decision did not reference either provision, and that there was “no analysis of the evidence presented at the [a]rbitration with respect to each factor and how it relates to each party.” As we explained above, the question of whether an arbitration award was legally and factually correct is entirely distinct from that of whether the arbitrator exceed his or her authority, and Mother’s argument thus misses the mark. Prince George’s Cnty. Police Civilian Emps. Ass’n, 447 Md. at 208. Further, when considering the statutory factors under FL § 11-106, the arbitrator “need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor.” Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356 (1995). It is sufficient that the arbitrator “clearly indicate[d] that [he] . . . considered all the factors[,]” and, even if the arbitrator’s “review of the factors is not clear, this Court may look to the record as a whole to determine whether [the arbitrator’s] findings were based on a review of the factors.” Id. The record establishes that the arbitrator considered all the statutory factors outlined in FL § 11-106 and assessed whether termination of alimony would be “necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result” under FL § 11-108. The arbitrator found that Wife could not “sustain her lifestyle regardless of whether alimony is paid.” See FL § 11-106(b)(1). He also noted Wife’s mental health issue and Husband’s admission that she “is not able to be employed[.]” See FL § 11-106(b)(2). The arbitrator compared her standard of living before and after the divorce, finding that “[Wife] has not only failed to alter her lifestyle to adjust to her declining financial status, but she has actually increased her expenditures in some significant ways.” See FL §§ 11-106(b)(3), (11). The arbitrator expressly mentioned that the parties were married for 35 years, see FL § 11-106(b)(4), and that Wife “was primarily responsible for raising [the parties’] children[.]” See FL § 11-106(b)(5). He also noted that Wife would start receiving her Social Security benefits around May 2024, whereas Husband had retired following a heart attack in May 2022. See FL §§ 11-106(b) (7)-(8). The record is also clear that the arbitrator heard

Topper’s testimony regarding Husband’s ability to meet his own needs while paying alimony to Wife, see FL § 11-106(b)(9), as well as regarding Wife’s ability to maintain her lifestyle with and without the alimony. See FL § 11-106(b)(11). The arbitrator also expressly considered the Points of Agreement and noted Husband’s concession that “the alimony provision in the Points of Agreement was proper based on the circumstances at that time.” See FL § 11-106(b)(10). The arbitrator then ordered that Husband’s alimony be terminated after December 1, 2025—almost two years after the arbitrator’s decision—reasoning that the immediate termination of alimony or the continuation of the existing alimony obligation would each result in “a harsh and inequitable result.” See FL § 11-108(3). Since the record shows that the arbitrator considered “all of the required factors set forth in [FL] § 11-106” and expressly addressed “a harsh and inequitable result” as required by FL § 11-108, we conclude that the circuit court erred in vacating the arbitration award. Finally, Wife’s argument that the arbitrator “mistakenly calculated her expenses at the time of the parties’ divorce versus at the time of the [a]rbitration” lacks merit. Specifically, Wife challenges the arbitrator’s findings that she “actually increased her expenditures in some significant ways” and “[a] review of her financial statements reveal[ed] a rise in her living expenses.” According to Wife, “the actual evidence showed that at the time of the [a]rbitration, her total monthly expenses were slightly less than at the time of the divorce[,]” as they decreased from $10,937 to $10,864. As the arbitrator noted, however, the record shows that Wife’s expenditures still increased in “some” respects, especially in terms of her house-related expenses. For example, her pre-divorce financial statement, dated July 9, 2020, shows a portion of her monthly expenses, titled “primary residence,” in the amount of $2,444, whereas her post-divorce financial statement, dated March 19, 2024, shows that amount ballooned to $4,156.71, Wife’s mortgage payment, housekeeping expenses, and repair costs for her secondary house also increased during the same period. As such, we do not find that the arbitrator was mistaken in finding Wife’s expenditures “increased . . . in some significant ways.” Under CJP § 3-224(c), a court “shall not” vacate an arbitral award “on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.” We are left with an abiding impression that the circuit court did precisely that in this case. Accordingly, we must reverse the court’s decision and remand the case with instructions to reinstate the arbitration award.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REINSTATE ARBITRATION AWARD. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

FOOTNOTES

We recite background facts from the arbitrator’s decision.

Judge William Nicklas, who was first on the parties’ agreed-upon list of three potential arbitrators, presided over the arbitration.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana described the Monte Carlo analysis as follows: A Monte Carlo simulation is a risk assessment model that accounts for variability and uncertainty in risk factors simulation creates a large

The

number of model estimates by selecting alternative values for the model’s assumptions. The assumption values are selected from distributions of likely values which are specified by the analyst. The assumption values take the form of a range using all possibilities between a minimum and a maximum value for whatever variables are uncertain. The completed simulation produces a range of results based on the random input values, each with a corresponding likelihood. For example, if the model generated a particular result during only 30% of the simulations, there is only a 30% chance that that result will occur in an individual trial. The model is particularly useful when reaching an exact numerical result is impossible or infeasible and the data provide a known range—a minimum and maximum, for example—but leave the exact answer uncertain. Burst v. Shell Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 3d 773, 782-83 (2015) (cleaned up). At the arbitration, Topper explained that he used Monte Carlo analysis to account for “the volatility of good and bad markets” in real-life investments. 4

On cross examination, Topper was asked why Wife’s investible assets decreased from approximately $2 million to $1,459,000, and Topper replied that the “[t]wo probably biggest reasons would be, in 2022, it was a very bad year as far as the markets[,]” and Wife was pulling $6,000 per month.

The arbitrator used the following values: For [Husband], the value of his home is [$]295,000 and the value of his accounts is $2,991,434 for a total of $3,286,434. [Wife’s] Maryland home is valued at $550,000 minus $220,000 for the mortgage, plus $270,000 for her Colorado condo, and $1,480,429 is the value of her account. [Wife’s] total is $2,300,429.

Section 11-106 of the Family Law Article outlines the following statutory factors that courts must consider before determining “a fair and equitable award” of alimony: (1) (2)

the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting; the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; (11) the financial need and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under § § 8–205 and 8–208 of this article; (ii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in [Section] 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur. FL § 11-106(b)(1)-(12). We discuss these statutory factors in further detail below.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Custody; modification; change in circumstances

Hanh Ngo v. Duc Nguyen No. 1048, September Term 2024 Argued before: Beachley, Zic, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Harrell, J. Filed: Sept. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of mother’s motion for modification of custody. The court’s determination that there had been no material change in circumstances as to warrant a change in custody is supported by the record.

Hanh Ngo (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County denying her motion to modify custody and visitation, but granting her motion to modify support. On appeal, Mother has filed an informal brief1 on the issues of custody and support. Duc Nguyen (“Father”) did not file a brief or participate in this appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in 2003. They share two minor children together, “JM,” born in 2008 and “JS” born in 2009. On 30 July 2021, Father filed a complaint for absolute divorce. Mother filed an answer and a counter-complaint for custody and child support. After a hearing on the merits, the circuit court entered a Custody, Access and Child Support order on 27 February 2023, granting joint legal custody and primary physical custody of the minor children to Father. The court ordered also Mother to pay child support in the amount of $1,498 per month, beginning on 1 February 2023. On 7 August 2023, the court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce. On 12 January 2024, Father filed a petition for contempt for Mother’s nonpayment of support. He amended the petition later to seek also an order authorizing him to claim the children as dependents on his income tax returns. According to the amended petition, Mother, who did not have primary physical custody of the children, claimed the child tax exemption for the children on her 2023 income tax returns. Thus, Father was unable to claim that exemption on his returns. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. On 12 April 2024, Mother filed a motion to modify custody and visitation, seeking primary physical custody of the children. Accompanying her motion was a “Child Support Financial Statement,” reporting that her monthly gross income was $1,583. On 18 April 2024, Mother filed a “Financial Statement,” reporting that her monthly gross income was $1600. Father’s financial statement reported that his monthly income was $6,000. Contempt and Modification Hearing On 24 June 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on all pending motions. Both parties were self-represented. They testified through interpreters. Father highlighted that the court had ordered Mother to pay child support, beginning on 1 February 2023, and that she failed to make any support payments, resulting in seventeen months of unpaid support. Mother testified that she had not paid child support because she could not afford the payments. She stated that she made one payment to Father of $20 a few days prior to the hearing because she was afraid of going to jail. According to Mother’s April 12 financial statement, she earns $1,583 in gross income per month. Mother stated that her income decreased since 2023 by approximately $2,000 per month “[b] ecause of the economy.” Mother stated that the children often go hungry and “are starving” while in Father’s care. She believes that, even had she paid child support as ordered, Father would not buy the children the things they need. She introduced bank statements showing that she opened a bank account specifically to use to give the children money for food. Mother expressed concern about the children’s school attendance and grades. She introduced high school attendance records for both children showing unexcused tardiness, often for first period, due to late arrivals to school. Mother stated that JS is doing poorly in school. She introduced a copy of his report card showing that he had a “D” average in both honors English and French; a “C” average in honors biology, honors geometry and honors history, a “B” in computer science, and an “A” in fitness. Mother testified that she wanted to raise the children. She stated that since the last custody hearing in February of 2023, the children have become depressed and unhappy with “the situation,” especially JM. Father stated that he brings the children to school on time and that he was not responsible for the children’s tardiness. With respect to JS’s grades, Father stated that they are “getting better” and that he planned to work more closely with him. Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

The circuit court reviewed Mother’s nail salon business records from the previous custody hearing, which showed that her business had received $84,000 in credit card payments in 2020. The court compared the records to evidence from the previous custody hearing showing that the deposits into her business bank account in 2020 averaged $18,000 per month. According to Mother, her monthly business deposits have increased by three percent since 2020 and credit cards payments to her business have also increased. Between 2023 and 2024, Mother’s revenue decreased from $18,000 per month to $16,000 per month due to the economy. Mother submitted her tax returns for 2023, which showed that her gross annual income was $19,078, and the gross income for her nail salon was $209,786. Mother claimed both children as dependents and received the child tax credit for the children. Circuit Court’s Ruling The circuit court noted that “[Mother] presented evidence that she was terribly unhappy with the result [of the custody trial] in February of 2023[,]” which she thinks was “the wrong decision.” The court stated that, despite its frequent prompting, Mother failed to produce any evidence of a change in circumstances since 2023. It was clear to the court that “[Mother] is extremely disappointed with the prior ruling from February of 2023, and this disappointment colors her testimony and damages her credibility.” The court noted that Mother testified that the children were depressed and sad, but she failed to present any medical testimony showing that this condition is a change from February of 2023. Although Mother testified also that the children are often hungry and that Father does not feed them properly, she did not introduce any evidence showing that the children were underweight or malnourished. Out of an abundance of caution for the children, the court ordered that Child Protective Services investigate Mother’s allegations that Father is not feeding properly the children. The court found that there had been “a small decrease” in Mother’s income of ten percent, and the court accepted her reported monthly income of $1,589. The court noted that there was a “fairly significant” increase in Father’s monthly income from $4,902 in 2023 to $6,000. Due to the changes in the parties’ financial circumstances, and based on the Child Support Guidelines, the court reduced Mother’s child support obligation to $395 per month, effective 1 July 2024. The circuit court found Mother in arrears in the amount of $25,446. The court added ten percent, or $40 per month, to Mother’s child support obligation as payment toward arrears, for a total monthly child support payment of $435. The court ordered further that, for the tax year 2024 and future years, Father (not Mother) was entitled to claim all exemptions related to the children on state and Federal income tax returns. The court noted that the order of 27 February 2023 did not address specifically the issue of the child tax exemption. Nonetheless, the court found that it was “sneaky and deceitful for [Mother] to secretly take [the exemption,]” and “[t]his action severely damage[d] her credibility.” The court entered a written Memorandum Opinion and Order on 26 June 2024. Mother noted this appeal timely. 48

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a case tried before the court, “an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence[,]” and the court “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). Indeed, “[t]he trial judge who sees the witnesses and the parties, and hears the testimony is in a far better position than the appellate court, which has only a transcript before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the child.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020) (cleaned up). Specifically, the decision of “whether to grant a modification rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless that discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment was clearly wrong.” Leineweber v. Leineweber, 220 Md. App. 50, 61 (2014) (cleaned up). A court abuses its discretion “when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 201. DISCUSSION

In her informal brief, Mother states that she appeals here the circuit court orders of 27 February 2023, 7 August 2023, and 24 June 2024. Of those orders, the later, entered on 26 June 2024,2 is the only one properly before us in this appeal. Mother’s appeal of the 27 February 2023 order was dismissed by this Court on 23 October 2023, due to Mother’s failure to file the necessary transcripts. The 7 August 2023 order was a final order as to the issues of divorce, marital property, and attorneys’ fees. Mother did not file a timely appeal from that judgment. Pursuant to Md. Rule 8-202(a), a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” Failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days terminates the right of appeal. Lovero v. DaSilva, 200 Md. App. 433, 441 (2011). Because Mother did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of the 7 August 2023 order, we shall not review now that judgment. See Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 557 (2019). I. Denial of Mother’s Motion for Modification of Custody A trial court uses a two-step process in deciding a motion for modification of custody. It must consider: “(1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances, and (2) what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the children.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 639 (2016). A material change in circumstances is a change that “affects the welfare of the child.” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012). If the court finds that there has been a material change, it next considers the best interests of the child. Id. at 170. The moving party has the burden of showing “‘that there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the final custody order and that it is now in the best interest of the child for custody to be changed.’” Id. at 171-72 (quoting TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Sigurdsson v. Nodeen, 180 Md. App. 326, 344 (2008)). In this case, the court’s determination that there had been no material change in circumstances such as to warrant a change in custody is supported by the record. The court noted that Mother made several “troubling” points during the hearing. First, she alleged that Father does not feed the children properly, though she did not present any witnesses or evidence to show that the children were malnourished or otherwise unhealthy. The court found that, “[g]iven her credibility challenges[,]” Mother’s testimony alone was not sufficient to convince the court that the children are in danger of being malnourished or that there has been a change in circumstances. Due to the potential seriousness of the dietary allegations, however, the court referred that matter to Child Protective Services for further investigation. Second, the court addressed Mother’s claims that the children are late for school and that JS’s grades show that he is “seriously struggling in school.” Father could not explain why the children were late to class because he brings them to school on time. The court noted that there could be “several explanations” for the children’s tardiness. It declined to speculate as to the cause. The court recognized that the children experienced “massive disruption in connection with the separation and divorce of their parents” and, thus, it was not surprising that they might be struggling in school. The court urged the parents that, if they were able to stop fighting, their “children’s lives would improve and their school performance would likely follow.” II. Order Granting Mother’s Motion for Modification of Support Section § 12-104(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code, (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.) authorizes a court to “modify a child support award subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification and upon a showing of a material change of circumstance.” See Wills v. Jones, 340 Md. 480, 488 (1995). An order for child support may be modified “only if there is an affirmative showing of a material change in circumstances in the needs of the children or the parents’ ability to provide support.” Payne v. Payne, 132 Md. App. 432, 442 (2000). A change is material when it is both “relevant to the level of support a child is actually receiving or entitled to receive” and “of sufficient magnitude to justify judicial

modification of the support order.” Wheeler v. State, 160 Md. App. 363, 372 (2004) (cleaned up). If a court finds a material change in circumstance occurred, it must then apply the Child Support Guidelines to determine the level of support to which the child is entitled. Wills, 340 Md. at 491. The Guidelines chart the amount of the monthly support obligation based on the parents’ combined income. FL § 12-204(e). In cases where the parties’ combined adjusted actual income in less than $30,000 per month, the court applies the Guidelines to calculate support. FL § 12-204(e) (amended 2022, 2024); see Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 386 (2020); Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 384 (2025). In her brief, Mother asks this Court to “reverse the judgment to be fair for [her] on [her] income calculation[.]” She does not specify further why she thinks the circuit court’s modified child support order was not “fair.” The circuit court noted that “[s]he is asking for a reduction in child support, but she refuses to pay child support anyway.” Although she testified that she could not afford even the modified monthly payments, she acknowledged that she opened a bank account for the purpose of giving the children directly money to pay for food and other items. In addressing this issue, the circuit court explained to Mother that she is required to pay “the full [$]435 every month[,]” regardless of how much over that she chose to spend on the children, but that she could not “cut child support to help them.” In this case, the circuit court determined that there had been a material change in circumstances due to a significant increase in Father’s income, based upon his financial statement, and a decrease in Mother’s income, based upon her 2023 tax return. Using the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet, the court reduced Mother’s support obligation to $395 per month, and included an additional payment of $40 per month toward the arrearage of $25,446. Use of the Child Support Guidelines is mandatory, and the amount of support set forth in the Guidelines is presumptively correct. See FL § 12-202(a) (“[I]n any proceeding to establish or modify child support, . . . the court shall use the child support guidelines set forth in this subtitle.” (emphasis added)). We perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s finding of a material change in circumstances and its calculation of Mother’s monthly child support obligation of $395, based on the Child Support Guidelines, and an additional amount to reduce the arrearages.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

Footnotes 1

Mother filed an informal brief pursuant to this Court’s 9 March 2021 Administrative Order permitting informal briefing in family law cases in which the appellant is a self-represented litigant. See Md. Rule 8-502(a)(9).

The order of 26 June 2024 memorializes the oral ruling announced on the record at the hearing on 24 June 2024.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Martial home; separation; Crawford credits

Sharene Turner v. Ramon Turner No. 1072, September Term 2024 Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Beachley, J. Filed: Sept. 24, 2025 The Appellate Court remanded the case to the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court to determine whether wife was entitled to “Crawford credits” for payments she made related to the marital home during the period of separation prior to divorce.

Sharene Turner (“Wife”) and Ramon Turner (“Husband”) were granted a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on May 24, 2024, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The court granted Husband a monetary award in the amount of $131,562.37, and attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $24,483.50. The court also ordered that certain of Husband’s and Wife’s retirement and investment accounts be distributed evenly on an if, as, and when basis. Finally, the court afforded Wife the opportunity to purchase the marital home based on a value of $547,500; in the event Wife did not exercise her option to purchase, the court ordered that the marital home be sold and the resulting proceeds divided evenly. Wife appealed, and presents the following questions for our review: a. Did the trial court err when it ordered [Wife’s] nonmarital investment accounts be treated as marital property? b. Did the trial court err in its order requiring [Wife] to purchase the marital home at a specific date and a specific amount? c. Did the trial court err when it failed to consider all the requisite statutory requirements when ordering the monetary award? d. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney’s fees? For the reasons discussed herein, we shall remand to the circuit court for it to consider Wife’s request for Crawford credits, but otherwise affirm the judgment. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The parties were married on May 3, 2008. Throughout the marriage, the parties kept their finances separate and, despite Husband earning substantially less than Wife, split 50

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. living expenses evenly. On January 1, 2023, Husband left the marital home and filed for divorce in February 2023. Trial was held March 28 and 29, 2024. The parties were the only witnesses at trial. Financial Statements and 9-207 Statement Wife’s financial statement indicated that her gross monthly wages were $13,594. Husband’s financial statement reflected a gross monthly income of $3,094.49. He testified that, commencing with his 60th birthday in June 2025, he expected to receive a military pension of approximately $1,100 per month. A joint statement of marital and non-marital property (“9-207 statement”) was admitted into evidence. The 9-207 statement was divided into three sections: the first section listed items the parties agreed were marital; the second section (which the parties left blank) was reserved for the parties to list items they agreed were non-marital; and the third section listed items which the parties did not agree were marital or non-marital. The majority of the parties’ property interests were included in the first section listing property agreed to be marital, including the marital home, vehicles, numerous bank accounts, and various items of personal property. Although the parties assigned values to their most valuable assets, the fair market value of the substantial majority of their tangible personal property was listed as “unknown.”1 We shall discuss the 9-207 statement as necessary in our resolution of this appeal. Suffice it to state at this juncture that the 9-207 statement suffers from a lack of clarity. Evidence Related to the Fidelity Accounts Wife’s flagship argument in her appellate brief focuses on the court’s characterization of three of her Fidelity accounts as marital property.2 Wife testified that the only Fidelity accounts she owned were the four accounts (account numbers 7669, 4510, 9178, and 6950) listed in the third section of the 9-207 statement as property that was contested. Wife asserted that the Fidelity accounts ending in 7669 and 4510 were both opened prior to the marriage and funded by rolling over retirement accounts from prior employers. She asserted that neither party contributed to the accounts after the initial rollover, nor withdrew funds from them: “I do not contribute to the Fidelity. The rollovers are just there, and all that is just growth.” Wife further stated that she had “never contributed from [her] paycheck” into the 7669, 4510, or 9178 accounts. “I did the rollover, put it in the account, and I didn’t touch them. I wasn’t really paying attention to it.” As to the 6950 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

account, however, Wife was not sure whether she opened the account before or after the marriage, but admitted that it was not a rollover account, and she regularly made deposits and withdrawals, treating the account “like a cash account.” Wife provided documents, which were admitted into evidence, indicating that she had funded the 9178 account with an $87,942.59 rollover from Merrill Lynch. She also transferred into the 9178 account 699 shares of Merrill Lynch stock. Wife testified that these assets were acquired prior to the marriage when Wife was employed with Merrill Lynch. The court ultimately found that the 9178 account was Wife’s non-marital property. No documents were admitted into evidence indicating the source of the initial funds in the 4510 and 7669 accounts, and no evidence indicated the value of those accounts prior to the marriage. The only documentary evidence admitted relating to the 4510, 7669, and 6950 accounts was a statement showing activities in those accounts during February 2024. The 9178 account is also included in this statement. The 4510 and 9178 accounts are described as “Rollover IRA” accounts, categorized as “Personal Retirement.” However, the 6950 and 7669 accounts are categorized as “General Investments” without any reference to a rollover. As of February 29, 2024, the accounts were valued as follows:

6950 7669 4510 9178 Total:

$12,126.59 $313,217.14 $494,187.60 $78,403.31 $897,934.64

The 6950 account (Wife’s “cash account”) had little activity in February 2024, only receiving small amounts of dividends and interest. The only activity in the 7669 account in February 2024 was the receipt of a dividend, which was reinvested. However, a portion of the statement relating to the 7669 account included a section titled “Stock Plans.” This section reflects Wife’s contributions to her employer Booz Allen Hamilton’s employee stock purchase plan via a 3% payroll deduction. The “Stock Plan” section contains the following disclaimer: Items shown under ‘Stock Plans’ represent your interests under your company’s stock plans, for which Fidelity Stock Plan Services LLC provides administrative and record keeping services. Items shown under ‘Stock Plans’ are not assets held in your Fidelity brokerage account . . . . Fidelity Stock Plan Services LLC provides this statement to you as part of administrative and recordkeeping services it provides

to the company. The statement does not indicate what happens to the funds Wife contributed to the plan at the end of the offering period, and there was no testimony or additional documents relating to the employee stock purchase plan. Notably, 95% of the holdings in the 7669 account consist of Booz Allen Hamilton stock. Wife began working at Booz Allen Hamilton in 2006 and she was still working at the firm at the time of the divorce. There were numerous transactions in the 4510 account in February 2024. In addition to dividends received and reinvested, there were eight trades on February 22, buying and selling shares in the various stocks and bonds held in the account. No money was deposited or withdrawn—the amount received from sales of shares was equal to the amount paid to purchase shares. Each of these transactions was described as either “You Bought” or “You Sold.” Neither party testified about the nature of the transactions in the 4510 account. Evidence Related to Marital Home and Timeshare Husband testified that the parties purchased the marital home on November 11, 2011. Both parties agreed that all mortgage payments on the marital home were made by Wife, both before and after separation. Prior to Husband moving out of the marital home, he paid utilities, HOA fees, cable, and internet bills. After the parties separated, Wife paid those expenses. On the 9-207 statement, Husband valued the marital home at $577,600, with a mortgage debt of $124,307. Wife valued the home at $547,500, with a mortgage balance of $126,436. She testified that she arrived at her valuation “from like Zillow or Redfin” websites, which she believed was more accurate than the appraisal of the property conducted more than six months prior to trial that valued the property at over $600,000. Wife expressed a desire to remain in the marital home, and believed she would be able to obtain financing to pay the mortgage and Husband’s half of the equity in the home. As mentioned above, a timeshare owned by Wife was listed in the 9-207 statement under the first section—items agreed to be marital property. Husband “guesstimat[ed]” that Wife had purchased the property for $17,000, and was “not aware of any increase or decrease in [its] value.” Wife testified that she purchased the timeshare for $15,500 in 2010 and indicated it would sell for “[b]etween $8,000 and $10,000.” Her valuation was based on a review she conducted prior to September 2023 of comparable timeshares for sale online. She testified that she did not provide a value for the timeshare on the 9-207 statement because she “didn’t

The statement reflected the following contributions: Employee Stock Purchase Contribution Summary Offering Period

Plan Type

Payroll Deduction

Employee Contributions (less withdrawals and adjustments)

01/01/202403/31/2024

Section 423 Qualified

3.000%

$815.66

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

agree with everything that they have down here as marital property” and she believed the parties “would kind of argue those things” at trial. Evidence of Dissipation Prior to the parties’ separation, Husband owned a Thrift Savings Plan retirement account (“TSP”) worth $249,560.76 as of October 1, 2021. In November 2021, Husband had surgery on his foot and decided to retire shortly thereafter. Husband testified that, aside from brief employment in December 2021, he had no earned income from November 2021 to February 2022, and therefore needed to withdraw funds from his TSP to cover living expenses. Additionally, Husband needed to withdraw funds to pay an attorney to represent him in a dispute with his former employer. After Husband moved out of the marital home, he withdrew funds from his TSP to hire a lawyer for the divorce, to buy furniture for his new home, to pay off loans, and to pay living expenses. Husband admitted that he used approximately $25,000 of the money withdrawn from his TSP on gambling, and estimated that his winnings were $10,000. Between January 2023 and March 2024, Husband withdrew all remaining funds in the TSP. In October 2023, Husband sold his Volkswagen Tiguan for $15,400. He testified that he used those funds to pay attorneys’ fees, pay off a loan, and take a month-long vacation to Kenya. Before the trip and while in Kenya, Husband sent wire transfers totaling nearly $5,600 for activities such as a safari trip, and as gifts to various individuals. He estimated that he spent a total of $10,000 on the Kenya trip. Trial Court Findings and Order The trial court announced its findings in a 19-page memorandum opinion. In its opinion, the court explicitly discussed each of the factors found in Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). Relevant to this appeal, the court found that “[n]either party will end up with substantial nonmarital property based upon the [c]ourt’s findings”; “[t]he incomes of the parties are unequal,” but the monetary award and division of equity in the marital home “will provide Husband with a substantial enhancement of his economic circumstances”; and “[t]he parties never identified their ages, although Husband alleged in his closing that ‘both [are] nearing retirement age.’” The court agreed with Wife that account 9178 funded by the Merrill Lynch rollover was non-marital, but determined that Fidelity accounts 7669, 4510, and 6950 were marital property. We initially note that the court recognized the confusion caused by the 9-207 statement, in which all four accounts were listed in the third section (indicating Wife’s assertion that the accounts were non-marital), but were also included in the first section (indicating the parties agreed they were marital) as “Fidelity Wealth Management” with a value equal to the value of the four accounts identified in the February 2024 statement. As to the 7669 and 4510 accounts, the court stated: Fidelity Account Number 7669 in [the February 2024 statement] is not a rollover account but is identified as a “General Investment” which does not comport with Wife’s testimony. 95% of the Account 52

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

is comprised of Booz Allen Hamilton Corporation Class A Stock for which Wife made contributions of $815.66 or a 3% payroll deduction during February 2024, which further undermines Wife’s testimony that 7669 is non-marital. The [c]ourt determines that Fidelity Account Number 7669 in the amount of $313,217.14 as of February 29, 2024, is Marital; Wife did not meet her burden of proof that Account Number 7669 is non-marital and the [c]ourt does not credit her testimony to that effect. Fidelity Account Number 4510 in [the February 2024 statement] is listed as a Rollover IRA in the amount of $494,187.60 as of February 29, 2024. Again, there is only the February 2024 statement in the record for Account 4510. [The February 2024 statement] though does reflect that on February 22, 2024, Wife bought and sold various holdings in the account, thus making trades in that account during marriage, thereby undermining her testimony that Fidelity Account Number 4510 was just a growth fund without any transactions and is non-marital. As a result, the [c]ourt determines that Fidelity Account 4510 in the amount of $494,187.60 as of February 29, 2024, is Marital, because Wife did not meet her burden of proof that Account 4510 was non-marital, and the [c]ourt does not credit her testimony in that regard. The court determined that the 4510 account should be divided equally on an if, as, and when basis and included the 7669 and 6950 account values in its calculation of the monetary award.3 Concerning the marital home, the court adopted Wife’s valuation of the property, $547,500. The court gave Wife the option of purchasing the marital home, or selling the home and equally dividing the equity with Husband, setting forth the following terms: ORDERED, that Wife shall have the right to purchase the marital home . . . for no less than $547,500 with the sale to be consummated no later than July 31, 2024; and it is further ORDERED, that should Wife exercise her right to purchase the marital home within the specified period of time and at the appropriate amount, she shall be required to pay Husband his half of the equity in the marital home, determined by deducting the outstanding mortgage amount as of July 31, 2024 from $547,500 and any other deductions for the payment of any expenses of her purchase; and it is further ORDERED, that should Wife not exercise her right to purchase the marital home or not be successful in securing financing, the marital home shall be sold and the parties shall equally divide the proceeds of sale, less all costs of sale, including any costs for the home to pass inspection[.] In addition to Husband receiving half the equity in the marital home, the court ordered that Wife pay to Husband a monetary award of $131,562.37, and that, absent an agreement between the parties, all personal property items that were TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

jointly owned should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. Although the court did not agree with Wife’s argument that Husband had dissipated over $200,000 from his TSP, it did find that he had dissipated $37,590.20 on gambling, and $15,600 on his trip to Kenya, totaling $53,190.20. Related to the dissipation claim, the court included in the marital property schedule Husband’s Volkswagen Tiguan that he had sold, assigning a value of $15,400 to his solelyowned assets. The court also noted that many of the items Husband purchased using funds withdrawn from the TSP were included in the monetary award calculation. The valuation of each item of marital property appeared in a chart created by the court, attached to its memorandum opinion. We recreate this chart below. To save space, we shall not list each of Husband’s personal property items individually in our chart, but instead shall combine them. Similarly, because both parties have multiple bank accounts, each party’s bank accounts shall be combined to arrive at an overall value of their respective bank accounts. After determining marital property and granting Husband a monetary award, the court turned its attention to Husband’s alimony claim. The court reviewed the factors enumerated in FL § 11-106(b) and denied Husband’s request for alimony “based on the equities as they exist at the time of divorce.” Finally, the court awarded Husband $24,483.50 in attorneys’ fees. In its memorandum opinion, the court stated: The [c]ourt has already made extensive findings relative to the financial resources and needs of the parties. Whether there was substantial justification for Husband to pursue the case presents a complicated question. The evidence reflected Husband’s dissipation of funds. The evidence also failed to support his alimony claim. On the other hand, the proof adduced by Wife that she was entitled to claim as non-marital various of her investment accounts was sorely lacking. As a result, the [c]ourt will award attorneys’ fees to Husband in an amount attributable to the pursuit of a marital award. The court then requested that Husband submit an exhibit listing the fees and costs related to the marital award, and provided Wife the opportunity to respond to Husband’s exhibit. Husband subsequently provided the court with invoices and a summary list of fees relating to pursuit of the monetary award, totaling $24,483.50. Wife did not respond. On June 14, 2024, the court entered an order awarding Husband attorneys’ fees. Motion to Alter or Amend On June 24, 2024, Wife filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Wife raised many of the same arguments in her motion as she does on appeal. The court denied Wife’s motion to alter or amend on July 15, 2024, leading to this timely appeal. DISCUSSION

I. Fidelity Investment Accounts Wife presents two primary arguments concerning the Fidelity accounts. First, she asserts that the court improperly TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Marital Property Item

Value

[Marital home]

$547,500

[Timeshare]

$10,000

Joint Husband Wife J W

Vehicle, Ford Fusion $16,600 2017 Vehicle, Volkswagen $15,400 (sold) Tiguan [Wife’s checking and [$3,356.54] savings accounts]

[Husband’s checking and savings [$8,570.32] accounts]

Booz Allen Hamilton ECAP

If, as, and when

Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Account (Dissipation)

$53,190.20

Military Pension

If, as, and when

The Court will Federal Employees’ Order that Group Insurance Wife be added Coverage as a beneficiary.

Furniture [in the marital home]

To be sold unless the parties reach agreement.

Adjustable Bed

To be sold unless the parties reach agreement.

[Husband’s personal property]

[$15,015]

Fidelity Accounts x7669 x4510 x6950

$313,217.14 (IRA)- If, as, and when [$]12,126.59

Booz Allen Hamilton x6173[4]

If, as, and when

shifted the burden of proof in its marital/non-marital property calculus. Second, she argues that the court erred in its interpretation of the February 2024 account statement. We begin by noting that only two accounts are at issue in this appeal—4510 and 7669. The court found that 9178 (the Merrill Lynch rollover) was Wife’s non-marital property, and Wife does not challenge the court’s finding that 6950 was marital.5 Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Concerning the burden of proof, the party alleging that an item is marital property has the initial burden to “present evidence as to the identity and value of the property[,]” Murray v. Murray, 190 Md. App. 553, 570 (2010), as well as an indication that the property was “acquired by either or both spouses during marriage[,]” Odunukwe v. Odunukwe, 98 Md. App. 273, 282 (1993). “Conversely, a party seeking to demonstrate the nonmarital nature of a particular property must ‘trace the property to a nonmarital source.’” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 428 (2003) (quoting Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 282 (1993)). Where a single account contains both marital and non-marital funds, the party arguing it is partially non-marital must provide evidence tracing a portion of the funds to a non-marital source. Otherwise, the entire account will be considered marital. Golden v. Golden, 116 Md. App. 190, 203 (1990). Husband therefore had the initial burden to establish that the Fidelity accounts were at least partially marital property. In that regard, the parties’ 9-207 statement includes “Fidelity Wealth Management” under the first section, listing the items the parties agree are marital property, with a value of $897,934.64. This total is identical to the total value of all four of Wife’s Fidelity investment accounts in the February 2024 statement. Thus, the 9-207 statement was evidence that the parties agreed that the four accounts in the Fidelity Wealth Management portfolio constituted marital property. It is certainly odd that the 9-207 statement also includes “Fidelity Accounts (x7669, 4510, 9178, 6950)” under the third section, which lists items the parties did not agree were either marital or non-marital. The parties did not agree on the total value of the accounts in the third section, and neither of their valuations match the valuations of the accounts reflected in the February 2024 statement. The court noted the contradictions in the 9-207 statement,6 but the court could reasonably conclude from the 9-207 statement that Wife acknowledged that the accounts were partially marital but wanted to preserve her non-marital claims to those accounts by listing them in the third section of the 9-207 statement. Moreover, the February 2024 statement showed both the values of the accounts and that transactions were being made within them during the marriage. In our view, Husband satisfied his initial burden, and the burden then shifted to Wife to prove that all or a portion of the accounts was directly traceable to a nonmarital source. As to both the 4510 and 7669 accounts, Wife emphatically stated that, except for the 6950 account, she did not contribute to the Fidelity accounts after they were created. As we shall explain, the court’s findings with regard to these two accounts stem from its failure to be persuaded by Wife’s testimony. See Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 594 (2019) (A “determination that a party failed to meet its burden to persuade the court on a question of fact is not clearly erroneous. . . . ‘[I]t is almost impossible for a judge to be clearly erroneous when he [or she] is simply not persuaded of something.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (first citing Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 14 (2007), aff’d 403 Md. 392 (2008), then quoting Bricker v. Warch, 152 Md. App. 119, 137 (2003))). 54

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Wife testified that the 7669 account was opened in 2004 (prior to the marriage), funded by a rollover of a retirement account. The 7669 account is categorized on the February 2024 statement as a “General Investment” account, whereas the 4510 and 9178 accounts are categorized as “Rollover IRA” accounts. As of February 29, 2024, the 7669 account was worth $313,217.14. Ninety-five percent of that total consisted of shares of Booz Allen Hamilton stock. The statement indicates that Wife was enrolled in an “Employee Stock Purchase” plan through Booz Allen Hamilton, and made contributions to the plan via a 3% payroll deduction. For the “offering period” between January 1, 2024, and March 31, 2024, Wife contributed $815.66 toward the employee stock purchase plan as a payroll deduction. Although there was no evidence or explanation on the February 2024 statement concerning what would happen to the funds in the plan at the end of the offering period, it is a reasonable inference that the funds would then be used to purchase Booz Allen Hamilton stock, which would be held in the 7669 account. The information concerning the employee stock purchase plan is included in the portion of the statement specific to the 7669 account, and that account is almost entirely comprised of shares in Booz Allen Hamilton. The February 29, 2024 statement expressly stated that “Items shown under ‘Stock Plans’ represent your interests under your company’s stock plans, for which Fidelity Stock Plan Services LLC provides administrative and record keeping services.” Because the 7669 account is included under “Stock Plans,” it is clear to us that the 7669 account is an employee stock purchase plan that invests in Booz Allen Hamilton stock, and it is also clear that Wife made contributions to the 7669 account from her paycheck during the marriage. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Wife’s testimony that she “never contributed from [her] paycheck into” the 7669 account during the marriage is “undermine[d]” by the employee stock purchase plan contributions.7 In short, the court could reasonably infer that Wife made regular employee contributions to the 7669 account during her employment with Booz Allen Hamilton from 2006 to the date of divorce in 2024, and that a substantial amount of those contributions would have been made while the parties were married. Other than her unconvincing testimony that she never made contributions to three of the Fidelity accounts after they were established, Wife made no effort to establish that a portion of the 7669 account was non-marital. According to Wife’s testimony, the 4510 account was opened in 2002, also using funds rolled over from a retirement account from a previous employer. The February 2024 statement indicates that there were numerous transactions on February 22, 2024, labeled “You Bought” and “You Sold.” Wife argues on appeal that the court misinterpreted these transactions as having been made by Wife, when they were in fact made by Fidelity as part of its management of her account. Wife provided no testimony or other evidence concerning these transactions, and this argument was not raised in the circuit court. Wife first discussed the transactions in her motion to alter or amend, but only argued that “[t]rading and selling in an investment account . . . of non-marital money does not automatically transmute the funds into marital property.” Wife’s only evidence that the 4510 account was non-marital TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

was her testimony. The paucity of evidence on this point is telling.8 The court did not find Wife’s testimony to be credible, a determination that is reinforced by Wife’s implausible claim that the Booz Allen Hamilton stock account (7669) was nonmarital because it was acquired before the marriage. In a bench trial, the trial court determines witness credibility and “[i]t is not our role to reassess the credibility of the witnesses who testify before the trial court.” Thornton Mellon, LLC v. Adrianne Dennis Exempt Trust, 250 Md. App. 302, 329 (2021); Rule 8-131(c). In conclusion, Wife produced insufficient evidence that any part of accounts 7669 and 4510 were traceable to a non-marital source. The court therefore correctly found the accounts to be entirely marital.9 See Golden, 116 Md. App. at 203. II. Marital Home Wife’s primary arguments concerning the marital home are somewhat confusing. She appears to believe that the trial court’s order required her “to take out a loan on the full $547,500” value of the property. She argues that the court erred in “requir[ing Wife] to purchase the home at $547,500,” thereby improperly “creating a new personal debt,” and not clearly stating if Husband “should transfer his ownership interest.” She further quotes Blake v. Blake, 81 Md. App. 712, 726 (1990), to argue that the court did not have the power to order that Wife purchase the marital home because FL § 8-205 “does not carry with it a right in the court to determine the assets that will be transferred or utilized to fund” a monetary award. Finally, Wife argues that the court’s findings on the FL § 8-205(b) factors were clearly erroneous and that the factors were not adequately considered. Property distribution in a divorce is primarily governed by statute. Under FL § 8-202(b)(2), “as to any property owned by both of the parties, [the court may] order a partition or a sale instead of partition and a division of the proceeds.” Additionally, with regard to a jointly owned marital home, the court may “authoriz[e] one party to purchase the interest of the other party in the real property, in accordance with the terms and conditions ordered by the court[.]” FL § 8-205(a) (2)(iii)(2). Before a court determines “the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in property[,]” it must consider the factors enumerated in FL § 8-205(b): (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

(9)

the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. In this case, the court’s order as to the equitable distribution of the marital home is clear. As noted above, the order stated: ORDERED, that Wife shall have the right to purchase the marital home . . . for no less than $547,500 with the sale to be consummated no later than July 31, 2024; and it is further ORDERED, that should Wife exercise her right to purchase the marital home within the specified period of time and at the appropriate amount, she shall be required to pay Husband his half of the equity in the marital home, determined by deducting the outstanding mortgage amount as of July 31, 2024 from $547,500 and any other deductions for the payment of any expenses of her purchase; and it is further ORDERED, that should Wife not exercise her right to purchase the marital home or not be successful in securing financing, the marital home shall be sold and the parties shall equally divide the proceeds of sale, less all costs of sale, including any costs for the home to pass inspection[.] In other words, Wife had two options: (1) she could allow the property to be sold and any proceeds from the sale divided equally between the parties, or (2) she could purchase the house based on the stated terms. The court clearly set forth the conditions in the event Wife elected to purchase the marital home: she could purchase Husband’s “half of the equity in the marital home” by July 31, 2024, and the equity in the home would be “determined by deducting the outstanding mortgage amount as of July 31, 2024 from $547,500 and any other deductions for . . . any expenses of her purchase.” We reject Wife’s argument that the court required her to secure a loan for $547,500. Wife’s objection to the court’s order in this regard is perplexing because the court not only afforded her the purchase option she requested, but also adopted Wife’s valuation of the home. Wife testified that she wanted “to keep the marital home[,]” that she would be able to give Husband “half of the equity from the home[,]” and that she did not believe she would have difficulty qualifying for refinancing. In her written closing argument, Wife stated: [Wife] would like to keep the house and [Husband] does not object if she can have it refinanced or assume the mortgage loan. [Wife] has excellent credit and sufficient income to qualify for a new loan. She requests the [c]ourt leave the property issue open for 90 days following the final judgment to accomplish the task. Whatever the monetary award amount decided by the [c]ourt can be paid by [Wife] from refinance of the home. We fail to see any error in granting Wife the option to purchase Husband’s equity in the home. Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Wife additionally argues that the court erred in its findings regarding certain FL § 8-205(b) factors, specifically “the value of all property interests of each party;” “the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;” and “the age of each party[.]” FL § 8-205(b)(2), (3), (6). Concerning “the value of all property interests of each party[,]” the court thoroughly discussed and substantially valued the assets identified on the 9-207 statement. The only significant marital property items the court did not explicitly value were retirement accounts to be evenly distributed on an if, as, and when basis.10 The court also found that “[n] either party will end up with substantial nonmarital property based upon the [c]ourt’s findings.” Wife argues that this final statement is “incorrect” because “the trial court will allow [Husband] to receive both half of the equity in the home from the sale of the home, a monetary award . . . , and a substantial portion of [Wife’s] retirement accounts.” Each of the items Wife lists are marital assets and do not contradict the court’s finding that the parties will not have “substantial nonmarital property.” (Emphasis added). The only property the court found to be non-marital was Wife’s Fidelity account ending in 9178 (worth $78,403.31), Wife’s jewelry and wedding ring, and Husband’s watch, bracelet, and wedding ring. Wife indicated on the 9-207 statement that her jewelry and wedding ring were worth $9,500. Husband testified that his watch, bracelet, and wedding ring were collectively worth $920. Wife testified that the purchase price of Husband’s watch was $1,900, and the price of his wedding ring was $900. Compared to the overall value of the marital property (totaling nearly $450,000, not including the equity in the marital home or the value of the investment accounts that are to be distributed on an if, as, and when basis), the court correctly determined that the non-marital assets were not “substantial.” A court is not required to make specific findings of the value of non-marital property; “[i]t is enough if the court is generally aware of the relative wealth of the parties[.]” Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 197 (1990). Wife argues that the court did not adequately consider “the economic circumstances of each party,” FL § 8-205(b) (3), because it failed to account for Husband’s income. The court found that “[t]he incomes of the parties are unequal,” but did not make specific findings as to the amount of each party’s income at the time of trial. Wife alleges in her brief that Husband’s monthly income at the time of trial was $2,355.67, and was expected to increase to $3,455.67 per month in June 2025 when he expected that he would start receiving his military pension. She asserts that her monthly income is “around $13,000.” In her financial statement, she indicated that her gross monthly wages were $13,594. Thus, by her own admission, Wife earned over five times more than Husband at the time of trial, and would still earn four times as much as Husband after he started receiving his military pension. We note, however, that the court ordered Husband’s military pension to be distributed equally on an if, as, and when basis. Using Wife’s purported income amounts, this would result in Wife earning $14,144 per month and Husband earning $2,905.67 per month. Thus, Wife’s income would remain well over four times Husband’s income. Wife does not explain how a more detailed consideration of the parties’ respective incomes 56

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

might result in the court reducing its monetary award to Husband, especially in light of the court’s order that Husband’s military pension be distributed equally and the court’s denial of Husband’s request for alimony. Wife further argues that the court erred in its findings related to the ages of the parties, FL § 8-205(b)(6). In discussing this factor, the court found: “The parties never identified their ages, although Husband alleged in his closing that ‘both [are] nearing retirement age.’” (Alteration in original). Wife is correct that the parties provided testimony as to their ages. Wife testified that she was 57 years old, and Husband testified that he was 58 years old. Wife argues that this error is relevant because “it shows [Wife] would be required to work far beyond when [Husband] will be able to [retire in order to] rehabilitate her retirement accounts” after the divorce. The court acknowledged that Husband was retired, although it found that he was capable of working, and that “Wife will need to continue to work to support her own living expenses” and build her retirement savings. In light of the court’s other findings, we fail to see how its error with regard to the parties’ precise ages would materially alter its decision. Wife additionally argues that the court erred in failing to consider her claim for “Crawford credits” for payments she made related to the marital home. “Generally, one co-tenant who pays the mortgage, taxes, and other carry charges of jointly owned property is entitled to contribution from the other.” Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 423 (2019) (quoting Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307, 309 (1982)). In Crawford, the Supreme Court of Maryland applied this general rule to married parties during the period of separation prior to divorce. 293 Md. at 311-12. Thus, “[a] married, but separated, cotenant is, in the absence of an ouster (or its equivalent) of the nonpaying spouse, entitled to contribution for those expenses the paying spouse has paid.” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 424 (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 641 (2007)). Crawford credits are “an equitable remedy within the discretion of the court.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 642). There are many reasons why such an award is not mandatory. For example, debt payments are often made with marital funds, “contribution is an equitable principle . . . and the ability to grant a monetary award under the Act enables the chancellor to achieve more complete equity than can be done through a Crawford contribution.” Moreover, “‘requiring contribution could create the very inequity which the Act was designed to prevent.’” Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 407 (2002) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 525 (2000), we listed “four exceptions that preclude contribution[,]” including “payment from marital property” and “an inequitable result.” Additionally, this Court has upheld decisions to award no contribution or only partial contribution “where the payor spouse ‘was receiving the benefit of the use of the residence and [the non-paying spouse’s] standard of living was considerably lower[.]’” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 542 (2008) (quoting Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183, 193 (1990)). However, the trial court must explain the reasons for its decision. Id. at 543. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Both parties testified that, prior to separation, Wife paid the mortgage and Husband paid the other expenses related to the house, such as HOA fees and utilities. After Husband left the marital home, he stopped making any payments related to maintaining the marital home. Because of this, Wife argues that Husband’s share of the equity in the home should be reduced by the amount of additional money Wife spent to maintain the property. Wife submitted into evidence mortgage statements from January 2023 to February 2024. Her financial statement indicated the amount of HOA fees and repair costs Wife was responsible for. Notably, there was no evidence concerning what funds Wife used to pay the mortgage or other carrying costs, nor any evidence that Wife had a bank account containing non-marital funds. Thus, it is possible that Wife used marital funds to pay mortgage payments, HOA fees, and other costs related to the home. The court did not address this issue in its memorandum opinion or order. Although judges “are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly[,]” it appears that Wife’s Crawford credits request may have been overlooked. See In re X.R., 254 Md. App. 608, 629 (2022) (quoting Marquis v. Marquis, 175 Md. App. 734, 755 (2007)). Accordingly, we shall remand to the circuit court to allow it to consider this issue. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 543 (“In this case, because of the absence of any explanation, we cannot discern whether the court’s omission of the home equity loan from the calculations was an intentional choice based on the equities of the case, or merely an oversight.”); Turner, 147 Md. App. at 407 (“It seems to us that, with far too many issues for the court to resolve, this one was overlooked. Because it is not clear why the court ruled as it did, we shall direct the court to reconsider this issue on remand.”).11 III. Monetary Award Wife makes several arguments concerning the monetary award. Most of her arguments stem from a misunderstanding as to how the court calculated the monetary award, such as her repeated assertion that the value of the marital home may have been included in the court’s calculation. The court stated that it “calculated an equal division of marital property” in determining the monetary award of $131,562.37, “representing that Marital Property attributable to Wife less the Marital Property attributable to Husband, including the amount dissipated by the Husband[.]” From this explanation, as well as a review of the chart attached to the memorandum opinion, it is clear that the court elected to enter a monetary award that would equally divide the marital property that was not jointly owned or otherwise distributed on an “if, as, and when” basis. Thus, the court determined that the marital property owned solely by Wife was worth $355,300.27: Timeshare Ford Fusion Checking and savings accounts Fidelity x7669 Fidelity x6950 Total TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

$ 10,000.00 $ 16,600.00 $ 3,356.54 $ 313,217.14 $ 12,126.59 $ 355,300.27

The court determined that the marital property owned solely by Husband was worth $92,175.52: Volkswagen Tiguan (sold) Checking and savings accounts Dissipation from TSP Personal property Total

$ 15,400.00 $ 8,570.32 $ 53,190.20 $ 15,015.00 $ 92,175.52

The $131,562.37 monetary award is one-half the difference of these two values, rounded down to the nearest cent:

$ 355,300.27 - $ 92,175.52 $ 263,124.75 ÷ 2 $ 131,562.375 It is apparent that, contrary to Wife’s arguments, the monetary award calculation did not include the value of the marital home, which the court addressed separately (and divided the equity equally) as discussed in Section II. above. As noted, the parties valued many of the items on the 9-207 statement as “unknown.” Wife argues that the court erred in assigning a value to these items. All items with “unknown” values on the 9-207 statement aside from the timeshare were owned by Husband, and their valuation and inclusion in the monetary award calculation therefore had the effect of lowering the monetary award.12 Husband provided testimony as to the value of each of these items. The court was not required to accept the valuation of the property as “unknown” as provided on the 9-207 statement, and had discretion to accept Husband’s valuation of his personal property. See Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 413-14; cf. Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 413 (2002). As to the timeshare, although the trial court suggested it was not fully satisfied with Wife’s testimony concerning its valuation, Wife did testify that she believed the timeshare was worth $8,000 to $10,000.13 The court’s determination of its value was not clearly erroneous. Wife next argues that the court should not have included the Volkswagen Tiguan as a marital asset because it had been sold prior to trial. “[P]roperty disposed of before commencement of the trial under most circumstances cannot be marital property.” Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 177 (1984). However, it appears that the court included the value of the Tiguan because the court found Husband had dissipated the money acquired from its sale on his trip to Kenya. See Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 652-53 (2011) (noting that dissipated assets may be included in the court’s determination of marital property). The court acknowledged in the chart attached to the memorandum opinion that the Tiguan had been sold, and included the full value of the sale ($15,400) as marital property owned by Husband. Like the “unknown” values for items discussed above, the court’s inclusion of the Tiguan in its monetary award calculation lowered its ultimate monetary award.14 In short, we fail to see how the inclusion of the Tiguan Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

in Husband’s column of the marital property analysis caused any harm to Wife. IV. Attorneys’ Fees Finally, Wife argues that the court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Husband. She asserts that the court erred by failing to explicitly mention Husband’s dissipation of assets, Husband’s retirement income, and the monetary and property awards in its determination to award attorneys’ fees to Husband. We initially note that the court expressly recognized the governing statutes, FL § 7-107 and FL § 11110,15 and stated the law required the court to “consider the financial resources and financial needs of both parties, as well as whether there was substantial justification for the prosecution or defending of the proceeding.” Recognizing its obligations in assessing attorneys’ fees, the court correctly noted that it had “already made extensive findings relative to the financial resources and needs of the parties.” Moreover, the court was clearly aware of the disparity in incomes. Because Wife admits that she makes nearly four times as much as Husband, a detailed consideration of the parties’ incomes would be unlikely to weigh against awarding attorneys’ fees. As to dissipation, monetary award, and division of equity in the marital home, the court made detailed findings on these issues elsewhere in its opinion. The court’s opinion as a whole indicates that it adequately considered the parties’ financial

resources and needs in its attorneys’ fees analysis. See Meyr v. Meyr, 195 Md. App. 524, 553 (2010) (“Although the court did not specifically recite the statutory factors in its award of attorneys’ fees, the court’s earlier statements show that it had considered these factors with respect to its other rulings.”); Sayed A. v. Susan A., 265 Md. App. 40, 90 & n.18 (2025). The court then proceeded to consider whether Husband had substantial justification for maintaining his claim as required by the applicable statutes. The court found this to be “a complicated question” because on the one hand, Husband failed to prove his alimony claim, and there was evidence that he dissipated marital assets. Yet the court weighed the countervailing fact that Wife’s evidence concerning her nonmarital property claims was “sorely lacking.” In our view, the court’s analysis demonstrated that it adequately considered “whether there was substantial justification for prosecuting or defending the proceeding.” See FL § 8-214(c)(2). In sum, our review of the record persuades us that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Husband attorneys’ fees “in an amount attributable to the pursuit of a marital award.” The characterization of three of the four Fidelity accounts as marital property became the substantial basis for the court’s monetary award, and the court tailored its fee award to counsel’s efforts to refute Wife’s claims that her Fidelity accounts were substantially non-marital. We discern no error or abuse of discretion.

CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY TO CONSIDER APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR CRAWFORD CREDITS. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OTHERWISE AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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FOOTNOTES

The vast majority of the personal property items listed on the 9-207 statement belonged to Husband. He testified as to the value of each item, totaling between $13,160 and $15,015.

As we shall discuss below, Wife only challenges the court’s findings as to two of these accounts—7669 and 4510.

The court also ordered that Wife’s Booz Allen Hamilton retirement account and Husband’s military pension be distributed equally on an if, as, and when basis.

It appears that this account is a duplicate of the Booz Allen Hamilton ECAP set forth above.

Both Wife and Husband state in their briefs that the court found that the 6950 account “was not marital property.” Wife asserts that the court found 6950 was non-marital “because there was no evidence of transactions during the marriage.” It appears that the parties have confused the findings related to 6950 with those relating to 9178. As to 6950, the court found that it “concededly is marital” without further discussion. Indeed, Wife acknowledged as much in her motion to alter or amend and testified at trial that she used the account as a “savings account.” It was the 9178 account that the court found to be non-marital due to a lack of transactions in the February 2024 statement, as well as the documentary evidence of the initial rollover funds.

The court requested that the parties “submit an appropriate 9-207” statement in their respective written closing arguments. Neither party complied with the court’s request.

Wife cites to Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496 (1993), to argue that contributions to the 7669 account made after the parties’ separation were not marital property. Alston, however, does not hold that property acquired after the separation but before the divorce is non-marital. Rather, it holds that, although such property is marital, it may not be equitable to include the property in a calculation of the monetary award, depending on how the property was acquired. See also Ware v. Ware, 131 Md. App. 207, 213 (2000); Williams v. Williams, 71 Md. App. 22, 34 (1987) (“Property acquired by a party up to the date of the divorce, even though the parties are separated, is marital property.”).

The evidence in this case stands in stark contrast to Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263 (2021). There, the parties produced over twenty years’ worth of statements for various investment accounts, which allowed this Court to trace shares owned prior to the marriage through to the date of divorce. Id. at 269-76. The only documentary evidence in the present case directly concerning the non-marital value of any of the accounts related to the Merrill Lynch rollover into the 9178 account, which the court determined was Wife’s non-marital property.

Wife suggests in her brief that the court’s finding that the 9178 account was non-marital indicates that the findings as to 7669 and 4150 were “unreasonable and untenable” because all of the accounts “shared the same nexus of pre-marital investment and subsequent management by the wealth management firm.” However, we view the court’s disparate findings to be a result of the court’s careful consideration of the specific evidence relevant to each account.

10 The court did not value some jointly owned furniture that was to be sold with the proceeds divided equally. 11 Because Crawford credits are an equitable remedy within the court’s discretion, the court on remand may or may not award these credits without disturbing the monetary award and distribution of the parties’ assets. 12 The 9-207 statement also did not include a value for the furniture in the marital home. The court found these items to be jointly owned, did not assign them a value, and ordered that they be sold and the proceeds divided equally. 13 Wife states in her brief that the parties agreed the timeshare was nonmarital property. There was no such agreement apparent in the record. The timeshare was listed in the first section of the 9-207 statement as an item the parties agree is marital. Wife never argued below that the court should find the timeshare to be nonmarital. 14 It appears that the trial court may have included the funds Husband dissipated during his trip to Kenya in its calculation twice. The court specifically found that Husband had dissipated $15,600 when he traveled to Kenya and gave money to various individuals associated with that trip. The court attributed this as dissipation of Husband’s TSP. However, Husband testified that he funded the trip using the money acquired by selling the Tiguan, totaling $15,400. It is unclear why the court would have included the sale price of the Tiguan as Husband’s asset if the court did not find that those funds had been dissipated. 15 FL § 8-214 would also apply. All three statutes require the same considerations.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Income; child support; evidence

Charles Hammann III v. Emily J. Hammann No. 1149, September Term 2024 Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Beachley, J. Filed: Sept. 23, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order reducing father’s child support obligation to $496 per month. The trial court abused its discretion by relying on Ms. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 that reflected her 2023 income instead of the affidavit provided by Ms. Hammann’s employer that verified that she would earn a minimum of $250,000 in 2024.

In this child support case from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the parties, Charles Hammann, III (appellant) and Emily J. Hammann (appellee), have been involved in highly contentious custody and child support litigation for nearly seven years. The original child support award memorialized in the January 20, 2020 Judgment of Absolute Divorce has been modified twice. This appeal arises from the May 31, 2024 Order which reduced Mr. Hammann’s child support obligation to $496 per month. Still dissatisfied, Mr. Hammann appeals and presents one question for our consideration: Did the [circuit] court abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of child support by not determining [Ms. Hammann’s] current, actual income to be the amount she currently earns, as reflected in the affidavit from her employer? Because we hold that the circuit court erroneously relied on Ms. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 rather than her employer’s affidavit stating her current actual income, we reverse the May 31, 2024 child support award and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts in this case are largely uncontroverted. Mr. and Ms. Hammann have two minor children as a result of their marriage, T.H., born in 2008, and W.H., born in 2011. The litigation between the parties commenced in August 2018 when Ms. Hammann filed for a limited divorce. On January 60

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. 22, 2020, after a contested merits hearing, the circuit court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce. Relevant here, the court ordered Mr. Hammann to pay child support in the amount of $1,539 per month to Ms. Hammann. On May 12, 2021, Ms. Hammann filed a Motion to Modify Child Support, alleging that Mr. Hammann had changed jobs and was earning a substantially higher salary. Following a two-day hearing, the court modified Mr. Hammann’s child support obligation by an Order entered on November 4, 2022. Under this Order, Mr. Hammann was required to pay $2,537 per month for the period of May 12, 2021, through December 13, 2021, and then $1,187 per month beginning January 1, 2022. The Order required the parties “to notify the other in writing within thirty (30) days of obtaining new employment, and provide information regarding their compensation.” The Order further required the parties “to exchange their W-2 statements on or before January 31 every year.” Mr. Hammann’s Motion to Alter or Amend the November 4, 2022 Order was ultimately denied. On April 14, 2023, Mr. Hammann filed a Complaint for Modification of Child Support in which he alleged a material change in circumstances based on Ms. Hammann’s substantial increase in income. The parties appeared in court on November 28, 2023, for a hearing on Mr. Hammann’s motion to modify. After hearing argument, the trial court continued the matter to February 7, 2024, to await receipt of the parties’ 2023 W-2 forms. On February 7, 2024, the parties again appeared in the circuit court. Because there was missing or incomplete financial information, the court stayed Mr. Hammann’s child support obligation and continued the matter to May 14, 2024. On May 14, 2024, the court conducted a half-day hearing on the merits. The court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on May 31, 2024, again modifying Mr. Hammann’s child support obligation by reducing it to $496 per month, retroactive to January 1, 2024. In determining “actual income” for child support purposes, the court used the parties’ 2023 W-2 statements. Because Mr. Hammann earned $215,668.04 in 2023, the court found his average monthly income to be $17,972. Similarly, because Ms. Hammann earned $206,503.26 in 2023, the court determined her average monthly income to be $17,209. Thus, the court rejected Mr. Hammann’s contention that Ms. Hammann’s actual income should be based on her employer’s affidavit verifying her base salary of $250,000 per year. Mr. Hammann filed a Motion to Alter or Amend on June 10, 2024, and a Supplemental Motion to Alter or Amend on June 28, 2024, alleging that the court erred in calculating Ms. Hammann’s actual income when it relied on TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

her 2023 W-2 rather than the affidavit signed by her employer on February 2, 2024. On July 25, 2024, the circuit court denied Mr. Hammann’s post-trial motions. This appeal ensued. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The trial court’s decision as to the appropriate amount of child support involves the exercise of the court’s discretion. A court can abuse its discretion when it makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise or upon factual conclusions that are clearly erroneous.” Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 735 (2013). “In an ‘above guidelines case,’ considered to be one in which the parties’ combined adjusted income exceeds $15,000 per month [1] —the highest level of income specified in the child support guidelines . . . —the trial court enjoys significant discretion in determining the amount of the basic child support award.” Ruiz v. Kinoshita, 239 Md. App. 395, 425 (2018) (citing Karanikas v. Cartwright, 209 Md. App. 571, 596 (2013)). “[T]he trial court need not use a strict extrapolation method to determine support[,]” but “may employ any ‘rational method that promotes the general objectives of the child support Guidelines and considers the particular facts of the case before it.’” Id. (quoting Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 410 (2003)). DISCUSSION

A. The Parties’ Contentions Mr. Hammann argues that the trial court erred when it based its modified child support order on Ms. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 form establishing that she earned $206,503 in 2023. According to Mr. Hammann, the court should have relied on the affidavit provided by Ms. Hammann’s employer that detailed her salary and compensation plan, effective October 2, 2023. The affidavit confirmed that Ms. Hammann’s base salary increased to $250,000 per year (plus other possible bonuses and profit-sharing contributions to be determined in her employer’s sole discretion). Had the court properly used “at least” $250,000 per year, or $20,833 per month, for Ms. Hammann’s actual income, Mr. Hammann contends that his child support obligation would have been further reduced. Ms. Hammann counters that the court correctly used her 2023 W-2 to determine her actual income to establish child support. In her view, the court did not abuse its discretion by electing “to rely on the parties’ earned income, rather than speculating as to their potential income.” (Emphasis in original). Ms. Hammann further points out that in “aboveguidelines” cases, the court may employ any rational method consistent with the objectives of Maryland’s child support guidelines. B. The Circuit Court Erred in Its Calculation of Ms. Hammann’s Income Under Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 12-104(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”), “[t]he court may modify a child support award subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification and upon a showing of a material change of circumstance.” In determining a party’s child support obligation, the court must consider each party’s actual income. FL § 12-201(i). FL § 12-201(b) defines “actual income” as income from any source, including (i) salaries; TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

(ii) wages; (iii) commissions; (iv) bonuses; (v) dividend income; (vi) pension income; (vii) interest income; (viii) trust income; (ix) annuity income; (x) Social Security benefits; (xi) worker’s compensation benefits; (xii) unemployment insurance benefits; (xiii) disability insurance benefits; (xiv) for the obligor, any third party payment paid to or for a minor child as a result of the obligor’s disability, retirement, or other compensable claim; (xv) alimony or maintenance received; and (xvi) expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent in the course of employment, selfemployment, or operation of a business to the extent that the reimbursements or payments reduce the parent’s personal living expenses. When the parents’ combined adjusted incomes total an amount greater than $30,000 per month, the child support guidelines no longer apply. FL § 12-204. Our Court has recognized “[s]everal factors [that] are relevant in setting child support in an above [g]uidelines case. They include the parties’ financial circumstances, the reasonable expenses of the child, and the parties’ station in life, their age and physical condition, and expenses in educating the child[].” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 316 (2013) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Freeman, 149 Md. App. 1, 20 (2002). “When the statute and case law speak of the inapplicability of the Guidelines to cases involving monthly parental income of more than [$30,000], it is clear that they mean that the numerical component of the Guidelines does not apply. We underscore that, even in an above Guidelines case, ‘[t]he conceptual underpinning’ of the Guidelines applies.” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 411 (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 149 Md. App. at 19). In this case, both Mr. and Ms. Hammann are salaried, W-2 employees who are eligible for discretionary bonuses from their respective employers. The trial court found that each party has “the potential of earning substantial bonuses” and “[t]heir income changes from year to year.” Mr. Hammann testified at the May 14, 2024 hearing that he earns an annual base salary of $150,000, but he also typically receives performance-based bonuses near the end of the year that can increase his annual earnings to well over $200,000. Neither party objects to the court’s use of Mr. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 to assess his actual annual income at $215,668.04, or $17,972 per month.2 The sole issue on appeal is the proper assessment of Ms. Hammann’s actual income for 2024. Although Ms. Hammann is correct that the circuit court had previously used the parties’ W-2 incomes to establish child support, we are not bound by that methodology. Here, the court was charged with setting child support as of January 1, 2024. In determining Ms. Hammann’s 2024 actual income, it was illogical for the court to use the 2023 W-2 form evidencing income of $206,503.26 for 2023 in light of the uncontroverted evidence that Ms. Hammann would earn a minimum of $250,000 in 2024. The court’s determination not to use the higher $250,000 actual income undermines the wellestablished principle that “the right to child support is a right held by the minor child,” Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 607 (2025), and that children are “entitled to a standard of living that corresponds to the economic position Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

of the parents[,]” Johnson v. Johnson, 152 Md. App. 609, 620 (2003) (quoting Smith, 149 Md. App. at 23). In cases where the parents’ incomes fall above the state child support guidelines, as they do here, the court has “significant” discretion to set the amount of child support. Ruiz v. Kinoshita, 239 Md. App. 395, 425 (2018). Nevertheless, in calculating each parent’s child support obligation, “the central factual issue is the ‘actual adjusted income’ of each party[.]” Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 316 (2013) (quoting Johnson, 152 Md. App. at 615). Therefore, “even in a case in which the statutory schedule of basic child support obligations does not apply, the trial court must ascertain each parent’s ‘actual income.’” Id. (quoting Walker, 170 Md. App. 255, 267 (2006).

Indeed, in Johnson we reiterated that “child support should be calculated based on the parent’s current income” and “currently existing circumstances[.]” 152 Md. App. at 621-22. In our view, the best evidence of Ms. Hammann’s 2024 actual current income is her employer’s affidavit that verified that she had received a raise as of October 2, 2023, that increased her annual salary to $250,000. We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on Ms. Hammann’s 2023 W-2 that reflected her 2023 income instead of the affidavit provided by Ms. Hammann’s employer that verified that she would earn a minimum of $250,000 in 2024. 3 We therefore shall reverse and remand this matter to allow the circuit court to recalculate child support consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

FOOTNOTES

The General Assembly subsequently increased the combined income table to $30,000 per month. See 2020 Md. Laws, Ch. 384.

At trial, Mr. Hammann asserted that his “actual income” should be determined by averaging his 2022 and 2023 W-2 statements. He makes no such argument on appeal.

At the hearing before the circuit court, Ms. Hammann’s counsel suggested on two separate occasions that the court could simply “charge the parties generally” as to child support because the parties’ incomes “appear to be relatively similar now for 2024.” We express no opinion whether “charging the parties generally” would be appropriate in this case, but merely note Ms. Hammann’s change in position on appeal.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Legal and physical custody; change; visitation

Dolly M. Singh v. Randeep Singh No. 100, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Arthur, Getty (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: Sept. 22, 2025 The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s modification of legal custody and physical custody of the parties’ minor child. Beginning in March 2024, the parents were no longer successful in transferring the child from the mother’s care to the father’s care, resulting in father having no visitation with the child for more than six months. There is no question that completely discontinuing visitation with one parent did not serve the child’s best interests.

The parties to this appeal are the parents of a child born in 2021. Under a divorce judgment issued in 2023, the parents shared joint legal custody of their child, the mother had physical custody on four days per week, and the father had physical custody on three days per week. Beginning in March 2024, the parents were no longer successful in transferring the child from the mother’s care to the father’s care. At the scheduled custody exchanges, the parents attempted to transfer the child to the father’s care, but each time the mother left with the child still in her care. As a result, the father had no visitation with the child for more than six months. The father petitioned for a modification of custody in the Circuit Court for Howard County. At the hearing on the petition, both parents agreed that the failed exchanges were detrimental to their child’s best interests, but they disagreed on the cause of the failed exchanges. The parents also agreed that the child would benefit from therapy, but they did not agree on the selection of a psychologist. The circuit court established a modified physical custody schedule under which the exchanges would take place at the child’s school or the exchange would be facilitated by a third party if it could not take place at the child’s school. The court granted the father sole legal custody on decisions concerning the child’s mental health care but maintained joint legal custody on other issues. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. The mother has appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ordered the modification of legal custody and physical custody. Because we see no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s decisions, the order will be affirmed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Prior Custody Determination Randeep Singh (“Father”) and Dolly Singh (“Mother”) married each other in 2019. Their only child, a daughter, was born in April 2021. Their marital relationship deteriorated largely because of disagreements about child care responsibilities. The parents separated in January 2022. Mother moved out of the family home in Arlington, Virginia, and established a new residence in Ellicott City, Maryland. Shortly after the separation, Father filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Arlington County, Virginia. Mother counterclaimed for divorce. The Virginia court conducted a three-day trial in June 2023 on the issues of divorce and custody of the two-year-old child. On July 19, 2023, the court issued a comprehensive letter opinion resolving the contested issues. In its letter opinion, the Virginia court wrote that, “[a]fter the birth of their child, the parties engaged in consistent fingerpointing as to which parent was or was not meeting their parental obligations[.]” The court concluded that “the parties’ inability to effectively communicate about their wants and needs as caregivers was the driving force in the breakdown of their marriage[.]” The court found that, since the separation, “neither parent ha[d] worked to actively support the child’s contact and relationship with the other parent.” The court stated that “[Mother] believes that the child is better off in her care and that of her family and that [Father’s] time with the minor child should be extremely limited.” In its discussion of child custody, the Virginia court explained that exchanges of the child from one parent to the other were often stressful. The child’s grandparents or other adult family members usually accompanied Mother and Father to the exchanges, and the two families sometimes displayed hostility toward each other. Mother’s parents made video recordings of the exchanges, apparently in an effort to document Father’s conduct. The court stated that the evidence at trial included “video evidence of custody exchanges in which both parties acted inappropriately and in such a way as to cause stress to the minor child.” The court noted: “One of these exchanges lasted over three hours, which evidences a complete disregard on the part of both parents for the child’s well-being.” The court stated, however, that the Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

parties had “testified that exchanges [we]re working better” as of the time of trial. The Virginia court explained that its “principal concern with whether to award joint legal custody” was “the parties’ pattern of attacking one another rather than making any real effort to work together to raise their child.” The court observed that the parents had been able to make some joint decisions, including the selection of a pediatrician. The court concluded that joint legal custody was appropriate, stating that “both parents clearly want to be and need to be actively involved in raising this child.” The court “decline[d] to award final decision-making authority to either parent[.]” The Virginia court concluded that shared physical custody was in the child’s best interests, despite the approximately one-hour travel time between the parents’ homes. The court reasoned: “Given the young age of this child, prolonged absences from either parent [would] make it harder to forge strong and lasting bonds with the absent parent.” On December 19, 2023, the Virginia court entered its final order granting a divorce on the ground of a 12-month separation. The order granted the parents joint legal custody and specified that they were “required to confer and mutually agree upon issues concerning the child’s health, welfare, and extracurricular activities as well as any other major decisions concerning the child’s wellbeing.” The divorce order established a “4-3 Non-Alternating” schedule for shared physical custody. Under this schedule, Mother would have the child in her care from Sunday mornings until Thursday mornings, and Father would have the child in his care from Thursday mornings until Sunday mornings. The order included a special schedule which would override the normal schedule on certain holidays and school breaks. The divorce order included additional terms governing exchanges of the child between parents. The order stated that Mother would pick up the child in the parking lot of a public park in Arlington, Virginia, and that Father would pick up the child outside of a bookstore in Columbia, Maryland. The order permitted the parties to modify the location of the exchanges by mutual agreement. The order specified: “Additionally, the Parties are ordered to ensure that all exchanges are completed in 30 minutes or less.” The order further stated: “The Parties are discouraged from videotaping exchanges to ensure the transition is as stress-free as possible.” B. Initial Custody Litigation in Maryland During the first few months after entry of the Virginia divorce order, the exchanges between parents continued to occur as scheduled, but often with difficulty. Despite the terms of the order, transfers of the child from Mother’s care to Father’s care sometimes lasted longer than 30 minutes. Mother’s parents continued to make video recordings of the exchanges. Father’s family members responded by making their own video recordings. In early 2024, Father moved to Laurel, Maryland, with the intention of reducing the travel time between the parents’ residences. On the morning of Thursday, March 28, 2024, the parents met at the Columbia Mall to transfer the child from Mother’s care to Father’s care. After 30 minutes had passed, Mother left with the child still in her care. On the following day, the 64

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parents met again to attempt to transfer the child to Father’s care, but Mother again left with the child in her care. The failed exchanges continued for the next several months. Each time the parents met at the drop-off location for a scheduled custody exchange, Mother left with the child in her care after 30 minutes. As a result, Father had no visitation with his child throughout much of 2024, including the scheduled access on the child’s third birthday and Father’s Day. Meanwhile, on April 16, 2024, Father filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Howard County, seeking to register the Virginia divorce order in Maryland. One week later, the circuit court registered the Virginia order as a foreign judgment under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Father then filed a contempt petition, alleging that Mother violated the Virginia order by withholding the child from his care. Father also asked the court to award him make-up visitation for each day on which Mother allegedly denied his access. Mother moved to strike the petition, arguing that Maryland courts lacked power to enforce the Virginia order. The circuit court granted the motion to strike, reasoning that it could not grant the requested relief because the alleged conduct had occurred before the registration of the Virginia order in Maryland. On May 14, 2024, Father filed a petition in the circuit court for modification of custody. Father alleged that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the prior custody determination by the Virginia court. Father alleged that Mother had withheld the child from his care “by refusing to transfer the [child] at the regularly scheduled and court-ordered exchanges.” Father alleged that Mother had prevented him from having any visitation with the child since March 24, 2024. In addition, Father alleged that Mother had refused to confer with him on issues related to the health and well-being of their child. Father asked the court to award him sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the child. Opposing the petition, Mother alleged that Father had “failed and refused to accept custody of [the child] at the custodial exchanges, despite [Mother] providing additional time beyond the court ordered 30 minutes for the exchange to take place.” Mother asserted that she had “continued to attempt to transfer custody” to Father at each required transfer but he “simply refuse[d]” to accept the child into his care. C. Dispute over Selection of Child Psychologist In an email dated June 21, 2024, Mother suggested to Father that “[i]t would be helpful for [the child] to see someone to explore what she [wa]s currently experiencing.” Mother proposed seeking therapy for the child with Dr. Mary Jane Ojie-Badger, a licensed clinical psychologist. In a response sent the same day, Father stated that he “agree[d] that it would be helpful” for the child “to see a professional who has experience with children in similar situations.” Father agreed to meet with Dr. Ojie-Badger but, after the consultation, he disagreed with selecting Dr. Ojie-Badger and proposed selecting a different psychologist, Dr. Gina Santoro. Mother disagreed with that proposal. On July 17, 2024, Mother filed a motion asking the court to TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

issue an order “directing the parties to commence therapy” for the child with Dr. Ojie-Badger. Mother asserted that both parents agreed that therapy would be in their child’s best interests. Mother asserted that Father had “refused to agree to utilize” Dr. Ojie-Badger, the therapist recommended by Mother. Mother argued: “the parties’ divorce decree orders them to share legal and physical custody, but does not vest in either of them tie-breaker authority, thus leaving it to the . . . court to make the appropriate finding.” Opposing the motion, Father stated that he disagreed with the selection of Dr. Ojie-Badger because he “had concerns regarding [Dr. Ojie-Badger’s] ability to be impartial” and because “Dr. Ojie-Badger informed [Father] that she does not work with children of the [child’s] age.” Father asserted that, when he proposed selecting Dr. Santoro, Mother rejected the suggestion because she believed that Dr. Santoro’s office did not have availability for children of their child’s age. Father asserted that he had confirmed that Dr. Santoro was available to take new patients of the same age as their child. Father also asserted that it was likely that the parents could resolve their dispute without court intervention, but he suggested that the court could revisit the issue if they did not resolve their dispute before the upcoming hearing on the petition to modify custody. On August 8, 2024, the circuit court denied Mother’s motion for an order requiring the child to undergo therapy with Dr. Ojie-Badger. D. Testimony at Hearing Before Magistrate On September 24, 2024, a magistrate conducted an evidentiary hearing on Father’s petition for modification of custody. Much of the parents’ testimony concerned the failed custodial transfers from Mother to Father. The parents also testified about their efforts to make parenting decisions jointly, including their unsuccessful efforts to agree on a therapist for the child. Failed Custody Transfers from Mother to Father In his testimony, Father explained that he had “not spent substantial time with [the child] for six months” as of the hearing date. Father stated that he “miss[ed] her deeply” and hoped that the court’s decision would allow him “to see [her] immediately because he [hadn’t] seen her in so long.” Father expressed concerns about the “psychological effects” on the child of participating in the failed exchanges, as well as the “long-term effects” of his “prolonged absence[]” from the child’s life. Father testified that, at the time of the initial separation, the parents “figured out through trial and error” that the “best practice” for someone of their child’s age was for one parent to “warm the child up,” and “to be patient and . . . make [their] daughter feel comfortable” rather than having one person “essentially snatch[] and grab[]” the child “and run[] away.” Father noted that Mother had specifically asked him “to be more patient” and had “accused [him] at one time of being too aggressive” when picking up their child.1 Father explained that he “ended up taking a more patient approach,” by taking time to “warm[] up to” his daughter before taking her from Mother’s care. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Father testified that, “for over a year it worked where [the child] was comfortable, and she wasn’t getting stressed out during these exchanges.” Typically, Father would take the child to breakfast and attend a story time activity at the bookstore or the Columbia Mall. Mother would follow along to help the child feel more comfortable, and eventually Mother would leave after about 30 minutes. According to Father, using this approach, the Thursday morning exchanges “went smoothly” for “roughly a year.” Father explained that Mother’s parents and Father’s parents were also present during the custodial exchanges. Father stated that, since the “very first exchange[,]” Mother’s parents made video recordings of the exchanges. Father recalled that Mother had presented some of the recordings at the Virginia divorce trial in an attempt “to show [his] alleged aggressive behavior in picking up [the child] and taking [her] back to [his] car.”2 Father stated that he and his family members had started to make their own video recordings in January 2024 to protect against any “false accusations” by Mother or her family. Father believed that the video recordings made it “kind of awkward” because “both parties” could not “act naturally” while being recorded. Father testified that, beginning in March 2024, he noticed a drastic change in Mother’s behavior during the Thursday morning exchanges. Father stated that Mother “began . . . hovering” near the child or “holding onto [the child] for the entire thirty minutes.” Father stated that Mother started “[s] aying things” to the child that would “appear[] to suggest that time with her dad was optional.” Father stated that Mother would “ask questions” to the child such as “do you want to go home?” Father stated that Mother would “kind of hint that there were plans for the rest of the day” or mention certain toys at Mother’s home. Father recalled that, on March 14, 2024, Mother “held onto” the child “for an hour and a half” before eventually leaving the child with Father. Father stated that, throughout that time, whenever he would try to approach the child, Mother would say, “give me space.” Father testified that, at the scheduled exchange on Thursday, March 28, 2024, Mother “held onto [the child] for virtually the entire half hour” and said that, if Father did not “pick [the child] up from [Mother’s] arms,” then she would be leaving with the child. According to Father, Mother told him: “If [the child] is in my possession at 9:30 I will be taking her.” Father stated that he “didn’t know what to do,” because he did not want to “be too aggressive in physically infringing” on Mother when picking up the child. Father stated that he “ma[de] efforts to sooth[e]” the child and tried to “calmly object” without “creat[ing] a conflict” in the child’s presence. Father recalled that, during these interactions, Mother also said “something to the effect” that the child was “voicing her opinion.” Father recalled: “[A]ll of a sudden her mother looks at her clock and says, oh[,] 9:30, I’m leaving.” For the first time, Father watched Mother take the child in her car and drive away at the beginning of his access time. Father testified that he consistently showed up for every scheduled exchange since March 28, 2024, aside from one occasion when he asked to reschedule an exchange because of an injury. Father stated that Mother repeated the same behavior at each attempted exchange. According to Father, Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Mother “either holds onto [the child] or hovers very closely or holds her by the hand” while he “tr[ies] to engage with [the child] and warm her up[.]” After about 30 minutes, Mother “looks at her watch and says, okay I’m leaving with [the child].” Father stated that, when he asked Mother to allow him to pick up the child from Mother’s arms during one attempted exchange, Mother “tugged back” and “moved away from him.” Father stated that he had “tried multiple times to . . . gently pick up” the child from Mother’s arms, but Mother would not “allow[] [him] to do that.” Father testified that, in an effort to improve the exchanges, he sent emails to Mother asking her to agree to change the drop-off location. Father proposed changing the location to a nearby playground because he thought that the child might feel more comfortable there. Father stated that, whenever he proposed changing the location, Mother either would not respond or would refuse to agree to try a new location. Father further testified that he had noticed changes in the child’s behavior as of March 2024. Father stated that, “[f]or almost a year” before March 2024, his daughter “would run towards [him]” and “happily engage with [him]” after only “a few minutes of warm up time.” Father stated that, since March 2024, it would take at least 15 to 20 minutes before he can interact with her, and she “will sometimes run away” when he tries to engage with her. In her testimony, Mother stated that custody transfers to Father had “always been challenging” and had “always been stressful” and had “always been traumatic.” According to Mother, “[i]t takes a while to sort of calm [the child] down.” Mother stated that “[t]here would be moments where [the child] would not want to” leave with Father and where she would be “crying” and “very emotional.” Mother stated that, prior to March 28, 2024, Father “would physically take [the child] and proceed during the exchange.” Mother also stated that Father “would still physically pick her up kicking and screaming and just walk away with her.” Mother testified that Father needed to resort to physically removing the child a “majority of the time if not all the time.” Mother acknowledged that, before March 2024, the parents sometimes went “well beyond [a] half hour” when transferring the child to Father. Mother further acknowledged that, “[a]t some point” she “stopped going well beyond the thirty minutes.” Mother testified that the lengthy transfers had caused her to “miss[] meetings at work” and to “miss[] deadlines.” Mother stated that she had “rearranged [her] schedule as much as she could[,]” but it “was getting to the point” where she “just couldn’t afford to do that anymore.” Mother also stated that she informed Father that she could not stay later than 9:30, gave him “five-minute warnings,” and told him, “please, you have to take her,” but he still would not pick up the child. Mother testified that she had “tried [her] best to . . . facilitate” the exchanges. Mother stated that she “genuinely d[id]n’t know” why the exchanges were no longer working. Mother claimed that she would tell Father, “please take her, you have five minutes left[,]” or “[i]t’s been about thirty minutes.” Mother stated that she tried to encourage the child to leave with Father, by saying things like “go have fun[,]” or 66

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“[g]o with Daddy,” or “you’re going to have a wonderful time.” Mother testified that the child would “bolt[] and run[] after her” or even “run[] into traffic” whenever she tried to walk away. Mother also claimed that, when she tries to walk away, Father “will physically usher” the child toward Mother and then “just stand[] there” while Mother consoles the child. Mother agreed that the failed exchanges were detrimental to the child’s best interests. Mother stated that the child “deserves time” with both parents, “deserves to have healthy relationships with both parents,” and “deserves exchanges that are not stressful and anxiety inducing.” Mother added, “none of what happened has contributed to this being her reality.” Efforts to Communicate to Make Shared Decisions Father testified that, although he had asked Mother to include him in the process of scheduling medical appointments for the child, Mother would typically schedule appointments “without conferring with [him].” Father stated that Mother “just notifies” him after she schedules an appointment “without checking with [him] and seeing whether the time works” for him. Father stated that, whenever he told Mother that he could not attend an appointment at the time she had selected, she would decline to reschedule the appointment. Father also stated that, when the parents had selected a dentist for the child, he had “no input” on the decision but he “didn’t object” after Mother “presented” the decision to him. Mother testified that, in October 2023, she enrolled the child for daycare at the Young School in Columbia. Mother did not confer with Father before making that decision, nor did she inform him of the decision. Mother testified that she had consulted with her attorney before enrolling the child at the Young School. Mother stated that, to her understanding, she did not need Father’s “permission” to enroll the child in daycare on days when Mother had physical custody.3 Father testified that he first learned that the child was attending preschool in December 2023, after the child began mentioning her “teacher.” When Father contacted the school, he learned that the school employees referred to the child by a nickname that Mother had recently decided to start using for the child. Initially, Father was unable to gain access to the child’s records when he requested records from the school. Father arranged to take a tour of the school in February 2024 on a day when the child was in his care. Father stated that he would prefer for the child to enroll there for “the entire week” so that she would have “a consistent schedule[.]” Mother testified that Father had spoken to her about enrolling the child at the Young School on Thursdays and Fridays, the two weekdays on which the child was in his physical custody. Mother stated that, in response, she told Father that she believed that “consistency” was important and that the child had been having “a wonderful experience with the Young School.” Mother stated that those comments were “the extent of [her] response[,]” because she believed that, under the existing custody arrangement, it was “his decision” to send the child to daycare or preschool on those days. Although the parents had started discussing the selection of a therapist on June 21, 2024, they still had not agreed on 3F

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a therapist at the time of the hearing on September 24, 2024. In his testimony, Father stated that both parents agreed that “it would be beneficial for [the child] to go to therapy[,]” even though they disagreed “about the reasons why” she would benefit from therapy. Father explained that he had agreed to meet with Dr. Ojie-Badger after Mother suggested selecting Dr. Ojie-Badger as the child’s therapist. Based on that consultation, Father concluded that Dr. Ojie-Badger “did not regularly see children” of the same age as their child and that he “also had some concerns about her neutrality.” Father testified that, after informing Mother that he did not agree with selecting Dr. Ojie-Badger, he proposed Dr. Santoro. Mother initially rejected Dr. Santoro because she claimed that “Dr. Santoro’s office . . . stated that they do not have availability for children [the child’s] age.” Father testified that he was able to confirm that Dr. Santoro “regularly sees children of [the child’s] age and that she has availability.” After both parents met with Dr. Santoro, Mother “objected to Dr. Santoro because she wasn’t certified in play therapy.” Father stated that, if granted tie-breaking authority, he planned to begin sending the child for therapy with Dr. Santoro “as soon as possible.” In her testimony, Mother agreed with Father that the child should be seeing a therapist. Mother stated that she “suggested originally reaching out to a psychologist” to help “figure out what’s going on” at the failed custody exchanges and to help “resolve it” for the child. Mother stated that she disagreed with choosing Dr. Santoro because Dr. Santoro “primarily has experience working with kids who are about five, nine, [or] ten[,]” and that Dr. Santoro was “not actually as experienced working with three-year-olds and four-year-olds.” Mother stated that she also objected because Dr. Santoro “is not certified in play therapy.” When asked whether she was “seeking a play therapist” for the child, Mother stated that she was “seeking someone who has experience working with kids in [the child’s] age group” and that she understood that this category would include “individuals who focus on play therapy[.]” Requests of Each Parent During the hearing, Father requested a modification of the physical custody schedule “to account for” what he calculated to be 78 days of “missed access time,” which he attributed to Mother’s conduct. Father proposed a “modified two-twothree” schedule, under which the child would spend most of her time in his care. Father also requested a modification of the “exchange protocol” to require all exchanges to occur “through pick up and drop off at the Young School.” Father further requested tie-breaking authority on issues such as the child’s health, education, and extra-curricular activities. Mother opposed each of Father’s requests, arguing that no modification of the custody arrangement was justified. Mother argued that the only change that needed to occur was that Father needed to physically “pick up his child and go” at each scheduled exchange. E. Recommendations of the Magistrate One week after the hearing, the magistrate issued a report that summarized all of the evidence and made recommended TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

findings of fact. The magistrate found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the prior custody determination by the Virginia court. The magistrate wrote: “Most notably the exchanges between the parents, which were proceeding without incident, have now become a protracted, unsuccessful attempt at exchanges which is extremely stressful for the child as she is literally in the middle between her parents at these events which occur weekly.” “Additionally,” the magistrate wrote, “the parents agree that the child needs therapy but have been wholly unable to pick a therapist.” In a discussion of the factors relevant to custody, the magistrate wrote: The child needs a regular predictable schedule and time with each parent. It is of utmost importance that exchanges take place to and from school/ daycare except on the rare occasion. Neither parent seems to be able to consider and act on the needs of the child as opposed to their own needs or desires. Neither parent is protecting the child from the adverse effects of conflict between the parties. The parents are able to communicate but Mother seems reluctant to discuss major decisions such as school/ daycare placement with Father. Both parents have much to contribute and they should both be involved in decision making. The exception to that is mental health care for the child. There must be a mechanism for prompt decision making on this topic. Father’s decision making in this regard seems to be more thoughtful and fact based. The magistrate recommended that Father should have “sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care for the child only.” The magistrate found that it was in the child’s best interests to modify the physical custody schedule “to allow for exchanges to occur at school/daycare.” The magistrate recommended: “Any exchanges that cannot take place at school/daycare should be facilitated between Father and a third party—not mother—agreed upon by the parties; if there is no agreement, the exchange will be facilitated by a professional monitor, chosen by Father, and paid for equally by the parents.” The magistrate recommended that Father should have access on the first, second, and fourth “full weekend” of each month “from pick up at school/daycare Thursday to return to school/daycare Monday morning[.]” The magistrate also recommended that, on the third week of each month, Father should have access “from pick up at school/daycare on Thursday to return to school/daycare on Friday morning[.]” The magistrate concluded that “make-up time” was appropriate and that it should not “be implemented in such a way” that would “inappropriately limit[]” the child’s time with Mother. The magistrate recommended that Father should have an extension of his share of the winter break in December 2024 and January 2025, as well as an additional two non-consecutive weeks of summer vacation in 2025 and 2026. Finally, the magistrate concluded: “Extraordinary circumstances exist warranting entry of an immediate order.” “Specifically,” the magistrate wrote, “Father has not had his Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

regularly scheduled time (3 days a week) since March and the child is being put in a difficult position during failed exchanges each week.” One week after the filing of the magistrate’s report, the circuit court heard arguments concerning whether the court should issue an immediate order based on the magistrate’s recommendations.5 Mother opposed the substance of the magistrate’s recommendations, as well as the recommendation to issue an immediate order. Mother argued that the court should maintain the existing physical custody schedule, direct Father to enroll the child at the Young School on Thursdays and Fridays, and require the Thursday transfers to occur at the Young School. After the hearing, the circuit court issued an order giving immediate effect to the magistrate’s recommendations, including the recommendations to award Father sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care, to modify the physical custody schedule, and to require the exchanges either to occur at school or to be facilitated by a third party. The order specified that, except for those modifications, other terms of the Virginia custody order would remain in effect. F. Exceptions to the Magistrate’s Recommendations Mother filed exceptions to the magistrate’s report and recommendations. Among other things, Mother challenged the recommendation to grant Father sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care. Mother argued that the magistrate erred in finding that Mother was “reluctant to communicate” with Father to make shared decisions and in finding that Father’s decision making on mental health care seemed to be “more thoughtful and fact based” than Mother’s decision making. Mother further challenged the recommendations to modify the physical custody schedule. Mother argued that the evidence did not support the magistrate’s statement that custody exchanges had been proceeding “without incident” before March 2024. Mother asserted that the only change that occurred in March 2024 was that Father was “no longer willing to pick up his daughter and leave the exchange.” Mother argued that there was no justification “to make it so all exchanges would occur though the child’s school or daycare[,]” because, she argued, “the only problematic exchange[s]” were the transfers from Mother to Father. Mother also argued that there was no basis to require that all exchanges be facilitated by a third party. Father opposed Mother’s exceptions and filed his own exceptions to challenge certain recommendations by the magistrate. Among other things, Father argued that the physical custody schedule was incomplete because it did not define the term “full weekend” and did not specify which parent had physical custody on a full or partial fifth weekend in a month. The circuit court considered the parties’ exceptions at a hearing on December 13, 2024. During the hearing, counsel for Mother continued to argue that the modifications were unnecessary and that the evidence did not support the recommended modifications of physical custody or legal custody. Nevertheless, counsel for Mother informed the court that the exchanges had been successful since the court issued 68

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the immediate order. Counsel for Mother also informed the court that, after receiving sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care, Father had selected Dr. Santoro as the child’s therapist and Mother had started taking the child to regular appointments with Dr. Santoro. On January 13, 2025, the court entered an order adopting the magistrate’s recommendations to award Father sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care, to modify the physical custody schedule, and to require the exchanges either to occur at school or daycare or to be facilitated by a third party. Granting in part Father’s exceptions, the court added new provisions defining the term “full weekend” in the physical custody schedule and specifying that Father has physical custody of the child “if there is a fifth full weekend in a month[.]” The court issued a memorandum opinion, which explained its decision to overrule Mother’s exceptions. The court concluded that the magistrate was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Mother “was reluctant to communicate to make decisions[.]” The court stated that, although the evidence showed that the parents communicated about certain matters, there was also evidence that Mother “enroll[ed] the child in school without telling [Father].” The court found that the magistrate did not err in concluding that “there needs to be a mechanism for prompt decision making on the mental health care of the child” or in finding that “Father’s decision-making process seemed to be more thoughtful and fact-based” on that issue. The court determined that the magistrate did not err in concluding “that there [wa]s a material change in circumstance because of the prolonged nature of the exchanges and the child being stuck between the parent[s.]” The court noted that the magistrate made express findings about “the amount of time and the conflict occurring during the exchanges” and “how [Mother] holds on to the child” at the exchanges. The court reasoned that the recommendation to have exchanges take place at school “helps to prevent interaction between the parties.” The court explained: “By taking [Mother] out of the exchange, there can be no prolonged interaction with [M]other and child.” The court concluded that, “[g] iven the testimony about the amount of stress on the child during exchanges of the child by the parties, and that these exchanges are likely amped up by everyone recording the exchanges,” the recommendation “that exchanges should be between [Father] and a third person” was not improper. Within 30 days after the court entered its order resolving the exceptions, Father moved for reconsideration in part. Father asserted that the order “d[id] not specifically address Thursdays in the fifth weekend of the month.” Father asked the court to revise the order to reflect that Father would have physical custody “in the event there is a partial fifth weekend” in any month. On March 6, 2025, the court granted Father’s motion and revised the custody modification order. The court explained that it had intended to grant Father physical custody “on every Thursday night” but its intent “was not explicitly stated” in the previous order. Within 30 days after the court granted Father’s motion for reconsideration, Mother noted an appeal to this Court.

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DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Mother asks this Court to vacate the orders modifying the prior custody arrangement. Mother contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded Father sole legal custody with respect to decisions about the child’s mental health care. Mother further contends that the court abused its discretion when it modified the physical custody schedule established by the prior custody order. 6 In any child custody determination, the court’s “‘primary goal . . . is to serve the best interests of the child.’” See, e.g., Caldwell v. Sutton, 256 Md. App. 230, 265 (2022) (quoting Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 60 (2016)). When a party moves to modify an existing custody order, the party must “‘show that there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the [previous] custody order and that it is now in the best interest of the child for custody to be changed.’” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App.146, 171-72 (2012) (quoting Sigurdsson v. Nodeen, 180 Md. App. 326, 344 (2008)). “‘A material change of circumstances is a change of circumstances that affects the welfare of the child.’” Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 503 (2022) (quoting Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 171). If the court finds a material change in circumstances, the court proceeds to decide “what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child[.]” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 639 (2016). As Mother acknowledges, this Court’s review of a custody decision is deferential in many respects. “An ‘appellate court does not make its own determination as to a child’s best interest; the trial court’s decision governs, unless the factual findings made by the [trial] court are clearly erroneous or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.’” Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 372 (2019) (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 637-38 (2007)). The fact-finder “who ‘sees the witnesses and the parties, [and] hears the testimony . . . is in a far better position than the appellate court, which has only a [transcript] before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the [child].’” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020) (quoting Viamonte v. Viamonte, 131 Md. App. 151, 157 (2000)) (further quotation marks omitted). When a circuit court refers a matter to a magistrate, the magistrate is authorized to take evidence and make recommended findings of fact. See Md. Rule 9-208(b). A party may challenge the magistrate’s findings by raising exceptions with the circuit court. See Dillon v. Miller, 234 Md. App. 309, 317 (2017). “‘[W]hen reviewing a [magistrate’s] report, both a trial court and an appellate court defer to the [magistrate’s] first-level findings (regarding credibility and the like) unless they are clearly erroneous.’” Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. 215, 227 (2024) (quoting McAllister v. McAllister, 218 Md. App. 386, 407 (2014)). Generally, factual “findings are ‘not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record’” to support those findings. Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. at 372 (quoting Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996)). In sum, the magistrate’s factual findings “are to be treated as prima facie correct and are not to be disturbed by the court unless found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in the record” before the magistrate. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 367 Md. 547, 554 (2002). TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

“[W]hile the circuit court may be ‘guided’ by the [magistrate’s] recommendation, the court must make its own independent decision as to the ultimate disposition[.]” McAllister v. McAllister, 218 Md. App. at 407 (quoting In re Priscilla B., 214 Md. App. 600, 623 (2013)). “‘On the ultimate issue of which party gets custody . . . [this Court] will set aside a judgment only on a clear showing that the [trial court] abused [its] discretion.’” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. at 201 (quoting Viamonte v. Viamonte, 131 Md. App. at 157). An abuse of discretion occurs “when ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. at 228 (quoting Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1, 15 (2000)). This Court will not secondguess a custody decision merely because it might have selected a different custody arrangement. See Jose v. Jose, 237 Md. App. 588, 599 (2018). “In many cases, the evidence and factors ‘would support the ultimate decision made by the trial judge’ and ‘would also support a contrary decision’ to award custody to the other parent.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. at 200 (quoting Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 89 Md. App. 301, 313 (1991)). Appellate courts “rarely, if ever, actually find a reversible abuse of discretion” when reviewing the ultimate decision about custody. McCarty v. McCarty, 147 Md. App. 268, 273 (2002). I. Modification of Legal Custody As the first issue in this appeal, Mother contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it granted Father sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care for the child. Mother argues that the court lacked justification to grant sole decision-making authority on that issue to either parent. Mother also argues that the court lacked justification to grant that authority to Father, rather than to Mother. Although courts must consider a variety of factors when deciding whether joint legal custody is appropriate, the “‘most important factor’” is “the ‘capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare.’” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 628 (2016) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304 (1986)). “Ordinarily the best evidence” concerning this factor is “the past conduct or ‘track record’ of the parties.” Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. at 307. If the parents’ conduct shows that they cannot make important decisions affecting their child’s welfare “together because, for example, they are unable to put aside their bitterness for one another, then the child’s future could be compromised.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. at 628. “Blind hope that a joint custody agreement will succeed, or that forcing the responsibility of joint decision-making upon the warring parents will bring peace, is not acceptable.” Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. at 307. In this appeal, Mother acknowledges that both parents “agreed on the need for a therapist” for the child and that they reached an “impasse” while trying to select one. Mother recognizes that the parents “were each unable to agree on the therapist proposed by the other[.]” Mother nevertheless asserts that the parents “generally agreed” on the child’s other health care providers and that they were “able to communicate” with each other about many decisions. Mother Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

argues: “Although [the parents] had yet to reach [a]resolution, there was no basis to grant one party unilateral decisionmaking authority over the other.” In our assessment, the evidence supported the decision to end the joint custody arrangement on the issue of mental health care for the child. Although the parents communicated with each other about many decisions, their cooperation was far from ideal. When the Virginia court decided in July 2023 that joint legal custody was appropriate, the court expressed serious reservations about “the parties’ pattern of attacking one another rather than making any real effort to work together to raise their child.” Several months after the Virginia court issued its letter opinion, Mother enrolled the child for daycare at the Young School without discussing that decision with Father or even informing him of the decision. Father’s testimony indicated that, on matters such as selecting a dentist or scheduling medical appointments, Mother often made decisions without his input, and he usually acquiesced after she notified him of her decisions. Based on the evidence, the magistrate found: “The parents are able to communicate but Mother seems reluctant to discuss major decisions such as school/daycare placement with Father.” This finding was not clearly erroneous. In emails dated June 21, 2024, both parents expressed their agreement that obtaining therapy was in the child’s best interests. Mother initially suggested selecting Dr. OjieBadger as the therapist and, one week later, Father suggested selecting Dr. Santoro. Neither parent agreed with the other parent’s choice. The disagreement prompted Mother to move for an order requiring the parties to begin therapy for the child with the therapist that she preferred. Mother argued that a court order was needed because “the parties’ divorce decree order[ed] them to share legal . . . custody, but d[id] not vest in either of them tie-breaker authority[.]” Father opposed the motion, suggesting that the parents might resolve their dispute without court intervention. The court denied the motion, leaving it to the parents to continue attempting to resolve their dispute. By the time of the hearing on September 24, 2024, the parents still had not made a joint decision on the selection of a therapist. As a result, the child had not started therapy during the three months that passed since the parents had agreed that she should receive therapy. Throughout this period, the child continued to endure the failed custody exchanges that had prompted Mother to seek therapy. Nothing in the parents’ testimony suggested that they had made any progress towards making a joint decision since their initial disagreements. Based on the evidence, it was reasonable to conclude that the parents were unable to make shared decisions concerning their child’s mental health care. The magistrate reasonably concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to provide “a mechanism for prompt decision making” on the issue of mental health care. Leaving joint legal custody in place on that issue would have been likely to prevent the child from receiving any mental health care, or at least would have caused additional delay. As the circuit court stated in its memorandum opinion, this protracted “standstill” between the parents was “not in the best interests of the child.” Under the circumstances, the court was not required to maintain the 70

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joint legal custody arrangement on the issue of mental health care. In her reply brief, Mother notes that “[h]ybrid versions of joint legal [custody] may be appropriate for a particular issue.” Mother suggests that the court could have maintained joint legal custody “perhaps with a mediator or parenting coordinator facilitating communications between them if there is an impasse.” In general, “trial courts have broad discretion in how they fashion relief in custody matters.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. at 636-37 (emphasis in original). The trial court may choose to allocate responsibility in particular areas of the child’s life, such as health care, if the court determines that the parents are unlikely to agree on those types of decisions in a timely manner. See id. at 637 n.11. The evidence in the present case made it reasonable to conclude that a remedy short of granting one parent sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care would result in future conflicts and, therefore, was not in the child’s best interests. Even if the court might have chosen a different remedy, awarding one parent sole legal custody on this issue was not outside the bounds of the court’s discretion. See Baldwin v. Baynard, 215 Md. App. 82, 111-12 (2013).7 In addition to arguing that the evidence did not support granting sole decision-making authority to either parent, Mother argues that there was “no just reason” to award sole legal custody to Father on the issue of mental health care. Mother suggests that the evidence weighed in her favor because she was the parent who “identified the need for a therapist for the child” and who “first identified a therapist for the child[.]” Mother asserts that Father “failed to identify the need for a therapist for the child[.]” 8 Mother fails to explain why she deems it particularly significant that she suggested seeking therapy for the child “first,” before Father did. When Mother suggested therapy in June 2024, the child was in Mother’s care 100 percent of the time; Father had no time with his child outside of the 30 minutes of interaction in Mother’s presence at the failed custody exchanges each week. Immediately after Mother suggested seeking therapy, Father told her that he also thought that the child would benefit from therapy and he engaged in the process of selecting a psychologist. Under those circumstances, it would be unreasonable to fault Father for purportedly “fail[ing]” to recognize that therapy would be beneficial before Mother did. In any event, the determination of which parent should have decision-making authority on an issue requires a careful assessment of the child’s overall best interest; it does not depend solely on which parent is the “first” to identify an issue. In deciding which parent should have the authority to make decisions about the child’s mental health care, the magistrate considered all of the evidence concerning their decision making. Mother asserts, however, that the magistrate received “minimal information about the parties’ history of decisionmaking[.]” Mother argues that there was an insufficient basis to determine that Father should be the sole decision maker on that issue. In particular, Mother argues that the evidence did not support the magistrate’s statement that “Father’s decision making” on the issue of mental health care for the child “seem[ed] to be more thoughtful and fact based.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In our assessment, the evidence was adequate for the magistrate to make a rational decision about which parent was better suited to make decisions about the child’s mental health care. Father testified that, after meeting with Dr. OjieBadger, he concluded that Dr. Ojie-Badger “did not regularly see children of [the child’s] age” and that he “also had some concerns about her neutrality.” Father testified that, when he first suggested Dr. Santoro as the child’s therapist, Mother “said that she contacted Dr. Santoro’s office, and that Dr. Santoro did not have availability.” Father explained, however, that this concern was unfounded, and he quickly confirmed that Dr. Santoro “regularly sees children of [the child’s] age and that she ha[d] availability.” Mother’s testimony did not rebut the statement that Dr. Santoro “regularly” treated children of their child’s age. Rather, Mother testified that Dr. Santoro “primarily” treated children five or older as her “main age group” of patients and her “current case load[.]” Mother opposed selecting Dr. Santoro largely because Dr. Santoro “is not certified in play therapy.” Nevertheless, when asked during cross-examination whether she was “seeking a play therapist” for the child, Mother did not give a direct answer. Mother stated that she was “seeking someone who has experience working with kids in [the child’s] age group” and stated that she understood that this category would include “individuals who focus on play therapy[.]” Based on this evidence, the magistrate was not clearly erroneous in finding that “Father’s decision making” on the issue of mental health care “seem[ed] to be more thoughtful and fact based” than Mother’s. As we understand this statement, the magistrate doubted the validity of Mother’s stated reasons for objecting to Dr. Santoro. The magistrate did not have similar concerns about Father’s testimony. Throughout the hearing, the magistrate had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both parents and to assess their credibility. The magistrate considered the parents’ testimony about their dispute over the selection of a therapist in the context of their testimony about decision making on other matters. The magistrate was not required to conclude, as Mother argues, that both parents’ objections were equally valid. Even if a different fact-finder might have viewed the evidence differently, the magistrate’s findings here were not clearly erroneous. In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that it was in the best interests of the child to modify legal custody by granting Father sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care for the child. II. Modification of Physical Custody As the second issue in this appeal, Mother contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it modified the physical custody schedule. Mother argues that the modifications lacked any justification and are contrary to the child’s best interests. As Mother observes, “an existing custody order ordinarily should not be modified in the absence of a showing of changes affecting the welfare of the child[][.]” Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 498 (1991). “When faced with a request to modify TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

custody the court must make a threshold determination whether a material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the [previous] custody order.” Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. 215, 249 (2024). “A change in circumstances is ‘material’ only when it affects the welfare of the child.” McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 594 (2005) (citing McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 482 (1991)). “[I] f a court concludes, on sufficient evidence, that an existing provision concerning custody or visitation is no longer in the best interest of the child and that the requested change is in the child’s best interest, the materiality requirement will be satisfied.” McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. at 596. In this case, the magistrate found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the prior custody determination by the Virginia court. The magistrate wrote: “Most notably the exchanges between the parents, which were proceeding without incident, have now become a protracted, unsuccessful attempt at exchanges which is extremely stressful for the child as she is literally in the middle between her parents at these events which occur weekly.” The magistrate further found that “[e]xtraordinary circumstances” existed, explaining: “Father has not had his regularly scheduled time (3 days a week) since March and the child is being put in a difficult position during failed exchanges each week.” On appeal, Mother appears to disagree with the conclusion that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a new physical custody schedule, or at least to take issue with the description of the material change. Mother asserts that “the exchanges were rife with conflict” at the time of the prior custody determination by the Virginia court. Mother also cites the Virginia court’s statement that one of the exchanges lasted longer than three hours. Mother argues that the “conflict” was “not a change.” Mother acknowledges, however, that there was “a short period of time” when the transfers to Father occurred after the Virginia court’s order. Mother argues: “Here, the only change had to do with the ‘failed exchanges’ for the start of [Father’s] access time, and there was no other reason or basis to alter the schedule itself.” To the extent that Mother may be arguing that the evidence did not establish a material change in circumstances, that argument is untenable. The change here was not a change from conflict-free transfers to stressful ones; the change was from successful transfers to unsuccessful ones. The undisputed evidence established that, for about one year, the parties were able to transfer the child successfully from Mother’s care to Father’s care. Beginning on March 28, 2024, those transfers were no longer successful. Consequently, Father had no access time with the child aside from the 30 minutes of interaction in Mother’s presence at the failed exchanges. Although the parents disagreed about the causes, there was no dispute that they had not transferred the child from Mother’s care to Father’s care for six months. At the hearing, all participants recognized that the failed exchanges were detrimental to the child’s best interests. Under either parent’s description, these failed exchanges subjected the child to conflict each week. These experiences prompted Mother to seek help from a child psychologist. Counsel for Mother remarked that the situation “[could not] Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

be at all pleasant for the child.” During cross-examination, counsel for Father asked Mother: “Do you believe what has gone on since March 28th is in [the child’s] best interests?” Mother answered: “No.” After hearing the testimony, the magistrate remarked: “This is tragic for this child to be in the middle of these exchanges.” The situation deprived the threeyear-old child of the opportunity to spend meaningful time with her father for six months. Father did not have any access until the court issued the immediate order modifying custody. There is no question that completely discontinuing visitation with one parent did not serve the child’s best interests. See Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 32 (1996) (reasoning that a change that “effectively discontinued contact” between the child and one parent was “obviously” a material change that might affect the child’s welfare). In her appeal, Mother expressly recognizes the need to find a “solution” to the problems that persisted from March 2024 until September 2024. Mother suggests that the appropriate solution was to “set a strict procedure for the exchange where both parents are present, and a fallback if one parent fails to perform.” Mother faults the court for adopting a new schedule under which she “only has one weekend per month” with her child and she “is unable to be present for any exchanges unless a facilitator is present[.]” Mother argues that the “reshuffling” of the 4-3 overnight schedule was unnecessary. Mother also argues that the only problematic exchanges were the Thursday transfers from Mother’s care to Father’s care and that there were “no issues” with the Sunday transfers from Father’s care to Mother’s care. In her view, “[t]here was no basis to rearrange the child’s parenting overnights to force exchanges to occur at school[.]” As mentioned earlier, trial courts have “wide discretion in determining questions concerning the welfare of children” and deciding what custody arrangement will serve a child’s best interests. Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 345 (2019). When reviewing a custody decision, this Court’s role is not to decide whether it would have made the exact same decision as the circuit court. See Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 638 (2007). This Court ordinarily will not disturb the circuit court’s exercise of discretion unless it was “‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the [appellate] court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 175 (2012) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 58384 (2003)). In this case, we see nothing unreasonable in the modified physical custody schedule that the court adopted. The modifications to the physical custody schedule had two main purposes. First, as Mother recognizes, the schedule was designed largely to “maintain the overall balance” of time established by the Virginia custody order. Under that order, the child was in Mother’s care for four days of the week (from Sunday morning until Thursday morning) and in Father’s care for three days of the week (from Thursday morning until Sunday morning). The second purpose of the modified schedule was to minimize interactions between the parents at any exchanges. To that end, the magistrate proposed a schedule that would

allow virtually every custody transfer to occur by one parent dropping the child off at school or daycare in the morning and the other parent picking up the child in the afternoon. The order kept in place the transfers from Mother to Father on Thursday mornings, a time when the child could attend school or daycare. Rather than scheduling transfers on Sunday mornings when the child would not be in school or daycare, the order required the transfers from Father to Mother to occur on Monday mornings. Then, to ensure that Mother would have at least some access time on weekends, the order provided Mother with one full weekend with the child each month. Finally, the order required that, whenever an exchange could not occur at school or daycare, the exchange must be facilitated by a third party. We disagree with Mother’s assertion that there were “no issues” with anything other than the Thursday transfers from Mother to Father. Even though the Virginia custody order expressly discouraged the parties from making video recordings, Mother’s parents continued to record custody exchanges and Father and his parents responded by making their own recordings. As the circuit court noted in its memorandum opinion, the video recordings were one factor that, along with the parents’ behavior, likely contributed to a stressful situation for the child. As Mother recognizes in her brief, “the high-conflict nature of the parties’ history” was a factor relevant to the custody decision. The court reasonably concluded that it was not in the child’s best interests to continue being exposed to the atmosphere of hostility at the exchanges. It was not unreasonable, therefore, to eliminate the Sunday parent-to-parent (or family-to-family) exchanges. This modification eliminated, to the extent practicable, interactions that might have an adverse effect on the child. Mother further complains about the provision requiring certain exchanges to be facilitated by a third party. The order states: “[A]ny exchanges that cannot take place at school/ daycare should be facilitated between [Father] and a third party—not [M]other— agreed upon by the parties; if there is no agreement, the exchange will be facilitated by a professional monitor, chosen by [Father], and paid for equally by the parties[.]” Mother argues that this provision gives Father “unilateral power to decide if exchanges will even occur[.]” Mother asserts that this provision grants Father “the sole ability to choose the facilitator, leaving him in the position to be able to, in fact, prohibit [Mother] from retrieving the child from his care.” These criticisms are unfounded. The order does not empower Father, either directly or indirectly, to withhold the child from Mother’s care on days when the order grants her physical custody. Like any other parent subject to a custody order, Father is obligated to comply with the order and he is subject to ordinary enforcement mechanisms if he does not. In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion when it modified the physical custody schedule in a way that would allow all custody transfers either to occur at the child’s school or daycare or to be facilitated by a third party.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

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FOOTNOTES

Father introduced a copy of an email that Mother sent to him in August 2022, when the child was one year old. In that email, Mother complained that the child “expressed severe separation anxiety when [Father] forcibly took her out of [Mother’s] arms and was crying uncontrollably because she wanted to be with [Mother].” Mother wrote: “Despite her continuing to cry, call for me, and reach out for me, you snatched her.”

During her case-in-chief, Mother called the maternal grandmother for the purpose of introducing certain video recordings into evidence. The magistrate did not admit the recordings into evidence, concluding that the witness was unable to authenticate the recordings properly.

At the time of Mother’s decision, the Virginia court had already issued a letter opinion announcing that the parties would have joint legal custody, but the Virginia court had not yet entered the final divorce judgment. Mother testified that she did not recall ever reading the letter opinion.

The nickname used by Mother for the child sounds similar to, but is not directly based on, the child’s first name. Although Father does not strongly object to Mother’s use of the nickname, Father consistently refers to the child by her first name.

Maryland Rule 9-208(i)(2) governs the procedure when a magistrate finds that extraordinary circumstances exist and recommends that the court issue an immediate order. Rule 9-208(i)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

If a magistrate finds that extraordinary circumstances exist and recommends that an order be entered immediately, the court shall review the file, any exhibits, and the magistrate’s findings and recommendations and shall afford the parties an opportunity for oral argument. After the opportunity for oral argument has been provided, the court may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s recommendations and issue an immediate order. An order entered under this subsection remains subject to a later determination by the court on exceptions. Mother’s appellate brief presents the following two questions: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Father sole legal custody for mental health decisions when it was Mother who identified the need for the child to have a therapist and there was no other identifiable factor to grant Father this authority? II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying an entire access schedule in a three hour hearing that was otherwise set after a multi-day trial and the sole issue of difficulty was the exchange protocol?

7 Mother also criticizes the circuit court’s decision by arguing that it is inconsistent with the Virginia court’s rationale for granting joint legal custody in July 2023. The circuit court, however, was not bound by that prior determination when assessing the child’s best interests in light of the circumstances that existed in September 2024. The circuit court considered new evidence about the parents’ decision making since the Virginia divorce trial. Based on that evidence, the court reasonably concluded that the benefits of granting one parent sole legal custody on the issue of mental health care outweighed the benefits of joint legal custody on that issue. 8 Throughout her brief, Mother asserts that the child had a “need for a therapist.” This assertion is inconsistent with some arguments that Mother advanced in the circuit court. In her exceptions to the magistrate’s recommendations, Mother disputed the magistrate’s statement that “the parents agree that the child needs therapy[.]” Mother argued that the parents merely agreed that therapy would be “beneficial” for the child. Mother argued that the magistrate’s “finding that the child ‘needs therapy’” was “a complete misstatement of the evidence and [wa]s clearly erroneous.” Mother has abandoned that argument in this appeal.

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025) Family home; personal property; factors

Spencer Nelson v. Jennifer Nelson No. 2229, September Term 2024 Argued before: Friedman, Tang, Kehoe (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Tang, J. Filed: Sept. 16, 2025 The Appellate Court vacated the Charles County Circuit Court’s amended judgment of absolute divorce as to the use and possession of the family home and family use personal property. The court failed to determine which tangible property within the home qualified as family use personal property under FL § 8-207(a). And its ruling did not reflect consideration of the factors under FL § 8208(b) in awarding use and possession of the family home and family use personal property.

This appeal arises from the dissolution of the marriage of appellant Spencer Nelson (“Father”) and appellee Jennifer Nelson (“Mother”). The Circuit Court for Charles County granted the parties a divorce pursuant to an order entered September 27, 2024 and amended on December 23, 2024. On appeal, Father raises the following questions for our review: I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deciding legal custody, physical custody, and visitation? II. Did the trial court err in failing to determine whether Mother was voluntarily impoverished for purposes of a child support award? III. Did the trial court err in deciding property issues under the Marital Property Act?1 IV. Do the cumulative errors of law and fact warrant a new trial? For the reasons stated below, we shall affirm in part and vacate in part. BACKGROUND

The parties were married on June 26, 2010, and they have two children. They separated in the spring of 2023 but continued to live together in the marital home during the divorce proceedings. On October 3, 2023, Mother filed a complaint for absolute divorce. She requested sole legal and physical custody of the children as well as child support. She also sought a determination of the value of all marital property, a monetary 74

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. award, equitable distribution of marital property, use and possession of the family home and family use personal property, and counsel fees. Father filed a counter-complaint for absolute divorce, which included similar requests. Neither party requested alimony. The circuit court conducted the merits hearing over three non-consecutive days: May 6, August 19, and September 27, 2024.2 Parties’ Statuses The parties were about 38 years old at the time of trial. Father has served as a JAG attorney and an active-duty Air Force major since 2014. During the marriage, the family relocated due to Father’s military orders: first to the United Kingdom, from 2014 to 2017; then to Denver, Colorado, from 2017 to 2019; and then to San Antonio, Texas, from 2019 to 2021. In 2021, Father received his current orders to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, and the family moved to Charles County. At the start of trial in May 2024, Father was working as an appellate defense attorney with USAF JAG Corps. He was later transferred to a different office that allowed him to telework a minimum of two days each week. He earned a monthly salary of $13,200. Mother holds a bachelor’s degree in information systems management. Before the marriage and during its early years, she worked for PriceWaterhouseCoopers. After the youngest child was born in 2017, she became a stay-at-home mother. In the spring of 2021, Mother re-entered the workforce as an independent contractor, earning $9,083 per month. She scheduled her work hours to coincide with the time the children were at school. During the summer months, she took on less work to care for the children. Both parties testified about each other’s mental and physical health. Father experienced depression and anxiety and was diagnosed with a milder form of depression, for which he was taking medication. In addition, Father has hypothyroidism, which impacted his energy levels and immune system. However, this condition did not hinder his ability to care for the children. Mother developed a panic disorder in 2021 after the COVID-19 pandemic. She sought therapy and underwent exposure therapy. Mother testified that she no longer has this issue and does not seek treatment for it anymore. Custody Requests At the time of the trial, the parties’ children were in elementary school, with the youngest child, aged eight, entering the third grade and the oldest, aged ten, entering the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

fifth grade. Both children have been diagnosed with autism and see a developmental pediatrician annually. The oldest child attends social skills classes once a week and participates in special interest groups, including creative writing, which support his pragmatic speech development. The youngest child also takes social skills classes and has been involved in special interest groups to gain more exposure to peers. In addition, the youngest child participated in Scouts, and Father usually took him to Scouts activities. Both children were diagnosed with asthma and required daily use of a nebulizer, along with medication through a rescue inhaler as needed. During the marriage, Mother was the primary caretaker for the children. She took them to and from the school bus stop each day, assisted with their homework after school, and scheduled and transported them to social skills classes and extracurricular activities. She managed and took the children to medical appointments, while Father was involved when Mother had a scheduling conflict. Mother planned, shopped for, prepared, and served all their meals, except on Sundays and other special occasions when Father would cook. She alternated nights with Father to put the children to bed. Mother wanted sole legal and primary physical custody of the children for several reasons. She highlighted Father’s behavior during the divorce proceedings, explaining that Father started making “unilateral decisions” regarding the children and exhibited “control issues that don’t allow [her] to have that close relationship” with the children. Mother explained that after she filed for divorce in October 2023, Father became more interested in the children’s schedules. He asked Mother about their homework routine and some of their extracurricular activities because he wanted to be more involved. He also wanted her “to report any deviations from [their] family routine directly to him in advance.” In addition, he “dictated that he is doing certain things” and would not allow Mother “to do those things anymore[.]” Mother testified that in the month she filed for divorce, Father decided to inform the children about the divorce. Mother objected to this conversation because the parties were “trying to work out [a] settlement back then, we didn’t know when [Father] was leaving, we didn’t know where he was going, we didn’t know what the agreement would be in terms of visitation, custody, [and] whatever else.” Since they were still living together, she believed there was no need to have that discussion with the children. She felt the parties needed to resolve issues before speaking to the children about the situation. Despite her objections, Father “decided the day and time” to tell the children about the divorce and told Mother she could join him if she wanted. He explained to the children that they were divorcing, stating that one reason for the discussion was that he wanted separate holidays, specifically to take them to Utah to visit his family for the upcoming Christmas. Mother disagreed with this reasoning and opposed Father’s decision to have the children spend the holiday away from her, especially since they were still living in the same house and could spend the holiday as a family. Mother testified that the parties’ disagreements extended to purchasing Christmas gifts for the children. Mother had TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

already purchased gifts and had agreed that Father could buy additional presents. However, Father purchased a $650 mountain bike for their oldest child, which Mother had previously objected to. Mother described an “abrupt shift” in January 2024 when Father learned that his next military assignment would not take him away from Maryland. According to Mother, Father announced that she was no longer allowed to care for the children from Thursday through Sunday, even though they still lived together and there was no custody agreement or access schedule in place. Mother described three situations in which Father controlled or undermined her access to the children during this period: Drop-Offs at the Bus Stop: Mother would walk the children to the bus stop for school, which was only half a block from their home. On Thursdays and Fridays, Father insisted on driving the children to the bus stop. As Mother and the children were leaving the house to walk, Father would yell to the children, “[N]o, you’re coming with me, get in my truck.” Despite this, Mother continued to walk to the bus stop on those days. When she discussed the issue with Father, he told her that she “wasn’t allowed to be there.” Bedtime with the Youngest Child: Mother explained that they had a routine of alternating nights for reading to and putting the youngest child to bed. On one of Father’s assigned nights, he told the child in Mother’s presence that she was not allowed to snuggle with him. He explained to the child that this was necessary so the child could get used to not having Mother around. Meals: Mother testified that she regularly prepared meals for the children, while Father would occasionally make special meals for certain occasions. However, after January 2024, Father informed Mother that she was “no longer allowed to cook” for the children from Thursday to Sunday. Recognizing that Father had no authority to impose this restriction, Mother continued to prepare dinners for the children as she always had. However, when the dinners were ready, Father would announce other meal options to the children. When Mother objected, Father would respond, “[N] o, it’s my day.” Another reason Mother sought sole legal and primary physical custody was her belief that Father demonstrated “poor judgment” in making medical decisions for the children. In November 2023, the children faced asthma issues that led to the oldest child being hospitalized. Around December 15, just two days before the children’s flight to Utah, Father took them to urgent care to get “cleared” for travel without informing Mother. However, Mother testified that the children were showing symptoms of COVID-19 before the trip, and the oldest child exhibited asthma symptoms and was wheezing on the day of the flight. Despite this, Father took the children to Utah. In addition, Mother requested sole legal and primary physical custody because she believed that Father had shown “poor judgment in parenting,” particularly by not respecting the children’s privacy and boundaries. She testified that Father exerted control over the youngest child, who was modest and desired privacy. According to Mother, Father “target[ed]” and “provoke[d]” this child, failing to respect his Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

boundaries and bodily autonomy. Mother testified about specific incidents of this. In June 2023, Father took a nude picture of this child without his knowledge and sent it to Mother. When Mother asked Father to delete the photo, he instead showed it to the child, taunting and mocking him, which caused the child to cry. In October 2023, the children visited a friend’s family farm. When they returned home, Father wanted to check them for ticks. Father checked the youngest child’s “private parts” in front of Mother, and the child protested. Even though the child was screaming, Father “yanked his underwear down,” causing the child to further yell and cry. In January 2024, when it was time for the youngest child to bathe, Father demanded that the child undress in the bedroom in front of the parties instead of in the bathroom so that Father could take the laundry to the laundry room. On another occasion, the youngest child was on a step stool in the kitchen putting dishes away as part of his chores. Father tugged on the child’s shorts to pull them down, which upset the child. In May 2024, while brushing his teeth, the youngest child had difficulty breathing and asked for his rescue inhaler. Father withheld the inhaler because the child had not finished brushing his teeth. The child pushed Father aside to reach his inhaler. Later, Father punished the child for interrupting and not completing his teeth-brushing. Mother testified that Father would pinch the child’s cheeks or tickle him, which would upset the child and cause him to scream for Father to stop. In the spring of 2024, Father repeatedly tickled and touched the youngest child while reading to him during bedtime, causing the child to scream and cry. On another occasion, Father pinched the child’s cheeks at a soccer game, prompting the child to scream at him to stop. Mother explained that when the child reacted by yelling, hitting, or throwing something at Father, Father would claim that the child had “anger issues” and would punish him by putting him in time-out. On one prior occasion, Father threatened to destroy the child’s tablet. In August 2024, during the interval between the merits hearing dates, the children were sitting on the couch watching television. Father came downstairs and immediately grabbed the youngest child’s big toe and pinched it. The child began screaming and became upset. Father called the child an “angry guy,” which, according to Mother, was typically his defense—saying that the child has anger issues. Mother testified that Father’s disregard for boundaries also affected her. Between 2019 and 2023, Father “flicked” and “slapped” her breasts despite her repeated verbal and written protests. Father did this in front of the children and, at one point, when she was healing from an incisional breast biopsy. Father disputed Mother’s accounts and characterizations of various incidents, suggesting that she was dramatizing these events. Regarding legal custody, Father testified that it was Mother, not him, who refused to co-parent. He provided an example related to the baptism of their children. The family were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints. He explained that in 2018, Mother had a “crisis of faith” and expressed a desire to “dial things back” on their religious practices. The parties compromised by attending 76

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church every other week. However, in March or April 2024, when Father wanted to discuss the children’s baptism, Mother refused to address the youngest child’s desire to be baptized. Regarding physical custody, Father stated that his new local assignment would allow him to follow a week-on, weekoff schedule with the children. However, Mother believed that this schedule would not provide the stability, consistency, and routines that the children, who have autism, require. She further stated that Father’s work schedule would not, and has never, met the children’s needs without resorting to third-party care. She pointed out that even if he could manage this schedule, he would still be working from home while the children are present, leading to a situation where they would be “sitting on devices doing whatever” while he works. Mother also explained that Father’s job required him to travel and be deployed, which meant there was uncertainty about his location for the next year or two, during which time he might receive a new assignment. She did not want the children in an environment that lacked consistency. In contrast, Mother did not have these same challenges; she worked while the children were in school, and she testified that both parents had agreed she would not work during the summers so she could care for the children. Mother testified that if the court were to grant her sole legal and primary physical custody, she suggested that Father have access to the children every other weekend, from Friday after school until Sunday evening, along with a mid-week evening visit and alternating holidays. She opposed making the mid-week visit an overnight stay because she believed the children “thrive on structure and routine” and should be in the “same space” consistently after returning from school. Mother explained that she wanted the children to have a “consistent school routine” because school is challenging for them. Property For the most part, both parties agreed that their property, whether titled solely or jointly, was marital property. The parties disagreed, however, about the marital characterization of Mother’s 401(k), which will be discussed further below. Mother timely filed her 9-207 statement pursuant to the Maryland Rules; however, Father did not submit his until August 30, 2024, after the second day of trial. There were discrepancies in the two statements regarding the values of the property, partly because the figures in various accounts had fluctuated since Mother’s filing and between hearing dates. The properties listed in the parties’ 9-207 statements were as follows: Real Property: The parties owned a jointly titled marital home in Maryland and a rental property in Texas, both of which were subject to a mortgage. Mother requested use and possession of the marital home for three years after divorce. Vehicles: The parties jointly owned a Dodge Ram with a lien and a fully paid-off Honda Pilot. Mother requested use and possession of the Honda Pilot for the family for three years after divorce. Financial Accounts: Mother had the following accounts in her name: a Capital One account where rental income from 2F

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the Texas property was deposited, a First Citizens account, a Robinhood investment account, a Prosper account, a Fundrise investment account, a Coinbase cryptocurrency wallet, and a Coinbase cryptocurrency exchange account. The parties had a joint Wells Fargo account, from which they paid counsel fees and other expenses. Retirement Accounts: Father had a Thrift Savings Plan and a Vanguard account. Mother had a Vanguard Roth IRA. As mentioned, Mother had a 401(k) plan with PriceWaterhouseCoopers that she started in 2008 while working there before the marriage. During the marriage, Mother rolled the 401(k) into a Vanguard Rollover IRA, which had a value of about $135,000 at the time of trial. As we will discuss further below, Mother testified, over objection, that she had about $10,000 in the PriceWaterhouseCoopers 401(k) before getting married. Father asserted that the entire value of the Vanguard Rollover IRA was marital property. Children’s Financial Accounts: Each child had a separate 529 college savings account and Roth IRA. The parties agreed that these accounts should remain with the children. Household Furniture and Items: Both parties itemized various household furniture in the marital home, the majority of which Mother requested use and possession of for three years after divorce. Additionally, between the second and final day of the hearing, Father purchased furniture and other items to furnish his new rental home, which he intended to move into after the divorce.4 The court issued an oral ruling on September 27, 2024 and granted the parties an absolute divorce. The Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce, entered December 23, 2024, provided as follows.5 The court awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children with access granted to Father, as detailed below. The court ordered Father to pay monthly child support of $2,241 commencing October 1, 2024. The calculation was based on Father’s monthly income of $13,200 and Mother’s monthly income of $9,083. 6 The court granted Mother use and possession of the marital home and family use personal property in the home for three years, after which a trustee would be appointed to sell the marital home, with proceeds to be split equally. It ordered Father to retrieve a dining room table, specific Christmas decorations, and his firearms, which Mother acknowledged all belonged to Father. The court ordered that the Texas property be sold and that “the proceeds of sale shall be divided as follows: 60% to [Mother] and 40% to [Father.]” The court ordered that the Dodge Ram be solely titled to Father and the Honda Pilot be titled solely to Mother within 90 days. The order provided that if either party was unable to re-title their respective vehicle, then the vehicle would be sold and the proceeds split evenly between the parties. The court ordered that “the following bank accounts shall be divided equally between the parties: Capital One, Wells Fargo, First Citizens Bank, Robin Hood[.]” As for retirement accounts, the court awarded Mother “her share of [Father’s] military Survivor Benefit Plan[.]” It further TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

ordered that “each party is entitled to their share of the other party’s retirement accounts per the Bangs formula[.]” As for Mother’s 401(k), the court stated in its oral ruling that “the original [$]10,000 that she put in is non-marital, but the rest is split 50/50.” 7 The court granted Mother’s request for counsel fees for certain filings she made in response to Father’s actions. The court ordered Mother to submit an affidavit of fees for the determination of the amount later. Father filed a timely appeal.8 We include additional facts as appropriate below. DISCUSSION

I. CUSTODY AND VISITATION Father argues that the circuit court erred in awarding Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children. He argues that the court erred in applying certain custody factors and that specific visitation provisions in the order were not supported by the evidence, were inconsistent with its findings, and/or were imposed without explanation. Although courts are not limited to a list of factors in applying the best interest standard in each individual case, our appellate courts in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1977), and Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986), have set forth a nonexhaustive delineation of factors that a court must consider when making custody determinations, which have been consolidated as follows: (1) the fitness of the parents; (2) the character and reputation of the parties; (3) the requests of each parent and the sincerity of the requests; (4) any agreements between the parties; (5) willingness of the parents to share custody; (6) each parent’s ability to maintain the child’s relationships with the other parent, siblings, relatives, and any other person who may psychologically affect the child’s best interest; (7) the age and number of children each parent has in the household; (8) the preference of the child, when the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a rational judgment; (9) the capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare; (10) the geographic proximity of the parents’ residences and opportunities for time with each parent; (11) the ability of each parent to maintain a stable and appropriate home for the child; (12) financial status of the parents; (13) the demands of parental employment and opportunities for time with the child; (14) the age, health, and sex of the child; (15) the relationship established between the child and each parent; (16) the length of the separation of the parents; (17) whether there was a prior voluntary abandonment or surrender of custody of the child; (18) the potential disruption of the child’s social and school life; (19) any impact on state or federal assistance; (20) the benefit a parent may receive from an award of joint physical custody, and how that will enable the parent to bestow more benefit upon the child; and (21) any other consideration the court determines is relevant to the best interest of the child. Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 345–46 (2019) (citing Sanders and Taylor, supra, and Cynthia Callahan & Thomas C. Ries, Fader’s Maryland Family Law § 5-3(a), at Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

5-9 to 5-11 (6th ed. 2016) (footnotes omitted)). Other factors that courts are encouraged to consider in custody determinations include: (1) the ability of each of the parties to meet the child’s developmental needs, including ensuring physical safety, supporting emotional security and positive self-image, promoting interpersonal skills, and promoting intellectual and cognitive growth; (2) the ability of each party to meet the child’s needs regarding, inter alia, education, socialization, culture and religion, and mental and physical health; (3) the ability of each party to consider and act on the needs of the child, as opposed to the needs or desires of the party, and protect the child from the adverse effects of any conflict between the parties; (4) the history of any efforts by one or the other parent to alienate or interfere with the child’s relationship with the other parent; (5) any evidence of exposure of the child to domestic violence and by whom; (6) the parental responsibilities and the particular parenting tasks customarily performed by each party, including tasks and responsibilities performed before the initiation of litigation, tasks and responsibilities performed during the pending litigation, tasks and responsibilities performed after the issuance of orders of court, and the extent to which the tasks have or will be undertaken by third parties; (7) the ability of each party to co-parent the child without disruption to the child’s social and school life; (8) the extent to which either party has initiated or engaged in frivolous or vexatious litigation, as defined in the Maryland Rules; and (9) the child’s possible susceptibility to manipulation by a party or by others in terms of preferences stated by the child. Id. at 346–47 (citing Fader’s Maryland Family Law § 5-3(b), at 5-11 to 5-12 (footnote omitted)). Regarding visitation, a trial court has “broad discretion” to impose conditions on a parent’s visitation rights “so long as it is in the child’s best interest and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the condition.” Cohen v. Cohen, 162 Md. App. 599, 608 (2005); see also Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. 299, 310 (1983) (explaining that a trial court may “impose such conditions upon the custodial and supporting parent as deemed necessary to promote the welfare of the children” and that an appellate court “will affirm the imposition of such a condition so long as the record contains adequate proof that the condition or requirement is reasonably related to the advancement of a child’s best interests”). In reviewing child custody determinations, we employ three interrelated standards of review. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 170 (2012). Our Supreme Court explained these three levels of review as follows: When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c)] applies. [Second,] if it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 78

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

551, 586 (2003)). An abuse of discretion means that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,” or the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 625–26 (2016) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). “We will not reverse simply because we would not have made the same ruling.” Jose v. Jose, 237 Md. App. 588, 599 (2018). A. Circuit Court’s Findings In awarding Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, the court made the following findings. The court found that the parents are both fit and proper. Regarding their character and reputation, the court found that the non-party witnesses testified that both parents are “amazing parents” and “very involved” with the children. The court found that the parties are caring, loving, and patient with the children. The court determined that both parents were sincere in their requests for custody. It observed that Father had become more involved with the children since the divorce filing, likely due to the impending custody decision. Regarding their willingness to share custody, the parties disagreed as to the amount of time each should have with the children. The children were too young to express any preferences about the custody arrangement. The court determined that both parents were capable of preserving the children’s relationships with each other, the other parent, and relatives. Mother organized playdates and activities and kept Father involved with the family. Meanwhile, Father arranged video calls with his sister and other relatives in Utah and planned visits to see them. The marital home and Father’s rental home were located close to each other. The court found that both parties could maintain a stable and appropriate home for the children. The parties were each gainfully employed. Mother worked as an independent contractor, which allowed her some flexibility to take time off during the summer. Her job demands did not interfere with her ability to spend time with the children. Father served as a major in the military and an appellate attorney, holding a demanding position. The court found that his work had necessitated relocations to various states and countries. The court found Father credible when he testified that he would be able to spend time with the children. However, it was not convinced that he would have an “open schedule” to be present for them “when they get off the school bus and whatnot[.]” Although he had managed to achieve some flexibility in the weeks leading up to the trial, this required him to take leave from his job. The court considered the ability of each party to meet the children’s needs regarding matters such as religion and found the following: [T]he family is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ [of] Latter[-d]ay Saints. I think that they are wanting to impart that in, with their children, but there is some, there’s a little bit of a disconnect between the parties on what the children -- how that plays out with the children. I think there was some TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

testimony about wanting to go to church and wanting to set up a schedule and that being interfered with. But as I stated previously, the, the parties don’t have an agreement and just living under the same roof, it’s kind of difficult to set those in play. The parties had not reached an agreement regarding custody or access. Because there was no agreement, the court found it “troubling” that a dispute arose over taking the children to the bus stop on days Father claimed he had custody of them. However, there was no history of alienation from either side, which highlighted each parent’s ability to prioritize and act upon the children’s needs rather than their own desires, as well as their capacity to protect the children from the adverse effects of conflict between them. The court determined that both parties could co-parent the children without disrupting their school and social lives. The children were involved in various extracurricular activities and programs, including Scouts, which Father took the youngest child to. The court remarked, “I think that’s real positive and I think that . . . should continue.” The court expressed concern about the parties’ ability to communicate regarding issues that affect their children’s welfare, describing the situation as “really disconcerting[.]” This communication breakdown was a significant factor in the court’s decision to grant Mother sole legal custody. The court observed that their interactions were “filled with animosity.” It noted that Father was in a “rush” to prepare for litigation, which “created a toxic communication environment between the both of them.” It concluded that, although their ability to communicate did not seem “very problematic” on the “surface,” they did not “see eye to eye on major issues.” Although the parties were separated, they were living in the same house. The court noted the challenges of reaching shared decisions about the children while the parties were cohabitating during this contentious multi-day merits hearing, which stretched over several months. The court stated, “[W] hile you’re living together, it’s very difficult to say we’re going to agree to do this and expect for you all to be on board when you’re coming in to [c]ourt and you’re basically mudslinging. You can’t go home and then go like let’s make sure we’re following a good routine.” The court pointed out various disagreements, such as when and how to tell the children about the divorce and how to purchase Christmas presents, remarking, “It’s just really difficult to have a meeting of the minds.” The court noted that the children’s autism was a significant factor in its decision to award sole legal custody to Mother. The court recognized that the children have a specific routine they need to follow, that they require certain medications, and that there are best practices for managing autism effectively. The court did not find Mother’s claim that Father was unable to remember the names of the children’s medication to be compelling. Instead, the court focused on the fact that Father was aware of the children’s autism and asthma and knew they needed medication to “address” these conditions, which was “paramount[.]” The court stated that the relationship between the parties and the children was another significant reason for awarding Mother sole legal custody. It found that the relationships TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

were generally positive, except for the concern that Father “lack[ed] boundaries” with the children. The court credited Mother’s testimony about her observations regarding Father’s interactions with the children, which included tickling, cheek-touching, and toe-wiggling. The court explained, “[B] eing playful is one thing, but when the child becomes visibly upset, . . . it’s pushed a little bit too far.” It observed that, if a child expressed discomfort by saying, “I don’t like that,” the parent needed to “pull[] back” so that the child understands “he has autonomy when it comes to his own body.” The court expressed concern that Father did not recognize his child’s boundaries and tended to downplay these issues. The court referenced the incident where Father checked for ticks as another example of not respecting his child’s boundaries. While the court acknowledged the importance of checking for ticks, it noted that this could have been done in a manner that did not make the child uncomfortable. The court explained that the child “already is challenged with autism” and expressed concerns about Father’s approach to the situation, despite good intentions. The court also referenced the incident where Father threatened to destroy the child’s tablet for not following the rules. While the court acknowledged that Father was trying to do what was best for the child, it expressed concern that his approach should have been more considerate of the child’s autism. The court explained: And I know you said we do this at bedtime and if he’s not, I, I looked for it because you made it, kind of a comment like, you know, he said like oh, like, you know, I want to do this, I think there’s just an appropriate way to do it based on what his challenges are and I just want it, want you to be sensitive to the fact that it can come off that you’re not obedient, so, therefore, I’m going to threaten to take away something, not only take away something, but destroy something, which again could have like some adverse effects on, on his, his mental wellbeing to have something like that threatened. He doesn’t know if you’re serious and so I just, I just find that that’s something that needs to be looked into. Being tickled, pinched cheeks, taking tablet, go to time-out. I just think that these children are under the care of doctors over their autism and their emotional issues and I think that all of that, while well meaning as coming from a father, it just needs to be a little bit more sensitive. And I just have concerns about that. The court found Mother credible when she testified that Father had “flicked” her breast, that she did not consent to this conduct, and that he continued to do so after her breast biopsy in a “malicious way.” The court found that Father’s downplaying his conduct as harmless was consistent with his reaction to the child’s request for him to stop tickling and grabbing his cheeks, indicating a lack of recognition of boundaries. The court did not characterize this conduct as physical abuse. Indeed, Mother trusted Father enough to leave the children alone in his care and had no real safety concerns Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

about leaving them with him unsupervised. However, the court found that Father’s conduct towards Mother regarding her body was a “form of emotional abuse” towards her. In addition, the court found that Father informing the children about their parents’ divorce, despite Mother’s objections regarding the timing and manner of the conversation, constituted “a form of control and emotional abuse.” In another part of its ruling, the court stated that, based on its observations of Father’s demeanor on the stand, it “found him to be absolutely controlling and emotionally abusive in some of his dealings with his minor children and with [Mother] in general, mainly her for the emotional abuse, but some of that lack of boundaries I found disturbing.” The court found that Father’s proposed custody schedule, where the children would alternate spending one week with Father and one week with Mother, might disrupt their continuity in schoolwork, social skills classes, and extracurricular activities. In contrast, the court found that a custody arrangement where the children spend every other weekend with Father, along with one parent helping them with homework each night, could provide better continuity. Based on the foregoing findings, the court awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children. Father was granted access every other weekend from Friday to Sunday evening, with exchanges taking place at a police station unless the parties agreed otherwise. Additionally, Father would have three non-consecutive weeks with the children during the summer break. The court also established a holiday schedule and advised the parties to collaborate on modifying the schedule for birthdays and other special occasions. B. Analysis Father challenges the court’s decisions regarding custody and visitation in various ways. We address them seriatim. 1. Cohabitation in the Marital Home During the Pendency of the Divorce Father argues that the court abused its discretion in penalizing Father for remaining in the marital home during the divorce proceedings, which he was allowed to do. He claims that the court repeatedly commented on the negative environment in the home and “appears to have penalized Father for declining to move out” of the house. He contends that the court’s ruling was based almost entirely on the parties’ conduct during the strenuous period of cohabitation. Specifically, the court focused on Father’s interactions with the children and “controlling” behavior in trying to carve out his own opportunities for parenting time. He contends that the court “ultimately decided only to penalize Father” for remaining in the home during this time. We disagree with Father’s characterization that the court penalized him for remaining in the home during the divorce proceeding. The court’s only remark regarding the parties’ cohabitation was about the difficulty of working together for the children’s best interest during a contested divorce while still living together, and its regret that the multi-day trial had been spread out over months rather than concluded 80

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earlier. Father’s contention that the court penalized him for remaining in the home during the divorce proceeding is not supported by the record and is without merit. 2. Father’s Involvement in the Children’s Lives Before the Divorce Father argues that the court erred in refusing to admit a log he prepared of moments he shared with his children over the years. The log contained columns for “date,” “location,” “activity,” “status,” and “evidence,” and it included descriptions of Father’s activities since 2013, accompanied by photographs. Father attempted to admit the log to demonstrate that he had been involved in caring for the children over the years. Mother objected because the log had not been produced in discovery. The court sustained the objection. Father proceeded to testify without objection as to the contents of the log and why he prepared it: I put in the tracker as it relates to the most current my daily activities with the kids and what I did with them and then I also wanted to put some substantiate [sic] evidence, so I put a picture in there. And then for the long range-stuff, since they were born, I just did one thing a month, just to show that I was involved in the kid’s life and usually put a picture in there to [sic] so that what I said was true. Father further testified that the log contained pictures showing him holding the children, making them dinner, and using a “special calming technique” to calm them. He stated that the log contained “numerous pictures” of Father carrying a child in a chest strap, a visit to the Air and Space Museum and the National Cathedral, “tons of outdoor stuff” with the children, and weekly social activities with them, including attending Scouts and church. Father testified that when he was not deployed, he was “extremely involved” with the children. He testified that he was “100 percent involved” with them and that his caretaking duties included putting them to bed every other day and shopping for them. At the next hearing date, Father again attempted to introduce the log, which had been supplemented with additional entries. Mother’s counsel objected for the same reasons as stated earlier. Father’s counsel indicated that he was offering the log to rebut Mother’s claim that he was not involved with the children. The court stated that Father had already “testified as to what he’s done to parent with the kids” and therefore questioned why the admission of the log was relevant. Father’s counsel explained that the contents of the log would corroborate Father’s testimony. The court sustained the objection. Relying on A.A. v. Ab.D., 246 Md. App. 418 (2020), Father argues that the court abused its discretion in excluding the log based on a discovery violation. However, his reliance on the case is unavailing. In A.A., the father propounded discovery requests to the mother in connection with his motion for modification of custody. Id. at 426. At the modification hearing, the father’s counsel requested that the court exclude the testimony of witnesses for whom the mother had failed to provide contact information and certain documentary TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

evidence. Id. at 427. The court granted the father’s request, ruling that any witness for whom information was requested and not disclosed would not be permitted to testify. Id. at 428–29. On appeal, we held that the trial court erred in failing to inquire as to the content of the testimony before excluding it. Id. at 447. Our analysis began with the principle that, in child custody cases, “[c]hildren have an indefeasible right to have their best interests fully considered.” Id. at 422. We explained that “[b]ecause the court did not explore what evidence [the m]other intended to offer, the court could not have known the significance of the proscribed evidence and its potential impact on its ability to determine the best interests of the children.” Id. at 448. In the instant case, the court did exactly what the court did not do in A.A.—that is, “explore what evidence [Father] intended to offer” to assess its potential significance. Id. Before the court sustained the objection to the log the first time, Father had already indicated that the log contained pictures showing his involvement with the children. In addition, during the colloquy with the court, Father’s counsel further proffered that the log was “identical” to the log Mother had previously admitted and that his log “was just in response to that.” By the time Father tried to admit the updated log at the next hearing date, he had already testified to its contents and to various instances to show that he was involved with the children’s lives. The court essentially concluded that the admission of the updated log was cumulative. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in its ruling. 3. Ability of Each Party to Meet the Children’s Needs Regarding Religion Father argues that the court’s finding that both parents “want[] to impart” their religion in the children and that there was “a little bit of a disconnect” on how to go about it was contrary to the testimony and evidence. He claims that this erroneous finding was caused by the court’s interference during his testimony on the topic of religion, which limited the court’s ability to collect the necessary facts to render an appropriate custody decision. He cites an instance when he attempted to testify about issues between the parties regarding religion on the first day of trial. He claims that the court “immediately interrupted and took over the questioning, requiring [him] to answer highly specific, unintuitive questions of its own making instead of allowing his testimony to develop through reasonable, open-ended questions as asked by his own attorney, cutting off each attempt to do so.” We disagree that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that the court’s interruption prevented it from gathering information regarding this factor. The testimony to which Father refers related to the parties’ inability to make joint decisions about the children’s religion. On the first day of trial, Father testified that the family were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and that he took the children to church every other week. When Father’s counsel questioned him on direct examination about the extent of his family’s involvement in the religion, the court interjected and tried to get Father’s counsel to focus the questioning on testimony relevant to assist the court in deciding custody. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

For instance, the court asked Father whether Mother had interfered with his ability to take the children to church, to which he said no. The court then directed Father’s counsel to proceed with direct examination. At that point, Father’s counsel sought to introduce evidence that Mother would not discuss one child’s desire to be baptized. Father’s counsel asked Father about instances when Mother had not co-parented regarding aspects of religion. The court interjected that counsel was seeking a “narrative.” The court then requested a proffer of Father’s testimony, to which counsel indicated that Mother had “systematically undermine[d]” him, without providing the court with a specific timeframe. Based on the proffer, the court directed counsel to narrow the scope of the questions to specific instances. After a further exchange between Father’s counsel and the judge, Father ultimately testified to a specific example in which Mother and Father had a conversation with the child four weeks prior to trial about the child getting baptized. The court encouraged Father: “That’s what I’m trying to get to. . . . That’s it, that’s it, because . . . if you say something general, it doesn’t help me.” The court further explained to Father that, “it’s nothing against your attorney, it’s just that if I say something that’s calling for a narrative, I have the obligation to make sure you narrow it so that when I write it down on what happened, I can be precise[.]” Father proceeded to testify that on this occasion, Mother “refused to sit down with [him and one of the children] and talk about [the child’s] desire to be baptized so then we could schedule it with the Bishop of our church. And so she refuses to co-parent and talk about that with me and her and [the youngest child].” Father also testified that, although Mother had “a crisis of faith,” “didn’t believe anymore,” and wanted to “dial things back,” Father wanted to raise the children in his religion. Accordingly, he stated, the parties had “made a compromise of going [to church] every other week.” Father testified that he took the children to church every other week, and Mother attended occasionally. Father did not present any further evidence regarding the topic of religion. Based on the record, we cannot say that the court’s interruption prevented it from gathering information regarding this factor. Father was ultimately allowed to testify about the children’s needs regarding religion, and he did not present any evidence on the issue beyond this testimony. Nor can we say that the court’s findings under this factor were clearly erroneous. 4. Mental Health of the Parties and Their Fitness as Parents Father argues that the court erred in admitting testimony regarding his mental health diagnosis and treatment. On the first day of trial, Mother’s counsel asked Father if he was currently on medication. His counsel objected, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 9-109 and Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586 (2000). The court overruled the objection, and Father testified that he took Cymbalta for his dysthymia, a mild form of depression. In relevant part, CJP § 9-109 provides: (b) Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, legislative, Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

or administrative proceedings, a patient or the patient’s authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing: (1) Communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient; or (2) Any information that by its nature would show the existence of a medical record of the diagnosis or treatment. The purpose of the privilege is to protect “confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient from involuntary disclosure.” McCormack v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 158 Md. App. 292, 306 (2004). In Laznovsky, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that, while the mental and physical health of a party is an issue to be considered by the trial court in a custody case, a person seeking custody who claims to be a fit parent does not, without more, waive the privilege under CJP § 9-109 with respect to his or her past mental health “diagnosis and treatment” communications and records. 357 Md. at 620–21. However, Laznovsky did not hold that a party is wholly protected from testimony as to their mental health. “The Maryland privilege, by its terms, extends only to records and communications dealing with ‘diagnosis and treatment.’” Id. at 593 n.5; see also Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 368 (1993) (“Privilege statutes must be narrowly construed.”). “Records of statements made by the patient during group therapy sessions, records of statements made by the patient to other patients during a hospital stay, and records of medication prescribed for the patient[, while confidential,] are not privileged under [CJP] § 9-109.” Reynolds, 98 Md. App. at 368; accord Shady Grove Psychiatric Grp. v. State, 128 Md. App. 163, 179 (1999) (“There is a statutorily recognized difference in scope between a privileged communication and the confidentiality of a medical record.”). Here, Mother’s counsel’s inquiry during trial did not seek diagnosis and treatment communications between Father and his psychiatrist or therapist; nor did counsel seek records about his diagnosis and treatment. Instead, Father testified about his own personal knowledge of his diagnosis and medication. Thus, the privilege did not apply, and the court did not err in admitting Father’s testimony about his mental health diagnosis and treatment. 5. Children’s Autism-Related Needs Father argues that the court’s findings regarding the children’s autism-related needs and the court’s criticisms about Father’s parenting were not supported by testimony from a medical expert or medical records related to their diagnosis. He contends that it was error for the court to make findings critical of his parenting based on Mother’s “biased” testimony, “unsupported opinions about the children’s needs and feelings,” and without independent evidence of the children’s condition. Father’s argument mainly concerns how the court weighed the evidence. “The weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.” Terranova v. Bd. of Trs. of Fire & Police Emps. Ret. Sys. of Balt. City, 81 Md. App. 1, 13 (1989). “Such broad discretion is vested in the [trial court] because only [it] 82

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sees the witnesses and the parties[ and] hears the testimony . . . ; [it] is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the minor child.” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 304 (2013) (citation omitted). The court heard testimony from Father regarding his parenting and his explanations for instances cited by Mother of Father’s parenting, disciplining, and his inability to respect the children’s boundaries and bodily autonomy. The court made findings based on that testimony—that the children were diagnosed with autism, they needed stability and routine, and there were “best practices” for dealing with autism. The court made no finding that Father’s parenting methods violated any best practices. Instead, it merely expressed concerns about the way he parented and suggested that he consult a professional to understand how to gain compliance from the children when they were not following the rules. The court found Mother credible in weighing the evidence. Its findings were not clearly erroneous. 6. Visitation Father challenges specific provisions in the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce concerning visitation. First, he points out that Mother had suggested that Father have a mid-week visitation schedule, but the court did not award him any mid-week visits as part of the regular visitation schedule. Second, the court found that Father’s taking at least one child to Scouts events should continue. However, the court did not take this into account when fashioning the regular visitation schedule, as it granted Father visitation with the children only every other weekend, from Friday after school to Sunday afternoon. Finally, Father takes issue with the provision requiring that exchanges occur at a police station even though there was no history of abuse between the parties or against the children. We agree with Father on the first two points but differ on the third. Regarding the first point, the court failed to explain why it denied the mid-week visit, despite Mother’s recommendation for it during her testimony. In other words, the evidence did not support withholding the mid-week visit from Father under the regular visitation schedule. Regarding the second point, the court mentioned during its oral ruling that Father should continue taking the child to Scouts events. However, it did not seem to consider how the regular visitation schedule would impact Father’s ability to take the child to this activity. In this regard, the court’s order regarding the regular visitation schedule was inconsistent with its own finding. Regarding the third point, there was evidence to support the court’s order “that non-school-day exchanges shall be at the La Plata Police Station, or at another location as mutually agreed by the parties[.]” The evidence indicated, and the court found, that the parties’ communications were characterized by animosity. During its oral ruling, the court expressed concerns about the interactions between Father and the children. It characterized Father as “controlling and emotionally abusive” in his “dealings” with both Mother and the children. This characterization was supported by the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

evidence and the court’s observations of Father’s demeanor while testifying. We discern no abuse of discretion by the court in imposing this requirement, as the court stated it is “the safer way to go for now.” For the reasons stated, we shall vacate the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce as it relates to the regular visitation schedule and remand for reconsideration of that schedule.9 We otherwise affirm the court’s decision to award Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children and to require “that non-school-day exchanges shall be at the La Plata Police Station, or at another location as mutually agreed by the parties[.]” II. VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT Father argues that the circuit court erred in calculating child support when it declined to address his argument that Mother had voluntarily impoverished herself. When determining child support pursuant to the child support guidelines, the court must determine the income of each parent. FL § 12-204. The court calculates a parent’s income based on either “[a]ctual income” or “[p] otential income,” depending on the parent’s employment circumstances. FL § 12-201(i). Actual income is defined as income from any source, including salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, and other forms of compensation. FL § 12-201(b)(1), (3). Alternatively, a court can impute potential income to a parent if it determines the parent is “voluntarily impoverished,” that is, when the parent makes “the free and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond his or her control, to render himself or herself without adequate resources.” Goldberger v. Goldberger, 96 Md. App. 313, 327 (1993); see FL § 12-201(q) (defining “voluntary impoverishment”). In making that determination, the court should consider a variety of factors to determine whether the parent has “freely been made poor or deprived of resources.” Goldberger, 96 Md. App. at 327. These factors include: (1) the parent’s current physical condition; (2) the parent’s level of education; (3) the timing of any change in employment or financial circumstances relative to the divorce proceedings; (4) the relationship between the parties before the divorce; (5) the parent’s efforts to find and retain employment; (6) the parent’s efforts to secure retraining if necessary; (7) whether the parent has ever withheld support; (8) the parent’s past work history; (9) the status of the job market in the area where the parties live; and (10) any other relevant considerations presented by either party. Id. Though a court “need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor,” it must “clearly indicate that it has considered all the factors.” Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356 (1995). If the court finds that a parent is voluntarily impoverished, “child support may be calculated based on a determination of potential income.” FL § 12-204(b)(1)(i). In this case, the court made no express oral or written ruling on Father’s claim that Mother voluntarily impoverished herself. Although Father’s counsel and the court engaged in an extended colloquy about the applicability of voluntary impoverishment during closing argument, we cannot infer TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

from the colloquy that the court rejected the claim. Nor can we conclude that the court implicitly rejected the claim by using Mother’s actual income in calculating child support. Accordingly, we vacate the child support award.10 On remand, the parties are entitled to a new evidentiary hearing on the issue of child support. To the extent the claim of voluntary impoverishment is raised again, the court should expressly make a finding on the issue. III. PROPERTY A. Use and Possession of Family Home and Family Use Personal Property Father argues that the court erred in awarding Mother use and possession of the marital home and the personal property in the home (other than the dining room table, specific Christmas decorations, and his firearms, which Mother acknowledged were non-marital). “‘Family home’ means the property in this State that: (i) was used as the principal residence of the parties when they lived together; (ii) is owned or leased by 1 or both of the parties at the time of the proceeding; and (iii) is being used or will be used as a principal residence by 1 or both of the parties and a child.” FL § 8-201(c)(1); but see FL § 8-201(c)(2) (excluding such property where it is “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; or (iii) excluded by valid agreement”). “‘Family use personal property’ means tangible personal property: (i) acquired during the marriage; (ii) owned by 1 or both of the parties; and (iii) used primarily for family purposes.” FL § 8-201(d)(1). It includes motor vehicles, furniture, furnishings, and household appliances, FL § 8-201(d)(2), but not property acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party or excluded by valid agreement, FL § 8-201(d)(3). “When the court grants an . . . absolute divorce,” the court may decide that one of the parties shall have the sole possession and use of the family home or family use personal property or divide the possession and use of the property between the parties. FL § 8-208(a)(1). In doing so, the court must determine preliminarily which property constitutes the family home and the family use personal property. See FL § 8-207(a) (“In a proceeding for . . . absolute divorce, the court may determine which property is the family home and family use personal property: (1) before the court grants an . . . absolute divorce; or (2) when the court grants an . . . absolute divorce.”); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 26 (1980) (citing the predecessor to FL § 8-207). In awarding possession and use of the family home and family use personal property, the court must consider each of the following factors: (1) the best interests of any child; (2) the interest of each party in continuing: (i) to use the family use personal property or any part of it, or to occupy or use the family home or any part of it as a dwelling place; or (ii) to use the family use personal property or any part of it, or to occupy or use the family home or any part of it for the production of income; and Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

(3) any hardship imposed on the party whose interest in the family home or family use personal property is infringed on by an order issued under . . . this subtitle. FL § 8-208(b). Father does not dispute that the marital home constitutes a “family home” under FL § 8-201(c)(1). Instead, he argues that the court failed to determine which tangible property within the home qualified as family use personal property under FL § 8-207(a). In addition, he argues that the court’s ruling did not reflect consideration of the factors under FL § 8-208(b) in awarding use and possession of the family home and family use personal property. We agree with Father. Accordingly, we vacate the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce as to the use and possession of the family home and family use personal property and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the parties are entitled to a new evidentiary hearing on this issue. B. Property Distribution The purpose of the Marital Property Act is “to divide equitably and fairly the property interests of spouses by giving consideration to the monetary and non-monetary contributions of each spouse.” Hoffman v. Hoffman, 93 Md. App. 704, 711 (1992). “In order to alleviate any inequities between the parties, the Act provides for a monetary award [an award of money] to be granted.” Id. “The monetary award is thus an addition to and not a substitution for legal division of the property accumulated during marriage, according to title. It is ‘intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion of that property.’” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 427 (2003) (citations omitted). In addition to making a monetary award, the court may transfer specific kinds of property interests according to statutory authority. See FL § 8-205(a) (subject to certain requirements, the court “may transfer ownership of an interest in property [described below], grant a monetary award, or both”); FL § 8-202(a)(3) (“Except as provided in § 8-205 of this subtitle, the court may not transfer the ownership of personal or real property from one party to the other.” (emphasis added)). FL § 8-205(a)(2) gives the court authority to transfer the following real and personal property in a proceeding for absolute divorce: (2) The court may transfer ownership of an interest in: (i) a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties; (ii) subject to the consent of any lienholders, family use personal property, from one or both parties to either or both parties; and (iii) subject to the terms of any lien, real property jointly owned by the parties and used as the principal residence of the parties when they lived together, by: 1. ordering the transfer of ownership of the real property or any interest of one of the parties in the real property to the other party if the party to whom the real property is transferred obtains the release of the other party from any lien against 84

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the real property; authorizing one party to purchase the interest of the other party in the real property, in accordance with the terms and conditions ordered by the court; or 3. both. Before it transfers ownership of an interest in the kinds of property just described, grants a monetary award, or both, the court must engage in a three-step process. The court must: (1) identify the marital property under FL § 8-203(a); (2) value the marital property under FL § 8-204; and (3) consider the statutory factors under FL § 8-205(b) before fashioning any award. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 499 (1993). First, “if there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the court shall determine which property is marital property.” FL § 8-203(a). Marital property is any property, “however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” FL § 8-201(e)(1). Marital property generally does not include property that the parties acquired before the marriage. FL § 8-201(e)(3)(i). Second, after determining which property is marital, the court must value it. FL § 8-204(a). The party seeking the monetary award has the burden of proving the value of each item of marital property, and the circuit court makes the final determination about each item’s value. Williams v. Williams, 71 Md. App. 22, 36 (1987) (citing FL § 8-205(a)). Valuation is not “an exact science,” and the court is under no compulsion to accept the values the parties present to it. Id. In the third step, the court shall consider the factors under FL § 8-205(b) in determining “the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in property [described above], or both.” These factors are: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. 2.

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FL § 8-205(b). “The failure to comply with the three-step process requires vacation of any marital award made.” Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 78 (1986). As we explain below, we must vacate the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce as to the determination of the non-marital portion of Mother’s Vanguard Rollover IRA account and the provisions relating to the distribution of property. 1. First Step Under the first step, the parties seemed to agree that most of the property was marital, except for Mother’s Vanguard Rollover IRA, a portion of which was initially held in her PriceWaterhouseCoopers 401(k) and later rolled into the Vanguard Rollover IRA. Father’s challenge in this step is not about the court’s failure to identify marital and non-marital property. Instead, he challenges the admissibility of evidence relied on by Mother to establish the pre-marital value of the Vanguard Rollover IRA. At trial, Mother presented a document showing the current balance of her Vanguard Rollover IRA account. This document was admitted into evidence without objection. She testified that the balance was $135,273. Mother then attempted to introduce another document that showed the value of her 401(k) as of June 30, 2010, just days after the parties married. This document comprised two images. The top half appeared to be an excerpt of a PriceWaterhouseCoopers statement, which included Mother’s “Retirement Plans Summary” reflecting an account balance of $10,126.55 for the period ending June 30, 2010. The bottom half was a screenshot from a website (“ofdollarsanddata.com”) featuring an “S&P 500 Historical Return Calculator,” which Mother used to calculate the investment growth of the alleged non-marital value of the 401(k), amounting to $62,327.95. Father’s counsel objected to the admission of the second document, claiming that “it’s hearsay documentation.” In response, Mother’s counsel argued that the document provided information about the balance held at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which amount was ultimately rolled into the Vanguard Rollover IRA account, as reflected in the first document that had already been admitted without objection. The court overruled the objection without addressing Father’s hearsay objection. Instead, it accepted Mother’s counsel’s argument and admitted the second document based on the premise that Father’s counsel had not objected to the admission of the first document. In reply, Father’s counsel maintained, “That’s a different document. . . . There’s two different documents,” emphasizing that the objection was specifically about the second document on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection and admitted the second document, stating that Father’s counsel could “cross [Mother] on it.” The court erred in admitting the second document. The court admitted the document because it treated this document as essentially the same document or containing the same type of information as the one previously admitted without objection. However, the second document was TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

different from the first and contained information maintained by a different institution. The second document, from which Mother testified, was the only evidence from which the court could have found that $10,000 of Mother’s Vanguard Rollover IRA was non-marital. Because there was no other evidence in the record to support the court’s finding as to the non-marital portion of Mother’s Vanguard Rollover IRA and because we conclude that the court erred in admitting this document, we vacate the court’s determination that $10,000 of the Mother’s Vanguard Rollover IRA was non-marital.11 Because we are remanding the case on property issues for other reasons discussed below, we address Father’s hearsay objection for guidance. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Md. Rule 5-801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible except as otherwise provided by the Rules or an applicable constitutional provision or statute. Md. Rule 5-802; Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 (2005) (“Hearsay . . . must be excluded as evidence at trial, unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule . . . or is ‘permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes.’” (quoting Md. Rule 5-802)). The exceptions are listed under Rules 5-802.1, 5-803, and 5-804. The second document contained hearsay because it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that the value of Mother’s 401(k) as of June 30, 2010 was $10,126.55 and that the investment growth on this portion was $62,327.95. See Md. Rule 5-801(c). The business records exception to the rule against hearsay was the only exception discussed at the merits hearing. See Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6). However, both parties agreed that the second document was not a certified business record, so that exception did not apply. 2. Second Step Under the second step, the court did not value any of the property listed on the parties’ 9-207 statements or that was otherwise presented at trial. 3. Third Step As we explain in subsection 5 below, the court transferred ownership of interests in property that is not authorized under FL § 8-205(a)(2). In addition, the court’s ruling did not reflect that it considered all the factors under FL § 8-205(b) in determining any award. While the court is not required to enunciate every factor it considered on the record, it should at least state on the record that it considered the required factors in making any award. Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577, 585 (1986). In this case, the court explicitly stated that it “didn’t necessarily consider” some of the factors under FL § 8-205(b) in “arriv[ing] at a fair and equitable monetary award [and] transfer of [the] interest in property.” FL § 8-205(b)(11). Instead, it considered only the contributions of the parties (Mother “carried the major load of caring for the children”), the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties (Father was “controlling and emotionally abusive” in particular “dealings” with Mother and the children), and the duration of the marriage (“a long marriage” of 14 years). Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

4. Vacatur Divorce cases involve interconnected financial considerations. Claims for a monetary award, transfer of an ownership interest in property, child support, and counsel fees “‘involve overlapping evaluations of the parties’ financial circumstances.’” K.B. v. D.B., 245 Md. App. 647, 679 (2020) (quoting St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 198 (2016)). Because the factors relevant to these claims are so interrelated, “when a trial court considers a claim for any one of them, it must weigh the award of any other.” Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 400 (2002). This interconnection means that when this Court vacates one award, we often vacate the remaining awards for re-evaluation, even if neither party challenges those decisions directly. See id. As a result of the court’s errors in connection with the three steps, we vacate the determination that $10,000 of the Vanguard Rollover IRA account was non-marital property as well as all provisions related to the distribution of property in the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce. In addition to the reason discussed in Section II, supra, we vacate the provisions of the judgment regarding child support. However, we do not vacate the order granting Mother’s request for counsel fees, as the court has not yet entered a judgment in the amount of fees; the amount was never determined (see supra, n.8). On remand, the court may exercise its discretion and reconsider its ruling that granted Mother’s request for fees. See Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 44 (1989) (until there is a final judgment, “under Rule 2-602, all prior rulings remain[] interlocutory and subject to revision”); accord Bennett v. Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, 259 Md. App. 403, 457 (2023) (a court order that is not a final judgment is “an interlocutory order that the court [is] free to revise and reconsider at any time before the entry of a final judgment”). 5. Remand On remand, the court must reassess its decisions regarding all three steps: the determination of marital property, the valuation of marital property,12 and the determination of any award (monetary award, transfer of ownership interests in property authorized by statute, or both) after considering the statutory factors. See Fuge v. Fuge, 146 Md. App. 142, 176 (2002). On remand, the court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances as they exist at the time, not the circumstances at the time of the first divorce trial. See id. at 176–77. In other words, the court must “take a fresh look at the parties’ circumstances to ensure the ‘equitable’ award that the law requires.” Id. at 177. To give the court guidance on remand, we will address Father’s other arguments. F

a. Vehicles The transfers of ownership interest in the parties’ vehicles are authorized only if they qualify as “family use personal property” under FL § 8-205(a)(2) (“The court may transfer ownership of an interest in: . . . (ii) subject to the consent of any lienholders, family use personal property, from one or both parties to either or both parties[.]”); see FL § 8-201(d) 86

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

(1), (2) (defining “family use personal property” as tangible personal property acquired during the marriage, owned by one or both of the parties, and used primarily for family purposes, including motor vehicles). In addition to not valuing the vehicles under step two of the analysis, the court erred by awarding the transfer of ownership interests in the vehicles without determining that they constitute “family use personal property.” To the extent that the parties have already transferred title of the vehicles, the court can consider their values and determine the entitlement of any monetary award on remand. See Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 410 (2019) (explaining that the vehicle’s title had already been transferred to the wife but that the entitlement to a monetary award of $17,000 for the value of the car could be sorted out on remand). b. Texas Property Father argues that the court erred in ordering the unequal division of proceeds from the sale of jointly owned rental property in Texas. He contends that, when a court orders the sale of jointly titled real property, the proceeds must be divided equally. We agree. Permitting a court “to order the sale of a [jointly owned property], then distribute the proceeds unequally, would circumvent [FL § 8-202(a)(3)’s] restriction on the court’s authority.” Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 164 (2006). “If the court wishes to adjust the equities between the parties, either with respect to the house specifically or the marital property generally, it must make a separate monetary award under FL [§] 8-205.” Id. at 165 (emphasis added). c. Mother’s Financial Accounts Father makes two arguments regarding the court’s decision about Mother’s financial accounts. First, he argues that the court erred in dividing joint and solely titled financial accounts. Second, Father argues that the court erred in failing to consider Mother’s other accounts in its award. We agree with both points. The court did not mention or account for the funds in Mother’s other four financial accounts—the Prosper account, the Fundrise account, the Coinbase Wallet, and the Coinbase Exchange account—in any part of the three-step analysis. In addition, the court erred by ordering that various accounts be divided equally. In Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372 (2019), we explained that the trial court erred in ordering that two bank accounts, deemed marital and titled solely in the husband’s name, “be divided equally between the parties” because that would “constitute[] an improper transfer of ownership.” Id. at 410. Similarly, in Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 102 Md. App. 301 (1994), we held that the court erred in ordering that bonds, some of which were in the husband’s name and some of which were in joint names, be equally divided between the parties, as the court could not transfer ownership of these accounts from one party to another. Id. at 316–17. On remand, all the parties’ financial accounts should be considered along with the other marital property as part of the statutory three-step process.13 See id. at 317. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

V. CUMULATIVE ERRORS Father argues that the circuit court’s treatment of and derision toward him, his counsel, and his case throughout the proceedings warrant a new trial. Since we are remanding on issues involving the regular visitation schedule, child support, and property issues for a new evidentiary hearing, we focus this discussion on whether Father is entitled to a new trial on the issues we have affirmed (i.e., legal and physical custody). Father claims that the “cumulative error doctrine” applies to various errors by the court and warrants a new trial. He contends the court mistreated him and his counsel compared to its treatment of Mother and her counsel during the proceedings. He claims that he was systematically prevented from presenting his full case due to frequent and unwarranted interruptions by the trial judge. He argues that all these issues infringed on his right to procedural due process, requiring a new trial. “‘Cumulative error’ is a phenomenon that exists only in the context of harmless error analysis.” Muhammad v. State, 177 Md. App. 188, 325 (2007). More precisely, it exists only in the context of multiple findings of harmless error. In the case of two or more findings of error, the cumulative prejudicial impact of the errors may be harmful even if each error, assessed in a vacuum, would have been deemed harmless. Where the prejudice from each of two or more errors is fractional, the fractions may add up. Each fraction of prejudice, however, is contingent on an undergirding finding of error. It is in this regard that many promiscuous claims of cumulative error go awry. In a case involving two or more errors, the thing that may cumulate is the prejudicial effect of two or more actual findings of error, not the effect of two or more mere allegations of error. There must first be error before there is any prejudicial effect of that error to be measured. Id. Father claims that the following instances demonstrate cumulative error: • The court interjected when it thought his testimony was speculative or when it thought his counsel’s questions were eliciting “speculative” responses, but it did not do the same regarding Mother or her attorney. • The court frequently interrupted open-ended direct examination questions posed to Father, labeling them as “calling for a narrative,” while allowing Mother to answer similar questions freely during her testimony. • Father was prevented from explaining why he believed Mother should not receive the Survivor Benefit Plan under his military pension after an unspecified objection from Mother’s attorney. • During the cross-examination of Mother on the second day of trial, the court prohibited Father from asking questions about a dispute concerning Christmas gifts, which affected the court’s award of legal custody to Mother. • The court sua sponte prevented Father’s counsel from TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

asking him about how Mother interfered when Father requested to exercise responsibility and care for the children during his remote workdays. The court deemed the question “not relevant,” stating that “they don’t have a set agreement as to how they co-parent inside of the home[.]” He claims that the court refused to hear argument as to the question’s relevance, given Mother’s claims that she was the primary caretaker and therefore the most suitable candidate for primary physical custody. • The court prevented Father from testifying about a video from December 2023 during direct examination, sustaining Mother’s counsel’s objection on the ground that the video had already been discussed on the first day of trial. However, during Father’s crossexamination, Mother’s counsel inquired about the same video he had previously objected to Father testifying from. The court then instructed Father to answer the question, contradicting its earlier ruling. • The court permitted Mother’s counsel to question Father using a summary exhibit that had only been produced the day before, contrary to its strict enforcement of discovery rules against Father. These questions, which pertained to purchases made for Father’s new residence over the previous month, had not been permitted when Father’s counsel attempted to ask them during direct examination. • Father received unequal treatment regarding objections. In one instance, Mother’s counsel asked Father, “Do you have a problem with your memory?” Father’s counsel objected because the question was argumentative—an objection that the court had raised many times against Father’s counsel during Mother’s cross-examination. However, the court overruled Father’s counsel’s objection, stating, “It’s cross.” When Father’s counsel highlighted this discrepancy, the court simply replied that “that’s what your redirect will be for.” As we explained, “there must first be error before there is any prejudicial effect of that error to be measured.” Muhammad, 177 Md. App. at 325. In each cited instance, Father either does not articulate his argument clearly or fails to support his assertions of error with legal authority. See Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6) (requiring that a brief contain an argument in support of the party’s position on each issue); Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 578 (1997) (“It is not [the Court’s] function to seek out the law in support of a party’s appellate contentions.”). In any event, based on our review of the record of these examples, we discern no actual error from which any prejudicial effect might cumulate. See Muhammad, 177 Md. App. at 325 (“Eight times nothing is still nothing.”) (citing Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 685–86 (1993) (“This is more a case of the mathematical law that 20 times nothing is still nothing.”); and Colvin-el v. State, 332 Md. 144, 180 (1993) (where claims individually have no merit, there is no merit to the argument that the “whole exceeds the sum of its parts”)). Instead, Father’s examples are intended to illustrate how the court allegedly treated him unfairly. We have said that Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

judges “have wide latitude in the conduct of trials and may, when necessary, interrupt and restrict attorneys in the presentation of their cases in an attempt to assure a correct presentation.” Ricker v. Ricker, 114 Md. App. 583, 594 (1997). Judges should participate directly in trials because they bear the responsibility for the orderly and fair administration of a trial. Id. “Particularly in non-jury cases, a trial judge is accorded substantial leeway in participating in the trial because the judge functions as a trier of fact as well.” Id. We explained: It is often helpful to a litigant in a non-jury case to discover the direction that the judge is leaning, or to assess the judge’s evaluation of the evidence as it is unfolding. Judges frequently do what juries cannot do during trials and engage in colloquies with attorneys. Those colloquies can contribute to a sharpening of the attorneys’ presentations and arguments. Participation by the court in the questioning of witnesses or in commenting on the evidence can promote an orderly and efficient use of court resources. Id. However, we cautioned that “[a]ctive involvement by a judge . . . must be done prudently.” Id. This is because “[e] ven the most unbiased judge, by actively engaging in the trial, runs the risk of appearing to lack objectivity and may chill the attorney’s capacity to represent the client’s interest most effectively.” Id. We explained: A judge who makes comments that devalue a litigant’s presentation midstream may not be forwarding the goals of a fair trial, but instead may lead the restricted party to believe that the judge is unwilling to listen. A judge who creates a courtroom atmosphere that appears unfair to the litigants may unintentionally cause the proceeding to become unfair. The litigants may react by abandoning a planned strategy or line of questioning that could affect the result or the record. A judge’s participation should not overreach and disrupt a litigant’s development of the evidence. Such behavior can transcend the bounds of proper judicial conduct and can go so far as to deprive a litigant of the right to a fair trial. Id. at 594–95. “Proper judicial conduct demands that judges refrain from activity that unnecessarily restricts litigants’ ability to present their cases and to develop their evidence.” Id. at 596 (citing the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct). Nothing is so valued in a judge as judicial

temperament that forwards the appearance as well as the actuality of objectivity and impartiality. A judge certainly ought not to conduct a hearing in such a manner that permits litigants to feel threatened or to discourage them from presenting their cases completely. Id. at 597. “Judicial remarks can be so troublesome, under some circumstances, as to invite reversal, even in a non-jury trial.” Id. “Remarks by a judge that wrongly suppress critical evidence can alter the course of the trial and the outcome[.]” Id. at 598. “The attorneys developing their cases in the courtroom under our adversary system should not be unreasonably restrained from offering relevant evidence to try to convince either the courts or juries to decide in their favor.” Id. On this record, therefore, the issue is whether the remarks and conduct by the trial judge deprived Father of a fair trial. See id. at 597. Assuming that they were “improper and injudicious,” we determine whether they were such that their effect upon the hearing deprived Father of due process. Id. “[I]n order to prevail, [Father must] show some nexus between the alleged improper comment [or conduct] and the course of the trial.” Id. at 598; see Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 346 (2008) (explaining that the issue is whether the complaining party “was harmed in any way due to the hearing judge’s conduct”). We have reviewed the instances cited by Father and examined the record. Although the court could have exercised greater restraint at times during the proceedings, Father has not shown any nexus between the allegedly improper comments or conduct and the course of the proceedings. The instances cited by Father do not amount to reversible error that warrants a new trial on the issues we have affirmed. CONCLUSION As explained, we affirm the judgment as to sole legal custody, primary physical custody, and the exchange location. We vacate the judgment as to the regular visitation schedule, child support, and property issues and remand these issues for a new evidentiary hearing. As noted, the court has not entered a final judgment on the amount of counsel fees; therefore, the court is free to reconsider its ruling that granted Mother’s fee requests and consider them together with any new fee requests by either side that may develop from the remanded proceeding. Until the court rules on the remanded issues, the vacated provisions of the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce will have the force and effect of a pendente lite order.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. JUDGMENT AS TO LEGAL CUSTODY, PHYSICAL CUSTODY, AND EXCHANGE LOCATION AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT AS TO THE REGULAR VISITATION SCHEDULE, CHILD SUPPORT, USE AND POSSESSION OF THE FAMILY HOME AND FAMILY USE PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; THE VACATED PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT TO REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT AS A PENDENTE LITE ORDER PENDING FURTHER ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT; COSTS TO BE EVENLY DIVIDED.

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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FOOTNOTES

The Marital Property Act is embodied under Md. Code Ann., Family Law Article (“FL”) §§ 8-201 to 8-214 (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.). The Act reflects “the State’s policy that ‘when a marriage is dissolved the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration being given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouses to the well-being of the family.’” Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 506 (1993) (quoting 1978 Md. Laws ch. 794, preamble). The essential aim of this statutory scheme is “to ensure that the value of both real and personal property is distributed in a fair and equitable manner.” McGeehan v. McGeehan, 455 Md. 268, 279 (2017).

Due to a scheduling conflict with Father’s counsel, the merits hearing was held over three non-consecutive days.

Maryland Rule 9-207 requires the parties to “file a joint statement listing all property owned by one or both of them.” Md. Rule 9-207(a). The rule requires that the joint statement must be filed “at least ten days before the scheduled trial date or by any earlier date fixed by the court.” Md. Rule 9-207(c). If a party fails to comply with the rule, the court may enter an order with prescribed sanctions such as barring the noncomplying party from opposing designated assertions on the complying party’s statement, or prohibiting the noncomplying party from introducing designated matters in evidence. Md. Rule 9-207(d).

Father’s purchases were not included in his 9-207 statement, as they were purchased after he submitted the statement.

The amended judgment added provisions granting Mother’s request to resume using her maiden name and requiring the parties to divide uninsured medical expenses for the children equally. These provisions were omitted from the court’s original September 27, 2024 Judgment of Absolute Divorce.

The child support guidelines worksheet does not appear to be in the record.

The Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce made no mention of the 401(k).

Although the Amended Judgment of Absolute Divorce granted Mother’s request for counsel fees as to specific motions, the actual amount was not determined. Nevertheless, the judgment of absolute divorce is appealable because counsel fees in family law cases are considered collateral matters that may be sought after entry of final judgment. Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 337–38 (1996).

Father did not raise any issues regarding visitation during holidays, summer breaks, birthdays, and other special occasions, so our decision to vacate the provision for the regular visitation schedule does not relate to those other visitation provisions.

10 As will be explained in Section III.B.4 infra, we must vacate the child support award for another reason. 11 Separately, Father argues that the court erred in allowing Mother to opine about the investment growth on the purported non-marital portion of the Vanguard Rollover IRA account. In addition, he argues that the court erred in not allowing him to call his expert to rebut Mother’s opinion about the investment growth. We need not address these arguments given our disposition regarding the admissibility of the second document and the court’s apparent rejection of Mother’s opinion about the investment growth. 12 Valuing the property includes accounting for furniture and other personal property in the home. We understand that determining the value of these items can be challenging. However, unless both parties stipulate otherwise, the valuation must be based on competent evidence in the record. 13 Blake v. Blake, 81 Md. App. 712, 724–25 (1990), and Freese v. Freese, 89 Md. App. 144, 150–51 (1991), illustrate a simple format to be followed when calculating the marital and nonmarital interests of spouses and in deciding whether to grant a monetary award. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 93 Md. App. 704, 722 n.5 (1992).

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

Case Index FULL TEXT

BRIEFS

Niccole M. Neff v. Mark D. Neff

Andrew J. Patch v. Pamela T. Patch

Ivan O. Hardnett v. Shameena Felix

Bonnie Yvette Hochman Rothell v. Danny L. Rothell

Robert J. McCutcheon III v. Susan T. McCutcheon

Hanh Ngo v. Duc Nguyen

Sharene Turner v. Ramon Turner

Charles Hammann III v. Emily J. Hammann

Dolly M. Singh v. Randeep Sing

Spencer Nelson v. Jennifer Nelson

Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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Topic Index FULL TEXT

BRIEFS

MONETARY AWARD; 401(K); WITHDRAWALS Niccole M. Neff v. Mark D. Neff

ALIMONY; MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; ARBITRATION Andrew J. Patch v. Pamela T. Patch

CHILD SUPPORT; CURRENT INCOME; EVIDENCE Ivan O. Hardnett v. Shameena Felix

INDEFINITE ALIMONY; MARITAL PROPERTY; ATTORNEY’S FEES Bonnie Yvette Hochman Rothell v. Danny L. Rothell

ARBITRATION; VACATE; ALIMONY Robert J. McCutcheon III v. Susan T. McCutcheon

CUSTODY; MODIFICATION; CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES Hanh Ngo v. Duc Nguyen

MARTIAL HOME; SEPARATION; CRAWFORD CREDITS Sharene Turner v. Ramon Turner

INCOME; CHILD SUPPORT; EVIDENCE Charles Hammann III v. Emily J. Hammann

LEGAL AND PHYSICAL CUSTODY; CHANGE; VISITATION Dolly M. Singh v. Randeep Sing

FAMILY HOME; PERSONAL PROPERTY; FACTORS Spencer Nelson v. Jennifer Nelson

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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Maryland Family Law Update • December 2025

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