August 2026

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AUGUST 2026 Vol. XXXVII, No. 8

When a stepparent adoption meets resistance Commentary: The importance of the tender years hearsay exception. Page 3 When a stepparent adoption meets resistance from a birth parent. Page 4

Steffani Langston is a senior associate at Wasserman White Family Law in Towson.

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Divorce records privacy veto overridden by General Assembly. Page 8

Table of Contents Vol. XXXVII, No. 8 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law 200 St. Paul Place Suite 2480 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Main Number: 443.524.8100 Suzanne E. Fischer-Huettner Managing Director Kendyl Kearly Editor Patrick Brannan Managing Editor Contributing Writers Hope Keller Maryland Family Law (ISSN 2373-7255) is published monthly (12 issues per year) by Bridgetower Media, 200 Saint Paul Place Suite 2480, Baltimore, MD 21202. The standard Digital+Print subscription is $478.80 per year. Periodicals postage paid at BALTIMORE, MD 21233-9998, and additional entry offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Maryland Family Law Update Subscription Services, PO Box 494, LINCOLNSHIRE, IL 60069-0494

advocacy commentary: The 3 Child importance of the tender years hearsay exception

story: When a stepparent adoption 4 Cover meets resistance from a birth parent

6 In the News:

AI is reshaping family law practice, but attorneys worry about DIY research

8 In the News:

Divorce records privacy veto overridden by Md. General Assembly

9 In the News:

Surrendering newborn to ‘safe haven’ can count as neglect, Md. court rules

10 Monthly Memo

Abuse prevention orders remanded for review … Fee award upheld in divorce appeal … SC appeals court: Husband can’t escape alimony by citing future retirement … Record supported decision to terminate father’s parental rights … Husband’s pro se conduct drove up litigation costs, RI Supreme Court finds

To order a subscription go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/ maryland-­family-law/subscribe/ or call 800-437-0916 or by email: support@bridgetowerhelp.com. To renew. change your address or to temporarily stop service. go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/maryland-family-law/ manage-account-fc/ or call 800-437-0916 or by email support@bridgetowerhelp.com. Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they affect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by The Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. ©2026 The Daily Record Company, all rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the express written permission of the publisher. The laws of every jurisdiction may differ, and the facts are capable of many interpretations. The contents of this publication are not to be construed as legal advice and should not be acted upon without consulting an attorney. Letters selected for publication are subject to editing. Letters from litigants in pending cases or their representatives will not be accepted for publication until after their cases have been finally decided. Address letters and comments to Editor, Maryland Family Law Update, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Maryland Family Law Update and The Daily Record Company are owned by Bridgetower Media.

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Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

11 Family Law Digest 13 Full Text Unreported Opinions 78 Case Index 79 Topic Index

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Child Advocacy

The importance of the tender years hearsay exception When allegations of abuse or neglect of a child arise, having the child found a Child in Need of Assistance can provide significant protection for the child. However, the allegations of abuse and neglect in the CINA Petition must be proven at an adjudication hearing where the rules of evidence are in effect, including the prohibition of hearsay testimony. Often allegations of abuse or neglect include statements made by the victim child to a professional, such as a physician or a therapist, in an out-of-court setting. In general, such out-of-court statements which are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible hearsay, unless permitted by statute or rule. In re J.J., 456 Md. 428, 432 (2017). However, Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article provides a “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule allowing the admission of out-of-court statements of a child under 13 years of age if made to certain specified professionals and if satisfying other required conditions. Using the “tender years” exception to admit a child’s statements can relieve the child from the trauma of testifying in court. “This statute addresses the inherent questions of trustworthiness raised by [...] a young child’s out-of-court statement and balances the need to protect child victims from the trauma of court proceedings with the fundamental right of the accused to test the reliability of evidence proffered against him or her.” Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. P.F, 137 Md. App. 243, 272 (2001); see also Prince George’s County

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RICHARD

PERRY

Child Advocacy Department of Social Services v. Taharaka, 254 Md. App. 155 (2022). Although the tender years exception is found in the Criminal Procedure Article, it applies in CINA cases. The exception requires that the child’s statements concerning the abuse or neglect must have been made to a physician, psychologist, nurse, social worker, therapist, counselor, forensic interviewer, teacher or other specified school personnel in the course of their professional duties. The statements of the child victim may be written, oral and may include “sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings and similar actions.” The alleged offender, and the alleged offender’s attorney, are entitled to advance notice of the intention to introduce the statement, and of the content of the statement, which in a CINA case means “within a reasonable time before the juvenile court proceeding.” The court may admit the child victim’s statements in a CINA case only “if there is corroborative evidence that the alleged offender had the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or neglect” and “only if the statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” To determine whether a statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the court considers an expansive set of 13 factors, including whether the statement was spontaneous; whether leading questions were used to elicit the statement; any motivation to fabricate the

statement, including by bias or coercion; whether the child’s alleged terminology is appropriate to the child’s age; the credibility of the person testifying to the child’s statements; and the internal coherence of the child’s statement. In determining specific guarantees of trustworthiness, the court must also examine the child victim, unless the statements come in the form of a recording. In an unreported case, the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the alleged abuser’s attorney was not entitled to be present during the juvenile court’s examination of the child victim under § 11-304(g) (2), as the statute permitted the attorney for a “defendant” to be present, but a parent in a CINA case is not a defendant. In re I.W., 2023 WL 3642083 (May 25, 2023). After examining the child, the court must make a finding on the record as to the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and the admissibility of the child’s statements. Notably, the Maryland Supreme Court has held there is no prerequisite that the juvenile court determine the child’s “truth competency”, the demonstration that a child can distinguish between a truth and a falsehood, before admitting the child’s statements. In re J.J., 456 Md. 428, 433 (2017). The tender years exception is an important tool for child advocates, to protect children from re-experiencing the trauma of their original abuse or neglect while testifying. Advocates must pay careful attention to the § 11-304 procedural requirements so that the child’s out-of-court statements are admissible. Richard Perry is a supervising attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.

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Cover Story

When a stepparent adoption meets resistance from a birth parent By Hope Keller Special to The Daily Record

Stepparent adoption is among the most common forms of adoption in Maryland, but it can be uncommonly tricky when a birth parent does not agree to it, family law practitioners say. When a stepparent adopts a stepchild, one of that child’s birth parents loses their parental rights. “It is a really challenging proceeding if everybody doesn’t consent,” said attorney Steffani Langston, a senior associate at Wasserman White Family Law in Towson.

Birth family Understanding the relationships within the child’s birth family is key to determining the likely success of a stepparent adoption, family law practitioner Sheri Mullikin said. “One of the very first questions I will ask is, ‘What is the status of the other parent?’ ” said Mullikin, who is based in Mount Airy. “Sometimes they’re deceased, but frequently there is another parent, and we have to address their rights” before considering the termination of those rights in a stepparent adoption. Under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding their children. If a birth parent agrees to their child’s adoption by a stepparent, they sign a written consent agreeing to the adoption. If they do not agree, the process changes, said Evan Marmie, an associate at Joseph Greenwald & Laake in Greenbelt. “It becomes a completely separate kind of case,” he said. 4

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Steffani Langston is senior associate at Wasserman White Family Law in Towson.

Mullikin, who estimated that between 30% and 40% of her cases are stepparent adoptions, said that when determining whether to take a case, she focuses on the questions that judges ultimately will ask. First, she inquires if the birth parent has maintained meaningful contact with the child. “Have they been calling, have they been having visits, are they consistent? Were they trying to be a part of this child’s life?” Mullikin said. “I also want to know, has my client or my client’s spouse done anything to

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

prevent the other parent from having contact? If they are trying to block contact, that’s a problem and I want to know.” Mullikin also wants to know if the birth parent has contributed financially to the child: “It could be minor, but have they paid anything at all? That can start during the pregnancy. Did they do anything to provide for Mom during that pregnancy?” The court also examines whether the birth parent has been abusive toward the child or other parent or been convicted of a crime of violence. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Cover Story The child, if they are at least 10 years old, also must agree to the stepparent adoption.

Show cause order When a birth parent refuses to sign a written consent form, or when a birth parent cannot be located or identified, the court will issue a show cause order informing the parent that an adoption case has been filed for their child. “We can still file for adoption without their written consent,” Mullikin said. The birth parent has 30 days to file a notice of objection with the court if they were served in Maryland and 60 days if they were served out of state. Paternity can be another issue in contested stepparent adoption cases. “If we don’t know (that the nonconsenting parent) is the actual father, we want DNA testing done,” Mullikin said. “It could be we have to notify all potential fathers.”

Post-adoption contact agreements When a birth parent does agree to a stepparent adoption, that parent need not be forever estranged from the child, Mullikin emphasized. Maryland law provides for post-adoption contact agreements between a birth parent and a stepparent. “Anything included in that agreement will be enforceable so long as it remains in a child’s best interest to enforce the terms of the agreement,” Mullikin said. She noted that such an agreement might help a birth parent consent to a stepparent adoption. “Perhaps if a parent is presented with that as an opportunity and it’s explained, ‘Look, you can continue to be a part of this child’s life,’ then they may be more likely to consent,” she said. One important caveat: The only way a birth parent can get a postadoption contact agreement is to agree in writing to the stepparent TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

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Family law practitioner Sheri Mullikin said understanding the relationships within the child’s birth family is important to determining the likely success of a stepparent adoption.

Key statutes • Maryland Family Law Code 5-3B • Requirements for Petition for Adoption: Maryland Rule 9-103 • Venue for adoptions: Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings 6-203 adoption. If they object to the adoption and the court rules against them, they forfeit a post-adoption contact agreement.

Best-interest standard Maryland’s best interest of the child standard applies in stepparent adoption cases, Marmie emphasized. “Ultimately, at the end of the day, regardless of what our client wants, it’s a judge’s decision what the best interests of the child are,” he said. “Those best interest standards still apply to an adoption as much as they apply to a custody battle.”

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Evan Marmie, an associate at Joseph Greenwald & Laake in Greenbelt, said a stepparent adoption can change if the birth parent doesn’t agree to the adoption.

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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In the News

AI is reshaping family law practice, but attorneys worry about DIY research

Depositphotos

Artificial intelligence is being used more and more across the legal industry but especially in the emotional and sensitive area of family law. Attorneys say it can help but worry about do-it-yourself research causing issues. Bridgetower Media Newswires

Artificial intelligence is making inroads in one the most emotional and sensitive areas of legal practice – family law. Practitioners and AI experts say the capabilities of some digital tools 6

have proven value in several aspects of separation, divorce, child support, custody, and alimony matters, as well as for the general management of office workflows and attorneys’ court appearances. But they also report that the technology has led to the emergence of

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

clients using ChatGPT, CoPilot and other genAI tools to research their own cases. The practice gives them more general knowledge about the litigation process, but practitioners say it can create unrealistic expectations of the strength and likely outcome of their cases. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the News Family law practitioner Damian J. Turco of Newburyport, Massachusetts, says that overall, AI has had an “overwhelmingly positive” effect on the profession. “Used thoughtfully, it has become an incredibly effective tool for streamlining routine work, reducing administrative bottlenecks, and organizing and analyzing large volumes of information,” said Turco, managing partner of Turco Legal and a former president of the Massachusetts Bar Association. “It allows attorneys to spend more of their time doing what only lawyers can do: Exercising judgment, counseling clients, negotiating resolutions, and advocating in court.” Bettina D. Hindin, a principal at Offit Kurman in New York City, said that clients who come to an initial consultation having done research aided by AI sometimes need to be brought down to earth about the probable outcomes of their cases based on the particular facts and applicable laws in their jurisdiction. “You have to calm them down a bit and bring them to the reality of their situation,” she said. “Each case is unique.”

Help with financials Lawyers say AI tools that can digitally absorb, organize, and analyze personal financial records can be of real help in determining parties’ financial resources in separation, divorce, and child custody matters. Such evaluations are a crucial step in determining spousal and child support levels. Financial AI tools can ferret out suspicious spending or investment patterns that it would take attorneys or law firm staff hours to discover, if they noticed them at all, said Hindin. Those anomalies, if verified by accountants or other forensics experts, can indicate that parties are attempting to hide assets or income, she added. “But there is a huge caveat,” Hindin cautioned. “It is not a replaceTheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

ment for the work and the judgment of the lawyer. It makes mistakes. It makes a lot of mistakes. As a basic tool to get you in the right arena and help you build a case, it is useful. But check your work.” Samuel Estreicher, professor of law at New York University School of Law, agreed that AI tools can be useful at “aggregative” tasks, such as absorbing high volumes of information and tabulating or organizing it in a form that lawyers can access. But he said AI can be “problematic” as a tool for legal research because of hallucinations and other inaccuracies.

Cost factors Half of American law firms employ five attorneys or less, and most family law practices fall into the soloor small-sized firm category. That means family law firms may not be able to afford licensing the more sophisticated legal AI tools that larger firms regularly deploy. But Hans Guntren, founder of the legal management services company Deliberately.ai, suggested that the more limited resources of many family law practitioners increases the importance of adopting legal-industry-specific AI technology to add sophistication to their operations. “Family law is often dismissed as too emotional, too complex, or too fragmented to benefit from technology,” he said in an article written for the American Bar Association earlier this year. “In reality, those are precisely the reasons artificial intelligence is most urgently needed here.” He noted that a single family law case can involve thousands of pages of financial records, plus years’ worth of text messages between the parties, photographs, medical and psychological records, property records, insurance documents, and other materials – all records that AI can triage and organize faster than any human team could.

Problems with pro se litigants Another area of family law practice where AI is having a notable effect is in the number of filings by self-represented clients, said Barbara M. Seymour, a professional responsibility and legal ethics specialist at Clawson & Staubes in Columbia, South Carolina. Seymour said that while general AI tools can make filings by self-represented plaintiffs look polished and sound reasonable, the papers often fail to meet applicable legal requirements and are threatening to overwhelm already crowded court dockets. Judge Jeffrey S. Sunshine, the coordinating judge for matrimonial matters in the New York state court system, said family attorneys are “cautious” about over relying on AI tools because most lawyers realize that large-language models are “only as good as the information you put into them” and understand the risks of “hallucinated” cases. Even the most accurate legal AI research materials are no substitute for old-fashioned research on LexisNexis and Westlaw, or in state-specific statute commentaries, Sunshine opined. “I don’t think that AI is evil,” said Sunshine, who is also a state Supreme Court justice in Brooklyn. “[But] it shouldn’t be your primary source of research. … I don’t think you can rely on it as the be all and end all.” Hindin agreed that that family law matters should stay “stubbornly human” until the time AI legal tools can be shown to be as “sentient” as human lawyers. Litigants in divorce or child custody and support cases are going through what for many is the most meaningful legal and personal matters they will face in their lifetimes, and they deserve the compassion and know-how of a lawyer to guide their journeys, she said. Hindin said a coffee mug on her desk says it all, “Your Google search does not replace my law degree.’ ”

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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In the News

Divorce records privacy veto overridden by General Assembly By Hannah Gaskill HGaskill@TheDailyRecord.com

ANNAPOLIS — The Maryland General Assembly on Aug. 4 overrode Gov. Wes Moore’s vetoes on two bills: legislation to make divorce records more private and to increase regulations for freight trains. In late May, Moore, a Democrat, issued veto letters for five bills that the legislature sent to his desk. The General Assembly, which convened a special session starting Aug. 3, bypassed Moore, allowing two pieces of legislation to take effect. Under the Maryland Constitution, bills passed during a regular legislative session that are vetoed by the governor must be taken up during the next time the legislature convenes if lawmakers intend to override him. A three-fifths vote is required from both chambers to do it. That’s what happened to Moore’s veto of Senate Bill 426, which requires that public records requests for divorce applications, financial and settlement records and custody orders be denied under the Maryland Public Information Act. This exempts final decrees. Under the legislation sponsored by Sen. Charles E. Sydnor III, D-Baltimore County, records custodians may allow these protected documents to be accessed if the person who requests them is a party of those proceedings or their attorney, or if the requesting individual has been authorized to inspect the records by court order. In his May 22 veto letter, Moore wrote that there are already protective measures in place that shield personal information from public inspection and that judicial records are generally governed by the Maryland Rules on Access to Judicial Records rather than the Public Information Act. The governor argued that because the bill lacked clarity, 8

The Daily Record file photo

The Maryland General Assembly overrode Gov. Wes Moore’s veto of a bill that makes divorce records more private during a special legislative session on Aug. 4.

it could lead to “interpretive challenges that could lead to larger constitutional questions.” Moore’s veto was overridden unanimously in both chambers. The General Assembly also overrode the governor’s veto of House Bill 862, which will prohibit freight trains that share the same corridor as high-speed passenger or commuter trains from operating in Maryland unless at least two crewmembers are aboard. Under the bill sponsored by Del. Dana Stein, D-Baltimore County, railroad companies will be solely responsible for the actions of their employees who violated the provisions of the bill. First offenses will result in a $10,000 fine, and any subsequent offenses over the following three years will cost up to $25,000. In another veto letter, Moore said a 2024 federal law established a final rule that created a two-person crew standard for freight operations and that the state-level policy would have been preempted. Lawmakers voted to override at 99-30 in the House of Delegates and 33-11 in the Senate. Three other vetoes didn’t get votes during the special session. The legislature did not null Moore’s

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

veto on Senate Bill 459, which would have mandated that half of the money budgeted for the state’s advertising to be directed to Maryland news organizations. Sponsored by Sen. Jim Rosapepe, D-Anne Arundel and Prince George’s, the legislation would not have applied to out-of-state advertising for tourism, employee recruitment or economic investment. In the letter explaining why he issued a veto, Moore said the bill would significantly impair the state’s ability to communicate with residents via modern advertising channels, including digital platforms, streaming services, outdoor media and partnerships with major regional organizations. Additionally, he wrote that the bill could put the state at financial risk by investing in news outlets regardless of their “proven standards of accuracy, accountability, and return on investment.” The General Assembly also declined to override the veto of House Bill 1151. Sponsored by Del. Thomas Hutchinson, R-Lower Eastern Shore, the legislation would have required the state’s Medicaid program and the Maryland Health Care Commission to study the potential financial impact the state would bear for reimbursing hospice houses for room and board services provided to patients during the last six months of life. Moore wrote that the state is preparing to forgo $2.7 million in Medicaid funding from the federal government because of the continued rollout of President Donald Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” In addition, the legislators did not take up Senate Bill 448, which is the duplicate of a House bill Moore signed to issue $27 million in general obligation bonds to acquire, construct, improve or renovate public facilities and public works projects. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the News

Surrendering newborn to ‘safe haven’ can count as neglect, Md. court rules By Ian Round IRound@TheDailyRecord.com

A parent who legally surrenders a newborn to a state-designated “safe haven” could be found to have neglected the child, the Maryland Supreme Court ruled in July. For more than two decades, the Maryland Safe Haven Act allowed parents to avoid civil liability or criminal prosecution for abandonment if they leave newborns at a hospital or other designated facility up to 60 days after birth. The facilities are required to provide care and then transfer the baby to the local jurisdiction’s department of social services. The ongoing custody and care are governed by the state’s Child in Need of Assistance statute, and the Maryland high court ruled July 15 that a finding of parental neglect is “necessary” for that system to work. In the 5-2 decision, Justice Peter Killough wrote that a parent’s surrender under the law could constitute neglect “where the uncontested facts establish that the surrendered child had no legal custodian and no provision for care upon hospital discharge, placing the child at substantial risk of harm.” Killough wrote that a neglect finding is based on a child’s “actual condition — not a categorical legal inference from the fact of surrender.” The ruling means that parents who are unable to raise their newborns might face the legal consequences of having committed neglect despite having surrendered them to locations deemed by the state to be safe. Parents could be placed on a child abuse registry, face more difficulty obtaining visitation or custody rights, and be disqualified from servTheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

The Daily Record/File Photo

The Maryland Supreme Court (formerly the Court of Appeals) building is shown in Annapolis in 2004.

ing as a foster parent, according to the Maryland Office of the Public Defender, which represented a mother who surrendered twins at Baltimore Washington Medical Center in September 2024. “We are aware that our holding requires us to attach the label of ‘neglect’ to an act the General Assembly has affirmatively encouraged and sought to protect,” Killough wrote. “That cannot be helped,” he continued. “The label is what the statute requires, and it is what the agency implementing the statute has applied for twenty-two years. A parent who complies with the Safe Haven Act faces a neglect finding — a finding that is necessary for the protective machinery of the State to operate.” Killough wrote the General Assembly has left this regulatory system “undisturbed” for more than two decades. If the General Assembly believes parents shouldn’t be found to have committed “neglect,” he wrote, it should pass a bill similar to one that was considered in 2019. That legislation would have allowed a local department of social services

to assume guardianship without neglect findings. The Office of the Attorney General, which represented the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services in the case, declined to comment. The Office of the Public Defender did not respond to a request for comment. Killough wrote that the mother’s interpretation of the law was narrow and “would lead to an absurd and illogical result.” “For an unharmed newborn who is left with a responsible adult or at a designated facility under the Safe Haven Act, the child cannot be a CINA unless the juvenile court finds that the child ‘has been neglected,’” he wrote. The mother appealed, arguing that a neglect finding is part of the “civil liability” from which the law protects parents. While the appeal proceeded, the father was awarded full custody. Killough was joined by Chief Justice Matthew Fader and justices Jonathan Biran, Brynja Booth and Steven Gould. Justices Shirley Watts and Angela Eaves agreed that the Safe Haven Act doesn’t immunize a parent from a neglect finding but argued the premise of the law is to encourage parents to place their children in safe hands if they are unable to provide for them. “A parent does not necessarily place a child at a substantial risk of harm by leaving an unharmed newborn at a designated facility without expressing an intent to return, which is exactly what Maryland’s Safe Haven statute authorizes,” Watts wrote in the dissent. “The statute expressly contemplates that the surrendering parent may leave the child and not come back.”

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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In the News

Monthly Memo Abuse prevention orders remanded for review BOSTON, MA -- Where a defendant father has filed an appeal challenging two District Court abuse prevention orders obtained by the plaintiff mother on behalf of the divorced couple’s two minor children, a remand must be ordered because the judge’s oral findings on the record raise a concern that the correct standard was not applied. “… On appeal, the father contends that the judge made no independent findings and instead impermissibly relied on findings of the judge who presided over the prior ex parte proceeding. We vacate the orders of February 26, 2025, extending the abuse prevention orders, and remand the cases for further proceedings. … “… ‘An ex parte order is entitled to no weight and the issue must be relitigated anew.’ … BridgeTower Media Newswires

Fee award upheld in divorce appeal PROVIDENCE, RI -- A Family Court order requiring a defendant to pay his former wife $74,680 to offset her fees and costs has been upheld on appeal because of his repetitive and unsupported legal arguments. A Family Court magistrate found that the defendant had violated both Rule 11 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure and G.L. §9-29-21 “because of specious arguments and filings made for which there was no reasonable legal or factual basis during the pendency of this divorce.” While acknowledging that the defendant had the right to proceed pro se, the magistrate determined that he had failed to make a reasonable inquiry as to whether his positions were supported by sufficient evidence and had not made his claims in good faith. Moreover, the magistrate noted that the defendant continued to proceed pro se despite multiple admonitions encouraging him to retain counsel, causing the plaintiff to incur substantial costs in re-

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sponding to the defendant’s unsubstantiated claims. The fee order was upheld by a Family Court judge. BridgeTower Media Newswires

SC appeals court: Husband can’t escape alimony by citing future retirement COLUMBIA, SC -- The South Carolina Court of Appeals largely upheld a family court’s divorce judgment resolving disputes over alimony, equitable distribution of real estate, and retirement assets, while modifying the order to clarify how the parties’ retirement accounts should be divided through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The court affirmed, with modifications, a divorce judgment awarding the wife permanent periodic alimony, ordering the sale of most marital real estate, and equally dividing the marital estate, while clarifying the method for calculating and dividing the marital portion of the husband’s retirement accounts through a QDRO. The husband challenged the award of $2,500 per month in permanent periodic alimony, arguing it should terminate when he reaches mandatory retirement age because his future income would decline. The appellate court rejected that argument, finding the family court properly considered the statutory alimony factors, including the parties’ incomes and expenses, and explaining that any future retirement remains speculative. The court further noted that South Carolina law expressly permits a supporting spouse to seek modification of alimony upon retirement if circumstances materially change, and the family court had clarified that its order did not preclude such a future request. BridgeTower Media Newswires

Record supported decision to terminate father’s parental rights RICHMOND, VA -- Where a father failed to complete services provided by the Hampton Department of Social

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

Services, never provided proof of a stable income sufficient to support the children’s needs, missed meetings and maintained minimal contact with the Department, the circuit court did not err in terminating his parental rights, which was in his children’s best interests. Curtis Daniels appeals the circuit court’s orders terminating his parental rights. He contends that the evidence did not support termination and that the circuit court erred in declining his request for more time to remedy the conditions resulting in foster care. BridgeTower Media Newswires

Husband’s pro se conduct drove up litigation costs, RI Supreme Court finds PROVIDENCE, RI -- A defendant was properly ordered to pay his exwife nearly $75,000 in attorneys’ fees over his conduct as a pro se litigant in their divorce proceedings, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has determined. Plaintiff Cassandra Constantino asserted that her husband, defendant Zsolt Orban, attempted in bad faith to draw out the proceedings and drive up her litigation costs by repeatedly advancing baseless, unsupported claims that non-marital assets and property her parents had gifted and left to her in Brazil had been transmuted into marital property. She also argued that such conduct justified an award of attorneys’ fees under both Family Court Rule 11, which provides sanctions against litigants for filings meant to increase the opposing side’s litigation costs, and G.L. §9-29-21, which authorizes sanctions for frivolous actions. A Family Court judge agreed with Constantino that her separate property in Brazil had not, in fact, been transmuted into marital property and that Orban indeed should be sanctioned. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. BridgeTower Media Newswires

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Family Law Digest RICHARD A. THOMAS JR. V. ARETHA RAMNARINE THOMAS Alimony; statutory factors; voluntary impoverishment No. 0237, September Term 2025 Argued before: Leahy, Albright, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J. Filed: June 30, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s award of alimony to wife for two years in the amount of $2,000. The court explicitly addressed the factors outlined in Maryland Code, Family Law § 11-106, including the parties’ standard of living, the ability of wife to obtain employment, the parties’ needs and resources, and the awards made under § 8-205. Contrary to husband’s contentions, the court also considered whether wife had voluntarily impoverished herself.

JAHARI D. COPPER V. NATASHA L. COPPER Child support; arrears; contract No. 1245, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Zic, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Graeff, J. Filed: June 23, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Talbot County Circuit Court’s child support award, requiring father to pay $754.00 per month for the support and maintenance of the minor child, and to pay mother $188.50 per month toward arrearages until they were paid in full. Although father argued that child support is a contractual matter, requiring a valid agreement, he is incorrect. Child support is a legal obligation, which does not require a contract and cannot be waived by agreement.

SYED SAQIB ALI V. SUSAN AL Final protective order; imminent harm; fear No. 2407, September Term 2024 Argued before: Friedman, Zic, Kenney (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Zic, J. Filed: June 10, 2026

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The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Court’s final protective order in favor of wife. There was sufficient evidence that husband’s conduct placed wife in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Wife testified that she felt harassed and frightened by husband’s many “anonymous” phone calls to her and to daughter. She further testified that she was scared on two occasions when husband waited in his car and then drove past her in a manner that frightened her—particularly considering an earlier encounter in which she felt he had tried to run her off of the road. The court also noted during the hearing that, while wife was testifying, husband was “glaring, smiling, laughing, [and] shaking his head” at her.

AMANEH ARASTEH V. MICHAEL ARASTEH Disputed assets; monetary award; equitable distribution No. 892, September Term 2025 Argued before: Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: June 9, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s monetary award of $70,000 to wife. In the record provided to this court, nothing suggests that the trial court omitted any disputed assets from the equitable distribution.

CHANAN ZLOTNITSKY V. LIMOR ZLOTNITSKY Actual income; spousal support; child support No. 2512, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Wright (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Wright, J. Filed: June 5, 2026 The Appellate Court reversed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s calculation of husband’s income. The court essentially treated the deposits into husband’s checking account as “actual income” separate from husband’s yearly salary, even though there was no evidence or argument to this effect. And, because the court relied on an erroneous income determination when deciding spousal support, child support and the award of attorneys’ fees, those decisions were also reversed.

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Family Law Digest EMMANUEL IFEAGWU V. CHIDINMA IFEAGWU Imputed income; voluntary impoverishment; factual findings Nos. 1842, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Friedman, Woodward (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Friedman, J. Filed: June 2, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s division of marital property and custody award. Although the trial court did not make an explicit finding that father was voluntarily impoverished, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the implicit finding of voluntary impoverishment that necessarily accompanied the trial court’s decision to impute income to father.

BRANDON JOHNSON V. COCONUT JACOBS Health care; best interests; statutory factors No. 2275, September Term 2025 Argued before: Berger, Arthur, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: June 1, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s order, inter alia, granting mother sole legal custody regarding the minor child’s health care. The circuit court engaged with the Maryland Code, Family Law § 9-201 factors in reaching its custody determination, considering three relevant factors when making the challenged determination.

was used in the exercise of domestic authority to punish or discipline her for her betterment or the promotion of her welfare. Nor did the court consider whether the amount of force used was moderate and reasonable in light of her age, condition, disposition and other surrounding circumstances, or articulate any finding that father’s infliction of corporal punishment was excessive, cruel or immoderate.

ASHLEE SMITH TURNER V. BLAIR ABELLE-KISER Physical and legal custody; minor child; statutory factors No. 2052, September Term 2024; No. 1783, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, J.; Nazarian, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Nazarian, J. Filed: April 28, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s legal and physical custody order regarding the parties’ minor child. The court evaluated the relevant factors, made factual findings that were supported by the record and applied the factors reasonably to the facts.

ALLISON HOFF V. MICHAEL PEREZ Custody; relevant factors; testimony and evidence No. 1280, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, J.; Nazarian, Reed, JJ. Opinion by: Reed, J. Filed: April 27, 2026

LEONID BURLACHUK V. JOYCELYN BURLACHUK Final protective order; corporal punishment; factual findings No. 1065, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J.; Nazarian, Harrell (specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Harrell, J.

The Appellate Court affirmed the Calvert County Circuit Court’s custody award. The circuit court judge properly considered testimony and evidence pertaining to each of the relevant factors. Its factual conclusions are appropriately based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing and thus are not clearly erroneous and are due deference on appeal.

Filed: May 8, 2026 The Appellate Court vacated the Howard County Circuit Court’s final protective order in favor of mother and two minor children. At no time did the court consider whether the corporal punishment imposed by father on one child 12

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Alimony; statutory factors; voluntary impoverishment

Richard A. Thomas Jr. v. Aretha Ramnarine Thomas No. 0237, September Term 2025 Argued before: Leahy, Albright, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J. Filed: June 30, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s award of alimony to wife for two years in the amount of $2,000. The court explicitly addressed the factors outlined in Maryland Code, Family Law § 11-106, including the parties’ standard of living, the ability of wife to obtain employment, the parties’ needs and resources, and the awards made under § 8-205. Contrary to husband’s contentions, the court also considered whether wife had voluntarily impoverished herself.

After twelve years of marriage, appellant Richard A. Thomas, Jr. (“Husband”), filed for divorce from appellee Aretha Ramnarine Thomas (“Wife”). Wife responded with a counter-complaint, also seeking absolute divorce. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered a judgment of absolute divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. In its judgment, the court awarded Wife $2,000 per month in alimony for two years; half of the value of the marital home; a marital award of $12,800, calculated as half of the value of a car; fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband’s pension under the Bangs formula;1 and $80,261.98 from Husband’s 401K retirement account. Husband filed this timely appeal and presents three questions for our review, which we combine and rephrase as follows:2 1. In deciding the marital property award, was the circuit court clearly erroneous in classifying the 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass as marital property, and did it abuse its discretion in its distribution of the marital home? 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by awarding Wife alimony? We hold that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in classifying the 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass as marital property, because the parties agreed in a joint statement that the property was marital, and because Husband provided insufficient evidence tracing the source of funds for the vehicle to nonTheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. marital property. We also hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife half of the value of the marital home or in awarding Wife alimony. Contrary to Husband’s assertions, the trial court properly conducted the requisite analyses under the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code. BACKGROUND

The parties married on April 30, 2012, in Prince George’s County. At the time of the marriage, Wife had a five-year-old child, M. During the marriage, the parties had no other children. Wife’s lack of full-time work and Husband’s alleged infidelity were among the reasons cited by the parties that led to their irreconcilable differences. The Divorce On May 28, 2024, Husband filed a complaint requesting an absolute divorce, a classification and valuation of marital property, and a monetary award. Wife filed an answer and a counter-complaint seeking, among other things: 1) an absolute divorce; 2) a determination and valuation of marital property; 3) a division, transfer, or sale of all jointly owned property; 4) an equitable distribution of the proceeds in the event of a sale; 5) a monetary award to adjust the equities; 6) rehabilitative and permanent alimony; and 7) attorneys’ fees. Husband responded, asking, among other things, that the court deny Wife’s claim for alimony and attorneys’ fees. The court held a hearing on December 17, 2024. Wife was called to testify first in Husband’s case. She recounted that during the first eight years of the marriage, the parties lived in an apartment in Maryland.3 During that time, Wife worked at A&T Towing full-time as an administrative assistant where she was paid $10 an hour. In an effort to start a catering business, Wife left her position at A&T Towing for about two years. Wife ran the catering business on her own, earning $24,000 in the first year. Wife had less success in the second year, so she closed the business and returned to A&T Towing in a part-time capacity. Wife explained that despite her attempts, she had been unable to obtain more hours at A&T Towing. She further explained that she did not attempt to retain employment elsewhere, in part because the divorce had been challenging for her and Husband never expressed a desire for her to contribute more to the family’s expenses prior to the divorce. In 2016, the parties vacated the apartment and moved into the marital home. Wife testified that the parties agreed she would contribute to the bills, groceries, and toiletries while Husband would pay the mortgage. Wife also paid the closing costs for the home. Wife asserted that before the parties separated in 2022, Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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they each contributed to maintenance of the house, but now those responsibilities (cutting the grass, cleaning, and taking out the trash) mostly fell on Wife. When Wife returned to the stand during her case, she expounded that the couple “started living separate and apart within the home[,]” when he became unfaithful in the marriage. She also alleged that Husband was abusive to her, causing her to file a protective order against him. Wife acknowledged that she filed the order two days after Husband filed for divorce and that the court denied her request for protective order. She believed that the marriage was “irretrievably broken and there [was] no expectation of reconciliation[.]” Regarding the family finances, Wife stated that she earned approximately $9,000 in 2021, $8,500 in 2022, and $10,000 in 2023. She also had an IRA with approximately $9,000, all of which was acquired during the marriage. She asserted that Husband provided most of the financial support during the marriage and that as a family they had a “good standard of living.” Regarding their assets, Wife stated that the marital home was worth approximately $375,000 and the 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass (“Cutlass”) was worth $40,000. Wife explained that Husband obtained the Cutlass by swapping it for another vehicle, an Impala, that he acquired prior to the marriage. She described the Cutlass as being in “ridiculous condition” when Husband traded the Impala for it, but that after he refurbished it, the car looked much better, giving it the value she assigned. Wife testified that the Cutlass was titled in her name until Husband “forced [her] to sign the title over to him” in February of 2023. Husband testified that his career as an electrician began in 2002 at J.E. Richards, where he worked for approximately 18 years, all the while contributing to a retirement plan. He then joined Rosedin Electric as a foreman, where he earned a gross income of about $154,550 a year. Husband explained that his latest contract was for a night-shift position with Kaiser Permanente, which paid him “time and a half,” but he is now working at “NIH” under his “normal scheduled pay” because the Kaiser contract is over. Accordingly, Husband anticipated that his income would decrease in the future. It was established at trial that Wife’s name was added to the deed of the marital home on the same day as the purchase— June 26, 2016. Husband stated that since then, he maintained the house by fixing leaky faucets, the dryer, washing machine, and anything electrical. During the marriage, Husband paid the electricity bill, car insurance, and he alone made payments on the $206,370 mortgage on the marital home. Husband said he had expressed his desire for Wife to obtain full-time employment because they had no children together and he was concerned about her being “stranded” if something happened to him. He claimed he started having discussions with her about this “right around the time we first purchased the house.” Husband confirmed that the Cutlass was previously in Wife’s name and that it is now in his name. As reflected on the “Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and NonMarital Property” filed pursuant to Rule 9-207 (hereinafter, “Joint Statement”),4 Husband claimed the Cutlass, an old car, was only worth $11,200. Husband testified that he had $162,000 in his Fidelity 401K, about $2,511 in his Robinhood investment account, and a 14

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pension. Both parties agreed that each had between $3,000 and $5,000 in their bank accounts at the time of the hearing. In the Joint Statement, Husband and Wife agreed that nineteen properties were marital including: 1) the marital home; 2) Wife’s NFCU checking; 3) Wife’s NFCU savings; 4) Wife’s NFCU money market account; 5) Husband’s Coinbase; 6) Husband’s NFCU checking; 7) Husband’s NFCU savings ending in 1503; 8) Husband’s NFCU savings ending in 4167; 9) Husband’s Robinhood account; 10) Husband’s Fidelity 401K; 11) Husband’s Eclectric Electrical LLC;5 12) Wife’s “A Taste of Love Catering” company; 13) Husband’s 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass; 14) Husband’s 1992 Dodge Dakota; 15) Husband’s 2000 Honda Civic; 16) Husband’s 2005 Acura; 17) Wife’s 2016 Hyundai Tucson; 18) Husband’s pension; 19) Wife’s Roth IRA. (Emphasis added). The parties also agreed that Property #1 at Dam Road in Trinidad (“Trinidad Property #1”) was not marital property but could not agree as to the marital disposition of the “DC Gov US Bank” and Property #2 at Dam Road in Trinidad (“Trinidad Property #2”). When questioned about alimony, Wife testified that she anticipated needing $1,500 for rent, $500 for utilities, $500 for groceries, $175 for car insurance, $70 for cable TV and wireless internet connection, $125 for her cell phone bill, $180 for her credit card debt, $150 for toiletries, $100 for her hair, $100 for clothing, $200 for gas, $1,000 for vacation, and $200 for health insurance. Husband claimed he could not afford alimony. During closing argument, Husband presented two arguments for the first time to the court. First, Husband asserted that he was entitled to Crawford credits6 because Wife had not contributed to the mortgage. Second, Husband argued that because the Cutlass was acquired with a premarital asset, it should have been considered non-marital property. Wife responded first by identifying the following issues regarding the Cutlass: 1) the parties agreed in the Joint Statement that it was marital property; 2) Wife, the only person who testified about the trade for the Cutlass, stated that the Cutlass was in bad condition when it was acquired; and 3) Husband restored the vehicle, providing it its value, during the marriage. Wife also argued that because Husband lived in the home, Crawford credits were not warranted. The Court’s Disposition On February 20, 2025, the court held a remote hearing to deliver its ruling. First, the court announced that it would grant the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Then the court turned to the monetary award and the Joint Statement. The court determined that “all of the assets that the parties agreed to were marital property[,]” but pointed out that there appeared to be “some last[-]minute suggestion” that the Cutlass was not marital property, because Husband obtained the vehicle by trading it for another car acquired prior to the marriage. Although the court acknowledged there was some testimony about this trade, the court stated that no evidence was provided “as to what other car there was that [Husband] used to obtain the [Cutlass].” The court considered Wife’s argument that Husband restored the vehicle with marital funds, rendering it marital property, and stated that “step one” was to testify to the existence of the other car, but “then step two was TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

what was the value of the other car so that I could kind of figure out whether or not . . . it would be mixed marital or what.” The court determined that, without having the value of the other car, the court could not determine the non-marital portion. The court then decided that because Husband put the vehicle in Wife’s name before transferring it to his own, the Cutlass was marital property. The court acknowledged the parties’ agreement as to the only non-marital property—”Trinidad Property #1.” Referring next to the disputed property reflected on the Joint Statement, the court found that it was simply “not able to come to any conclusions with respect to the “DC Gov US” bank account, which had no value, or Trinidad Property #2, for which no testimony or evidence was presented. Having identified the marital property, the court proceeded to the next step, which was to declare the value of the marital property. The court began with the marital home and arrived at a value of $353,900 by splitting the difference between Husband’s proposed value of $332,800 and Wife’s proposed value of $375,000.7 For the remainder of the marital property, the court determined that “for everything that belong[s] to [Wife]” its value would be that proposed by Wife and the same for everything belonging to Husband. For the Cutlass, the court observed “there was no independent evidence provided” of the value of the restored vehicle, and once again, the court split the difference between the proposed values ($11,200 and $40,000) and determined the Cutlass was worth $25,600. In considering the factors for determining whether to order a monetary award, the court found that Husband’s net worth was $410,486.66 and Wife’s was $224,357.01. The Court recognized that both parties made contributions to the marriage. Although Husband made the bulk of the financial contributions to the marriage, Wife worked part-time and provided non-monetary contributions by caring for the home while Husband was working. In considering the next factor—the financial status of the parties—the court determined, after reviewing “tax returns, W-2 forms, 1099’s and financial statements, . . . that [Husband], for 2023, made about $128,000.” In 2022, he made approximately $143,000, and in “2024, $124,963.74, year-todate.”8 For Wife, the court found that she earned approximately $9,300 in 2021, $8,600 in 2022, and $10,141 in 2023 working parttime for the towing company. Wife also had $3,675 in monthly expenses at the time of the hearing. The court acknowledged a ten-year age gap, with Wife being the elder, but also noted that both of the parties are in good physical and mental health and neither suffer from any disabilities. The court stated that it believed it had “covered most of all the factors . . . with respect to [the] monetary reward” and determined that “looking at everything” it was “appropriate to sell the house” and split the proceeds equally after “any expenses” incurred from the sale. Due to the disparity in the parties’ net worth, the court found that it was equitable to split Husband’s pension pursuant to the formula outlined in Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 367-68 (1984),9which “will consider the date of marriage, the dates that the contribution started[, and] when vest[ing] occurred,” which the court believed was 2013. The court determined that the amount that accumulated during the marriage would be split equally. Similarly, the court concluded that the parties would split the marital portion of TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Husband’s Fidelity 401k equally. As for Wife’s Roth IRA, the court decided Wife would retain this account. Finally, the parties would split the value of the Cutlass equally and for the remaining assets, retain that which belonged to them. After resolving the marital property, the court considered an alimony award. Differentiating the two awards, the court stated, “I do want to be clear that . . . alimony is to provide maintenance to a financially dependent spouse, which this [c] ourt has no choice but to find that [Wife] was while she was married to [Husband.]” The court stated that in its alimony determination, it needed to consider additional factors beyond those in its marital property analysis. To begin, the court found that the parties’ standard of living was middle-class and that there was a disparity in incomes between the parties. The court referred to its prior findings regarding Husband’s income and expenses and stated that Husband “play[ed] a major role of being provider in the family” paying the mortgage and the “bulk of the household expenses.” The court explained that Wife was employed for eight of the twelve years the parties were married, but “did not make . . . much money” between her catering business and her position at the towing company. The court pointed out that in “her highest year” at the catering company Wife earned $24,000, and the court acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic “would have had an impact on the catering business[.]” The court found that Wife was earning $375 biweekly with expenses of $3,675 a month at the time of the hearing. The court stated that for the first several years of the parties’ marriage, Husband “lacked knowledge regarding [Wife’s] income[,]” demonstrating to the court that Wife’s income was not in the “forefront of his mind or he wasn’t that concerned with how much money she made.” On this issue, Husband testified that he first “discussed [Wife’s] income when they were purchasing a house in 2016, which is some years after they were married” and that “he had no knowledge about her income until they first started filing tax returns in 2022.” The court went on to explain that despite Husband’s awareness of Wife’s limited income, he “pushed to purchase a more expensive home” and “encouraged and supported [Wife] to start a catering business, which would cause outlay of money before you would expect an income.” The court stated that it didn’t seem like how much money Wife was making was a “real concern for [Husband]” and that Husband had at least “acquiesced to the fact that [Wife] didn’t make a lot of money for a good number of years[.]” The court pointed to this history of a disparity in income during the marriage when addressing whether Wife was voluntarily impoverished. Turning to “the time it would take for [Wife] to gain sufficient education or training” to find suitable employment, the court found that Wife would not need additional training or education, because she had a high school diploma and “quite a few transferable skills[,]” including in administrative work, that would help her “find another job.” The court stated that Wife had acquired these skills through her prior work experience at a daycare, a catering company, a towing company, and a law office. The court found that Wife had made no effort to find work, even though she “could have been looking for some work in the time that she was separated up to now[.]” The court stated that Wife “should be able to live independently” and Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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recognizing the challenging job market, found that there was “no reason that [Wife] couldn’t have found some job” that paid more than $812 a month. Wife did not seek indefinite alimony, which indicated to the court that Wife “believed that she would become self-supporting within a reasonable period of time.” The court determined that six years was an unreasonable amount of time for Wife to receive alimony. The court stated that it was “not going to require [Wife] to live with her relatives[,]” recognizing that Wife would have to pay at least $1,500 in rent for an apartment. To “encourage [Wife] to get her own job and to make her own money” the court granted Wife’s request for rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $2,000 for a period of two years. The court granted the award finding that Husband had the ability to pay, even considering the expenses Husband identified in his financial statement, some of which the court did not find to be reasonable. The court determined that each party would pay their own attorneys’ fees. Finally, the court denied Husband’s request for Crawford credits, reasoning that because both parties lived in the house after the marriage broke down, Husband’s payment of the mortgage was not an unfair loss. On March 12, 2025, the court entered a judgment of absolute divorce reflecting its oral ruling. The court granted Husband’s request for an absolute divorce and ordered that the marital home be “immediately listed” and sold “with the parties dividing the proceeds of the sale, realtor rebate, and mortgage escrow account equally[.]” The court also ordered that Husband pay Wife a marital award of $12,800 within thirty days and transfer to Wife $80,261.98 from his Fidelity 401k. Further, the court ordered that Wife receive fifty percent of the “marital portion of [Husband’s] pension” pursuant to the Bangs formula and pay Wife $2,000 a month in alimony for two years. DISCUSSION

I. Marital Property A. Parties’ Contentions i. Classification of the 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass Husband argues that the court erred in classifying the Cutlass as marital property when it was acquired by trade with a vehicle Husband owned prior to the marriage. Husband offers two authorities in support of this contention. First, Husband says that under the source-of-funds doctrine, “an asset acquired during marriage is marital property only to the extent that marital funds or marital efforts contributed to its acquisition.” Second, he says that under Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”) § 8-201(e)(3), “‘marital property’ does not include . . . property acquired before the marriage” or “property directly traceable” to pre-marital property. Husband argues that the court committed legal error subject to de novo review by disregarding Wife’s testimony, which constituted “direct tracing evidence” under § 8-210(e)(3) that the Impala he traded for the Cutlass was acquired prior to the marriage. Husband asserts that the court cannot deem the entire Cutlass marital property simply because it could not determine the value of the non-marital contribution. Because 16

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the court’s improper treatment of the Cutlass as marital property “inflated” the marital estate, Husband asks that this Court reverse the monetary award and its division of marital property and remand with instructions to classify the Cutlass as non-marital property “in proportion to the value attributable to the pre-marital vehicle[.]” Wife counters that the court properly determined that the Cutlass was marital property, because the parties agreed in the Joint Statement that it was marital, Husband’s source-of-funds argument is not factually supported, and the Cutlass was a gift to Wife. Wife asserts that the agreement reflected in the Joint Statement is binding on the parties and precludes the circuit court from classifying the Cutlass as non-marital property. Wife emphasizes that Husband waited until closing argument to claim that the Cutlass was non-marital property and failed to provide evidence as to the value of the car that was traded for the Cutlass. Wife points to her testimony as to the “ridiculous condition” of the Cutlass and Husband’s subsequent restoration with marital funds. Wife asks that this Court consider that the Cutlass was in Wife’s name, indicating that the Cutlass was in fact a gift to her, and when coupled with the use of non-marital funds, it was clearly marital property. ii. The Marital Home According to Husband, the court abused its discretion when it distributed the marital home without sufficiently considering the factors enumerated in FL § 8-205(b). Specifically, he claims Wife received “more than half” of the marital estate and “post-divorce benefits” while Husband “bore” the cost of the mortgage during the marriage. The court’s judgment further imposed a reduction in Husband’s retirement savings, postdivorce living expenses, and a $12,800 marital award to Wife. Husband alleges that the court failed to consider his substantial financial contributions and Wife’s lack thereof, despite her ability to contribute. Husband claims these omissions were abuses of discretion requiring reversal and a “more nuanced allocation of the marital home.” Husband also alleges that the court was clearly erroneous in failing to classify and value Trinidad Property #2 despite Husband’s testimony and valuation of the property. Husband claims this error deprived him of having all “marital and disputed property considered in the § 8-205(b) analysis” and left this Court without a sufficient record for review. Further, Husband argues the court failed to consider the dearth of evidence of misconduct contributing to the parties’ estrangement, the cumulative effect of the marital property awards, and the duration of the marriage. Wife responds that the court properly followed the threestep process outlined in FL §§ 8-203 through 8-205 to determine which property is marital property, the value of the marital property, and whether to transfer the property and order a monetary award. In doing so, the trial court properly assessed each of the factors enumerated in FL § 8-205(b). In particular, the court addressed Husband’s status as the breadwinner for the family, Wife’s suspicion of Husband’s infidelity, Wife’s payment of the closing costs of the home, and that marital funds were used to pay for the mortgage. Wife argues that the court’s awards were proper and that Husband’s “archaic approach” which “discounts [her] contributions” and awards Husband for his superior monetary contributions is contrary to applicable TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

law. Wife contends that Husband raises the issue concerning the Trinidad Property #2 for the first time in his brief as a “futile attempt at claiming reversible error[.]” She points out that no testimony was provided as to the property and that the court correctly noted this in its ruling. ii. Legal Framework We begin our discussion concerning the marital property award with a summary of the relevant statutory and applicable case law. In Maryland, marital property must be divided fairly and equitably, but not necessarily equally. Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 105 (2004). This may lead to a transfer in ownership of property or a monetary award to adjust the equities. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 519 (2008); FL § 8-205(a)(1) (“the court may transfer ownership of an interest in property . . . , grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property”). To make this determination, the court follows a three-step process. Brewer, 156 Md. App. at 106. First, under FL § 8-203, the court must decide whether property is marital or non-marital. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519; FL § 8-201(e)(1) (defining marital property as “property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.”); FL § 8-201(e)(3). Pursuant to FL § 8-201(e)(3) (iv) marital property does not include property: “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.” Second, pursuant to FL § 8-204, the court “shall determine the value of all marital property.” See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519; Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 355 (2025) (“The party seeking the monetary award has the burden of proving the value of each item of marital property, and the circuit court makes the final determination about each item’s value.”). Valuation of the property “is not ‘an exact science,’ and the court is under no compulsion to accept the values the parties present to it.” Sims, 266 Md. App. at 355 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 71 Md. App. 22, 36 (1987)). Under the source-of-funds rule: when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and marital property, the property is characterized as part nonmarital and part marital. Thus, a spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled to an interest in the property in the ratio of the nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and marital investment in the property. The remaining property is characterized as marital property and its value is subject to equitable distribution. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 80 (1982); see Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 168 (1984) (“Where property is purchased and paid for in part before marriage and in part during marriage with nonmarital and marital funds, the property is nonmarital in part and marital in part.”). This rule is “premised on the concept that it is unfair” for a “spouse who has contributed separate funds to the purchase or improvement of property to enjoy all the benefits of sole ownership . . . without regard to the fact that it had been purchased or improved in part with community funds.” Harper, 294 Md. at 70. The statute is clear that any property “acquired during the marriage that TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

is directly traceable to a non-marital source” is not marital property. FL § 8-201(e); Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 187 (1990) (emphasis in original). An “inability to trace property acquired during the marriage directly to a non-marital source simply means that all property so acquired [is] marital property.” Melrod, 83 Md. App. at 187 (emphasis in original). Third, the court must determine whether “the division of marital property according to title will be unfair” and “if so, may make an award to rectify the inequity.” Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 350 (1995). In balancing the equities, the court must consider each of the following factors:10 (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-210(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. FL § 8-205(b). A trial judge need not “state each and every consideration or factor” and a failure to do so will not “constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 533 (citing Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md. App. 431, 445 (2003)). We explained in Brown v. Brown that, “title is not controlling in terms of a monetary award. But, it is only marital property that is subject to equitable distribution by way of a monetary award.” 195 Md. App. 72, 110 (2010). We further clarified that, although non-marital property may not be subject to equitable distribution, the court may consider such non-marital property as a factor in its equitable distributions of the remaining marital property.” Id. at 116-17. In reviewing the circuit court’s analysis, we cannot “substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result.” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230 (2000). The court’s answers to legal questions are reviewed de novo and “whether property is marital and, if so, its value, are both factual questions that we review for Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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clear error.” Sims, 266 Md. App. at 353; Rule 8-131(c) (“When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court will . . . not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). Ultimately, the decision of “whether to grant a monetary award, and the amount of such an award, is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521. An “abuse of discretion may arise ‘when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 625-26 (2016) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997)) (cleaned up). C. Analysis Classification of the 1972 Oldsmobile Cutlass We hold that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in classifying the Cutlass as marital property. Our decision in Brown v. Brown, 195 Md. App. 72 (2010) is dispositive. In Brown, we determined that because the parties agreed in their joint property statement that the home was non-marital, the court could not classify the home as marital property. 195 Md. App. at 93, 104. This was true in Brown even though the home was demonstrated at trial to be marital property “because it was held by the parties as tenants by the entirety during the marriage[.]” Id. The court reasoned that the joint property statement was a “stipulation of fact by the parties through their counsel.” Id. Here, the parties agreed in the Joint Statement that the Cutlass was marital property. Neither party raised issue with this classification until closing argument when Husband’s counsel asserted that the Cutlass was in fact nonmarital property. Husband cannot at the last minute disavow the agreement he set out in the Joint Statement and the court was not clearly erroneous in classifying the Cutlass as marital property pursuant to that agreement. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 360 (trial court was clearly erroneous in deciding property was nonmarital when the parties agreed in their Rule 9-207 statement that it was marital and provided evidence to support it). Husband’s argument also fails because he ignores the lack of evidence presented to the court directly tracing the Cutlass to a non-marital source. In Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 187 (1990), this Court held that property “acquired by purchase during the marriage . . . is marital property unless it can be traced directly to a non-marital source of funds or property.” Mr. Melrod, who had acquired income-producing property prior to the marriage as well as a trust that provided him with a $5,000 monthly income, comingled his non-marital income with his marital income. Id. at 186. Mr. Melrod also paid mortgage debts during the marriage towards property he acquired prior to the marriage and acquired new properties during the marriage. Id. This Court reasoned that because Mr. Melrod commingled his non-marital and marital income, “no specific sum of money used to acquire property or reduce an indebtedness on any property [could] be directly traced to any source.” Id. at 187. This Court emphasized that “[d]irectly traceable” does not mean “attributable” and determined that the inability to trace the property directly to a non-marital source “simply means 18

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that all property so acquired was marital property.” Id. Similarly, here, as the court stated, no evidence was presented “as to what other car there was that [Husband] used to obtain the [Cutlass].” Further, Husband used marital funds to refurbish the Cutlass, but no testimony was provided as to how much was contributed, rendering it impossible for the court to determine the marital portion of the Cutlass. See Melrod, 83 Md. App. at 188 (explaining that if a spouse “chooses to commingle marital and nonmarital funds to the point that direct tracing is impossible, his or her property may lose its non-marital status.”). Wife testified that the Cutlass was in “ridiculous” condition when Husband acquired the vehicle through the trade, but that in comingling this non-marital property with marital funds, he was able to restore the vehicle. It was Husband’s burden to establish that the Cutlass, acquired during the marriage, was non-marital property. See Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 428 (2003) (“[A] party seeking to demonstrate the nonmarital nature of a particular property must ‘trace the property to a nonmarital source.’” (quoting Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 282 (1993)). Without evidence about the respective value of the marital and premarital contributions, the court could not separate out the premarital portion. Moreover, the court correctly determined that the Cutlass being in Wife’s name before Husband transferred it to his own suggested that the Cutlass was marital property. While the title of the vehicle is not dispositive as marital property is any “property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage[,]” this was yet more evidence that the parties comingled assets and treated the Cutlass as marital property. FL § 8-201(e) (emphasis added). In sum, we hold that because the parties agreed that the Cutlass, originally titled in Wife’s name, was marital property in their Joint Statement, and because no evidence was introduced allowing the court to “directly” link the Cutlass to any non-marital source, the court was not clearly erroneous in classifying the Cutlass as marital property. Distribution of Marital Home We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife half of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, which was held by Husband and Wife as tenants by the entirety. The court’s well-reasoned findings reflect that the court followed the three-step statutory requirements by identifying the family home as marital property, valuing the home based on both parties’ estimates, and then determining how to distribute the marital property. In its analysis, the court reviewed each of the factors in FL § 8-205(b) before deciding to split the proceeds equally between the parties, even if not all factors were specifically identified as such. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 533 (“The chancellor is not required to articulate every fact upon which he relies.”). Husband urges us to reverse the court’s determination, arguing that the court failed to properly consider the prescribed factors. Specifically, Husband contends that the court failed to consider the parties’ contributions by discounting Husband’s substantial financial support and the lack thereof by Wife. We disagree. Husband’s argument ignores the court’s explicit finding that he was the “breadwinner” and that “the monetary contributions come from the [H]usband.” However, the court TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

noted that Wife contributed $10,000 to the closing costs of the home acquired during the marriage. And the court considered Wife’s non-monetary contributions to the home. Under the overall circumstances, the court was entitled to accord those non-monetary contributions equal weight. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 506-07 (1993) (explaining that the history of FL § 8-205(b) “indicates that the General Assembly was primarily concerned with achieving equity by reflecting non- monetary contributions to the acquisition of marital assets, and this principle should be a major consideration in a trial judge’s analysis.”). Husband also argues that the court apportioned the home’s equity inappropriately, giving inadequate weight to the fact that Husband purchased the home with funds from his pension. Husband provided no evidence, however, that linked the marital home to the funds from his pension. Husband testified that he paid the mortgage for the home and that he had a pension that he vested in 2013, but there is no record evidence that the money he used to pay for the costs associated with the home derived from his pension, let alone from the nonmarital portion of the pension. For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its distribution of the marital home. As a separate matter, Husband argues for the first time on appeal that the court erred in declining to classify and value Trinidad Property #2. Husband presented this argument at the conclusion of his discussion concerning the distribution of the marital home, which as indicated by his question presented, only raised issue with respect to the marital home. Because this argument does not concern the distribution of the marital home and was not otherwise presented in the “Questions Presented” portion of Husband’s brief, we would ordinarily decline to address this issue. Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, 126 Md. App. 394, 426 (1999) (“Confining litigants to the issues set forth in the ‘Questions Presented’ segment of their brief ensures that the issues presented are obvious to all parties and the Court.”); Md. Rule 8–504(a)(3) (A brief shall contain “[a] statement of the questions presented, separately numbered, indicating the legal propositions involved and the questions of fact at issue expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case without unnecessary detail.”). Even so, we agree with Wife that the court was not clearly erroneous in deciding not to classify or value the property, as there was no evidence from which the court could render a determination. II. Alimony A. Parties’ Contentions Husband argues that the court abused its discretion by awarding Wife alimony, contending that the court failed to make express findings as to the factors outlined in FL § 11-106. Husband asserts that Wife is not entitled to alimony because she “voluntarily impoverished” herself—she could be self-supporting but has made no effort to obtain more hours or higher-paying employment. Husband contends that Wife, pursuant to her testimony, is waiting for the outcome of the divorce to determine whether to seek alternative employment and that the court’s reasoning that it may be challenging for TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Wife to find such employment is unsupported. Similarly, Husband asserts that the court’s finding that Wife does not need further training to find employment indicates that “there is nothing to rehabilitate” with alimony. Husband argues the court failed to consider Wife’s “voluntary underemployment[,]” the duration of the marriage, and the circumstances that led to the parties’ estrangement while overemphasizing Wife’s non-monetary contributions and “ignoring the substantial financial contributions” of Husband in its analysis. From Husband’s perspective, rehabilitative alimony is unnecessary and inequitable, because the other marital awards provided Wife with “a significant financial foundation” and there is no evidence that Wife could not independently meet her needs. Husband argues the alimony award jeopardized his ability to meet his own needs and left him with less “total financial benefit from the judgment” than Wife. Wife defends the court’s alimony award, arguing that the court properly considered all the factors outlined in FL § 11106. In addressing the financial needs and resources of the parties, the court correctly found that Husband earned more than Wife. Wife claims Husband’s “calculation[s] of his income” and expenses were unreliable, as he alleged different incomes in his financial statement than that expressed through his testimony. Even taking the “expenses from Husband’s Financial Statement at face value,” Wife argues the court correctly found that he had the ability to pay Wife alimony. Wife contends that she needs alimony to “help her get a full-time job” given the challenging job market and her difficulty with the divorce. Wife asserts that the court correctly concluded that she did not voluntarily impoverish herself because throughout the marriage her income was lower than Husband’s, Husband suggested she start the catering business, Wife was unable to obtain additional hours at work, and her financial situation would not change much in a full-time minimum wage position. Wife contends the evidence demonstrated a need for even greater alimony, but that the court’s decision was not arbitrary and should be upheld. B. Legal Framework In Maryland, alimony is “intended to ease the transition from dependence to self-support.” Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 387 (2002); Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 (1992) (“[T]he purpose of alimony is not to provide a lifetime pension, but . . . to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting.”). In other words, it is not intended to “create a subsistence level” for the economically dependent spouse; it is usually designed to serve as a stopgap. St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 184-85 (2016) (quoting Strauss v. Strauss, 101 Md. App. 490, 512 (1994)). In determining whether to award alimony, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in FL § 11-106(b). Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 604 (2005). These include: (1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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(4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet the party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; (11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur. FL § 11-106(b). Under the first factor, parties are selfsupporting when their income exceeds their reasonable expenses. FL § 11-106(b)(1); St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 186 (“A spouse is not necessarily ‘self-supporting’ under the alimony statute merely because the spouse has enough income ‘to hold body and soul together.’” (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 392)). Trial courts determine “the appropriate level of reasonable need based on all of the statutory alimony factors, including the standard of living established during the marriage.” St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 186. The court also may, but is not required to, consider a spouse’s “voluntary impoverishment or potential income” in its alimony determination. Id. at 179 (defining voluntary impoverishment as having the “free and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond his or her control, to render himself or herself without adequate resources” (quoting Wills v. Jones, 340 Md. 480, 490 (1995)). In St. Cyr, we vacated the trial court’s alimony award and remanded for reconsideration because the court’s alimony analysis was “incomplete.” Id. at 170, 176, 178. First, the court failed to compare the wife’s income with her reasonable needs to determine whether she would be self-supporting pursuant to FL § 11-106(b)(1). Id. at 186. We reasoned that a “calculation of the recipient spouse’s future expenses and income ‘is . . . an important component to any finding of selfsufficiency’” without which it is unclear whether the spouse will be able to become self-supporting. Id. at 187 (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 353-54 (1995)). Second, the record was insufficient “for the court to make findings about the time necessary for [the wife] to gain sufficient education or training to enable her to find suitable employment” pursuant to FL § 11-106(b)(2). Id. at 184, 195. We determined that while it was reasonable for the court not to speculate about wife’s earning potential, the law “requires 20

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the court to ‘project[ ] forward in time to the point when the requesting spouse will have made maximum financial progress, and compar[e] the relative standards of living of the parties at that future time.’” Id. at 188 (alteration in original) (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 338 (2007)). This was particularly important in St. Cyr, because the wife “refused to put on evidence about the financial progress that she [was] likely to make” and had “taken the position that she [was] unable to work[.]” Id. Because the court concluded that it lacked enough evidence to “make any meaningful prediction about [w]ife’s future prospects for self-sufficiency[,]” we held that the court erred in awarding a specific amount of alimony for a specific duration. Id. at 193. Generally, we “will not disturb an alimony award unless the trial court has arbitrarily exercised its discretion or its judgment was otherwise wrong.” Doser, 106 Md. App. at 351-52. C. Analysis We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Wife alimony in the amount of $2,000 for a period of two years. In its alimony analysis, the court explicitly addressed the factors outlined in FL § 11-106, including the parties’ standard of living, the ability of Wife to obtain employment, the parties’ needs and resources, and the awards made under FL § 8-205. The court indicated that it would not re-address the factors it had previously discussed in its assessment of the monetary award, but considered them in its alimony determination. The court did not abuse its discretion in referring back to its prior analysis of these factors. Turner, 147 Md. App. at 389 (“[T]he court need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor, [it] must clearly indicate that it has considered all the factors.” (quotations omitted)). Contrary to Husband’s contentions, the court also considered whether Wife had voluntarily impoverished herself. The court determined that there was a disparity in the parties’ respective incomes during the marriage and that Husband had “acquiesced to the fact that [Wife] didn’t make a lot of money for a good number of years” and “wasn’t concerned with how much money she made.” For the first part of the marriage and until the parties started filing tax returns together, Husband was not aware of the value of Wife’s income. It is undisputed that Husband was the breadwinner during the marriage and that Wife was dependent on Husband financially. The most Wife earned in a year was $24,000 in her catering business, and on average, about $9,000 per year at the towing company. This came out to $750 on a monthly basis with $3,675 in expenses at the time of the trial. The court considered these expenses and Wife’s income, determining that alimony was needed temporarily to cover some of Wife’s needs, such as rent, during her search for higherpaying employment. Considering Husband’s income and expenses, the court determined that Husband had the capacity to pay some alimony to assist Wife with this transition. This was a reasonable inference given the disparity in income and Wife’s inability, at the time of trial, to fund her expenses on her current salary. The court also considered Wife’s future earning potential by projecting forward and determining that Wife had the requisite TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

skills to obtain suitable employment. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 189. The court stated that it wanted to “encourage [Wife] to get her own job and to make her own money” and acknowledged that up until that point Wife had not made efforts to do so. See Turner, 147 Md. App. at 387 (“[T]he policy of [Maryland] is to limit alimony, where appropriate, to a definite term in order to provide each party with an incentive to become fully selfsupporting.” (quotations omitted)). Although the court was optimistic about Wife’s ability to obtain employment, stating that Wife had “quite a few transferable skills” obtained through the various jobs she held in the past, the court also considered the challenging job market and the time it would take to find such a higher-paying

position. The court determined Wife would need support to meet her monthly expenses. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 194 (“[A] n award of temporary alimony must be grounded in a finding that the recipient spouse is not self-supporting and needs . . . other steps to help that spouse achieve financial self-reliance.” (quoting Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 328 (2002)). The alimony award of $2,000 a month would cover about half of her expenses, many of which Husband financed during the marriage. This is not a “subsistence level” award as it does not provide for all her monthly expenses, but it would ease her transition from marriage to divorce. See id. at 184-85. The court did not abuse its discretion in providing such an award. We affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

FOOTNOTES

1

See generally Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350 (1984).

2

Husband’s frames the issues in his brief as follows: 1.

Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Classifying the Oldsmobile Cutlass as Marital Property?

2.

Whether the Circuit Court’s Distribution of the Marital Home Was Inequitable Under Md. Code, Fam Law §8-205(b)?

3.

Whether the Circuit Court’s Awarded Amount and Duration of Rehabilitative Alimony Was an Abuse of Discretion?

3

Before moving to the United States in 2003, Wife obtained a high school diploma and worked for an attorney in Trinidad.

4

Rule 9-207 provides that, “[w]hen a monetary award or other relief pursuant to [Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.),] Family Law Article § 8-205 is an issue, the parties shall file a joint statement listing all property owned by one or both of them.”

5

Eclectric Electrical LLC was a business owned by Husband that had been forfeited prior to the divorce.

6

Crawford credits are contributions provided to a co-tenant “who pays the mortgage, taxes and other carrying charges of jointly owned property” by the other co-tenant. Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 406 (2002) (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307 (1982).

7

The court found that either party could value the property because it was purchased by husband and titled in both party’s names.

8

The Court observed that on Schedule C for Husband’s 2022 tax return, he listed expenses of $224,673 for his Eclectic Electrical business. Although the court noted that it “wonders where all that money came from,” the court resolved that “there was no evidence or testimony about that.”

9

The Bangs formula “has been ‘codified as the default method in Maryland’ under FL § 8-204(b).” Fulgium v. Fulgium, 240 Md. App. 269, 286 (2019). This formula “calculates the value of the pension to which the non-employee spouse is entitled as the percentage multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of months and years of the marriage, the denominator of which is the number of months and years of employment at the time of retirement.” Potts v. Potts, 142 Md. App. 448, 473 (2002).

10 Section (a) of FL § 8-205, referenced herein, states, in relevant part: (a)(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, after the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property, the court may transfer ownership of an interest in property described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Child support; arrears; contract

Jahari D. Copper v. Natasha L. Copper No. 1245, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Zic, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Graeff, J. Filed: June 23, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Talbot County Circuit Court’s child support award, requiring father to pay $754.00 per month for the support and maintenance of the minor child, and to pay mother $188.50 per month toward arrearages until they were paid in full. Although father argued that child support is a contractual matter, requiring a valid agreement, he is incorrect. Child support is a legal obligation, which does not require a contract and cannot be waived by agreement.

In this appeal, Jahari D. Copper (“Father”), appellant, challenges an August 2, 2024 order of the Circuit Court for Talbot County requiring him to pay Natasha L. Cooper (“Mother”) child support in the amount of $754.00 per month, pursuant to a Complaint to Establish Child Support brought by the Talbot County Office of Child Support (“Talbot County”), appellee. Father also challenges the court’s July 30, 2024 order denying relief he sought in numerous filings, alleging that the child support enforcement action violated state, federal, and constitutional law. On appeal, Father presents several questions for review,1 which we have consolidated and rephrased, as follows: 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in removing Father from the child support hearing finding Father in contempt of court and then continuing the hearing in Father’s absence? 2. Did the circuit court err in denying Father’s various requests for relief based on his assertions that he is not subject to the authority of the government or judiciary and that the child support enforcement order violated federal and constitutional law? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 22

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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother were married on May 26, 2007, and they have two children together. At the time of the child support hearing, only one of their children, J., born on September 18, 2007, was a minor.2 On August 30, 2023, Mother filed a complaint for absolute divorce. She requested primary physical and joint legal custody of J., as well as child support. Father did not file an answer to Mother’s complaint, and on October 19, 2023, the court entered an order of default against him. On January 26, 2024, a magistrate held a hearing on the complaint for absolute divorce. Neither party was represented by counsel, and Father chose not to participate in the hearing.3 Father did not file a request to vacate the default judgment. The magistrate determined that both parties waived their right to request alimony, that Father waived his right to a monetary award, and that Mother’s request for a monetary award must be denied because the parties did not own any property together. The magistrate found that J. lived primarily with Mother and J. had not had contact with Father since October 2023. She determined that it was in J.’s best interest that Mother be awarded sole legal and physical custody. Mother requested child support, but she was unable to present evidence of Father’s income at the hearing. The magistrate recommend that Mother be granted an absolute divorce on the grounds of a six-month separation. On February 9, 2024, the court issued an order ratifying the findings and recommendations of the magistrate, and it awarded Mother an absolute divorce from Father, as well as sole legal and physical custody of J. On March 20, 2024, Talbot County filed a Complaint to Establish Child Support on Mother’s behalf. The complaint requested an order directing the payment of child support, and medical and dental expenses of the minor children, retroactive to the date of the filing of the complaint. Father did not file an answer to the complaint. Instead, beginning on May 23, 2024, he filed a series of papers challenging the court’s jurisdiction and authority over him, the first of which was a form document, entitled “Violation Warning, Denial of Rights Under Color of Law,” addressed to the magistrate. The document warned the magistrate that she “may be in violation of Federal law” and to “cease and desist with [her] demand.” Other filings included a notice of “Special Appearance” “FOR THE COURT TO PROVE IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PROCEED IN THIS MATTER,” and a copy of the summons served upon Father with a handwritten demand for “proof of CLAIM as to [the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

court’s] LEGAL or lawful authority as a public servant to bother [him] at all.”4 On May 30, 2024, Father filed a notice of “Special Appearance,” expressly reserving affirmative defenses related to “standing, service and sufficiency of process, subject matter jurisdiction, joinder, venue, and other strictly procedural and jurisdictional defenses.” On June 7, 2024, Father filed another form “Violation Warning,” asserting a “Denial of Rights Under Color of Law” against the magistrate, and a request for judicial notice of case law and regulations relating to child support and paternity. On June 10, 2024, Father filed a “Motion to Dismiss Title IV-D Hearing for Violations of CFR, U.S.C., and Constitutional Law.” He requested dismissal based on: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of voluntary contract; (3) violation of separation of powers; (4) due process violations; (5) unlawful use of bank levy and security bonds; and (6) misrepresentation of IV-D agencies as courts.5 On June 21, 2024, Father filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. He asserted additional grounds for dismissal based on the separation of powers doctrine and contractual and jurisdictional requirements for child support enforcement. On June 26, 2024, Father filed an affidavit stating that he was not subject to “codes, statutes, or regulations not constitutionally applicable to a natural person” and requesting removal of his name from the birth certificate of J.6 On July 8, 2024, Father filed a “Notice of Demand for Personal Responsibility Contract,” which demanded information and documents he claimed were required by law to hold him liable for child support. He also filed interrogatories directed to an unspecified recipient, requesting admissions to various legal assertions, as well as correspondence to the Child Support Enforcement Office demanding that it cease and desist all child support actions against him. On July 8, 2024, the court denied Father’s Motions to Dismiss. Over the next few weeks, Father filed a flurry of other papers. On July 10, 2024, Father filed a request for recusal of the hearing judge, arguing that the current judge’s impartiality was compromised because he was “under contract with the IV-D agency” and was a member of the same bar association as the Talbot County attorney. On July 15, 2024, Father filed a request for clarification of the court’s order denying his motion to dismiss, and on July 24, 2024, he filed a complaint against the court and Talbot County for failure to respond to his earlier correspondence and alleged constitutional violations.7 Child Support Hearing On July 26, 2024, the court held a hearing on the complaint for child support. When the court asked if Father was present, he responded: “Objection, Your Honor. No, Mr. Copper is not present. I am the Respondent.” Father immediately requested to approach the bench, which the court denied, and then Father asked whether his “inalienable rights [we] re still in full effect.” After Father asked a second time to approach the bench “with [his] inalienable rights in full effect,” the court denied his request and told him to sit down. The following exchange then took place: TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

THE DEFENDANT: I’m not just sitting down. Can you answer my question please? THE COURT: Sir, if you disrupt this courtroom I’m going to have you removed. THE DEFENDANT: This is not even courtroom. All of you in here are 4D contractors. This is not a courtroom. THE COURT: Mr. Copper. THE DEFENDANT: And it’s all in my paperwork. And you can see it right here. THE COURT: Mr. Copper sit down. THE DEFENDANT: Can you take this to the Judge because both of them have 4D contracts with each other and the State[?] THE COURT: Mr. Copper sit down. THE DEFENDANT: Can I take a seat with my inalienable rights in full effect? Can you answer the question[?] THE COURT: No. You, I want you to sit. THE DEFENDANT: Are you a (inaudible) and neutral Judge because I also put that in[?] THE COURT: Sit down. All right. Mr. Bailiff. THE DEFENDANT No, you not answering none of my questions (inaudible). THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: You may want to get some assistance in here. THE DEFENDANT Get some assistance for what? It’s because you’re not answering my question. THE COURT: Sir, you’re disrupting this [c]ourt and I’m not going to tolerate it. THE DEFENDANT: No, you’re not affording me my due process is what’s going on. That’s what’s going on. THE COURT: Sir. Sir, you’re... THE DEFENDANT: You’re not affording me my due process. I asked you simple questions. Yes or no can I take the stand with my inalienable rights in full effect? THE COURT: Mr. Copper sit down. THE DEFENDANT: And that is not doing anything but asking a question. THE COURT: Mr. Copper you are in contempt of this court of my opinion. THE DEFENDANT: Can you prove that this is a court because 4D is quasi judicial (inaudible)[?] THE COURT: Mr. Copper. THE DEFENDANT: And I also had that right here too. THE COURT: Mr. Copper. THE DEFENDANT: It’s quasi judicial in nature. All of you all are contractors under 4D and . . . THE COURT: Mr. Copper if you don’t sit down and be quiet I’m going to have you removed. THE DEFENDANT: If you don’t answer my questions I am going to sit in a USC Subsection 1983. You all are violating my due process rights right now. So we can play this game if you want to. THE COURT: No, we’re not going to play games. THE DEFENDANT: I know we’re not because we’re going to end it right now. All you have to Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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do is answer my question. You can’t even answer simple question. I have a lot of paperwork here that is also filed with this court that needs to be addressed. THE COURT: All right. Sir, I find you, I find you in contempt of court. All right. THE DEFENDANT: I asked a simple question and you failed to answer a simple question. THE COURT: You need more assistance or can you remove him? THE DEFENDANT: And you’re trying to get your toy soldiers who also are contracted under 4D to say that I’m up here in contempt. THE COURT: All right, I’m going to order him removed from the courtroom and placed in a cell. THE DEFENDANT: No, there’s no contempt of court. I’m not . . . THE COURT: Put him in a holding cell. THE DEFENDANT: No, you can’t do that. It’s not even a court. THE COURT: I just did it. THE DEFENDANT: No, don’t put your hands on me man. Don’t put your hands on me. I’m not going to no damn holding cell. He’s going to answer my questions that’s part of the process because all of you all are going to get (inaudible) Section 1983. I know what’s going on. I’m going to sit right there. I’m not going to the holding cell. I’m not going to go contempt of court because it’s not court. Father was then removed from the courtroom. The court instructed the clerk to note that it found Father in contempt of court for disrupting the proceeding and not allowing the court to be heard. The court advised that Father would be held in the Detention Center, in a holding cell, until the case could be finished. Talbot County moved forward with its case in Father’s absence. Mother testified that she earned $72,919 as a Benefits and Retirement Specialist for the Maryland Judiciary. She was not paying any health insurance for J. and did not make or receive any alimony payments. She did not pay child support in any other matters. Kristin Bringman, the Talbot County Child Support Supervisor, testified that Talbot County had access to information about Father’s salary through the Beacon System, an automatic benefits system in the State that tracks employee income for W-2 records. Ms. Bringman testified that Father was employed by Eurofins Agroscience, and his income was $32,594 for the first two quarters of 2024, which equaled $5,432 per month. The court instructed Talbot County to prepare a proposed order in accordance with the child support guidelines, retroactive to April 1, 2024, with arrearages calculated at 25% of the child support order. On August 1, 2024, the court issued an order directing Father to pay $754.00 per month for the support and maintenance of J. The order further provided that Father had accumulated arrearages of $2,262.00, and it ordered Father to pay Mother $188.50 per month toward those arrearages until they were paid in full. The court ordered Talbot County to impose an immediate and continued withholding order on all Father’s 24

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earnings, to be served immediately on his employer. Two days prior, on July 30, 2024, the court issued an order denying the relief appellant sought in the following outstanding filings: • May 23, 2024 “Violation Warning Denial of Rights of Color of Law;” • May 24, 2024 writ of summons demanding the court respond in 21 days with proof of its lawful authority over him; • May 30, 2024 Notice of Special Appearance; • June 7, 2024 Request for Judicial Notice; • June 26, 2024 affidavit requesting removal of his name from his child’s birth certificate; • July 8, 2024 demand that the Maryland Child Support Administration and the Department of Human Services “cease and desist” all child support actions against him, and the Notice of Demand for Personal Responsibility Contract with interrogatories; • July 10, 2024 request for recusal of the hearing judge; • July 15, 2024 request for clarification of order denying the motion to dismiss; and • July 24, 2024 letter of complaint to the county administrative judge. The court explained that all of the filings appeared to be based on Father’s belief that he was a “free man, not subject to the commercial regulations and statutory obligations applied to natural persons.” The court stated that it did “not find [Father’s] arguments compelling,” and it ordered “that to the extent [Father’s] outstanding filings described above seek any relief, any relief sought be, and is hereby, DENIED.” This appeal followed. DISCUSSION

Father’s brief lists 15 “ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW” in addition to five questions for this Court. He also seeks remedies, requesting that we (1) vacate the circuit court’s judgment with prejudice, “ensuring the matter cannot be reopened,” (2) award compensatory damages for resources spent defending the action; (3) award punitive damages for judicial misconduct; (4) issue a declaratory judgment affirming Father’s rights under the constitution and federal law; and (5) grant an injunction preventing further enforcement actions based on the order.8 Although Father’s brief is somewhat difficult to follow and lacks proper citation to factual and legal authority, we shall, nevertheless, address each of Father’s issues and questions presented. I. Contempt of Court We begin with Father’s argument that the circuit court erred in proceeding with the July 26, 2024 hearing on child support after he was found in contempt of court and removed from the courtroom. He contends that he was unlawfully detained, and the court’s decision to proceed with the hearing in his absence “violated [his] right to be present, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and established principles of equitable jurisprudence.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Talbot County contends that the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father removed from the hearing based on his disruptive conduct. It argues that the court “properly proceeded with the hearing following [Father’s] removal” and that, in doing so, his “constitutional rights were not violated.” The issue here involves “direct contempt,” which is “contempt committed in the presence of the judge presiding in court or so near to the judge as to interrupt the court’s proceedings.” Md. Rule 15-202(b). Contempt is a “despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court . . . a person whose conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard . . . or otherwise tends to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties, has committed a contempt.” Fisher v. McCrary Crescent City, LLC, 186 Md. App. 86, 114 (2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1060 (2010). A direct contempt “may be summarily punished to protect the orderly administration of justice and vindicate the dignity of the court.” State v. Crawford, 239 Md. App. 84, 109 (2018). “In order to constitute a direct contempt, it is not necessary that the conduct bring to a halt the proceedings in progress.” Mitchell v. State, 320 Md. 756, 763 (1990). Rather, as the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained: To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common law and the punishment imposed is due process of law. Id. at 763 (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925)). A circuit court’s determination that an individual is in direct contempt of court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 37 (2013). Accord Smith v. State, 382 Md. 329, 337 (2004) (“It is reposed in the first instance in the trial judge’s sound discretion whether to hold an individual in contempt, and his or her decision generally will not be overturned on appellate review absent an abuse of that discretion.”). “Where a defendant is ‘disruptive, contumacious, [and] stubbornly defiant’ in a manner that interferes with the dignity, order, and decorum of a courtroom, the trial court has the discretion to order ‘constitutionally permissible’ accommodations made, after warning the defendant of those potential consequences, up to and including expelling the defendant from the courtroom.” In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451, 463 (2016) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970)). The court may proceed with a hearing following a party’s removal from the courtroom for direct contempt. Allen, 397 U.S. at 346 (court’s decision to remove defendant from the courtroom and continue trial in his absence was not unconstitutional). As the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained, even in criminal cases, a “defendant’s Sixth and TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Fourteenth Amendment right to be present at his or her trial, though fundamental, is not absolute” and may be forfeited by consent or misconduct.9 Smith, 382 Md. at 344 n.6. The Sixth Amendment right to be present, however, does not apply to civil proceedings. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 131 Md. App. 187, 192 (2000). In a civil case, the right of a party “to be present throughout the trial is not an absolute right,” and “in the discretion of the court, with due regards to the circumstances as to prejudice, the case may be tried or finished when a party, including a defendant, is absent.” Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, 366 Md. 597, 619 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1055 (2002). Here, as soon as the hearing began, Father was confrontational, recalcitrant, and defiant, and his conduct impeded the court from conducting an orderly hearing. The court asked Father to sit down eight times, but he repeatedly refused, insisting instead that the court answer his questions. Father stated: “This is not even a courtroom,” and he argued that “[a]ll of you in here are 4D contractors.” He also claimed that the court was violating his due process rights and threatened to “s[end] in a USC Subsection 1983” if the court did not answer his questions. The court gave Father several warnings before removing him. Prior to the contempt finding, the court stated that if Father continued to disrupt the proceeding, he would be removed, and the court was “not going to tolerate [Father’s disruptions].” After stating that Father was in contempt of court, the court gave him one additional opportunity to “sit down and be quiet,” which Father refused. Once Father was removed, the child support proceeding continued in his absence. The hearing was not lengthy, and the court determined the child support award based on the mandatory statutory formula, using Father’s W-2 documentation. Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father in contempt and removing him from the hearing. We also perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to continue the hearing in Father’s absence. II. Child Support is Not Contractual Father contends that the court’s “child support order lacks a legal foundation and should be vacated.” He asserts that child support enforcement “is a contractual matter requiring the presence of a valid agreement,” i.e., “a Personal Responsibility Contract or garnishment contract,” and absent a valid contract, “any enforcement of child support is invalid.” Talbot County argues that Father “has a legal, not contractual, duty to pay child support.” It asserts that, “[a]s a matter of law, whether [Father] has entered into a contract for the payment of child support or not, he is obligated to obey a court order directing his payment of a specified amount.” A circuit court’s determination of an appropriate award of child support based on the statutory guidelines “will not be disturbed but for a clear abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 605 (2025). We review the circuit court’s factual findings in support of the award determination, however, for clear error. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 216 Md. Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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App. 205, 219 (2014). Where a child support order involves the interpretation and application of Maryland case law and statutes, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the circuit court’s conclusions were legally correct. Houser, 490 Md. at 605. Talbot County is correct that child support is a legal obligation, which does not require a contract and cannot be waived by agreement. Id. at 607. Section 5-203(b)(1) of the Family Law Article, provides that parents of a minor child “are jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 5-203(b)(1) (2019 Repl. Vol). The obligation to support a minor child is both a legal and moral obligation under Maryland law. Houser, 490 Md. at 607. Because a child support obligation is for the benefit of the minor child, the right is held by the child, not “by the parent to whom the child support is paid.” Id. Child support “derives from the obligation of the parent to the child, not from one parent to another.” Id. (quoting Rand v. Rand, 40 Md. App. 550, 554 (1978)). Accordingly, although parents may enter into a child support agreement, a court is not obligated to “accept an agreement between parties regarding decisions about their child support obligations,” and a duty to pay child support cannot be waived or bargained away by contract. Id. Parents do not have a constitutional right to waive their child’s right to child support, and court-ordered child support does not violate “parents’ fundamental rights in the upbringing of their children” because child support is not a parental right, but rather, it is a parental obligation. Id. at 611-12. Nor do parents have a “liberty interest in avoiding” a child support obligation “validly imposed under State law.” Id. at 613. Because the obligation to pay child support is a legal, statutory obligation, that does not require the agreement of either parent, the court did not err in ordering Father to pay support under FL § 5-203(b)(1). Additionally, as Talbot County correctly notes, child support orders are always subject to modification “upon a showing of a material change of circumstance.” FL § 12-104(a). Father’s request that the judgment be vacated with prejudice is therefore improper. III. Denial of Other Filings Father argues that the court erred in denying his motions to dismiss, demand for personal responsibility contract, judicial notices, and affidavits “without providing any legal basis or applicable law.”10 He contends that the court’s denial of his filings “without legal basis violates procedural due process.” Father also alleges that the child support enforcement action violated federal and constitutional law, and that the court engaged in judicial misconduct and breached its judicial duty. Talbot County contends that the court properly acted within its discretion to deny Father’s various outstanding filings. It asserts that Father’s filings did not comply with the Maryland Rules and were largely based on the “sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist” theory, which this Court has rejected. Talbot County also argues that Father “failed to establish that his constitutional rights were violated,” and his 26

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“remaining claims were not before the equity court and are not legally cognizable.” A. Court’s Grounds for Denial We begin with Father’s argument that the court denied his filings without legal basis. The majority of the outstanding filings listed in the court’s July 30, 2024 order were based on Father’s belief that the court lacked authority over him. His filings referenced doctrines of the “redemptionist theory,” which reasons that: a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 1933, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country’s national debt. Redemptionists claim that [the] government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman’s name. Anderson v. O’Sullivan, 224 Md. App. 501, 509 (2015). Individuals who subscribe to this theory often write in all capital letters, as Father did in several of his filings, including the affidavit in support of his amended appellant brief, to distinguish between the live person and the fictional strawman, reasoning that “when your name is written in all capital letters, IT IS NOT YOUR NAME!” Id. at 510. 11 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We have held that “[t]hese contentions have not, will not, and cannot be accepted as valid.” Id. at 512. Many of Father’s filings are rooted in this meritless conspiracy theory. In Father’s May 24, 2024 filing, he stated: “As director and beneficiary of my LEGAL PERSON/ corporation. You have 21 days to respond . . . and provide proof of CLAIM as to your LEGAL or lawful authority.” Father then filed a notice of “Special Appearance” reserving the right to contest jurisdiction over him. Father’s June 26, 2024 affidavit stated that he was “a free man in the flesh, not a legal entity or corporation, and not subject to codes, statues, or regulations.” In the July 8, 2024 correspondence filed, Father listed his name in all caps and stated that he did “not consent or waive any of [his] rights to freedom and liberty as a flesh and blood man as God gave [him] the power to handle [his] own affairs.” Under the signature line was “UCC 1-308,” which appeared to reference the UCC filing process redemptionist theorists allege can be used to “acquir[e] an interest in their strawman.” Anderson, 224 Md. App. at 509. Father’s request for recusal of the judge, his request for clarification of the order denying his motion to dismiss, and his complaint against the court, which challenged the court’s authority over him, are also signed by Father “WITHOUT PREJUDICE UCC 1-308.” In addition, the majority of the filings subject to the July 30, 2024 order did not comport with requirements of the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Maryland Rules governing motions. Maryland Rule 2-311(c) provides that a written motion “shall state with particularity the grounds and the authorities in support of each ground.” In his June 7, 2024 “Request for Judicial Notice,” Father requested that the court take judicial notice of various documents, but he did not state with particularity how they apply to the child support enforcement action against him. His Notice of Demand for Personal Responsibility Contract demanded that the court provide documents and responses to 13 interrogatories, without providing any legal authority to support his request or the court’s obligation to respond. In denying the relief that Father sought in the nine filings listed in the order, the court did provide an explanation. It stated: “Underlying all these filings seems to be [Father’s] belief that he is a ‘free man, not subject to the commercial regulations and statutory obligations improperly applied to natural persons.’” The court stated that Father’s arguments were not “compelling,” and it denied Father’s outstanding filings to the extent that they sought any relief. Additionally, as Talbot County notes, even if the court did not provide an explanation for its ruling, courts are not required to elaborate on the reasons for denying a motion because they are presumed to “know the law and to apply it properly.” State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 174 (2003) (quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206 (1997)). As discussed further below, Father has not rebutted the presumption that the court was correct in denying his outstanding filings. Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 257 Md. App. 1, 55 (2023) (“[T] he most fundamental principle of appellate review [ ] is that the action of a trial court is presumed to have been correct and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party claiming error to persuade us that [an] error occurred.”) (quoting White v. Pines Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, 173 Md. App. 13, 50 (2007)). B. Father’s Alleged Statutory and Constitutional Violations are Without Merit Father presents 15 issues for review in this appeal, 10 of which allege either federal statutory or constitutional violations, and all of which lack meaningful argument. To be addressed by this Court, “a party’s appellate brief must include ‘[a]rgument in support of the party’s position on each issue.’” Id. at 55-56 (quoting Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6)). We are not required to “seek out law to sustain [an appellant’s] position,” or “address an issue where a party provides only conclusory statements without sufficient factual or legal support.” Id. at 56 (quoting Rollins v. Capital Plaza Assocs., 181 Md. App. 188, 202 (2008)). With this in mind, we will discuss the remaining issues Father presented in his brief. Father argues that the court’s refusal to respond to his certified mail request for a Personal Responsibility Contract and garnishment contract violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Father provides no authority, however, for his position that the court must respond to requests for documentary evidence from parties. Courts do not provide potential evidence to parties; rather, courts determine what evidence is admissible. See Md. Rule 5-104(a) (courts TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

determine admissibility of evidence). It is the burden of the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue to produce sufficient evidence. See Bd. of Trs., Cmty. Coll. of Balt. Cnty. v. Patient First Corp., 444 Md. 452, 469 (2015). Moreover, as we noted, supra, a contract agreeing to pay child support is not required for a court to order a parent to meet his or her obligation to pay child support. With regard to his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Father has not identified, with specificity, any procedural due process right the court violated. Because Father cannot show a violation of federal law, he has no claim under Section 1983. Thomas v. Gladstone, 386 Md. 693, 700 (2005) (Section 1983 provides cause of action for violations of Federal law under color of State law). Even if he did, Section 1983 provides for a federal cause of action, and is not a proper defense in a State child support enforcement action. Id. Father’s Fourth Amendment argument also fails. He asserts that Talbot County’s “enforcement of fraudulent child support orders in complete disregard of evidence” violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and the Fourth Amendment. Father does not specify how Talbot County’s child support enforcement actions in this case violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and he does not provide any legal theory for his conclusory allegations. Nonetheless, a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public records, credit records, and certain financial documents accessed to enforce child support obligations. See Jones v. Buckner, 963 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (search of public crime records and credit records to secure compliance with child support order did not violate Fourth Amendment). Moreover, as indicated, any claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 must be brought in a separate cause of action and are not proper defenses in this matter. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 817 (6th Cir. 2019) (Section 1985 creates cause of action for conspiracy to deprive another of equal protection of the laws, obstruction of justice, and witness intimidation), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 855 (2020); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990). Father also cites to 42 U.S.C. § 666(a), the Public Health and Welfare title, but he does not discuss any particular provision of this voluminous subsection to support his argument that a signed contractual agreement is required here. Regardless, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) requires states to implement procedures to increase the effectiveness of their child support enforcement program. It does not require a signed contractual agreement by a parent to enforce a child support order.12 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a). Father raises several claims regarding judicial misconduct. He asserts that the court’s “blanket denial” of his filings “constitutes judicial misconduct and a constructive denial of due process under 28 U.S.C. § 455.” Father also contends that the judge had a disqualifying conflict of interest, and the judge breached his judicial duty in refusing to address Father’s “affidavits and filings.” Father’s contentions have no basis in law or fact. To start, 28 U.S.C. § 455, which addresses when a judge shall recuse from a proceeding, is not applicable to state court judges. United States. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 931 F.Supp. 1074, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“As the statutory language makes clear, this provision applies solely Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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to members of the federal judiciary.”), aff’d, 120 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1997). In any event, Father does not cite specific grounds in support of his assertion that the judge had a conflict of interest or engaged in judicial misconduct. Additionally, Father’s contention that the court’s refusal to address filings warrants punitive damages is not a legally actionable claim under the doctrine of judicial immunity. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 343-44 (2021) (judicial immunity is a form of absolute immunity designed to promote the independence of the courts without fear of lawsuit from disgruntled litigants). Father alleges that “Title IV-D creates perverse incentives for courts and officers to financially benefit from fraudulent child support orders” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. As Talbot County correctly notes, however, Father does not identify a particular characteristic forming the basis for disparate treatment, or how the courts financially benefit from child support orders. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 185 Md. App. 625, 636 (2009) (equal protection requires the government to justify decisions which treat people differently based on a particular characteristic). Because this argument is devoid of any legal or factual support, we will not address it further. Father also contends that child support enforcement procedures “amount to involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. This argument, however, has been squarely rejected by courts. See Child Support Enf’t

Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 472 (D. Haw. 2005) (compiling cases holding that child support enforcement mechanisms do not run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment). Accord United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999) (enforcement of child support is constitutionally permissible). Father’s final contention is that the copyright infringement of his legal name without permission constitutes a violation of his intellectual property rights.13 This argument does not appear to have been raised below and therefore is not preserved. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”). Even if it were raised below, Father has not presented any facts, authority, or argument in support of his claim. In any event, Father’s assertion appears to be rooted in his belief in the redemptionist theory and disregards well-established law providing that names are generally not subject to copyright or trademarks. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (personal names not subject to copyright). Accord Abraham Zion Corp. v. Lebow, 761 F.2d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 1985) (personal names protected as trademarks “only if, through usage, they have acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning”). For the reasons stated, the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the relief sought in Father’s outstanding filings.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TALBOT COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

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FOOTNOTES

1

Father is not represented by counsel in this appeal. His questions on appeal were, as follows: 1. Whether the lower court’s denial of Appellant’s filings without legal basis violates procedural due process. 2. Whether child support obligations require the presence of a valid contract. 3. Whether the court acted within its discretion by detaining Appellant and proceeding in his absence. 4. Whether Title IV-D creates perverse financial incentives for court to enforce fraudulent orders. 5. Whether the court’s refusal to respond to certified mail inquiries constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

In the interest of privacy, we refer to the minor child by the initial, J.

3

The court scheduled a virtual hearing on the complaint for absolute divorce for January 8, 2024, pursuant to an Order of Default entered against Father on October 19, 2023. Because Father contested Mother’s custody request, however, the court rescheduled the matter for a two hour in-person merits hearing on January 26, 2024.

4

In its July 30, 2024 order, the court stated that these were filed on May 24, 2024. Odyssey lists the filing date as May 23, 2024.

5

IV-D refers to Title IV, Part D, of the Social Security Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., which “conditions state receipt of federal funding upon the state’s passage of . . . provisions” addressing child and spousal support enforcement. Nusbaum v. Nusbaum, 243 Md. App. 653, 679 (2019), cert. denied, 467 Md. 705 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 556.

6

In its July 30, 2024 order, the court states that the affidavit was filed on July 1, 2024. The filing date on Odyssey is June 26, 2024.

7

On July 17, 2024, appellant filed a request for information, under the Public Information Act, pertaining to the child support enforcement action. On July 26, 2024, he filed several judicial notices stating, among other things, that he is a free and natural man “distinct from any legal fiction or entity,” that he did “not consent to being identified, treated, or otherwise recognized as the legal person or entity of JAHARAI DEMON COPPER,” and that any contracts involving him were unenforceable. The orders at issue in this case did not address these filings.

8

We note from the outset that the appellate courts typically do not award damages, issue declaratory judgments, or award injunctive relief. Rather, our role is to review a circuit court’s decision to deny or grant such relief. See, e.g., Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam, 212 Md. App. 422, 435 (2013) (appellate courts review damage awards for clear error), aff’d, 440 Md. 1 (2014); Coates v. Charles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 266 Md. App. 266, 287 (decision to grant injunction falls within sound judgment of circuit court), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Stewart, 492 Md. 446 (2025).

9

In criminal cases, we have recognized that defendants must be allowed to return to the hearing as soon as the defendant is willing to behave appropriately. Smith v. State, 382 Md. 329, 344 n.6 (2004).

10 Father challenges the court’s denial of his motions to dismiss, but with one exception, he does not make specific arguments in this appeal addressing the issues and legal theories he raised in these motions. Father does not address, with particularity, allegations of: (1) improper agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, (2) violations of the Fifth Amendment, (3) violations of repayment obligations under 45 C.F.R. § 302.33, (4) violations of separation of powers, (5) lack of jurisdiction, (6) the use of bank levy and social security bonds; and (7) the misrepresentation of IV-D agencies as courts and related due process violations. Accordingly, we will not address these issues. See Konover Prop. Tr. v. WHE Assocs., 142 Md. App. 476, 494 (2002) (“It is not this Court’s responsibility to attempt to fashion coherent legal theories to support [Father’s] sweeping claims.”). We have addressed the single issue from Father’s motion to dismiss that he did raise in this appeal, the alleged requirement of a voluntary contract to justify child support, and, as indicated, we conclude that it has no merit. 11 Father states in his affidavit that: “I am the Respondent in the aforementioned case and a living Man, distinct from the LEGAL NAME ‘JAHARI DEMON COPPER.’ I appear specially, under duress, to assert my rights and preserve them in accordance with UCC 1-308.” 12 45 C.F.R. § 303.101, which requires states to implement expedited processes “to establish paternity and to establish, modify, and enforce support orders,” is also inapplicable here. 13 Father’s argument that the court violated state transparency laws in failing to respond to his Maryland Public Information Act (“MPIA”) request is not before us. The court’s July 30, 2024 order expressly states that it is not addressing Father’s MPIA request, dated July 22, 2024. Nevertheless, as Talbot County notes, to obtain information under the MPIA, Father must initiate a request pursuant to the Public Information Act. Md. Code. Ann., Gen. Provisions § 4-202(a) (2019 Repl. Vol.).

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Final protective order; imminent harm; fear

Syed Saqib Ali v. Susan Al No. 2407, September Term 2024 Argued before: Friedman, Zic, Kenney (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Zic, J. Filed: June 10, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Court’s final protective order in favor of wife. There was sufficient evidence that husband’s conduct placed wife in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Wife testified that she felt harassed and frightened by husband’s many “anonymous” phone calls to her and to daughter. She further testified that she was scared on two occasions when husband waited in his car and then drove past her in a manner that frightened her—particularly considering an earlier encounter in which she felt he had tried to run her off of the road. The court also noted during the hearing that, while wife was testifying, husband was “glaring, smiling, laughing, [and] shaking his head” at her.

Syed Saqib Ali appeals the grant of an extended final protective order (“FPO”) by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for the benefit of his ex-wife Susan Ali and the parties’ eldest daughter (“Daughter”). Mr. Ali presents the following questions for our review, which we have condensed and rephrased for clarity:1, 2 1. Did the circuit court err in extending the FPO without a hearing? 2. Did the circuit court err in extending the FPO on behalf of Daughter? 3. Did the court err in extending the FPO as to Ms. Ali? For the following reasons, we affirm in part, and vacate in part. BACKGROUND

Mr. and Mrs. Ali were married in 1999. Together they have two daughters: one born in May 2006 (previously, “Daughter”), and one born in 2009.3 In 2022, the parties separated, and Mr. Ali moved out of the marital home. Ms. Ali subsequently filed for divorce4 and custody of the two children. Mr. Ali filed a counterclaim. 30

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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. On September 7, 2023, while the divorce proceedings continued, Ms. Ali filed a petition for a protective order in the circuit court, seeking protection for herself and Daughter against Mr. Ali. Ms. Ali indicated that, on or about September 5, 2023, and “many times previously,” Mr. Ali had engaged in “mental injury of a child,” “stalking,” and “harassment[.]” She then wrote that Mr. Ali “has a history of driving past our house playing loud music and shining his car headlights into the windows of the house despite being told it scares my child and myself and being asked to stop[.]” Ms. Ali explained that the parties had been engaged in divorce and custody litigation since 2022, and that she was granted an FPO in July 2022, which had expired several weeks earlier on July 1, 2023. Following a hearing, the court entered a temporary protective order (“TPO”) for Ms. Ali, effective until October 13, 2023, on which date the court also scheduled an FPO hearing. On Mr. Ali’s motion to postpone the FPO hearing, the court extended the TPO until, and set a new FPO hearing for, October 25, 2023. On October 25, 2023, the court entered an FPO for Ms. Ali and Daughter by consent, effective through July 25, 2024. Mr. Ali did not admit the allegations in the petition. The court ordered Mr. Ali not to abuse or threaten to abuse Ms. Ali; not to contact or harass Ms. Ali or Daughter; not to enter the cul-de-sac where they lived; and to stay away from Mother’s work and Daughter’s school. On July 22, 2024, three days before the FPO was set to expire, Ms. Ali filed a petition on behalf of herself and Daughter to extend the FPO for two years. In the space to describe the events, Ms. Ali wrote “harassment” next to the “other” box. She wrote that Mr. Ali had violated the [FPO] multiple times[,]” and referenced a June 28, 2024, finding of guilt by the District Court for Montgomery County of Mr. Ali for violating the FPO. The next day, on July 23, 2024, the court entered an order temporarily extending the FPO from July 25, 2024, to July 26, 2024. On July 25, 2024, Ms. Ali filed an amended petition to extend the FPO, which was identical to her initial petition to extend the FPO, except that the amended petition sought a six-month extension instead of a two-year extension. We shall refer collectively to the petition to extend and amended petition to extend as the “petitions to extend.” On July 26, 2024, the court held a hearing and entered an order extending the FPO, and the hearing on the petitions to extend the FPO, until September 27, 2024. Nine days before the hearing date, Mr. Ali moved for a continuance of the hearing and, with Ms. Ali’s consent, the court re-scheduled the hearing for January 24, 2025. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

On that date, the circuit court held a contested evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petitions to extend the FPO. Both Ms. Ali and Mr. Ali, as well as Mr. Ali’s mother, testified. After hearing testimony and arguments, the court granted Ms. Ali’s petitions. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that during the term of the FPO, Mr. Ali had committed further acts of abuse that placed Ms. Ali “in fear of imminent bodily harm” and “with regard to [Daughter],” caused “mental harm to a child.” The court ordered Mr. Ali not to abuse, threaten to abuse, harass, or contact by any means Ms. Ali or Daughter. Additionally, Mr. Ali was ordered not to enter the cul-de-sac on which Ms. Ali and Daughter live, and to stay away from Ms. Ali’s and Daughter’s places of work. The extended FPO was given effect for 18 months, or until July 25, 2026. Mr. Ali timely appealed the grant of the extended FPO. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the issuance of a final protective order, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Md. Rule 8-131(c). Moreover, we “consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]” Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392 (1975) (citations omitted). We leave the determination as to credibility to the circuit court, as it has “the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’ behavior and testimony during the [hearing].” Barton v. Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001) (quotation omitted). We make our own appraisal as to the law. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). A trial court’s disposition, when founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, “should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” In re Cadence B., 417 Md. 146, 155 (2010) (quotation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “ruling is clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when it constitutes an untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.” Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 478 (2014) (quotation and internal marks omitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.” Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 199 (2005). DISCUSSION

I.

The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Extending The FPO Without Holding A Hearing. We begin by outlining the relevant statutory framework. This matter concerns several provisions of the Maryland Domestic Violence Act (“Act”), which was enacted in 1980 and later codified as amended at §§ 4-501 through 4-515 of the Family Law (“FL”) Article of the Maryland Code (1984, Repl. 2019, Supp. 2024). Relevant to the facts before us, the Act provides that FPOs may be granted for the protection of specific individuals, or “persons eligible for relief[,]” which include, among others, a current or former spouse of the respondent, a relative related by blood, a child of the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

respondent, and a vulnerable adult. FL § 4-501(m)(1), (3)–(5). Following a hearing, a court may grant an FPO if it finds by a “preponderance of the evidence” that certain acts of “abuse” have occurred. FL § 4-506(c)(1)(i)–(ii). “Preponderance of the evidence means more likely than not.” C.M. v. J.M., 258 Md. App. 40, 56-57 (2023) (cleaned up) (quotation omitted). A. The Parties’ Arguments Citing to La Valle v. La Valle, 432 Md. 343 (2013), Mr. Ali argues that the circuit court erred in entering the July 23, 2024 order that temporarily extended the FPO until July 26, 2024. He argues that he was “neither notified of—nor present at—a hearing . . . on July 23, 2024[,]” in violation of FL § 4-507(a). Ms. Ali responds that this argument is entirely misplaced. B. Analysis Section 4-507 of the Act provides for extensions of FPOs for up to two years. Pursuant to FL § 4-507(a)(2)–(3), a court may extend an FPO for up to six months if “good cause” is shown, or up to two years if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that during the term of the FPO, the respondent “committed a subsequent act of abuse against a person eligible for relief named in the protective order[.]” Regardless of which period of extension is requested, two requirements must be fulfilled before an FPO is extended: notice must be given to all affected persons, including the respondent, and a hearing must be held. FL § 4-507(a)(1)(i)–(ii). A court “shall” hold a hearing on a motion to extend within 30 days after the motion is filed. FL § 4-507(a)(4)(i). If a hearing “is not held before the original expiration date of the final protective order, the order shall be automatically extended and the terms of the order shall remain in full force and effect until the hearing on the motion.” FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii). Thus, by operation of law, an FPO shall extend past the original expiration date of the FPO, until the hearing on the extension request, if a request to extend is filed prior to the expiration of the original FPO. Id. Applied here, the temporary extension granted by the circuit court on July 23, 2024, was not the result of a hearing that Mr. Ali was unaware of, but rather, occurred by operation of law. As explained above, FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) contemplates the possibility that an extension hearing may not take place between the timely filing of an extension petition and the original expiration date of the FPO. In this circumstance, FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) provides that the FPO “shall be automatically extended and the terms of the order shall remain in full force and effect until the hearing on the motion [to extend.]” (Emphases added.) The unamended petition to extend was filed by Ms. Ali on July 22, 2024—before the FPO’s original expiration date of July 25, 2024—and Mr. Ali was personally served with the petition on the same day it was filed. On July 26, 2024, the parties appeared for a hearing on petitions to extend, but the hearing was rescheduled for a new date selected and agreed to by both parties. Considering that all procedural steps required by the Act were fulfilled, the extension granted on July 23, 2024, was not improper. We further note that Mr. Ali’s reliance on the decision in La Valle is misplaced. In La Valle, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that FL § 4-507 did not permit a court to extend Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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an expired protective order, even if an extension petition was timely filed during the term of the FPO. 432 Md. at 358-59. We note that in 2020, seven years after La Valle was decided, the General Assembly amended the Act to include the pertinent language in FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) that automatically extends the terms of an FPO until a hearing on the petition to extend. Chapters 134 and 135, Laws of Maryland 2020. Accordingly, the language in La Valle upon which Mr. Ali relies is no longer viable. For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not err in temporarily extending the FPO without holding a hearing. II. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. ALI COMMITTED MENTAL HARM TO DAUGHTER PURSUANT TO FL § 4-507(e). A. The Parties’ Arguments Next, Mr. Ali argues that the circuit court erred in extending the FPO as to Daughter; specifically, he argues that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to extend the FPO on Daughter’s behalf because she turned 18 years old in May 2024, and therefore, was an adult when Ms. Ali filed the petition to extend the FPO in July 2024; and (2) the court erred in finding that his conduct constituted mental harm to child because Daughter was not a child, and there was no evidence that the alleged abuse occurred when Daughter was younger than 18 years old. In response, Ms. Ali contends that: (1) because Daughter was under 18 years of age when the FPO was granted, she was properly included in the petition to extend; and (2) Mr. Ali has not “preserved” his argument that the circuit court erroneously found he committed mental abuse of a child. B. Legal Framework As explained above, the Act provides for protection for specified individuals through an FPO, including individuals “related to the respondent by blood, marriage, or adoption” as well as “a parent, stepparent, stepchild, or child” of the respondent” FL § 4-501(m)(3)–(4). “If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, the [Act] provides for an additional form of abuse to include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7” of the Family Law Article. FL § 4-501(b)(2)(i). In relevant part, FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i) defines such abuse as “the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed by . . . a parent[.]” (Emphasis added.) Although the Act does not explicitly define “child,” the term is defined in FL § 5-701(e) as “any individual under the age of 18 years.” C. Analysis We conclude that the plain language of the Act authorized Ms. Ali to petition on behalf of Daughter. Section 4-501(m)(4) describes those individuals eligible for protection in relation to the respondent—not by age. Because there is no dispute that Daughter is, in relation to Mr. Ali, his child, there is no merit to the argument that the petition to extend the FPO needed to be filed before Daughter turned 18 years of age for Daughter to be eligible for relief under the Act. FL § 4-501(m)(4). 32

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That said, “mental injury of a child” is a kind of abuse only listed in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of the Family Law Article. FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i); see FL § 4-501(b)(2)(i) (“If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, the [Act] provides for an additional form of abuse to include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7[.]”) (emphases added); see also FL § 5-701(e) (defining “[c]hild” as “any individual under the age of 18 years”). Thus, for a court to make a “mental injury of a child” abuse finding, the allegedly abusive act or acts must have occurred when the person eligible for relief (as defined under the Act) was “under the age of 18 years[.]” FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i), (e). Based on our understanding of the record, the circuit court found that Mr. Ali’s conduct toward Daughter only constituted “mental harm to a child.”5 We commend the court on its thorough consideration of the testimony provided, and do not express judgment on whether the record supports that Mr. Ali committed any alternate form(s) of abuse against Daughter. Because neither party cites to evidence that Mr. Ali’s conduct toward Daughter occurred when she was not over the age of 18 years, and our review of the record does not reveal any, we vacate the extended FPO as to Daughter.6 III. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Extending The FPO As To Ms. Ali. A. The Parties’ Arguments Mr. Ali next argues that the circuit court erred in extending the FPO as to Ms. Ali because there was no evidence presented that his conduct placed her “in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[,]” and because the court did not assess his conduct as required by FL § 4-507(a)(3) (iii)(1)–(4). Again, Ms. Ali responds that these arguments are “wholly without merit.” We address each of Mr. Ali’s arguments in turn. B. Analysis 1. There was sufficient evidence that Mr. Ali’s conduct placed Ms. Ali “in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” Beginning with relevant statutory language, the Act defines “abuse” in part as “an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” FL § 4-501(b)(1). The proper standard to determine whether an eligible person was in “fear” “is an individualized objective one—one that looks at the situation in the light of the circumstances as would be perceived by a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position[.]” Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 138 (2001). “[A] belief as to imminent danger is necessarily founded upon the [petitioner’s] sensory and ideational perception of the situation that he or she confronts, often shaded by knowledge or perceptions of ancillary or antecedent events.” Id. at 139 (quotation and internal marks omitted). The issue is “not whether those perceptions were right or wrong, but whether a reasonable person with that background could perceive the situation the same way.” Id. We recap the relevant evidence and then turn to our analysis. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

At the hearing on Ms. Ali’s petition to extend the FPO, she alleged that Mr. Ali’s repeated violations of the existent FPO amounted to subsequent acts of abuse that caused her to be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. She testified that during the term of the FPO, Mr. Ali, repeatedly made “anonymous” phone calls to her and Daughter’s phones, calling her or Daughter from a private phone number and sometimes playing music, including the StarSpangled Banner and Jingle Bells, whistling, clearing his throat, or coughing. Ms. Ali explained that often, one of Mr. Ali’s family members would call after the anonymous call ended. Ms. Ali also testified that Mr. Ali called Daughter, and, using text-to-voice to modify his voice, said that he was “sorry [he] put [his] hands around [Daughter’s] neck.” Ms. Ali stated that the calls were “very, very upsetting” and made her “very scared” because she believed he was “trying to figure out where we [were] by making the phone calls.” Ms. Ali also testified that Mr. Ali would drive by her house “blast[ing] music,” and that on two occasions, she had seen him waiting in his car immediately outside of her cul-desac. The first time occurred in March 2024, when Ms. Ali’s friend called shortly after leaving her house to inform her that Mr. Ali was sitting in a car just outside of her cul-desac. Ms. Ali had planned to return misdelivered mail to her neighbors, but then waited about 15 minutes after receiving her friend’s call to do so. Upon exiting her house and driving down her driveway, she saw Mr. Ali stopped in his car at the corner of the street. Ms. Ali testified that as soon as Mr. Ali saw her, he started driving backwards to get out of her line of sight. She waited several more minutes thinking Mr. Ali would leave her neighborhood, but when she pulled out of her cul-de-sac and onto the street, he was still there. She explained that Mr. Ali then drove toward her, and as they passed each other, he “made sure to go very close to my lane[.]” Ms. Ali testified that this made her “very scared” because he had previously tried to “run [her] off the road” in 2023. The second time Ms. Ali saw Mr. Ali outside of her culde-sac, which she alleged occurred in late summer of 2024, was while driving from her home to court. Ms. Ali testified that she saw Mr. Ali sitting in his car in the neighborhood around her house, and as she drove by, he “came out [from where he had been waiting] and zoomed past [her] and got in front of [her car] to leave the neighborhood.” Mr. Ali testified that since the parties had separated in May 2022, he had lived with his parents about a half of a mile from the marital home, where Ms. Ali and Daughter continued to live. Contrary to Ms. Ali’s testimony, however, he denied ever driving into the cul-de-sac because doing so would violate the FPO. As to the specific March 2024 allegation, when Ms. Ali’s friend notified her of Mr. Ali’s presence after leaving the marital home, he testified that he was subsequently arrested and charged with violating the FPO and stalking. Mr. Ali explained that to defend against these charges, he subpoenaed the police officer’s body camera for footage capturing Ms. Ali’s complaint to law enforcement. Mr. Ali confirmed that in the video, Ms. Ali never claimed that he “tried to drive her off the road or anything to that effect[.]” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

The FPO violation and stalking charges were later nol prossed. [Id.] Regarding the allegation that he tried to run Ms. Ali off the road on their way to court, which Mr. Ali testified occurred during 2023, he stated that he and his mother were in his car when he and Ms. Ali began driving parallel to each other on the same street at the same time. He testified that he did not try to drive Ms. Ali off the road. Mr. Ali also denied making phone calls to Ms. Ali and to Daughter. Mr. Ali’s mother separately testified that Mr. Ali did not try to run Ms. Ali off the road when they were driving to court. Mr. Ali’s appellate arguments concerning sufficiency urge us to draw different inferences from the evidence. This is not our role. Instead, trial courts are “most aptly situated” to assess credibility of witnesses, and thus are “‘entitled to accept—or reject—all, part, or none’ of their testimony, ‘whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.’” Hripunovs v. Maximova, 263 Md. App. 244, 263, 269 (2024) (quoting Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011)). See Md. Rule 8-131(c) (providing that reviewing courts “will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses”). The record before us reveals that Ms. Ali testified that she felt harassed and frightened by Mr. Ali’s many “anonymous” phone calls to her and to Daughter. She further testified that she was scared on two occasions when Mr. Ali waited in his car and then drove past her in a manner that frightened her—particularly considering an earlier encounter in which she felt he had tried to run her off of the road. The court also noted during the hearing that, while Ms. Ali was testifying, Mr. Ali was “glaring, smiling, laughing, [and] shaking his head” at her. Given these pieces of evidence, the court was entitled to conclude that Mr. Ali’s actions, shaded by Ms. Ali’s knowledge or perceptions of “ancillary or antecedent events[,]” placed her in fear of imminent serious bodily harm under the individualized objective standard. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139. 2. The circuit court properly considered the factors in FL § 4-507(a)(3)(iii)(1)–(4) to determine the duration of the extended FPO. To determine the period of extension when a two-year extension of an FPO is requested, a court “shall” consider: (1) the nature and severity of the subsequent act of abuse; (2) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the respondent the person(s) eligible for relief; (3) any pending criminal charges against the respondent; and (4) the nature and extent of the injury or risk of injury caused by the respondent. FL § 4-507(a)(3)(iii) (1)–(4). Although these factors must be considered, we presume trial courts know the law and apply it correctly. Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 284 (2021). As such, trial courts are not required to “go through a detailed check list of the statutory factors, specifically referring to each[.]” Malin v. Miniberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 429 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted). Applied here, we discern no error in the circuit court’s Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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decision to grant an 18-month extension. The court made relevant factual findings addressing the nature and severity of the subsequent acts of abuse by Mr. Ali, the severity of his prior abusive conduct, and the nature of the injuries to Ms. Ali and to Daughter. Additionally, because no pending charges against Mr. Ali were presented during the hearing, none were discussed by the court in its ruling. The court was not otherwise required to expressly link its relevant factual findings to the mandatory statutory factors. See Malin, 153 Md. App. at 429. Discerning no

error, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion granting the 18-month extension as to Ms. Ali. CONCLUSION

We hold that the circuit court did not err in temporarily extending the FPO without holding a hearing or in extending the FPO for 18 months as to Ms. Ali. For the reasons explained above, we vacate the court’s grant of the extended FPO as to Daughter.7

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART; COSTS TO BE PAID 2/3 BY APPELLANT AND 1/3 BY APPELLEE.

FOOTNOTES

1

Mr. Ali presented the following questions in his appellate brief: I.

Whether the [c]ircuit [c]ourt abused its discretion in extending the [FPO] without a hearing or notice to [Mr. Ali] pursuant to Maryland Code, [Family Law] Art. § 4-507[.] II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting [Ms. Ali’s] [a]mended [c]omplaint for [e]xtension of [f]inal [p] rotective [o]rder on behalf of [Daughter.] III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [Mr. Ali’s] conduct constituted “mental abuse of a child[.]” IV. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [Mr. Ali’s] conduct placed [Ms. Ali] in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. V. Whether the trial court erred in allowing allegations of subsequent abuse without prior notice of these accusations. 2

We do not address Mr. Ali’s argument concerning the circuit court’s admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse” because this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”); see also Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 126 (2015) (recognizing that “the [preservation] rule exists to prevent sandbagging and to give the trial court the opportunity to correct possible mistakes in its rulings”) (quotation omitted). On appeal, “[a] party cannot complain about the court’s failure to rule on a pending motion unless it has brought [it] to the attention of the trial court.” Malarkey v. State, 188 Md. App. 126, 156 (2009). See Braxton v. State, 123 Md. App. 599, 650 (1998) (holding that an issue was not preserved when the court reserved ruling and appellant never asked the court to rule). At the underlying hearing, Mr. Ali moved to “dismiss” the extension petitions because he had no notice “on what [he was] supposed to be defending[.]” Following a lengthy discussion, the court stated that it would take Mr. Ali’s position under advisement. Mr. Ali neither contemporaneously objected to the admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse” during the hearing nor, at any point thereafter, re-raised his oral motion to dismiss. Therefore, although Mr. Ali initially complained of admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse[,]” his failure to ask the court to rule on the oral motion or otherwise object to specific evidence presented during the hearing renders the issue unpreserved for appellate review. See Malarkey, 188 Md. App. at 156.

3

The parties’ younger daughter is not a subject of this appeal.

4

On April 11, 2025, Ms. Ali was granted an absolute divorce. Mr. Ali subsequently filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which is currently pending.

5

After the circuit court gave its oral ruling extending the FPO, Mr. Ali’s trial counsel argued that the court did not have “jurisdiction to include [Daughter] in the [extension] order.” The court disagreed, reasoning that Daughter’s “status is that of a child, even if she’s not a minor child.” Although Mr. Ali did not raise the specific sufficiency argument regarding “mental injury of a child” that he now raises on appeal, he was not required to do so to preserve the issue for appellate review. See Md. Rule 8-131(c) (“When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court of the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]”); see also Slick v. Reinecker, 154 Md. App. 312, 349 (2003) (after a bench trial, a party need not move for judgment at the close of evidence to preserve a claim of evidentiary sufficiency).

6

This disposition does not inhibit Daughter from filing a new request for an FPO against Mr. Ali or seeking other legal relief, as appropriate.

7

We reiterate that our disposition regarding the extension of the FPO as to Daughter does not preclude Daughter from seeking a new FPO or other legal relief, as available.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Disputed assets; monetary award; equitable distribution

Amaneh Arasteh v. Michael Arasteh No. 892, September Term 2025 Argued before: Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: June 9, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s monetary award of $70,000 to wife. In the record provided to this court, nothing suggests that the trial court omitted any disputed assets from the equitable distribution.

In connection with a judgment of absolute divorce, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County ordered appellee Michael Arasteh (“Husband”) to pay a monetary award in the amount of $70,000.00 to appellant Amaneh Arasteh (“Wife”). Wife noted an appeal. In her informal brief, she presents three questions for review: 1. Whether the Circuit Court erred by failing to consider and divide all marital assets as part of the monetary award. 2. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion in determining the value of marital property and calculating the monetary award. 3. Whether the Circuit Court failed to provide due process and a fair hearing in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-311(f). For the reasons stated below, we shall affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in a civil ceremony on March 16, 1993. They had a religious ceremony of marriage on June 27, 1993. They separated in August 2022. Husband filed a complaint for divorce a month later. Before trial, the parties submitted a joint statement of marital property. The parties agreed that the majority of their assets were marital property. The parties appear to have disagreed only that certain jewelry and rugs were marital property. However, they both valued the jewelry at $50,000 and the rugs at $100,000. The parties provided limited testimony concerning TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. their various assets. Husband testified that he owned an undeveloped lot worth $24,700.00 and that he had bank accounts, as well as two retirement accounts worth $440,000 and $30,000. Husband stated that the jewelry and rugs were given to the parties as wedding gifts. Wife asserted that the jewelry and rugs were not wedding gifts, but were instead gifts to her from her parents or an inheritance. Wife testified that, at the religious ceremony, Husband had promised to pay her a dowry of 600 gold coins. Wife explained that, “in Islam, you can ask for that dowry anytime, even during your marriage. But if you want to get divorced, definitely you need to get it.” She testified that Husband had never paid her dowry and that he “has a lot of” gold coins, although she did not know how many. Husband testified that he had previously owned “maybe three or four coins,” but that he had sold them in 2020. At the close of the evidence, the court stated that it could not reach a decision without more information about Husband’s Social Security benefits. Consequently, the court continued the matter. Wife said that she would submit video of the religious ceremony to support her assertion that no jewelry or rugs were given to the couple at that time. After another hearing, the court determined that all property at issue was marital. Despite the parties’ opposition, the court appointed a trustee to facilitate the appraisal and sale of the marital property. At one point, the court “agreed to suspend the Trustee’s duties to allow for additional time for settlement negotiations” between the parties. The court, however, allowed the trustee to resume work on May 21, 2024, because the parties were unable to reach an agreement. The court conducted several status conferences, including one on July 1, 2024. After that conference, Wife’s counsel withdrew his appearance. Wife indicated that she intended to find another attorney and provided the court with her telephone number, email address, and “temporary address.” Shortly thereafter, Husband’s counsel withdrew her appearance. On February 6, 2025, the court held a final hearing. Wife was not present for that hearing and has not provided this Court with a transcript of the proceedings. The record indicates that the hearing was held remotely and that Wife was emailed information about how to join the hearing. According to the hearing sheet, both Husband and the trustee were present for the hearing. The court issued a written order and memorandum opinion on June 2, 2025. In its memorandum opinion, the court reviewed the procedural history of the case and stated that the trustee gave the court an “informal[] report[]” on Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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October 22, 2024. The trustee reported “that his work had stalled” because of “the parties’ refusal to cooperate” and that Husband’s parcels of real property “were in foreclosure status and tax sale, and were not worth rescuing using the funds in the Trustee’s control.” The court stated that at the hearing on February 6, 2025, it had determined that “it has no other alternative but to value the marital property, determine a monetary award, and grant the parties’ divorce.” The court found that the marital property consisted of “the accounts held by the Trustee, jewelry, and various other items of personal property[.]” The court also found that the “total value” of the marital property was “approximately” $310,000.00, but noted that it was “unable to ascertain” the values of some pieces of property because of “the parties’ lack of cooperation with the Trustee.” The court granted Wife a monetary award of $70,000.00. In addition, the court awarded Wife the “jewelry held by the Trustee and the Persian rugs[.]” The court awarded “the vehicles and their respective keys to Husband.” Wife noted this timely appeal.

State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 183-84 (2003) (quoting Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 104-05 (1999)). In the absence of a sufficient factual record showing otherwise, we “presume that [the trial court] did the right thing for the right reason.” Campbell v. State, 235 Md. App. 335, 339 (2017). Thus, without any proof to the contrary, we must presume that the court made the required findings at the hearing on February 6, 2025. Turning to the jewelry and rugs, Husband testified that they were wedding gifts. Wife stated that they were not. We see no indication that Wife gave the court the wedding video, which she claimed would show that the jewelry and rugs were not gifts to the married couple. Thus, the court could reasonably have found Husband’s testimony more credible on this issue. “In its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the Circuit Court was entitled to accept—or reject—all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.” Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011) (emphasis in original).

DISCUSSION

II. Valuation of Marital Property Wife argues that the court erred in determining the value of the marital property. Specifically, she argues that the court “relied on incomplete and outdated financial information,” and “failed to consider updated financial statements that had been requested but not yet received.” Wife’s argument on this issue suffers from the same problem as her previous argument—because Wife has not provided the relevant parts of the record, we do not know what evidence the circuit court relied on in making its decision. We have before us the parties’ testimony and documentary evidence from February 2024, but no information concerning the trustee’s reports to the court or the transcript of the final hearing, during which the court might have clarified what information it was relying on and how it arrived at its total marital property valuation. We therefore “presume that [the court] did the right thing for the right reason.” Campbell v. State, 235 Md. App. at 339. As to Wife’s contention that the court erred in failing “to consider updated financial statements that had been requested but not yet received,” the record does not indicate that Wife requested a continuance or raised any other issues regarding the updated statements. In general, we do not decide an issue that has not “been raised in or decided by the trial court.” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Thus, the issue of “updated financial statements” is not before us.

I. Determination of Marital Property Wife argues that the court “erred by failing to consider and divide all marital assets” and that the court “improperly included jewelry and carpets . . . as marital property.”1 Wife lists the following items as having been “omitted . . . from equitable distribution”: (1) two retirement accounts; (2) the undeveloped lot; (3) gold coins; (4) cars; and (5) “cash from commercial property rental.” “A circuit court’s classification of property as marital or non-marital is subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard[.]” Huntley v. Huntley, 229 Md. App. 484, 489 (2016). Under this highly deferential standard of review, we may reverse the trial court only if there is no credible evidence to support its decision. See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 190 Md. App. 553, 568 (2010). In the record provided to this Court, nothing suggests that the trial court omitted any disputed assets from the equitable distribution. Although the court’s order and memorandum opinion do not contain a complete list of items included as marital property, the court stated that it found all disputed property to be marital. To the extent that Wife argues the court improperly found that certain items, such as the gold coins, did not exist, we are unable to consider the issue because of Wife’s failure to provide a transcript of the hearing on February 6, 2025.2 An appellant must obtain “a transcription of any portion of any proceeding relevant to the appeal[.]” Md. Rule 8-411(a) (2). “It is incumbent upon the appellant claiming error to produce a sufficient factual record for the appellate court to determine whether error was committed[.]” Mora v. State, 355 Md. 639, 650 (1999); accord DiMeglio v. State, 201 Md. App. 287, 314 (2011). “‘[T]he most fundamental principle of appellate review . . . is that the action of a trial court is presumed to have been correct and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party claiming error to first allege some error and then to persuade us that that error occurred.’” 36

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

III. Due Process Wife describes her third contention on appeal as: “Whether the Circuit Court failed to provide due process and a fair hearing in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-311(f).” We present Wife’s final argument in its entirety: [Wife] was self-represented after trial and was not given an adequate opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine regarding financial disclosures. Certain documents were submitted after the hearing without proper notice or opportunity to respond. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

These procedural errors undermined the fairness of the judgment and warrant reversal or remand for a new hearing. Only one hearing occurred after Wife’s counsel withdrew. The circuit court sent Wife notice of that hearing using the contact information that she had given to the court, but Wife failed to appear. She makes no claim that the notice was inadequate, and she did not request a continuance. Thus, she had an “adequate opportunity to present evidence or crossexamine regarding financial disclosures.” She did not take advantage of that opportunity. Wife’s reference to Rule 2-311(f) is confusing. That rule concerns hearings held in response to motions, but Wife does not specify any motion on which the court failed to hold a hearing. In addition, she does not identify the “documents”

that she claims were submitted after the hearing. In short, Wife’s argument is not specific enough for this Court to review. “Parties’ appellate briefs must contain ‘[a] rgument in support of the party’s position on each issue.’” Oxley v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., 268 Md. App. 575, 587 n.6 (2026) (alteration in original) (quoting Md. Rule 8-504(a) (6)). “[A]ppellate courts cannot be expected to either (1) search the record on appeal for facts that appear to support a party’s position, or (2) search for the law that is applicable to the issue presented.” Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594, 618 (2011). A failure to present sufficient argument in an appellate brief acts as a waiver of the insufficiently argued issue. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc. v. Timm, 245 Md. App. 84, 117 (2020).

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

FOOTNOTES

1

In her brief Wife asserts that Husband “improperly included jewelry and carpets . . . as marital property and assigned them an inflated value.” In fact, both parties assigned the same value to these items in the joint statement of marital property.

2

If the court did find that Husband had no gold coins, the finding would not be clearly erroneous. Husband testified that he had sold his gold coins in 2020, two years before the parties’ separation. The trial court could credit Husband’s testimony.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Actual income; spousal support; child support

Chanan Zlotnitsky v. Limor Zlotnitsky No. 2512, September Term 2024 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Wright (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Wright, J. Filed: June 5, 2026 The Appellate Court reversed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s calculation of husband’s income. The court essentially treated the deposits into husband’s checking account as “actual income” separate from husband’s yearly salary, even though there was no evidence or argument to this effect. And, because the court relied on an erroneous income determination when deciding spousal support, child support and the award of attorneys’ fees, those decisions were also reversed.

This appeal stems from a judgment, entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, granting Chanan Zlotnitsky (“Husband”) an absolute divorce from Limor Zlotnitsky (“Wife”). In that judgment, the court resolved issues related to, among other things, marital property, spousal support, child support, and attorneys’ fees. Husband appeals from that judgment, raising two questions for our review. For clarity, we have rephrased those questions as1: 1. Did the trial court err in calculating Husband’s income, causing Husband’s income to be artificially inflated when the court determined spousal support, child support, and attorneys’ fees? 2. Did the trial court err in finding that Husband had dissipated marital funds? For reasons to follow, we hold that the trial court erred in calculating Husband’s income. We therefore reverse that portion of the court’s judgment, as well as the portions of the judgment concerning spousal support, child support, and attorneys’ fees, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Otherwise, we affirm. BACKGROUND2

Husband and Wife were married in 1993. The parties had four children, three of whom have since become 38

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. emancipated. The parties’ youngest child was twelve years old at the time of trial. In 2021, Wife filed for divorce, and Husband subsequently filed a counter-complaint for divorce. A four-day merits trial was held beginning in July 2024. Husband’s Income At trial, Husband proffered that, as recently as 2021, he had a gross monthly income of approximately $54,000.00, which he had received through various business interests. Husband testified that, since that time, his income had declined. In 2022, Husband received a total of $328,182.00 in distributions from his interest in a company he started with his brother, CEO Housing Partners, LLC. That same year, Husband began working as an independent contractor for a different company, CEO Development Group, LLC, earning $20,000.00 per month. Husband testified that he did not receive any distributions from CEO Housing Partners in 2023 or 2024. Husband testified that, in 2024, his income was derived almost entirely from his work as an independent contractor for CEO Development Group. Both parties prepared summary exhibits, which the court accepted into evidence, reflecting their respective interpretations of monies that had been deposited in Husband’s personal checking account in 2024 from his various business interests. Husband’s exhibit showed that, as of June 2024, he had received approximately $250,000.00 from CEO Housing Partners and approximately $9,000.00 from other sources. Husband testified that a portion of the $250,000.00 he received in 2024 was actually carry-over income that he had earned in 2023 from CEO Development Group but that he had not collected until 2024 for tax purposes. Husband testified that, for the purposes of the summary exhibit, he combined all payments he received from CEO Housing Partners and CEO Development Group into one category. Husband testified that the entirety of the $250,000.00 he received in 2024 was from his work as an independent contractor for CEO Development Group. According to Husband’s summary exhibit, Husband’s average income in 2024 was approximately $21,000.00 per month. Like Husband’s summary exhibit, Wife’s summary exhibit showed that Husband had received $250,000.00 from CEO Housing Partners and CEO Development Group in 2024. In addition, Wife’s exhibit included various charges on Husband’s business credit cards, as well as payments Husband had received from other business interests in 2023, all of which Wife claimed should be counted as part of Husband’s current income. Wife argued that Husband’s total TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

income was $34,145.00 per month, which he derived from two sources: direct money he received as salary, and charges he made on corporate credit cards for personal expenses. Dissipation Husband testified that, in 2021, the parties owned a funded money market account through Morgan Stanley (the “Morgan Stanley account”). Husband testified that, after Wife filed for divorce, he accessed a line of credit on the account and transferred approximately $500,000.00 into a different joint account and then into his personal checking account. Husband testified that all of that money was then used to buy stocks through a jointly-titled entity, Zlotnitsky Investments, LLC, based on the recommendations of the parties’ adult son. Husband testified that he withdrew the funds from the Morgan Stanley account without Wife’s knowledge or permission. Husband testified that, as of trial, the value of the investments had dropped significantly. As a result of Husband’s actions, the Morgan Stanley account, which was valued at $581,349.00 at the time of trial, was encumbered by a debt of $409,723.00, which reduced the marital value of the account to $171,626.00. Aside from his testimony, Husband did not offer any evidence to show how the funds were utilized after being removed from the Morgan Stanley account or how the purported investments had performed leading up to trial. Wife argued that Husband had dissipated the $409,723.00 and that, consequently, the marital value of the Morgan Stanley account should be assessed at $581,349.00. Wife argued that she never consented to the removal of the funds and that Husband’s insistence that the funds were used for investment purposes was unsubstantiated and not credible. Trial Court’s Ruling Following trial, the court issued a memorandum opinion and accompanying judgment. Among its many decisions, the vast majority of which are not germane to the instant appeal, the court granted primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Wife and ordered Husband to pay child support. In so doing, the court made the following findings regarding Husband’s income: [Husband] testified that he makes $20,000.00 per month working as an independent contractor at CEO Development Group. [Wife] argued that the Court should find [Husband’s] income to be greater than $240,000.00 annually because he receives income from his business interests and uses corporate credit cards to cover some of his expenses. Additionally, [Wife] believes that [Husband] will secure a business interest in his current employer, which is owned by his brother, once the divorce is finalized. She argues that the only reason he does not have an interest now is because he wants to minimize his income for alimony and child support purposes. In support of this allegation, [Wife] offered a summary spreadsheet that details transfers and deposits into [Husband’s] personal checking account in the year preceding tria1. The spreadsheet shows deposits TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

from CEO Housing Partners LLC, 1267 North Laurel Venture LLC, CEO Development Group, miscellaneous checks, and Zelle and Venmo transfers. [Husband] offered his own summary spreadsheet in rebuttal to [Wife’s] spreadsheet. [Husband’s] spreadsheet went back eighteen months and showed largely identical transfers to [Wife’s] summary spreadsheets, though it did not show any of the transfers from CEO Development Group. In comparing the spreadsheets and analyzing the deposits, the Court agrees with [Wife] that the deposits from CEO Housing Partners LLC, 1267 North Laurel Venture LLC, and CEO Development Group are additional income. The Court does not agree that the check deposits, which [Husband] testified were from selling his Porsche and his iControl settlement, should be considered part of [Husband’s] income. Additionally, the Court was not persuaded that the Zelle and Venmo transfers were income. Further, in making an income determination, the Court only considered the income [Husband] has earned in 2024. [Wife’s] summary went back one year before trial, but the Court was not able to determine whether there was other income earned in the first half of 2023 that was not represented by the chart. Therefore, the Court only used the deposits from 2024 and has determined that [Husband] received additional income of $190,882.70 from CEO Housing Partners, LLC; $4,972.90 from 267 North Laurel Venture, LLC; and $60,000.00 from CEO Development Group. The Court did not speculate as to whether [Husband] would receive any similar payments in the remainder of 2024. This totaled $255,855.60 in additional income on top of [Husband’s] wages as an independent contractor. In support of her allegation that [Husband] has additional income because he puts personal expenses on corporate credit cards, [Wife] offered a summary spreadsheet of what she believes are [Husband’s] personal charges on CEO Housing Partners LLC’s American Express card. The Court determined that [Husband] paid those expenses from his personal account and that these charges are not additional income. Therefore, the Court finds that [Husband’s] monthly income is $41,321.30. (Footnotes omitted.) The court also identified and valued the parties’ marital property. Regarding Wife’s dissipation claim, the court found as follows: [Wife] alleges [Husband] took out a line of credit against the Parties’ jointly titled Morgan Stanley Select UMA account ending in 3203 and the Morgan Stanley LOC account ending in 3204. She argues this was dissipation because [Husband] failed to get her consent before he took out the line of credit, did so during the separation after Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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she had filed for divorce, and he used the funds for investing rather than an appropriate family purpose. She further argues that she would not have consented to taking a line of credit against their assets at the time. The investments did not perform and the lien against the Morgan Stanley accounts was $409,723.00 as of the date of trial. [Husband] admits he withdrew the funds to make an investment and argues that had the investment performed well [Wife] would be requesting a share of the return on investment rather than claiming dissipation; however, he offered no evidence to support how the investment was appropriate at the time it was made. The Court finds that [Husband] took out a line of credit against the joint account during the separation without [Wife’s] consent and invested those funds into his son’s company. He did so by transferring the funds to his Chase Checking account ending in 6679 and then into Zlotnisky Investments. Consequently, the Parties have a $409,732.00 outstanding liability against the joint account. The Court credits [Wife’s] testimony that she would have not authorized the use of these funds for any investments while the Parties were in contested litigation. At the time [Husband] made these investments he stated he could not afford to pay for the minor child’s educational and therapy expenses. [Husband] offered no valid reason for investing such a large sum of money into his son’s business nor did he offer any evidence as to how and when the funds were lost or if, in fact, they were actually lost in the investment. The Court finds that [Wife] has met her burden in demonstrating that [Husband] dissipated marital funds as [Husband] had no appropriate family purpose for the expenditure. Based on those findings, as well as many other findings not relevant here, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife a monetary award of $430,141.00. In addition, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $10,000.00 per month in indefinite alimony, $5,200.00 per month in child support, and $35,000.00 in attorneys’ fees.3 This timely appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as needed below. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s judgment regarding dissipation is a factual one and, therefore, is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202 (2004). A court’s judgment regarding a party’s income is also factual and is likewise reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 216 Md. App. 205, 223-24 (2014). DISCUSSION

I. Parties’ Contentions Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that 40

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his monthly income was $41,321.30. Husband contends that the court “double counted” his income by treating the $250,882.70 in deposits into his personal checking account in 2024 as being separate from the $240,000.00 per year he received from CEO Development Group as an independent contractor. Husband argues that the evidence did not support the court’s decision, as neither he nor Wife ever asserted that the deposits into his account were anything other than his salary from CEO Development Group. Husband contends that the court’s income determination must therefore be reversed and that the case must be remanded for a redetermination of his income. Husband also contends that, because the court’s determinations regarding spousal support, child support, and attorneys’ fees were based on an erroneous assessment of his income, those determinations must also be reversed, and, on remand, the court should make new findings in light of Husband’s redetermined income. Wife contends that the court did not err. Wife argues that the court’s assessment of Husband’s income was proper based on Husband’s testimony that he earned $240,000.00 from CEO Development Group and the parties’ summary exhibits, which showed, according to Wife, additional income from other sources. Wife argues that the court was not required to accept Husband’s explanation that the two incomes were the same. Analysis When determining the amount of a parties’ child support obligation, a court must assess the “actual adjusted income” of each party. Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 316 (2013) (cleaned up); see also Md. Code, Fam. Law (“FL”) § 12204(a). “‘Actual income’ means income from any source.” FL § 12-201(b)(1). Although the recognized sources of income are many, see FL § 12-201(b), a court’s calculation of a party’s support obligation must be based on the party’s verified “actual” income.4 Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 316-17 (cleaned up). That is, where, as here, a party is employed to full capacity, the court’s income assessment must be based on evidence of what the party actually receives as income. FL § 12-201(i)(1). We hold that the court clearly erred in calculating Husband’s income. The court, citing Husband’s testimony, found that Husband earned $240,000.00 per year from CEO Development Group. The court also found, based on the parties’ summary exhibits, that Husband earned, by way of cash deposits into his checking account, an additional $250,882.70 from CEO Housing Partners and CEO Development Group in 2024. The court then combined those two “incomes” and determined that Husband earned over $40,000.00 per month in 2024. The problem with the court’s final determination is that the evidence did not establish, and Wife never argued, that the $250,882.70 in deposits into Husband’s checking account represented anything other than his yearly salary from CEO Development Group. The court essentially treated the deposits into Husband’s checking account as “actual income” separate from Husband’s yearly salary, even though there was no evidence or argument that Husband actually received that money from a source other than CEO Development Group. Given that the amount of TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

the deposits was consistent with Husband’s yearly salary from CEO Development Group, and given that Wife did not dispute Husband’s claim or otherwise argue at trial that the deposits into Husband’s checking account should be counted in addition to Husband’s yearly salary of $240,000.00, the court clearly erred in treating the deposits as additional income and in calculating Husband’s income to be $41,321.30 per month. As noted, Wife claims that the court’s income determination was not clearly erroneous because that determination was based on two separate pieces of evidence, namely, Husband’s testimony and the summary exhibits, which established that Husband received $240,000.00 from CEO Development Group and an additional $250,882.70 in cash deposits into his checking account from CEO Development Group and CEO Housing Partners. Wife argues that the court was not obligated to credit, and in fact did not credit, Husband’s explanation that the two incomes were the same. We are not persuaded by Wife’s arguments. To begin with, although Wife did claim at trial that Husband had additional sources of income beyond the $240,000.00 he received from CEO Development Group, Wife never argued that Husband earned $250,882.70 per year from CEO Development Group and CEO Housing Partners and $240,000.00 per year from CEO Development Group. As such, Wife’s current claim – that the two “incomes” should be treated separately – is not properly before this court, as it should have been raised at trial. Md. Rule 8-131(a). Furthermore, the record shows that each of the summary exhibits, which is the evidence Wife now relies upon in claiming that Husband had two incomes, was created and introduced as a summary of all Husband’s earnings, including his salary from CEO Development Group. Rather than treating the summaries as they were intended and incorporating Husband’s salary into the figures presented, the court concluded, erroneously, that the summaries were indicative of some additional income that was separate and apart from Husband’s salary from CEO Development Group. That inference, while perhaps reasonable in a vacuum, was not reasonable in light of the summaries’ intended purpose. For those reasons, we must reverse the court’s determination regarding Husband’s income, and we must remand the case for a reassessment of Husband’s income in light of the above discussion. And, because the court relied on an erroneous income determination when deciding spousal support, child support, and the award of attorneys’ fees, we must reverse those decisions as well. On remand, the court, upon recalculating Husband’s income, should recalculate, where appropriate, Husband’s obligations regarding spousal support, child support, and attorneys’ fees. II. Parties’ Contentions Husband next claims that the court erred in finding that he dissipated marital assets when he removed money from the parties’ Morgan Stanley account. Husband claims that dissipation arises only when a spouse removes property for “an improper purpose.” Husband argues that Wife did not show an improper purpose and that, at most, his removal of the funds constituted an unwise financial decision. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Wife argues that the court’s dissipation finding was proper. Wife contends that the court correctly applied the law and appropriately determined, based on the evidence, that Husband had dissipated assets. Analysis Generally, property disposed of before trial cannot be marital property. Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 368 (2025). Where, however, a party has wrongfully squandered, i.e., dissipated, marital property, the court may consider that property in valuing marital property and fashioning a marital award. Heger v. Heger, 184 Md. App. 83, 94-95 (2009). “Wrongful dissipation occurs when one spouse uses marital property for his or her own benefit for purposes unrelated to the marriage, at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.” Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md. App. 317, 349 (2013). Dissipation may also be found when: “(1) the marriage is not undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown, and/or (2) the dissipating spouse’s principal purpose was a purpose other than the purpose ‘of reducing the amount of funds that would be available for equitable distribution at the time of the divorce.’” Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 652 (2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Welsh v. Welsh, 135 Md. App. 29, 51 (2000)). In short, “[d]issipation occurs when ‘marital assets [are] taken by one spouse without agreement by the other spouse.’” Id. (quoting John F. Fader, II & Richard J. Gilbert, Maryland Family Law, § 15-10 (4th ed. 2006)). “Both the burden of persuasion and the initial burden of production for demonstrating an act of wrongful dissipation are on the party making the allegation.” Hiltz, 213 Md. App. at 349. “[A prima facie case] of dissipation occurs when evidence is produced that marital assets were taken by one spouse without agreement by the other spouse.’” Omayaka, 417 Md. at 656 (quoting John F. Fader, II & Richard J. Gilbert, Maryland Family Law, § 15-10 (4th ed. 2006)). Once the alleging party makes a prima facie dissipation case, “the burden shifts to the alleged dissipator to show that their expenditures were appropriate.” Sims, 266 Md. App. at 369. “After the alleged dissipator provides evidence that the expenditure was appropriate, it is up to the circuit court to determine whether the dissipation claimant has proven that the alleged dissipator did indeed dissipate marital assets.” Id. To be sure, “[t]he doctrine of dissipation is aimed at the nefarious purpose of one spouse’s spending for his or her own personal advantage so as to compromise the other spouse in terms of the ultimate distribution of marital assets.” Heger, 184 Md. App. at 96. As such, “[i]t matters not … that one spouse has, post-separation, expended some of the marital assets[;] … what is critically important is the purpose behind the expenditure.” Hiltz, 213 Md. App. at 349. That said, dissipation may be proven by circumstantial evidence. For instance, “[p]roof that a spouse made sizable withdrawals from bank accounts under his or her control is sufficient to support the finding that the spouse had dissipated the withdrawn funds.” Omayaka, 417 Md. at 657. Moreover, because dissipation is a question of fact, a court is not required to accept, at face value, a party’s explanation regarding the property at issue. Hiltz, 213 Md. App. at 34950. Thus, where a court is presented with evidence of sizable Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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withdrawals, and the alleged dissipator provides testimony concerning what he or she did with the funds, the court is at liberty to believe or disbelieve the alleged dissipator’s explanation. Omayaka, 417 Md. at 657. That is because the court, in assessing the credibility of witnesses, is “entitled to accept – or reject – all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.” Id. at 659. Against that backdrop, we hold that the court did not err in finding that Husband had dissipated some of the marital funds contained in the parties’ Morgan Stanley account. Wife presented uncontroverted evidence that Husband made sizeable withdrawals from an account under his control, without Wife’s knowledge or consent, at a time when the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. That evidence was sufficient to make a prima facie case of dissipation. Although Husband did offer evidence, via his own testimony, that the funds were invested for the benefit of the parties and that the funds had been depleted because the investments performed poorly, the court was under no obligation to accept Husband’s testimony, particularly given that Husband offered no independent evidence in support. In fact, the court ultimately did reject Husband’s claims regarding the fate of the withdrawn funds, and the court found that, absent a credible explanation from Husband that his use of the funds was appropriate, Wife had carried her burden of proving that Husband had dissipated the funds. None of those findings was clearly erroneous.

Husband contends that he “acted with an appropriate purpose” in investing the funds and that the funds were “transparent, traceable, and intended to benefit the marital estate.” Husband also contends that there was no “taking” because he merely transferred the funds from one marital asset – the Morgan Stanley account – to another marital asset – Zlotnitsky Investments, LLC. Husband notes that the court “made no finding that [he] acted in bad faith, concealed assets, diverted funds for personal use, or engaged in financial misconduct.” Husband argues, therefore, that Wife “failed to establish the essential element of dissipation – the removal of assets from the marital estate for an improper purpose[.]” We find Husband’s contentions unavailing. The court was not required to accept Husband’s claims regarding what he did with the funds after they were removed from the Morgan Stanley account, nor was the court required to find bad faith or other misconduct in the handling of said funds before determining that the funds had been dissipated. Again, Wife made a prima facie case for dissipation by showing that Husband removed the funds from the Morgan Stanley account without Wife’s knowledge or consent at a time when the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. The onus was thus on Husband to present credible evidence that the withdrawals were appropriate, and the court was free to accept or reject that evidence. Ultimately, the court rejected Husband’s evidence and found that the funds had been dissipated. The court did not err in reaching that conclusion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID 1/2 BY APPELLANT AND 1/2 BY APPELLEE.

FOOTNOTES

1

Husband phrased the questions as: 1. Did the trial court err in calculating [Husband’s] gross income by adding his annual compensation from CEO Development Group of $240,000, and the deposits of that same pay into his personal checking account, thereby double counting his compensation? 2. Did the trial court err in finding dissipation of a marital asset where [Husband] withdrew funds from one jointly owned investment account to invest in another jointly owned investment account, where the record contained no evidence of bad faith, financial misconduct, or use of these funds for a nonmarital purpose, and the funds were traceable and remained within the marital estate?

2

Because Husband challenges only a few specific rulings by the trial court, we present only those facts necessary to decide the issues raised in this appeal.

3

The trial court originally ordered Husband to pay $75,000.00 in attorneys’ fees, but the court later reduced that amount after Husband filed a motion for reconsideration.

4

A court may impute income on a party upon a finding that the party is voluntarily impoverished. FL § 12-201(i)(2). No such finding was made here.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Imputed income; voluntary impoverishment; factual findings

Emmanuel Ifeagwu v. Chidinma Ifeagwu Nos. 1842, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Friedman, Woodward (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Friedman, J. Filed: June 2, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s division of marital property and custody award. Although the trial court did not make an explicit finding that father was voluntarily impoverished, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the implicit finding of voluntary impoverishment that necessarily accompanied the trial court’s decision to impute income to father.

In this appeal, appellant Emmanuel Ifeagwu (Father), representing himself, challenges the division of marital property and custody award ordered by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in his divorce from appellee Chidinma Ifeagwu (Mother). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. BACKGROUND

Mother and Father were married on April 9, 2016, in Nigeria. The parties have three children: NK, born in April 2018; K, born in November 2021; and N, born in August 2024. After they married, Mother, who is a U.S. citizen, sponsored Father for his green card and they moved to the United States and settled in Maryland. After Father became a United States citizen in March 2021, he began verbally abusing Mother and obsessively accusing her of infidelity with any nearby man, including neighbors, co-workers, repairmen working at the house, and even Uber drivers. Eventually, the relationship degraded to the point that Father moved into the guestroom. When Mother discovered that she was pregnant with the parties’ third child, Father publicly denied that the baby was his. Mother filed a complaint for absolute divorce on July 30, 2024, and Father filed his cross-complaint on September 3, 2024. At the end of September 2024, Mother took the children and moved out of the house to get away from Father’s verbal TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. abuse and disruptive behavior. Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a petition for protection from domestic violence. The court granted Mother a temporary protective order and ordered Father to vacate the house. Mother then returned with the children. The court later entered a final protective order that extended through November 22, 2025. In March 2025, the parties proceeded to trial on their crosspetitions for divorce. Mother was represented by counsel and Father was self-represented. Throughout the proceedings Father asserted that N was not his child, demanded that the court order paternity testing immediately, and objected to proceeding until paternity was established. The trial court treated Father’s repeated objections as motions for a continuance, which the court repeatedly denied. Despite the trial court’s rulings and instructions, Father continued to disrupt the proceedings by asserting that N was not his child and that paternity testing was necessary. Paternity testing ultimately confirmed that he was N’s Father. At a disposition hearing, the trial court awarded Mother primary physical and sole legal custody, with supervised visitation for Father and court ordered reunification therapy with all three children. The trial court found that, based on the limited evidence of assets and property presented, only the house in which the parties had lived and a portion of Mother’s Thrift Savings Plan were marital property subject to division. The trial court found that an equitable distribution was appropriate and awarded Mother two-thirds of the value of each and granted Father a monetary award equal to the remaining one-third. The trial court also awarded Mother use and possession of the house for three years, awarded Mother attorney’s fees, and ordered Father to pay child support. DISCUSSION

Father now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) not dividing Mother’s military pension as marital property; (2) failing to make the findings necessary to award attorney’s fees; (3) imputing an income to him for purposes of calculating child support; (4) relying on insufficient evidence to calculate the monetary award; (5) failing to support its custody award with necessary factual findings; and (6) violating his due process rights by not adequately accommodating his decision to represent himself. We address each in turn. I. Pension Mother has a military pension that was not part of the court’s division of marital property. In his first issue, Father Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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argues that the monetary award must be vacated and remanded because the trial court failed to “identify, classify, and consider” Mother’s military pension. We conclude, however, that Father has waived any error with regard to Mother’s pension. As a general rule, an appellate court will not decide an issue “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.” MD. RULE 8‑131(a); Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 386 (2025). Thus, before we can consider whether the trial court erred by not including Mother’s pension in the division of marital property, the record must plainly show that the issue was either raised or decided by the trial court. Our review of the record, however, shows that at no time did Father identify Mother’s pension as marital property or request that it be divided. Indeed, the only mention of the military pension that we have found was during Mother’s opening argument and closing statement, during which she argued that under federal law the pension was not marital property subject to division because the parties had not been married for the required ten years.1 In neither instance did Father object to or dispute Mother’s argument. Regardless of whether Mother’s assertion was accurate, Father never asked the trial court to address it and thus waived his right to challenge it. See, e.g., Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 483 (2002). As a result, this argument is not preserved for appellate review. II. Attorney’s Fees In his second issue, Father argues that the trial court erred in awarding Mother $15,000 in attorney’s fees without making the required findings as to necessity, reasonableness, and Father’s ability to pay. The record does not support his argument. The decision to award attorney’s fees rests solely in the discretion of the trial court. Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 447 (2002); Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 468 (1994). There are no magical words that a trial court must recite when making the award. Collins, 144 Md. App. at 447. Nonetheless, it must be clear from the record that the trial court considered the required statutory criteria in light of the facts of the case. Id. We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the award was arbitrary or clearly wrong. Id. The Family Law article provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees under three provisions applicable here. See MD. CODE, FAMILY LAW (“FL”) § 7-107 (recovery of fees in divorce proceedings); FL § 8-214 (recovery of fees in marital property division proceedings); FL § 12-103 (recovery of fees in child custody, support or visitation proceedings). Although Father does not point to a specific provision, all three require the court to consider the necessity and reasonableness of the fee award, and the financial resources of the parties. See FL §§ 7-107(a), (b); 8-214(c); 12-103(b). First, Father is incorrect that the trial court failed to explain how his actions made the award of attorney’s fees necessary. The trial court specifically explained that it was awarding attorney’s fees to Mother due to “what [had] transpired over the course of this case, having to come back on more than one occasion, some of which [was] due to [Father’s] 44

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noncompliance with the court’s order.” And indeed, the record shows that among other things, Father failed to follow the trial court’s instructions, repeatedly reargued issues that the trial court had clearly decided, and at times outright refused to participate, all of which caused significant frustration and delay and unnecessarily increased Mother’s legal fees. It is quite clear why the trial court found the award of attorney’s fees to be necessary. Next, it is clear from the record that the trial court specifically considered the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees it awarded. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees included an affidavit that itemized the work done on Mother’s behalf and listed the hourly rate. Mother testified that the fees were exclusively for work done on her behalf in the divorce case and did not include any fees or expenses related to the domestic violence case or to Father’s two appeals. In determining the amount of the fee award, the trial court considered the affidavit and testimony and specifically noted that, due to the proceedings taking far longer than anticipated, Mother had accrued additional legal fees not accounted for in her original request. Although the trial court did not use the term “reasonable,” it is nonetheless apparent from the record that the trial court considered what would be a reasonable award in light of the circumstances of the case. Finally, although Father asserts that it was unreasonable for the trial court to make him pay Mother’s attorney’s fees when he didn’t have enough money to pay an attorney for himself, we note that it is not apparent from the record that Father decided to represent himself due to a lack of funds. The record shows that Father was represented by counsel in early stages of the case, and there is no explanation given as to why Father chose to discharge his attorney and represent himself instead. Moreover, as we discuss in the next section, the trial court found Father’s testimony about his financial circumstances and income to not be credible, imputed an income based on an implicit finding that he was voluntarily impoverished, and found that Father’s income was likely to increase significantly in the near future. It is thus apparent from the record that the trial court did consider Father’s ability to pay and was persuaded that Father had sufficient resources. There is evidence in the record showing that the trial court considered the statutory factors in light of the circumstances of the case, and exercised its discretion to decide an appropriate award that was neither arbitrary nor clearly wrong. We see no cause to disturb that judgment. III. Imputed Income Next, Father argues that the trial court erred in imputing income to him equivalent to the federal minimum wage for purposes of calculating child support without making an explicit finding that his unemployment was voluntary. We disagree. We review the trial court’s determination of a child support obligation for abuse of discretion. Gladis v. Gladisova, 382 Md. 654, 665 (2004). We will not disturb that discretionary decision so long as “the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the ultimate decision is not arbitrary.” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 385 (2020) (cleaned up). A trial court’s findings are only clearly erroneous if, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, they are not supported by competent evidence. Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 606 (2019). A parent’s child support obligation is calculated based on their income. FL § 12-204(a)(1). If the trial court finds that a parent is voluntarily impoverished, “child support may be calculated based on a determination of potential income” imputed to the parent. FL § 12‑204(b) (1)(i). A parent may be considered voluntarily impoverished when they have “‘made the free and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond his or her control, to render himself or herself without adequate resources.’” Digges v. Digges, 126 Md. App. 361, 381 (1999) (quoting Goldberger v. Goldberger, 96 Md. App. 313, 327 (1993)). Factors relevant to voluntary impoverishment include, but are not limited to, the parent’s physical condition, level of education, timing of any change in financial circumstances, efforts to find and retain employment, work history, status of the job market, and whether the parent has withheld support in the past. Durkee v. Durkee, 144 Md. App. 161, 183-84 (2002); Goldberger, 96 Md. App. at 327. Contrary to Father’s assertion, a finding of voluntary impoverishment need not be explicit. Rather, a finding of voluntary impoverishment can be implicit so long as there is adequate support in the record. Durkee, 144 Md. App. at 183. Here, although the trial court did not make an explicit finding that Father was voluntarily impoverished, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the implicit finding of voluntary impoverishment that necessarily accompanied the trial court’s decision to impute income to Father. At trial, Father himself testified that he had been an architect for many years and had his own successful architecture firm in Nigeria before moving to the United States. Father also testified that he was still licensed as an architect, but was currently unemployed and attending school. He stated that he had recently received his Master’s degree and was working on earning a Ph.D. On his financial statement, Father claimed $4,650 in monthly expenses and asserted to the court that he relied solely on gifts from friends to support himself. Despite being a licensed architect and having at least one graduate degree, evidence showed that Father made only minimal and sporadic financial contributions throughout the marriage. He held five different jobs over the six years preceding the breakup of the marriage. Although there was little testimony regarding the type of jobs Father held, he asserted that his last position was “with the State” and he had to leave it due to the protective order. Mother testified that at one point Father had been earning approximately $50,000 per year, but she was generally unaware of his income. In discussing Father’s financial resources and employment generally, the trial court noted that Father was highly educated and there was no apparent reason that he was not or could not be employed. Moreover, the trial court explicitly found Father’s testimony that he was able to meet his expenses based solely on gifts from friends and family, to not be credible. But even accepting that Father was unemployed at the time of trial, the trial court found that considering the graduate degrees he was earning, it expected Father’s income would increase considerably in the near future. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

It is clear from the trial court’s findings that it believed Father had financial resources that he had not disclosed to Mother or the court, and that Father had the ability to be gainfully employed but was choosing not to pursue those opportunities. That is precisely the definition of voluntary impoverishment. FL § 12-201(q) (“‘Voluntarily impoverished’ means that a parent has made the free and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond the parent’s control, to render the parent without adequate resources.”). Because an implicit finding of voluntary impoverishment is supported by evidence in the record, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impute an income to Father for purposes of calculating child support. IV. Equitable Distribution Next, Father argues that the trial court erred in its calculation of his monetary award. Specifically, Father asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding as to the market value of the marital home because the trial court relied only on Mother’s opinion.2 We disagree. The evidence at trial showed that although the house was purchased during the marriage and was thus marital property, the mortgage was in Mother’s name only and Mother had been solely responsible for maintaining the house and for making the mortgage payments during and after the marriage. In their 9-207 statements, Mother and Father disagreed on the estimated market value of the marital home. Mother asserted that the value of the house was $330,000 with $230,777 remaining on the mortgage. Father asserted that the value of the house was $426,000 with an encumbrance of only $182,783. The trial court accepted Mother’s valuation of the house and the amount due on the mortgage because “an owner of property is presumed to be qualified to testify as to [their] opinion of the value of property [they own].” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Gimbel, 54 Md. App. 32, 44 (1983); see also Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 413 (2019). Although Father had a marital interest in the house, he did not have an ownership interest. As a result, his opinion as to the value did not have the same presumption of reliability. To dispute Mother’s valuation, the burden was on Father to present the court with credible evidence. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 413; Brown v. Brown, 195 Md. App. 72, 120 (2010). That he did not do. A trial court’s ruling regarding the value of marital property is a finding of fact that we will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous. See Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 229 (2000). As the owner of the house, Mother’s opinion as to its value was competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Thus, there is no abuse of discretion. V. Custody and Supervised Visitation In his fifth issue, Father argues that the trial court failed to support its custody decision with specific findings of fact under the appropriate factors. The record does not support Father’s contention. “[C]ustody determinations must be made on a case-bycase basis due to the uniqueness of the fact patterns in such disputes.” Petrini, 336 Md. at 469. Maryland courts consider a variety of factors to determine what is in the best interest Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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of a child. FL § 9‑201(a); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986); Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419 (1978). Because of the individualized nature of a best interest analysis, not all factors will be relevant to every situation and no one factor “has talismanic qualities.” Petrini, 336 Md. at 469 (quoting Taylor, 306 Md. at 303). “[T]rial courts are endowed with great discretion in making decisions concerning the best interest of the child.” Petrini, 336 Md. at 469. We review the trial court’s custody ruling for an abuse of discretion. Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 625 (2016). This deference recognizes that the trial court had the advantage of observing the parties to evaluate their demeanor and credibility. Id. At the disposition hearing, the trial court explained that to make its custody decision, it had considered “a number of factors” and specifically referenced Taylor v. Taylor and Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders. On the record, the trial court addressed both the fitness of the parents and the character and reputation of each of the parties and found that those factors weighed heavily in Mother’s favor. The trial court noted that Mother had been a serving member of the military for a long time, had a good relationship with her children, and had brought in witnesses to testify to her having a reputation for good character. In contrast, the trial court found that Father was not always truthful in his representations to the court. With regard to the ability of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions, the trial court found that Mother and Father had none, that they had been unable to agree on anything, and that this circumstance was unlikely to change. The trial court specifically found that Father was the one who made communication difficult, based on both Mother’s testimony about her problems communicating with Father, and the trial court’s own observations of Father’s refusal to adhere to the court’s instructions. With regard to the potential for maintaining natural family relations and the length of separation from the parent seeking custody, the trial court found that there was a strong relationship between Mother and the children, and that apart from her military deployments, Mother had consistently been with and cared for the children. In contrast, there was very little connection between Father and any of the children, no relationship at all between Father and N, and Father had been completely separated from the children since the protective order was entered. The trial court found that the young age of the children and that all three were daughters weighed in favor of Mother. Moreover, there was ample testimony that Mother’s home was a suitable residence for the children, but no testimony at all about where Father was living. Finally, the court found that the children’s home life had been stable since Father had moved out. Although the trial court did not go through every factor listed in the caselaw, it is apparent from the record that the trial court considered and applied the factors that were appropriate for the circumstances of the case. The trial court’s decision that it was in the best interest of the children

for Mother to have primary physical and legal custody is supported by the discussion of those factors. The trial court’s analysis specifically highlighted which factual findings supported limiting Father to supervised visitation, including the protective order that was still in place and Father’s history of disruptive actions in the home. The record shows that trial court relied on the appropriate legal framework and made factual determinations that were supported by evidence in the record, and we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ultimate determination. VI. Due Process In his final issue, Father argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial court failed to offer him “reasonable accommodations” as a self-represented litigant. Specifically, he asserts that in light of his choice to represent himself, the trial court should have admitted inadmissible evidence of the value of the parties’ home and credited his testimony about his employment. He claims that the court’s failure to do so made the proceedings “fundamentally unfair.” He is incorrect. The rules of procedure apply equally to both attorneys and self-represented litigants. Tretick v. Layman, 95 Md App. 62, 68 (1993). The legal system acknowledges that “an untrained, inexperienced litigant is generally at a great disadvantage.” Id. at 69. Nonetheless, there are no separate rules or standards for litigants who choose to proceed without the aid of counsel. Gantt v. State, 241 Md. App. 276, 302 (2019); Tretick, 95 Md. App. at 68. The trial judge’s primary role is to act as an impartial referee, ensuring that the adversarial proceedings are conducted fairly. Tretick, 95 Md. App. at 69. To lend aid to either side “would subvert a necessary part of our adversarial system designed to guarantee just trials.” Id. We note first that it appears from the record that the trial court did allow Father some leeway because of his selfrepresented status, including repeatedly explaining rules of evidence and offering Father the opportunity to continue his direct testimony out of order, even though the proceedings had moved on to cross-examination. It is also apparent from the record that despite this leeway, the trial judge made every effort to ensure that both sides were held to the same standards and rules. That is precisely what due process requires. Indeed, the trial court would have been derelict in its duty if it had chosen to selectively enforce the rules to favor Father. We see no error in the trial court’s actions. CONCLUSION

Our review of the record shows that the trial court faithfully executed its role as a neutral arbiter and was exceedingly patient in explaining to Father the sequence of the proceedings and what was expected of him. For each of the issues Father raised in this appeal, the trial court applied the appropriate law, considered the necessary factors, and made findings that are clearly supported by evidence in the record. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

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FOOTNOTES

1

In Mother’s Maryland Rule 9-207 Statement of Property, she listed only the Thrift Saving account and the house as marital property. In Father’s 9-207 statement, Father listed those assets as well several bank accounts (discussed infra, note 2) and a “retirement” account as marital assets. He did not specify what type of retirement account. We are not persuaded that this ambiguous reference was enough to put the court on notice that Father sought the division of Mother’s military pension. MD. RULE 8-131(a). Moreover, even if it had been, Father’s failure to say anything at all when Mother mentioned the pension would have nonetheless served as a waiver.

2

Father also complains that the trial court erroneously excluded “many claimed assets” from the list of marital property to be divided. In his brief, Father does not identify any particular asset, but we note that in his Rule 9-207 statement, he listed several accounts that Mother did not, including accounts at Truist Bank, USAA, Navy Federal Credit Union, Charles Schwab, Mary Kay, and Wells Fargo. In making its ruling, the trial court acknowledged these claims but found that there was no evidence to show the value, or in some cases the existence, of those assets and declined to divide them without sufficient proof. See Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 227 (2000) (“[T]he party who asserts a marital interest in property bears the burden of producing evidence as to the identity of the property.”). We can only speculate that these are the same assets Father is referring to on appeal, but without a more specific allegation of error, there is nothing for us to review.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Health care; best interests; statutory factors

Brandon Johnson v. Coconut Jacobs No. 2275, September Term 2025 Argued before: Berger, Arthur, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: June 1, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s order, inter alia, granting mother sole legal custody regarding the minor child’s health care. The circuit court engaged with the Maryland Code, Family Law § 9-201 factors in reaching its custody determination, considering three relevant factors when making the challenged determination.

Brandon Johnson (“Father”) and Coconut Jacobs (“Mother”) are the unmarried parents of one child, C. On November 4, 2025, Father and Mother appeared before the Circuit Court for Howard County for a one-day trial regarding Father’s Petition to Modify Custody. After hearing testimony from both parents, the circuit court delivered its order on the record on November 13, 2025. Therein, the circuit court found there was a material change in circumstances; continued the parties’ joint legal custody but granted Father tie-breaking authority; granted Mother sole legal custody regarding C.’s health care; ordered that C.’s primary residence be with Father; modified the holiday schedule; and declined to order Mother to submit to a mental health evaluation. A corresponding written order was entered on April 7, 2026.1 Father noted a timely appeal and presents three questions for our review, which we have recast and rephrased as follows: I. Whether the circuit court erred by ordering that Mother shall have sole legal custody with respect to decisions involving C.’s health care. II. Whether the circuit court erred by altering the holiday schedule in the custody order. III. Whether the circuit court erred by declining to order Mother to submit to a mental health evaluation. For the reasons herein, we affirm. 48

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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. BACKGROUND

Procedural History 2 On December 29, 2023, the circuit court entered a Consent Order for custody (“Original Order”), granting Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of C. Among other things, the Original Order mandated that Mother and Father communicate regarding all aspects of C.’s welfare via OurFamilyWizard (“OFW”), a parenting application. The circuit court entered a second Consent Order on September 23, 2024, pertaining to the exchange of. C. in the event that the minor child cannot be taken to daycare due to illness or inclement weather. Thereafter, on September 26, 2024, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Custody Due to Relocation, citing a job transfer to Florida. In that petition, Mother proposed a month-on-month-off custody schedule, under which C. would spend January, March, May, July, September, and November in Florida with Mother and the remaining six months in Maryland with Father. No court order was entered regarding Mother’s petition. On January 16, 2025, Father filed a Petition to Modify Custody (“Petition to Modify”). In that petition, Father alleged that Mother had relocated to another state and had left C. in his custody since January 1, 2025. Accordingly, Father requested sole legal and physical custody of C. A month later, on February 14, 2025, Father filed a request for an emergency hearing, alleging that Mother picked C. up from daycare on February 12, 2025, during Father’s parenting time, and expressing concern that Mother had left the state with C. An emergency hearing was held on March 3, 2025. The sitting Family Magistrate recommended that Father be granted sole physical custody of C. on a temporary basis and that Mother be ordered to return C. to Father by 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, March 9, 2025. An order to that effect was entered thereafter. Subsequently, Mother filed a Motion to Terminate Temporary Custody Order on March 17, 2025, and a hearing was held on May 15, 2025. The sitting Family Magistrate recommended, among other things, “[t]hat, on a temporary basis, Father be granted tie-breaking authority in the event of impasse, following full discussion, on all legal custody decisions.” Additionally, the Family Magistrate recommended that a merits trial be held on the Petition to Modify after the completion of a custody evaluation. An order to that effect was entered thereafter (“Temporary Custody Order”). TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Merits Trial on the Petition to Modify A one-day trial on Father’s Petition to Modify was held on November 4, 2025. At the trial, Father asked the circuit court to make the Temporary Custody Order permanent. Pertinent here is testimony related to C.’s medical care, the proposed holiday schedule, and the court appointed social worker’s recommendation that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation. During Father’s testimony, the circuit court inquired about C.’s medical care and the following transpired: THE COURT: Who takes the child to the doctor? [FATHER]: We both take him to the doctor. I just took him to the doctor like a couple of weeks ago, like two weeks ago. THE COURT: Is [Mother] informed of all sorts of medical issues, actual activities? [FATHER]: Yes, it’s on our chart. It’s on [MyChart through the doctor]. On cross examination, Mother’s counsel elicited the following: [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Prior to January 2025, who made the doctor’s appointments for [C.]? [FATHER]: He’s only been . . . Whoever called, the mother did. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And how are you informed of those doctor’s appointments? [FATHER]: I’ve only been to two. Anything outside of those was . . . Like I said, that was prior to 2024 before we even had a custody agreement in place. Thereafter, Mother testified: [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: . . . Since December of 2023 until, I guess, March of 2025, who made appointments, who made doctor’s appointments for [C.]? [MOTHER]: I’ve always made his doctor’s appointments until just recently. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And what doctor was he going to? [MOTHER]: When he’s here, he went to [a doctor in Maryland], and when he was with me in Florida, he had a doctor down there in Florida. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Okay. When in Maryland, did you give [Father] notice about the appointments? [MOTHER]: Yes, I gave him notice on [OFW]. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And how did you do that? [MOTHER]: I put it on the calendar. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: The shared calendar? [MOTHER]: Yeah, the shared calendar. I mean, I don’t know. Sometimes I message him, but it was always -- I told him what it was. [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Did he attend? [MOTHER]: Some of them he did, and some of them he didn’t. Additionally, there was significant testimony about how the Original Order did not work well for the parties. Father testified that he and Mother “don’t see each other, . . . [w] e can’t get along.” Further, Father highlighted that he and TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Mother had “a track record of going to Court” since the Original Order and stated that “traditionally, when it comes to decision-making, you know, . . . we can’t get on the same page[.]” According to Father, portions of the Original Order, such as where C. was to be exchanged, had “been long violated.” Despite his general disfavor of the Original Order, Father testified that there were portions that had “work[ed] well”: [FATHER]: . . . We previously had a snow day clause in our initial, initial Court Order. So I would like to kind of keep some of those things from the Court Order because they actually work well. THE COURT: So which Court Order are you referencing? [FATHER]: The original, the original. Where, like I said, when we had the holiday schedule, like this year, I’ll have him for Thanksgiving. She has him for Christmas. Last year I had him for Christmas. So some of those things I would like to keep in place. ... THE COURT: . . . What are you proposing in terms of what should happen on certain holidays, birthdays? [FATHER]: Yeah, I would like, again, like I said, we had that. She’d get him for Mother’s Day. I’d get him for Father’s Day. Like I said, last year I had him for Christmas. She had him for Thanksgiving. So this year is my turn for Thanksgiving. And, you know, she’ll have the Christmas schedule. . . . THE COURT: All right. So what are holidays that are important to you, or at least what you believe are important to [Mother]? [FATHER]: For me, Christmas, Thanksgiving are the big ones. Like I said, I had him for last year for Christmas and, you know, didn’t have him for, she had him for Thanksgiving. So, you know, this year I have him for Thanksgiving. She’ll have him for Christmas. So as long as there’s a rotation in which he actually sees both of us, like I said, my family’s in Georgia. So we might travel sometimes. Sometimes they may come here. So it depends. . . . Mother did not testify regarding the holiday schedule of the Original Order or what she would propose for the holiday schedule in the Modified Custody Order. Finally, Father requested that the circuit court adhere to the court appointed social worker’s recommendation, which was part of the custody evaluation admitted into evidence, that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation. Specifically, the social worker recommended that Mother “submit to a mental health evaluation and begin mental health treatment to address any underlying obstacles to engaging productively in coparenting.” At the trial, Father clarified why he had requested that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation: [FATHER]: . . . There’s been time I picked up my son and he had his fingernails painted. I didn’t agree with that. I didn’t say anything to the mother, but, you know, I just took him home and cleaned it off. But, you know, we have a son and I just, Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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you know, it’s, I don’t understand why you would paint a little boy’s fingernails at that age. And also some of his hairstyles, they’ve been done in a very feminine manner for a two-year-old. And that was something that I brought up to, you know, the social worker’s attention. THE COURT: What’s the correlation between painting the child [sic] fingernails and certain hairstyles with [Mother’s] mental health? [FATHER]: Oh, well, he’s a son. She has two other kids that are girls. So like I said, to me, if a child wants to grow up as an adult and engage in a certain lifestyle, that’s their prerogative. But for a woman to paint a child’s son, a little boy’s nails and do his hairstyle in a specific feminine manner, I just don’t think that’s, something isn’t registering with that. I just don’t think that makes sense to me. I don’t know. Like I said, I brought it up to the social worker. I don’t know what the reason were. I don’t know if it was done to, it could have been done to spite me as a father, being that I’m a father, I have a son. It could have been done to piss me off, but I didn’t say anything to her. I don’t know why it was done. I just brought it up. THE COURT: So you don’t have any evidence to make any correlation between that and a mental health evaluation? [FATHER]: No. THE COURT: Other than you disagree with the painting of the hairs and the fingernails? [FATHER]: Correct. Regarding Mother’s mental health, Father later testified: [O]ne of the things that I brought up to the social worker’s attention that, you know, in regards to the mental health evaluation, um, you know, you can say one thing and something will come to mind. Now, like I said, I’m not a mental health professional, but like in the past, I’ll say something to [Mother] and something completely different will register, like the furthest thing possible. You know what I mean? So that was one of the things, like, you know, like I said, that will help with the communication barrier. Father also sought to testify about other custody suits that Mother had been involved in as evidence that Mother should be required to submit to a mental health evaluation. The circuit court, however, sustained Mother’s objection on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant. The Modified Custody Order On November 13, 2025, the circuit court delivered its ruling on the record and a corresponding written order was entered on April 7, 2026. The circuit court determined that both parties are “fit and proper parents.” The circuit court concluded, however, that “[t]he previous order was not going well. I believe that [Father] and [Mother] both testified to that, where there was a shared schedule, a 50-50 schedule. That schedule was not going well, and that’s the testimony of the parties.” To that end, the circuit court determined that “[a] 50

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new schedule must be developed for the benefit of the child.” The circuit court explained: One part of my ruling is that the previous orders were not working. And the hope is that . . . the Court puts this order going forward to make sure it’s something that can be at least for a period of time as the child develops. But you guys tried 5050. You tried three weeks over the summer. You tried this. You tried that. And both of you testified credibly that it wasn’t working. The circuit court ordered that the parties be granted joint legal custody of C. with Father “having tie-breaking authority in the event of an impasse after full discussion, save for discussions regarding the child’s health. That will be the primary, and by that I mean decision-making regarding the child’s health care, shall be the sole province of [Mother].” The circuit court explained that it found credible Mother’s testimony that she was the primary parent handling C.’s health care and Father’s testimony that he went to some of C.’s doctor’s appointments, but did not go to others. As for holidays, the circuit court determined: [I]t’s [] ordered that on Mother’s Day, independent of this Order, [Mother] shall have parenting time with the child from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. It’s further ordered that on Father’s Day, [Father] shall have parenting time with the child from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. ... I shall also order the parties shall alternate the Thanksgiving holiday with [Father] having odd years and [Mother] having even years. The parties shall alternate Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with [Father] having even years and [Mother] having odd years. Finally, regarding Father’s request that Mother submit to a mental health evaluation, the circuit court explained: The social worker made certain recommendations. I don’t need to go through it as the parties are well aware of the recommendations and that particular evaluation. Ultimately, [Father] testified he’s requesting a mental health evaluation because [Mother] paints the child’s nails and styles his hair in what he describes as a feminine way. The Court does not believe that’s appropriate in terms having [Mother] do a mental health evaluation. I understand there may be cultural issues, issues which are important to the parties in terms of how they wish the child to have their nails and hair styled, but we believe our decision functionally remains in the best interest of the child. And I don’t believe a mental health evaluation is appropriate here, despite what the evaluation says. Father noted a timely appeal. We shall include additional details as necessary in our forthcoming analysis. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a circuit court’s child custody determinations under “three interrelated standards of review.” Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 502 (2022) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)). Indeed, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

[w]hen the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Maryland Rule 8-131(c)] applies. [Second], if it appears that the [circuit court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the [circuit] court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [circuit court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [circuit court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 502 (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586). When reviewing a circuit court’s child custody determinations, “we give ‘due regard . . . to the opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 584). Moreover, “[w]e recognize that ‘it is within the sound discretion of the [circuit court] to award custody according to the exigencies of each case[.]’” Id. (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 585-86). DISCUSSION

I. We discern no error in the circuit court’s modified child custody order. When presented with a request to modify an existing custody order, “[o]ur courts engage in a two-step process.” Kadish, 254 Md. App. at 503 (citing Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 170). The circuit court must first determine whether “there has been a material change in circumstances.”3 Id. (quoting Green v. Green, 188 Md. App. 661, 688 (2009)). Should the circuit court find a material change in circumstances, the court must “then proceed[] to consider the best interests of the child as if the proceedings were one for original custody.” Id. at 503-04 (quoting Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 170). The animating principle underlying our analysis, therefore, is the best interest of C. Sixteen non-exhaustive factors for a circuit court to consider when making a custody determination to ensure the child’s best interests are listed in Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2025 Suppl.), § 9-201 of the Family Law Article (“FL”).4 A. The circuit court did not err in ordering that Mother shall have sole legal custody with respect to C.’s health care. The circuit court awarded Mother sole legal custody with respect to C.’s health care. On appeal, Father argues that this determination was erroneous because Mother “has a track record of not including [him] in the health procedures and medical documentation regarding [C.],” which has the result of alienating him. Father asserts that he attended all of C.’s doctors’ appointments in Maryland that he was made aware of. Further, Father cites a medical appointment that he made for C. in June 2025 that Mother allegedly cancelled because she had taken C. to the doctor in March 2025 during her temporary relocation to Florida. Father contends that Mother did not inform him of the March 2025 appointment TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

and that, in any event, he would not have been able to attend because it was in another state. Additionally, Father cites an incident in November 2023 in which C. suffered a broken foot while in Mother’s custody and Mother allegedly did not adequately communicate the emergency with Father. Finally, Father contends that, because he is now the primary custodial parent, he should be granted sole legal authority to make decisions regarding C.’s health care. The circuit court engaged with the FL § 9-201 factors in reaching its custody determination, considering three relevant factors when making the challenged determination. First, the circuit court addressed “whether and how parents who do not live together will share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child.” FL § 9-201(a)(3). With respect to that factor, the circuit court concluded: [Father] testified that the parties split their responsibilities[.] . . . Both parties are fit and proper, so when [C.] was in [Mother’s] care, the Court finds that [Mother] can care for the child appropriately. And when [C.] was in [Father’s] care, he can care for the child appropriately. And we find the testimony of [Mother] credible that she [bore] the responsibility, the primary responsibility of the child’s health care. She was the one making those decisions. She was the one primarily going to doctor’s appointments. [Father] testified credibly that he went to some, he didn’t go to others. Second, the circuit court assessed “each parent’s role and tasks related to the child and how, if at all, those roles and tasks have changed.” FL § 9-201(a)(12). Regarding this factor, the circuit court explained: I believe, I think father states a very [tautological] explanation. He says he wants to be a father. He wants [sic] the child to the doctor and to school and things of that nature. And I believe [Mother] is the same sort of feeling. She wants to be a mom. And she wants to be engaged in all those things between herself and [C.] Third, the circuit court considered “the parents’ relationship with each other, including: (i) how they communicate with each other; (ii) whether they can co-parent without disrupting the child’s social and school life; and (iii) how the parents will resolve any disputes in the future without the need for court intervention.” FL § 9-201(a)(14). The circuit court concluded that, although both Father and Mother are fit parents, the court was “not terribly convinced” that they could work together. The circuit court then granted Mother sole legal custody to make decisions regarding C.’s health care. We discern no error in the circuit court’s determination. We first observe that the circuit court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Although Father testified that both he and Mother took C. to the doctor, Father also testified -- contrary to his assertion on appeal that he attended all doctors’ appointments in Maryland that he was aware of --that prior to 2024, he had only been to two of C.’s doctors’ appointments. Although it is true that the circuit court concluded that “the parties do not communicate well[,]” there was testimony Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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that information regarding C.’s doctors’ appointments and health care is readily accessible to both parties on MyChart, an application that both parties have access to. Notably, the circuit court also concluded that the November 2023 incident involving C.’s broken foot was an accident and that it “was [not] malicious.” The circuit court applied the appropriate legal standard, namely the relevant factors in FL § 9-201(a). Applying the findings of fact to the “best interest” factors, we discern no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s ultimate conclusion that it is in C.’s best interest for Mother to have sole legal custody with respect to health care decisions, notwithstanding the fact that C.’s primary residence is now with Father. To be sure, Mother previously made and attended all of C.’s doctors’ appointments. Moreover, the circuit court concluded that Father and Mother were not working well together, and it was “not terribly convince[ing]” that they would be able to work together. In such circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court’s decision, which maintains the share of responsibility as it was prior to Mother’s temporary relocation to Florida, was an abuse of discretion. B. The circuit court did not err in amending the holiday schedule in the custody order. As part of the written order memorializing the Modified Custody Order, the circuit court provided the following holiday schedule: [Mother] shall have access with the Minor Child on Mother’s Day and the [Father] shall have access with the Minor Child on Father’s Day. Mother’s Day and Father’s Day shall be defined as 9:00am to 7:00pm on Mother’s/ Father’s Day; and . . . the parties shall alternate Thanksgiving with the [Mother] having the minor child for Thanksgiving in the even years and the [Father] having the minor child for Thanksgiving in odd years; and . . . the parties shall alternate Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, with the [Mother] having the minor child for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in the odd years and the [Father] having the minor child for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in even years[.] Father challenges this amended holiday schedule and asserts that the holiday schedule in the Original Order, which defined holidays as more than just the individual day, worked well. 5 Accordingly, Father requests that the Modified Custody Order be amended in such a way so as to revert back to the holiday schedule of the Original Order. This portion of the Modified Custody Order was not erroneous. Although Father did testify that he would like to keep the holiday schedule of the Original Order, there was also significant testimony that the Original Order did not work well. To be sure, the circuit court included as part of its ruling “that the previous orders were not working” and that a new arrangement was needed. Given such a finding, it is clear that there is no error in the holiday schedule encapsulated in the Modified Custody Order. This is especially so when the amended holiday schedule splits holidays evenly, thereby 4F

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providing C. equal access to both parents for important holidays. Finally, we address Father’s confusion regarding the Modified Custody Order to the extent that it provides for the parties to “alternate Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.” In our view, this provision means that the Christmas holiday is defined as December 24th and December 25th. To be sure, the written order provides that Mother will have C. “for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in the odd years” and Father will have C. “for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in even years[.]” (emphasis added). This is consistent with the circuit court’s oral order. We empathize with Father’s disagreement regarding this amended holiday schedule. We note, however, that the circuit court added a provision that, “the parties shall have custody at all other times that the parties mutually agree.”6 Pursuant to this provision, therefore, Father and Mother may arrange with one another for either parent to have an extended holiday period with C. C. The circuit court did not err by declining to order Mother to submit to a mental health evaluation. The circuit court admitted into evidence the custody evaluation in which the court appointed social worker recommended that Mother “submit to a mental health evaluation and begin mental health treatment to address any underlying obstacles to engaging productively in coparenting.” On appeal, Father challenges the circuit court’s rejection of this recommendation. Father contends that Mother’s behavior -- leaving C. with family while she was on vacation during Father’s court allocated Father’s Day weekend, recommending a month-on-month-off custody schedule to accommodate her relocation to Florida, and filing for contempt alleging that Father refused her court ordered video calls with C. -- are indicative of Mother’s poor mental health and the need for a mental health evaluation. Although the circuit court admitted the custody evaluation into evidence, it was not required to accept the recommendations therein. To be sure, it is the duty of the circuit court to make its own independent assessment of the best interest of the child by analyzing the relevant “best interest” factors. See, e.g., J.A.B. v. J.E.D.B., 250 Md. App. 234, 258-59 (2021) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion “with respect to its custody determination” where it “did not simply adopt the recommendation of any party or of the custody evaluator,” and instead explained its own reasoning while engaging with the relevant factors). At trial, Father’s request that Mother be required to undergo a mental health evaluation rested on three things: Mother painting C.’s fingernails on one occasion and doing C.’s hair in “feminine” hairstyles; Mother’s “communication barrier,” which Father characterized as an obstacle to effective coparenting; and separate custody suits involving Mother’s two other children, each of whom has a different father. As to Mother’s painting of C.’s fingernails on one occasion and doing C.’s hair in “feminine” hairstyles, Father expressly conceded at the trial that there was no correlation between the challenged behavior and Mother’s mental health. Indeed, Father agreed with the circuit court that he merely disagreed TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

with Mother’s conduct. The circuit court concluded that the challenged conduct did not warrant requiring Mother to submit to a mental health evaluation: Ultimately, [Father] testified he’s requesting a mental health evaluation because [Mother] paints the child’s nails and styles his hair in what he describes as a feminine way. The Court does not believe that’s appropriate in terms of having [Mother] do a mental health evaluation. I understand there may be cultural issues, issues which are important to the parties in terms of how they wish the child to have their nails and hair styled, but we believe our decision functionally remains in the best interest of the child. And I don’t believe a mental health evaluation is appropriate here, despite what the evaluation says. Moreover, the circuit court considered the challenged conduct when assessing “the child’s developmental needs, including physical safety, emotional security, positive selfimage, interpersonal skills, and intellectual and cognitive growth.” FL § 9-201(a)(6). Specifically, the circuit court explained: The child, as I can tell, does not have any developmental issues. [Father] noted personal issues concerning the child’s fingernails and hairstyle being in an effeminate manner. I don’t find that particularly relevant or persuasive here. I understand that there are, as I said before, there may be cultural things in different environments where fingernail painting or certain hairstyles may not be appropriate to some people. We don’t find that moves the needle one way or the other. I don’t find that painting the child’s fingernails is abusive to the child. I don’t think certain hairstyles are abusive to the child at this part of the child’s development. We find no error in this conclusion. As noted, Father acknowledged at the trial that his disagreement with Mother’s conduct was not correlated to the request that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation. In such circumstances, we find no error in the circuit court’s findings of fact and no abuse of discretion in its ultimate conclusion that Mother’s conduct -- painting C.’s fingernails and doing his hair in a manner described by Father as “feminine” -- did not necessitate a mental health evaluation. Regarding Mother’s alleged “communication barrier” and its effect on co-parenting, we similarly find that there was no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that such allegations did not warrant a mental health evaluation. At trial, Father testified: “in the past, I’ll say something to the [Mother] and something completely different will register, like the furthest thing possible. You know what I mean? So that was one of the things, like, you know, like I said, that will help with the communication barrier.” The circuit court concluded that “the parties do not communicate well” and observed that the parties were “trying to effectively hurt one another[.]” Further, the circuit court characterized Father’s request that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation as an attempt to disparage TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Mother: “And I heard from [Father], he said that [Mother] is a somewhat fit and proper parent, that she needs a mental health evaluation. And going forward, I’m going to put this in the Order, it’s probably best you don’t disparage one another in front of the child.” The circuit court went on to note that “functionally, it looks like [Mother and Father are] communicating via [OFW], and that’s something that should continue.” The circuit court, therefore, concluded that any communication problems between Father and Mother were caused by both parties. Moreover, the circuit court clearly viewed Father’s request that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation as a tactic to disparage Mother. In our review, we must “give ‘due regard . . . to the opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’” Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 171 (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 584). We cannot say that such findings were in error. As to Mother’s other custody actions, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the circuit court properly excluded such evidence and did not consider it in its ultimate custody determination. Father asks us to consider the fact that Mother has been a party to multiple custody actions in the Circuit Court for Howard County involving her other two children, each of whom has a different father. Because Mother is “46 years old with 3 children by 3 separate men,” and her eldest daughter is 23 years old, Father opines that “a large majority of [Mother’s] adult life she’s been a single parent[] [w]hich could lead to Parental Estrangement or Parental Burnout.” As an initial matter, we note that we disagree with the notion that, by virtue of being a single mother of three children each having a different father, a mother should be required to undergo a mental health evaluation as part of a custody dispute. Our disagreement with this notion is even more pronounced in a situation where, as is the case here, the circuit court expressly finds that the mother is a fit parent who wants to care for her child. In any event, the circuit court properly excluded testimony concerning Mother’s other custody cases as irrelevant and prudently did not consider such facts in making its ultimate custody determination. We, accordingly, decline to consider Mother’s other custody disputes here. Father’s other arguments regarding why Mother should be required to undergo a mental health evaluation are similarly unavailing. Each piece of evidence raised by Father on appeal was addressed by the circuit court. First, regarding Father’s assertion that Mother left C. with her family while she went on vacation during Father’s court ordered Father’s Day weekend, the circuit court noted: [Mother] stated that she informed [Father] 45 days before [her requested] vacation. A vacation that was scheduled in June, and [Mother] informed [Father] beforehand. In June 24, [Father] reached out to [Mother] . . . requesting or asking where the child was. [Father] sent a message in [OFW] that he was going to call the police and that he was going to inform the authorities that [Mother] was going to kidnap the child. Second, the circuit court discussed Father’s disagreement Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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with Mother’s proposed month-on-month-off custody schedule, which ultimately was abandoned by Mother as she would no longer be able to relocate to Florida, or elsewhere, because she had “burned all her bridges with her employment,” and is no longer able to relocate. Third, the circuit court heard testimony from Mother regarding Father’s alleged refusal to initiate video calls between Mother and C. and took judicial notice of the previous recommendations and custody orders filed after the Original Order, in which Mother’s Petition for Contempt regarding the video calls was expressly denied. Notably, Father did not argue at trial that these facts have any bearing on Mother’s mental health or that such facts would warrant a mental health evaluation. To the extent that Father’s arguments on appeal merely encapsulate his argument below that Mother’s “communication barrier” warrants a mental health evaluation, we are not persuaded that the circuit court erred in declining to order such an evaluation. As noted, the circuit court

found both parties to be fit parents with a desire to care for C. Further, the court determined that the parties continually attempt to disparage one another and that, although the parties do not communicate well, they have been able to communicate regarding C. via OFW. Given all the surrounding circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in rejecting the social worker’s recommendation that Mother be required to submit to a mental health evaluation. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting Mother sole legal custody with respect to health care decisions concerning C. Further, we conclude that the amended holiday schedule as part of the Modified Custody Order is proper and not erroneous. Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not err by rejecting the court appointed social worker’s recommendation that Mother undergo a mental health evaluation. We, therefore, affirm the Modified Custody Order.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

FOOTNOTES

1

Father filed the notice of appeal on December 19, 2025. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(f), this appeal is properly before us. (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement or signing by the trial court of a ruling, decision, order, or judgment but before entry of the ruling, decision, order, or judgment on the docket shall be treated as filed on the same day as, but after, the entry on the docket.”).

2

Rather than address the litany of motions filed by the parties, we address only those that are pertinent to the issues on appeal.

3

“A material change of circumstances is a change of circumstances that affects the welfare of the child.” Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 171. Father does not contend that the circuit court erred in finding a material change of circumstances. We, therefore, do not address this step further.

4

Because not all factors are relevant to this appeal, we address the factors only as they are relevant in our forthcoming analysis.

5

The Original Order defined Thanksgiving as “the Wednesday before Thanksgiving until the Monday after Thanksgiving”; Christmas as “December 22nd to December 29th”; Mother’s Day as “10 a.m. on Mother’s Day to Monday morning at daycare drop off”; and Father’s Day as “10 a.m. on Father’s Day to Monday morning at daycare drop off.”

6

We note that there appears to be a minor discrepancy between the circuit court’s November 13, 2025 oral order and the subsequent written order. Although the circuit court stated orally stated that “the parties shall have custody at all other times that the parties mutually agree,” the written order states “Plaintiff [(Mother)] shall have access with the minor child any other time as the parties mutually agree.” (emphasis added). Although Father does not raise this apparent discrepancy on appeal, we observe that it is well established that if there is a discrepancy between an oral and written order, “unless it is shown to be in error, it is the transcript that prevails.” Savoy v. State, 336 Md. 355, 360 n.6 (1994) (citation omitted).

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TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Final protective order; corporal punishment; factual findings

Leonid Burlachuk v. Joycelyn Burlachuk No. 1065, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J.; Nazarian, Harrell (specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Harrell, J. Filed: May 8, 2026 The Appellate Court vacated the Howard County Circuit Court’s final protective order in favor of mother and two minor children. At no time did the court consider whether the corporal punishment imposed by father on one child was used in the exercise of domestic authority to punish or discipline her for her betterment or the promotion of her welfare. Nor did the court consider whether the amount of force used was moderate and reasonable in light of her age, condition, disposition and other surrounding circumstances, or articulate any finding that father’s infliction of corporal punishment was excessive, cruel or immoderate. #

On 28 May 2025, Joycelyn Burlachuk (“Mother”), appellee, filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County a petition for protective order against her former spouse, Leonid Burlachuk (“Father”), appellant, seeking relief for herself and the parties’ two children whom we shall refer to as A., born in 2016, and B., born in 2019. The court granted a temporary protective order that was extended to 17 June 2025. After a hearing on 17 June 2025, the court entered a final protective order in favor of Mother, A., and B. Among other things, the court awarded Mother custody of A. and B. for the duration of the final protective order and ordered Father to enroll within seven days in anger management and parenting classes. Eight days after entry of the final protective order, Father filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. This timely appeal followed. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Father presents for our consideration the following five questions, which we have rephrased slightly: I. Did the circuit court err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Father assaulted A.? TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it made medical and psychological findings unsupported by the record? III. Did the circuit court err in admitting medical records over objection? IV. Did the circuit court err in granting a protective order to Mother? V. Did the circuit court err in allowing testimony regarding a prior protective order involving Mother? For the reasons set forth below, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a five-year marriage, the parties were divorced in 2022. Thereafter, they shared custody of their two minor children. The children lived with Mother from Monday through Friday during the school year and lived with Father on the first, second, and fourth weekends of every month. In the summers, the children alternated weekly between their parents’ homes. On Monday, 26 May 2025, Memorial Day, the two minor children were at the home of their Father and his girlfriend, G., whom Father described as his “domestic partner.” That morning, two other minor children were also in Father’s house, having had a sleepover with A. and B. the night before. One of those children left the home at about 8 a.m. and the other was picked up by her mother, X., at about 1 to 1:30 p.m. Prior to the time that X. arrived at the house to pick up her child, Father, G., A., and B. had lunch, which consisted of rice, broccoli, and some meat. At the time X. arrived, the two children had not finished eating. Shortly after X.’s arrival, B. finished eating, but A. remained at the table and did not eat the food on her plate. Father testified that between 1 p.m. and 6 p.m., A. remained at the table and was given encouragement to finish eating her food. A. expressed her disagreement and refused to eat. Father decided to impose “discipline” to address A.’s “eating habits.” He discussed with G. whether using a belt was an appropriate thing to do and, after their “negotiation,” he “decided that it was appropriate[.]” Father struck A. on her upper arm one time with a belt. Father testified this was the first time he hit either of his children with a belt. Father stated that he believed in proper discipline and follow-up, including “reasonable corporal punishment,” as “[t]his builds character.” He did not intend to hurt A., but rather to help her with her fear of trying new foods. Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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G. testified that on the morning of the incident, the children were offered breakfast, but did not eat. Prior to lunch, they had some fruit snacks. Between noon and 1 p.m., food left over from the prior night’s dinner, consisting of fried rice, noodles, and broccoli, was served. After Father and G. finished eating, they went to the living room with the other child who had slept over the night before. A. and B. remained at the table. A. had rice and broccoli, and B. had chicken, rice, and broccoli. G. testified that they “struggle” to get A. to eat enough. After B. finished eating, A. still had about a half cup of rice and three “broccolis” on her plate. Later, B. went outside to play with the family dog. After about an hour and a half, A. was still at the table and her food remained untouched. G. testified that A. had not eaten enough that day. A. was offered ice cream if she finished her food. Between 3 and 4 p.m., Father, G., A., and B. went out for ice cream, but because A. had not finished her lunch, she was not permitted to have any and she was “a little sad.” A., who did not have any shoes on, remained in the car while Father, G., and B. walked up to an ice cream stand and then sat at a picnic table that was next to the car. They returned home at about 4:30 p.m. At that point, G. “heated up” A.’s remaining portions from her lunch meal, which consisted of “two spoonfuls of rice and two broccolis.” G. and Father told A. that she had to finish her lunch before they began dinner. Between 7 and 8 p.m., G. began to prepare dinner. A. did not finish her food before dinner started. Father told A. that she had ten minutes to eat, or he would spank her with a belt. G. set a timer for ten minutes. After ten to fifteen minutes went by, and A. just pushed her food around the plate, Father spanked A. with a belt. G. acknowledged that she did not see the spanking because she was cooking dinner when it occurred. G. stated that Father did not “whip” A. A. “cried, and she finished her food[.]” Thereafter, A. went upstairs, got ready for bed, and then came downstairs and ate dinner. The next day, G. took the children to school. She did not observe any distress, anxiety, or crying. G. testified that Father was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol on Memorial Day and that he did not lose his temper with A. According to G., typical discipline in Father’s home included no electronics, no going outside, no stories before bed, and staying in their rooms. Mother saw the two children when she arrived home from work at about 8:40 p.m. on the Tuesday following Memorial Day. When Mother entered the door to her home, the children, who were with their babysitter, were “hysteric[al]” and “panicking.” Mother, who is a nurse at Holy Cross Hospital, testified that she “observed the kids in [a] panic state” and saw “a red erythematous mark” or “a bruise mark” on A.’s right upper arm. Mother took A. to the emergency room at Holy Cross Hospital. While there, A. “was sad, withdrawn, tearful,” and was grinding her teeth and biting her nails a lot. According to Mother, after the incident, A. remained withdrawn, sad, and continued to grind her teeth. Mother testified that, on a prior occasion in mid-March 2025, she had concerns about B. when she was in Father’s care. Mother produced a photograph of B. that she took in mid-March 2025, after the child returned home from Father’s care with a black eye. According to Mother, B. indicated that she got the black eye from Father. Mother did not report the 56

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incident because B. later said that the black eye occurred during horseplay with Father. An email exchange between the parties from about 9 March 2025 included a statement by Father that B. fell in the kitchen and hit the corner of her eye. Mother was concerned about B.’s black eye and Father’s failure to take the child to an urgent care center or an emergency room. Mother stated that she did not take the child to get medical treatment because “the signs and symptoms subsided” over the course of two days. Mother included the black-eye-incident in the petition for protective order that gave rise to the instant case because she had concerns about the children when in Father’s care, the children had a history of being injured in Father’s care, and Father had a history of not seeking appropriate medical care for them. With respect to the black-eye-incident involving B., G. testified that Father was giving B. a piggyback ride when he lost his balance. She and Father cared for B.’s black eye and “either emailed or took the video of [B.] explaining that she was playing and slipped.” According to Mother, she petitioned for protection for herself because of Father’s “constant harassment and history of abuse toward” her. Previously, in April 2021, Mother obtained a final protective order for herself after she “was physically attacked by [Father.]” Mother testified that Father had a history of alcohol use. In April 2025, Father and G. showed up at Mother’s house “on a day that they weren’t supposed to” because it was not Father’s day for visitation, and demanded the children from their babysitter. Mother left work and went to her home. She observed Father and G. standing outside Mother’s door wearing dark glasses, smoking and vaping, appearing disoriented, and being “pretty disruptive.” Mother described Father as “belligerent.” She smelled alcohol on the breaths of Father and G. She believed that Father “was definitely … under the influence” because she saw him under the influence during their marriage and his behavior and appearance indicated to her that he had been drinking. According to Mother, Father “ha[s] a temper[.]” Mother told Father if he did not leave, she would “call the cops.” He and G. left. Mother filed a police report that day and requested, by phone and email, that Father stay away from her home. X., the mother of one of the children who had spent the night before the incident at Father’s house, testified that she arrived at Father’s home to pick up her child just after 1:30 p.m. When she entered the house, she saw A. and B. at the dining room table with plates of food in front of them. They were supposed to be eating, but were just sitting there. Her child was in the living room playing on a tablet. Father and G. were sitting on a couch within view of the dining room. X. stayed for about twenty minutes and then left with her child. When she left, A. and B. were still at the dining room table. X. observed broccoli and rice on their plates. B. was “mostly done” and A. had “a medium-large amount of food” on her plate. A. was “kind of poking at her food[.]” She looked “bored” and “disinterested with the food.” Nothing about their behavior seemed alarming to X. Mother, Father, and X. were the only witnesses to testify at the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court stated that it was “not having the child testify.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

DSS Report The circuit court took judicial notice of a report prepared by the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (“DSS”). We do not set forth here the details of the report . It is sufficient to note that a DSS social worker interviewed Mother, Father, G., A., and B. The social worker’s report referred to the 2021 domestic violence case against Father in which Mother claimed that he assaulted her physically and verbally. It noted also that Mother advised that B. “had a black eye on March 11, 2025 when she returned from [Father’s] care.” With regard to the incident on 26 May 2025, it was reported that A. “had some discoloration on her right arm[,]” but at the time of the social worker’s visit with the child on 4 June 2025, the injury was no longer present and A. “did not feel comfortable showing” the social worker her arm for an assessment. No finding of maltreatment was made by DSS. Circuit Court’s Ruling At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Mother sustained, by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proof as to abuse, specifically, “an assault on [A.] on the Memorial Day spanking with the belt.” In making that finding, the court stated: “It doesn’t matter what your intent was, sir, corporal punishment is not to be used, and abuse is defined in the Family Law Article and the Criminal Law Statute, and it doesn’t matter what your intent was. Parentheses, assault is a general intent crime.” The court stated further: The Court also has severe concerns about [Father’s] method of parenting. Making a kid sit there for several hours to eat three, two, or one stalk of broccoli plus rice and noodles, I think is absurd. It is a terrible parenting idea. It doesn’t encourage the child to eat at all that way. I know that there are many individuals that feel that a child should eat what’s on his or her plate and finish her plate, but modern psychology tells us that’s not always the best situation. Children are unique. They have their own level of understanding and commitment. It’s perfectly understandable that the child apologized because she didn’t want to suffer the same type of treatment. Then making her eat what was left over from lunch at dinner is further absurd and potentially harmful. I don’t know all the bacterial count that can grow between lunchtime and dinner, but it just seems absurd to me, absolutely absurd. It is not healthy parenting. And it’s not about mother and it’s not about father. It’s about the girls. It’s about the children. I also will say that while certainly children should be respectful to the members of the household, even though [G.] is not the stepmother, certainly the children should be respectful. I didn’t hear anything where they weren’t respectful. But the primary obligation is each biological parent, not a stepparent, not a domestic partner, and not TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

a grandmother in the house or anybody else. It’s the two parents. It’s of great concern to the Court. Among other things, the court ordered Father not to threaten or abuse Mother, A., or B. “in any fashion” and not to enter Mother’s residence. The court ordered that A. and B. would be in Mother’s sole custody and that Father would have visitation every other weekend. The court ordered Father to enroll within seven days of the order in parenting and anger management classes. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the issuance of a final protective order, “we accept the facts as found by the hearing court unless it is shown that its findings are clearly erroneous.” Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 754 (1999); Md. Rule 8-131(c). A trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230 (2000). Substantial evidence is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[.]’” Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569 (1998) (cleaned up) (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978)). We consider the evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Mills v. Mills, 178 Md. App. 728, 73435 (2008). We defer likewise to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, as it had “the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’ behavior and testimony during the trial.” Barton v. Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “As to the ultimate conclusion, however, we must make our own independent appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case.” Piper, 125 Md. App. at 754. FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Final protective orders are governed by Title 4, subtitle 5 of the Family Law (“FL”) Article of the Maryland Code. Entry of a final protective order is governed by FL § 4-506(c) (1)(ii), which provided in May 2025, as it does now, that, “if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order, the judge may grant a final protective order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.” “Preponderance of the evidence means more likely than not.” C.M. v. J.M., 258 Md. App. 40, 56-57 (2023) (cleaned up). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that the alleged abuse occurred. Piper, 125 Md. App. at 754. “‘If the court finds that the petitioner has met th[at] burden, it may issue a protective order tailored to fit particular needs that the petitioner has demonstrated are necessary to provide relief from abuse.’” Id. (quoting Ricker v. Ricker, 114 Md. App. 583, 586 (1997)). A person eligible for relief includes, among others, a former spouse of the respondent, a person related to the respondent by blood, marriage, or adoption, a child of the respondent who resided with the respondent or person eligible for relief Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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“for at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition[,]” and an individual who has a child in common with the respondent. FL § 4-501(m).1 At the time of the May 2025 incident that gave rise to the instant appeal, FL § 4-501(b) defined “abuse” for purposes of a final protective order, as it does now, to mean any of several acts including, but not limited to, “assault in any degree[.]” FL § 4-501(b)(1)(iii). Here, the circuit court granted a final protective order based on a finding of assault – specifically, an unlawful touching. In Maryland, assault encompasses three modalities: “(1) intent to frighten, (2) attempted battery, and (3) battery.” State v. Frazier, 469 Md. 627, 644 (2020) (cleaned up); Hammond v. State, 257 Md. App. 99, 126 (2023); Snyder v. State, 210 Md. App. 370, 382, cert. denied, 432 Md. 470 (2013). The battery variety of assault consists of “the unlawful[,] unjustified, offensive[,] and non-consensual application of force to the person of another.” Hickman v. State, 193 Md. App. 238, 256 (2010); see also Quansah v. State, 207 Md. App. 636, 647 (2012) (“A battery is a touching that is either harmful, unlawful or offensive.”). A criminal battery may be intentional or unintentional. Lewis v. State, 263 Md. App. 631, 647 (2024); Elias v. State, 339 Md. 169, 183 (1995). “An intentional battery is a specific intent crime: the defendant must have committed the act with the specific intent to injure the victim, even if the injury intended is slight.” Lewis, 263 Md. App. at 647-48 (citing Lamb v. State, 93 Md. App. 422, 455 (1992)). Unintentional battery is a general intent offense. “[T]he intent need only be for the touching itself; there is no requirement of intent to cause a specific injury.” Elias, 339 Md. at 183 (cleaned up). “‘[A]ny unlawful force used against the person of another, no matter how slight, will constitute a battery.’” Lamb, 93 Md. App. at 447 (quoting Kellum v. State, 223 Md. 80, 85 (1960)); accord Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 567 (2018). In cases where the person for whom relief is sought is a child, “abuse” may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of the Family Law Article. FL § 5-701(b)(1) defines “abuse,” in pertinent part, as: (i) the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed by: 1. a parent; 2. a household member or family member; 3. a person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of the child; 4. a person who has responsibility for supervision of the child; or 5. a person who, because of the person’s position or occupation, exercises authority over the child[.] “‘Mental injury’ means the observable, identifiable, and substantial impairment of a child’s mental or psychological ability to function caused by an intentional act or series of acts, regardless of whether there was an intent to harm the child.” FL § 5-701(r). “Long before the advent of contemporary child abuse legislation, it was a well-recognized precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the parent 58

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of a minor child or one standing in loco parentis was justified in using a reasonable amount of force upon a child for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child’s welfare.” Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 271 (2001) (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126 (1978)). Accordingly, “[a]s a defense, by way of justification, to what would otherwise be an assault and battery, an individual in loco parentis” may seek to establish “that the force used upon the child was privileged as necessary and proper to the exercise of domestic authority.” Anderson v. State, 61 Md. App. 436, 443 (1985). The General Assembly codified this common law right to impose reasonable corporal punishment in FL § 4-501(b)(2)(ii), which provides: “Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit reasonable punishment, including reasonable corporal punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child.” “The common law notion of privileged force as a defense to what would otherwise be assault and battery has two clear limitations.” Anderson, 61 Md. App. at 444. First, the force must “truly be used in the exercise of domestic authority by way of punishing or discipling the child – for the betterment of the child or promotion of the child’s welfare – and not be a gratuitous attack.” Id. When a “battery is inflicted on the child with no purpose of enforcing parental discipline[,]” the parental privilege does not arise. Fisher, 367 Md. at 274. Second, the amount of force used must be “moderate and reasonable.” Anderson, 61 Md. App. at 444-45. Where moderate force is applied for the purpose of discipline or punishment, the parent or custodian is not liable for assault and battery or a similar offense. Id. at 446. “[A] reasonable spanking of a child for disciplinary purposes inflicts pain and, in a physical sense, harms or injures the child. But it is not a legally recognized harm or injury.” Fisher, 367 Md. at 272. Where the “chastisement becomes immoderate,” however, “it defeats the parental privilege and is treated as an ordinary assault and battery, as if perpetrated upon a stranger[.]” Anderson, 61 Md. App. at 446. Stated otherwise, “‘[s]o long as the chastisement [is] moderate and reasonable, in light of the age, condition and disposition of the child, and other surrounding circumstances, the parent or custodian [will] not incur criminal liability for assault and battery or a similar offense.’” Fisher, 367 Md. at 271 (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 126). “‘On the other hand,’” if a parent or custodian inflicts corporal punishment “‘with a malicious desire to cause pain,’” or if the punishment “‘amount[s] to cruel and outrageous treatment of the child, the chastisement [is] deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 126). When deciding whether a particular parental discipline is child abuse under either FL §§ 5-701 or 4-501, the circuit court “always determines whether the corporal punishment was reasonable.” Charles Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 303 (2004). In assessing the reasonableness of corporal punishment, courts employ an objective standard. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Fisher, 367 Md. at 272. Similarly, to determine whether a parent acted maliciously, a court “looks to the objective facts of the intended conduct and not to the subjectively perceived result.” Id. Courts must “consider … the totality of circumstances surrounding the physical punishment[.]” Vann, 382 Md. at 299; accord Fisher, 367 Md. at 272. Relevant factors include “the misbehavior of the child[,]” “the amount of force used in the punishment from the parent’s perspective, … the physical and mental maturity of the child, and the propriety of the decision to use force in circumstances that may increase the potential for serious injury.” Vann, 382 Md. at 299. Ultimately, however, “[t]here simply is no privilege … within the context of administering ostensible child discipline, for excessive, cruel, or immoderate conduct[.]” Anderson, 61 Md. App. at 446. As Maryland’s Supreme Court recognized in Vann, “[r]easonable corporal punishment, by definition, is not child abuse.” 382 Md. at 303. “[C]hild abuse and reasonable corporal punishment are mutually exclusive; if the punishment is one, it cannot be the other.” Id. DISCUSSION

I. Father contends that the circuit court erred in finding that he assaulted A. He argues that the judge’s statements that “corporal punishment is not to be used,” “it doesn’t matter what your intent was[,]” “assault is a general intent crime[,]” and that Father’s “method of parenting” with respect to making a child sit for hours to eat three, two, or one stalks of broccoli plus rice and noodles was “absurd” and “a terrible parenting idea[,]” conflicted with the parental privilege provided by FL § 4-501(b)(2)(ii). Father maintains that by announcing that corporal punishment should not be used, the court deprived him of the privilege afforded by the statute. He also contends that the evidence showed that his use of corporal punishment on A. was not unreasonable. The court’s statement that “corporal punishment is not to be used” does not find support in the law. The rest of the judge’s remarks focused on her opinion about Father’s method of parenting, speculation about bacteria on the food, and her opinion that children should be respectful to members of the household. At no time did the court consider whether the corporal punishment imposed by Father on A. was used in the exercise of domestic authority to punish or discipline A. for her betterment or the promotion of her welfare. Nor did the court consider whether the amount of force used was moderate and reasonable in light of A.’s age, condition, disposition, and other surrounding circumstances, or articulate any finding that Father’s infliction of corporal punishment was excessive, cruel or immoderate. As the court failed to assess properly whether Father’s conduct constituted reasonable corporal punishment, which the law permits, or abuse, which the law prohibits, we shall vacate the circuit court’s finding and remand the case for further proceedings. II. Father contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in making medical and psychological findings that were TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

not supported by the evidence. Specifically, he points to the judge’s statements about modern psychology’s view of making an individual finish eating what is on his or her plate and about bacteria that can grow on food between lunch and dinner. Father is correct that there was no evidence to support those findings. Those comments were neither factual findings nor legal conclusions, but statements of the trial judge’s view of Father’s “method of parenting.” In assessing whether the corporal punishment was inflicted for the purpose of parental discipline and whether the amount of force used was moderate and reasonable, the court should have considered the evidence presented at the hearing, made factual findings based on that evidence, and applied the facts to the law. III. Father contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence A.’s medical records from Holy Cross Hospital. He complains that “no witness with knowledge of the hospital’s record-keeping practices” testified, that the custodian’s certification was never read into the record, and that the court did not make findings that the record contained the foundational facts required by Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6), which sets forth the exception to the rule against hearsay for records of regularly conducted business activity. Lastly, Father argues that Mother failed to provide notice pursuant to Md. Rule 5-902(b)(12),2 and that he was not given advance written notice and pre-hearing access to the medical records and the custodian’s certification. At trial, when presented with the medical records, Father asked for time to review them, and the court granted that request. When counsel for Mother requested to have the medical records admitted in evidence, the court asked to see the “authentication” from the custodian of records. After reviewing that document, the court admitted the medical records without objection. Not only did Father fail to object to the admission of the medical records, but he relied upon the medical records in his motion for reconsideration in which he argued that the records “undermine any suggestion that [A.] suffered trauma or serious injury.” Because the record shows that Father’s contention on appeal was waived, we need not resolve here that issue in light of our decision to vacate the circuit court’s entry of a final protective order and remand for further proceedings. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any [issue other than jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”). Nonetheless, we highlight here some potential issues that may resurface in any further proceedings on remand. IV. Father contends that the circuit court erred in granting a protective order for Mother because it did not find that he had “committed a qualifying act of abuse against” Mother, “nor did it articulate any basis on the record for concluding that the sweeping stay-away and no-contact provisions were necessary to protect her.” In light of our decision to vacate the circuit court’s grant of a final protective order, we need not decide here this issue. Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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V. Father argues that the circuit court erred in allowing testimony about a prior protective order obtained by Mother in 2021. Although much of the testimony that

Father complains of was not objected to, in light of our decision to vacate the circuit court’s grant of a final protective order, we need not engage here with the merits of this argument.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY APPELLEE AND ONE-HALF BY APPELLANT.

FOOTNOTES

1

Effective October 1, 2025, the definition of “person eligible for relief” is codified at FL § 4-501(n).

2

Maryland Rule 5-902(b)(12) provides: (12) Certified Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. — The original or a copy of a record of a regularly conducted activity that meets the requirements of Rule 5-803(b)(6)(A)-(D) and has been certified in a Certification of Custodian of Records or Other Qualified Individual Form substantially in compliance with such a form approved by the State Court Administrator and posted on the Judiciary website, provided that, before the trial or hearing in which the record will be offered into evidence, the proponent (A) gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record and (B) makes the record and certification available for inspection so that the adverse party has a fair opportunity to challenge them on the ground that the sources of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

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TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Physical and legal custody; minor child; statutory factors

AshLee Smith Turner v. Blair Abelle-Kiser No. 2052, September Term 2024; No. 1783, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, J.; Nazarian, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Nazarian, J. Filed: April 28, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s legal and physical custody order regarding the parties’ minor child. The court evaluated the relevant factors, made factual findings that were supported by the record and applied the factors reasonably to the facts.

This appeal arises from a custody dispute between appellant AshLee Smith Turner (“AST”) and appellee Blair Abelle-Kiser (“BAK”) over custody of their minor child, Z.1 AST appeals from two orders of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County: the first modifying and establishing legal and physical custody and the second denying reconsideration of that custody order. She challenges the court’s legal custody decision, and especially the decision to grant tiebreaking authority to BAK, the denial of AST’s motion for reconsideration, and the decision to award attorney’s fees to BAK. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND

The members of this family have lived complicated and challenging lives in recent years. The circuit court record reflects the details, but for present purposes, and in the interest of protecting everyone’s privacy as best we can, we recount only the portions relevant to the issues before us in this appeal. The parties are parents to Z, a minor child. They married before they had Z and were granted a judgment of absolute divorce in June 2022. AST is cisgender, and BAK is transgender. After a series of cross-state moves by AST out of, then back into, Maryland, the parties were operating under an interim consent order for physical custody and access that they signed in May 2024. BAK then filed a petition to modify custody. The parties stipulated that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting modification TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. and disagreed only on the terms of a new custody order. The court held a two-day hearing in which it took testimony from AST, BAK, AST’s current spouse, BAK’s current spouse, and a court evaluator. The court received into evidence various pieces of documentary evidence, including a report from the court evaluator. Among the facts raised during the modification hearing, the evaluator’s report brought to the court’s attention that Z had begun exploring their gender identity, had requested that they be referred to by a new name and pronouns, and that BAK had supported this exploration. At the end of the hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench and, on the record, made findings of fact, explained its reasoning, and applied the best interest factors in formulating a custody order. The court issued and entered a detailed written order memorializing the ruling soon after. In that order, the court awarded joint physical custody, child support, a portion of BAK’s attorney’s fees, and, most relevant to this appeal, joint legal custody with conditional tiebreaking authority vested in BAK. AST filed a timely motion to reconsider. AST asked the circuit court to carve out the issue of Z’s gender identity from BAK’s tiebreaking authority and to reconsider its decision to award attorney’s fees. The court first held a hearing on the motion in February 2025, continued that hearing to July, continued it again to September, then denied the motion. AST noted timely appeals from both the modification order and the denial of reconsideration. We will supply additional facts as necessary below. II. DISCUSSION

AST presents two questions in her brief that raise three substantive issues that we have rephrased as follows: 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when setting legal custody? 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion denying the motion to reconsider? 3. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion awarding attorney’s fees?2 We hold that the circuit court exercised its discretion properly in connection with all three issues. The court evaluated the relevant factors for legal custody, made factual findings that were supported by the record, and applied the factors reasonably to the facts. The motion to reconsider, meanwhile, sought to expand the litigation significantly. And although the court found both parties had substantial justification in pursuing their positions, the court had an adequate record of the parties’ finances to ground a discretionary award of attorney’s fees Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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under Maryland’s statutory fee-shifting regime for family law matters. First, we employ a three-part standard when reviewing custody decisions: When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard . . . applies. If it appears that the [trial court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [trial court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [trial court]’s decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 125–26 (1977) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977), reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court acts beyond the bounds of minimally acceptable choices: An abuse of discretion arises when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, when the court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when its decision is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court. Jose v. Jose, 237 Md. App. 588, 598–99 (2018) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Second, we review the denial of a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1, 15–16 (2000). Finally, we review an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion as well. David A. v. Karen S., 242 Md. App. 1, 23 (2019) (citing Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 468 (1994)). A. The Circuit Court Exercised Its Discretion Properly In Granting Joint Legal Custody With Qualified Tiebreaking Authority. AST argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when setting legal custody. Specifically, she claims that the circuit court gave BAK “unilateral” and “plenary” power. She complains that because Z has begun exploring their gender identity, because BAK is trans, and because BAK has been supportive in that exploration, the circuit court abused its discretion by establishing legal custody as the court did. Importantly, AST does not challenge BAK having tiebreaking authority generally, but asks instead that the court carve gender identity-related parenting decisions out of the tiebreaker. She contends, in essence, that allowing a trans parent to have tiebreaking authority when a child has begun exploring their gender identity is inherently an abuse of discretion. We disagree. “[I]n any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child.” Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986). Legal custody refers to a parent’s authority to make “long-range decisions” regarding things like education, health, and “other matters of major significance concerning the minor’s life and welfare.” Cynthia Callahan & Thomas C. Ries, 62

Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

Fader’s Maryland Family Law § 5-4(b), at 5-19 (7th ed. 2021) (footnotes omitted). Over the years, Maryland courts have assembled a non-exhaustive list of factors trial courts must consider in determining custody. See Taylor, 306 Md. at 304– 11 (collating factors); Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1977) (collating additional factors). Although custody courts must consider the factors and state their reasoning on the record, “the court need not articulate every step of the judicial thought process in order to show that it has conducted the appropriate analysis.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 195–96 (2020). First, we disagree with AST’s characterization that the circuit court granted BAK “unilateral” or “plenary” authority. It didn’t. To the contrary, the circuit court granted joint legal custody with tiebreaker authority vested in BAK, then conditioned BAK’s tiebreaker on two things: (1) good faith engagement with AST on the issue that reaches an impasse and (2) a mandatory two-hour mediation to try and resolve the disagreement. We have long endorsed tiebreakers as a way to facilitate joint custody, see, e.g., Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md. App. 548, 560–62 (2004), and have rejected any argument that tiebreaker authority is unilateral in nature: “[T]iebreaking authority does not eliminate the voice of the parent without that authority. Rather, such measure[s] pragmatically reflect[] the need for some decision to be made for the child when parents themselves cannot agree.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 634–35 (2016). The conditions on BAK’s tiebreaker go well beyond the minimum set by our Supreme Court, see id. at 632–33 (exercise of tiebreaking authority requires good faith engagement first), by adding mandatory mediation. The additional process may slow decision-making and, if the parents disagree, add cost. But these conditions defeat any notion that BAK’s tiebreaker operates unilaterally, even in the context of parents who disagree. Second, we see no legal error or clear factual error in the court’s custody decision, nor an abuse of discretion in its final formulation. Although not required to perform a rote checklist of the required factors, see Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 196, the court devoted considerable time elaborating on its rationale from the bench—the explanation and ruling consumed fifteen pages of transcript. The circuit court considered all the custody factors and explained on the record how it applied each to reach its conclusion. See Taylor, 306 Md. at 304–11, and Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 420 (best interest factors). Although the court expressed hope at one point that the parties wouldn’t end up mired in conflict over parenting decisions, the court’s decision to award joint custody with this conditional tiebreaker reflects the reality that the parents might disagree, and the court created a mechanism that keeps everyone involved while allowing decisions to get made. This decision represented a well- and deeply-considered exercise of the court’s custody discretion. Finally, the circuit court didn’t abuse its discretion in deciding not to separate decisions relating to gender identity from the rest of the custody structure. The court had the opportunity to consider the testimony of AST, BAK, BAK’s current wife, AST’s current husband, and the court evaluator. The court received various documents admitted into evidence, including the court evaluator’s report. AST relies TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

most heavily on the evaluator’s report on appeal, but the court was entitled to, and did, give that report the weight it thought best, and in any event the report’s conclusions weren’t so onesided as to undermine the ruling. It may be that the evaluator suspects that BAK might have allowed a quicker progression of Z’s gender exploration than AST would, and perhaps that they were moving too quickly. But in the same breath, the report criticizes AST for moving too quickly to integrate her new husband into Z’s life. The custody plan ordered by the court recognizes the complexities and fluidity of parenting and retains the opportunity and incentives for the parents to work together to make all the decisions Z will need them to make. Moreover, the court evaluator interviewed multiple therapists, including those treating Z. As the evaluator noted, “[b]y all accounts, [Z] made [the decision to explore their gender identity] independently.” And Z’s therapist “recommended that the parties follow [Z]’s lead in terms of using [their] preferred pronouns and whatever name [they] wanted to be called on a daily basis.” The report never suggests that supporting Z in their gender exploration is not in their best interest. Indeed, at least according to their therapist, supporting Z’s gender identity formation and exploration is affirmatively in their best interest. The circuit court considered and weighed the report appropriately, and well within its considerable discretion, in establishing custody. Although not in so many words, we sense from AST’s arguments on appeal that she would prefer a rule that a transgender parent should not be awarded tiebreaking authority over a cisgender parent on matters of gender identity and expression. AST has not identified, and cannot identify, any individual or specific reason why BAK is unfit or less qualified to exercise tiebreaking authority on these issues than she is, nor has she challenged the tiebreaker in any other dimension. But although our courts no longer recognize the law/equity distinction of old, custody decisions are quintessentially equitable in nature and not an appropriate setting for per se rules—especially per se rules that could be grounded in stereotypes, prejudice, and the like. Cf. Royall v. Dicks, Md. App. , No. 597, Sept. Term 2024 (filed April 3, 2026) (rejecting argument that false statements about sexual orientation are defamatory per se). We affirm the circuit court’s decision to award joint custody with a conditional tiebreaker in favor of BAK. 3 B. The Circuit Court Denied The Motion To Reconsider Reasonably. AST also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her motion to reconsider under Maryland Rule 2-535. We see no abuse of discretion here either. Under Rule 2-535, “[o]n motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment and, if the action was tried before the court, may take any action that it could have taken under Rule 2-534.” Md. Rule 2-535(a). Under Rule 2-534, “. . . the court may open the judgment to receive additional evidence, may amend its findings or its statement of reasons for the decision, may set forth additional findings or reasons, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

may enter new findings or new reasons, may amend the judgment, or may enter a new judgment.” But “a post-trial motion to reconsider is not a time machine in which to travel back to a recently concluded trial in order to try the case better in hindsight,” Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 484 (2002), and “[l]osers do not enjoy carte blanche . . . to replay the game as a matter of right.” Id. In fact, “[w]ith respect to the denial of [post-trial motions], . . . the discretion of the trial judge is more than broad; it is virtually without limit.” Id. AST’s motion sought exactly such a do-over. The evidence admitted at trial exposed more than adequately the parties’ disputes over Z exploring their gender identity, between the witnesses’ testimony and the court evaluator’s report. AST had every opportunity to proffer or examine an expert or put on any relevant testimony or evidence she wanted during the original trial but didn’t. And the issue barely registered in her closing argument. Moreover, as the circuit court found distressing at the last reconsideration motion hearing, this motion had ballooned into a request to put on six to ten witnesses offered by AST, a late-disclosed expert trying to testify remotely from California (whom BAK moved in limine to exclude), and more, all in a half-day hearing. At that point, we could imagine a party arguing that it was more unreasonable to grant the motion than to deny it. Perhaps AST realized after the final order issued that she should have put on a stronger or different position on legal custody as it pertained to Z’s gender identity, but a post-judgment motion is not an opportunity to try again with more evidence. The circuit court’s well-considered decisions were supported by a sound record, and the court was well within its discretion to deny a motion to try again. Id. AST is free, of course, to seek a modification of custody if circumstances change materially and if a different arrangement would serve Z’s best interests. But that is a different question for another time and would require an appropriate record. 4 C. The Circuit Court Exercised Its Discretion Properly In Granting Attorney’s Fees. Finally, AST challenges the circuit court’s decision to award BAK a portion of her attorney’s fees. AST’s attack is two-pronged: first, she challenges whether a circuit court has discretion to award fees when it finds that both parties were substantially justified in pursuing their legal positions, absent “compelling evidence of substantial asymmetry in the parties’ financial status and/or needs”; and second, she asserts that without an official long-form financial statement for BAK, the circuit court lacked adequate evidence to rely on when evaluating the discretionary factors. We agree with the circuit court on both arguments. Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article establishes a fee-shifting regime for custody cases. Md. Code (1999, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 12-103 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). The decision to award fees is discretionary, FL § 12-103(a) (“The court may award to either party . . . costs and counsel fees . . . .”) (emphasis added), but “[b]efore a court may award costs and counsel fees . . . the court shall consider: (1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing, Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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maintaining, or defending the proceeding.” FL § 12-103(b). AST contends first that courts cannot award fees when they find both parties’ positions were substantially justified. According to Davis v. Petito, 425 Md. 191 (2012), though, the issue is not so binary: Essentially, substantial justification, under . . . subsection[] (b) . . . of Section 12-103 relates solely to the merits of the case against which the judge must assess whether each party’s position was reasonable. A judge, after finding substantial justification, then must proceed to review the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, and the financial status and needs of each party before ordering an award under Section 12-103(b). *** The only time that the relative amounts of the parties’ attorneys’ fees should be considered is when both are determined to have a substantial justification for their positions[.] Id. at 204, 206 (footnote omitted). Davis instructs that the statute allows for awards of fees even when both parties were substantially justified in their positions, which makes sense— the statute’s text does not indicate whether any of the three factors are given dispositive or heavier weight than the other two. Id. at 206; FL § 12-103(b). The court should consider the relative amounts of fees when both sides’ positions are justified, but shouldn’t dismiss a fee request altogether. As to the second prong of her attack, AST doesn’t cite,

and we haven’t found, any authority for the black-and-white proposition that a long-form financial statement is strictly required in order to assess “. . . the financial status of each party . . . [and] the needs of each party . . . .” FL § 12-103(b). And we decline the invitation to hold as much here. To the extent that AST argues further that the circuit court had insufficient evidence to determine the financial status and needs of each party, we disagree there as well. As the circuit court noted from the bench, it did have before it evidence of the parties’ finances, including BAK’s testimony about her financial situation: Looking at the financial conditions of the parties, I did take note of the testimony from [BAK] about, first of all, how much she’s incurred in attorney’s fees. She’s, essentially, gone into debt. She testified that her savings are tapped out, her wife’s savings have been used, she took money out of her retirement account, and used her credit cards heavily to try to pay the mounting legal expenses in this action. The circuit court, as the finder of fact, was free to give BAK’s financial testimony as little or as much weight as it found appropriate. Testimony is as much evidence as financial documents are. We’re satisfied, as was the circuit court, that there was enough there to support adequately any underlying factual findings, and therefore that the circuit court had enough evidence to weigh the statutory factors guiding its discretion to award fees.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

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FOOTNOTES

1

We will refer to the parents by their initials and have selected the random initial “Z” for the child to protect everyone’s privacy. We will use the singular “they” pronoun to refer to Z, but purely for privacy and neutrality. We mean no disrespect to anyone involved in this case and express no views on Z’s gender identity.

2

AST phrased the Questions Presented as: •

Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the custody court to award joint legal custody to divorced cisgender and transgender parents, subject to plenary final decision-making authority reserved to the transgender parent, in the absence of any explanation or mention on the record as to why it was in the best interests of the parties’ prepubescent [child] to exclude [their] cisgender parent from sharing decision-making authority concerning [their] transgender parent’s ongoing efforts to promote the child’s adoption of [opposite] gender identification markers at school and other settings.

•

Whether the custody court abused its discretion and/or otherwise erred in awarding attorney’s fees in the absence of the predicate findings required under Family Law Article §12-103(b) and the relevant case law.

BAK phrased the Questions Presented as: •

Did the trial court act within its discretion when it awarded the parties joint legal custody with tiebreaking authority being vested in Ms. Abelle-Kiser?

•

Did the trial court act within its discretion when it ordered the Appellant to contribute $25,000.00 to Ms. AbelleKiser’s attorney’s fees?

•

Did the trial court act within its discretion when it denied the Appellant’s Rule 2-535 motion?

3

After oral argument, AST filed a “Rule 8-502(e)(1) Notice of Supplemental Citation to ‘Rule 9-205.1 – Appointment of Child’s Attorney.’” In that filing, she argues for the first time that we should remand the case to the circuit court “with a directive to appoint a best interest attorney with an opportunity for discovery, but with an expedited date for an evidentiary hearing to consider the appropriateness of including a tiebreaking provision in the custody order.” Although it purports to respond to a question from this Court at oral argument, this is not an appropriate use of the Notice of Supplemental Citation rule. Indeed, Maryland Rule 8-502(e) does not allow for new argument that requests relief not previously requested in briefs, i.e., a directive to appoint a best interest attorney. We will, therefore, strike this filing on our own motion.

4

This may well be where the family is headed. Not only does AST disagree with the legal custody decision, her opening brief on appeal states that she wants to re-open physical custody as well: Finally, given the apparent relationship (i.e., cause and effect) between [Z]’s full time residence with [BAK] and the gender identification issues having likely arisen from it, enhanced by the lack of any meaningful counterbalance under a six night per month access schedule afforded [AST], should the matter be remanded, Appellant asks that the custody court be directed and authorized to reconsider not merely [BAK]’s plenary tiebreaking authority, but all interrelated custody issues, including physical access.

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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 8 (2026) Custody; relevant factors; testimony and evidence

Allison Hoff v. Michael Perez No. 1280, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, J.; Nazarian, Reed, JJ. Opinion by: Reed, J. Filed: April 27, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Calvert County Circuit Court’s custody award. The circuit court judge properly considered testimony and evidence pertaining to each of the relevant factors. Its factual conclusions are appropriately based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing and thus are not clearly erroneous and are due deference on appeal.

The instant appeal arises out of Michael Perez’s (“Appellee”) Complaint for Absolute Divorce against Allison Hoff (“Appellant”), which was filed on June 12, 2024. During the pendency of this divorce case, Appellee filed a Motion for Emergency Custody of the parties’ only minor child (“G.”).1 Following a hearing on August 12, 2024, the court found that an emergency existed and granted Appellee sole legal and physical custody of G. on an emergency basis, “with visitation and access between [the child] and [Appellant] to be supervised as determined by [Appellee] under the circumstances.” Leading up to the court’s merits hearing on this case, numerous motions were filed by the parties, which are described in greater detail below. A merits hearing took place over the course of three days, April 29, April 30, and June 9, 2025, in the Circuit Court for Calvert County. Appellee moved to have Appellant’s mental health records that the court deemed relevant during its incamera review marked and admitted, to which Appellant’s counsel objected. The court ruled that the psychiatristpatient privilege had been waived and admitted the records. On July 18, 2025, the court issued a Judgment and Opinion granting the parties an Absolute Divorce based on six-month separation. The court also granted Appellee sole legal and physical custody of G. and awarded Appellant supervised visitation of the child. The court ordered that Appellant pay Appellee $1,703.00 per month in child support, with additional accompanying orders on the method of payment. The court denied Appellant’s claim for alimony. Finally, the court ruled on the division of the parties’ property. 66

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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. On August 18, 2025, Appellant noted this timely appeal.2 In bringing her appeal, Appellant presents three questions for our review: I. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it admitted [Appellant’s] psychiatric and mental health records over objection? II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Appellee sole legal and physical custody of the Parties’ son? III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to grant Appellant a monetary award? For the following reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court for Calvert County’s judgment on the admissibility of Appellant’s mental health records and on child custody. We reverse and remand the court’s division of marital property, in part, solely pertaining to the erroneous classification of Appellee’s Police FCU Savings Account. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in October 2020 in a civil ceremony in Friendship, Maryland. The parties separated around August 27, 2024, and have remained separate and apart since. Prior to their separation, the parties began having disagreements, principally about finances, Appellant’s increased religious involvement, their differing opinions on what religion their child, G., should be raised as, and whether to vaccinate G. Both Appellee and Appellant’s Mother, Faye Hoff, testified that they found Appellant’s increased religious involvement concerning. Specifically, Appellee testified about one instance when Appellant said she “was told by Jesus to [g]o down to a field and worship[,]” and brought G. with her. There were additional instances that caused Appellee to grow concerned for G.’s safety and wellbeing when he was in Appellant’s care. Specifically, on April 29, 2024, Appellee observed a bruise on G.’s forehead and on May 6, 2024, Appellee noticed G. had a black eye. Appellee testified that G. had been in Appellant’s care on both of those days. Also, Appellee testified that on May 15, 2024, Appellant left G. unattended in the bathtub. Appellee also testified that Appellant took a video of G. crawling under the kitchen sink, where there were cleaning materials and mouse poison, rather than stopping him. On June 12, 2024, Appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce against Appellant. The parties continued residing together, sleeping in separate bedrooms, until around August 27, 2024. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

Appellee and many of those close to Appellant grew concerned with Appellant’s mental health. These concerns culminated in early August 2024. Appellee testified that since he worked the nightshift, the “[m]ajority of the time it was [Appellant] doing the drop-offs in the morning, unless it was predetermined that I would[.]” On August 2, 2024, Appellee testified that when he woke up after his night shift, G. was crying in his crib with a dirty diaper and wearing the same clothes Appellee put G. in the night before. When Appellee went to find Appellant, she was awake and stated that she thought Appellee was watching G. The child was then taken to the house of Deb Lineberry, G.’s babysitter, for her to watch G. as usual. Deb testified that when she brought G. home that afternoon, Appellant was outside, “stumbled off that first step. Her arms were crossed, and there was no eye contact. There was no – no light on, really it seemed.” Deb testified that Appellant repeatedly yelled, “in the name of Yah, get out[,]” seemingly talking to voices in her head. Deb asked Appellant if she was okay and if she wanted her to keep G. longer, to which Appellant said yes. Appellant told Deb she was coming with her, and got in Deb’s car with Deb, Deb’s daughter, and G. Appellant was not wearing shoes. Deb testified that Appellant was in and out of sleep, and kept repeating, “in the name of Jesus, get out, in the name of Yah, get out.” When they returned to Deb’s house, Appellee had arrived, and he had called the police. Once inside Deb’s house, Appellant “got down on all fours and was chanting, crying,” and saying, “in the name of Yah, get out, in Jesus’ name, get out.” Deb took G. and her children to a nearby beach to remove them from the situation, and Deb testified that when they returned Appellant was spread out, face down on the floor by her front door. Deb’s husband told Deb that Appellant had been like that for about an hour and refused any help. Deb and Appellee decided Deb would keep G. for the night, and Appellee had to physically move Appellant to his truck to bring her home. Once the parties were home, Appellant found spare keys to Appellee’s truck, and “erratic[ally]” drove it back to Deb’s house. Appellant eventually returned home. Appellee testified that on August 3, 2024, Appellant repeatedly said, “One, two, three,” and jumped where she stood. A video was played at the hearing showing this behavior. That same day, the parties and others who were present had a discussion in which Appellant agreed she should go to the hospital. This conversation was also reflected in a video that was played at the hearing. On this day, Appellee accompanied Appellant to Anne Arundel Medical Center, where she “was involuntarily admitted to the psych department at the emergency room.” While Appellant was hospitalized, Appellee and Appellant’s mother took turns visiting Appellant. On August 6, 2024, Appellee filed a Motion for Emergency Custody, asserting that Appellant had “voluntarily checked herself into Anne Arundel Medical Center (“AAMC”) due to a mental breakdown[,]” and “was deemed involuntary” and “transferred to inpatient care at McNew Medical Center[,]” where she was “under an involuntary petition.” The court held a hearing on this matter on August 12, 2024, and ultimately found that an emergency existed and that the necessary TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

remedy was to grant Appellee sole legal and physical custody of G. on an emergency basis, “with visitation and access between [the child] and [Appellant] to be supervised as determined by [Appellee] under the circumstances. Appellant was ultimately transferred to McNew Medical Center and was later released on August 16, 2024. Appellant returned to the family home, where Appellee was also residing. Appellee testified that Appellant “didn’t follow her plan of care and stopped taking her medicine, which ultimately led to her kicking in my door one day[,]” and provided a photo at the hearing of the damaged door. On August 18, 2024, Appellant was again involuntarily committed to McNew Medical Center. In accordance with the Emergency Custody and Visitation Order, either Appellant’s mother or Deb were often present for supervised visitations between Appellant and G. However, after some time, Deb found Appellant’s behavior concerning and ultimately “realized [she] was not equipped for this” and supervising visits between Appellant and G. was not “something [she] wanted to continue doing[,]” noting that it was “hard to watch.” On September 17, 2024, Appellant filed a Motion for Pendente Lite Hearing on Access, in which she requested that the court grant her unsupervised access to the minor child on an equal share-time basis pending the final custody hearing. The court set a Pendente Lite Hearing for November 14, 2024. On September 19, 2024, Appellant answered Appellee’s Complaint for Absolute Divorce, stating therein that she denied the allegations contained in Appellee’s Complaint and requesting that Appellee’s Complaint be dismissed and that she “be awarded such other and further relief as just and proper.” On September 25, 2024, Appellee filed a Response to Appellant’s Motion for Pendente Lite Hearing on Access, in which he denied the allegations set forth in Appellant’s Motion and requested that the court deny Appellant’s request for unsupervised visitation. On November 13, 2024, the court granted in part Appellee’s Motion for Sanctions for Failure of Discovery and ordered that Appellant “shall produce full and complete Answers to Interrogatories and Responses with all documentation responsive to [Appellee’s] Request for Production of Documents by November 15, 2024.” In the same Order, the court also ordered that the pendente lite hearing set for November 14, 2024, be postponed until after Appellant produced answers and documents in compliance with the order. On December 3, 2024, Appellant’s counsel’s Motion to Withdraw Appearance was granted, and Appellant proceeded pro se in this matter. Acting pro se, on December 31, 2024, Appellant filed a Petition to Modify Custody and Visitation; a Md. Rule 9-203(b) Financial Statement; a Request for Emergency Custody Hearing; a Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce; a Md. Rule 9-203(a) Financial Statement; a “Parenting Plan Tool”; a Motion for Emergency/Expedited Pendente Lite Relief (RE1. 158-59); and a Motion to Shorten Time. On the same day, the court denied Appellant’s Motion for Emergency/Expedited Pendente Lite Relief and her Motion to Shorten Time. 2F

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In December 2024, while working, Appellee stopped in a hotel in Washington D.C. to use the restroom and coincidentally ran into Appellant sleeping in the hotel lobby. On another day in December 2024, Appellant called Appellee while he was working and said she was at a restaurant and was not feeling well. When Appellee arrived, Appellant was in the back of an ambulance and Appellee was told that Appellant had passed out in the restaurant and was going to be taken to the hospital. Appellant was taken to Georgetown University Hospital. In January 2025, under the supervision of Appellant’s mother, Appellant and G. went to California to visit Appellant’s family. Patty Buchanan, Appellant’s aunt, testified that she found Appellant’s behavior and treatment of G. during this visit concerning. On January 13, 2025, Appellee filed a Motion for Order Authorizing Release of Medical and/or Mental Health Records and to Compel Discovery. On January 24, 2025, Appellant filed an answer to this motion. On January 27, 2025, Appellant filed an Amended Petition to Modify Custody and Visitation that was accompanied by many exhibits, including letters from friends expressing their view of Appellant’s character and the parties’ relationship history and personal letters from Appellant to Appellee. These lengthy letters included information about the current custody and divorce case and allegations that Appellee had previously physically and emotionally abused Appellant. On February 4, 2025, Appellee filed an Answer to this Amended Petition to Modify Custody and Visitation and filed an Answer to Appellant’s Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce. On February 6, 2025, the court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Appellee’s Motion for Order Authorizing Release of Medical and/or Mental Health Records and to Compel Discovery. Specifically, the court ordered: the custodian of records for [Appellant’s] medical and/or mental health records regarding treatment commencing January 1, 2024 to present, including but not limited to treatment records from Luminis Health Anne Arundel Medical Center and Georgetown University Hospital shall release said records to the Circuit Court for Calvert County, Maryland for an In Camera review to consider [Appellee’s] Motion Authorizing Release of Medical and/or Mental Health Records[.] Further, the court ordered that Appellant shall provide Appellee’s counsel a full and complete answer to Appellant’s Interrogatory No. 22 in writing and under oath within five days of the order, and if she failed to do so, “[Appellee’s] Request to Compel Discovery [would be] reserved for consideration at the merits hearing.” On March 13, 2025, Appellant filed another Motion for Emergency/Expedited Pendente Lite Relief, with supporting exhibits, and another Motion to Shorten Time. In the Motion for Emergency/Expedited Pendente Lite Relief, Appellant again raised accusations that Appellee had abused her in the past. The next day, the court denied Appellant’s Motion for Emergency/Expedited Pendente Lite Relief and denied Appellant’s Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce “having been filed with the court and the case is to proceed in due course.” 68

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On April 1, 2025, and again on April 7, 2025, the Family Services Coordinator issued a memo acknowledging that records from Luminis Health were received. Notably, Appellant’s mother testified that in April and May of 2025 she witnessed some concerning behavior from Appellant, including Appellant talking to herself again. A merits hearing on this matter took place over the course of three days, April 29, April 30, and June 9, 2025, before the Circuit Court for Calvert County. On the first day, Deb Lineberry, the parties’ former babysitter for G., and Appellee testified. On the second day, Appellee completed his testimony and Patty Buchanan, Appellant’s aunt, testified. On the third and final day of the merits hearing, Appellant and her mother both testified. 3F

Circuit Court’s Ruling on the Admissibility of Appellant’s Psychiatric and Mental Health Records During their opening statement, Appellant’s counsel stated: We would, however, remind the Court that under Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, the patient–psychiatric patient– privilege applies even in cases of child custody matters. We’d request that all records related to mental health of the [Appellant] cited and planned to be utilized be barred from admission under Maryland case law.” At the merits hearing, Appellee’s counsel asked the court to mark and take judicial notice of the Georgetown University Hospital records and the Luminis Health records, which the court did, marking them as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 5 and Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 6. Appellee’s counsel then offered these exhibits for admission, noting that the court deemed them relevant during the court’s in-camera review. Appellee’s counsel also stated: I would ask the court to take judicial notice that hospital records meet the criteria of what would be considered a business record. Also that statements in the medical records are made for the purposes of medical diagnosis. I would also assert to the court that [Appellant] did give consent. I mean there’s consent forms included in both of the packets executed by [Appellant] to the release of the documents. And she also provided directly to my office through – I believe it was when she was with [her former attorney], but in her first round of discovery, she also produced records. But the consent forms are included in there. So my position would be the totality of these. Appellant’s counsel responded: I would argue that my client had no understanding of her legal rights at this point to give consent to medical records being disclosed. She believed she was under a Court order to provide records and didn’t wish to violate. … At the time, I don’t believe she had representation of Counsel, but if she had, I would have objected to producing those records. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

In addition, Laznovsky is very clear that mental health records are protected from psychiatric privilege and would protect her for not producing those records even for purposes of child custody cases. Appellee’s counsel argued that the instant situation is different than that in Laznovsky, and that Appellant waived her psychiatrist-patient privilege. At the merits hearing, the Judge ruled from the bench on the admissibility of these records, stating in relevant part: Obviously, Health General Article 4-307 indicates that mental health records are generally confidential. And it cites also to [Cts. & Jud. Pro. § 9-109], which is the communications between patient and psychiatrist and psychologist. Obviously, that deals with situations where there’s no waiver or there’s no authorization of release. … [Appellant’s counsel] argues, well this doesn’t even apply because these are medical records, they’re no mental health records. I don’t know enough about that distinction to say that that’s a basis. But then we come to the issue of waiver and authorization. First of all, … [Appellant] … provided her Luminis records in discovery. She didn’t assert that privilege as to those records at that time. She can’t provide them in discovery and then turn around and say they’re privileged after the fact. So to the extent she provided the Luminis records in discovery, I find that she waived her right to assert the privilege as to those records. Even if they’re considered mental health versus medical. In addition, as it related to the Georgetown University records, I don’t know that she produced those. But the indication there, I think, is a little more straightforward. She was hospitalized allegedly for seizures, not for necessarily mental health. So I don’t think that this privilege applies there. … … I find that A, she’s waived any privilege by providing the documents in discovery to opposing Counsel, and B, she signed releases as to both sets of documents. And certainly it’s relevant because fitness is at issue in this case, and she is asserting that her hospitalizations, for reasons having to do with chemical imbalance or seizures and not related to any mental health issue that she was suffering. So certainly for those reasons, I think it’s relevant – as to whether or not that’s accurate or not or whether there is a mental health issue. So based on that, I find that she’s waived the privilege by not asserting it, by providing the documents and by executing releases relating to the documents. And I don’t think this is like the Laznovsky case TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

in that there is something more here. This isn’t just your standard custody case where someone says, oh, I know my wife or my husband is seeing a counselor, so I’m just going to subpoena the records and find out what’s going on with their mental health. There is more here, in that we know – I don’t think there’s a dispute that [Appellant] here was hospitalized at various different points, including in August and then again in December. … I’m going to admit Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 5 and 6. The Circuit Court’s Judgment and Opinion A. Grounds for Divorce On July 18, 2025, the Judge issued a Judgment and Opinion granting the parties an Absolute Divorce based on six-month separation. B. Alimony The court denied Appellant’s claim for rehabilitative alimony. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the factors under Md. Code, Fm. Law, § 11-106 and based its denial on the fact that the parties’ marriage was relatively short, both parties are highly educated, Appellant is a licensed physical therapist and owns and operates her own physical therapy business, she “has earned nearly $75,000 per year in the past and testified that she could earn between $70,000.00 and $100,000.00 per year in her profession[,]” Appellant did not present credible evidence that she is unable to work and instead maintains that her mental health is managed and under control, and she receives between $4,000.00 and $5,000.00 monthly from her parents and inherits over $30,000.00 annually. C. Division of Marital Property and Monetary Award In reaching its conclusion on the division of marital property, the court followed the three-step process set out in Md. Fam. Law § 8-203-05, in which the court must: (1) determine what property is marital; (2) determine the value of the martial property; and (3) balance the equities and rights of the parties based on the factors set forth in § 8-205. The court determined that Appellee’s 457(b) Plan and his District of Columbia Police Officers and Firefighters Retirement Plan were partially marital property, insofar as the property that was accrued in these entities after the parties’ marriage. The court also held that AM Concierge Physical Therapy, the Pacific Premier Checking and Savings Account, and the parties’ two dogs were also martial property. The remainder of the property analyzed by the court was deemed nonmarital, including the “Police FCU” accounts. The court valued the martial portion of the 457(b) Plan at $56,917.74, the court could not provide a valuation of the District of Columbia Police Officers and Firefighters Retirement Plan, the court valued AM Concierge Physical Therapy at zero, the court valued the Pacific Premier Checking Savings Account at $5,324.05, and the court valued both dogs at zero. Based upon the factors set forth in Md. Fam. Law § Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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8-205, the court awarded Appellant 50% of the 457(b) Plan’s $56,917.74 in marital assets, her marital share of Appellee’s pension through the District of Columbia Police Officers and Firefighters Retirement Plan, and that “each party shall retain any personal property that it titled in their own name as identified in the Court’s Opinion[.]” The court noted that “[a]ll other claims for division of property and monetary award” are denied. Notably, this awarded Appellant a total of $33,930.35 plus her marital share of Appellee’s pension, including her 50% share of the 457(b) Plan ($28,458.87), her Police FCU S-0 and S-99 accounts ($5,092.39; $55.04), and her Pacific Premier checking and savings accounts ($324.05). This awarded Appellee a total of $52,292.30 minus Appellant’s marital share of his pension, including his 50% share of the 457(b) Plan ($28,458.87), his GMC Sierra ($10,587.73), his Police FCU checking account ($2,743.42), his E-Trade account ($6,125.21), and his Robinhood account ($4,377.07). Finally, the court ordered that Appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs was also denied. D. Child Custody & Child Support In reaching its custody decision, the court noted that it “is guided by the best interests of the child” and considers the “non-exhaustive list of factors set forth in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, (1986); Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1978)[.]” The court concluded that “[t]he evidence showed that the parties are unable to communicate effectively with one another to reach shared decisions regarding the minor child[.]” Additionally, the court stated that it “has serious concerns about [Appellant’s] mental fitness to care for [G.]” based on “[t]he testimony and evidence presented by [Appellee], as well as witnesses Ms. Lineberry, Patty Buchanan ([Appellant’s] aunt), and Faye Hoff[.]” The court concluded that Appellee has a “very close and loving bond with [G.,]” and that Appellee has made “considerable effort” to maintain contact between G. and Appellant. The court found that both parties were sincere in their requests for custody, but that Appellant minimized her mental health issues. Based on these determinations, the court concluded it was in the best interests of the child that Appellee be granted sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor child, G., and the court awarded Appellant supervised visitation of the child with an agreed upon supervisor or child supervision center, “the cost of which shall be borne by [Appellant].” The court stated that it has “serious concerns with [Appellant’s] mental fitness and […] ability to care for [G.] in an unsupervised setting.” Further, the court noted that “[s]hould [Appellant] wish to transition to unsupervised visitation, absent an agreement of the parties, [Appellant] shall undergo a full psychological evaluation by an agreed upon or Court ordered psychologist[.]” Finally, the court ordered that Appellant pay Appellee $1,703.00 per month in child support, with additional accompanying orders on the method of payment. Post Judgment Filings & The Instant Appeal On August 18, 2025, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Supplemental Memorandum and 70

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Supporting Exhibits. On August 18, 2025, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 28, 2025, Appellee filed an Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration. On August 28, 2025, the circuit court denied Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration. Originally, this case was scheduled for oral argument before this Court on February 2, 2026. However, on January 25, 2026, Appellant filed an Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief or to Allow Supplement to Same and to Postpone Oral Argument. In this Emergency Motion, Appellant provided that Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5 and 6, containing Appellant’s records from two hospitalizations, had been sealed and admitted in the records of the instant appeal. Appellant’s counsel stated that it became clear that “review of the records by this Court would be relevant to the issues raised on appeal.” Thus, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to unseal the two exhibits, which the circuit court granted on January 9, 2026. Appellant then filed an Uncontested Motion to Correct the Record, and this Court ordered that the exhibits be transmitted from the circuit court to this Court. Appellant’s Emergency Motion provided, “[w]ith the motion to unseal the exhibits still pending in the [circuit court], Appellant filed an Appendix to her principal brief including the two sets of records, under seal, so that this Court would not be delayed[.]” Appellant stated that they believed the records supplied in their Appendix “were identical to those that constituted Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 and 6.” However, Appellee’s brief stated that the records in Appellant’s Appendix were not identical to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5 and 6. Specifically Appellee stated that Appellant’s records failed to include signed waivers by Appellant that were present in the actual exhibits. Appellant’s Emergency Motion provided that upon this discovery, Appellant underwent significant efforts to acquire a copy of the exhibits. However, Appellant was not initially successful and would not be able to view the exhibits until the circuit court re-opened following inclement weather, which would be after Appellant’s reply brief was due to this Court. Appellant’s Emergency Motion acknowledged that Appellee objected to the relief requested by Appellant’s Emergency Motion and declined Appellant’s request that she receive full copies of the exhibits directly from Appellee. However, Appellee did not object to Appellant viewing the exhibits in person upon the circuit court’s reopening. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requested this Court grant its Emergency Motion and extend the deadline for filing Appellant’s reply brief by seven days to allow the circuit court to locate the exhibits and allow Appellant to review them. Appellant also requested that oral arguments for the instant appeal be postponed. On January 28, 2026, this Court granted Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief or to Allow Supplement to Same and to Postpone Oral Argument, ordered that Appellant’s Reply Brief shall be filed on or before February 2, 2026, and ordered that this appeal shall be rescheduled for oral argument in the April 2026 session. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

DISCUSSION

Admission of Appellant’s Psychiatric and Mental Health Records A. Parties’ Contentions Appellant argues that the court committed reversible error by admitting privileged psychiatric and psychological records over her objection. In support of this, Appellant highlights the following events: on October 18, 2024, Appellee filed a Motion for Sanctions for Appellant’s failure to respond to discovery; on October 28, 2024, Appellant’s former counsel, Mr. Hansen, filed a Motion to Strike his Appearance; on October 31, 2024, Appellant responded to Appellee’s Motion; on November 13, 2024, the court granted Appellee’s Motion in part, ordering Appellant to respond to the discovery requests. Appellant provides that Mr. Hansen filed a Certificate of Discovery stating that Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request for Production of Documents were mailed to Appellee’s counsel. Then, on December 3, 2024, Appellant states that the court granted Mr. Hansen’s Motion to Strike his appearance as Appellant’s counsel. As for the admission of the Luminis records, Appellant states that: Apparently, in March 2024, without having had an opportunity to review same, [Appellant] acting pro se, executed a release to [Appellee’s] counsel allowing her to obtain some part of the records from Luminis. She had already been the subject of an Order compelling full and complete disclosure of responses to requests for production of documents. Appellant provides that “[h]er counsel objected to disclosure of the records at trial, based on the mental health records [privilege].” Appellant summarily asserts that in these circumstances, it was “unconscionable” for the court to conclude that Appellant waived her psychiatrist-patient privilege for the Luminis records “after the court demanded them and after opposing counsel allegedly served a waiver upon her.” As for the Georgetown records, Appellant argues that the court erred in deeming these records to be medical and not psychiatric because “those records contain a directive and implicit diagnosis that [Appellant] was being treated for schizophrenia, which takes those records out of the realm of purely medical records.” Appellant also asserts that “an admission for seizures would otherwise be irrelevant to child custody[,]” and that Appellant never waived any privilege with regard to these records. Appellant concludes that the court committed “reversible legal error in finding that Laznovsky did not apply to the Georgetown record[s], and abused its discretion in admitting the Luminis […] records after finding a knowing waiver of privilege.” Appellee argues that “the validity of the waivers prior to trial is not an issue preserved for appeal,” because Appellant conceded that her acts of disclosing the records in discovery and executing the authorization forms for the records “constituted a waiver.” Appellee asserts that Appellant instead argues that she could revoke her waiver at the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

merits hearing, “and based upon the revocation of her waiver, Laznovsky barred admission of the records.” However, Appellee argues that regardless of the validity of the waivers prior to the merits hearing not being preserved for appeal, “the [c]ourt’s ruling was correct.” Appellee rejects Appellant’s assertion that her waiver constituted “a limited waiver or a release ‘for insurance and billing purposes’ executed upon admission.” Instead, Appellee points out that the “plain language of the releases signed by [Appellant] authorized ‘all records’ be released to the Circuit Court for Calvert County, an entity not involved in billing or insurance in any way.” Additionally, Appellee acknowledges that while Appellant was permitted to revoke her waiver of privilege, “the revocation is effective only as of the date the privilege was revoked, not retroactively[.]” Appellant revoked her waiver on April 29, 2025, which all the records predated, and therefore “privilege did not apply to the Georgetown and Luminis records and the [c]ourt properly admitted the records.” Finally, Appellee argues that if the court erred by finding that the Georgetown records were medical records and not mental health records, “it [was] harmless error because [Appellant] waived her privilege as to the Georgetown records.” Appellee states that “[i]t is not probable that the admission of the records prejudiced [Appellant] in the [c] ourt’s custody decision” because the court did not reference any of the records in its findings nor custody ruling[,]” and there was “ample evidence to support the findings of [Appellant’s] parental unfitness and questionable mental health exclusive of the Georgetown and Luminis records.” In Appellant’s Reply Brief, Appellant states that she “signed the alleged privilege waiver under order of the court after affirmatively invoking privilege and the record does not include proof that (or which) records were disclosed in discovery[.]” Specifically, Appellant argues that nothing in the record supports Appellee’s argument that Appellant disclosed the records during discovery and thus waived the privilege. Additionally, Appellant reiterates her argument that the court erred in categorizing the Georgetown records as medical records. B. Standard of Review First and foremost, “[o]rdinarily, an appellate court will not decide any [] issue unless it plainly appears by the records to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.” Md. Rule 8-131(a). In St. Luke Inst., Inc. v. Jones, 471 Md. 312, 328-29 (2020), the Supreme Court of Maryland provided the applicable standard of review, stating: With respect to the application of discovery rules, “it is long settled that the trial judges are vested with a reasonable, sound, discretion in applying them, which discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of its abuse.” Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 560 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although we generally review discovery disputes under an abuse of Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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discretion standard, the dispute in this case involves a civil litigant’s right to obtain mental health records that are ordinarily protected from disclosure by statute and may only be obtained in accordance with the express statutory provisions authorizing such disclosure. When a trial court’s order involves an interpretation and application of statutory and case law, we must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review. Nesbitt v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72 (2004). Under Md. Health Gen. § 4-307, mental health records are generally confidential and “not discoverable or admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative action[,]” unless an exception outlined in the statute applies. One of these exceptions is that “[a] healthcare provider shall disclose a medical record without the authorization of a person in interest[,]” in accordance with a court order as permitted under Cts. & Jud. Pro. § 9-109. Md. Health Gen. § 4-307(k)(1)(iv). Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Pro., § 9-109 provides the law concerning the “patient-therapist privilege,” which applies to communications between licensed psychologists and psychiatrists and their patients. Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Pro., § 9-109(a). In relevant part, this statute states: (b) Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings, a patient or the patient’s authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing: (1) Communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient; or (2) Any information that by its nature would show the existence of a medical record of the diagnosis or treatment … (d) There is no privilege if: … (6) The patient expressly consents to waive the privilege, or in the case of death or disability, his personal or authorized representative waives the privilege for purpose of making claim or bringing suit on a policy of insurance on life, health, or physical condition; … Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Pro. § 9-109(b); (d). In In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. 701, 707-10 (1997), this Court relied on Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 (1975), which evaluated waiver of the attorney-client privilege, to guide its determination of whether the psychiatrist-patient privilege had been waived. In Harrison, the Supreme Court of Maryland stated that one’s intent to waive a privilege must “be expressed either by word or act, or omission to speak out.” In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. at 707-10 (quoting Harrison, 276 Md. at 137). Further, “[o]nce the confidential matter has been disclosed, it is no longer secret and the privilege which might be claimed disappears.” Harrison, 276, Md. at 137-38. Furthermore, “a privileged party cannot fairly be permitted to disclose as much as he pleases and then to withhold 72

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the remainder to the detriment of the defendant.” Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 359 Md. 671, 693 (2000). C. Analysis The issue of whether there was a valid waiver was preserved for review by this Court because it was “raised in or decided by the trial court[.]” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Even though Appellant conceded that there was a valid waiver at the merits hearing, and instead argued that her waiver could be and was recanted, the court still decided this issue, stating “I find that she waived her right to assert privilege as to [the Luminis] records.” We agree that there was a valid waiver of the psychiatristpatient privilege as to the Luminis records. Appellant was represented by her former counsel, Mr. Hansen, until December 3, 2024, when the court granted Mr. Hansen’s Motion to Strike his appearance as Appellant’s counsel. Thus, Appellant was represented by Mr. Hansen when she provided the Luminis records in discovery to Appellee on November 12, 2024. Appellant’s act of providing these records in discovery, while represented by counsel, effectively expressed Appellant’s “intent to waive [her] privilege.” See In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. at 707-10 (quoting Harrison, 276 Md. at 137). Additionally, on March 18, 2025, Appellant signed a release for the Luminis records that explicitly stated, “[r]elease my health information to: Calvert County Circuit Court[.]” Notably, Appellant obtained a new lawyer and filed an Entry of Appearance on March 24, 2025. Thus, Appellant signed the release without representation of counsel. Regardless, signing the release, coupled with her explicit disclosure of these records in discovery, bolstered the validity of Appellant’s waiver of her psychiatric-patient privilege. At the merits hearing, on April 29, 2025, Appellant attempted to invoke her psychiatric-patient privilege for the Luminis records, arguing that Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, barred the admission of these records. This is the first time Appellant asserted the psychiatric-patient privilege. However, at this point, Appellant had already waived this privilege for the Luminis records by the act of giving the records to Appellee during discovery and signing the release of the documents to the court. See In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. at 707-10; Harrison, 276 Md. at 137-38); Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 693. Further, Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, is not on point for the instant case. In Laznovsky, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that a party in a child custody case does not waive their psychiatrist-patient privilege by asserting they are fit to have custody of their child. This is not instructive because Appellant did not waive her psychiatrist-patient privilege by asserting she is fit to have custody of her child, but rather she waived her psychiatrist-patient privilege by providing the Luminis records to Appellee during discovery and signing the release for these records. See In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. at 707-10; Harrison, 276 Md. at 137-38); Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 693. Additionally, the Georgetown records were also properly admitted. However, the court did err in ruling that the psychiatrist-patient privilege did not apply to Georgetown records because she was being treated for seizures rather than for mental health concerns. Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Pro. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

§ 9-109(b) provides that the psychiatrist-patient privilege applies to: “(1) Communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient; or (2) Any information that by its nature would show the existence of a medical record of the diagnosis or treatment[.]” Appellant’s Georgetown records state Appellant is a “single Female w/ PPH Bipolar disorder and Schizophrenia…” The records also reflect that Appellant denies these diagnoses, that Appellant’s prior hospitalization at Anne Arundel Medical Center for mental health concerns, and include comments from Appellee and Appellant’s mother regarding Appellant’s mental state. The nature of this information certainly shows “the existence of a medical record of the diagnosis or treatment,” and thus the court should have determined that the Georgetown records were subject to the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Pro. § 9-109(b). However, this was a harmless error because if the court had found the psychiatrist-patient privilege was applicable to these records, it also would have concluded that Appellant waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege by explicitly providing the records to the court and Appellee. On March 14, 2025, Appellant signed a release for her Georgetown records to be sent to the Circuit Court for Calvert County. As noted above, Appellant obtained a new lawyer and filed an Entry of Appearance on March 24, 2025, and thus Appellant signed this release without representation of counsel. Regardless, the principles in In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. at 707-10; Harrison, 276 Md. at 137-38); and Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 693; dictate that Appellant waived her privilege as to the Georgetown records, and she “cannot fairly be permitted to disclose as much as [she] pleases and then to withhold the remainder to the detriment of the defendant.” Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 693. Therefore, the court’s error in ruling that the psychiatristpatient privilege did not apply to Georgetown records was a harmless error because the documents would have been admitted either way and thus Appellant was not prejudiced by the error. See Md. Rule 5-103(a) (stating that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling.”); see also Lamalfa v. Hearn, 457 Md. 350, 372-73 (2018) (holding that “even if manifestly wrong, we will not disturb an evidentiary ruling by a trial court if the error was harmless[,]” and that the probability of prejudice guides the appellate inquiry). The circuit court did not commit reversible error in admitting both Appellant’s Luminis and Georgetown records. Child Custody Award A. Parties’ Contentions Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting Appellee sole legal and physical custody for two main reasons: (1) caselaw concerning parties to a custody battle that cannot effectively communicate about decisions regarding the child counsels for a joint custody award, and the trial court did not partake in a detailed analysis for deviating from a joint custody finding; and (2) the trial court improperly TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

considered [Appellant’s] religiosity when determining her fitness as a parent, and misstated the trial testimony related to the same. As for “(1)”, Appellant argues that the court’s order is “far afield from the guideposts in [Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620 (2016)] and its supporting authorities” and did not adequately detail “why a deviation from pure joint legal custody is in the best interests of the [child].” Appellant asserts that “the trial court’s lack of one single case law citation whatsoever (other than perfunctory citations to Taylor and Sanders[)], … is an abuse of discretion[,]” and “[a]t the very least, the scant analysis should entitle [Appellant] to a limited remand on the issue.” As for “(2)”, Appellant argues that “[a] dangerous conflation that permeates this case is [Appellant’s] struggles from August 2024 to January 2024 with her strongly held and genuine religious beliefs.” Appellant asserts that in considering religion when making child custody determinations, Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388 (1963); Bienenfield v. Bennett-White, 91 Md. App. 488, 507 (1992); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 516-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); “and their progeny draw the line at physical or psychological harm to the child.” Thus, Appellant asserts that here, the “[c]onsideration of the testimony regarding [Appellant’s] religion was an abuse of discretion.” Appellee argues that the court’s award of sole legal and physical custody was not an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Appellee argues that the court “made ample factual findings in support of the award of sole legal and physical custody to [Appellee][,]” and listed these factual findings. Appellee asserts that the court considered all the required factors set out in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986) and Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1978), and individually reviewed each factor in its opinion. Appellee rejects Appellant’s argument concerning Santo, 448 Md. 620, and asserts that the court’s decision was “logical and consistent with the conclusion of a reasonable person” based on the testimony given at the merits hearing, the court’s credibility determinations, and the extensive evidence presented at the merits hearing. Appellee specifically highlighted that “testimony of [Appellant’s] concerning behavior came from four (4) separate witnesses,” two of which were Appellant’s family members, and that the court made a credibility determination from observing Appellant during the three days of the merits hearing that Appellant “was minimizing her mental health issues.” Additionally, Appellee noted that the court relied on evidence that spanned from August 2024 through May 2025. Thus, Appellee concludes that “[t]he [c] ourt’s decision cannot be characterized as ‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court…’” Appellee also argues that the court did not consider Appellant’s religious views in reaching its custody determination. Appellee asserts that his concern with the incident when Appellant took G. to a field “at Jesus’ alleged direction” related to G.’s safety, not specifically religion. Appellee notes that this instance was also concerning given the context of G. having sustained injuries while in Appellant’s care. Appellee also provides that cross examination from Appellant’s attorney elicited his testimony about Appellant’s Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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religious behaviors and the parties’ religious differences. Appellee argues that the court did not rely on Appellant’s religious behaviors in reaching its decision, but even if it had, that is allowed as it relates to the safety of the child. B. Standard of Review When reviewing child custody matters, Maryland appellate courts apply three distinct standards of review. See Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 616 (2017) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551 (2003)). First, when an appellate court “scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard” applies. In re Yves S., 373 Md. at 568. Second, “if it appears that the [trial court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.” Id. Third, “when the appellate court views the ultimate decision of the [trial court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [trial court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. Under this framework, “it is within the sound discretion of the [trial court] to award custody according to the exigencies of each case,” and “a reviewing court may interfere with such a determination only on a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.” Id. at 585-86. An abuse of discretion occurs: Where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court … or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and interferences before the court,” or when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic[.]” Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185 (2005) (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 (1997) (internal citations omitted)). Further, in Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Maryland noted: Such broad discretion is vested in the [trial court] because only he sees the witnesses and the parties, hears the testimony, and has the opportunity to speak with the child; he is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what deposition will best promote the welfare of the minor. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 125 (1997). Additionally, Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986), sets out the factors to be considered when the trial court is deciding whether to award joint legal custody.5 These considerations include: i. The capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare; ii. The willingness of the parties to share custody; iii. The fitness of the parents; iv. The relationship established between the child and each parent; v. The preference of the child; vi. The potential disruption of the child’s social and school lives; 74

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vii. The geographic proximity of the parental homes; viii. The demands of parental employment; ix. The age and number of children; x. The sincerity of both parent’s requests; xi. The financial status of the parties; and xii. The benefit to the parents. See Viamonte v. Viamonte, 131 Md. App. 151, 158-59 (2000) (citing Taylor, 306 Md. at 304-11). C. Analysis Here, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Appellee sole physical and legal custody of G. The circuit court judge properly considered testimony and evidence pertaining to each of the factors set forth in Taylor, 306 Md. 290 and Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406. Notably, the court found that the parties are “unable to reach shared decisions regarding the minor child and that joint legal custody would not be in the best interests of the minor child[,]” and considered the parties willingness to share custody. Regarding the fitness of the parents, the court considered the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing and concluded that “the [c]ourt has serious concerns about [Appellant’s] mental fitness to care for G.” The court concluded Appellee has a “close and loving bond with G.” and that since Appellant’s hospitalizations in August 2024, “Appellant does not have as strong a bond as [Appellee] with the minor child.” The court found Appellee has made “considerable effort” to maintain contact between G. and Appellant. The court noted Appellee’s work schedule and recognized that he has hired an au pair for G. The court found that both parties were sincere in their requests for custody, but that Appellant minimized her mental health issues. Notably, the court’s factual findings regarding child custody make no mention of Appellant’s mental health records. The court’s factual conclusions are appropriately based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing and thus are not clearly erroneous and are due deference on appeal. We must give due regard to the court’s credibility determination that Appellant minimized her mental health issues and that “the [c]ourt has serious concerns about [Appellant’s] mental fitness to care for [G].” Based on these factual determinations, we cannot say “no reasonable person” would reach the conclusion that it is not in G.’s best interests for Appellant to have legal or physical custody or unsupervised visitation. Wilson, 385 Md. 185 (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 (internal citations omitted)). In reaching this conclusion, the court properly relied on the relevant “guiding rules or principles[,]” set out in Taylor, 306 Md. 290 and Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406. Therefore, the court did not commit an abuse of discretion in awarding Appellee sole physical and legal custody of G. Failure to Grant Appellant a Monetary Award A. Parties’ Contentions Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to grant Appellant a monetary award. Specifically, Appellant argues that awarding Appellee “almost 95% of TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

the marital property, failing to adjust the equities, while simultaneously declining to award alimony to the Appellant and assessing 100% of the cost of supervised visitation as a community center is an abuse of discretion.” Appellant asserts that the court’s conclusion that the “Police FCU Account” is non-marital because “[Appellant] received her share of these funds, totaling $53,484.84 on or about April 22, 2024[,]” was clearly erroneous. Appellant states that a check was written on April 22, 2024, for $53,484.84 to “Michael Perez,” (emphasis in original) not to Appellant. Appellant provides that these funds were deposited into Appellee’s personal account at the Police Federal Credit Union. Appellant states that this account showed total deposits of $125,361.23, from which Appellee “unilaterally deducted six months of alleged deficit to cover family expenses for totaling $15,816.00[,]” and “deducted an additional $12,444.83 for alleged monies ‘Allison Borrowed from Family Accounts for AM Concierge Physical Therapy.’” Appellant also notes that Appellee wrote Appellant a check for $42,327.79 for what he “erroneously claimed was her share of the marital funds.” Appellant contends that she did not consent to these deductions. Further, Appellant argues it was an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that these deductions were “an agreed disposition of marital property, but Appellant’s contribution of [$48,497.08] to the marital estate from her personal injury settlement” were not counted as part of the marital property analysis.6 Appellant asserts that the marital property totaled $125,361.23, making Appellant’s 50% share $62,680.61, but since Appellee paid Appellant $43,327.79, “a 50% division of the marital property entitled Appellant to an award of $19,352.82.” Appellant acknowledged that an even split of marital property is not mandated. Appellant argues that the court erroneously determined that “[Appellee] held marital property worth $80,751.17, and [Appellant] held only $5,471.48, not taking into account the monies kept by [Appellee] in dividing the Parties’ accounts.” Therefore, Appellant concludes that “[t]he [c]ourt granted [Appellant] a 50% interest in the marital share of the pensions but failed, utterly, to make an equitable division of the marital property.” Appellant contends that this division of property, coupled with denying Appellant’s claim for alimony and assigning Appellant 100% of the cost of supervised visitation centers, was an abuse of discretion and thus “[t]he judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial before a different judge.” Appellee states that “the identification of [Appellee’s] PFCU Savings Account as non-marital was a mistake but asserts the error is harmless[.]” Appellee argues that under Md. Rule 5-103, Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App 492, 51516 (2008), and given the evidence and the court’s reasoning for denying the monetary award, “it is not probable that adding [Appellee’s] PFCU $3,418.02 savings account balance to the marital property would make any difference in the [c] ourt’s monetary award analysis.” Irrespective of the PFCU savings account, Appellee provides that when the 50% split of Appellee’s pension is taken into account, Appellee received $52,292.30 in marital property and Appellant received $33,930.35 in marital TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

property. Appellee asserts that the court “systematically considered all of the factors set forth in Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 8-205,” considered all the testimony and evidence, and thus did not commit an abuse of discretion. Further, Appellee notes that Appellant wrongfully relies on bank account balances from July 1, 2024, over a year before the divorce and nine months before the merits hearing. Appellee asserts that under Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 177 (1984), “the relevant inquiry involves the value of marital property on the date of divorce, not date of separation or any prior date[.]” Additionally, Appellee argues that Appellant never argued at the merits hearing that Appellee dissipated assets, Appellant does not make that argument on appeal and thus has not preserved that issue for appeal. Appellee notes that even if Appellant had made a dissipation argument, “the [c]ourt found [Appellee’s] explanation regarding the expenditure of funds credible and the [c]ourt would be correct in relying upon the account balances at or about the time of divorce. In Appellant’s Reply Brief, Appellant argues that “the court erroneously failed to consider Appellant’s dissipation claim in determining a marital award.” Appellant asserts that Appellee wrote a check for $53,484.84 from the parties’ joint bank account for their business, Presence Real Estate Investments (“PREI”), which he deposited into his PFCU savings account. Appellant maintains that she never consented to this transfer of funds and that Appellees made this transfer in contemplation of divorce. Appellant argues that “[t]he [c]ourt made a clearly erroneous factual finding that this check was a payment to [Appellant] as an agreed settlement division of the Police FCU account, converting this account to non-marital property.” Appellant asserts that this deposit was Appellee’s “unilateral attempt to divide the parties’ joint bank accounts[.]” Appellant states that she raised in her brief her “contention that [Appellee] ‘embezzled’ the monies in the PREI account when he divided the parties’ property,” and that “[i]t is immaterial that Appellant did not use the precise word ‘dissipation’ at trial or in her brief[.]” In conclusion, Appellant asks this Court to “remand the case to the [circuit court], with directions to grant a marital award of $19,352.82, or, alternatively, remand for a new trial as to the disposition of marital property, including the $53,484.84 diverted from the parties’ business account.” B. Standard of Review In determining whether to grant a monetary award, the trial court must follow a three-step process. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519 (citing Md. Fam. Law §§ 8-203; 8-204; 8-205) (citations omitted); see also Alston, 331 Md. at 49899. First, the trial court must determine which property is “marital property” under Md. Fam. Law §§ 8-201(e); 8- 203. See id. Md. Fam. Law § 8-201(e) defines marital property as: (e)(1) “Marital property” means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage. (2) “Marital property” includes any interest in real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety unless the real property is excluded by valid agreement. Maryland Family Law Update • August 2026

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(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, “marital property” does not include property: (i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources. Second, the trial court must determine the value of all marital property under Md. Fam. Law § 8-204. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519; see also Alston, 331 Md. at 498- 99. “Whether property is marital and, if so, its value, are both factual questions that we review for clear error.” Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 353-54 (2025). Third, the trial court must consider the factors outlined in Md. Fam Law § 8-205 to determine a fair division of marital property, which can be accomplished by transferring property or issuing a monetary award. See id. The factors set forth in Md. Fam Law § 8-205 are as follows: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. Md. Fam. Law § 8-205(b)(1)-(11). A trial court’s decision whether to grant a monetary award and the amount of such an award “is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 (1993) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “a discretionary standard of review applies.” See Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230 (2000) (internal citations omitted). This Court will only overturn the circuit court’s decision whether to grant a monetary award and its amount if there was an abuse of discretion. See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 521 (2008) (citing Alston, 331 Md. at 504) (citations omitted). “This means that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result.” Innerbichler, 132 Md. App at 230. 76

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C. Analysis Here, in determining whether to grant a monetary award, the trial court undertook the proper three-step process of: (1) identifying a marital property; (2) determining the value of all marital property; and (3) considering the factors set out in Md. Fam Law § 8-205 to determine a fair division of marital property. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519; Alston, 331 Md. at 498-99; Md. Fam. Law §§ 8-201(e); 8-203; 8-204; 8-205. As for steps (1) and (2), all of the court’s factual determinations of which property was marital property and the value of each item of marital property were not clearly erroneous and supported by the evidence, except the court’s classification of Appellee’s Police FCU savings account, which was clearly erroneous. See Sims, 266 Md. App. at 353-54. The court erred by classifying Appellee’s Police FCU savings account as nonmarital property. For step (2) specifically, Appellee correctly points out that many of Appellant’s arguments about the value of items of marital property rely on bank account balances from many months before the merits hearing or the parties’ divorce. Here, the court properly relied on evidence of various from the time of the merits hearing and the ultimate divorce when determining each item’s value. See Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 653 (2011). For step (3), the court was not clearly erroneous in awarding Appellant a total of $33,930.35 plus her marital share of Appellee’s pension, including her 50% share of the 457(b) Plan ($28,458.87), her Police FCU S-0 and S-99 accounts ($5,092.39; $55.04), and her Pacific Premier checking and savings accounts ($324.05). The court was also not clearly erroneous in awarding Appellee a total of $52,292.30 minus Appellant’s marital share of his pension, including his 50% share of the 457(b) Plan ($28,458.87), his GMC Sierra ($10,587.73), his Police FCU checking account ($2,743.42), his E-Trade account ($6,125.21), and his Robinhood account ($4,377.07). These determinations were supported by evidence and the court properly considered each of the factors set forth in Md. Fam Law § 8-205. However, as noted above, the court erred by classifying Appellee’s Police FCU savings account as non-marital property. Notably, Appellant’s Police FCU S-0 account, Police FCU S-1 account, and Police FCU S-99 account were all classified as marital property. Appellee agrees with Appellant that the court’s identification of Appellee’s Police FCU savings account as non-marital “was a mistake[.]” We also agree. The money in the Police FCU savings account was deposited from from the PREI bank account, which was the parties’ joint bank account for their business. Thus, the funds in the Police FCU savings account were clearly marital property. See Md. Fam Law. 8-201(e). Further it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that the Police FCU savings account was non-marital because “[A]ppellant received her share of these funds, totaling $53,484.84 on or about April 22, 2024[,]” when a check on that date and for that amount was actually written to “Michael Perez,” Appellee, not Appellant. Thus, there was no such valid agreement for the division of this account that would deem the account nonmarital. See Md. Fam. Law 8-201(e) (identifying that “marital property” does not include property that is “excluded by [a] valid agreement”).7 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law

While the parties agree that the trial court’s classification of the Police FCU savings account as non-marital was erroneous, the parties disagree on whether this mistake was a harmless error. A lower court’s error is reversible when it results in substantial prejudice. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 516 (citing Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 342, 36 (2003)). “Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below; an error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 516 (citing Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004)). As of April 17, 2025, and thus at the time of the parties’ divorce judgment, Appellee’s Police FCU Savings account was valued at $3,418.02. While this is not a substantial sum of money, compared to the total amounts awarded to each party in this matter, $33,930.35 to Appellant plus her marital share of Appellee’s pension and $52,292.30 to Appellee

less Appellant’s marital share of his pension, this amount is not insignificant. Failing to classify this account as marital property, and thus not including it in the evaluation and division of marital property, arguably prejudiced Appellant because it allowed Appellee to keep marital assets without any equitable evaluation by the court. Therefore, this case must be reversed and remanded solely insofar as Appellant’s Police FCU account is concerned. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the Circuit Court for Calvert County’s judgment on the admissibility of Appellant’s mental health records and on child custody. We reverse and remand the court’s division of marital property, in part, solely pertaining to the erroneous classification of Appellee’s Police FCU Savings Account.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CALVERT COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; 2/3 OF THE COSTS TO PAID BY APPELLANT AND 1/3 TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

FOOTNOTES

1

Since the parties’ child is a minor, this Court will refer to the child by his first initial, G.

2

Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed 31 days after entry of the judgment in this case. However, the 30th day after entry of judgment fell on a Sunday, in which case “the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday[.]” Md. Rule 1-203(a)(1).

3

This hearing was postponed due to pending discovery disputes and ultimately obviated by Appellant’s Motion to Modify Custody.

4

The Luminis health records are the records from Anne Arundel Medical Center.

5

As noted by the circuit court, on October 1, 2025, the law for child custody determinations changed from being determined based on the best interest factors set out in Taylor, 306 Md. 290, to the factor set out in Md. Code, Fam. Law, § 9-201.

6

On December 11, 2023, Appellant received an automobile accident settlement in the amount of $48,497.08. Appellant alleges that she deposited this money into the parties’ joint account with a note, “To Mike … because marriage is worth more than money.” The court concluded it was unable to account for these funds because they were co-mingled with other funds.

7

While we agree with Appellant that the Police FCU savings account was erroneously classified as non-martial property, we reject Appellant’s dissipation argument on appeal. Appellant’s argument that “[i]t is immaterial that Appellant did not use the precise word ‘dissipation’ at trial or in her brief[,]” is incorrect. Appellant did not specifically raise a dissipation argument in the trial court or in her brief on appeal. Appellant first raised dissipation in her reply brief, and thus this issue is not preserved for consideration on appeal. Md. Rule 8-131.

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Case Index FULL TEXT

BRIEFS

Richard A. Thomas Jr. v. Aretha Ramnarine Thomas

13

11

Jahari D. Copper v. Natasha L. Copper

22

11

Syed Saqib Ali v. Susan Al

30

11

Amaneh Arasteh v. Michael Arasteh

35

11

Chanan Zlotnitsky v. Limor Zlotnitsky

38

11

Emmanuel Ifeagwu v. Chidinma Ifeagwu

43

12

Brandon Johnson v. Coconut Jacobs

48

12

Leonid Burlachuk v. Joycelyn Burlachuk

55

12

AshLee Smith Turner v. Blair Abelle-Kiser

61

12

Allison Hoff v. Michael Perez

66

12

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Topic Index FULL TEXT

BRIEFS

ALIMONY; STATUTORY FACTORS; VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT Richard A. Thomas Jr. v. Aretha Ramnarine Thomas

13

11

22

11

30

11

35

11

38

11

CHILD SUPPORT; ARREARS; CONTRACT Jahari D. Copper v. Natasha L. Copper

FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER; IMMINENT HARM; FEAR Syed Saqib Ali v. Susan Al

DISPUTED ASSETS; MONETARY AWARD; EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION Amaneh Arasteh v. Michael Arasteh

ACTUAL INCOME; SPOUSAL SUPPORT; CHILD SUPPORT Chanan Zlotnitsky v. Limor Zlotnitsky

IMPUTED INCOME; VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT; FACTUAL FINDINGS Emmanuel Ifeagwu v. Chidinma Ifeagwu

43

12

48

12

HEALTH CARE; BEST INTERESTS; STATUTORY FACTORS Brandon Johnson v. Coconut Jacobs

FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER; CORPORAL PUNISHMENT; FACTUAL FINDINGS Leonid Burlachuk v. Joycelyn Burlachuk

55

12

PHYSICAL AND LEGAL CUSTODY; MINOR CHILD; STATUTORY FACTORS AshLee Smith Turner v. Blair Abelle-Kiser

61

12

66

12

CUSTODY; RELEVANT FACTORS; TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE Allison Hoff v. Michael Perez

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