Introduction
ThisreportidentifiessignificantproblemswithPakistan’sE-SafetyBillandcomparesitwith onlinesafetylegislationinothercountries.OnJuly26,2023,thefederalcabinetprovided approvalinprincipletotheE-SafetyBill2023.1 Formallyknownas “An act to provide for fostering and promoting safe online Social Network Platforms,”2 theE-SafetyBillpurportstobealawthat implements“reasonablerestrictions”ononlinecontent.However,theE-SafetyBillraises numerousredflags.ThereareconcernsthatthePakistanigovernmentwillusethebillasatool tosuppressfreespeech andcensoronlinecontentusingonline“safety”asanexcuse.Someof theE-SafetyBill’smostsignificantissuesinclude:
1. its“one-size-fits-all”approachtoregulatingonlineplatformsthathavelittleincommon,
2. itsregistrationrequirement,
3. thelackofclarityintheobligationsitimposesonSocialNetworkPlatforms(SNP),
4. theriskthatthelaw’svagueprovisionswillbeinterpretedinanoverbroadmanner,and,
5. thereactionitmayinducefromforeigncompanies whomaysimplystopservingcustomers inPakistaninviewoftheonerousobligationsitimposes.
Eachoftheseissuesimplicateshumanrightsconsiderations,suchastheprotectionoffreedom ofexpressionandtherighttoinformation,asenshrinedinArticles19and19Aofthe ConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistanandtheInternationalCovenantonCiviland PoliticalRights(ICCPR).
Context
Countriesallovertheworld,fromAustraliatotheUnitedKingdom,arefacingdifficultiesin determininghowtoregulateonlinecontentwhilerespectingthefundamentalrightsoffreedom ofexpressionandaccesstoinformation.Therapidadvanceoftechnologyandtheabilityof variousonlineplatformstoquicklydisseminateinformationtolargeaudiencesarecreatinga senseofurgencyforcountriestodevelopeffectiveonlinesafetylegislation.
Pakistanisoneofthecountriescurrentlyattemptingtoenactlegislationtoregulateonline platformsandthecontenttheycarry.LegislationinPakistanisboundbytheConstitutionof Pakistanand,asasignatoryparty,theICCPR.TheSupremeCourtof Pakistanhasexplainedthat “every statute is in the public interest and must always align and flow with the text and spirit of the Constitution. Therefore, the constitutional values, fundamental rights and the principles of policy laid down under the Constitution enjoy a symbiotic relationship with any statutory framework including the one regulating media content . . .”3 Thisframeworksuggestsbothfreedomof expressionandtherighttoinformationmustberespectedandprotectedbyanystatute regulatingmediacontent.WhiletheSupremeCourtdoesconsidersomereasonablerestrictions ontheserightsasacceptable(forexample,toprotectagainsthatespeechorpreventminors fromaccessingpornographicmaterial,)theirlegallypermissibleapplicationsarelimited.4 The
1 Ali,Kalbe, Impact of New 'Cyber Laws' May Be Felt Far and Wide,Dawn,July27,2023. https://www.dawn.com/news/1766979
2 Introduction,Thee-SafetyBill(2023).
3 PakistanElectronicMediaRegulatoryAuthority(PEMRA)v.ARY CommunicationsPrivateLimited(ARYDigital) (2022),SupremeCourtofPakistan,14-15
4 Ibid.,16.
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SupremeCourtofPakistanconstrainstheapplicationoftheserestrictions,emphasizing“The reasonable restrictions should therefore not only be rationally connected to, but also be no more than necessary to accomplish, any of the legitimate objectives mentioned in Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution.”5 ThisReportdetailshowtheE-SafetyBillfailstoachieveitsself-proclaimed goalofenhancingonlinesafetyand,evenworse,implementsrestrictionsthatarenotrationally connectedtothisgoal.Thisexaminationhighlightshowthebill’sinadequacies,particularlyin itslackofprecisionandcleardefinitions,undermineitsabilitytoachievetheintendedpurpose ofsafeguardingonlinespacesandmaintaininganenvironmentthatprotectsfreedomof expressionandtherightsoftheindividualsusingthesespaces.
1. OneBilltoRegulateManyVastlyDifferent Platforms
TheproposedE-SafetyBillimposesthesameregulatoryprovisionsonawiderangeofplatforms thatvaryinfunctionandcontent.Theambitiousscopeofthebillraisesconcernsregardinghow applicabletheprovisionsaretoeachplatformandwhethertheplatformscanreasonably comply.TheE-SafetyBillregulatesSocialNetworkPlatforms,includingWebTVchannels(i.e., YouTube,Netflix,AmazonPrime),socialnetworkingsites(i.e.,Twitter,Facebook,Instagram), cloud-basedcontentdistributionservices(ambiguousastowhatplatformsthiscategory includes),platformorcommunicationchannels,advertisers,e-commerceservicesproviders, onlineinformationandcontentdeliverysystems(ambiguousastowhatplatformsthiscategory includes),andothersimilarplatformsasdeterminedbytheE-SafetyBill’sregulatingauthority.6
TheE-SafetyBill’sbroadreachfavorsquantityoverqualityasitregulatesnumerousplatforms butdoesnottailoritsprovisionstoaddressthedistinctfunctionsandcontentofeachplatform. Oneexamplearisesfromthebill’sprohibitionofcontentcontaininghatespeech.7 ASocial NetworkPlatformwithcontentuploadedfromasinglesource,suchasNetflixuploadingonly themoviesandshowsitselects,canreasonablycomplywiththebill’sprohibitionbecausethe individualorcorporationisthesolesourceresponsiblefortheplatform’scontent.Incontrast,a socialnetworkingsitewithmillionsofusersconstantlyuploadingcontent,suchasFacebook, cannotensureacompleteabsenceofcontentcontaininghatespeechontheplatformbecauseit isunreasonablyburdensome toscreenallthecontentpreemptively.
UnlikethePakistaniE-SafetyBill,theAustralianOnlineSafetyAct2021treatsdifferentkindsof onlineplatformsdifferently.Forexample,“socialmediaservices,”“designatedinternet services,”“searchengineservices,”“appdistributionservices,”and“hostingservices”areall separatecategoriesrecognizedbythelawandsubjecttodifferentialobligations.8 Eachprovision oftheactclarifieswhichcategoriesofplatformsitappliesto.Forexample,underPart7 –Cyber AbuseMaterialTargetedatanAustraliaAdult,Section88explainsremovalnoticesonlyasthey applytosocialmediaservices,relevantelectronicservices,ordesignatedinternetservices, Section89explainsremovalnoticesonlyastheyapplytoend-users,andSection90explains removalnoticesonlyastheyapplytohostingserviceproviders.9 Similarly,theEuropeanUnion’s DigitalServicesAct(DSA)prescribesdifferentobligationstodifferentkindsofplatforms.Some
5 Ibid.,17-18.
6 Thee-SafetyBill,2023,I(2)(oo).
7 Thee-SafetyBill,2023,IV(28)(f).
8 AustraliaOnlineSafetyAct,2021,1(5).
9 Ibid.,Part7(88-90).
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obligationsaretargetedat“AllIntermediaries,”butothersimplicate“HostingServices,”“Online Platforms”and“VeryLargeOnlinePlatforms(VLOPs)andVeryLargeOnlineSearchEngines (VLOSEs)”specifically.10ThecategorizationsusedintheAustralianandEuropeanlawsallowfor moretailoredregulationsthatapplytotheparticularfunction,service,andcontentofthe platform.ThePakistanE-SafetyBillfailstocategorizeinthisfashion,however,andprovides vagueregulationsforplatformsrequiringdetailedandspecificregulations.
2. AFlawedRegistrationRegime
InordertooperateinPakistan,theE-SafetyBillsubjectsplatformstoaregistrationobligation. Thisrequirementraisesconcernsaboutthegovernment’sincreasedpowertocontrolcontent, potentiallyusingitasatooltodictatewhatinformationisaccessibletothepublic.This immenseregulatorypoweroverSocialNetworkPlatformsjeopardizesthefundamentalrightto freedomofexpressionandtherighttoinformationguaranteedbyArticle19ofthePakistani ConstitutionandICCPR.
Whileinternationallawdoesnotexplicitlyprohibitaregistrationobligationondigitalplatforms, itsetsastandardthatstatesmustfollowtoensuresucharequirementislegitimate.11 Inorderto doso,thePakistanigovernmentmustprovetheregistrationobligationa)hasa legitimate aim, meaningthattheregistrationrequirementshouldnotbeusedasatooltostifledissent,control information,orcensorcriticalvoices;andb)is necessary and proportionate,meaningthereare nolessrestrictivemeansavailabletoreachsuchaim.Asexplainedbelow,theE-SafetyBillfails bothoftheserequirements.
ThehistoricalmisuseoflegislativemeasuresinPakistanraisessubstantialconcernsthatthe governmentmightemployregistrationrequirementsnotforgenuinesafetypurposes,butasa mechanismtoassertcontrolandstifledissent.Thegovernment’spast actionstakenunderthe PreventionofElectronicCrimesAct2016(PECA)giverisetosuchconcerns.Thisisevidentfrom the2020rulingofIslamabad'sHighCourt,inwhichtheCourthighlightedconcernsthatthe provisionsofPECAwerebeing“misinterpreted by the Pakistani public functionaries or being used in a reckless unprofessional manner to suppress critical journalistic pursuits.”Theimmensepower vestedintheE-SafetyAuthoritytogoverntheseplatforms,coupledwithalackofaclearaimfor thisrequirement,isitselfproofthatthisrequirementisnotlegitimate.
AcomparativeanalysiswithotherjurisdictionsdemonstratesthatthePakistanigovernmenthas failedtoemploylessrestrictivemeans,asrequiredbythesecondcriterionspelledoutabove.By contrast,theEuropeanUnion’sDSAoffersanalternativeapproach.Ratherthanmandating platformregistration,itrequirestheappointmentofalegalrepresentativeforplatforms operatingoutsidetheEU,whichensuresalegalpresencewithoutassociatedphysicalpresence. TheDSAexplicitlyclarifiesthat“the designation of a legal representative within the Union …. shall not constitute an establishment in the Union.”Conversely,AustraliaandtheUKhave charteddifferentpaths.Theirlegislationdoesnotimposeanyregistrationorlegalpresence requirementsononlineplatforms.IntheUK,aplatformregistryexistsforinformational purposes,butitdoesnotburden platformswithadditionalobligations.Thisapproach
10 Regulation(EU)2022/2065oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof19 October2022onaSingleMarket forDigitalServicesandamendingDirective2000/31/EC(DigitalServicesAct)
11 TheUnitedNations(UN)SpecialRapporteuronFreedomofOpinionandExpression,theOrganizationforSecurity andCo-operationinEurope(OSCE)RepresentativeonFreedomoftheMedia,andtheOrganizationofAmerican States(OAS)SpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpression, Joint Declaration On Freedom Of Expression And Elections In The Digital Age,30April2020.
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acknowledgestheimportanceofmaintainingcommunicationswithplatformcompanies withoutundulyinterferingwiththeiroperationsorpressuringthemintodoingagovernment’s bidding.
Ontopoftheregistrationrequirement,adatalocalizationobligationwillfollow.TheDraftData ProtectionBillmandatesthatthesecompaniesprocess"criticalpersonaldata"exclusively withinserversordigitalinfrastructuresituatedinPakistan.However,thisspecializedprocessing addstotheburdenoftheSNPsandintroducessevereprivacyrisks,asitcompelscompaniesto sortandidentifydatafallingunderthiscategorytofulfilltheadditionalrequirements.This obligation,coupledwiththeregistrationrequirement,contradictstheessenceoftheInternet, whichthrivesoninclusivityandthefreeflowofideas,posingasignificantchallengeforPakistan inmaintainingadiversedigitallandscape.Ifthisrequirementgoesthrough,platformsmaynot registerandcouldstopoperatinginPakistanduetothefearofstrictandvaguecontent requirementswhich,ifnotcompliedwith,carrytheriskoffinancialloss,potentiallegaltrouble, andthechanceofimprisonment.Theresultingdepartureof foreignplatformswillreducethe choicesPakistanishavetocommunicateandimpairtheirfreedomofexpressionandaccessto informationrights.
3. UnclearProhibitedContent
TheproposedPakistaniE-SafetyBill,ostensiblyintroducedtosafeguardagainstobjectionable content,raisessignificantconcernsregardingitspotentialimpactonthebedrockofdemocratic societies:freedomofexpression.Itsprovisions,ratherthanofferingclarity,leaveampleroom forsubjectiveinterpretation.Thevaguenessofthebill’sprovisionsexposesacriticalflawinits structureandopensthedoortopotentialmisuseandarbitrarysuppressionofdissentingvoices. Ifpassedinitscurrentform,thisbillposesagenuinethreattotheveryessenceofdemocratic discourseinPakistan.
Oneofthemostalarmingaspectsoftheproposedbillliesinitsvaguedelineationof“prohibited content.”Whiletheintentiontocurtailharmfulcontentisunderstandable,thebill'slanguage leavesmuchtobedesiredintermsofspecificity.Whatconstitutescontent"againsttheIslamic valuesandideologyofPakistan,etc."12 "derogatoryremarksaboutanyreligion,sect, community"isleftopentointerpretation asexemplifiedbytheuseofthevague“etc”in definingwhatcontentisunlawful!13 Thisvaguenessnotonlyundermineslegalclaritybutalso createsadangerousopeningforpotentialabuse.Thelackofcleardefinitionsopensthedoorto arbitrarydecisionsonwhatisdeemedprohibited,potentiallyleadingtothesuppressionof legitimateandconstructivediscourse.
Whilethebillostensiblyseekstomaintainjournalisticintegrity,itsstringentguidelinesfornews andcurrentaffairsprogramsseemtoleanmoretowardsstiflingratherthanupholdingthefree press.Promotingaccuracyandfairnessisanadmirableaspiration,butmandatingitisquite another.Whatisworse,thebill'svaguelanguageprovidesampleroomforsubjective interpretationandpotentialabuse.Therequirementfor“objectivity”inpoliticalanalysisraises concernsaboutstiflingcriticaldiscourseandlimitingthepluralityofperspectivesessentialfora robustdemocraticsociety.Toputitbluntly,whogetstodecidewhatis“objective”inthecontext ofcurrentevents?Additionally,thestipulationtoavoid“gratuitous”detailsinnewscoverage couldbemisconstruedasanattempttosanitizereality,potentiallyunderminingthepublic's
12 Thee-SafetyBill,2023,Chpt.IV.28(a)
13 Thee-SafetyBill,2023,Chpt.IV.28(d)
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righttobeinformedinafullandcompletemanner.This,inturn,hintsataninclinationtoexert undueinfluenceovermedianarratives,whichisdeeplytroublingforanationthatvalues democraticprinciples.
IncontrasttotheproposedPakistaniE-SafetyBill,theUnitedKingdom'sregulationsforuser-touserandsearchservicesoutlinespecificdutiesandsafetymeasures,reflectingamoredetailed approachtocontentmoderation.Serviceprovidersaregivena listofcategoriesofcontentthat childrenarenotallowedtosee,suchascontentthatisabusiveandtargetscharacteristicslike raceandreligion,orcontentthatencouragesviolence.14 Additionally,theUKbillcreates differentobligationsforchildrenasopposedtoadults,whichhighlightsadiscernable commitmenttotheprinciplesprofessedbythebill.15 Specifically,itreinforcesthenotionthat thebillisdesignedtoprotectindividuals.Itwouldmakesensetohaveadifferentregimefor adultsandchildrenwhoseneedsinthiscontextwouldbedifferent. Theseprovisionsaimto ensureuserempowerment,protectcontentofdemocraticimportance,andoffermechanisms forreportingpotentiallyharmfulmaterial.
Thisambiguitynotonlydiminishesthebill'sefficacybutalsoposesatangibleriskofstifling lawfuldissent,asitcouldfacilitatearbitrarycensorshipundertheguiseofsafeguardingsocietal valuesorinstitutions.
Similarlyvagueprovisionsofproposede-safetylegislationinSriLankahavedrawnsignificant internationalcriticism.TheInternationalCommissionofJurists(ICJ)expressedconcernsabout theSriLankanlegislation,whilenotingthat“these clauses are overbroad in that they would encompass expression that is protected under human rights law”. 16 Inviewoftheirsimilarities, thesamecouldbesaidaboutPakistan’sE-SafetyBill.
Insummary,thecurrentdraftoftheproposedPakistaniE-SafetyBillpresentsaconcerninglack ofclarityinitsprohibitionframework.Theambiguitysurroundingprohibitedcontent,especially whencomparedtoothersimilar(albeit,flawed)legislationinothercountries,raisessignificant concernsabouttheimplementationofthisbill.
4. RiskofBroadInterpretationand DiscretionaryEnforcement
TheE-SafetyBillprovidesitsenforcementagency,theE-SafetyAuthority,withbroadpowersto regulateSocialNetworkPlatforms.Thesepowersincludetheauthorizationtoaccess CommunicationDevicesifitreasonablysuspectscontraventionofthebill,conductinspections ofpremises,andsummonpeopleforinquiryatitsdiscretion.17 Inthewakeof Arshad v. Pakistan, thevagueprovisionsoftheE-SafetyBillraisevalidconcernsthattheAuthoritycouldabuseits broadlydefinedpowerstosuppressPakistan’svaluedrightstofreeexpressionandprivacy.
In Arshad v. Pakistan,theIslamabadHighCourtheldthattheFederalInvestigatingAgency(FIA) abuseditspowersunderthePreventionofElectronicCrimesAct2016(PECA2016)by
14 UKOnlineSafetyBill,2023,Chpt.7,Section59
15 UKOnlineSafetyBill,2023,Chpt.2,Section11
16 InternationalCommissionofJurists,”Sri Lanka: Proposed Online Safety Bill would be an assault on freedom of expression, opinion, and information”, 29September2023.Accessibleat:https://www.icj.org/sri-lanka-proposedonline-safety-bill-would-be-an-assault-on-freedom-of-expression-opinion-and-information/
17 Thee-SafetyBill(2023),II(4).
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administeringavaguenoticetosummonArshad,ajournalist.18 TheIslamabadHighCourt determinedthenoticewassentbytheFIAinretaliationforArshad’sworkasajournalist,and heldtheFIAviolatedArshad’srightsunderArticles19and19AoftheConstitutionofPakistan.19 TheCourtalsonotedtherewasarecentincreaseinthenumberofclaimsfiledagainstpublic functionariesforabuseofPECA2016provisions.20 Publicfunctionarieswerewillingtoabusethe provisionsofPECA2016andstrayfromtheproceduresoutlinedbythelaw.TheE-SafetyBill posesanevenmorepotentthreatasitsprovisionscontainfew,ifany,limitationsorprocedural rulestoconstraintheAuthority.TheE-SafetyBill’slackofspecificityregardinghowtheAuthority mayenforcethebillcreatesopportunitiesforabuseofthepowersthebillgrants.
UnliketheE-SafetyBill,theAustralianOnlineSafetyAct,2021limitsthepowerofthe CommissionerbyspecificallyconfiningitsregulatorypowertoClass1andClass2material.The formerconstitutes“materialthatoffendsagainstthestandardsofmorality,decencyand proprietygenerallyacceptedbyreasonableadults,”whilethelatterrelatestomaterials “inappropriateforgeneralpublicaccessandchildrenunder18”respectively.21 ByusingtheClass system,AustraliaprovidesmoreprecisedefinitionsofthekindofonlineharmtheCommissioner hastheauthoritytoregulate.Inaddition,otherprovisionsoftheactlimitthesanctionsthe Commissionercanapplytoeachviolationof theactbasedontheClassofmaterialinquestion. Finally,theAustralianlawalsoincludesexamplesofcontenttheCommissionerdoesnothave powertoregulate.22
TheUnitedKingdom’sOnlineSafetyBillalsocontainssafeguardsagainstbroadinterpretation anddiscretionaryenforcementofitsprovisionsbyofficials.TheUKlegislationrequiresofficials togothroughthecourtsystemtogetawarrantbeforesearchinganypremisesorseizinga device.23 ThisrestrictionofpowercontrastsdrasticallywithPakistan’sprovisionpermittingthe Authoritytoinspectpremisesandsummonpersonsatitsdiscretion.Theseprovisionsof Pakistan’sE-SafetyBillarestrikinglysimilartoprovisionsofSriLanka’sbill,whichhavecome underheavycriticismfromlearnedinternationalexperts.24
5. RetainingAccesstotheServicesofForeign Corporations
ThenumerousissuesfoundwithintheE-SafetyBillincreasethelikelihoodthatforeign corporationswillrefusetoestablishandmaintainapresenceinPakistan.Forexample,theESafetyBillholdsalldirectors,partners,andemployeesofacorporation operatingaSocial NetworkPlatformpersonallyliableforanynoncompliancewiththeprovisionsofthebill.25 Itis easytoimaginethatmanyforeigncorporationswillnotagreetooperateunderthistypeof liabilitybecauseoftheriskofarrestandpunishmentoftheirindividualemployeesinPakistan.If
18 RanaMuhammadArshadv.Pakistan,GlobalFreedomofExpression,ColumbiaUniversity2020,2/5.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid,4/5.
21 ESafetyCommissioner."OnlineContentScheme:RegulatoryGuidance." Online Safety Act,(2021):4.Accessed January28,2024.
22 Ibid.
23 Schedule12Section108,UKOnlineSafetyBill(2023).
24 OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights, Human rights concerns over the two draft laws in Sri Lanka,13 October2023.Accessibleat:https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/10/human-rights-concerns-overtwo-draft-laws-sri-lanka
25 Thee-SafetyBill,2023,VIII(56).
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theE-SafetyBilldetersSocialNetworkPlatformsfromoperatinginPakistan,therewillbefewer sourcesavailabletodisseminateinformationthroughoutthecountryandfewerplatformsfor thePakistanipeopletoexpresstheirthoughts.Theselimitations willimpacttheabilityof citizenstoexercisetheirrightstofreedomofexpressionandaccesstoinformation.26
Conversely,theEuropeanUnion’sDigitalServiceActrequirestheCommissionandBoardto implementonlineindustryregulationsthroughcodesofconduct.27 TheDSAsuggeststhe Commissionconsultswithverylargeonlineplatformswithintheregulatedindustry,othervery largeonlineplatforms,providersofintermediaryservices,civilsocietyorganizations,andother interestedpartieswhenthecodesofconductraiseconcernsforsignificantsystemicrisk.28
UnlikethePakistanE-SafetyBill,theDSAstatestheCommissionandBoardmustaccountforthe needsofallinterestedparties.29 ThePakistanDigitalEditorsAlliance(PDEA)requeststhe Pakistanigovernmentmakesimilarinquiriesand“holdmulti-stakeholderengagementwith membersoftech,media,ande-commerceindustriesforinformativediscussionsandfeedback beforepassinganylawontheregulationofdigitalmediaanddataprotection.”30
Conclusion
Basedonthisevaluationandcomparativeanalysis,thePakistanigovernmentshouldwithdraw theE-SafetyBill.Numeroussectionsofthebill,includingtheProhibitedContentandthePowers andFunctionsoftheAuthority,areambiguousandsubjecttoabuse.Inaddition,thebilldoes notconformwithinternationallaworemergingglobalbestpractices.Thebillventuresfar outsidethescopeofanylegitimateaimtoreasonablyrestrictonlinecontentandfailsto narrowlytailornecessaryandproportionate regulations.
Thebill'sregistrationrequirementanddatalocalizationobligationsgrantexcessivecontrolto thegovernment,potentiallydeterringforeigncorporationsandlimitingthediversityofonline platformsavailabletoPakistanicitizens.Thevaguedelineationofprohibitedcontentfurther compoundstheseissues,leavingroomforsubjectiveinterpretationandincreasingtheriskof abuse.Withoutclearlimitationsandproceduralsafeguards,thebroadpowersgrantedtotheESafetyAuthorityraiseseriousconcernsaboutpotentialmisuse,echoingpastinstancesof governmentaloverreach.Correspondingly,thePakistanigovernmentshouldwithdrawtheESafetyBillfromconsiderationandstartwithanewapproachthatputsrespectforthe Constitutionandinternationalhumanrightslawfrontandcenter.
26 Similarprovisionshavecomeunderscrutiny.Forexample,theproposedSriLankaOnlineSafetyBillraisesa similarconcern.Itsprovisionspotentiallycriminalizenearlyallformsoflegitimateexpression,resultinginachilling effectonthefreedomofexpression.TheAsiaInternetCoalitions(AIC)wentasfarascallingthebill“draconian”for itsrestrictiveimpactonpublicdebateandtheexchangeofideas.
27 Article35(1),DigitalServicesAct,(2022).
28 DigitalServicesAct,2022,Article35(2).
29 Ibid.,Article35(3).
30 "PDEA Alarmed over Cabinet Approving Bills on Online Media Regulation, Data Protection.",PakistanDigitalEditor's Alliance.July28,2023.Accessibleat:https://pdea.pk/2023/07/28/pdea-alarmed-over-cabinet-approving-bills-ononline-media-regulation-data-protection/.
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