Theories of IR preview

SIXTH EDITION

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EDITED BY

RICHARD DEVETAK JACQUI TRUE

Theories of International Relations Sixth edition Richard Devetak (Ed.) Jacqui True (Ed.) Scott Burchill Andrew Linklater Jack Donnelly Terry Nardin

Matthew Paterson Christian Reus-­Smit André Saramago Toni Haastrup Alina Sajed

About the Editors and Authors Richard Devetak (ed.) is Professor at the University of Queensland, Australia. He is the author of Critical International Theories: An Intellectual History (Oxford University Press 2018) and a number of publications on international intellectual history.

Jacqui True (ed.) is Professor of International Relations, Director of the Gender, Peace and Security Centre at Monash University, Victoria, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. Her recent books include Violence Against Women: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press 2021) and The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security (Oxford University Press 2019).

Scott Burchill is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia.

He has also taught at Monash University, the University of Melbourne and the University of Tasmania.

His most recent book is Misunderstanding International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan 2020).

Jack Donnelly is the Andrew Mellon Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies and Distinguished University Professor at the University of Denver, Colorado. He works principally in the areas of international relations theory and international human rights.

Toni Haastrup is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics in History, Heritage and Politics at the University of Stirling, Scotland. Her work seeks to understand prevailing global power hierarchies that inform cooperation and conflict within the international system drawing on critical feminist theorizing.

Andrew Linklater is Emeritus Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. He is a member of the Academy of Social Science and a fellow of the British Academy and Learned Society of Wales.

Terry Nardin is Professor of Politics at Yale-NUS College in Singapore.

Matthew Paterson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Manchester and Research Director of the Sustainable Consumption Institute. His research focuses on the political economy, global governance and cultural politics of climate change.

Christian Reus-Smit is Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. His recent books include International Relations: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2020) and On Cultural Diversity (Cambridge University Press 2018).

Alina Sajed is Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. She is the author of Postcolonial Encounters in International Relations. The Politics of Transgression in the Maghreb (Routledge, 2013), and the co-editor (with Randolph Persaud) of Race, Gender, and Culture in International Relations (Routledge 2018).

André Saramago is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Portugal. He is a Fellow of the Norbert Elias Foundation, Netherlands. His research interests focus on critical international theory, historical sociology and the relation between ecology and world politics. xi

Preface to the 6th Edition We are grateful to Andrew Linklater and Scott Burchill who encouraged us to take on the editorship of Theories of International Relations after their leadership of the volume from the outset and across five editions. It has been very rewarding for both our careers to be part of Theories, and we remain indebted to Andrew Linklater in particular for recruiting us early on to the project when we were postgraduate students. Our involvement in the volume tracks both of our careers in the field of International Relations, our respective movements to and from the Southern and Northern hemispheres, and attempts to grapple with the change and continuity in world politics across the twenty-five years since the first edition was published. While they are not representative by any means, we take our own experiences of shifting our research focus and undertaking new intellectual projects as reflecting the changes in the International Relations discipline and the ongoing quest to understand the political world in which we live.

Like earlier editions, this one presents rigorous, fair and detailed accounts of the theories currently animating the discipline. In this regard, we continue a twenty-five-year tradition of Theories of International Relations while updating and refreshing the volume for a new generation. Theories of International Relations was the first text in the discipline to provide a systematic, cutting-edge survey of theories, including post-positivist and critical theories. The volume originally emanated from Australia, though with a multinational authorship. This edition further diversifies that authorship and the theories included, since International Relations is a dynamic field with both new and enduring theoretical perspectives and themes.

In this edition we are very pleased to include two new chapters and scholars, ‘Institutionalism’

by Toni Haastrup and ‘Postcolonialism’ by Alina Sajed. We are influenced by and committed to the global IR project, as outlined by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Antje Wiener, Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith, and others. How could we not be, given that Theories emanated from ‘down under’, to coin a colloquialism for Australia and New Zealand, the settler-colonial states at the antipodes of the historical centres of IR scholarship in Europe and North America.

Understanding the variety of contexts and perspectives in which knowledge is formed remains a vital task of IR theory.

We are grateful also to fellow authors who have been part of the Theories of IR project across several editions, all of whom are eminent scholars and experienced teachers immersed in the study of international relations. Finally, we must acknowledge the conditions under which this edition was prepared. The COVID-19 global pandemic generated a global health crisis the likes of which have not been seen in over a century. If the salience of IR theory was not already evident, the COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder of the need to think theoretically about the things that matter to humanity and the planet, especially at the level of the international and the global.

We look forward to feedback from students and scholars in the field, which is essential to keeping theoretical debates alive, and motivates us to continue the tradition of theorizing in the field of International Relations.

Richard Devetak Jacqui True xii

REALISM

JACK DONNELLY

2

Political realism – Realpolitik, power politics – is a venerable tradition, going back at least to Thucydides’ History relating to the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bce). Realism has also been central to the academic study of international relations (IR) for most of the twentieth century. Serious students should not only acquire an appreciation of political realism but also understand how their own views relate to the realist tradition.

Although I am not a realist, I am not an anti-realist either. Realism, I will argue, is a limited yet important approach to (and set of insights about) some parts of IR. This chapter focuses on the variety of contemporary realist theories.

I begin by defining realism – or, rather, the range of positions commonly encountered under that rubric – and then, as a concrete example of realist theory in action, look briefly at American realist responses to the rise of China. To provide depth to the argument that realism is a diverse tradition that nonetheless has a certain character or style, the following section looks at leading examples of three types of realism while also highlighting four widely shared emphases. The next to last section focuses on the variety of senses of ‘theory’ employed within the realist tradition (and adds additional depth to the discussions of structural and neo-classical realism, the two most prominent strands of the tradition today). The chapter concludes by emphasizing the centrality of fear and uncertainty in realist arguments – and thus the variable relevance of realism as the world more or less closely resembles a largely lawless international system dominated by a concern for survival.

Key Concept: Anarchy Literally, the absence of rule or a ruler. Anarchy, understood as absence of an international government, demarcates IR from domestic politics. Much of IR theory can be seen as a debate over the best strategies for dealing with the problems posed by anarchy – especially the possibilities of creating

rule-governed international order: governance in the absence of a government. Realists are characteristically pessimistic about accomplishing more than mitigating some of the worst consequences of anarchy, especially in security relations among great powers.

Defining Realism Although definitions of realism differ in detail (see Donnelly 2000: 6–9; Cusack and Stoll 1990: ch. 2), they share a clear family resemblance. For example, William Wohlforth (2008: 133) and Jack Donnelly (2008: 150) in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations present realism as 19

20 Theories of International Relations

a theory rooted in groupism (politics takes place within and between groups), egoism (when individuals and groups act politically, they are driven principally by narrow self-interest), and anarchy (the absence of an international government). The intersection of groupism and egoism in an environment of anarchy, realists argue, makes IR, regrettably, largely a politics of power and security.

Similarly, Robert Gilpin (1996: 7–8), a leading realist author of the last third of the twentieth century, presents realism as grounded in three fundamental propositions. The basic unit of social and political affairs is the ‘conflict group’. States are motivated primarily by their national interest.

Power relations are a fundamental feature of international affairs.

John Mearsheimer, who is perhaps the best-known academic realist today, presents a similar list of five core realist propositions. (1994/95: 9–10) The international system is anarchic. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability. The most basic motive driving states is survival. States are instrumentally rational.

Few ‘non-realists’, however, would deny that anarchy, egoism and power are central to IR. These characteristically ‘realist’ features are not distinctively ‘realist’; they do not demarcate ‘realist’ from ‘non-realist’. Furthermore, terms like ‘primarily’, ‘largely’, ‘most basic’ and ‘fundamental’ obscure exactly what (or how much) is being claimed. This does not, however, make ‘realism’ an empty or confused category. Realism is a complex and diverse family of perspectives, theories and arguments that are regularly employed in IR in patterned ways.

Three broad types of realist theories are commonly encountered today. Classical realism gives roughly equal emphasis to the anarchic structure of IR (i.e. the absence of an international government) and the egoism of political actors. Structural realism (also known as neo-realism) argues that the anarchic structure of international politics compels the priority of the pursuit of power even from those who might prefer otherwise. Neo-classical realism starts with structure (defined by anarchy [absence of international government] and polarity [the number of great powers in a system]) but seeks more fully developed analyses by adding additional features such as domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making.

In addition, two substantive bodies of realist thought are commonly encountered. Offensive realism, championed especially by John Mearsheimer, argues that states, because they can never be certain that even currently friendly states will not turn against them in the future, seek to maximize their power. In an older idiom, great powers are ‘revolutionary’ or ‘revisionist’ powers seeking to move up, and if possible dominate, the power hierarchy. Defensive realism, associated especially with Kenneth Waltz, holds that rational states in anarchy are principally concerned with retaining (rather than improving) their relative power position. Great powers, in other words, tend to be ‘status quo’ powers.

Although Mearsheimer (2001: ch. 1) argues that offensive realism is the best or most authentic version of realism, most contemporary realists (and nearly all non-realists) see this as an empirical rather than a theoretical issue. Some states, as a matter of fact, are status quo powers. Others are revisionists. And a defensive realist world of status quo great powers (which is far less dangerous than a world filled with revisionist states always striving to improve their position) can persist for generations (e.g. in Europe over most of the century following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815).

Realism 21

Box 2.1 Realists Responses to the Rise of China Many realists have weighed in on how to respond to China’s rise as a great power. Although they all see increasing conflict between the United States and China over the coming decades, there are important differences in realist assessments.

Mearsheimer paints a bleak picture. ‘To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully’ (2010: 382).

This, he argues, is rooted in the fundamental character of anarchic international systems. ‘The best way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much more powerful than all the other states in the system … the ideal situation for any great power is to be the hegemon in the system’ (2010: 397. Cf. 2001: 21). And there is no reason to believe that this is not China’s preferred position.

Although global hegemony is out of China’s reach, regional hegemony is a (not un)realistic aspiration that seems consistent with the self-image of China’s rulers and population. This, however, means overturning the existing American-dominated regional security order. And there is no reason to imagine that the United States, which has long arrogated to itself a special regional and global status (2010: 385–387), will accept a fundamental transformation of the regional order.

Conflict thus seems inescapable. And such conflict can easily become violent, both because of the high stakes (hegemony) and the particulars of the Sino-American rivalry. (2010: 391–393).

China has a variety of vital interests potentially worth fighting for. (There are few more compelling geopolitical interests than control over one’s borders.) China’s hand is strengthened by the fact that America’s European allies have few vital interests in the region. And despite China’s central role in the global economy, Mearsheimer argues that ‘economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other’ (2010: 393). Mearsheimer thus concludes: ‘international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. And there is little doubt that there is one on the horizon’ (2010: 396).

One obvious problem with this argument is that it does not consider the responses of threatened states. If, as realists argue (see below), the fundamental logic of anarchic IR is balancing power against power, then a Chinese move towards

regional hegemony will provoke a near-­universal anti-hegemonic alliance. Therefore, China, knowing that it will meet such a response and uncertain about its ability to overcome it, may opt for nonviolent transformations that leave it short of hegemony. This would, at the very least, reduce the likelihood of war (by reducing the stakes for both the United States and China).

Stephen Walt responds to this argument by emphasizing the collective action problems that are likely to be encountered in creating and maintaining such an anti-hegemonic alliance. (2018: 26–27). In addition to the ordinary problems of free-riding (i.e. contributing less than one’s share in the hope that others, who also depend on the good, will make up the difference), there are also lingering historical animosities, especially between Japan and South Korea. In addition, China’s neighbours are pulled in the opposite direction by their extensive economic ties with China. (I would add that the apparent unreliability of the United States, evidenced by the Trump administration, is a further problem of considerable significance.)

Walt thus also concludes that ‘realism offers a gloomy forecast for the future of Sino-American relations and the future of Asian security’ (2018: 28). But, he adds, although ‘the potential for trouble is growing’ (2018: 29) peaceful balancing may be possible.

This also is the conclusion of America’s bestknown realist, Henry Kissinger, who subtitles his article ‘The Future of U.S.–Chinese Relations’ ‘Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity’ (2012). Like many other classical realists, Kissinger argues that sound diplomacy, based on a recognition of the ‘realities’ of IR, can make the world a somewhat less dangerous, and sometimes actually quite liveable, place (at least for those with the power to protect their vital national interests).

There is no single realist position on this (or any other) substantive issue of IR. There is, however, a clear realist sensibility that focuses on the problems posed by rising powers in a states system lacking an international government – and the impediments to effective international cooperation, especially in security affairs, posed both by the need of each state to take care of itself and by the pressure to see other states as not merely rivals but (actual or potential) enemies.

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Exemplary Realist Arguments Those interested in starting with a concrete example of realist theory in action should first read the text box on the rise of China (Box 2.1). This section emphasizes both the variety of realist arguments and the fact that they nonetheless share certain common features. In particular, it looks briefly at examples of leading classical and structural realist theories (Thomas Hobbes and Kenneth Waltz) and introduces neo-classical realism – while also drawing attention to four characteristic arguments made by realists of varying stripes.

The Hobbesian State of Nature Chapter 13 of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, published in 1651, provides an unusually clear and influential classical realist model based on three simple assumptions. (1) Men are equal. The gendered language reflects standard seventeenth-century usage. We might, however, see the analysis – particularly Hobbes’ assumptions about the overriding motives of ‘men’ – as more deeply gendered, reflective of a particular masculinist perspective (see (Tickner 1988) and [cross reference to True chapter]); (2) They interact in the absence of a government; (3) They are driven by competition, diffidence and glory. The conjunction of these conditions, Hobbes argues, leads to a war of all against all.

To strip away the effects of social convention and get at ‘the natural condition of mankind’ (which is the title of the chapter), Hobbes employs the analytical device of the state of nature, an imagined pre-social condition that states in IR resemble in important ways. Men, Hobbes argues, are naturally equal. (Even ‘the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others’ (par. 1). ‘From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends’ (par. 3). Each of us, considering ourselves at least as good as everyone else, expects to have at least as much as anyone else. Scarcity, however, makes this impossible. The resulting frustration generates enmity; a desire to ‘destroy, or subdue one another’ (par.

3) – which leads to fear and uncertainty.

In addition to being fearful, men, Hobbes argues, are also naturally competitive and vain. ‘In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, makes men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation’ (par. 6–7). Hobbes then specifies the environment in which such men interact: it is anarchic, in the literal sense of lacking a government (without ‘archy’, rule). They ‘live without a common Power to keep them all in awe’ (par. 8).

This conjunction of anarchy, egoism, and equality, Hobbes argues, inescapably creates a state of war ‘of every man against every man. For WAR, consists not in Battle only … but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary’ (par. 8). In the absence of a government, any conflict readily degenerates into violence. And with prosperity, freedom, and even survival on the line, preparing for the worst is the only reasonable course. Therefore, ‘every man is Enemy to every man’ (par. 9) – not because they are particularly evil, but because equal, selfish, fearful and vain men in anarchy cannot reasonably see one another as anything other than an enemy (if not now, then in the future).

Hobbes, of course, recognizes another side to human nature. There are ‘passions that incline men to Peace … Fear of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them’ (par. 14). We also have reason, which ‘suggests

Realism 23

convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement’ (par. 14). In the absence of enforcement, though, agreements are fragile, making cooperation risky – and thus rare.

And Hobbes argues that, at least outside of society, the passions that incline us to peace are less powerful than those that incline us to enmity (and, in anarchy, war).

The state of nature is regularly ‘escaped’ by the creation of society. But societies – states, in contemporary IR – are left in a similar situation. And those states, both by inclination and driven by the pressures of anarchy, act principally out of fear and a desire for gain, making IR, many realists argue, very similar to the Hobbesian state of nature.

Waltzian Structural Realism Structural realists, rather than appealing to human nature as classical realists do, make a few assumptions about states – typically, that they seek survival and security above all other concerns.

This focuses attention on how international anarchy (the absence of an international government) compels such states, whatever their other interests and internal differences, to behave in patterned ways. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, dominated academic IR well into the 1990s and remains today the most influential work in the discipline.

Key Concept: Levels of Analysis Degrees of abstraction – or, in the case of social political levels, degrees of aggregation or disaggregation. In IR it is common to distinguish individual, state and international/system levels.

(Additional sub-national and supranational levels

seem necessary to comprehend globalization.)

Explanations that rely on factors at, for example, the individual level (e.g. leadership psychology) will be very different than those at, say, the system level (e.g. the balance of power).

Waltz cast his theory at the level of the international system. Abstracting from the particular characteristics of states and individuals, he sought to explain ‘a few big and important things’ about IR (1986: 329) and the ‘striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’ (1979: 66) solely through the structure of international systems.

Political structures, Waltz (1979: ch. 5) argues, are defined by their ordering principle, functional differentiation and distribution of capabilities. An ordering principle establishes how authority is allocated in the system. Political actors, Waltz argues, either stand in relations of super- and subordination or they do not. He labels these ordering principles hierarchy and anarchy and argues that national political systems are hierarchic and international political systems are anarchic.

Political structures are also defined by how functions are allocated; by the division of political labour. In hierarchic systems, one’s place in the hierarchy and one’s functions (roles) are closely interrelated. Functional differentiation, however, requires actors to depend on one another to perform their assigned tasks. In anarchy, Waltz argues, such dependence is too risky. Each state instead must ‘put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so’ (1979: 107). Therefore, ‘national politics consists of differentiated units performing specified functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities’ (1979: 97).

The distribution of capabilities among the actors is the third element of Waltzian political structures. If all international systems are, by definition, anarchic and if anarchic orders have minimal