Issuu

HSEQ

page 12

KNOW SHARING

page 19

TECH & INNOV

page 34

NewsLetter Content Manager’s Corner ......... 2 Health, Safety, Environment and Quality .................... 3 Vetting ......................... 20 Security......................... 25 Fleet group Management ............... 26 Regulatory .................... 29 Crewing......................... 30 Procurement ............... 31 Technology & Innovation ................. 33 MT in the Media ........... 35 Congratulatory ............. 36 Out of the blue ............ 37 Appendices .................. 38

MT IN THE MEDIA

page 35

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Manager’s Corner by Shashank Jahagirdar Dear Colleagues, It feels great to see engagement and enthusiasm amongst our colleagues onboard and ashore after MTTO newsletter was reinstated. Your feedback helps us raise our own bar so please continue to share your thoughts. It is engagement like these which re-emphases that our team fully understands and lives up to the new Purpose.

Though many international organizations declared seafarers as essential or key workers, there have been very limited involvement from individual seafaring nations for providing vaccinations to seafarers on priority. Our management team continues to engage with concern authorities and are taking up the initiative to get our seafarers vaccinated on priority.

Time flies as we see 1st quarter of 2021 coming to an end. The new crewing team settled down in short time, surprising all of us with their dedication and passion towards our seafarers. Right from onboarding to working with new faces virtually & implementing Compas, they have proved that nothing is impossible if you have the right attitude and willingness to take up challenges.

We will go live with our new marine travel partner ATPI in near future. ATPI group is one of the leading travel partners in the world, especially in marine travels. ATPI’s expertise in marine travels will not only help us sustain cost leadership but we are confident that shift to ATPI will bring efficiencies in travel bookings for our seafarers. Project Team & Crewing operations are working together to ensure smooth transition.

The fierce spread of COVID has indeed worsened the situation for crewing operations but we are operating at full throttle as we understand our seafarers have been making huge personal sacrifices throughout this pandemic. We recognize them as our unsung heroes who are playing a vital role in keeping global trade routes open and it is this realization that drives our team to do better every day in arranging timely relief.

The physical health concerns that follow COVID-19, for seafarers onboard or transiting between their vessel and home, as well as for their families can cause an increase in overall anxiety. Many of these risks can be mitigated with the stringent application of health, hygiene, and social distancing guidelines widely available. However, the uncertainty of the situation, extended time away from friends and family, fears for one’s own and family’s safety and wellbeing can also cause an increase in stress and anxiety and have a compounding effect on one’s mental, emotional and physical wellbeing. Times like this highlight how crucial it is that we come together and reflect on how we can take good care of our mental health and support each other.

Amid raging second wave of COVID, our crewing team is successfully performing crew changes by liaising with concern authorities. Many countries are tightening the security and air travel restriction continue to increase. COVID test requirement is dynamic, and airlines/port/countries are revising the requirement after seeing daily increase in COVID cases. Team is keeping our seafarers updated on latest developments and planning logistics after a thorough check. This is to ensure seafarer does not face any hassle during travel.

We acknowledge and appreciate our seafarer’s resilience during these difficult times. We request all our seafarers to continue to keep their mental/physical health and safety as priority. We wish to see you leave your home with a smile and come back to your family with a smile. Together we can make the difference so let us continue to work with same spirit which is in line with our new Purpose.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Health, Safety, Environment and Quality By Prasenjit Mohanta There was 03 recordable personal injury under LTI submitted Fleet Wide during March 2021. At the end of March 2021 MT safety performance (12 months rolling) was as follows:

LTIF

12 months rolling 0.49 LTI

LTIF

1.08

LTI

TRCF

0.84

TRCF

1.90

TRC

YTD March 2021

During March 2021 - 5 external audits (ISM/ISPS/MLC) were conducted on board our fleet vessels. Shore management vessel visits – as part of our commitment to visible leadership, we shall be publishing a list of vessels visited by shore management each month. Below virtual visits were undertaken during March 2021. Umesh Shinde

Maersk Caelum

02-Mar

Madhav Kamath

Maersk Stratus

08-Mar

Madhav Kamath

Roy Maersk

09-Mar

Robert Elliot

NightCrawler, Ex-Bro Designer

22-Mar

Shashank Jahagirdar

Robert Maersk

26-Mar

Datharam Puttheguthu

Eva Maersk

27-Mar

Janus Auken

Bro Nibe

31-Mar

Peter Hawkin

Maersk Mediterranean

31-Mar

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Incidents

INC-8KQ-21-2

Bro Agnes

01/03/2021

Incidents

Overboard pollution by yard / FERROL shipyard

INC-O43-21-1

Maersk Erik

02/03/2021

Incidents

RBD Palm oil on deck

ACC-O43-21-1

Maersk Erik

04/03/2021

Accident

IP got hit by frame on the deck during darkness time and fell down on deck toward his left-hand side.

ACC-O46-21-1

Romoe Maersk

04/03/2021

Accident

IP got hurt with twisted ankle during laying mooring lines.

INC-A5B-21-1

Maersk Capri

05/03/2021

Incidents

Cargo Spill from Terminal at Tampico Mexico

ACC-U65-21-1

Maersk Kara

08/03/2021

Accident

IP suffered injury in the area close to his right ear as he fainted in E/R workshop and hit his head.

INC-KB4-21-2

Maersk Maru

11/03/2021

Incidents

Windlass damage during anchoring operation in bad weather.

ACC-KB4-21-1

Maersk Maru

12/03/2021

Accident

IP got injured resulting to fractured wrist while working on the mooring winch for shifting of ropes.

ACC-KH4-21-1

Henriette Maersk

14/03/2021

Accident

IP while playing basketball twisted his knee.

ACC-4ZQ-21-1

Bro Nyborg

15/03/2021

Accident

IP while climbing the ladder on a windy day hit his head against the mast ladder.

ACC-5Q8-21-4

Maersk Mediterranean

16/03/2021

Accident

IP while preparing surface for painting stepped on coiled hose lost his balance and fell down.

ACC-198-21-1

Maersk Kate

16/03/2021

Accident

IP while making an attempt to stop the hatch from impact and tried to grab it but his hand got caught between the hatch and coming.

INC-5ZQ-21-1

Bro Nibe

25/03/2021

Incidents

Entering Danish Territorial Waters for anchoring without Pilot

INC-L06-21-4

Hammerhead

30/03/2021

Incidents

Port side Main engine (Azi pull) stopped suddenly.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

BRO AGNES – 01ST MARCH 2021 Overboard pollution by yard / FERROL shipyard Description/Sequence of events: At 12:05 on 1st March 2021 it was noticed that oil traces were there overboard (starboard side), same was immediately informed to the yard safety representative. Investigation After investigation was discovered that yard workers open diesel line on deck and drain directly to the ship main deck 1-2 ltrs of diesel. Due to heavy rain all oil flow with rain overboard. The vessel protected by floating booms around all the time. The oil was contained by the oil fence rigged around the vessel and subsequently cleaned by Yard. Underlaying / Root Cause:  The shipyard personnel dismantled one pipe without informing the crew promptly.  Language barrier could have played a role in this incident.  Inadequate coordination between the shipyard personnel and the vessels crew. Shipyard personnel

did not inform the vessel crew and let the residual oil drain on deck. Recommendation:  Yard Manager assigned to the vessel must be present during coordination meeting and all plans for the day to be discussed in details.  The scope of work on daily basis must be discussed on regular basis during the coordination meeting.



Shipyard personnel on the other hand must notify the crew/officers if there is any pipe/or equipment to be dismantled. Extra ordinary meeting was held by the Master in the presence of all crew Officers emphasizing to be observant on the actions of the Yard personnel as obviously they are not keen on talking to crew likely due to language barrier.

MAERSK ERIK – 02ND MARCH 2021 RDB Palm oil spill on deck Description and sequence of events. On March 02, 2021 while Discharging various grades of vegetable oil cargoes at Taman, Russia, Cargo of RBD Palm Oil spilled on deck from slop line drain valve. Investigation The investigation into the incident has been conducted by the Master and the Marine Superintendent of the Maersk Erik. This has included a combination of review of near misses, document analysis, interviews and witness statements. Findings:  The valve and hydrant cap of Slop Line drain were inadvertently opened and not checked.  Failure to warn - There was no marking/stencil on the drain line indicating that it’s a drain for the cargo line.  Proper Risk Assessment and job plan for which all hydrants are to be opened and reported was missing.  Inadequate compliance with company procedures. 06.404.01 - Cargo Operation Planning & Execution was not followed or executed, which states “Before, during and on completion of any cargo and deslopping operations, there are defined requirements for physical cross-checking of cargo system and line settings by at least two responsible deck officers. These checks shall include the settings of all valves, blanks, vents and over-boards; to verify their correct positioning according to the cargo plan;” Cargo system /

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Valves settings were not checked commencement of cargo operations.

prior

Immediate cause  Adverse weather conditions – As preparation for sub-zero conditions. Lines were to be drained, so as to avoid damage to ship’s equipment. However, wrong valve was opened.  Failure to secure – Slop line cargo drain valve and hydrant cap were not secured.  Inadequate warning system - There was no identification on the slop cargo line drain.  Failure to follow rules and regulations – Cargo system / Valves were not checked prior to commencement cargo operations.  Failure to follow rules and regulations – Two man check not completed.

Recommendation:  Extraordinary Safety Meeting was held discussing the incident.  Drain valve was marked on deck and all other markings on the vessel to be checked to avoid any inadvertent opening of valves to avoid recurrence.  Chief officer to prepare and share a detailed Risk Assessment for Winter precautions for review by Marine Superintendent.  A Refresher training to be done and recorded for all deck-crew and the checklist of pre-cargo operation checks and contents of ShipNet ID 06.404.01 discussed. Lesson learnt  Risk awareness of inadvertent opening of wrong valves, while preparing the vessel for operation.  Importance of marking/stencilling of equipment on deck.  Importance of through 2-man check while lining up for vessel operations. MAERSK ERIK – 04TH MARCH 2021 Personal Injury due to fall on deck

Underlying and root cause:  Inadequate Leadership and/ or supervision – Improper or insufficient delegation – Two Man check as required by 06.404.01 were not performed.  Inadequate Leadership and /or supervision during adverse weather conditions – Risk Assessment and risk awareness that other valves and mitigation not done.  Inadequate maintenance - There was no identification/ marking on the slop cargo line drain.  Improper Motivation – Inadequate disciplineCargo system / Valves were not checked prior to commencement cargo operations.  Improper Motivation – Inadequate discipline – Two man check not completed.

Description and sequence of events. On March 04, 2021 around 0500 Hrs Lt while Discharging cargo at Taman, Russia, IP fell on deck and suffered Comminuted fracture of the radius of the arm with displacement. Investigation The investigation into the incident has been conducted by the Master and the Marine Superintendent of the Maersk Erik. This has included a combination of review of near misses, document analysis, interviews and witness statements. Findings:  IP went on deck, taking good initiative to check the progress of work and cargo parameters after his watch. However, the risk awareness was inadequate.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

 IP went on deck at hours of darkness and outside of catwalk/safety walkway without any personal communication or illumination device.  Slippery deck – due to the presence of morning dew/condensation and possibly minor residue of palm oil cargo originating from the cargo tank squeezing activity two days prior to the incident.

Recommendation:  Extraordinary Safety Meeting was held with the crew and the incident was discussed to avoid recurrence.  IP completed the below safety refresher trainings, 0001 Personal Safety. 0002 Ship General Safety.  Rapid Fleet Notification shared with the fleet vessels.  Safety Alert on this accident will be shared with the fleet as part of Learning from Incidents. Lesson learnt  Hazard awareness and adequate attention to surroundings are key to prevent accidents  Moving on deck with elevated longitudinal frames is unsafe, especially during the hours of darkness and should not be allowed  Only safety walkways should be used for movement on deck, unless a particular tasks requires to go across decks. ROMOE MAERSK – 04TH MARCH 2021 Personal injury while handling mooring ropes

Immediate cause

Description and sequence of events. Personal injury with twisted ankle during laying mooring lines out on deck as part of arrival preparations for Port of Vitoria.

 Improper position of task - Improper use of catwalks/safety passages, not carrying personal illumination device during the hours of darkness.  Environmental conditions – Presence of morning dew and condensation on deck, making it slippery. Underlying and root cause:  Inadequate mental/ psychological capability – Poor judgement. IP went on deck during the hours of darkness outside safety walkway and without personal illumination and communication device.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Immediate cause: A momentarily failure to observe surroundings before taking next step was identified as root cause. Underlying and Root cause:  Lack of awareness.  Supervision in adequate.  Latent hazard not identified not understood

7. Continue Knowledge sharing & training during meetings/drills and exercises onboard about First aid, various injuries and its symptoms and actions to take. 8. Also please continue encouraging ship staff to observe various SMS safety tools to identify and report such issues. MAERSK CAPRI – 05TH MARCH 2021

Recommendations: To avoid recurrence, vessel has carried out a safety meeting and following was discussed with all crew to create awareness. 1. Discussed industry(Club/Class) documents on Slips trip falls with all crew members on board and also discussed safe methods to move about ship. 2. Few examples were discussed such as There could be particular challenges for example when tank cleaning veg oil tanks which may make the deck much more slippery than usual. A small thought during tool box meetings given to safe movement on board goes a long way to remind everyone to take care of their own safety. 3. It’s worth noting the comment at the end of one of attachments, “None of this is exactly ‘rocket science’; all might be thought of as simple seamanship and common sense, but the Club’s statistics confirm time and time again the absence of these precautions, and simple human carelessness, between them, really do cause enormous amounts of human misery and heavy claims.” 4. Briefed all crew about the important barriers (Tool box meeting, RA, briefing, PTW, company procedures, supervision, debriefing, etc) that should be used to avoid incidents accidents on board. 5. All crew were advised to follow safe working practices at all times and strictly comply to the company PPE requirements as per the PPE matrix. 6. Timely reporting of such occurrences/injury, etc during transit/travel during embarkation/disembarkation of the vessel or onboard so that appropriate corrective measures can be taken or arrange a doctor visit in cases of injury.

Cargo spill from terminal Description and sequence of events. On March 05, 2021 around 0500 Hrs Lt while terminal personnel startd loosing nuts to remove blind from cargo arm. Same time Vessel personnel noted small dipping of cargo from the arm. After few second dipping stopped and Terminal personnel continue to release nuts to remove blind. Suddenly cargo start spraying around from loading arm, as blind was slack. Alarm sounded..

Immediate cause:  According Pemex information, this spill was caused by an air bubble inside the loading arm. Underlying and Root cause: The incident is purely due to shores fault and the vessel has no involvement to the cause of the spillage. Estimated amount of cargo spilled on terminal 2040ltrs

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Recommendations: At every loading/discharging port, all draining of the loading arm will be suggested to be done at shore side or at drip tray onboard. It will be depressurized to make sure there is no pressure trapped on the line. MAERSK KARA – 08TH MARCH 2021 Repairman fainted in ER workshop Description and sequence of events. On 8th March 2021 at 09:30LT one of the engineer reported that Repairman fainted in E/R workshop and hit his head to the corner of the grinder's support frame. He suffered injury in the area close to his right ear. Immediately compresses applied to stop the bleeding. His face was washed with water and he become conscious. Injured person moved to ship's hospital where his wound was cleaned and bandage applied.

any signs of alcohol or drug intoxication. Also, was not carrying out any heavy tasks/lifts. He was preparing to do some maintenance around the ER bottom platform, came up to the workshop to grab some tools and lost consciousness at that point. Condition including blood pressure and temperature was normal. First aid of cleaning and dressing the wound was done onbd. There was no requirement of radio medical advise or doctor visit. On further queries, repairman responded as below:  He had similar fainting at home once, but very long time ago (10 or 15 yrs ago).  He is not taking any kind of medicines regularly for any known health issues. As a precaution, condition was monitored for next few days. No abnormalities observed. The wound healed by first aid and continues to do normal tasks. MAERSK MARU – 11TH MARCH 2021 Damage to the windlass

Immediate cause:  Reason for fainting was unknown. it was just beginning of the day after rested weekend. Person was not showing any signs of alcohol or drug intoxication. Also, was not carrying out any heavy tasks/lifts. He was preparing to do some maintenance around the ER bottom platform, came up to the workshop to grab some tools and lost consciousness at that point. Comments from marine assurance: Reason for fainting was unknown. it was just beginning of the day after rested weekend. Person was not showing

Description and sequence of events. Vessel was in ballast anchored at Rotterdam anchorage n5, at port anchor with 9 shackles on deck when she was called to proceed to pilot station Weather condition was rough, wind was 40kn and gusting above 50kn (Bf 8/9) Master took decision to heave up anchor based on his experience of anchoring in the same weather / winds conditions. Ch Off was called on bridge for toolbox meeting and risk assessment. It was noted that anchor team shall be ready to take on band brake and put crossbar down as soon as requested by Master or chain tension changed to long. For the reason of in time actions the team shall be positioned 1(Ch Off) Supervision, 1(AB) Windlass operator, 1(Pumpman) Band brake handling, 1(OS) Crossbar handling (Total 4 persons). On bridge was Master in conn, 3rd Off for OOW duties and AB at steering control. Ch Off was instructed to heave up anchor following the condition when the chain is moderate and going to slack and to apply bend brake when chain going to long. Vessel was moved by ME towards wind / anchor position (no time record) and at 0848LT start heaving anchor. By 0855 come 7sh on

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

deck and at 0900 was 6shackles on deck. At 0905 it was reported 4 shackles on deck and " not able to continue heaving" Next report was "gear wheel is broken" Immediate cause: When big swell lifted bow out of water a strong hug made a downward force acted upon chain try pull chain into water. This strong force was transmitted to main gear wheel via chain gipsy / main shaft - same time hydraulic motor was locking/heaving it hence preventing this movement - at same time brake was disengaged and crossbar was lifted due to try heaving anchor home. Hence two opposite torsional forces acted upon main gear wheel which the wheel was not able to withstand, result it broke.

collapsed. Vessel was not able to heave her anchor up. Later due to heavy weather condition and also commercial benefit in upcoming voyage it was decided to let go her port anchor from bitter end and proceed to repair yard to avoid delays with upcoming voyage. Vessel then proceeded to ROG repair berth for repairs. The big gear wheel for windlass was not available in Rotterdam or nearby areas; hence makers advised to use the wheel from one of the aft mooring winches and install on the port side forward windlass which was important to be fixed. Before the aft winch could be dismantled it was to be made free from the mooring line. The vessel was made fat to berth using all the aft mooring lines. In order to reel out STBD mooring line, the line had to be made fast on the bitt. Hence weight was taken on the stopper and then slacked line was secured on nearby mooring bitt. After the line was secured, the line was being continued to slack to reel out from the drum but the mooring line got caught in the gap plate between the storage and tension drum and then due to slight tension the line slipped out from the plate gap causing sudden upward movement which hit the 2/Off palm causing right hand wrist injury.

Underlying and Root cause:  Heaving anchor in severe weather conditions.  Effect of heavy swell was not considered in Risk Assessment.  Readiness of crew to work in heavy weather condition was assessed incorrectly. MAERSK MARU – 12TH MARCH 2021 Personal injury while handling mooring lines Description and sequence of events. Vessel was at anchor in Rotterdam waiting for loading. On 11 March 2021 she was asked to proceed to Pilot station for berthing. While picking up her port anchor the big windlass gear just sheared off and whole gear wheel got

Immediate cause:  Inadequate leadership and/or supervision – No work planning done, no toolbox, no risk assessment for repair job in the yard.  Inadequate Problem detection / Situational Awareness by all involved.  With crew complement onboard overlooked residual fatigue for the period of past seven days of operations.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

 Inadequate knowledge/experience – Painter was called to operate the winch.  Same task was assigned twice causing double work and desire to complete the work asap.  Mooring design flaw as mentioned in findings above not captured anywhere/RA for crew to be familiar with the arrangement.

Underlying and Root cause: Company Standards policies, or Administrative Controls (SPACs) not used – Enforcement issue  Risk Assessment / toolbox meeting was not completed prior starting the task. Crew involved were not prepared for shipyard work neither mentally not physically while coming directly from incident scene to repair berth.  Unauthorised person (Painter) was called to operate the winch.  No rest hour planning / Fatigue management taken into account. Recommendation:  Extraordinary safety meeting conducted with all crew to discuss the incident and lessons learnt.  Seagull training for Risk Assessment and Safe Mooring Practice to be completed by all crew.  Risk assessment for mooring operation to be reviewed and necessary hazards pertaining to design flaw incorporated to prevent such accidents in future. Crew training to be carried out to ensure they are familiar with setup.  Master & C/Eng to randomly take rounds of deck / engine room, also if possible, to attend/participate during Toolbox meeting to verify enforcement / compliance with company safety procedures.

Further compliance to be verified during the next Internal Audit of the vessel by Shore Superintendents.  Vessel next Internal Audit to be carried out with add focus on implementation/compliance of company safety tools and procedures onboard. Lesson Learnt:  Crew to be mentally and physically prepared for shipyard work especially when this is unscheduled visit due to some incident or emergency.  Rest hour planning/management to be done and any challenges should be immediately reported to shore management for support.  Senior Management onboard should always discuss work planning /resources management with the repair yard team. Risk assessment and toolbox meeting should be conducted with all involved without fail.  Always be situational aware of the surrounding work area. BRO NYBORG – 15TH MARCH 2021 Injury on the head Description and sequence of events. Officer had a head injury. His job was to climb the Radar Mast to take pictures for ELMT of the radar scanners name plate. While climbing up his helmet was taken by the wind and in the attempt to recover the helmet he hit his head against the mast ladder. The ladder is sharp metal and it caused a small scar. He has been given first aid and Radio Medical has been consulted. Weather: Wind force 5 and light rolling in the sea at anchor. Underlying and Root cause:  Helmet taken by the wind when climbing the radar mast ladder.  Strong wind was not considered as hazard for the specific job.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Sum up: Safety meeting conducted the 16th March 2021 for all crew. Use of fall arrest demonstration conducted after this meeting and fall arrest equipment received check by chief officer and additional supplies will be on the next safety equipment PO nothing found to be needed urgent. Have made 1Q/2021 Safety Initiative improved helmet suggestion with 2 securing points for the chin strap on each side and mail forwarded the 22nd March 2021 with safety helmet options from the internet which would avoid helmets blow off by the wind.

Arm position simulated at the time of fall

MAERSK MEDITERRANEAN – 16TH MARCH 2021 Wrist injury due to trip / fall MAERSK KATE – 16TH MARCH 2021 Description and sequence of events. During paint preparation, deck flushed with fresh water and blown with air to remove salt formation. In this process painter step on coiled hose lost his balance and fell down. To avoid falling painter put his right arm in front of him on stiffener and he suffer wrist sprain. Weather conditions / Slight Sea / Wind SE x 4 Was the deck was slippery due to water / No Was the IP stepping on the deck longitudinals while moving on the deck / He tried to step over logitudinals Was vessel rolling at the time / No / Vessel at Houston outer anchorage PPE worn by the IP / As per Company Matrix. Underlying and Root cause:  Stepped on the coiled hose and lost balance.  Lack of situational awareness.

IP Forearm Fracture while securing WBT hatch Description and sequence of events. At 2000 Hrs on March 16th, 2021 while alongside at West Thurrock, UK; the IP was securing the Water Ballast Tank hatches prior to departure. The IP removed the securing pin to 1P WBT and the hinged hatch cover fell by gravity. The IP made attempt to stop the hatch from impact and tried to grab it, but his forearm got caught between the hatch cover and coming. Weight of the manhole lid caused a compression injury to his right forearm. IP was later found to have fractured forearm, and repatriated home.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

5. Inadequate design ergonomics of the hatch cover. There is a single handle placed on the centre of the hatch cover. Once the cover is open and locked in position, this handle is 1.48m height from the deck. For short statured persons to grasp the handle while closing the hatch would require raising their arms above shoulder height. 6. There was no risk assessment conducted by the vessel for opening/closing these hatches. 7. The IP had been onboard since June 2020 (10 months) and was due to sign-off and recently advised no reliever was available. Mentally he might have not had full presence of mind due to anticipated sign-off having been postponed. Root cause: 1. Inadequate Task Planning a. No risk assessment had been conducted for the task b. No method / procedure had been developed for the task 2. Inadequate hatch design ergonomics a. Handle position unsuitable for short stature individuals Immediate / Root cause: 1. The IP’s Ulnar fracture was caused by blunt force impact to the forearm by the steel hatch cover falling. The IP’s forearm was caught between the cover and the hatch coaming. 2. The IP had completed this same task many times. An element of job complacency was possible. 3. There was some coiled razor wire stowed within close proximity (70cm) of the hatch. The razor wire was not covered. The close proximity of this hazard likely caused the IP to assume poor bodily positioning for securing the hatch. 4. The IP was doing the task alone and did not have a second man assisting.

Recommendations:  Vessel to conduct ship specific Risk Assessment for opening and securing WBT hatches.  Vessel to develop ship specific procedure for operating the hatches which shall consider manpower and aids to assist with safely lowering the hatches such as rope tails which have been tested out.  A safety sign/warning notice should be placed on each hatch of this construction type.  Findings to be shared with all sister vessels. To be discussed next safety meeting onboard.  Company Naval Architect to be consulted for potential design solutions. BRO NIBE – 24TH MARCH 2021 Entering Danish Territorial Waters without Pilot

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Description and sequence of events. Vessel had departed from Saint Petersburg with a draught of 7,90m FWEK on March 22nd 2021, loaded with a cargo of 12534 mts of Vacuum Gas Oil for Charterer Litasco SA. Destination was Amsterdam for orders via Kiel Canal. Destination was later changed to Ensted Vaerket, Aabenraa, and upon entering the waters South of Langeland and Aeroe, the vessel crossed into the Danish Territorial Water Region and proceeded to drop anchor 3,5 nm from the Coast of Aeroe awaiting a vacant berth at Ensted Vaerket. This was done without employing a pilot, which was a violation of the Danish Pilotage Act – Section 4.



that had to be decided upon was not given the proper attention. Lack of proper planning. The master should have paid much closer attention to the information in the chart, and studied the information in Admiralty Digital Radio Signals 6 in more detail. Misunderstanding Operator’s Internal procedures. The wording: “You are therefore NOT to order the pilot yourself but to forward your requirements to the agent for the specific port call” stopped any potential attempts at ordering a Dan Pilot from Great Belt South Pilot Station. Wrong Interpretation of Agent’s information. The words “Lodspligtig from Poels Rev” led to the belief that vessel could enter the area freely without a pilot on board. The agent failed to inform the vessel properly. The pre-arrival information mail template sent out by the agent could have contained detailed information on the Danish Pilot Act and what that implies for the area in question.

Follow-up Corrective Action: The incident is to be shared with the Fleet high lighting the importance of Compliance and proper voyage planning. Preventative Action: Maersk Tankers Order Letter and ShipNet Procedure 05.260.03 to be updated to explain in more detail, preferably with a map insert of Denmark and the Territorial waters to help guide mislead masters. Immediate / Root cause: Basically poor voyage planning and poor preparation for the port call in the way that master was too quick to jump to the easy conclusions. Root Cause: The root cause of the incident was identified as:  Lack of time to reconsider all decisions. Final discharge orders arrived late PM at the end of a busy work day, where crew changes and Class attendance had been high on the agenda thus the new voyage plan and new port call arrangement

HAMMERHEAD – 30TH MARCH 2021 Port side Main engine (Azi pull) stopped suddenly Description and sequence of events. On 30th March at the port of Falmouth, Port side engine (Azi pull) of Hammerhead stopped during maneuvering in Falmouth anchorage. Vessel still safely carried out operation and sailed to the discharge port with STBD engine. Immediate cause:

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Automatic shutdown by the monitoring system.

the stopper and fairlead, the stopper got stuck between the fairlead and the loose rope, the stopper couldnot be removed due to weight on the weight on the loose rope. This was due to the less space between the stopper and the centre fairlead which lead to this occurence. The stopper should have been taken at the further Bollard, which would have provided more space. Scenario 2 During lifeboat drill, it was observed that the shackle arrangement for FPD on the lifeboat is in reverse position and the movement of the shackle is disabled. Quick reconnection of hooks while lowered in the water, Improper use of equipment, Under stress

Root cause:  Port side main engine suddenly stopped during maneuvering in Falmouth anchorage, Gear rim for starter and RPM monitoring shift from normal position. RPM monitoring sensors - 3 pcs damaged. Action taken  Vessel was safely maneouverred to Antwerp with one pod.  Remote touble schooting was carrid out with the manufacturer.  Emergency spares were connected to the vessel.  Shore service team attended the vessel to rectify the situation. Near misses and condition Scenario 1 While making fast the loose rope aft , the rope stopper was used to take weight to make figure of 8 on the bollard close to the centre fairlead. during slacking the loose rope from the winch due to the less space between

Scenario 3 During routine rounds, engineer found LO metal pail bottom to be damaged and leaking to the floor, creating a slippery surface in LO store. The LO was transferred into another clean pail, and properly labeled. LO Store was cleaned of any traces of oil. The subject LO drum was one of the older stocks remaining, rest of the drums checked which are comparatively new, same received in New York. Scenario 4 One of the fleet vessel experienced challenges while taking in ballast water via the BWTS during cargo operations where the water was noted to be dirty during the discharge operations in Quanzhou, China. The uptake was done with the BWTS by-passed. There after the vessel proceeded on a trans pacific voyage to Vancouver, BC and during the voyage carried out Ballast Water exchange without to use the Ballast Water Treatment System, not meeting the D-2 standards.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

The pre-arrival Ballast water report was sent out to the Canadian Authorities and same was acknowledged without any additional comments by the authorities. However, during the PSC inspection in Vancouver, the visiting PSCO highlighted non-use of BWTS and issued a deficiency. Though, after discussion, the vessel was permitted to discharge the ballast on board via the BWTS, this could have also led to vessel being not permitted to discharge the ballast at the port, leading to other implications. Scenario 5 Another fleet vessel experienced challenges while taking in ballast water via the BWTS during cargo operations where the water was noted to be dirty during the discharge operations in New Orleans, USA. The uptake was done with the BWTS by-passed. During the voyage, vessel was instructed by the office to carry out Ballast Water exchange using the Ballast Water Treatment System, as vessel crew were not aware of action required to be taken due to the lack of familiarity with relevant section of the BWMP. As per Class approved BWM Plan, vessel is permitted to by-pass the BWMS in places with challenging water quality, (highlighted below, section quoted from vessel’s BWMP). However, the exchange needs to be done via the BWTS, which was also not done in Scenario-1 .

Basis above cases, following recommended:  Ensure strict compliance with the D-1/ D-2 standards as required by your Int. Ballast Water Management Certificate. Pls inform office and authorities in case there are any challenges and/ or possible noncompliance immediately for assistance.  Relevant entries to be made in the Ballast Water Record book and vessel’s Deck log.  Ensure that the BWTS is well maintained and filters cleaned prior to arrival into ports where the water is expected to be dirty/muddy to ensure that vessel has done the due diligence.



Familiarization of responsible crew i.e. those involved with BW management on-board vessel with the contingency measures within the BWMP. Please convene a management meeting to discuss above and reiterate the contingency measure as per BWMP if BWTS is not functioning as required.

Scenario 6 The accommodation stair case have antipiracy grills which are held in open position with bolts. This bolt is so badly corroded, if it breaks and the grill falls on somebody, they will be severely injured.

Scenario 7 While normal monthly testing of Engine Room local water mist fire fighting system, it was noticed that the water mist was not released in any of the sections. It was observed that after activating a particular section of water mist system, the isolation valve for that particular section was opening. The mist release alarm was sounding, but the water mist pump was not starting, thereby not possible to actually activate the water spray for fighting the fire of particular area. On further investigation it was found all concerned relays were operating, but the water pump starting signal was not available at the pump starting panel. Scenario 8 During loading operations in Swinoujscie the 2 P/S cargo tanks were loaded to about 96 % (final ullages: 1.05 m and 1.07 m) . The 95% HLA did not activate, though this was expected to happen at a corresponding ullage of 1.18 m. Upon completion of the discharge the 2 P/S high level alarms were removed from position and probes inspected, cleaned and

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

tested. No physical damages were found. A test was carried out by submersing the alarm probes into a bucket of water and the alarms came. Further into the investigation it was noticed that the above mentioned HLA were engraved with 1P and 1S and corresponding serial numbers. The engravings on some other cargo tanks HLA were checked and found: for 1P Drain Tank , 1S 5P , 4S Slop P etc. Scenario 9 On routine safety rounds, It was observed hissing (air leakage) sound coming near engine room ventilation fan no. 1, On investigation found copper tube union thread gave away leaking air. This copper tube carry air for damper closing from remote in case of emergency. Air leaking from copper tube pipeline leading to damper closing arrangement. Ermeto coupling thread gave away due to vibration. Thread worn out due to age/vibration. Female hexagonal cap slipped from union as thread worn out. Damper can be closed remotely by activating solenoid valve for damper closing arrangement. Due to leakage not full air pressure available at inlet of the piston. It Can lead to ambiguous situation damper might close or can remain open in case of critical emergency situation demanding closing of all air flaps and opening to ER.

Scenario 11 During routine deck inspection, fall protection chains on the forecastle were found completely rusty and in very poor condition. Weather and sprays of sea water influence.

Scenario 11 During routine checks it was noticed that several mesh for accommodation drains were in advanced corroded condition and some were completely missing. If not rectified in time this could have led to clogged drain pipes and personnel injury if one would have stepped wrongly above the drain holes. Possible weather condition has led to the advanced corrosion condition; insufficient maintenance and overlooking the poor condition of the drains mesh.

Scenario 10 During life testing of Rescue Boat engine in open sea was noticed too low cooling water flow , thus giving high temperature alarm on the engine. After investigation it was found that the water pump impeller broke down and was blocking the flow of water to the motor. As possible reason, testing motor without cooling water. Dirty cooling media with abrasive substance. Age of rubber impeller.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

HIGH POTENTIAL (HIPO NEAR MISS) During the review of the Oil Record Book Part II on board it was noted that inappropriate entries were made for the period 03rd – 05th March 2021. The master informed the company of his findings. Vessel was instructed with corrective actions, regarding appropriate entries into the ORB and vessel`s flag administration informed. Intermediate and Root Cause: A. Inadequate compliance with company procedures Intermediate Cause – Excessive Action Requirements (During hand over / take over). Root Cause - Company Standards, Policies or Administrative Controls (SPACs) Not Used – Enforcement issue B. Inadequate knowledge of requirements Intermediate Cause – Knowledge-based decision required. Root Cause – Company Standards, Policies or Administrative Controls (SPACS) Not Used – Unaware of SPACs

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

KNOWLEDGE SHARING PORT OF SINES, Portugal Port of Sines is located along the North Atlantic coast of Portugal and is exposed to the long ocean swell. It is an artificial port not guarded by breakwater. Due to swell ships often experience surging movement whilst moored alongside berth. Over the last few years our ships have reported Incidents / Near Misses during this port call resulting in parted or damaged mooring ropes, damaged gangway, parted tug’s line, and evacuation from berth. Implementing control measures to reduce the risks to ALARP level can assist with making the port call safer and occurrence free.

Local weather forecast, port contingency plan, availability, procedure & timeline required for tugs, pilot, mooring crew etc, shall be verified during Master-Pilot information exchange as well as pre-transfer key meeting with the terminal representatives & local agent. Masters shall use their professional judgment to assess the risks on site and make the decision to depart from a berth in ample time or to deploy additional moorings and have tugs assisting her to remain alongside. Mooring lines deployed shall be as long as possible, with chafe guard and preferably maintained equal and slightly slack to allow the vessel to ‘play’ taking into consideration tolerance for cargo hose/arm. For vessels equipped with wire ropes, longer 22m tails should be considered. SN procedure 06.203.01, Mooring Equipment Guidelines and OCIMF Effective Mooring should be consulted for further guidance regarding mitigating swell or surge alongside. Technical and Commercial departments should be updated if facing issues.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Vetting By Madhav Kamath SIRE: 14 SIRE inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of March 2021 with a total of 34 observations, giving an average of 2.43 observations per inspection. M.T. Maersk Cumulus and MT Maersk Cirrus were top performers with NIL observations in their SIRE inspections. Well done!! 10 vessels received VBIS award during the month. 1 Vetting rejection was recorded during the month.

SIRE Chapter statistics: Chapter

Feb 2021

Ch 1 - General Information Ch 2 - Certification and documentation Ch 3 - Crew Management Ch 4 - Navigation and Communications Ch 5 - Safety Management Ch 6 - Pollution Prevention Ch 7 - Maritime Security Ch 8 - Cargo and Ballast Systems Ch 9 Mooring Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition Ch 12 - Ice Operations

Number of observations 0 3 1 1 10 1 0 3 4 6 5 0

% of Total observations 0 8.8 2.9 2.9 29.4 2.9 0 8.8 11.8 17.6 14.7 0

SIRE Inspections ‐ Chapterwise statistics 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Mar‐21

12 months rolling

Good improvement seen in Chapter 2, 4, 8 and 9 from the previous month.

12 months rolling Number of observations 0 81 39 52 109 35 5 90 79 110 75 7

% of Total observations 0 11.9 5.7 7.6 16.0 5.1 0.7 13.2 11.6 16.1 11.0 1.0

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

MTTO Top 10 most repeated SIRE observations (12 months rolling): CHAPTER

QUESTION NO.

QUESTION

REPEAT COUNT & TREND

Ch 2 - Certification and documentation

2.4

Does the Operator’s representative visit the vessel at least bi-annually?

30 ↓

Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments

10.32

26 ↓

Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition

11.4

Ch 2 - Certification and documentation

2.7

Are the following, where applicable, all in good order and do they appear to be well maintained? Is the general condition of service pipework satisfactory and is it free from significant corrosion and pitting and soft patches or other temporary repairs? Is the vessel free of conditions of class or significant recommendations, memoranda, or notations?

Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments

10.7

19 ↓

Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition

11.1

Does the operator subscribe to a fuel, lube, and hydraulic oil testing programme on a frequency in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and are there procedures to act on these results? Is the general condition, visual appearance, and cleanliness of the hull satisfactory?

Ch 3 - Crew Management

3.2

Are the STCW and flag Administration’s regulations that control hours of work to minimise fatigue being followed and are all personnel maintaining hours of rest records in compliance with MLC or STCW requirements?

15 ↑

Ch 6 - Pollution Prevention

6.21

15 ↔

Ch 9 - Mooring

9.26

Ch 3 - Crew Management

3.5

If the vessel is provided with an approved Ballast Water Treatment System, is the system in good order, used where required and are officer’s familiar with the safe operation of the same? If the vessel is equipped for mooring at single point moorings, does it meet the recommendations as applicable, contained in Mooring Equipment Guidelines? Does the officers’ matrix posted for the vessel on the SIRE website accurately reflect the information relating to the officers on board at the time of the inspection?

23 ↑

19 ↑

16 ↓

15 ↓

14 ↓

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Vetting Hall of fame VBIS Prize winners, March 2021 Vessel

Inspecting company

Maersk Cyprus Henriette Maersk Kirsten Maersk Eva Maersk Maersk Kara Maersk Bristol Bro Nordby Maersk Cumulus Maersk Kate Maersk Cirrus

Observation count

Lukoil Saras OMV BP IMT(ExxonMobil) IMT(ExxonMobil) Equinor (Statoil) BP P66 BP

2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0

Lower Vetting Performers, March 2021 (>5 obs)

Vessel

Inspecting company

Observation count

Hulda Maersk

Lukoil

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Port State Control (PSC) 17 PSC inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of March 2021 with a total of 25 deficiencies giving an average of 1.5 deficiency per inspection. 11 PSC inspections in the month were recorded with NIL deficiency. PSC statistics for 12-month rolling average stands at 2.10 deficiency per inspection. Excluding the Black Sea MOU, the 12-month rolling average stands at 0.56 deficiency per inspection. Deficiencies in the Black Sea MOU account for 80% of all deficiencies recorded in the last 12 months. 60% (83 out of a total of 138) PSC inspections were recorded with Nil deficiencies.

PSC Inspection results ‐ 12 month rolling

Zero deficiency ‐ 83 inspections 27% 1‐2 deficiency ‐ 18 inspections 13%

60% 3 or more deficiencies ‐ 37 inspections

PSC Chapter statistics 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Mar‐21

12 months rolling

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

What’s new: With the sunsetting of TRAMOS (ex-shore commercial operations system), VIMS and VIMS Mobile have been migrated from the TRAMOS platform to a new independent online web application. The new VIMS is available to all users (vessels and shore) at https://vims.maersktankers.com from 1 January 2021. Please note that the Master’s and Chief Engineer’s email has been set up for the Vessel Management login. Other Officers can access the VIMS using the bridge email login for “read-only” access. Should you have any challenges logging in, please reach out to your vessel’s HSSEQ & MO Superintendent. OCIMF is working on revamped SIRE 2.0 which is planned to be launched in 2022. More details shall be shared in the coming months.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Security By Pradeep Balakrishnan Significant trends for the Risk Areas: Piracy activities continued to be low in the Gulf of Aden/ Horn of Africa area with no reported incident during the month. On-going conflict in Yemen continues to be a concern for Southern Red sea/Bab El Mandeb area transit. Vessels to exercise caution while transiting Red sea south of Jizan (Saudi Arabia)-area closer to the coast. Increased migrant activities/ Search and Rescue operations off Libya is a major concern. 08 security incidents were reported in West Africa/Gulf of Guinea Maritime crime area during the month including 02 kidnapping and ransom cases. Vessels being guided on route planning basis recent incidents/ hot spots. Escort boat being arranged for Nigerian port approaches. Armed team being employed onbd during stay off Lome and Cotonou. Further update of alternate arrangement is still awaited from Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) post cessation of Lagos SAA patrol boat services on 27th January. As per un-confirmed reports, Nigerian navy is planning to implement earlier proposed ‘Deep Blue project’ which aims to provide security solutions within the Nigerian maritime domain to all vessels. As a temporary measure Nigerian navy armed team being employed onboard during Lagos anchorage stay.

Horn of Africa (Red Sea /Gulf of Aden /Arabian Sea):

There was no report of piracy attack during the month. Hijacking Nil

Approach Nil

Attack Nil

Gulf of Guinea/West Africa:

There was no reported hijacking. Out of 08 reported incidents, 02 were kidnapping and ransom- one from a chemical tanker in position 214 n miles south of Cotonou and second from a barge in Bonny River. Hijacking Nil

Kidnap/Ransom

Attack/ Robbery

Southeast Asia:

04 boarding incidents were reported in the area- 02 of them in Singapore straits. Hijacking

Attacks/ Boarding/ Armed Robbery

Nil

Major conflicts Areas in Appendix

Based on the current situation and the continued threat from pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, Danish National ISPS Coordination Authority has instructed Danish vessels to operate at ISPS Level 2 in the Gulf of Guinea.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Fleet Group Management - Bunker Adjustment Factor by Varisth Agarwal Most of the Maersk Product tanker vessels operate under Maersk Tankers A/S commercial pools which also include vessels from other owners. The total earnings of the pool are distributed to the vessel’s Owner basis various factors like age of the vessel, cargo carrying flexibility, trade area flexibility etc. For example, a B-class vessel gets 0.5 additional point for ice class and 2 additional points to carry IMO cargo. Each pool point could bring additional 60 to 150 usd/day depending of current pool point value.

Over and above the static factors there is one significant measure which can affect owner’s earnings by almost 2500 usd/day/vessel and that is Bunker adjustment factor or BAF. BAF is calculated basis vessel’s fuel performance/consumption for various sailing conditions like laden, Ballast, idle, load and discharge. In simple words if a vessel consumes an average of 1 MT/ day higher than its expected and pool average consumption then the owner is directly penalized basis the current bunker price during the month ie. About 300-450usd/MT. Fuel performance of a vessel depends on vessels design, construction, machinery and automation. It also depends on efficient day to day operation, maintenance and reporting which are primarily driven by our onboard crew.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Some of the important points to note for BAF improvements are1. Correct fuel reporting in Semark. 2. Additional operational consumption reporting in sub fuel tabs 3. Main Engine consumption (ME SFOC or Hull/propeller condition) 4. Hotel load and boiler consumption during Idle and Load 5. Follow up of best practices checklist shared by Fuelopt team Below example in table 1 shows the BAF adjustment on final earnings of a vessel and table 2 shows how vessel level BAF is calculated basis consumptions during various sailing conditions.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

In line with BAF improvement, this year vessel KPI includes propulsion, AE and boiler consumption monitoring. Propulsion KPI is calculated by fuelopt data team basis previous year performance of the vessel whereas AE and boiler consumption are compared with a common technical baseline for sister vessels. Reports basis below filtration schemes are included or excluded for propulsion performance evaluation. Data Filters Used Beaufort: Upto BF 5 Min. Speed: 10.5kn Max. Speed: 15.0kn Min. MCR%: 10.0% Min Report Period: 10h Added Resistance Annual Decay used Annual Decay – 5% Drydock Decay – 10% Weather consideration. Owned vessel – Hindcast data External Vessels – Hindcast data Our ambition for next year is to replace present propulsion, AE and boiler KPI to BAF in vessel scorecard which will be in line to the earnings seen by vessel owners in Insite digital platform. We believe that the vessel team can directly impact the Topline (vessel earning) by careful monitoring of BAF performance. Considering the tough market and already optimized daily running cost, the scope of further improvement in owners earning is with fuel performance/BAF. There are various initiatives run across the organization like auto logging, digitalization and equipment modification where our onboard team plays an important role in final execution. Not to forget that every drop of fuel saved has a direct impact on CO2 emission where we all are obliged to contribute for the present and future safe environment. This is now accelerated by our company’s new purpose which includes the word ‘Planet’.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Regulatory By Jai Kumar Alimchandani Non-compliance with regulations is not an option. This can result in expensive fines and penalties for the Company as well as possible prison sentences for staff at sea and ashore. When any vessel is in doubt regarding regulations or procedures, they shall contact relevant shore departments. If necessary, these concerns may be escalated through management levels. Whenever required, regulatory affairs will be consulted. To reiterate, Maersk Tankers has a zero-tolerance policy towards non-compliance. The below article appeared in The Maritime Executive on 25 March 2021 titled Maersk Boxship Stopped in Pacific Awaiting Repair Crew and Parts. This can be found at https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/maerskboxship-stopped-in-pacific-awaiting-repair-crew-andparts Even though not explicitly mentioned, the reason seems to have been a fuel issue that caused a huge containership to drift in the Pacific Ocean for over two weeks. Quote BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE 03-25-2021 09:26:00 (Emphasis added) A Maersk operated containership remains stopped in the Pacific awaiting the arrival of a service technical crew that is being dispatched along with replacement parts for the vessel’s main engine. Unlike other recent incidents, Maersk reports no loss of containers saying that the crew and the container cargo have remained secure and that the vessel is maintaining power to its refer boxes. The nine-year-old containership Maersk Eureka operating under the Singapore flag with a capacity of 13,092 TEU, is sailing from Japan to Long Beach, California. The 140,973 dwt containership had been delayed in Japan departed Yokohama on March 6.

On March 12, the Maersk Eureka had to stop its main engine to replace a damaged fuel pump. While she was able to resume her voyage the following day, the main engine had to be again stopped on March 14 to perform further investigation. After determining that the vessel required repairs before continuing its voyage, Maersk organized to have a service technician crew and parts sent out to meet up with the ship. An ocean-going tug was expected to depart Dutch Harbor, Alaska today, March 25, with the crew and parts. They expect it will take the tug three days to reach the location of the Maersk Eureka. Repairs are expected to continue through March 31, with the vessel then continuing its voyage operating 15 to 20 days behind schedule. Complicating the situation are weather forecasts for higher winds during the next three to five days. Maersk reports however that while smaller swells have increased, the vessel and cargo remain secure. This situation is in contrast to the Maersk Eindhoven which a month ago suffered a brief loss of propulsion power which Maersk attributed to an automatic safety feature that caused the engine shutdown due to an oil pressure reading. The loss of maneuverability came while the vessel was sailing in heavy seas and resulted in severe rolling. The motion of the vessel caused 260 containers to be lost overboard and an additional 65 containers to be damaged but remain on deck. The vessel also sustained slight damage forcing it to see a port of refuge to stabilize its cargo and make repairs before proceeding to California. Unquote Update: The vessel arrived at Long Beach, California anchorage on 6 April 2021.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Crewing by Shashank Jahagirdar COVID cases continue to increase in India with Maharashtra state being one of the highest contributors. Strict lockdown/night curfew measures are being implemented in Mumbai and nearby areas to bring down the numbers. As per the analysis, young generation is seen as major carriers of Corona virus and number of people being admitted in the hospital is increasing with every passing day. We urge our seafarers to follow all the guidelines as same is in their best interest. Our team in Mumbai continues to work from home and are in constant contact with our seafarers for advance planning and logistics. Medical clinics have reported revised timings for collection of samples for COVID 19 test. Our team will continue to monitor situation and plan activities well in advance. Domestic and International travel quarantine rules are dynamic and govt authorities are watching the numbers carefully before announcing new changes. Thus, all seafarers are requested to contact respective E2E Operator for understanding latest quarantine rules. We also encourage our seafarers to read latest guidelines on respective airline website/state govt/home country website as well as local administration website.

Some of the highlights of 2021 from Crewing: TRAVEL PARTNER 

As mentioned in Manager’s Corner article, all existing marine travel related arrangements (Flights, Visa’s & Hotels) will be taken care by the ATPI team. As they have experience of using Compas application we intend this transition to be a smooth process. Booking process remains the same (as done in Compas). Only the travel partner name will change.



Our Project Team is already working on the framework and will share detailed transition plan in second quarter of 2021.

COMPAS  We have received suggestions/feedback on how we can manage Port calls in Compas. After analyzing all the responses, we have stopped the automatic import of port calls from IMOS portal with effect from 12th April 2021. Masters will only have rights to add/edit/delete port calls in Compas (as it was done in WinAdmi). 

Revised E-appraisal workflow for deck/engine officers, ratings, galley team & repair team was released recently, and information was shared with all vessels. The changes made are as per suggestions received from the Masters/onboard management team. We thank everyone for their patience, contribution, and support for making this a success.



We have seen tremendous improvement in Payroll through Compas. Number of escalations are coming down. The team is continuously working with CAST team to ensure our seafarers get answers to their queries. We thank everyone for keeping patience during implementation phase and will continue to work towards bringing in more efficiency with the help of new system and team.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Procurement by Jie Ying Koh, April May Tangalin and Mikkel Kjaergaard Dear Colleagues at Sea, In the January MTTO Newsletter, we wrote about the impact of COVID-19 on the overall freight rates, and how we saw the freight rate increased significantly over the course of the year. In 2021, while we expect the freight rate to gradually reduce, it is unlikely for the rates to reach the same level pre pandemic. As such, for the month of March, we are over budget by 34% year to date. While the overbudget did not come as a surprise, your colleagues in Supply Chain are working on mitigating this and we will require your assistance to optimize our freight expenses. In order to optimize our freight budget, it is paramount that we focus on forward planning of our stores and consumables. Below are some ‘best practices’ in planning for our stores and consumables:

How can you help in optimizing our freight expense? Approximately 45% of our spend in freight and warehousing expense is due to shipping cost to the vessel. In year 2020, on average, each vessel received around 9 airfreight shipment and 3.3 tonnes of spares by air. It is our goal to reduce this for 2021 as that will not only reduce our overall freight cost, it will also reduce our carbon footprint. In 2020, our carbon footprint for our shipment accounts to 1000 tonnes which is equivalent to 40,000 trees.

1. Where possible, you should raise quarterly stores for consumables that can be purchased locally at key ports where Maersk Tankers have a contract with the local ship chandlers. Example of key ports would be Singapore, ARA, Fujairah, Houston, Algeciras to name a few. In order to allow the supply chain buyer to have sufficient time to process the orders, it is recommended that you raise the requisition at least 5 business days in advance. 2. Spares requisitions for planned maintenance are recommended to be created 6 months in advance to have sufficient time for the order to be sent together with the consolidated stores from the warehouse. 3. Last minute requirement typically will result in higher freight cost as these may have to be sent directly from the supplier’s site to the vessel. In order to minimize such requirement, we suggest that you review any upcoming planned jobs or items nearing expiry date in order to raise these requisitions well in advance. It is also recommended that you highlight these requisitions to your buyer either through email or during the VPR calls. This will allow the buyer sufficient time to plan the delivery of these spares.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

4. While last mile barge charges only accounts for 10% of the total freight budget, it is also important that we optimize this cost by avoiding last minute delivery of spares consumables that will require an additional barge. It is expected of the agent to ensure that the full list of shipments and ship chandlers deliveries are delivered in one barge (where possible), however, we will depend on you to manage the agent’s performance and to alert us of any situation where the agent is not optimizing the last mile delivery properly.

We understand that for certain vessel trade, it is difficult to plan the port of delivery in advance due to short notice of port call. However, we believe that together we can work out a solution for you through close collaboration and communication between the buyer, tech superintendent, vessel crew and operator. The Supply Chain Vessel Report will be a good tool for you to get visibility of the status of your orders as well as the performance of your vessel from a supply chain standpoint. Our combined efforts to improve and optimize the way we do our logistics will definitely align the business towards our purpose of innovation & supporting efforts toward a more sustainable planet.

Procurement Fundamentals Greener Logistics & warehousing

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Technology & Innovation – Planned Maintenance Systems by Ashok Patra Dear Reader, The core objective of Planned Maintenance as a function lies in ensuring our maintenance platform is compliant to OEM recommendations, statutory & regulatory requirements, and MT procedures to drive our repair and maintenance strategy. With Maersk Tankers transformation from a traditional tanker company to a service provider, there will be requirements from new Owners that we may have to additionally comply with going forward. However, in our long history of creating maintenance plans from external sources for our new vessels or migrating them from previous owner’s data for secondhand tonnages, the data quality and compliance have not strictly been adhered to. Another significant perspective worth mentioning here is regarding our application Shipnet that many of us tend to miss out. It is designed on a fleet-ship model, so changes made to any machinery maintenance plans or spare

parts also require attention to where that machinery is applicable in our entire fleet. Combining the two perspectives holistically, it certainly complicates the challenges. We can relate it to “The Butterfly Effect” – the idea that small things can have non-linear impact on a complex system. The concept is imagined with a butterfly flapping its wings and causing a typhoon. Nevertheless, Maersk Tankers is known to solve problems. And hence, a new in-house team based out of Mumbai was finalised in late 2020. The team has a mixed skillset of colleagues from Marine, Mechanical & IT engineering and brings together rich experience of creating PMS for various sectors of Shipping industry. A detailed PMS Org structure can be seen below.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

“Data is the new Oil” was coined back in 2006. The concept is just like oil, raw data isn’t valuable in and of itself, but the value is created when it is gathered completely and accurately, connected to other relevant data in a timely manner. Optimizing maintenance for our fleet also requires capturing data from various events i.e. docking, performance, defects etc.

All this data is essential in driving effective operational decisions. From PMS perspective, the starting point is and remains to ensure we have an accurate and compliant maintenance platform. With an internal target of March 2022, a glimpse of our machinery wise approach can be seen in the flowchart here.

I sincerely appreciate the prompt responses from all vessels, despite your busy schedules, to the survey sheets and engagement to follow-up questions (a lot of questions actually!) we have been bombarding you all with off late. I would also like to extend my gratitude to colleagues from Fleet technology, Fleet Group Management and Electrical for continuous support in driving this project. Looking ahead, capturing an optimized data and connecting with all relevant elements of maintenance i.e. planned and unplanned maintenance, dockings, performances etc certainly makes way for more data driven & valueadded initiatives. This is a journey and PMS Optimization is just the beginning!

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

MT in the Media by Ketan Rane Hulda Maersk seen with new colours loaded to the marks.

Harald Maersk at anchor, showing some run off and fender marks.

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Congratulatory by Shashank Jahagirdar Seafarers’ safety is our priority. We value our seafarers as they contribute towards the company vision and play a very vital role in our success story. It gives us immense pleasure to see many of our seafarers being associated with us for so many years and have witnessed this company transform from a traditional ownership setup to one of the leading clients serving company. We would like to congratulate our officers who have completed 10 years of service with Maersk Tankers

These numbers only assure us that we have support of our dynamic ship team who are willing to contribute to this journey and make it a memorable one for all. It is possible that there could be omission of some name in the below list due recent data migration to Compas system. In such cases, we request you to send an email to onkar.bhosale@maersktankers.com with your name, Crew ID & anniversary details. Thank you!

Sr No.

First Names

Last Name

Rank

Years Completed in MT

Lesan

Sorin Nicolae

C/O

10 years

Shnyra

Vasily

C/O

10 years

Fetisov

Mikhail

C/O

10 years

Bekrenev

Sergei

C/E

10 years

Zhivotchenko

Andrei

C/E

10 years

Struchaev

Vladislav

C/E

10 years

7 8

Anvar Igor

Sabirov Romanov

C/E C/O

10 years 10 years

March 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Out of the blue We strongly encourage reader’s sharing of best practices, feedback, suggestions, and constructive criticism from our fleet. This section was formerly known as

‘Reader’s Corner’, however it remained underutilized. Best-Practices by Master, Bro Nibe – Daily 1130 ‘crew temperature check’ on the Bridge, wherein birthdays / celebrations were marked, key company messages shared and where any concerns regarding wellbeing were addressed… Immersive Leadership shared by Master, Maersk Callao due to “Recent rise in personal injury cases”.