Health, Safety, Environment and Quality

By Prasenjit Mohanta

There was no recordable personal injury under LTI submitted Fleet Wide during June 2021.

At the end of June 2021 MT safety performance (12 months rolling) was as follows:

12 months rolling YTD June 2021 LTIF 0.48 LTI 7 LTIF 0.54 LTI 4 TRCF 0.82 TRC 12 TRCF 0.95 TRC 7

During June 2021 - External audits (ISM – 7 / ISPS – 7 / MLC – 6 / Green Award - 0) were conducted on board our fleet vessels.

Shore management vessel visits – as part of our commitment to visible leadership, we shall be publishing a list of vessels visited by shore management each month. Below virtual visits were undertaken during June 2021.

Madhav Kamath Umesh Shinde Peter Hawkin Peter Hawkin Madhav Kamath Umesh Shinde Maersk Tangier Maersk Trenton Maersk Arctic Maersk Callao Timberwolf Maersk Tokyo 02-Jun 02-Jun 15 June 18 June 23-Jun 30-Jun

Incidents

INC-O62-21-1 Maersk Tangier 01/06/2021 Incidents MGO loss due to mixing to HFO in Service system

ACC-KH2-21-1 Helene Maersk 04/06/2021 Accident Left leg hit by crancking lever

INC-4R9-21-1 Maersk Magellan 06/06/2021 Incidents Tug hitting hard on vessels stbd side

ACC-U19-21-1 Maersk Aegean 07/06/2021 Accident During maintenance job on Fresh Water UV Sterilize

INC-4GQ-21-2 Bro Developer 07/06/2021 Incidents Vessel placed off Hire - non compliant with RN42

INC-O27-21-2 Sembrani

INC-7KQ-21-1 Bro Anna 13/06/2021 Incidents Crane failure during Suez transit

16/06/2021 Incidents Problem wit PS Windlass

INC-L06-21-5 Maersk Messina 22/06/2021 Incidents A/E 2: No.6 Con Rod and No.7 Main Brgs Failure

INC-U63-21-1 Maersk Arctic 24/06/2021 Incidents Not able to heave up Port Anchor

INC-O48-21-1 Roy Maersk 24/06/2021 Incidents Falling in the water from pilot ladder

INC-O62-21-2 Maersk Tangier 26/06/2021 Incidents Anchoring incident - entangle foul chain, anchor

MAERSK TANGIER – 01ST JUNE 2021

MGO loss due to mixing to HFO in Service system

Description/Sequence of events: Around 22.0-25.0 MT of ULSMGO accidentally has been lost from MGO Service Tk and mixed/consumed with HFO in FO Service Tk..

Underlaying / Root Cause:  MGO from MGO Service tank flowed into HFO

Service tank via Aux. Boiler FO Service system.  MGO Service tank level was not monitored regularly and the tank valve was not shut when not in use  HFO system parameter's changes were not evaluated and reported.  seal ring of 3-way fuel valve of Aux. Boiler heavily damaged. Recommendations:  Main valve of MGO service tank to auxiliary boiler to be shut when not in operation  Strictly follow all Company's procedures regarding E/R watch keeping and reporting of any abnormalities observed.

HELENE MAERSK – 04TH JUNE 2021

Left leg hit by crancking lever

Description and sequence of events. During weekly davit lifeboat testing, when manual cranking, the level escaped from the clutch and hit the left leg of IP causing bruised skin and pain in the affected area(shin and fibula).

Investigation The handle was found slightly miss shaped(flared up) thus allowing to slip from the shaft when in use

Underlying and root cause:  The handle condition degraded due to wear/tear and usage for 11 years.  Wrong positioning of the IP during handling lever.

Immediate action taken  The IP was put to rest position, affected are disinfected, bandage applied and ice pack applied for 1 hour. IP is able to step on his left leg.  The starboard handle was also inspected and found in similar condition. Two handles to be manufactured by ship's staff using thicker material.  The crew instructed to inspect the handles before manual use. Crew instructed to stay perpendicular to way of lever, to avoid any contact with lever in future.

MAERSK MAGELLAN – 06TH JUNE 2021

Tug hitting hard on vessels stbd side

Description and sequence of events. After casting of from the berth at Dongying vessel was heading towards the pilot station while pilot on board. Pilot ordered tug to come alongside so that he can disembark from the vessel. The tug approached the vessel at higher speed and after touching our vessel with his bow, than swing with the aft part and hit very hard on ship side. The impact was so hard that made a shock on our vessel. Immediate cause  Poor steering/approach and unsafe speed of the Tug by tug Master. Failure to appreciate the dangers of the operation.

Underlying and root cause:  It could be inexperienced tug Master or other reasons which are unknown to us due to 3rd party.  Unsafe Maneuvering by the approaching tug and poor situational awareness of the Tug while picking up pilot from the vessel.

MAERSK AEGEAN – 07TH JUNE 2021

Injury while working on Fresh Water UV Sterilize

Description and sequence of events. During maintenance job on Fresh Water UV Sterilizer, IP’s left hand was injured. UV Sterilizer housing dismantled and cleaned. While assembling back UV Sterilizer Quartz Sleeves, last one of them break and slip into IP’s left hand. UV Sterilizer Quartz Sleeve guided into the groove with IP’s left hand from Sterilizer Housing, while with left hand he was guiding the Quartz Sleeve out of the groove when the glass break and went into his hand.

Investigation: Basis investigation carried out, following were the reasons for quartz breaking/ injury:  Even though PPE was in use, due to restricted space and fragile material, gloves were removed to control the sleeve.

 Spare was used from stock, quartz maybe affected by age leading to sleeve quartz breaking.

Underlying and Root cause: Inadequate PPE, Material failure

Corrective Action: IP was provided with medical assistance. Ch Engr briefed E/room on the possibility of material failure after long storage.

Preventive Action: The injury was discussed during safety meeting. All were briefed to ensure priority is given to usage of correct PPE, even while working in areas with restricted space. Quartz spares likely to get effected by age. Hence to be inspected prior use and to be handled with care.

BRO DEVELOPER – 07TH JUNE 2021

Vessel placed off Hire - non compliant with RN42

Description and sequence of events. Non- compliance of head counts on nationality basis the local requirement for coastal trading at Brazil.

Investigation: Following are the relevant observations upon investigation:  The incident seems to be happened for the first time in all the vessels trading in Brazil, hence it is a good learning too.  There are 2 aspects to the incident, a. Noncompliance of RN42 b. VISA expiration due to overstay.  Noncompliance to RN42 is only when there is a lesser headcount of percentage Brazilian nationality seafarers onboard. This remains nonnegotiable and subject to fines and delays.  VISA expiration, however, is within tolerable margin as the cost incurred per day per crew is approx.. 20

USD. This remains cost to the company and can be justified depending on the needs for extension of any contract in an emergency or critical situation.  VISA can only be applied once the crew is onboard.

Due to pandemic VISA couldn’t be applied from home country,  Joining without a VISA restricts only 1 time entry in a 12 months period unless VISA is applied from the home country.  Due to pandemic there has been challenges in applying Brazilian VISA from the crew’s own country of residence. However, Same can be applied when on-board with a valid police clearance.  Local application of VISA in Brazil taking longer time than usual.  Planning for joining an intended vessel should trigger the requirement of applying of police clearance as a default preparation which seems to be missing. This should be part of normal documentation for all crew and officers.  In case there is a delay which leads to extension of stay onboard – also resulting in visa expatriation – a contingency plan should be ready to identify whether the vessel is complying with RN42.  Extension of any assignment of EE was done without considering the non-compliance.  No action was taken to immediately counter the non-compliance or RN42.

Immediate cause:

 Noncompliance with percentage of Brazilian crew required as per local regulations..

Underlying and Root cause: Though there has been contributing factors indirectly due to restriction and challenges due to COVID situations, below mentioned causes remains direct causes.  No assessment was done before considering extension of EE’s extension of contract in reference to non-compliance of RN42.  There is no contingency plan against noncompliance due to delays or extensions.  Local application of VISA taking longer time than usual.

Recommendations: Corrective action :  To disembark the extra crew at the first opportunity and bring vessel back in compliance Or embark a

Brazil national crew to comply with the requirements as soon as possible.  To have back-up officer ready for joining with Brazil visa/ Apostle documents and can be connected at least 2 wks prior the onboard officer completing 90 days.

Preventive action,  To closely liaise with Vships to track the count of

Brazilian and non Brazilians onboard the vessels whenever there is crew change carried out using crew list as a reference (rather than monthly practice) and keep Vships informed to connect proportionate Brazilian crew in case of addnl MT crew is onboard  Masters of vessels under PetroBras Charter need to be made aware of RN42 requirements and they should also verify crew change plan in accordance with RN42. ;  A list ( tracker) will be maintained to track the officers entry in Brazil and where Residency visas are applied but not approved/published by Ministry of Justice, Brazil.  To closely liaise with AEON immigration agents and seek Vships assistance for faster processing of

Residency visas ; visa approval/publishing usually takes 30 days and is at sole discretion of Ministry of

Justice , Brazil. SEMBRANI – 13TH JUNE 2021

Crane failure during Suez transit

Description and sequence of events. Prior entering the Suez Canal on 12th June at 0500 hrs morning both the Hose handling cranes were tested, swung out and the hooks secured on the hose raill for receiving the Suez Canal Mooring boat and picking up stores. While the mooring boat was approaching the port crane was switched on. When the AB was about to climb up the operating platform suddenly the runner was heaved up without operating the lever causing excessive stress on the wire and the wire parted along with the securing strop. Eventually the port crane was secured and the Stbd one was used for the jobs involved. That the runner was being heaved up without operating the lever causing excessive stress on the wire and the wire parted along with the securing strop. Eventually the port crane was secured and the Stbd one was used for the jobs involved.

Immediate cause: Operating lever was not set to neutral position prior switching off the crane power.

Underlying and Root cause:  Operating lever was not freely operating , lever was touching the protective cover, leading to failure of fail safe mechanism .

 Also the power was put off without confirming that the operating Lever was in Neutral position.  Inadequate inspection/maintenance  Improper use of Equipment/Procedure not followed.

Recommendations:  Port Hose handling crane wire to be renewed.  Monthly inspection of lifting gear to include inspection of operating levers and fail safe mechanism.  Training for all deck ratings in crane handling procedures to be carried out at regular intervals..

BRO ANNA – 16TH JUNE 2021

Problem wit PS Windlass

Description and sequence of events. Abnormal noise from port side combined windlass/mooring winch was reported. Damage to the bearings was suspected. Vessel informed Technical department and visit of technician from ROG shipyard was arranged. It was difficult to determine if there is any damage without disassembling the windlass, but due to abnormal noise during operation further investigation was recommended. Layby berth at ROG shipyard was arranged and vessel shifted there after completion of discharging at Vopak Europoort. After further investigation by shipyard verdict was that windlass has to be disassembled and bearings are to be renewed. Same was relayed to Technical, Operations and Marine Operations. Vessel was just fixed for next voyage and taking into account approx 4 days for repairs could not meet the laycan. Voyage was cancelled. Furthermore vessel was declassed for future single voyage assessment until successful completion of repairs verified by Class.

Immediate cause: The immediate cause is associated with inadequate repair on the last DD and inadequate lubrication.

Underlying and Root cause:  The system is not properly lubricated leading to friction and internal corrosion.  Inadequate supervision and inadequate work scope at

DD.

Recommendation  The winch/windlass was dismantled and repaired at the yard.  During the repair, the causes were investigated properly.  Proper testing / inspection/supervision after and during every major overhauling / DD by Senior Officer and Class.  PMS was followed, greasing point was recently replaced and suspicious noise was reported. This to be checked at regular intervals, that grease is passing freely, it is of correct type and no metal/other parts are present.

MAERSK MESSINA – 22ND MAY 2021

A/E 2: No.6 Con Rod and No.7 Main Brgs Failure

Description and sequence of events.

A/E 2 : No.6 Connecting Rod Bearing and No.7 Main Bearing Failed, while Aux engine was running onload.

Underlying cause: Bearing shell dis-located from the place and blocked the lubrication port of the bearing shell which caused lubrication supply cease to both Main and crank pin bearing. Exact cause of failure to be ascertained with the consultation with engine maker.

MAERSK ARCTIC – 24TH JUNE 2021

Not able to heave up Port Anchor

Description and sequence of events. Abnormal noise from port side combined windlass/mooring winch was reported. Damage to the bearings was suspected. Vessel informed Technical department and visit of technician from ROG shipyard was arranged. It was difficult to determine if there is any damage without disassembling the windlass, but due to abnormal noise during operation further investigation was recommended. Layby berth at ROG shipyard was arranged and vessel shifted there after completion of discharging at Vopak Europoort. After further investigation by shipyard verdict was that windlass has to be disassembled and bearings are to be renewed. Same was relayed to Technical, Operations and Marine Operations. Vessel was just fixed for next voyage and taking into account approx 4 days for repairs could not meet the laycan. Voyage was cancelled. Furthermore vessel was declassed for future single voyage assessment until successful completion of repairs verified by Class. Underlying and Root cause: 1. Strong Easterly wind gusts pushed the ship away towards sea where depth started increasing. Anchor being on the slope, lost its holding on ground. 2. Windlass was put in gear while the ship was still swinging to port trying to bring the chain right ahead for easy pickup, using ME. 3. With weight on the chain, windlass was still in gear, brake and stopper were put later. 4. Due to weight, the anchor chain slipped while in gear causing damage to motor. 5. Damage to motor resulted in stopping the oil flow through the controllers. Movement of controlling levers creating high pressure causing hydraulic leak. 6. Anchor brake did not hold due to worn outbrake liner, which appeared to be good from outside, earlier. 7. Sudden tension on the chain due to wind gusts, while windlass gear was still engaged lead to anchor slip.

Recommendation: 1. Thorough risk assessment to be carried out by anchor party when going to pick up anchor during such condition of anchor dragging. 2. Using main engine, vessel to be brought to a stable position with chain leading ahead so as to avoid further dragging of anchor. Then only the Windlass to be engaged. 3. Two powerpacks to be used whenever lifting anchor instead of one powerpack, to have additional power, especially in situations of rough weather and anchor dragging.

ROY MAERSK – 24TH JUNE 2021

Falling in the water from pilot ladder

Description and sequence of events. Service boat arrived around 18:55 with the on signers. 19:00 Last person to climb onboard felt off the pilot ladder after having missed to get a good hold on the line. The weight was on the hands when lifting the leg for the next step and the hand lost the grip. The PIC was wearing ship's inflatable life jacket. The life jacket inflated and worked as intended. 19:08 Mob boat was launched About 10 minutes later and MOB was recovered in to the MOB boat. 19:30 the Mob boat was secured onboard Roy Maersk again. No injuries to man over board

Immediate cause: Failure to get a good grip with the hands before releasing the weight from the legs to climb to the next step above.

Underlying and Root cause: Personal Causes, heavy rain approaching and on signer in the hurry to come on board.

Recommendation The root cause for this incident is the human factor. The Chief officer was in a hurry to come onboard and was not able to grip the ladder properly. Good thing that the vessel already have the MOB on stand by during personnel transfer in Singapore anchorage, as such practice will be continued every personnel transfer (thus with permission and approval from MPA or local authorities for lowering the MOB boat. The incident was then discussed onboard during Safety meeting especially the learning's and preparedness of the crew during MOB situation or during personnel transfer onboard.

MAERSK TANGIER – 26TH JUNE 2021

Anchoring incident - entangle foul chain, anchor

Description and sequence of events. During departure, Singapore while heaving up Port anchor we notice entangle foul chain. Chain approximately 40-50mm link diameter. Chain was trapped around shank and one end (bottom) going down between fluke other end (upper) outside Fluke. During dragging vessel did not observed any more tension then short stay at foul chain, which may lead to conclusion both ends, are clear from bottom. Observed some old rope attached to chain as well. Vessel tried drop anchor and dragging ahead and astern in attempt to free chain from anchor, without any positive outcome. Pilot advised Singapore safety via VHF. Singapore port authorities advised vessel anchored at stbd anchor, and awaiting Port Authorities boat to arrive to access situation. Charterer agent advised. Vessel safely anchored at stbd anchor. MPA safety boat arrived and after inspection required foul chain to be removed prior sailing from port anchor which is kept at water level. MPA Singapore arrange local SSE (salvage) company for job. Vessel sail without any additional disturbances from Singapore.

Immediate cause: Entangle foul chain at port anchor.

Underlying and Root cause:  Not charted, wild foul chain at anchorage area.  Lost anchors and chains not cleared by MPA authorities.

Near misses and condition

Scenario 1 Upon routine inspection of LSA equipment it was observed the MOB lifebuoy smoke and light signal on port side bridge wing was incorrectly installed and would have not been able to break away from mounting brackets when lifebuoy is released. The light and smoke signal should have been positioned with the light facing downwards. Person who installed it was unaware of correct mounting instructions. Manual was not consulted. Officer in charge of LSA maintenance was instructed to remove the smoke and light signal and install it in correct position.

Before

After

Scenario2 During ER Monthly inspection it was observed that the duct from ER FAN no. 1 the corners are unprotected and can easily lead to some injury if hit accidentally by any person. The old pads used to protect the corner became wated due to wear and tear. New pads were fabricated and fitted in position.

Sharp edge

Fabricated protection

Scenario 3 During weekly safety routines checks on critical equipments , MOB engine was not able for starting up. After further troubleshooting investigation ,has been found broken gasoline suction pipe leading from bottom of gasoline reservoir . On top of this, mesh filter was missing as well which it could be develop in worst cases as metal particles/dirt going to fuel oil pump or even into the carburetors making engine not to run. New suction pipe has been fitted including also the mesh filter.

Scenario 4 After completion of Cargo operations with a barge. Vessel was in process of disconnecting and picking up cargo hose onboard. It was noticed that the barge crew had disconnected the hose but not blanked the flange. The barge crew was signaling the ship's crew to lift up the hose. Stop work authorization was used by the officer present at the manifold from lifting the hose before it was properly blanked.

Severe / High Potential Near misses:

Close qtr. situation with fishing vessel occurred, which was avoided by the fishing vessel as the vessel didn’t took early action following colregs. The same was reported to shore authority by the FV. Investigation revealed that OOW didn't take proper collision avoidance action in time having 2 fishing vessels on her starboard side. An extra ordinary bridge team meeting was held to discuss the scenario / Issue. A formal investigation was held to confirm the RC and CAPA. Same is shared with MCA.