Issuu

NewsLetter HSEQ

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Content Manager’s Corner ......... 2 Health, Safety, Environment and Quality .................... 3 Vetting ......................... 12 Security......................... 17 Fleet group Management ............... 18 Regulatory .....................22 Crewing..........................24 Procurement ............... 25 Technology & Innovation ..................26 MT in the Media ........... 28 Congratulatory ............. 29 Out of the blue ............ 30 Appendices .................. 31

REGULATORY

Page 22

CREWING

Page 24

MT IN MEDIA

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July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

it can be seen that the most repeated SIRE observations are either on ‘General Appearance and Condition’ (VIQ 11.1, 11.3 and 11.4) or related (VIQ 10.32, 2.7, 4.7 and 9.20) to it as highlighted below. It is crucial that we remain focussed on the aspects of upkeep of equipment and continuous improvement and thereby provide the very best service to our customers.

Manager’s Corner By Janus Auken Dear Reader,

On-board management is strongly encouraged to liaise with relevant shore departments in ensuring best utilization of available resources and thus maintaining the highest quality standards.

Once again, I have the pleasure of contributing the Manager’s Corner article in the MTTO Monthly Newsletter. Last time I wrote, I highlighted the recent amendments to the MT Sustainability Policy to include a zero tolerance approach for harassment, discrimination and bullying at the workplace. In this issue, I would like to reiterate the importance of a strict enforcement and compliance with the Maersk Tankers D&A Policy and supporting procedure. As per ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ mentioned under ShipNet Procedure 01.100.03 - Maersk Tankers Drug and Alcohol Procedure - ‘The Master is responsible for informing, implementation and compliance with this procedure on board the vessel. The Master is responsible for ensuring that breath testing for alcohol is carried out in the correct manner…’. Additionally, under Section 2.2 – ‘If there is a suspicion by any crew of a violation of the D&A policy on board his vessel, he or she must report this to the Master or any senior officer. The Master or senior officer must then immediately conduct the breathalyser test on the concerned person and inform the Designated Person Ashore (DPA) or Deputy Designated Persons Ashore (DDPA).’ In the recent past, there have been reports of alleged MT D&A policy violations in way that the related SMS procedure has not been followed as mentioned above. These allegations were received some time after the reported occurrence and without supporting information. In such a situation, it merely reduces the reporting to an allegation without the evidence. Additionally, this also indicates noncompliance with the SMS on the part of person reporting the case. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that in case of any suspected violation of D&A policy onboard a vessel, that the suspicion is acted upon at the same time and as outlined process in SN Procedure 01.100.01. This will ensure that only verified cases are reported. Also, this would ensure that the process is not utilized contrary to Maersk values in a broader context. The second topic that I would like to address in this Manager’s Corner article is related to ‘Quality’. Considering our historical SIRE performance and looking at the bigger picture, we have come a long way in narrowing the gap between top and bottom fleet performer i.e. the spread between best and worst inspection results has reduced and our performance is within the target. This would not have been possible without the hard work and effort by our onboard management teams and crews who are also on the front line. Having said that and looking at the list of the top10 most repeated SIRE observations, there is still room for improvement. Our customers charter Maersk Tankers vessels with clear expectation that the vessel (and its equipment) would be in good operational condition at all times. However, based on review of SIRE performance YTD,

Inspection statistics YTD 30 August 2021 SIRE Total inspections: 145 Total observations: 425 Observations per inspection: 2.93 Rejections recorded in VIMS: 9 PSC Total inspections: 104 Total deficiencies: 125 Deficiencies per inspection: 1.20 (0.60 excluding Black Sea MOU) Detentions: NIL Top 10 most repeated SIRE observations (YTD 2021) 1.

VIQ 10.32 Are the following, where applicable, all in good order and do they appear to be well maintained? – 20 times 2. VIQ 2.7 Is the vessel free of conditions of class or significant recommendations, memoranda or notations? – 19 times 3. VIQ 10.7 Does the operator subscribe to a fuel, lube and hydraulic oil testing programme on a frequency in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and are there procedures to act on these results? – 14 times 4. VIQ 11.4 Is the general condition of service pipework satisfactory and is it free from significant corrosion and pitting and soft patches or other temporary repairs? – 13 times 5. VIQ 11.1 – Is the general condition, visual appearance and cleanliness of the hull satisfactory? - 11 times 6. VIQ 4.7 Is navigation equipment appropriate for the size of the vessel and in good order? – 9 times 7. VIQ 6.21 If the vessel is provided with an approved Ballast Water Treatment System, is the system in good order, used where required and are officer’s familiar with the safe operation of the same? – 8 times 8. VIQ 9.20 Are windlasses, anchors, locking bars and cables in good order and operating effectively? – 7 times 9. VIQ 11.3 Is the general condition, visual appearance and cleanliness of the weather decks satisfactory and are deck working areas clearly identified and provided with non-slip surfaces? - 7 times 10. VIQ 9.26 If the vessel is equipped for mooring at single point moorings, does it meet the recommendations as applicable, contained in Mooring Equipment Guidelines? - 6 times

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Health, Safety, Environment and Quality By Prasenjit Mohanta

There was no recordable personal injury under LTI submitted Fleet Wide during July 2021. At the end of July 2021 MT safety performance (12 months rolling) was as follows: LTIF TRCF

12 months rolling 0.55 LTI 0.89 TRC

8 13

LTIF TRCF

YTD July 2021 0.54 LTI 0.95 TRC

5 8

During July 2021 - External audits (ISM – 5 / ISPS – 4 / MLC – 4 / Green Award - 0) were conducted on board our fleet vessels. Shore management vessel visits – As part of our commitment to visible leadership, we shall be publishing a list of vessels visited by shore management each month. Below virtual visits were undertaken during July 2021. Rajeev Pratap Singh

Maersk Messina

06-Jul

Datharam Puttheguthu

Maersk Mississippi

09-Jul

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Incidents INC-O29-21-2

LIONHEART

03/07/2021

Incidents

Suspected Touch bottom at Kaohsiung berth 105

ACC-A5H-21-1

Maersk Curacao

03/07/2021

Accident

Minor Skin Burn

INC-2Q9-21-3

Maersk Beaufort

04/07/2021

Incidents

Mooring rope parted during docking

INC-O46-21-1

Romoe Maersk

08/07/2021

Incidents

Fwd spring mooring winch brake assembly broken

INC-KP9-21-3

Maersk Cirrus

12/07/2021

Incidents

STS cast off due to parted mooring ropes

INC-KP6-21-2

Maersk Nimbus

14/07/2021

Incidents

Parting of aft spring ropes - Limbe

INC-KH2-21-1

Helene Maersk

14/07/2021

Incidents

Hard landing on fender while berthing without tugs

ACC-O64-21-1

CL YINGDU

18/07/2021

Accident

Eye injury during routine inspection

INC-646-21-1

Ras Maersk

18/07/2021

Incidents

Life Jackets lost at Sea

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

• LIONHEART – 03RD JULY 2021 Suspected bottom touch at Kaohsiung berth 105

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Description/Sequence of events: On 3rd July 2021, Vessel checked echo sounder and it was showing 4.1 meters UKC during unberthing. Changed to forward transducer and the UKC showed 0.2 and 0.0 sometimes. As vessel pulled out of berth the ford UKC increased. Informed pilot but he did not believe the echo sounder nevertheless he said he will inform port about our observation. The bottom is soft mud as per chart and pilot. As per the estimate vessel could have touched bottom at the forward end port side about 10 cms during the final stages of loading. Soon after departure vessel checked ballast tanks Fore peak,1P, 2P and 3P. No sign of damage or water ingress. As the vessel was not sure about the touch bottom but strongly suspected that it would be the case.

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Underlaying / Root Cause: • Insufficient water depth at berth. • Incorrect information given out by agent and Port to the Vessel and other concerned parties. • Failure to maintain declared depth by the Kaohsiung Port. • Soundings of seabed around the vessel while alongside at berth not carried out by ships staff to determine safe loading draft.

Vessel to Request agent for official declaration on minimum depths at berth/channel by port authority & terminal. Min depth at berth to be checked with pilot and recorded in bell book. Incidence to be shared with fleet. Before any future call at this terminal by any fleet vessel the actual depth information to be obtained from reliable sources.

MAERSK CURACAO – 03RD JULY 2021 Minor Skin Burn Description and sequence of events. One of the deck crew members reported with one day delay minor skin burn on the leg. The burn was caused by touching non-isolated heating line on the deck while crossing the exposed pipe. The burn did not cause a pain but on the next day the skin peel off and was sensitive when irritated by touch. On the next day when reported to C/O / Capt - Radio Medical was contacted. The burn was disinfected and dressing applied. Crew member was able to work without any restrictions. 2 days after the burn got well. On C-class vessels heating lines are not isolated therefore extra care must be taken by crew when the cargo is heated. Even short contact of the skin with bare hot pipe causes immediate burn of the skin.

Actions taken: • All WBT internally inspected, no indentation/damage noticed • Under water inspection of hull carried out in Singapore on 19th July, No Indentation/damage to coating noticed. Recommendations: • Ship staff familiarized with SMS procedure, Soundings of sea bed around the vessel while alongside at berth to be carried out by ships staff to determine safe loading draft (Form D-6).

Underlying and root cause: • Lack of care when crossing the heating pipe on the deck - taking short cuts. Although there is unrestricted way to the valves via catwalk the way is far longer when going from

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

• •

PS to STB. Even going from one side of the vessel to the other there is possible to avoid easily hot exposed pipes. Failure of proper reporting to supervisor - no matter how minor it shall be reported earlier. Lack of safety highlighting warning personnel of hot steam pipes in area where they may come in contact with hot surfaces. Improper approach to the valve on heating line. The overall rolled up exposing the leg of the Ab when he walked over a hot pipe. Crossing over the hot pipes is the shortest way but not the safest.

Immediate cause • Tug Master pulled the ropes very fast instead of gradually increasing the weight. Underlying and root cause: • Inadequate communication between pilot and aft tug. Lesson learned: Incident was result of third-party employee actions the root cause for which needs access to information not within control of the company. ROMOE MAERSK – 08TH JULY 2021 Fwd spring mooring winch brake assembly broken

Immediate action taken • Although the burn was not causing a pain it was causing discomfort when touching. Seaman cooled down the burn with cold water. On the next day when reported to C/O / Cpt - Radio Medical was contacted. The burn was disinfected and dressing applied. • All crew were advised one more time during toolbox meeting about handling of valves when the cargo is heated. MAERSK BEAUFORT – 04TH JULY 2021 Mooring rope parted during docking Description and sequence of events. During shifting operation from layby Berth to Dry dock at Besiktas Shipyard, aft tug gave a sudden strong pull to the vessel. This resulted in parting of two ships mooring ropes which were used to make fast the aft tug. Tug had to be made fast again to complete the manoeuvre.

Description and sequence of events. The berth is a T shaped Jetty with a central manifold area and 5 Fenders. The direction of TGL Terminal is parallel to the direction of the swell that comes in from the open sea and directly behind the terminal are rocks, which do not quell the swell, only repel the swell, whereby the resultant swell motion is erratic and makes the swell double in size and the swell period makes situation worse at times. At the time of incident vessel was at ballast draught and therefore with the erratic movement causing the mooring lines to work more stretching and slacking more meters. Underlying and Root cause: • During wintertime weather in S-Atlantic causes swell from SE-ly direction, with few possible windows with good condition. • The vessel berthed at limiting conditions. • Vessel ended up with ballast draught in limiting condition. • Vessel draught during operation should never be less than 8.5 m (IE only part discharge) Preventive Action: • Best case scenario on mooring plan to be discussed with the Pilot during Master-pilot exchange.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

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• • •

• •

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Previous experience of the onboard crew members to be discussed during the Risk Assessment and toolbox meeting for mooring operations at this port. Additional mooring ropes to be passed in advance considering the swell and weather conditions at the berth. Frequent rounds to be taken to check the weight on mooring lines while the vessel is berthed. Measures to avoid chafing at leads to be taken. (Canvas covering, greasing, etc). Additional ballasting options to be considered where practicable and Best suitable trim to be kept to minimize surging at berth. Use of additional fenders to e considered to prevent any damage and reduce vessel movement. Mooring winches to be prepared and maintenance/checks to be carried out in good order prior arrival such ports. All crew to strictly follow safe mooring practices.

MAERSK CIRRUS – 12TH JULY 2021 STS cast off due to parting mooring ropes. Description and sequence of events. STS Cast Off due to failure of mooring systems between Maersk Cirrus and daughter vessel at offshore Lome, caused by weather conditions and un-synchronized movement between the two vessels. Due to heavy unsynchronized rolling from both vessels about 8 mooring ropes parted. Maneuvering vessel was in very light condition and was rolling heavily mooring master decided to cast off. Underlying and Root cause: • Daughter vessel was in very light ballast condition • Swell and rolling period too high, • Similar size off vessel, leads being relatively short for moorings between vessels. • Mooring ropes on daughter vessel appeared to be old.

Recommendations: • STS should not be done between same size of vessel if weather conditions are boarder line for acceptance. • Better screening off STS vessel RE Mooring Outfit and condition of same. • Experience will lead to better future decision making and Discussion in Key Meeting prior to proceeding with Intended Operation. MAERSK NIMBUS – 14TH JULY 2021 Parting of aft spring ropes @ Limbe Description and sequence of events. On 14-Jul-2021 during discharging at Sonara Terminal Jetty No. 2 open sea berth, it was observed that vessel has started moving along the jetty due to increased swell. This resulted into parting of 2 spring lines. Cargo arms were immediately disconnected and Tug assistance was taken. Immediate cause: Weather conditions, long low swell increasing in height Magnitude. Underlying and Root cause: • Vessel moving alongside the open sea berth due to increased long low swell. • Open sea berth exposed to increased swell conditions. Recommendations: On enquiring with the Pilot & loading master, such events do occur at Limbe at this time of Year due to Weather Conditions. They were aware of the incidence of Swell effecting the Open Berth. In fact during this period, and considering the wider area of GOG and Maersk Tankers having two Other vessels in the area conducting STS operations, this timeline was impacted severely with delays to STS operations for Maersk Cirrus and Maersk Stratus due to Swell and Weather conditions existing for 3 to 4 days. This Incident was not an Isolated case, or could be attributed to vessel management of moorings at Limbe, it was more so a phenomena that occurred in the region over multiple days.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

•

Obtain and monitor weather forecasts, specifically with the swell conditions for LIMBE Port, as the vessel had exercised, to ensure that Cargo Operations are ceased prior to any issues in remaining at berth are experienced, as was conducted in this case. Consider a future request with Terminal to assist with tug, at the first Indication that the swell, its magnitude and direction are potentially going to Impact vessels ability to remain safely at berth, especially when approaching completion of Discharge Operations and vessel being in near Ballast Condition Share Incident report with Vessels due to Discharge at Limbe, for Awareness and Knowledge Sharing.

CL YINGDU – 18TH JULY 2021 Eye injury during routine inspection Description and sequence of events. At 0900 hrs Chief Engineer proceeded on his routine round of the machinery spaces. Around 0915 hrs while passing by the No. 1 main air bottle (reservoir) he thought of checking the condensate in the air bottle as a part of random check and stopped by for draining the condensate. There are 2 valves on the drain line coming out from bottom of the bottle of which he opened the first valve fully and was slowly opening the outer valve. At this time the acrylic glass on the sighting port located after the second valve shattered due to pressure and pieces of broken fiber glass flew across the area. Chief engineer turned his face away with reflex action but one of the pieces hit his right eye lid at high velocity. Chief engineer could feel the pain on the right eye and found himself bleeding.

He immediately returned to ECR himself and activated engineer’s call alarm holding his right eye with tissue papers. At 0920 hrs duty engineer (3/Eng) came to ECR and called Master and Chief Officer for further assistance. Investigations outcome: • The main air reservoir has capacity of 5.5m3 and is fitted with condensate drain trap which discharges to the oily bilge tank. The pipe from the reservoir up to the bilge tank is 24m long in total and consists of 4m x 15A SCH 40 horizontal piping followed by 20m x of 50A SCH 40 vertical piping. The line enters the bilge tank from top & the tank was 27% full at the time of incident. • Crew (usually motorman or duty engineer) perform the task of routine condensate draining. This is performed about twice a day and before maneuvering. CE during his/her routine machinery space rounds conducts random checks and has performed this task many times in the past. • The air reservoir contains compressed air at 30 bars and at the time of incident the pressure was 27 bars. • The condensate draining arrangement consisted of a 15A size line emerging from bottom of the reservoir with 2 isolating valves on the horizontal section, then opening into a vertical 50A size line which goes downwards up to bilge tank. The top end of 50A line was fitted with a flange and 3mm thick acrylic glass which served as sight glass to observe contents. The drain trap of no. 2 air reservoir is fitted with 10mm thick acrylic glass. • The line leading up to bilge tank was confirmed to be clear and free of any clogging. • The original design of the condensate drain consisted of open funnel which allowed for release of air/pressure to atmosphere and only liquid condensate (water/oil etc.) to go down to oily bilge tank by gravity. As per work done history available on board the original design has been modified by ship’s crew

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

during August 2018. There is no correspondence to indicate if this modification was discussed & reviewed with shore management.

• • •

• •

The modified design of the condensate draining arrangement is a closed system not allowing for release of compressed pressure to atmosphere. The 4mm thick acrylic glass fitted on top of the drain line was not a suitable material and may have weakened over the period to withstand 30 bar air pressure. There is no routine to replace it at specific interval. Immediate/Direct cause: • Substandard act/practice: Failure to use PPE properly. Person was not wearing any eye protection as the closed drain trap arrangement provided false sense of safety. • Substandard conditions: Defective equipment or machinery. The modified drain trap arrangement included 3mm thick acrylic glass was not of adequate strength or it may have weakened over the period due to exposure to heat, pressure and failed to withstand the high air pressure from reservoir and shattered into pieces one of which the right eye of person at high velocity. The sight glass on drain trap of no. 2 main air bottle (of same size & specifications) is 10mm thick; so it is not clear if the glass drain trap of no.1 bottle was renewed with thinner glass.

Job factors: Inadequate engineering Inadequate evaluation of changes: Crew did not apprise shore management of the planned modification before as well as after the modification was carried out. There is no evidence that proper risk assessment and independent design review was carried out before implementing the change/modification. The modification of the system was not authorized by shore management. Inadequate supervision and monitoring: The modification of the system was neither authorized nor noticed during subsequent ship visits by shore management. It was not noted or highlighted by crew sailing on board after initial modification.

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Root Cause of the Incident: • Personal factors: Improper attempt to save time or effort

Corrective and Preventive actions: • Brief details of the incident along with immediate checks and actions to be carried out were shared with the fleet vessels by means of Rapid Fleet Notification mail. • Consumption to be changed over to no. 2 air reservoir. Until permanent repairs of the condensate drain arrangement are carried out the broken fibre glass to be replaced with 4mm steel plate with holes for escape of air. Crew performing daily draining operation to be briefed and shall wear eye protection or face shield. • Condensate drain trap arrangement to be reverted as per original design concept and as

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

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reviewed by technical team for all air reservoirs on board. Air reservoir condensate drain-trap arrangement on all sister vessels to be verified for any unauthorized modification and corrected as necessary. Effectiveness and any challenges with drain trap arrangement to be verified during next VPR call with the vessel.

Near misses and condition

Scenario2 During lowering and maneuvering of rescue boat in the water , it was found out that the clamp bracket was not secured with the trim position pin. This condition was found out when the boat was already in water, after the astern manoeuvre. Most likely the pin was removed for securing the cooling water barrel for the testing of boat engine. Immediately the boat crew fixed the main engine with the trim position pin and after that rescue boat was performing satisfactory during the manoeuvring.

Scenario 1 While lowering the life boat it was noticed that lowering hook sheaves for wire were restricted in movement due

to dirt/grease. The sheaves were not moving freely. After securing of lifeboat, maintenance was carried out and both sheaves were cleared of dust/soot and old grease. due to which friction between teflon sheeves and metal bracket was increased.

Excessive soot deposit on grease. After securing of lifeboat, maintenance was carried out and both sheeves were cleared of dust/soot and old grease. due to which friction between teflon sheeves and metal bracket was increased. New grease was applied, including greasing of wire for davit.

The crew was briefed regarding the importance of the rescue boat, the necessity that the boat should be ready all the time and that any extra minutes spent for preparing the boat means extra minutes for the IP to stay in water, increasing the risk of hypothermia. It was highlighted the importance of conducting regular drills, so any issues found during the drill can be avoided in real situations. Scenario 3 During STs operation, at one moment one head line parted and our crew went to forward station to adjust and renew the broken rope. They noticed that other line were about to brake and they kept away at safe distance. After few seconds another 2 line parted and nobody was injured. Few head lines, spring lines and stern lines parted from both ships endangering mooring station team members. Scenario 4 Vessel was passing Taiwan strait inside Changua Wind farm Channel TSS during hours of darkness. A target was crossing from port side of own vessel, with CPA of 0.25 NM and BCR 0.55 NM. No give way action

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

taken by crossing vessel. Contact with give way vessel was attempted in ample time but no response received. Master was called on the Bridge. Our vessel took actions to avoid collision by altering course and reducing speed while monitoring the other vessel movement at all time. Eventually the CPA was increased to 1.2 NM and BCR 1.65 NM. Sum up discussion: It may be argued that close-quarters situation arose after the our vessel’s alteration of course at TSS exit. Originally own vessel would be crossing ahead of the rogue vessel. Even though the vessels were still far away at the time of course alteration, it may have possible misinterpretation that our vessel intends to cross astern of other vessel. Severe / High Potential Near misses 1: The vessels loaded Condensate at Shell Terminal at Braefoot Bay from 10th to 12 July 2021. The vessel received an observation report from Shell on 12 July 2021 after the cargo operation. It was reported that there was a spike in the pressure in the Terminal loading manifold at 08:50 LT on 11 July 2021 in excess of the agreed maximum pressure. As per report, the pressure reached 6.34 barg and came very close to initiating ESD if it reached 6.8 barg. This event caused no injury, pollution, or property damage. Findings: • The Port log confirmed that on 11 July 2021, at 0850H, the duty Officer was changing from cargo tanks 2 P/S and 4 P/S to cargo tanks 3P, 4P, 5P/S, and 6P/S. It would appear that the manner the automatic cargo valves were operated in this specific instance was not timely, causing the momentary spike in the manifold pressure. • The duty Officer in question is an experienced Officer with similar stint on a sister's vessel. Unfortunately, he has recently signed off; his testimonial or explanation of the event, therefore, is not available. Verbal requests to keep positive pressure in the manifold could be a contributing factor in this event. Immediate Causes: • The automatic cargo valves (opening and closing) were not operated timely, causing a spike or surge in the manifold pressure.

Root cause: • Inadequate compliance with Shell/terminal guidelines Actions taken: • Extra Ordinary meeting with Deck Officers reference BM 4ZQ-21-10. • Pre-arrival meeting and Cargo Safety operational meeting • Fleet Sharing • The event is recorded as HiPo Near Miss in our ShipNet (reference NM-4ZQ-21-25) and will be discussed with all crew/officers at the next scheduled Safety meeting. Severe / High Potential Nearmisses 2: While carrying out pre-inspection of working aloft equipment it was found that the Main mast Cabloc was not holding. Immediate and Root Causes: • Defective cabloc due to improper maintenance and restricted work place. • Position of the cablock is very restricted and most of the time gets overlooked during inspections. Actions taken: • Removed the old cabloc and replaced with new cabloc. • Newly in place cabloc tested confirmed working properly.

Sum up: • Officer in charge should make sure that all fall arrest equipment are carefully examined and maintained. • Safety equipment located in remote locations needs attention and should not be missed out. This can be achieved by using equipment list referring to its location as a checklist while conducting maintenance. • Pre inspection of all working aloft equipment needs to be done as it was done in this case

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Vetting

By Madhav Kamath SIRE: 20 SIRE inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of July 2021 with a total of 62 observations, giving an average of 3.10 observations per inspection. M.T. Maersk Capri and Bro Distributor were top performers with One observation in their respective SIRE inspections. Well done!! 8 vessels received VBIS award during the month. No Vetting rejections were recorded during the month. SIRE Chapter statistics: Chapter Ch 1 - General Information Ch 2 - Certification and documentation Ch 3 - Crew management Ch 4 - Navigation and Communications Ch 5 - Safety management Ch 6 - Pollution prevention Ch 7 - Maritime Security Ch 8 - Cargo and Ballast Systems Ch 9 - Mooring Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition Ch 12 - Ice Operations

July 2021 Number of % of Total observations observations 0 0 13 21 0 0 10 16.1 12 19.4 4 6.5 0 0 4 6.5 7 11.3 4 6.5 7 11.3 1 1.6

12 months rolling Number of % of Total observations observations 0 0 78 11.7 29 4.3 58 8.7 107 16.0 40 6.0 8 1.2 84 12.6 80 12.0 98 14.7 80 12.0 5 0.7

SIRE Inspections - Chapterwise statistics 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Jul-21

12 months rolling

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

MTTO Top 10 most repeated SIRE observations (12 months rolling):

REPEAT COUNT & TREND

CHAPTER

QUESTION NO.

QUESTION

Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments

10.32

24 ↓

Ch 2 - Certification and documentation

2.7

Ch 2 - Certification and documentation

2.4

Are the following, where applicable, all in good order and do they appear to be well maintained? Is the vessel free of conditions of class or significant recommendations, memoranda, or notations? Does the Operator’s representative visit the vessel at least bi-annually?

Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments

10.7

20 ↑

Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition

11.1

Does the operator subscribe to a fuel, lube, and hydraulic oil testing programme on a frequency in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and are there procedures to act on these results? Is the general condition, visual appearance, and cleanliness of the hull satisfactory?

Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition

11.4

Ch 4 - Navigation Communications

4.7

and

Ch 6 - Pollution Prevention

6.21

Ch 9 - Mooring

9.26

Ch 3 - Crew Management

3.2

Ch 5 - Safety Management

5.29

22 ↑ 20 ↓

19 ↓

Is the general condition of service pipework satisfactory and is it free from significant corrosion and pitting and soft patches or other temporary repairs? Is navigation equipment appropriate for the size of the vessel and in good order?

16 ↔

If the vessel is provided with an approved Ballast Water Treatment System, is the system in good order, used where required and are officer’s familiar with the safe operation of the same? If the vessel is equipped for mooring at single point moorings, does it meet the recommendations as applicable, contained in Mooring Equipment Guidelines? Are the STCW and flag Administration’s regulations that control hours of work to minimise fatigue being followed and are all personnel maintaining hours of rest records in compliance with MLC or STCW requirements? Are lifeboats, including their equipment and launching mechanisms, in good order and have they been launched and manoeuvred in the water in accordance with SOLAS requirements?

14 ↔

14 ↑

13 ↓

12 ↓

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Vetting Hall of fame VBIS Prize Winners, July 2021 Vessel

Inspecting company

No of Observations

Maersk Capri Bro Nuuk

Equinor ASA (ex-Statoil)

Bro Distributor

Lukoil

Hammerhead

Lukoil

Hans Maersk

Maxcom Petroli Spa

Nightcrawler

Shell

Maersk Kara

VIVO Energy

Timberwolf

VIVO Energy

Lower VettingInspecting Performers, July 2021 (>5 Obs) Vessel company Observation count Maersk Nimbus

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Port State Control (PSC) 14 PSC inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of July 2021 with a total of 15 deficiencies giving an average of 1.07 deficiency per inspection. 9 PSC inspections in the month were recorded with NIL deficiency. PSC statistics for 12-month rolling average stands at 1.60 deficiency per inspection. Excluding the Black Sea MOU, the 12-month rolling average stands at 0.57 deficiency per inspection. Deficiencies in the Black Sea MOU account for 71% of all deficiencies recorded in the last 12 months. 64% (99 out of a total of 155) PSC inspections were recorded with Nil deficiencies.

PSC Inspection results - 12 month rolling

Zero deficiency - 99 inspections

23%

13%

1-2 deficiency - 20 inspections 64% 3 or more deficiencies - 36 inspections

PSC Chapter statistics 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Jul-21

12 months rolling

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

What’s new: The new VIMS is available to all users (vessels and shore) at https://vims.maersktankers.com from 1 January 2021. The new VIMS has now completed 6 months since put in operation. Changes and updates are being made based on suggestions and feedback from end users. Please note that the Master’s and Chief Engineer’s email has been set up for the Vessel Management login. Other Officers can access the VIMS using the bridge email login for “read-only” access. Should you have any challenges logging in, please reach out to your vessel’s HSSEQ & MO Superintendent. OCIMF is working on revamped SIRE 2.0 which is planned to be launched in Q2 of 2022. Trial SIRE 2.0 inspections are being conducted in the industry, and basis the feedback received OCIMF shall make final adjustments to SIRE 2.0, before being officially launched

** Knowledge Sharing and Port Information in Appendix

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Security

By Pradeep Balakrishnan Significant trends for the Risk Areas: Overall, the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is much reduced however reports of suspicious approaches against vessels sailing through the area do come up. The conflict in Yemen causes an increased risk to merchant vessels in the Red sea/ Bab El Mandeb area, especially to the ones calling at Saudi ports. Vessels to exercise caution while transiting Red sea south of Jizan (Saudi Arabia)-area closer to the coast. Increased migration / Search and Rescue operations off Libya is a major concern. 02 security incidents were reported in West Africa / Gulf of Guinea Maritime crime area during the month which shows some improvement. Vessels being guided on route planning basis recent incidents / hot spots. Escort boat being arranged for Nigerian port approaches. Armed team being employed onboard during stay off Lome and Cotonou. Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) working on implementation of earlier proposed ‘Deep Blue project’ which aims to provide security solutions within the Nigerian maritime domain to all vessels. As a temporary measure Nigerian navy armed team being employed onbd during Lagos anchorage stay.

Horn of Africa (Red Sea / Gulf of Aden / Arabian Sea): There was no report of piracy incident during the month. Hijacking

Approach

Attack

Nil

Gulf of Guinea / West Africa: There was no reported hijacking and activities were relatively low during the month. Hijacking

Kidnap / Ransom

Attack / Robbery

Nil

Southeast Asia: 05 boarding incidents were reported in the area- 02 each were in Singapore TSS and at Manila anchorage.

Hijacking

Attacks / Boarding / ArmedRobbery

Nil

Based on the current situation and the continued threat from pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, Danish National ISPS Coordination Authority has instructed Danish vessels to operate at ISPS Level 2 in the Gulf of Guinea. **Major conflict Areas in Appendix.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Fleet Group Management

- Dry Docking and Planned Maintenance By Luis Aranha. Dry Docking Dry docking is a critical milestone during the lifetime of a vessel. Maersk Tankers has for many years used the Dock Plan program to prepare dry dock specifications for sending out to yards worldwide and obtaining quotes to decide on which yards to use. Quotations from yards and vessel trading pattern and job scope were key factors in deciding on which yard to use for the repairs. Currently, 2 docking programs are being evaluated for the functionalities, these being • ShipNet Docking module • VesselMan. Both are cloud-based programmes and are also available as a native application on a mobile or tablet. ShipNet docking module is an intuitive program that communicates with the vessel Planned maintenance program. Docking Module is very friendly and does not require any special training for using it. The module has been used effectively for: •

•

Preparing specifications and sending out to yards o Specifications can be built up from scratch, uploaded from a Dock Plan export file, created from a template, or copied from another project (sister vessel). Obtaining quotations from yard o Yard comparison divides Yard quotes into Specification groups and easy to compare yards prices and decide. Providing daily progress reports o Daily reports are created from dock module and can be personalized as per preferences, to contain cost overviews, Gantt chart, Important specification updates (drag and drop), Statement of facts, meeting notes, attachments Providing an easy to view cost update for management.

• • •

Generating completion reports for both internal and external stakeholders, when required. Linking purchase orders from procurement within the module Linking with vessel Planned Maintenance system (PMS)

One of the key functions of the SN docking module is, that if a work order has been imported into the docking module from a dry dock work package, the work order can be closed in the PMS if required from within the docking module. All attachments and work summary that has been included when completing the job in the docking module will replicate in SN PMS. Dry Dock Work Package in ShipNet PMS (Refer L0406 in SN Library) Vessels are required to maintain a dry-dock work package within ShipNet PMS. A well-executed and maintained drydock work package assists both vessel and technical superintendent in keeping track of and planning repairs at next upcoming docking. Both scheduled jobs and unscheduled jobs shall be included in the drydock work package.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Detailing relevant information in the work order when including it in the dry-dock work package will reduce the workload for both vessel and superintendent when preparing the specifications in the module. The more information that is provided to yards, helps in getting more accurate quotes from yards and we don’t end up with hidden costs when the job is undertaken by shipyard

A document with the relevant information can be added to the work order as per above. Tanker Management Self-Assessment (TMSA) and Dry Dock TMSA requires that the company has a formal system to develop dry-dock specifications, which involves collaboration between the vessel and shore management, there is increased focus during recent TMSA audits on compliance with this requirement. Compliance can be effectively demonstrated with use of dry-dock packages in vessel PMS.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Fleet Group Management

- Biofuel trial on the Maersk Capri By Jasween Kaur, Marius lasca, Michael Dellgren, Andrey Shpodaris We are pleased to announce that Maersk Capri has successfully completed the first Biofuel operational trial in Maersk Tankers. The fuel was supplied at Amsterdam by our strategic partner Cargill. This second-generation Fatty Acid Methyl Ester (FAME) biofuel blend was made from a sustainable advanced feed stock (Spent bleaching earth) that meets the definition of waste or residue according to Renewable Energy Directive (RED) standards and came duly documented by a POS (proof of sustainability) from supplier. The B30 blend consisted of 70% regular VLSFO and 30% FAME. The key objective of this in-service test was to gain experience with the behavior of the fuel and to collect verifiable data. To further demonstrate the usage of Biofuel blends, do not have any negative impact on the performance of the engines, the reliability of the operation and fuel handling is equally good or better than VLSFO. The collected knowledge will enable us to develop standard procedures for the future Biofuel trials and general usage. No adverse effects to equipment or machinery have been observed. No modification to the engine or infrastructure was required. As per OEM (Original Equipment Maker) guidance, no change of settings on the MAN ME-C Engine was necessary, which means that these Biofuels can conveniently be used as a ‘drop in fuel’. In the preparations for the trial, the project team worked closely with the OEM and fuel specialists for advisory, agreement and support. One important task in the pre-planning phase was to obtain acceptance from the Flag State Administration, in this case Danish Maritime Authority prior to conducting the trials. The permit was granted and issued by DMA on 16th July in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 3.2

The RA plan included:        

A comprehensive Risk Assessment Plan was also developed in collaboration with all involved stakeholders. The RA plan contained established mitigation measures required for safe handling of the blended Biofuel in Maersk Tankers.

Bunker tank preparations Fuel system preparations Sample handling and instructions Monitoring equipment testing Main and auxiliary engine inspections Spare inventory and stores replenishment Lubricants monitoring and shore analysis Microbial analysis.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

On 16th July 2021, Maersk Capri, bunkered 118.9 MT of B30 during her call at Amsterdam. Consumption started on the 24th July and continued until the 29th July 2021. The sea trial was performed during a laden Transatlantic passage, enroute to Corpus Christi, USA, Biofuel was consumed on the Main Engine, Auxiliary Engine #3 and Composite Boiler. Main Engine and Auxiliary Engine trials over a period of 13 days, performance was measured at least once a day, according to the trial performance program. Main Engine performance tests were taken as close as possible to 25%, 50%, 75% and NCR loads, followed by similar tests on traditional VLSFO fuels for Back-to-back comparison and verification. During this period a comprehensive set of data was collected including fuel consumption measurements to determine the combustion properties and energy efficiency of the Biofuel blend.

Figure 1- Fuel consumption figures for VSLFO and B30.

If a comparison between the two fuels is to be drawn, then a slight increase in consumption could be detected when operating on Biofuel. This was as expected, due to the lower energy content. However, the differences are limited and the consumption measurements involve a certain variance, why no conclusion can be made. This identifies the benefits in terms of CO2 savings achieved by operating on Biofuel is to come from the methodology, rather than the direct emissions. According to Cargill’s calculations a potential 22% CO2 saving is achieved, if the RED (Renewable European Directive) methodology is going to be adapted by IMO. Throughout the trial period, no irregular signs of improper combustion were sighted from the funnel. The long-term stability, degradation and potential microbial growth is going to be established by studying a set of samples stored on board for over the next 6 months.

Figure 2- Properties of VLSFO and B30 fuels

Acknowledgements Maersk Tankers would like to express gratitude to Cargill and Maersk Product Tankers in supporting the successful Biofuel trial on the Maersk Capri. The Project Team is grateful for the dedicated assistance rendered by the crew, in preparing the vessel and the comprehensive collection of valuable data. Ship Details Ship’s Name: Maersk Capri (Oil / Chemical Tanker) Call Sign: OZCN2 IMO No.: 9786140 Port of registry: Svendborg Class/Flag: LR/ DIS Deadweight: 49919, GRT: 29816 Main engine Make/ Type: MAN B&W Diesel STX Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., 2-Stroke, 6G50ME-C9.5 Diesel Generator Engine Make/ Type: 6L23/30H MAN B&W Stx Engine Co., Ltd– 3 sets

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Regulatory

By Jai Kumar Alimchandani Non-compliance with regulations is not an option. This can result in expensive fines and penalties for the Company as well as possible prison sentences for staff at sea and ashore. When any vessel is in doubt regarding regulations or procedures, they shall contact relevant shore departments. If necessary, these concerns may be escalated through management levels. Whenever required, regulatory affairs will be consulted. To reiterate, Maersk Tankers has a zero-tolerance policy towards non-compliance. The UK MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) issued its report on the investigation of the cargo tank explosion and fire on board the chemical tanker Stolt Groenland in Ulsan, Republic of Korea on 28 September 2019. The investigation was done by the MAIB on behalf of the Cayman Islands Government, the vessels Flag Administration. Quoted below is the Synopsis & the Conclusions of the investigation. The full report can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/maibreports/cargo-tank-explosion-and-fire-on-chemicaltanker-stolt-groenland Quote (Emphasis added) SYNOPSIS On 28 September 2019, a cargo tank containing styrene monomer on board the Cayman Islands registered chemical tanker Stolt Groenland ruptured causing an explosion and fire. The tanker was moored alongside a general cargo berth in Ulsan, Republic of Korea and the Singapore registered chemical tanker Bow Dalian was moored outboard. The ignition of the styrene monomer vapour resulted in a fireball, which reached the road bridge above. Both vessels were damaged, and two crew suffered minor injuries. Fifteen emergency responders were injured during the fire-fighting, which lasted for over 6 hours.

The rupture of the styrene monomer tank resulted from a runaway polymerisation that was initiated by elevated temperatures caused by heat transfer from other chemical cargoes. The elevated temperatures caused the inhibitor, added to prevent the chemical’s polymerisation during the voyage, to deplete more rapidly than expected. Although the styrene monomer had not been stowed directly adjacent to heated cargo, the potential for heat transfer through intermediate tanks was not fully appreciated or assessed. Critical temperature limits had been reached before the vessel berthed under the road bridge in Ulsan. The tanker’s crew did not monitor the temperature of the styrene monomer during the voyage, and therefore were not aware of the increasingly dangerous situation. A similar dangerous styrene monomer polymerisation incident had occurred a couple of weeks earlier on board another Stolt Tankers B.V. ship, Stolt Focus. The heat generated by the polymerisation process was noticed before the critical runaway temperature was reached. The styrene monomer cargoes on board both tankers was loaded at a similar time from the same tank in Houston and were exposed to similar environmental conditions. The incident on board Stolt Focus was not reported to the ship’s Flag State or other masters in the Stolt Tankers B.V. fleet. Following the accident, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Republic of Korea, prohibited ship-to-ship transfer operations for dangerous cargo on general cargo berths in Ulsan. Stolt Tankers B.V. took immediate action to ensure that the temperatures of all cargoes carried on board its ships were monitored and reported to its shore management. It also took steps to enhance crew awareness on the hazards of inhibited and heat sensitive cargoes. The company is developing technological and administrative initiatives to assist with the safe stowage and monitoring of heat sensitive cargoes. A recommendation has been made to Stolt Tankers B.V. aimed at ensuring the wider marine chemical sector benefits from the lessons learned from the Stolt Focus incident and research initiatives that were carried out as a result of this accident. Recommendations have also been made to the Cayman Island Shipping Registry, the Chemical Distribution Institute and Plastics Europe (Styrene Producers Association). These are intended to assist in ensuring that the guidance provided in certificates of inhibitor and styrene monomer handling guides is consistent and achievable given the limitations of equipment and testing facilities on board ships.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Figure 5: CCTV still showing vapour ignition SECTION 3 – CONCLUSIONS 3.1 SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The explosion and fire on board Stolt Groenland resulted from the runaway polymerisation of the styrene monomer cargo in cargo tank 9S. [2.2] 2. The polymerisation of the styrene monomer in 9S was initiated by the cargo’s elevated temperature for much of the voyage, which reduced the effectiveness of the TBC inhibitor. [2.3, 2.6] 3. The elevated temperature of the styrene monomer in 9S resulted from the transfer of heat from the HMD cargo in the port side tanks, via the adiponitrile cargo in 9C. [2.4] 4. The precaution of not stowing the styrene monomer next to the heated HMD cargo was not sufficient in meeting the adequate segregation requirement of the IBC Code.[2.7] 5. The probability of heat being transferred from the HMD cargo tanks to the styrene monomer cargo was not fully considered during the planning and approval of the cargo stowage. [2.7] 6. Calculations to predict heat transfer during cargo stowage planning were not conducted because they were complex and outside the capabilities of the ship operator and the tanker’s crew. They were also outside the scope of the cargo stowage software. [2.7] 7. Instructions and guidance were clear that inhibited cargoes should not be stowed adjacent to heated cargoes, but the likelihood of heat transfer through adjacent or intermediate cargo tanks was not covered in detail. [2.7]

8. Despite being a requirement in Stolt Groenland’s SMS, the temperature of the styrene monomer was not monitored, and the temperature alarms available on the cargo monitoring system were not set. The crew also either did not notice, or did not recognise the significance of, the elevated temperatures of the cargoes discharged in Kobe and Ulsan. [2.8] 9. The absence of temperature monitoring of the styrene monomer was influenced by the crew’s view that it was a benign cargo when inhibited, and that no previous problems or difficulties with its carriage had been experienced. [2.8] 3.2 SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The actions to be taken on encountering elevated temperatures in the styrene monomer cargo on board Stolt Groenland, which were stated on the certificate of inhibitor, were not viable. The crew had no means of testing for TBC concentration or polymers, and no additional TBC was carried. [2.9] 2. Given the proximity of Yeomp Quay to Ulsan and the Ulsan Bridge, and the toxic smoke that was emitted from the explosion and fire on board, the potential consequences to the surrounding environment were severe. [2.10] 3.3 OTHER SAFETY ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT

NOT

DIRECTLY

1. In not reporting or alerting other tanker masters to a similar polymerisation incident that occurred 2 weeks earlier, an opportunity was lost to prevent this accident. [2.11] Unquote

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Crewing

By Rita Kollar Pomford The Marine HR Team in Copenhagen is ‘back’! We are pleased to inform that we have a full team again in CPH assisting our Scandinavian seafarers. The team consist of Ingrid, Marine HR Specialist who is now back full time – and whom most of you already know as she has been part of the team for the last few years, undersigned Marine HR Manager, Rita (joined MT in June) and Marine HR Specialist Preety (previously part of the Recruitment & Training team) who started in our team here in August and is supporting us from India I have now been in the company for 2 months and enjoy very much being back in the ‘Maersk family’ and look forward to get to know our seafarers better and assist in all HR related matters. One of the main tasks of our team is cadet recruitment which we continue to focus on, relationship building with DMA, Danish Shipping and the respective local seafarer Unions and assist both the crew and the crewing team with Danish related legislation.

With our little team fully in place and the good cooperation established with our colleagues in India, Philippines and Singapore – we hope that we can close the gap that might have been experienced earlier this year due to no presence in the CPH office. Together with our crewing colleagues we are here to assist you and we look forward to a continuous good cooperation please don’t hesitate to reach out to us and if you happen to be in Copenhagen please come by the office and say hi!

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Procurement By Frederik Pind

Tools being incorrectly requested from local chandlers •

Issue - It has been observed that tools are often requested in the same requisition which is created for Engine consumables. The request is sent to the local Chandlers as the consumables are normally supplied by them and invariably they then supply the tools too. This should not happen.

•

Next Steps - Please raise a separate requisition for tools as we have an exclusive agreement with a European vendor (Lemvigh Muller A/S) for supply of the same. All the tools offered by the vendor have been vetted for quality and chances of bad quality tools being supplied is remote.

•

Best Practice - Please use the following guideline for assistance:

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Technology & Innovation EEXI & CII – By Mads Wagner

New international regulations now in force to lower carbon emissions from ships For the shipping industry to take it’s part in lowering carbon emissions, IMO at the last held MEPC in June, agreed on regulations which will enter into force by January 1st 2023. The regulations are divided into two steps and will apply on individual vessel basis. Step one is to have your vessel certified with regards to EEXI – Energy Efficiency of Existing Ships. If you do not get this certification you are not allowed to trade your vessel after January 1st 2023. EEXI explained in brief, is that based on the relationship between the vessel speed and power you will get a certain EEXI rating. When this rating is below the threshold limit you are all good. If you are above the limit you basically have two options; either you install energy saving devices to reduce the required power or you “permanently” reduce your installed power. The word “permanently “ I will explain a bit later. Step two is an annual monitoring of the carbon emissions (Carbon Intensity Indicator, CII) of the vessel from 2023. CII is a measure how energy efficient you operate your vessel. Your vessel will be given a score A to E, where A is the best. If you get D or E you are required to take action to keep your vessel operating. As the threshold limit decrease by 2% every year, your vessel will gradually get a worse and worse rating in case it is operated constantly. After 2026 IMO has yet to decide the annual reduction rates. Explained in other words…. EEXI is your ticket to the game Once you show your EEXI ticket at the entrance your CII performance will determine your seat The question is of course how will this affect our fleet and do we need to prepare. In EEXI aspect it is a problem that our remaining fleet after the recent sales is quite old and for this reason not very energy efficient. For newer vessels “the eco vessels” like classes T- ,C, S- and the BP vessels all fitted with the MAN ultra-long stroke engines and highly efficient propellers, we will have no problem to obtain EEXI certification and the vessels can keep trading at the current NCR after 2023. Our older vessels, on the other hand face a massive engine power limitation in case we do nothing – for most vessels between 20% and 40% and the limitation will be “permanent” meaning you have a physical blocking of engine power. An engine power limitation of such magnitude, will affect the operational profiles of the

vessel if traded as today. By installing energy saving devices we can decrease the engine power limitation required, but not to an extent where we can completely avoid it. The challenge for the remaining fleet with regards to retrofitting energy saving devices is the “Dynamic Fleet” strategy. The horizon of the “Dynamic Fleet” is short and it works against any long-term emission reductions - when a vessel is up for sale it will never be a good financial investment installing energy saving devices unless a new Owner is willing to pay a premium for the vessel. The increased focus from our management cutting emissions, we hope will lead to an increased appetite for energy saving retrofits as well as carbon neutral new buildings. Reading the above it should be clear that EEXI can hit us hard, where it seems the annual CII rating until 2026 will be less troublesome if we continue to operate the vessel as we do today. Ending with an example to visualize the impact of EEXI and CII, let’s look at our good vessel Karen Maersk. Today “Karen” has an MCR of 9,480 kW, an NCR of 8,058 kW and a service speed of about 15.2 knots. To comply with EEXI, “Karen” will need an engine power limitation to about 5,900 KW and the new service speed will be around 13.8 knots. Do we choose to install energy saving devices which reduce the required power by 10%, which will be a considerable retrofit investment in the range above USD 500k, the new engine power limitation will be increased to about 6,400 kW and the service speed will be about 14.6 knots. With regards to CII “Karen”, will perform well until 2026 when she is operated as today as illustrated below. Vessel Karen Maersk

2023 B

2024 B

2025 C

2026 C

In the end the individual acceptable engine power limitation is first and foremost a commercial decision how much can we accept that the top speed of our vessels drop? In this respect it is important to state that any engine power limitation must never impair the safety of the crew and the vessel, by not having sufficient power installed to navigate safely in adverse weather conditions.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

EEOI - By Kartikey Singh Update on EEOI for July’21:

Vessel Count

Segment

Average EEOI

AER

Fleet

12.79

5.87

Inter

31.19

14.47

Handy

17.62

8.21

11.86

5.20

LR2

7.61

3.60

Key Highlights: 1. Handy and Intermediate segments have a stable score as compared to Jun’21. 2. MR segment has a slight decline in EEOI due to reduction in CO2 emitted compared to a slight rise in Tonne-mile. 3. LR2 Segment has a slight decline in EEOI. This can be attributed to a higher increase in Tonne-mile as compared to CO2 emitted. 4. Overall, Fleet EEOI has reduced by 0.75% compared to June’21 resulting in a 28.7% CO2 reduction YTD.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

MT in the Media By Ketan Rane

Bro Nibe seen with only Boot-Top and Topside coating intact

Maersk Tangier with good hull condition except few deck run offs seen causing stains

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Congratulatory

By Shashank Jahagirdar

MTTO July list 2021 Sr No. CREW ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

•

First Names

Last Name

Rank

3043168

Rakesh

Dahiya

CPT

3043240

Parveen

Kumar

C/E

3033383

Latt

Aung Zin

3/E

3043525

Samusevs

Olegs

3/E

3043817

Campean

Adrian

2/E

3043535

Rasputin

Dmitry

E/E

103750

Vladimir

Markovic

C/O

Years Completed in MT 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years

NOTE : It is possible that there could be omission of some name in the above list due recent data migration to new Compas system, in such cases we request you to send an email to : onkar.bhosale@maersktankers.com with your name, APM ID and Anniversary details.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Out of the blue We strongly encourage reader’s sharing of best practices, feedback, suggestions, and constructive criticism from our fleet. This section was formerly known as

‘Reader’s Corner’,

however it remained underutilized.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Appendix

Security By Pradeep Balakrishnan Major Conflict Areas GULF OF OMAN/ ARABIAN GULF: Vessels to continue with precautions in view of ongoing conflict in Arabian Gulf/ Gulf of Oman. There have been reports of some vessels getting intercepted by Iranian forces (IRGC) in Gulf of Oman / Strait of Hormuz region. On 29th / 30th July, product tanker ‘Mercer Street’ was hit by drones (explosive Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) while transiting in international waters off the coast of Oman. Ship’s master (Romanian citizen) and a security guard (UK citizen) were killed in the incident. The vessel was later met and escorted under her own power by an US Navy vessel. As per some reports, Iran may be responsible, particularly as the vessel is Israeli owned. Iran has denied the accusations. LIBYA: Intermittent clashes between Government of National Accord (GNA)-allied militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA) take place at some areas. For past many weeks, an interim Government of National Unity (GU) led by Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, is working to implement UN-backed mandate, which includes preparing for parliamentary elections due in December 2021. Stakeholders to the Libyan conflict have made no notable progress in reaching an agreement over Libya’s national budget or the legal and constitutional framework required to govern the upcoming December elections. These deadlocks are largely indicative of a lack of political will among members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and Libya’s parliament. The UN has accused unspecified Libyan factions of attempting to obstruct the preparation of elections. Offshore migrant activity continued to be high. According to International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the number of migrants dying at sea has doubled in the first half of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020. The increase in migration has been attributed to squalid conditions and overcrowding at onshore Libyan detention centres.

Merchant vessels remain at risk of being called upon to assist in SAR operations. Merchant vessels undertaking SAR operations face severe delays, for calling ports with migrants onboard including refusal to enter European destinations, due to COVID-19 concerns. Also, there are various legal, regulatory and security concerns associated- including physical safety concerns to crew associated with migrant behaviour onboard. Maersk Tanker vessels may be permitted to call some Libyan ports - basis evaluation of latest security reports and legal clearance. Also, Owner’s approval required due to safety concerns and probable delays if involved in migrant’s SAR. Service of remote security consultant being utilized during vessel’s stay in Libyan waters. YEMEN: The conflict situation continues. A Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries, backed by Western states, continues its military intervention in a bid to restore control of the country to internationally recognized President/ Government. All vessels attempting to enter Yemeni ports will face postponements and multiple inspections causing delays. In view of combined maritime threats, including possible mines, vessels are advised to use the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) and to avoid proximity to the western and southern Yemenis shore while transiting Red sea. The plan of cease fire/ withdrawal of forces from Hodeidah City (basis UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement Dec’18), getting delayed continually. The security threat rating in the port of Hodeidah continues to be ‘Extreme’ and port call is on ban for MT vessels. Maersk Tanker vessels may be allowed to call other Yemenis ports, on case to case basis depending on the prevailing situation and by arranging advisory service.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Appendix

Vetting - Knowledge Sharing By Naveen Kumar Inspection Date: Between 01 July 2021 and 31 July 2021

SIRE VIQ-7 Medium Risk Observations  4. Navigation and Communications 4.15 Is the master and deck officers’ familiar with the safety parameter settings for the ECDIS and have the safety settings been correctly applied for the vessels passage? Inspector Observations: For the previous port of Bonny, the vessel crossed the set safety contour of 20 meters (safety depth and safety contour calculated at 13 meters). There were no lines drawn round the safety depth values as per the operator ECDIS procedures. The bridge team were unaware of this function on the ECDIS (LDL - Limiting Danger Line). Owners Comments: The vessel proceeded outbound Bonny Offshore Terminal via dredged Deepwater channel, and then crossed the safety contour just prior to the fairway buoy and pilot disembarkation. The ECDIS safety parameters were correctly set. TRANSAS ECDIS doesn’t support LDL functionality, and this was explained to the inspector. However the area of inspector’s concern was marked as a “no-go” area, the XTD & Safety Frame was properly adjusted for the channel, echo sounder was operational and risk assessment for crossing safety contour was completed as per operators SMS 05.003.05. 4.15 Is the master and deck officers’ familiar with the safety parameter settings for the ECDIS and have the safety settings been correctly applied for the vessels passage? Inspector Observations: For the arrival port of Dublin, the vessel crossed the set safety contour of 20 meters (set at 12meters). The operator' s procedures did not give clear guidance for either method 1 or method 2 as per NP 232 for crossing the safety contour and only gave guidance for requiring a height of tide window.

Owners Comments: The passage plan for the last voyage was comprehensively prepared by our Navigating Officer, ensuring that the safety of navigation is observed at all times. Crossing the safety contours is covered in our procedure and only permitted during approaches / departures after a risk assessment and with the presence of the Master on the Bridge, which is being observed religiously. Vessel assessed both methods as described in NP232, both had associated hazards, and there is no definitive recommendation on how to proceed safely therefore it was concluded that our present navigational procedure is adequate. 

9. Mooring

9.5 Do all mooring lines and where fitted, mooring tails, meet Industry guidelines? Inspector Observations: Ship's design MBL was 68.1 tons. LDBF for 2 wires was 72.9 tons and 8 wires was 82.3 tons which were not 100-105% of Ship design MBL. Owners Comments: As per operators' procedures the retirement criteria for steel wire ropes warrant replacement to be carried out as per OCIMF MEG 4 guidelines, at intervals not exceeding 60 months, the wires which have been highlighted herein were ordered and received onboard whilst MEG3 was still being conformed to. Please note that the vessel was delivered in May 2008 which predates MEG4 requirements. The vessel has a total of 18 Mooring wires in service of which 8 have already been replaced and are MEG 4 compliant, planning for replacement of the remaining wires is already in place. : A thorough risk assessment is in place for working with the highlighted high-power mooring lines and all crew have been briefed about the same until issue has been fully rectified.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Low Risk Observations 

2. Certification and Documentation 2.6 Does the Master review the safety management system, report to the operator on any deficiencies and does the operator respond to the Master's review? Inspector Observations: Vessel's Master was required to carry out a review of a section of SMS once a month and the complete SMS review was to be completed in a year. Last monthly review was completed on 23 June 2021. The last monthly review did not contain any positive/ negative comments without any material substance. Owners Comments: Our SMS is divided into various Elements & to comply with the ISM code our procedures require the Master to review one element of the onboard Safety Management System every month. The results of the review and any suggestions for changes are reported to the company under the master’s review section within the Monthly Safety Committee Meeting module, these inputs from vessels are collected by Marine Standards and distributed to the appropriate functions within the organization for further evaluation. The safety committee meeting minutes for May 2021, detailing the master’s review for element 06 ‘Cargo, ballast and mooring’ were shared with the inspector wherein suggestions were made and the company’s response to the same were brought to the inspector’s attention. VIQ mentions that there should be evidence of positive/negative feedback within the master’s review, & that this should be carried out at least once in 12 months, our SMS is reviewed monthly we consider this as an ongoing process and believe that there may not be productive feedback available every month, warranting comments or suggestions. We appreciate the inspector’s opinion, however, feel that this observation is subject to the inspector’s subjective interpretation of requirements.

PORT STATE CONTROL (2018) 1ST EDITION (2018) Port: Novorossiysk, Russia MOU: Black Sea 16105 Access control to ship Inspector Observation: ISPS code required Anchor cover and anchor ball missing Owners Comments: Vessel was alongside terminal 7, safely moored with stbd side anchor in water as per terminal requirement. After mooring completed, anchor cover was not in use. However as vessel was moored alongside, master did not deem necessary to put up anchor ball as day signal. Hawse pipe cover placed, and day signal was hoisted immediately. Meeting was held with all crew to create awareness with the observation and corrective action taken to avoid recurrence. Responsible officer to ensure that hawse pipe cover and anchor ball is hoisted upon vessel berthing with anchor down.

July 2021 MTTO Newsletter

Port Information

Puerto Castilla, Honduras By Satish Singh Puerto Castilla is located on the N shore of Bahia de Trujillo, approx. 2nm SE of Cabo de Honduras Light.

General overview: The harbour is situated inside Cape Honduras and affords natural protection on three sides with an opening to the W, with mostly no swell. One modern berth of length 225m with a max draught of 10.5m is used for all operations.

The port is not equipped with any tugs and berthing/ unberthing operations are carried out by using offshore anchor and without tugs. The vessel approaches berth at 30 deg. Angle. When vessel is 40m from berth starboard anchor is dropped to 3 shackles and 2 headline and stern line are passed ashore.

Planning The key to any port approach is planning. Both anchors should be tested whether they are free to let go, maintenance required if any like greasing of gypsy and guide roller, checking of windlass brakes, are carried out prior port approach. Part of the passage plan and/or pilot exchange is to discuss how anchors will be used to control vessel drift.

Dredging anchors A dredging anchor will hold the bow steady while allowing a ship to move forward or aft. A bow anchor can be dredged from a ship going forward or astern. The advantages of dredging an anchor when moving forward are principally that the ship’s pivot point moves to the position of the hawse pipe and, to overcome the anchor’s drag, propulsive power is used giving good steering at low speed.